G.R. No.

L-22962 September 28, 1972

PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO,

CONSUELO B. MORALES and CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE A. VILLAMOR, (Deceased) Substituted by FELISA
VILLAMOR, ROSARIO V. LIAO LAMCO, MANUEL VILLAMOR, AMPARO V. COTTON, MIGUEL
VILLAMOR and CARMENCITA VILLAMOR, respondents.

Filiberto Leonardo for petitioners.

Ramon Duterte for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The point pressed on us by private respondents,1 in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals in the interpretation of a
stipulation which admittedly is not free from ambiguity, there being a mention of a waiver of the defense of prescription, is not calculated to
elicit undue judicial sympathy. For if accorded acceptance, a creditor, now represented by his heirs,2 who, following the warm and generous
impulse of friendship, came to the rescue of a debtor from a serious predicament of his own making would be barred from recovering the
money loaned. Thus the promptings of charity, unfortunately not often persuasive enough, would be discredited. It is unfortunate then that
respondent Court of Appeals did not see it that way. For its decision to be upheld would be to subject the law to such a scathing indictment.
A careful study of the relevant facts in the light of applicable doctrines calls for the reversal of its decision.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals follow: "Before the year 1933, defendant [Jose A.
Villamor] was a distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller who was the agent of the Insular Lumber
Company in Cebu City. Defendant being a friend and former classmate of plaintiff [Canuto O.
Borromeo] used to borrow from the latter certain amounts from time to time. On one occasion with
some pressing obligation to settle with Mr. Miller, defendant borrowed from plaintiff a large sum of
money for which he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City. Mr. Miller filed civil action against
the defendant and attached his properties including those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the
deed of mortgage in favor of plaintiff could not be registered because not properly drawn up. Plaintiff
then pressed the defendant for settlement of his obligation, but defendant instead offered to execute
a document promising to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years. Liquidation was
made and defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the sum of P7,220.00, for which
defendant signed a promissory note therefor on November 29, 1933 with interest at the rate of 12%
per annum, agreeing to pay 'as soon as I have money'. The note further stipulates that defendant
'hereby relinquish, renounce, or otherwise waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our
Code of Civil Procedure for the collection or recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. ... at any time
even after the lapse of ten years from the date of this instrument'. After the execution of the
document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally requesting defendant to settle his indebtedness from
time to time. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the
execution of the document as there was no property registered in defendant's name, who
furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war,
plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account, — hence the
present complaint for collection."3 It was then noted in the decision under review that the Court of
First Instance of Cebu did sentence the original defendant, the deceased Jose A. Villamor, to pay
Canuto O. Borromeo, now represented by petitioners, the sum of P7,220.00 within ninety days from
the date of the receipt of such decision with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the expiration
of such ninety-day period. That was the judgment reversed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of
March 7, 1964, now the subject of this petition for review. The legal basis was the lack of validity of
the stipulation amounting to a waiver in line with the principle "that a person cannot renounce future
prescription."4
The rather summary and curt disposition of the crucial legal question of respondent Court in its five-
page decision, regrettably rising not too-far-above the superficial level of analysis hardly commends
itself for approval. In the first place, there appeared to be undue reliance on certain words employed
in the written instrument executed by the parties to the total disregard of their intention. That was to
pay undue homage to verbalism. That was to ignore the warning of Frankfurter against succumbing
to the vice of literalism in the interpretation of language whether found in a constitution, a statute, or
a contract. Then, too, in effect it would nullify what ought to have been evident by a perusal that is
not-too-cursory, namely, that the creditor moved by ties of friendship was more than willing to give
the debtor the utmost latitude as to when his admittedly scanty resources will allow him to pay. He
was not renouncing any right; he was just being considerate, perhaps excessively so. Under the
view of respondent Court, however, what had been agreed upon was in effect voided. That was to
run counter to the well-settled maxim that between two possible interpretations, that which saves
rather than destroys is to be preferred. What vitiates most the appealed decision, however, is that it
would amount not to just negating an agreement duly entered into but would put a premium on
conduct that is hardly fair and could be characterized as duplicitous. Certainly, it would reflect on a
debtor apparently bent all the while on repudiating his obligation. Thus he would be permitted to
repay an act of kindness with base ingratitude. Since as will hereafter be shown, there is, on the
contrary, the appropriate construction of the wording that found its way in the document, one which
has all the earmarks of validity and at the same time is in consonance with the demands of justice
and morality, the decision on appeal, as was noted at the outset, must be reversed.

