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Asian Affairs
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Ahmed Waqas Waheed & Javeria Younas Abbasi
Published online: 10 Jun 2013.

To cite this article: Ahmed Waqas Waheed & Javeria Younas Abbasi (2013)
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN, Asian Affairs, 44:2, 202-214, DOI:

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Asian Affairs, 2013
Vol. 44, No. 2, 202– 214,



Ahmed Waqas Waheed is a doctoral candidate at the School of Politics and Inter-
national Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London, and Assistant
Professor in the Department of Political Science, Forman Christian College,
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Pakistan, where Javeria Younas Abbasi is a research assistant.

Pakistan is a nuclear power. It is a frontline state in the War on Terror
sponsored by the United States. It is often in conflict with neighbouring
India. The volatile mix of geopolitical realities and domestic political
dynamics endangers its viability as a successful state. The country
stands at a critical juncture. After the ousting of the last military
regime, the hope was that the elected successor government would run
its full term until the next elections and then be replaced by a further
democratically elected government. Yet if Pakistan fails to consolidate
real democracy, as it has persistently failed to do in the past, the road
will again be clear for the return of military rule.

Pakistan has undergone long spells of military dictatorship, interspersed

with periods of democratic rule. As a result, its failure to evolve into a
thriving democratic polity has often been attributed to the deleterious
effect of extensive military rule on political institutions and traditions.
But in focusing on military rule in explaining the plight of democracy
in Pakistan, most scholars stress the importance of Pakistan’s wider geo-
political situation, rather than the internal realities Even those who list
the problems confronting Pakistan as a democracy – electoral contesta-
tion, participatory politics, provincial disparities and other internal
factors – do not focus on the structural anomalies which make the con-
solidation of a true democracy in Pakistan highly improbable, if not
impossible. Notable amongst these anomalies are: the presence of a land-
owner oligarchy, commonly referred to as ‘feudal’, with predominant
power over the political system of Pakistan; the preoccupation of the
masses with economic, rather than political, gains; and the way in
which the military’s role in domestic politics has been strengthened by

# 2013 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs


the country’s geostrategic importance and its status as a nuclear power.

This has meant that the major powers have been less concerned than they
might be over the form of polity in the state. But even when the Western
powers have supported democratic governments, those governments’
failure to provide effective solutions to the problems facing the mass
of the people has damaged the very image of democracy.

For the failure to democratize goes much beyond the misdemeanours of

the politicians, the malaise of the military, political corruption, lack of
governance and weak institutional infrastructures. Most intellectuals
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analyzing the state of democracy in Pakistan seem to suggest that the

answer to the problems would come from within. While all agree that
curbing military involvement in domestic politics would increase the
chances of true democracy taking root, others go farther and suggest
that change should arise from within a democratic regime. Astonish-
ingly, no one questions whether Pakistan is ready for democracy or
not. The key question is not why Pakistan has failed to become a
proper democracy; the question is whether the flaws in the structure of
Pakistani democracy are so great and so ingrained in its political compo-
sition that they make true democracy unattainable.

This paper suggests that there are three dimensions which do not just
substantially hamper the progress of democracy in Pakistan but actually
make such development inconceivable. The first is the presence of a
land-based, elitist, oligarchic culture that dominates the political
arena; the second is the steady build-up of a negative perception
amongst the masses with regard to the performance of democracy in
Pakistan; the third is the permanent role in the political processes of
the country achieved by the military, partly because the military has
been empowered by the Western powers, who have disenfranchised
democracy in pursuance of their strategic interests.

The landowner oligarchy in Pakistan’s political process

Leaving aside all other meanings attributed to ‘liberal constitutional
democracy’, a minimalistic definition would contain free and fair elec-
tions and the rule of law. Once these basic pillars are erected, albeit
even superficially, a country is considered democratic; however, the
degree to which it liberalizes determines its approximation to
Western-style democracy. In the case of Pakistan, elections have cer-
tainly been conducted. How ‘free and fair’ they were is open to

contestation. However, what needs to be seen is whether the hierarchical

social structure supports free and fair elections. Shafqat observes that
“the experience of Pakistan reveals that, whereas the electoral process,
at least theoretically, provides equal opportunity to all citizens to seek
a public office, in reality landlords/tribal leaders, big business and reli-
gious leaders tend to be the primary contestants. The data for five elec-
tions, from 1985 to 1997, reveals that the representation of various
classes and groups has shown some increase, but feudal/tribal leaders
still continue to be the dominant class”.1 Does this oligarchy ‘represent
the masses’? Clearly not. The already powerful oligarchy sees politics as
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a way to further strengthen its hold. The concerns and problems of a

general public are nowhere important. Thus, politics has become a
game for the rich and this is a result of the power and influence that
the feudals enjoy in the country, to the extent that “It is almost imposs-
ible for a middle-class individual to consider standing in elections”.2

