Magno V Comelec

Facts:

Private respondent Carlos Montes filed for the disqualification of petitioner as

candidate for the office of mayor for the 2001 elections. His petition was based on the ground that the
latter was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. That the latter was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to
1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct
bribery. Subsequently, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order
of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Comelec rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent and held that petitioner was disqualified for running for the office of mayor based on sec. 12
of the Omnibus election code which provides that “Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18)
months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty. That “The disqualifications to be a
candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.” According to the
Comelec, as per the provision, the disqualification of the candidate shall be lifted only after 5 years
from the service of sentence. But, Inasmuch as petitioner was considered to have completed the service
of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. Petitioner
contends that direct bribery is not a crime of moral turpitude and that it is the Local Government Code
that is applicable in his case, specifically sec. 40, which provides that a person, running for a local position
shall be disqualified when he is sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence. That he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from
probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local
Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001
elections. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON petitioner is disqualified to run for office.
Held:
No, Petitioner is not disqualified to run for the office of mayor. The SC ruled that on the apparent
conflict between the Omnibus election code and the Local Gov’t Code, the latter must prevail for it
succeeded the latter, in accordance with statutory in case of irreconcilable conflict between two
laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will.[
 Miranda v. Carreon
Facts:
Amelita Navarro succeeded the position of herein petitioner as vice-mayor, as the
latter has been suspended. Navarro appointed some of the respondents for various positions in the city
government. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the
City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB), which was created pursuant to Republic Act No.
7160. Such appointments were also approved by the Civil Service Commission. When petitioner
reassumed office, he considered the PSPB irregular since the majority party, to which he belongs, was not
properly represented. He then formed a three-man special performance audit team to conduct a
personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those on
probation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted to him a report dated stating that
the respondents were found wanting in their performance. Petitioner then issued an order terminating
respondents’ services because they performed poorly during the probationary period. Respondents
appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on probation, they can be dismissed from the
service on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of six months, not after
three (3) months. They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their
dismissal from the service violated their right to due process. The CSC issued Resolution No. 982717
reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and ordering that respondents be reinstated to their former
positions with payment of backwages. Meanwhile, the COMELEC disqualified Mayor Jose Miranda as a
mayoralty candidate in the 1998 May elections. His son Joel G. Miranda, herein petitioner, substituted for
him and was proclaimed Mayor of Santiago City. He then filed a motion for reconsideration of the CSC
Resolution No. 982717 (in favor of respondents) but it was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 990557 dated
March 3, 1999. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review on certiorari, the Court
of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the CSC Resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but before it could be resolved by the Court of Appeals, several events supervened. This Court, in Joel G.
Miranda vs. Antonio M. Abaya and the COMELEC, set aside the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor of
Santiago City for lack of a certificate of candidacy and declared Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro as City Mayor
by operation of law. Mayor Navarro filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Withdraw the Motion for
Reconsideration (previously submitted by former Mayor Joel G. Miranda). The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of its Decision. On June 11, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted
Mayor Navarro’s Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration. In effect, the CSC Resolution
reinstating respondents to their positions stays. Hence, petitioner Joel G. Miranda contends before the SC
that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the CSC Resolution declaring that the termination of
respondents services is illegal and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions with payment of
backwages. In their comment, respondents claim that since petitioner ceased to be Mayor of Santiago
City, he has no legal personality to file the instant petition and, therefore, the same should be dismissed.
Issue:

WON former mayor Miranda can still file the petition for motion for reconsideration

Held:

No. The SC ruled that Miranda has no legal standing in his former petition for his motion
for reconsideration anymore. The SC based their ruling upon Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that when a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and
during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and
maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such
time as may be granted by the Court, it is satisfactorily shown by any party that there is substantial need
for continuing or maintaining it and the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue
the action of his predecessor. The SC ruled It is clear from the Rule that when petitioner ceased to be
mayor of Santiago City, the action may be continued and maintained by his successor, Mayor Amelita
Navarro, if there is substantial need to do so. But Mayor Navarro found no substantial need to continue
and maintain the action of her predecessor in light of the CSC Resolution declaring that respondents
services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In fact, she filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (lodged by petitioner). She likewise
reinstated all the respondents to their respective positions and approved the payment of their salaries. In
conclusion, the SC held that petitioner, not being a real party in interest, has no legal personality to file
this petition. Besides, his motion for reconsideration was validly withdrawn by the incumbent Mayor.
Even assuming he is a real party in interest, they see no reason to disturb the findings of both the CSC and
the Court of Appeals. The reinstatement of respondents who, unfortunately, were victims of political
bickerings, was found by the SC to be in order.
 Moreno v COMELEC