1. The facts rightly understood argue for the reversal of the decision arrived at by respondent Court
of Appeals. Even before the event that gave rise to the loan in question, the debtor, the late Jose A.
Villamor, being a friend and a former classmate, used to borrow from time to time various sums of
money from the creditor, the late Canuto O. Borromeo. Then faced with the need to settle a pressing
obligation with a certain Miller, he did borrow from the latter sometime in 1933 what respondent
Court called "a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City."5 It was
noted that this Miller did file a suit against him, attaching his properties including those he did
mortgage to the late Borromeo, there being no valid objection to such a step as the aforesaid
mortgage, not being properly drawn up, could not be registered. Mention was then made of the late
Borromeo in his lifetime seeking the satisfaction of the sum due with Villamor unable to pay, but
executing a document promising "to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years."6 It is
with such a background that the words employed in the instrument of November 29, 1933 should be
viewed. There is nothing implausible in the view that such language renouncing the debtor's right to
the prescription established by the Code of Civil Procedure should be given the meaning, as noted in
the preceding sentence of the decision of respondent Court, that the debtor could be trusted to pay
even after the termination of the ten-year prescriptive period. For as was also made clear therein,
there had been since then verbal requests on the part of the creditor made to the debtor for the
settlement of such a loan. Nor was the Court of Appeals unaware that such indeed was within the
contemplation of the parties as shown by this sentence in its decision: "Plaintiff did not file any
complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was
no property registered in defendant's name who furthermore assured him that he could collect even
after the lapse of ten years."7

2. There is much to be said then for the contention of petitioners that the reference to the
prescriptive period is susceptible to the construction that only after the lapse thereof could the
demand be made for the payment of the obligation. Whatever be the obscurity occasioned by the
words is illumined when the light arising from the relationship of close friendship between the parties
as well as the unsuccessful effort to execute a mortgage, taken in connection with the various oral
demands made, is thrown on them. Obviously, it did not suffice for the respondent Court of Appeals.
It preferred to reach a conclusion which for it was necessitated by the strict letter of the law untinged
by any spirit of good morals and justice, which should not be alien to legal norms. Even from the
standpoint of what for some is strict legalism, the decision arrived at by the Court of Appeals calls for
disapproval. It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the
literal sense of the words employed is to be followed, such is not the case where they "appear to be
contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties," which "intention shall prevail."8 Such a
codal provision has been given full force and effect since the leading case of Reyes v. Limjap,9 a
1910 decision. Justice Torres, who penned the above decision, had occasion to reiterate such a
principle when he spoke for the Court in De la Vega v. Ballilos 10 thus: "The contract entered into by
the contracting parties which has produced between them rights and obligations is in fact one of
antichresis, for article 1281 of the Civil Code prescribes among other things that if the words should
appear to conflict with the evident intent of the contracting parties, the intent shall
prevail." 11 In Abella v. Gonzaga, 12 this Court through the then Justice Villamor, gave force to such a
codal provision when he made clear that the inevitable conclusion arrived at was "that although in
the contract Exhibit A the usual words 'lease,' 'lessee,' and 'lessor' were employed, that is no
obstacle to holding, as we do hereby hold, that said contract was a sale on installments, for such
was the evident intention of the parties in entering into said contract. 13 Only lately in Nielson and
Company v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, 14 this Court, with Justice Zaldivar, as ponente,
after stressing the primordial rule that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the
intention of the parties must be sought, went on to state: "This is the basic rule in the interpretation of
contracts because all other rules are but ancillary to the ascertainment of the meaning intended by
the parties. And once this intention has been ascertained it becomes an integral part of the contract
as though it had been originally expressed therein in unequivocal terms ... ." 15 While not directly in
point, what was said by Justice Labrador in Tumaneng v. Abad 16 is relevant: "There is no question
that the terms of the contract are not clear on the period of redemption. But the intent of the parties
thereto is the law between them, and it must be ascertained and enforced." 17 Nor is it to be
forgotten, following what was first announced in Velasquez v. Teodoro 18 that "previous,
simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties are properly cognizable indicia of their true
intention." 19