Such negative perceptions serve only to reinforce the position of the elite
by concentrating and even widening its influence over other areas of
social responsibility. Thus the feudal-elitist culture has permeated into
every sphere of socio-politico-economic influence. Furthermore, the
interests of the elite lie in maintaining a political order that caters to
their personalized interests rather than pursuing allegiance to a certain
political ideology. Consequently, since the feudal elite wield consider-
able power and influence, the government machinery is also manipulated
to serve their personal interests. In the political exercise of such person-
alized power, the feudal group have established a dominion where their
control reigns supreme and is recognized as such by governmental
machineries operating within the ‘identified’ feudal jurisdiction. Since
there is no allegiance to a political ideology or philosophy and pursuits
of personalized interests dictate the power equations, the feudal elite are
found in the government as well as in the opposition. The perpetuation of
such an anomalous hierarchical structure has a pivotal role in impeding
democratic growth.

The perpetuation of power requires power. For the feudal elite to

survive, it is of immense importance that its hold on power does not
weaken. Analysing historical trends of participation in democratic elec-
toral competitions, it becomes apparent that feudal participation in the
democratic process has decreased only marginally. Furthermore, the
reinforcement of power in the national decision-making process suggests
that since these feudals have an iron grip on power, any decisions con-
sidered to be in favor of strengthening democracy and thus potentially

contrary to their interests would not only be vociferously opposed, but

probably not even make it to the decision-making table. Such is their
power that, as Cohen puts it,
Despite many years of pressure from the International Monetary Fund or other
international financial institutions and foreign aid donors, no Pakistani govern-
ment has ever imposed agricultural taxes. The feudals have also successfully
resisted attempts to introduce social change and reform, let alone education and
economic development. Bhutto could not remove them, nor could Ayub or any
other general, and they seem likely to withstand any effort to build democracy
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‘from below’, as they have unmatched political resources based on their control
of land and property.3

To exercise power and control and to perpetuate their existence it is thus

imperative for these feudal elites to control the pace and direction of
development in their subservient communities, so that potential alterna-
tive candidates for power may be eliminated. Easterly observes that
the severe social backwardness of rural areas all over the country, which explains
much of Pakistan’s overall lag in social indicators for its income level, is consist-
ent with the story that landowners oppose human capital accumulation. In the
presence of such a feudalistic culture, talking about democracy not only reeks
of a miscomprehension of the prevailing political scenario but exhibits rhetoric
of crass commercialism, intellectual ignorance and Western appeasement.4

Easterly borrows from Olson to suggest that the feudal structure in Paki-
stan is a semblance of what Olson terms ‘stationary bandits’. He explains
that unlike roving bandits who steal from the people and invest in them
marginally to perpetuate a looting spree, the stationary bandit steals for
the day. This implies that in such looting, there is no compassion exhib-
ited towards the betterment of the masses. Thus while the masses con-
tinue to suffer, these feudal stationary bandits continue to usurp power
and wealth, and prevent citizens from objective and vociferous interfer-
ence in their power-consolidating process.5

So, it can be asserted with some certainty that democracy cannot be

achieved with a feudalistic social structure in place. The two are
mutually exclusive. Where one exists, the other cannot. Since the
change to the established feudal culture cannot come from within a
democratic government, thus any government with a civilian head
would, at best, be just that – a government with a civilian head. In
order to evolve into a truly democratic society, it is imperative that
land reforms be made and citizenry participation in electoral contesta-
tion is encouraged. The argument that democracy needs time to evolve

thus does not apply in the case of Pakistani political experience. The
passage of time, which should have accentuated the evolutionary
process of democracy, has only resulted in the consolidation and
enhancement of power among the feudals. Feudalism not only deprives
citizens of the opportunity to participate in electoral competition, and
widens the chasm between the elites and the poor, but strikes at the
core of the dilemma. It challenges, quintessentially, the definition of
democracy. Most analysis treats this phenomenon as a part of the demo-
cratic dilemma in Pakistan; however, it is not a part of the problem. It is
the root of the problem.
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It would be pertinent here to borrow from Lipset his analogical argument

about the problems of promoting democracy in under-developed
societies. He suggests that a situation conducive to democratic growth
can only exist in a highly developed society in which “the mass of the
population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop
(the) self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irre-
sponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished
mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy . . . or in