Facts:
Private respondent Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running
for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four months and One day to two
years and Four months by the Regional Trial Court in 1998. Petitioner argued that the petition lacks
cause of action for he was already granted probation. He also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation
Law, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial
court in December, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he
lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the 2002 elections. The
case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing
wherein after due proceedings, he was found to be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay. The
first division of COMELEC, as well as the COMELEC en banc, also adopted the same decision. The
COMELEC en banc stated that Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and end two years thence. The grant of probation
to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office. Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local
Government Code take precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the
Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials. Petitioner argues before the SC that the disqualification under
the Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to
probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly
be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election
as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct. The OSG filed a
comment and argued that the SC in Dela Torre v. Comelec, definitively settled a similar controversy by
ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted
probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains
totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

Issue: WON petitioner is qualified for office

Held: Yes, the SC ruled for the eligibility of petitioner to run for office. In accordance to the OSG’s
comment the SC ruled that the Dela Torre v. Comelec case is not squarely applicable with the case at bar.
That their pronouncement therein that the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of
which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this
case. At any rate, the phrase within two years after serving sentence should have been interpreted and
understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by
one year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase
modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared
that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. The SC held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of
the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the
grant of probation. That it appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office
is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period
of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. The SC agreed
with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government
Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not
expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
statute.
 Fermin v COMELEC
Facts:
After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan, the Regional Assembly of the ARMM, passed
Autonomy Act No. 205, creating the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new
municipality was constituted by separating Barangays. Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was
a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the
transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North
Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006,] formally making Barangay Indatuan a
component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the
transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter of Barangay Indatuan, Northern
Kabuntalan. On March 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern
Kabuntalan in the May 2007 National and Local Elections. On April 2007, private respondent Dilangalen,
another mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition for Disqualification against Fermin, alleging that the
petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in
his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record. Elections were held without any decision being
rendered by the COMELEC in the said case, Dilangalen won against Fermin. The latter subsequently filed
an election protest with the RTC of Cotobato City. In June 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, disqualified
Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is
a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin
could not have been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed
the Division's ruling. Petitioner resorted to the SC. During the pendency of his petition, Dilangalen filed,
with the RTC of Cotabato a motion to dismiss the Election Case against him on the ground that Fermin
had no legal standing to file the said protest, the COMELEC En Banc having already affirmed his
disqualification as a candidate; and this Court, in the abovementioned case, did not issue an order
restraining the implementation of the assailed COMELEC resolutions. The RTC, however, denied such
petition. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court remained steadfast in its stand that the election
protest was separate and distinct from the COMELEC proceedings, and that, unless restrained by the
proper authority, it would continue hearing the protest. The COMELEC set aside such ruling. The COMELEC
en banc denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the divisions ruling on account of Fermins
failure to pay the required fees and it further directed the issuance of an entry of judgment in the said
case. On March 2008, the judgement became final, hence petitioner filed a petition for certiorari again,
before this court.

Issue: WON the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC
WON Fermin has a standing as a candidate

Held: The SC held that what is piivotal in this case is the ascertainment of the timeliness of the Dilangalen
petition is its proper characterization.

As aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the Dilangalen petition was filed pursuant to Section
78 of the OEC; while private respondent counters that the same is based on Section 68 of the Code. he
Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section
78[33] of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a Section 78 petition, namely: (1) the
candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter
which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he
filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive
the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.[34] It likewise appropriately raises a question on
a candidates eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the one-year residency requirement
under the law. Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation
that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section
78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional[35] and statutory[36] provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate.[37] Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253[38] of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate,[39] with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining candidate.
The court stressed that a Section 78 petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a Section 68
petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities.
Private respondents insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-
372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a Petition for
Disqualification, does not persuade the Court. The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin
allegedly lacked one of the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not
established residence in the said locality for at least one year immediately preceding the election. Failure
to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the disqualification
of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification. Considering
that the Dilangalen petition does not state any of the grounds for disqualification stated in either sec. 12
of the oec or sec 14 of the lgc, it cannot be categorized as a Section 68 petition.