There is another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts specifically referred to in Kasilag
v. Rodriguez, 20as "not less important" 21 than other principles which "is to the effect that the terms,
clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid
and legal contract when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid
contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of
the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows: 'On the
supposition that the various pacts, clauses, or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but
should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal
obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its
essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity
as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in cases where the latter, by an
established connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal
obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.'
... The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law as condensed in the following words: 'Where
an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do
several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be
separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is
that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful
promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although
the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary
implication declares the entire contract void. ..." 22

Nor is it to be forgotten that as early as Compania Agricola Ultramar v. Reyes, 23 decided in 1904,
the then Chief Justice Arellano in a concurring opinion explicitly declared: "It is true that contracts are
not what the parties may see fit to call them, but what they really are as determined by the principles
of law." 24 Such a doctrine has been subsequently adhered to since then. As was rephrased by
Justice Recto in Aquino v.
Deala: 25 "The validity of these agreements, however, is one thing, while the juridical qualification of
the contract resulting therefrom is very distinctively another." 26 In a recent decision, Shell Company
of the Phils., Ltd. vs. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, 27 this court, through Justice Padilla,
reaffirmed the doctrine thus: "To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not
bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties, should there be a controversy
as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the contracting parties do or perform
their respective obligations, stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and inquired into, and should
such performance conflict with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must
prevail over the latter." 28 Is it not rather evident that since even the denomination of the entire
contract itself is not conclusively determined by what the parties call it but by the law, a stipulation
found therein should likewise be impressed with the characterization the law places upon it?

What emerges in the light of all the principles set forth above is that the first ten years after
November 29, 1933 should not be counted in determining when the action of creditor, now
represented by petitioners, could be filed. From the joint record on appeal, it is undoubted that the
complaint was filed on January 7, 1953. If the first ten-year period was to be excluded, the creditor
had until November 29, 1953 to start judicial proceedings. After deducting the first ten-year period
which expired on November 29, 1943, there was the additional period of still another ten years. 29 Nor
could there be any legal objection to the complaint by the creditor Borromeo of January 7, 1953
embodying not merely the fixing of the period within which the debtor Villamor was to pay but
likewise the collection of the amount that until then was not paid. An action combining both features
did receive the imprimatur of the approval of this Court. As was clearly set forth in Tiglao v. The
Manila Railroad Company: 30 "There is something to defendant's contention that in previous cases
this Court has held that the duration of the term should be fixed in a separate action for that express
purpose. But we think the lower court has given good reasons for not adhering to technicalities in its
desire to do substantial justice." 31 The justification became even more apparent in the latter portion
of the opinion of Justice Alex Reyes for this Court: "We may add that defendant does not claim that if
a separate action were instituted to fix the duration of the term of its obligation, it could present better
proofs than those already adduced in the present case. Such separate action would, therefore, be a
mere formality and would serve no purpose other than to delay." 32 There is no legal obstacle then to
the action for collection filed by the creditor. Moreover, the judgment of the lower court, reversed by
the respondent Court of Appeals, ordering the payment of the amount due is in accordance with law.

3. There is something more to be said about the stress in the Tiglao decision on the sound reasons
for not adhering to technicalities in this Court's desire to do substantial justice. The then Justice, now
Chief Justice, Concepcion expressed a similar thought in emphasizing that in the determination of
the rights of the contracting parties "the interest of justice and equity be not ignored." 33 This is a
principle that dates back to the earliest years of this Court. The then Chief Justice Bengzon in Arrieta
v. Bellos, 34 invoked equity. Mention has been made of "practical and substantial justice," 35 "[no]
sacrifice of the substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice," 36 "to afford substantial justice" 37 and "what equity
demands." 38There has been disapproval when the result reached is "neither fair, nor
equitable." 39 What is to be avoided is an interpretation that "may work injustice rather than promote
justice." 40 What appears to be most obvious is that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
under review offended most grievously against the above fundamental postulate that underlies all
systems of law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of March 7, 1964 is reversed, thus
giving full force and effect to the decision of the lower court of November 15, 1956. With costs
against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.

Makalintal, J., is on leave.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner questions the appointment of private respondent Ruby G. Gelvezon as Chief Nurse I of the
Representative Pedro Trono Memorial Hospital in Guimbal, Iloilo, as approved by the Civil Service
Commission in its Resolution No. 89-321 dated May 5, 1989. She claims she has a preferential right to be
appointed to the said position, which she had held in an acting capacity for more than a year. She stresses
that she is next-in-rank and not disqualified; Gelvezon, on the other hand, is not eligible.