Cohen argues that “Pakistan’s fate as a democracy is likely to be that of

some of the Greek city-states studied by Aristotle and described in The
Politics. Most of these, according to Aristotle, were imperfect oligarchies
that evolved into imperfect democracies, which in turn reverted to oli-
garchic states . . . . Rarely would they evolve into true systems based on
what Aristotle regarded as sound principles: governance by the few (or
the many) in the interests of all . . . Practically speaking, however,
moving from oligarchy to a full-fledged democracy will be very diffi-
cult”.7 How can this difficulty be overcome? Cohen suggests that a revo-
lution emanating from within the rural population, which comprises
approximately 60 per cent of the nation’s population, might be the only
viable option left to “remove feudal autocracy from its dominant pos-
ition”.8 Such a revolution may not be so impossible if one considers the
changing perceptions of democracy among the masses in Pakistan.

Perceptions of democracy in Pakistan

The second crucial question concerns the perceptions of democracy in a
country where “social indicators like infant mortality, and female
primary and secondary educational enrollment are among the worst in

the world”.9 And where education, health and societal livelihood are
lagging far behind other countries. It does not require rocket science to
determine the likely nature of social perceptions of democracy in a
country caught in such a desperate situation. Initially, a developing, or
under-developed, society may perceive democracy as the system best
suited to improve its standards of education, health, livelihood and law
and order, etc. The failure of democracy to bring about such a social tran-
sition can have irreversible repercussions. As Carothers argues,
It may not be fair in some philosophical sense for people to judge democracy on
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the basis of socio-economic performance of a given weak democratic regime.

Democracy is in a strict sense about political values, choices, and processes; it
does not per se provide answers to economic and social problems. Yet, fair or
not, this is what is demanded by the citizens of new democracies (and for that
matter, established ones as well). And when the performance is poor over time,
the effects can be negative. In many new democracies, citizens are seriously dis-
enchanted with their governments. This disenchantment is turning into a larger
loss of belief in democracy itself and, in some more aggravated cases, into
instability and political conflict. . . . Given the high expectations that many
people in the region had for what the end of dictatorship would bring, frustration
over poor democratic performance turns easily into bitterness.10

Therefore, a consistent lack of performance by democratic regimes and

their inability to move towards substantive democracy not only discredit
democracy as a political concept, but also generate a negative attitude
towards its viability. Thus the realization of true democracy in a
country places a high premium on the fulfilment of the social aspect
of its promises.
It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a common assumption of all other
modern models of democracy is precisely that if liberal democracy amounts to
a merely formal structure of citizenship rights and political authority without sup-
plementary social conditions that promote freedom and equality, then the claim to
democracy is liable to be systematically undermined – by private interests, the
power of capital and the practical exclusion of a substantial proportion of citizens
due to a lack of resources or social recognition.11

In essence, true democracy cannot be realized without mass support, and

the absence of this support would suggest that the masses are prepared to
turn for their social uplift to other types of regimes, even military
regimes. Nor is this support likely to emerge if democratic regimes
are unable to maintain law and order and provide for basic necessities;
in other words, to move towards substantive democracy.

Pakistan is a classic example of this dire scenario. Successive democratic

regimes have failed to live up to their promises. Democratic tenures
characterized by an absence of good governance, no improvement in
the basic political, social and economic infrastructure, and deteriorating
social conditions have all played their part in maligning democracy. Yet
most academic discourse about the social state of the country rhetori-
cally reiterates that the masses are committed to democracy. This flies
in the face of the prevailing social realities.

