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RETHINKING DEMOCRACY IN
PAKISTAN
Ahmed Waqas Waheed & Javeria Younas Abbasi
Published online: 10 Jun 2013.
To cite this article: Ahmed Waqas Waheed & Javeria Younas Abbasi (2013)
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN, Asian Affairs, 44:2, 202-214, DOI:
10.1080/03068374.2013.790608
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Asian Affairs, 2013
Vol. 44, No. 2, 202– 214, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2013.790608
Ahmed Waqas Waheed is a doctoral candidate at the School of Politics and Inter-
national Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London, and Assistant
Professor in the Department of Political Science, Forman Christian College,
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Introduction
Pakistan is a nuclear power. It is a frontline state in the War on Terror
sponsored by the United States. It is often in conflict with neighbouring
India. The volatile mix of geopolitical realities and domestic political
dynamics endangers its viability as a successful state. The country
stands at a critical juncture. After the ousting of the last military
regime, the hope was that the elected successor government would run
its full term until the next elections and then be replaced by a further
democratically elected government. Yet if Pakistan fails to consolidate
real democracy, as it has persistently failed to do in the past, the road
will again be clear for the return of military rule.
This paper suggests that there are three dimensions which do not just
substantially hamper the progress of democracy in Pakistan but actually
make such development inconceivable. The first is the presence of a
land-based, elitist, oligarchic culture that dominates the political
arena; the second is the steady build-up of a negative perception
amongst the masses with regard to the performance of democracy in
Pakistan; the third is the permanent role in the political processes of
the country achieved by the military, partly because the military has
been empowered by the Western powers, who have disenfranchised
democracy in pursuance of their strategic interests.
Such negative perceptions serve only to reinforce the position of the elite
by concentrating and even widening its influence over other areas of
social responsibility. Thus the feudal-elitist culture has permeated into
every sphere of socio-politico-economic influence. Furthermore, the
interests of the elite lie in maintaining a political order that caters to
their personalized interests rather than pursuing allegiance to a certain
political ideology. Consequently, since the feudal elite wield consider-
able power and influence, the government machinery is also manipulated
to serve their personal interests. In the political exercise of such person-
alized power, the feudal group have established a dominion where their
control reigns supreme and is recognized as such by governmental
machineries operating within the ‘identified’ feudal jurisdiction. Since
there is no allegiance to a political ideology or philosophy and pursuits
of personalized interests dictate the power equations, the feudal elite are
found in the government as well as in the opposition. The perpetuation of
such an anomalous hierarchical structure has a pivotal role in impeding
democratic growth.
‘from below’, as they have unmatched political resources based on their control
of land and property.3
Easterly borrows from Olson to suggest that the feudal structure in Paki-
stan is a semblance of what Olson terms ‘stationary bandits’. He explains
that unlike roving bandits who steal from the people and invest in them
marginally to perpetuate a looting spree, the stationary bandit steals for
the day. This implies that in such looting, there is no compassion exhib-
ited towards the betterment of the masses. Thus while the masses con-
tinue to suffer, these feudal stationary bandits continue to usurp power
and wealth, and prevent citizens from objective and vociferous interfer-
ence in their power-consolidating process.5
thus does not apply in the case of Pakistani political experience. The
passage of time, which should have accentuated the evolutionary
process of democracy, has only resulted in the consolidation and
enhancement of power among the feudals. Feudalism not only deprives
citizens of the opportunity to participate in electoral competition, and
widens the chasm between the elites and the poor, but strikes at the
core of the dilemma. It challenges, quintessentially, the definition of
democracy. Most analysis treats this phenomenon as a part of the demo-
cratic dilemma in Pakistan; however, it is not a part of the problem. It is
the root of the problem.