At the time of the challenged appointment, Gelvezon was no longer in the service, having retired as Senior
Nurse of the said hospital on October 26, 1986, subsequently collecting the gratuity, terminal leave and
other benefits due her. She was therefore being reinstated under CSC Memorandum-Circular No. 5, s-1983,
which allows the reinstatement of a retiree only under certain conditions. The required request of the
Regional Health Office No. 6 for authority to reinstate her was denied by Civil Service Regional Office No. 6
(CSRO No. 6) on the ground that the vacancy could be filled by promotion of qualified personnel, "attention
being invited to the attached copy of the letter-protest dated September 15, 1988 of Ms. Violeta Teologo,"
one of two other aspirants for the same position. This denial was appealed to the Civil Service Commission
by Dr. Prudencio J. Ortiz, Regional Health Director, who justified the appointment of Gelvezon on grounds of
the "exigency of the service" and her superior qualifications compared to those of the other applicants.

In the assailed resolution, the CSC set aside the denial of CSRO No. 6 and directed it "to take appropriate
action on the appointment of Mrs. Ruby G. Gelvezon, subject to Civil Service Laws and Rules." It declared
inter alia that "in the case of Mrs. Gelvezon, who is neither a retiree nor over-age (57 or over), the head is
not required to secure prior authority." cralaw virtua1aw lib rary

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the appointment of Gelvezon was violative of
law and the pertinent administrative regulations, particularly CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s-1982.
CSRO No. 6 also reminded the CSC that "grant of authority is a condition precedent before Mrs. Gelvezon
can be reinstated in the service, considering that she retired therefrom as may be duly supported" by her
application for retirement dated May 23, 1988 and its approval effective October 26, 1988.

These representations were denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-307, dated January 11, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which read:chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to deny, as it hereby denies, the
instant motion for reconsideration. The earlier decision of this Commission as embodied in CSC Resolution
No. 89-321 dated May 5, 1989 is therefore affirmed. However, Mrs. Ruby G. Gelvezon, the Chief of Hospital
II of RPTMH and the Regional Health Director of Region VI, Iloilo City are hereby admonished to be more
prudent and circumspect in making representations, otherwise, a repetition of a similar act in the future will
be dealt with administratively.

The petitioner then came to this Court, claiming that the respondent CSC had committed grave abuse of
discretion in sustaining the reinstatement of private respondent Gelvezon.

Required to comment, the Solicitor General begins with an assertion of his right and duty "to present to the
Court the position that will legally uphold the best interest of the Government although it may run counter
to a client’s position" and his "specific mandate to act and represent the Republic and/or the people before
any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require." He then declares that he cannot agree with the
respondent CSC and proceeds to explain why he thinks it is in error.

In the recent case of Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 1 we sustained the authority invoked here by the
Solicitor General. To be fair, however, we have made it clear that whenever he disagrees with the office he
is supposed to represent, as in the case at bar, we shall allow such office to file its own comment in support
of its position. Such comment has been submitted by public respondent CSC.

It is the contention of the Solicitor General that the abovementioned resolutions of the CSC should be
reversed as contrary to law and regulations. His view is that the CSC cannot direct the appointment of
Gelvezon as this would be an encroachment on the prerogative of another department, besides the fact that
there is no justification for her appointment in view of her ineligibility and the availability of other
candidates. He notes especially her disqualification for the office for having misrepresented that she had
merely resigned (and so needed no special authority to return) when the truth was that she had retired.

It is true, as he maintains, that the CSC cannot usurp the appointing power from the appropriate authority
and substitute its choice with another on the ground that the latter is better qualified. The discretion to
determine this matter belongs to the appointing authority and not respondent CSC. The only function of the
CSC in this regard is to ascertain whether the appointee possesses the prescribed qualifications and, if so, to
attest to such fact. The only ground upon which the appointment may be disallowed is that the appointee is
not qualified, not that he is in its opinion less qualified than others. The presumption is that the appointing
authority is the best judge of this matter. As we said in Luego v. Civil Service Commission: 2

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

The CSC denies that it has usurped the appointing power of another department and stresses that all it did
was direct CSRO No. 6 to act on the appointment made by the Health authorities. It was not making the
appointment itself or ordering it to be made but merely sustaining it under the applicable civil service rules
and regulations. Finding that Gelvezon possessed the prescribed qualifications and satisfied the
requirements of CSC Memorandum-Circular No. 5, s-1983, it had merely approved her reinstatement as
proposed by the Regional Health Director.