The masses remain interested in democracy, not as a political concept

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but rather as a way to seek to resolve their personal issues by demanding

compensations for their votes. Thus, competitors in electoral contests are
driven by the demands of their respective constituencies to provide for
jobs, to improve development by influencing the bureaucratic machinery
and to develop personal relations with the members of the administration
in their respective constituencies in order to be able to deliver. In effect,
the concept of democracy has undergone a value change where the
masses are involved in a barter trade with the feudal elites, providing
the elite with the power they “desire while extricating personalized
favors from them in return”.12

This argument suggests an interesting balance in the equation of power

between the powerful political elite and the masses. It suggests that “the
masses are no longer interested in ideologies; instead they are learning to
use elections to their own practical ends”.13 Thus, when political elites
fail to satisfy their constituencies, a value change occurs. The masses
look beyond democracy for other viable options and hence entertain
the idea of dictatorship. Such an analysis is consistent with the recent
political history of Pakistan. In 1999 Pakistan slid from democratic to
dictatorial rule, following the successful coup orchestrated by General
Musharraf. One observer noted that “the domestic reaction to the coup
and Sharif‘s conviction, excepting criticism from parts of the middle
class and some former parliamentarians, has varied from relief to
surreal acceptance. While some city streets saw people distributing
sweets to celebrate the coup, many citizens just wondered about
whether the country would relapse into another crisis”.14 He further
observes that “the structural imbalances and economic travails that
have contributed to the country‘s continued political instability have
spawned growing pessimism”. However, others were more explicit in
how they saw the eve of the coup. As Rashid observes, “Pakistan
appeared to many foreign observers as, at worst, a battle lost between
democracy and dictatorship, and at best as an overreaction to the

failure of democracy, one that did not warrant army intervention. Pakis-
tanis saw it quite differently. The bloodless coup met with overwhelming
public support. Leaders across the political spectrum hailed the army for
‘saving’ Pakistan”.15

But these events are worth a more comprehensive analysis. Some would
argue that the crucial factor that brought about regime change was the
will of the military elite rather than popular dissatisfaction with the pol-
itical elite. If so, what assurance do we have that such a regime reversal
would not occur again? How can we assert that the masses have always
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supported democracy no matter what, when they have actually been wit-
nessed dancing in the streets after a military coup? Most importantly, is
the tolerance for a democratic regime increasing or decreasing? Many
would argue that the enthusiasm which the masses have displayed for
the demise of dictatorial rule demonstrates their never-flinching
support for democracy. But reality and the events of the past might
lead to a different conclusion. Consider the following argument by
Rashid, put forward after the coup:
The question uppermost in people’s minds is whether the army can deliver on its
promises. Continued public support for the coup will depend on whether the army
can fulfill its own agenda . . .. Unlike in the past, the army will have to work with,
and strengthen, the judiciary, chambers of business and commerce, the press, devel-
opmental non-governmental organizations, and human rights groups. It will have to
introduce ordinances to change some of the worst aspects of human rights abuses,
which have led the international community to criticize Pakistan.16

This suggests that a military government would try to ameliorate the

conditions in the country in a way that is supposed to be the hallmark
of a democratic regime rather than a dictatorial regime. It shows that
the public is really concerned not so much with the kind of government
but rather with the fulfilment of their needs. It will support whoever
brings the Holy Grail to its doorstep first. Thus, the support that
people have given to democracy is largely relative. It is not democracy
that the masses support but rather change. Any change that would bring
about improvement in their situation would be supported by the masses.

Hence the masses’ changing perception of democracy as a consequence

of the failure of successive democratic regimes to be substantively
democratic constitutes the second reason why Pakistan has not realized,
and might never realize, the dream of becoming a true democracy. It is a
vicious circle: ‘may the best man win’ is not sufficient to guarantee

The military problem

The third element is the role of the military. The current, somewhat pre-
carious, situation of democracy in Pakistan shows that the political elite
has not learnt its lesson. Though the military currently sit as spectators
on the sidelines, the possibility of another intervention does not seem
so improbable. Yet is the military’s recurrent involvement in Pakistan’s
politics really inevitable? Why have the military assumed such a pivotal
place in Pakistani politics in the face of an apparently widespread con-
sensus that their role is detrimental to democracy? For most analyses
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suggest that repeated military interventions constitute a major reason

for the failure of democracy to take root in the country.17 Reasons for
military interventions in the democratic process of Pakistan often
include domestic political instability, the existential threat from neigh-
bouring India and the way in which the geostrategic importance of Paki-
stan often determines foreign preferences. Thus the Pakistan Army
assumes a role as guardian of the physical and ideological frontiers, in
response to internal and external security threats.