The SC ruled in emphasis that a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section
12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that
is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Having thus
determined that the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 78 of the OEC, the Court now declares that
the same has to comply with the 25-day statutory period for its filing. The record in these cases reveals
that Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections on March 29, 2007.[58] It is clear therefore that the petition to deny due course to or cancel
Fermins CoC was filed by Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary period. However, the Court finds
the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately declared that Fermin was not a
resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said elections. The SC ruled that
COMELEC relied only on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a resident
of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before
Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a
finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to
the May 14, 2007 elections.[61] Petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as
of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his
subsequent claim that he complied with the residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner
could have transferred to BarangayIndatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006. Neither does
this evidence support the allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for
the transfer of his voting record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. In conclusion, the SC ruled
that the COMELECs order for the dismissal of Fermins election protest is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, considering that the same is premised on Fermins alleged lack of legal standing to file the
protest, which, in turn, is based on Fermins alleged lack of residency qualification. That the Dilangalen
petition should be dismissed, a disquisition that Fermin has no standing as a candidate would be reckless
and improper.
 Velasco v. COMELEC

Facts:

Velasco was born in San Antonio, Pampanga in 1952. In 1983, he moved to and
worked in the United States of America where he subsequently became a citizen. Sometime in 2006,
Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. His application was approved in July 2006. On the same day, he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006 and has not left since, except for
a 3-day Hongkong trip. In October 2006, applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The
Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his application. Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his
name in the list of voters with the MTC. The MTC, found that Velasco had not changed his domicile, so
they granted his petition and ordered Velascos inclusion in the List of Voters of Sasmuan. The RTC,
however,reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision. The RTC reasoned out that Velasco lost his
domicile of origin [Sasmuan, Pampanga] when he became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws,
he could only stay in the Philippines as a visitor or as a resident alien. Velasco, according to the RTC, only
regained or reacquired his Philippine residency on July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino
citizenship. The RTC based this conclusion on our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that naturalization in
a foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Velasco appealed to the CA.
Subsequently, Velasco filed a CoC for the office of the mayor, claiming that he was a registered voter of
Sasmuan. He also executed an affidavit renouncing, abandoning, and relinquishing his American
citizenship. Respondent Panlaqui, who was also running for the office of mayor, filed a Petition to Deny
Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velascos CoC, claiming that Velasco is not a registered voter of
Precinct No. 103-A, as his name is not included in the list of voters; that RTC has rendered a decision
denying Velasco’s petition for inclusion as voter; that Velasco does not possess the constitutional
requirement of legal residency (i.e., one year residency in the Philippines immediately preceding the
election as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution) to register as voter; he arrived in the
Philippines only last September 14, 2006; and that Velasco is not eligible to run for office since he is not
a qualified voter. Petitioner denied the allegations of Panlaquis petition and claimed in defense that: he
possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan, as he is a domiciliary and permanent resident of the
Philippines and Sasmuan since birth; that, when he took his oath of allegiance on July 31, 2006, he is
considered not to have lost his Philippine citizenship and therefore continues to enjoy full civic and
political rights under the Constitution and the statutes; that the appeal or review of the RTC decision is
pending resolution with the Court of Appeals; that he did not act with malice, bad faith and gross
misrepresentation when he stated that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan in his
COC, as the MTC decision has not been reversed with finality; that he has renounced his American
citizenship on March 29, 2007 or prior to the filing of his COC, making him eligible to seek elective public
office pursuant to Republic Act No. 9255; and that he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan
and of a candidate for Municipal Mayor, Sasmuan being his domicile of origin and permanent
residence. He claimed that he is qualified to vote and seek public office until a final judgment is rendered
saying otherwise; hence, he did not commit any misrepresentation and Panlaqui’s petition should be
dismiss. Velasco garnered the most number of votes in the election. As the COMELEC failed to resolve
Panlaquis petition prior to the election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor of Sasmuan. He took his oath of
office and assumed the powers and functions of the office. The second divison of COMELEC issued a
resolution declaring petitioner’s proclamation as mayor, null and void. They found petitioner guilty of
material misrepresentation when he claimed in his COC filed that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan,
Pampanga. This defect, according to the Second Division, effectively voided Velascos CoC. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the second division and it
added that absent a writ or order issued by the CA, Section 138 of the OEC shall apply, making the decision
of the RTC final and executory. Hence the petition before the SC. The CA subsequently issued a decision,