It is not clear from the records who has appointed Gelvezon as Chief Nurse I. Dr. Jose M. Tupaz, Jr.,
Director of the Hospital, merely recommended her reinstatement to Dr. Prudencio M. Ortiz as Regional
Health Director, who in turn requested from CSRO No. 6 authority to reinstate her. The reinstatement was
presumably to be done by him. Under the law, it is the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Health, who can make appointments of key personnel in the Department of Health. Yet, in the
case at bar, Dr. Ortiz was asking for authority to reinstate Gelvezon as if he himself had the power to do
this.

It seems to us that Dr. Ortiz’s request should at the very least have been coursed through or cleared by the
Secretary of Health before being submitted to CSRO No. 6 with his approval. The reinstatement of Gelvezon
would require a new appointment and it has not been shown that the Regional Health Director has the
power to make such appointment. The presumption of regularity of official functions is not applicable
because the power in question clearly belongs not to Dr. Ortiz but his superiors.

But even assuming that the Regional Health Director was duly empowered to make the appointment, there
were still special conditions that had to be fulfilled under Memorandum-Circular No. 5, s-1983, which,
significantly, was promulgated by the Civil Service Commission itself. It must be remembered that we deal
here not with the appointment of a newcomer to the public service. Gelvezon is a retiree. Additional
requirements are prescribed for her appointment because it involves the reinstatement of a person who,
after having left the government, has a change of heart and wishes to return. cralawnad

These requirements are embodied in CSC Memorandum-Circular No. 5, s-1983, reading in full as follows: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR

TO: ALL HEADS OF MINISTRIES, BUREAUS, AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

SUBJECT: Guidelines on Appointment of Persons who have Reached the age of 57 Years. Reinstatement of
Persons who have been Previously Retired from the Service, and Retention in the Service of Persons who
have Reached the Compulsory Retirement Age of 65 Years.

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 830 dated November 27, 1975 as implemented by Letter of
Implementation No. 47 dated August 18, 1976, the Civil Service Commission is empowered to reinstate in
the service persons who have been previously retired from the service, and to extend the services of
persons who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, except Presidential appointees.

To insure effective and facilitate action on requests of such nature, the following guidelines are prescribed:
1aw libra ry
chan rob1e s virtual

1. All requests shall be made by the appointing authority concerned and directly addressed to the respective
Civil Service Regional Office. CSC Regional Offices have been given authority to act on such requests.

2. Requests for authority for such appointment, reinstatement or retention shall meet the following
conditions as certified by the appointing authority.

a. the exigencies of the service so require;

b. the officer or employee concerned possesses special qualification not possessed by other officers or
employees in the agency where he is to be appointed or retained; and

c. the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees in the agency concerned, or
by transfer of qualified officers or employees from other government agencies, or there are no eligibles in
the appropriate register of the Commission available for certification to the vacancy.

3. No person shall be reinstated if he has been separated from the service through delinquency or
misconduct on his part or if he has been separated under LOI Nos. 11, 14, 14-A, and 14-B unless he has
been granted executive clemency by the President.

4. Each request must be accompanied by a medical certificate issued by a government physician certifying
that the person is still physically and mentally healthy to be appointed in the service.

5. Officers or employees who have been recommended for appointment, reinstatement, or retention in the
service shall not be allowed to assume or continue in office pending receipt of authority from the Civil
Service Regional Office concerned.

Henceforth, all requests relating to the above matters should make reference to this Memorandum Circular.
law libra ry
chanrobles

This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately.

(SGD.) ALBINA MANALO-DANS

Chairman

August 1, 1983 (Emphasis supplied)

The Solicitor General maintains that the appointment of Gelvezon, assuming it has been made by the
appropriate authority, nevertheless does not meet the three conditions mentioned in Paragraph 2 of the
memorandum-circular. Neither is the authorization to reinstate required in Paragraph 5 sustainable under
the proven facts.