According to Cohen, “A full-blown democracy, in which the armed

forces come under firm civilian control, will be impossible until Paki-
stan’s strategic environment alters in such a way that the army retreats
from its role as guardian of the state”.18 But with Pakistan occupying
a pivotal position as a frontline state in the war against terror and its
obsession with security vis-à-vis the Indian threat, there is little possi-
bility of a move forward to realize the ideals of a true democracy. In
order to reduce military intervention in domestic politics, it is imperative
to rob the military of the excuses it uses to justify its stance. To put it in
plain words, the military would not be able to intervene if (1) domestic
politicians showed an improvement in their conduct, (2) the threat to the
security of the country, from India and other outside sources, was mar-
ginalized and (3) international influences are sustained by long-term pri-
orities, i.e. internationally the promotion of democracy takes priority
over geostrategic interests.

Historically, as Wilke suggests,

The people in charge – bureaucrats on the one side, army officers on the other –
were at great pains in protecting and dominating the state field against adversaries
from in and outside the official borders. Internally, they had to confine their effort
to some ‘core’ state: secure the most essential rules inside narrowly drawn bound-
aries; externally, they had to prepare for war, since Pakistan’s territorial status (if

we include – as we must, following official ideology – Jammu and Kashmir) was

not clearly determined. More importantly, external and internal matters were
mixed right from the start, giving the army a key state-building role.19

This still seems to be the issue. On the basis that weak political insti-
tutions generate weak policies and are thus in some way hazardous
since they result in internal insecurity, the army takes it upon itself to
rectify the situation, by deposing the civilian politicians and their politi-
cal system. Until and unless democratic forces mature to a point where
national consensus on state building and policy formulation takes pre-
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cedence over self-serving politicking, the military will always have a

reason to intervene in the democratic process to ‘rectify the wrong’.
As pertinent then as it is now, Wilke, writing in 2001 suggested:
In politics, as in life in general, it is timing that is most crucial. And for now, it can
be no matter of controversy that Pakistan is facing not just a crisis of democratic
rule or of good governance, but a crisis of the state. There seems to be too much at
stake right now to wait for a political actor capable of pursuing all targets: civilia-
nization, democratization and good governance. And just as some people in Paki-
stan still await the introduction of interest-free banking, observers inside and
outside Pakistan seem to wait for political actors who do not pursue their own
– particular – interests. Everybody knows, they will not show up, even after
the army’s return to the barracks.20

As Cohen puts it, “Normalization of relations with India is a necessary

but insufficient condition for Pakistan’s democratization”.21 Hostilities
between the two countries do not spring from geographical discontent-
ment but rather from ideological differences; however, the former
becomes a consequence of the latter. Thus, until Pakistan feels less threa-
tened by India, the military will have its say in political issues, domestic
and international, and will use every excuse to capture larger portions of
the budget so as to build its strength. In that process, its organized struc-
ture and its claim to be the custodians of the state enable it to grow

The strength of which the military so often boasts is not entirely a cre-
ation of domestic politics; it has in large measure been due to the
Cold War. Being placed at the right geostrategic location at the right
time, the military capitalized on, and exploited, every available opportu-
nity to enhance its military and political strength. Given the overall geo-
political situation, it is not a surprise that the international community
subordinates the promotion of democracy in one country to wider
issues. As a consequence, the military dictatorship of General Zia was

sustained for 11 years, while that of General Musharraf was for eight
years. Had there been relentless and sustained international pressure
on these dictators to give up power so that democratic forces would
have a chance to flourish, Pakistan might have seen longer democratic
tenures. But geoplolitical dictates pointed in a different direction.
Shah, writing against the backdrop of the Cold War, iterates that
Pakistan’s cold war alliance with the United States, driven in most part by its per-
ceived insecurity vis-à-vis India, as well the inchoate nature of its political insti-
tutions and civil society, provided the military/bureaucratic elites with the
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opportunity to gradually expand their role within the power structures of the
state. This institutional imbalance, more than any other development, would
impede the development of democratic institutions.22

Substitute the ‘War on Terror’ for the ‘Cold War’ and there is a consist-
ent thread. However, this geopolitically significant role that Pakistan has
often had to play is not the reason why democracy has failed, though it is
a reason why it would never succeed. The ‘failure’ of democracy
suggests that democracy will eventually prevail; but the concept is not
grounded in reality and is, at best, an idealistic political scenario. But
to imply that it cannot succeed would be to draw attention to inherent
structural flaws and geopolitical realities embedded in the society in