reversing the decision of the RTC. It ruled that contrary to the RTCs finding, Velasco effectively reacquired
his residence when he decided to relocate in the Philippines for good in 2003; from 2003-2006, Velasco
stayed in the Philippines for a total of almost two years for the last three years immediately preceding the
May 2007 election; from the totality of these acts, Velasco revealed his intention to reacquire his rights
as a Filipino citizen. Citing Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, the CA considered Velasco a qualified
voter. The SC issued a status quo ante order enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the assailed
resolutions. However, In an interesting twist, the CA issued an Amended Decision in response to a motion
for reconsideration of its earlier decision dismissing Velascos Rule 42 petition for lack of jurisdiction. It
reversed its earlier ruling that it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, explicitly stating that the
jurisprudence it cited to support its appellate jurisdiction in voters inclusion/exclusion proceeding is no
longer good law because of the amendments to the election law on which its cited jurisprudence was
based. It declared that Section 138 of the OEC being explicit that the decision on appeal by the RTC in
inclusion and exclusion cases is immediately final and executory appears to be a clear mandate for this
Court (the CA) not to entertain instant petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling Velasco’s CoC
Held:
No, the SC found petitioner’s contention devoid of merit. The SC first differentiated the
proceedings for cancellation, granting or denying of due course and that inclusion/exclusion proceedings.
The SC stated that Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant
or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the facts stated
in the COC by the would-be candidate be true, as any false representation of a material fact is a ground
for the COCs cancellation or the withholding of due course. The false representation that these provisions
mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. The process of
voters inclusion/exclusion, on the other hand, as part of the voters registration process, is provided and
defined under Sections 138, 139 and 143 of the OEC. Inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve
the simple issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on
the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. In
terms of purpose, voters inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are different proceedings; one
refers to the application to be registered as a voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the
application to be a candidate. Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues and
entail different reliefs although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities where they may be
said to converge or interface. One such commonality is on the matter of residence. Section 9 of Republic
Act 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act(VRA), requires that voters shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election. The OEC, on the other hand, requires under its Section 74
that the would-be candidate state material facts such as, among others, his residence. Under the
combined application of Section 65 of the OEC and Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC), a local
official must among others have the same residency requirement as required under the VRA. Another
point of convergence is on the candidate’s status as a registered voter; a candidate for a local government
position must be a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, province, or city where he or she intends
to run for office. The remedies available in the two proceedings likewise differ. Velascos remedy from the
adverse decision in his petition for inclusion as voter is as provided under Section 138 of the OEC quoted
above. From the MTC, the recourse is to the RTC whose decision is final and executory, correctible by the
Court of Appeals only by a writ of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the approval of a certificate of candidacy or its denial is a matter directly
cognizable by the COMELEC, with the decision of its Division reviewable by the COMELEC en banc whose
decision is in turn reviewable by this Court under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and Section 7, of Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution. The SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In the
present case, the ERB denied Velascos registration as a voter, which denial the RTC subsequently
supported. As already mentioned, this denial by the RTC is, by law, final and executory.Since Velascos
knowledge of the RTC decision at the time he filed his COC is not disputed, the COMELEC concluded that
he committed a material misrepresentation when he stated under oath in his COC that he is a registered
voter of Sasmuan. Under these facts and legal situation, the court stated that annot hold that the
COMELECs conclusion is legally erroneous, much less that it is tainted by grave abuse of discretion. It is a
matter of record, appearing in a final RTC judgment no less, that Velasco was not a registered voter of
Sasmuan at the time he filed his COC. His claim in this regard was therefore false and was a material
misrepresentation. Other than his active misrepresentation, Velasco likewise was inexplicably silent
about, and thus knowingly omitted any mention of, the denial of his registration. As the COMELEC did, the
SC can only conclude that he deliberately concealed the existence of the final and executory RTC ruling
when he filed his COC. He could not disclose this fact as the unavoidable consequence of disclosure was
to render him unqualified to be a candidate. That the COMELEC relied on the RTC ruling in canceling the
COC of Velasco cannot likewise be a legal error as Section 138 of the OEC is clear and categorical in its
terms: Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to
the Regional Trial Courts within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall
become final and executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time
the appeal was received and its decision shall be final and executory. The court noted that when Velasco
sought recourse with the Court of Appeals, he did so by way of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
a recourse that was not available to him because an RTC ruling in an inclusion/exclusion is final and
executory. This led the appellate court to recognize in its Amended Decision of August 19, 2008, albeit on
motion for reconsideration, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Velascos appeal.