Like the assessment of the appointee’s qualifications, the determination of whether the appointment is
demanded by the exigencies of the service should be made by the appointing authorities themselves, at
least in the first instance. As it is they who can best understand the needs and operations of their own
offices, their findings on this matter are entitled to great respect even from this Court.

We note, however, that in meeting the requirement of Paragraph 2 (a), Dr. Tupas, as Director of the
RPTMH, merely said in his recommendation: 3
1. That the exigency of the service demands that the position should be filled. Problems in the Nursing
Service have cropped up wanting of the attendance of a nursing administrator which may assume,
unmanageable magnitude if left unsolved.

This same recommendation was reiterated verbatim by Dr. Ortiz in his own letter to CSRO No. 6 requesting
authority to reinstate Gelvezon. 4

Its tortuous construction aside, the above-quoted statement actually says nothing. It is no more than so
many clichs stringed together to satisfy the requirement, without any earnest effort to specify the problems
facing the Nursing Service and why they "may assume unmanageable magnitude if left unsolved" because of
the non-appointment of the recommendee. The "exigency of the service" is not explained nor is it shown
why it "demands" the filling of the position. The necessity for Gelvezon sounds exaggerated. The
generalization seeks more to impress than to inform and persuade. If a meaningless justification like this
could suffice, the requirement might as well be discarded altogether as a useless formality.

Regarding subsection (b), the respondents stress that in the examination given by the Selection, Placement
and Promotion Board of the RPTMH, Gelvezon placed first with a rating of 88.25%, followed by Medalla P.
Balandra with 87.5% and Violeta T. Teologo with 83.25%. This was probably the main reason for the
conclusion that Gelvezon was the best candidate among the three and for the following encomium from Dr.
Ortiz (again echoing Dr. Tupaz word for word): cha nrob les.com : vi rtua l law lib ra ry

2. Mrs. Ruby G. Gelvezon brings along with her the degree of competence, respectability and dedication to
service, qualities very desirable among people in the Civil Service, especially in the Department of Health.
These qualities are found wanting in the other applicants. 5

It is not explained why applicants Balandra and Teologo are "wanting" in the qualities of "competence,
respectability and dedication to service" that seem to be the exclusive virtues of the private Respondent.
The statement is itself wanting or not stating what other special qualifications Gelvezon possessed, besides
topping the examination, that were not possessed by the other candidates. The qualifications of these
aspirants were not discussed at all and were probably simply dismissed as irrelevant. But they are not, of
course, for the requirement is that the appointee must possess special qualifications "not possessed" by the
other candidates.

As we see it, the recommendation is at best an unfair commentary on Balandra and Teologo, at worst an
undeserved disparagement of their credentials. These are not so far behind those of Gelvezon, especially in
the case of Balandra, or even of Teologo, who had served as acting Chief Nurse and holds the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Gelvezon finished only the Graduate Nurse course.

The discretion given the appointing authority is subject to stricter review where the person appointed is
being returned to the government after voluntarily retiring and collecting all the benefits appurtenant to
such retirement. The earlier approval of Gelvezon’s retirement signifies that her services as Senior Nurse
were dispensable in 1986. Suddenly she is needed again. It must take more than the usual explanation to
justify her reinstatement now on the ground that her services are after all indispensable. A retiree cannot
just resume where he left off without the special qualifications (not possessed by the other candidates)
required in Paragraph 2(b). cralawnad

Even assuming that Gelvezon does have these qualifications, her appointment is still not defensible under
Paragraph 2(c) because there are other candidates for the office who are eligible and available. The rule
expressly allows reinstatement only "if the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or
employees in the agency concerned." It is true that the next-in-rank rule admits of exceptions, as we have
ruled in many cases. 6 But deviation from that rule requires special justification in the case at bar because a
retiree should ordinarily not be allowed to pre-empt incumbent aspirants.