Hence, there is a need for intellectuals, thinkers and scholars alike to
redefine the narrow, idealistic framework within which analyses of pol-
itical Pakistan are carried out. Realities on the ground are much more
complex and complicated. If the goal of a political system is to
enhance the quality of life and security and to reach out to the masses
in a socio-economic mode, democracy becomes just another option.
But if one persists in the view that true democracy is the only way
forward, that requires that the feudalistic social hierarchical structure
should be done away with, that the threat from India to the security of
the country is nullified and that external influences emanating from
the country’s geopolitical presence should be neutralized. That looks
to be an improbable vision, so maybe other options should be considered
which might have more chance of bettering governance infrastructure,
reducing institutional imbalances and promoting economic growth and

Unless a political system provides adequate space for the true represen-
tation of the masses, it is bound to be rejected by the people. The under-
estimation of the political reality of Pakistan has become an ominous
trend in much intellectual discourse, which only beats the drums of
democracy to establish a political connection with the West. As Cohen
Twenty years ago I argued that the central issue of Pakistani politics was rebalan-
cing the civil-military relationship, and that a gradual, staged retreat from politics
by the army, coupled with the demonstration of increasing competence by the
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civilians, might lead to the restoration of full democratic rule in the country.
This not only underestimated the degree to which military rule in Pakistan is
widely supported by people who nominally favor democracy, it also did not antici-
pate the severe economic and social problems exacerbated by ten years of flawed


1. Saeed Shafqat, ‘Democracy in Pakistan: Value Change and Challenges of Insti-

tution Building’. The Pakistan Development Review Vol. 37. Issue 4, Part II
(1998): 291.
2. Irshad Haqqani, ‘The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan?’ The Muslim World
Vol. 96. Issue 2 (2006): 223 –224.
3. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 143.
4. William Easterly, ‘The Political Economy of Growth Without Development:
A Case Study of Pakistan’. Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth
Project. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001, p. 143.
5. Ibid.
6. S.M Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
political Legitimacy’. American Political Science Review Vol. 53. Issue 1 (1959):
7. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 284.
8. Ibid., p. 285.
9. William Easterly, ‘The Political Economy of Growth Without Development:
A Case Study of Pakistan’. Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth
Project. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001, p. 2.
10. Thomas Carothers, ‘Democracy’s Sobering State’. Current History Vol. 103. Issue
677 (2004): 413 –414.
11. Craig Brown, ‘Democratic Paradigms and the Horizons of Democratization’. Con-
tretempts 6 (January 2006): 49.
12. Saeed Shafqat, ‘Democracy in Pakistan: Value Change and Challenges of Insti-
tution Building’. The Pakistan Development Review Vol. 37. Issue 4, Part II
(1998): 285 –286.

13. Mahmood Monshipuri and Amjad Samuel, ‘Development and Democracy in Paki-
stan: Tenuous or Plausible Nexus?’ Asian Survey Vol. 35. Issue 11 (1995): 988.
14. Iftikhar Malik, ‘Pakistan in 2000: Starting Anew or Stalemate?’ Asian Survey Vol.
41. Issue 1 (2001): 108.
15. A. Rashid, ‘Pakistan‘s Coup: Planting the Seeds of Democracy?’ Current History
Vol. 98. Issue 632 (1999): 412.
16. Ibid., pp. 412–414.
17. See for example Aqil Shah, ‘A Transition to ‘Guided’ Democracy’, in Jim Rolfe
(Ed.), Asia Pacific: A region In Transition. Asia Pacific Center for Security
Studies, 2004. Irshad Haqqani, ‘The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan?’ The
Muslim World Vol. 96. Issue 2 (2006): 223 –224. Hassan A. Rizvi, ‘Democracy
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in Pakistan.’ Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South

Asia as part of the Qualitative Assessment of Democracy. Delhi: Lokinti Center
for the study of Developing Societies, 2004, p. 3.
18. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 278.
19. Wilke Boris, ‘State-Formation and the Military in Pakistan: Reflections on the
Armed Forces, their State and some of their Competitors’. Working Paper
No. 2. Reasearch Unit of Wars, Armament and Development. University of
Hamburg, 2001, p. 26.
20. Ibid., p. 32.
21. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 278.
22. See for example Aqil Shah, ‘A Transition to ‘Guided’ Democracy’, in Jim Rolfe
(Ed.), Asia Pacific: A region In Transition. Asia Pacific Center for Security
Studies, 2004, p. 209.
23. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 279.