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the world”.9 And where education, health and societal livelihood are
lagging far behind other countries. It does not require rocket science to
determine the likely nature of social perceptions of democracy in a
country caught in such a desperate situation. Initially, a developing, or
under-developed, society may perceive democracy as the system best
suited to improve its standards of education, health, livelihood and law
and order, etc. The failure of democracy to bring about such a social tran-
sition can have irreversible repercussions. As Carothers argues,
It may not be fair in some philosophical sense for people to judge democracy on
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failure of democracy, one that did not warrant army intervention. Pakis-
tanis saw it quite differently. The bloodless coup met with overwhelming
public support. Leaders across the political spectrum hailed the army for
‘saving’ Pakistan”.15
But these events are worth a more comprehensive analysis. Some would
argue that the crucial factor that brought about regime change was the
will of the military elite rather than popular dissatisfaction with the pol-
itical elite. If so, what assurance do we have that such a regime reversal
would not occur again? How can we assert that the masses have always
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supported democracy no matter what, when they have actually been wit-
nessed dancing in the streets after a military coup? Most importantly, is
the tolerance for a democratic regime increasing or decreasing? Many
would argue that the enthusiasm which the masses have displayed for
the demise of dictatorial rule demonstrates their never-flinching
support for democracy. But reality and the events of the past might
lead to a different conclusion. Consider the following argument by
Rashid, put forward after the coup:
The question uppermost in people’s minds is whether the army can deliver on its
promises. Continued public support for the coup will depend on whether the army
can fulfill its own agenda . . .. Unlike in the past, the army will have to work with,
and strengthen, the judiciary, chambers of business and commerce, the press, devel-
opmental non-governmental organizations, and human rights groups. It will have to
introduce ordinances to change some of the worst aspects of human rights abuses,
which have led the international community to criticize Pakistan.16
This still seems to be the issue. On the basis that weak political insti-
tutions generate weak policies and are thus in some way hazardous
since they result in internal insecurity, the army takes it upon itself to
rectify the situation, by deposing the civilian politicians and their politi-
cal system. Until and unless democratic forces mature to a point where
national consensus on state building and policy formulation takes pre-
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The strength of which the military so often boasts is not entirely a cre-
ation of domestic politics; it has in large measure been due to the
Cold War. Being placed at the right geostrategic location at the right
time, the military capitalized on, and exploited, every available opportu-
nity to enhance its military and political strength. Given the overall geo-
political situation, it is not a surprise that the international community
subordinates the promotion of democracy in one country to wider
issues. As a consequence, the military dictatorship of General Zia was
212 RETHINKING DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN
sustained for 11 years, while that of General Musharraf was for eight
years. Had there been relentless and sustained international pressure
on these dictators to give up power so that democratic forces would
have a chance to flourish, Pakistan might have seen longer democratic
tenures. But geoplolitical dictates pointed in a different direction.
Shah, writing against the backdrop of the Cold War, iterates that
Pakistan’s cold war alliance with the United States, driven in most part by its per-
ceived insecurity vis-à-vis India, as well the inchoate nature of its political insti-
tutions and civil society, provided the military/bureaucratic elites with the
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opportunity to gradually expand their role within the power structures of the
state. This institutional imbalance, more than any other development, would
impede the development of democratic institutions.22
Substitute the ‘War on Terror’ for the ‘Cold War’ and there is a consist-
ent thread. However, this geopolitically significant role that Pakistan has
often had to play is not the reason why democracy has failed, though it is
a reason why it would never succeed. The ‘failure’ of democracy
suggests that democracy will eventually prevail; but the concept is not
grounded in reality and is, at best, an idealistic political scenario. But
to imply that it cannot succeed would be to draw attention to inherent
structural flaws and geopolitical realities embedded in the society in
general.
Conclusion
Hence, there is a need for intellectuals, thinkers and scholars alike to
redefine the narrow, idealistic framework within which analyses of pol-
itical Pakistan are carried out. Realities on the ground are much more
complex and complicated. If the goal of a political system is to
enhance the quality of life and security and to reach out to the masses
in a socio-economic mode, democracy becomes just another option.
But if one persists in the view that true democracy is the only way
forward, that requires that the feudalistic social hierarchical structure
should be done away with, that the threat from India to the security of
the country is nullified and that external influences emanating from
the country’s geopolitical presence should be neutralized. That looks
to be an improbable vision, so maybe other options should be considered
which might have more chance of bettering governance infrastructure,
reducing institutional imbalances and promoting economic growth and
development.
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 213
Unless a political system provides adequate space for the true represen-
tation of the masses, it is bound to be rejected by the people. The under-
estimation of the political reality of Pakistan has become an ominous
trend in much intellectual discourse, which only beats the drums of
democracy to establish a political connection with the West. As Cohen
confesses,
Twenty years ago I argued that the central issue of Pakistani politics was rebalan-
cing the civil-military relationship, and that a gradual, staged retreat from politics
by the army, coupled with the demonstration of increasing competence by the
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civilians, might lead to the restoration of full democratic rule in the country.
This not only underestimated the degree to which military rule in Pakistan is
widely supported by people who nominally favor democracy, it also did not antici-
pate the severe economic and social problems exacerbated by ten years of flawed
democracy.23
NOTES
13. Mahmood Monshipuri and Amjad Samuel, ‘Development and Democracy in Paki-
stan: Tenuous or Plausible Nexus?’ Asian Survey Vol. 35. Issue 11 (1995): 988.
14. Iftikhar Malik, ‘Pakistan in 2000: Starting Anew or Stalemate?’ Asian Survey Vol.
41. Issue 1 (2001): 108.
15. A. Rashid, ‘Pakistan‘s Coup: Planting the Seeds of Democracy?’ Current History
Vol. 98. Issue 632 (1999): 412.
16. Ibid., pp. 412–414.
17. See for example Aqil Shah, ‘A Transition to ‘Guided’ Democracy’, in Jim Rolfe
(Ed.), Asia Pacific: A region In Transition. Asia Pacific Center for Security
Studies, 2004. Irshad Haqqani, ‘The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan?’ The
Muslim World Vol. 96. Issue 2 (2006): 223 –224. Hassan A. Rizvi, ‘Democracy
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