The treatment of Paragraph 5 is still another matter that is not easy to understand. Contrary to the original
findings of the respondent CSC, there was a need for authority to reinstate Gelvezon because she had
retired from the public service four years ago. The reason for the original erroneous finding was her
suppression of that material fact. Confronted later with the record, she could not deny that she had indeed
not merely resigned but retired. The CSC then retracted its earlier statement and conceded that as a retiree
Gelvezon was directly covered by the memorandum-circular. Nevertheless, by some queer logic, it blandly
declared in its Resolution No. 90-037: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

. . . Moreover, the Commission, in said Resolution, directed CSRO No. 6 to act on the appointment of Mrs.
Gelvezon for the reason that the Commission found that said Mrs. Gelvezon merely resigned from her
position and thus, CSC MC No. 5, series of 1983 does not apply to her case. By this action of the
Commission, whatever defect there may be in the questioned appointment of Mrs. Gelvezon to the
contested position is thus validated or rectified." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

The Court feels that in giving such authority, the CSC was unduly forebearing. Even if Paragraph 2 were
disregarded, Gelvezon would still not qualify for the position because she had falsified her application and
concealed the fact that she was a retiree. It is plain that she was less than honest. As the CSC itself later
declared:c hanro bles. com : virt ual law l ibra ry

A keen restudy of the case reveals that Mrs. Gelvezon actually filed an Application for Retirement under RA
1616 on May 23, 1986 effective October 26, 1986, as shown by the said document and her signature in it.
More importantly, in a letter dated July 12, 1988 to the Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH), the
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Iloilo Branch, Iloilo City, approved the said
application for retirement of Mrs. Gelvezon effective October 26, 1986, which approval was docketed as
Retirement Gratuity No. ILO-RG-003331. Hence, it can be said that a misrepresentation or suppression of
fact was made by Mrs. Gelvezon, the Chief of Hospital II of RPTMH and the Regional Health Director as to
the alleged resignation of Mrs. Gelvezon . . ., (Emphasis supplied)

One wonders why, despite this finding, the CSC still approved Gelvezon’s appointment, deciding simply to
rap her on the wrist with a mere admonition. To use the language of Rule 111, Section 23, of Civil Service
Rules and Personnel Actions and Policies, she "had intentionally made a false statement of a material fact or
had practiced or attempted to practice a deception or fraud in connection with her appointment." Yet the
CSC brushed aside this offense as a minor infraction that deserved no sterner action than a mild reproof.

Her reinstatement does not square with the high standards the CSC has itself set for the members of the
Civil Service. As the constitutional body charged with the improvement of the quality of the civil service, the
CSC should have been the first to question Gelvezon’s appointment instead of heartily endorsing it.

Parenthetically, we note the Solicitor General’s observations that Gelvezon was not really being reinstated as
she had never before held the position of Chief Nurse I, having retired only as Senior Nurse. He is correct,
strictly speaking, but the word "reinstatement" was probably used in a generic sense to mean simply
returning to the service. At any rate, the point is not really material because the memorandum-circular
speaks of "appointment, reinstatement or retention" of the persons covered by its provisions. cra lawnad

We hold, in sum, that as a retiree, Gelvezon could not be simply reinstated like any new appointee but had
to satisfy the stringent requirements laid down by CSC Memorandum-Circular No. 5, s-1983. While it is true
that the appointing authority has wide discretion to determine the need to appoint and to assess the
qualifications of the person to be appointed, that discretion may not be exercised ex-gratia but "in
conformity to the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve the ends of substantial justice." 7 That
discretion may be reviewed and reversed in proper cases, especially where extraordinary care is required to
attend its exercise, as in the case at bar. Apart from the fact that the Regional Health Director does not
appear to be the official authorized to appoint the private respondent, we are not convinced that Gelvezon
was the best choice under the particular circumstances of this case, not the least important of which was the
shunting aside of the other candidates, who were eligible and available, besides being incumbent in the
service. We also feel that while not the crucial consideration, the private respondent’s disqualification should
have been taken into serious account in comparing the over-all competence of the candidates instead of
being dismissed as a light and forgivable misdeed.

It is really curious that Gelvezon was accommodated in the disputed position despite the confidence of
formidable arguments against her reinstatement. For prejudicing the rights of the other qualified candidates,
the grave abuse of discretion clearly shown here should be corrected and reversed.

Promotions in the Civil Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications, including occupational
competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and, not least important, loyalty to the service. The last trait
should always be given appropriate weight, to reward the civil servant who has chosen to make his
employment in the Government a lifetime career in which he can expect advancement through the years for
work well done. Political patronage should not be necessary. His record alone should be sufficient assurance
that when a higher position becomes vacant, he shall be seriously considered for the promotion and, if
warranted, preferred to less devoted aspirants.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is GRANTED. CSC Resolution Nos. 89-321 and 90-037 are hereby SET ASIDE as
NULL AND VOID. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Endnotes: