Act- and Rule- Utilitarianism:

Strengths and Weaknesses amongst Moral Theorists and Moral Agents

Alicia Mak Ka Yean

SP0002: Ethics

Professor Melvin Chen

19 April 2019

Question 3

Word count: 2390

 The normative stance of utilitarianism has had a long history of development and

modifications since the first systematic account of classical utilitarianism by Bentham – that

our actions have to promote the intrinsic good, pleasure, and reduce the intrinsic bad, pain.

Based on the principle of utility, he contends that actions are right when they promote

pleasure, and wrong when they cause pain. Alternative views towards Bentham’s stance have

created different forms of utilitarianism: Mill, for example, has argued against the nature of

Bentham’s hedonism, for the existence of different qualitative levels of pleasure and pain,

affecting the calculation of utility (Driver, 2014). Contemporary alternatives for utilitarianism

have also helped refine classical utilitarianism, with one such form being the theory of rule-

and act-utilitarianism. First introduced by Brandt in his work Ethical Theory, the theory

questions how actions affect overall utility, and thus its rightness. Act-utilitarianism concurs

that the dependence is direct – the consequences of the act itself must be judged directly to

ascertain its overall utility (Eggleston, 2014). In contrast, rule-utilitarianism claims that this

dependence is indirect, and instead mediated by rules: the utilitarian criterion is applied to the

basic general rules governing these acts (Harsanyi, 1977). Rule-utilitarianism remains to be

the more popular form, with both utilitarians and its critics claiming it as the “most plausible

form of utilitarianism” (Decew, 1983). Brandt was a self-proclaimed rule-utilitarian, and

recent works have attributed Mill’s moral theory as that of rule-utilitarianism. (Turner, 2015).

While works have typically chosen a stance between act- and rule- utilitarianism, this

essay will argue that the choice between both options is dependent on the perspective and

objectives of the person seeking to apply the theory to an action. Undeniably, both act- and

rule-utilitarianism are still utilitarian in foundation, and each evaluation of an action should

consider its utility. Their difference, however, lies in the scope of consequences it evaluates:

Act-utilitarianism considers the consequences if a sole person performs the act, while rule-

utilitarianism evaluates the consequences should everybody perform the act as a general rule

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(Brody, 1967). People that seek morally right actions can be split into two groups: moral

theorists and moral agents, with both requiring a difference scope of circumstances evaluated.

Rule-utilitarianism is the more appropriate form of evaluation to be used by moral

theorists. A theorist’s aim would be to understand how everyone, or society, ought to behave

in order to create an ideal system that maximises utility. Rather than focusing on how people

would realistically act, the theorist considers on how people should ideally act. This provides

them the freedom to consider the consequences of an action if it was theoretically followed

by society, with little consideration on the problems of how individuals would realistically

act, as they are burdened with human limitations such as moral weakness. Moral theorists can

thus utilise a generalisation test present within rule-utilitarianism when evaluating an action’s

act for all of society. Emmons asserts that rule-utilitarianism raises the question of “What are

the consequences if everyone were to do X in situation Y?” to evaluate the utility of an act,

and it assumes everyone would indeed do action X. In this case, the assumption is justified.

(Emmons, 1973). Act-utilitarianism, in comparison, would require that each individual act’s

utility is evaluated, requiring much time and effort to understand each individual in a society.

Rule-utilitarianism, would thus be more efficient in providing a moral theorist an answer to a

theoretical what-if question.

For moral theorists to create an ideal system for a society, it is necessary for them to

also understand what “morally right” agents would do. According to Brandt, “morally right”

can be construed as “the moral code a fully rational person would choose and must strongly

tend to support for his society”. These “morally right” agents are without decision errors, and

have all relevant information. While the existence of such an agent may seem impractical,

these assumptions are necessary due to the aim of a moral theorist to create an ideal system. It

is also stated that a fully rational person would choose to do an act if, and only if, it was

called for by an ideal moral code. The argument outlined by Brandt proceeds as follows:

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 P1: An act A is morally obligatory for person P iff A is permitted by a moral system S

justified for P.

P2: A moral system S is justified for P iff S is worthy of being chosen by P.

P3: A moral system S is worthy of being chosen by P iff P, were he fully rational,

would have a strong tendency to support S for the society in which he expected to

leave his lifetime.

P4: P, were he fully rational, would tend strongly to support S iff S would maximise

utility if it were current, that is iff S is an ideal moral code

C: An act A is morally obligatory for P iff A is called for by an ideal moral code.

Considering the definition mentioned above, an action is thus morally right if, and only if, it

has been called for by an ideal moral code (Decew, 1983). This argument supports that a

rational person would follow rule-utilitarianism rather than act-utilitarianism – that the

rightness of an act should be based off the rules regarding the act, which has in this case,

become a moral code for the rational person. As a moral theorist, the ideal system should be

based on the fully rational man’s choice of rule-utilitarianism.

However, this argument is prone to critique by detractors of rule-utilitarianism,

claiming that the use of an “ideal moral code” in the formation of an ideal system could

cultivate a form of rule worship. Rather than an evaluation of the consequences of actions

using the principle of utility, rule-utilitarianism leads to a heavy reliance of rules. Even in an

ideal society where the rules do follow the principle of utility, and maximises each action’s

utility, it seems that “doing the right thing” is simply based on a codified set of instructions

on what is right or wrong – an agent would simply follow the rules governing the action first,

rather than consider the act’s consequences. This reflects more of a deontological

perspective, which focuses on the rightness and wrongness of the actions itself, instead of the

utilitarian focus towards consequences.

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 In relation to this critique, Smart similarly claims that this reliance on rules is relevant

for moral agents that do not have time to work out the pros and cons, and would fall back on

rules as mere rules of thumbs (Smart, 1973). However, while moral agents may commit the

fallacy of rule worship by resorting to established rules to know what one ought to do in tight

situations, the same cannot be said for moral theorists. Moral theorists, in the process of

creating an ideal system, would have the opportunity for proper deliberation required to

consider the utility a certain action would generally produce before deeming it a morally right

rule - thus still following the principle of utility.

In contrast to a moral theorist, a moral agent would be determining what he, as an

individual, ought to do, and would choose the type of utilitarianism that best suits this

objective. An agent cannot assume an environment of ideal society, and has to practically

consider the environment he exists in, including how others could possibly behave (Emmons,

1973). In such cases, rule-utilitarianism could be able to account for agents that follow

different normative stances. It would be realistic to assume that it is unlikely that every single

member of a society would follow the same normative stance of maximising utility – some

might focus on self-interest, or on their duties. According to Harsanyi, rule-utilitarianism

takes into account the importance of social institutions that has a network of differing moral

obligations in society as compared to act-utilitarianism. For example, one can take the

traditional morality that promises should be kept. Act-utilitarianism would deem breaking a

promise as morally right if it brought about even a slightly higher utility, such as white lie to

minimise the other party’s sadness. In contrast, rule-utilitarianism would have considered the

consequences of a general practice allowing repeated promise breaking – such as a distrust

for the law, which would greatly reduce the incentive to engage in lawful activities, and thus

decrease utility. In such a case, promise breaking remains morally wrong. Rule-utilitarianism

allows for the recognition of the social institutions which establish the network of moral

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rights and obligations amongst different people in society, through the rules set in place. In

most cases, this allows the agent to maintain that the rights and obligations of others in a

society must not be infringed upon the grounds of immediate social utility (Harsanyi, 1977).

Emmons, however, has raised up a criticism against this argument: What if the rules

accepted by society are less than ideal (Emmons, 1973)? A moral agent, in this case, would

be caught between following society’s rules dictating the performance of the act, or following

the principle of utility. Mill provides a similar argument– even the most optimal, practical,

rules are bound to have exceptions where its performance in a certain context would generate

an enormous amount of negative utility (Turner, 2015). For example, what would happen if

there are extreme cases where following the rule of keeping a promise would not improve a

society’s welfare? Take a case where promise-breaking would prevent someone from setting

off a nuclear bomb that would decimate the entire country, with the negative utility generated

offsetting all of the utility promise-keeping has created: should the rule still be followed? In

such cases, it is argued that a conformity of rules should not absolve the individual of

responsibility for his actions. While Lyons has raised weak rule-utilitarianism as a possible

counterpoint which allows “sub-rules” to handle the exceptions in rules, he concedes that

they will necessarily tend to fall back into act-utilitarianism to evaluation each exception

(Lyons, 1965).

To such type of objection, Mill has claimed that we should not expect to include any

universal rules, which has regarded as “chimerical”. Rather, general practical rules can be an

aid for agents, though they are imprecise and rife with “approximate generalisations”, and

should not even be established for a “complicated class of subjects” (Turner, 2015).

In light of arguments made against rule-utilitarianism, it seems that the use of act-

utilitarianism would be able to resolve its limitations. For a moral agent that utilises act-

utilitarianism, his first line of thought would be to contemplate the probable consequences of

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performing the act in question, and evaluating its net utility. Through this thought process, he

will truly be relying solely on the utilitarian criterion – the principle of utility. However,

Smart concedes that even as an act-utilitarian, he would have to turn to certain societal rules

when there is little opportunity for a proper deliberation of consequences. The stark

difference from the rule worship as committed by rule-utilitarians, however, is that an act-

utilitarian would regard the rules set in place simply as rules of thumb, and look to them only

as rough guides, rather than a moral code to be used in every situation. This can be useful

even for act-utilitarians, as it prevents an endless counting of the probable consequences

should the act be performed, especially in cases where time remains limited to make a

decision. For example, when a married man sees that his wife is tired, and decides to offer to

wash the dishes – the moral agent (the married man) has not deliberated the various

consequences and utility in performing the action. Instead, he has used the rule of thumb that

it would maximise utility, in this situation, to act spontaneously without calculation (Smart,

1973).

Emmons raises the point that extreme act-utilitarianism could be inconsistent in

situations calling for a “reversal of polarity”. This situation occurs when the theory of act-

utilitarianism is applied to action A, which could give different results should everyone do A

as compared to if an individual does A (Emmons, 1973). For example, a moral agent could be

in a situation where he can vote only with great inconvenience to himself. The candidate that

the moral agent intends on voting for currently has the majority vote, and will improve social

utility greatly once voted in. Based on act-utilitarianism, the utility maximising, and morally

right act would be not to vote, since the candidate would be voted in anyway. However, if

everyone refrains from voting like the moral agent, the candidate would not be voted in, and

utility would not be maximised (Brody, 1967).

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 Mill rebuts against this argument by claiming that a single moral agent should not

normally attempt to calculate the consequences of his actions for the whole world. Instead, a

moral agent would be better off limiting his scope to the evaluation of more local

consequences and direct effect on the people he understands well in most cases. To regulate

larger matters affecting the wider globe, the individual would be better off staying within the

general rules laid out by the social authorities (Turner, 2015). As the role of a moral agent, it

is likely that his scope of actions would be limited to directly affecting less important matters,

and is much more confined to consequences in his community. Harsanyi further claims that a

utilitarian would normally be able to assume that the “remote effects of his actions tend

rapidly to zero”. An example brought up would be of a man deciding whether to seduce his

neighbour’s wife – the man does not need to consider the possibility that if he does seduce

her, that a remote descendant would be a great benefactor of the human race. Instead, he

should be considering the consequences in the short term – which is, the unhappiness he is

likely to cause to his neighbour (Harsanyi, 1977). Act-utilitarianism thus remains to be a

more effective theory in these aspects for a moral agent.

In conclusion, one could decide between act- and rule-utilitarianism based on its

effectiveness in meeting his objectives: Moral theorists are likely to use rule-utilitarianism for

its wider scope of evaluation in an ideal system they have to create. In contrast, a mix of

weak-utilitarianism backed up by act-utilitarianism would appeal to moral agents as a rule of

thumb that can be practically followed, while still backed by the principle of utility.

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 References

Brody, B. A. (1967, December). The equivalence of act and rule utilitarianism. Philosophical
Studies, 18(6), 81-87.

Decew, W. J. (1983, January). Brandt's new defense of rule utilitarianism. Philosophical

Studies, 43(1), 101-116.

Driver, J. (2014). The History of Utilitarianism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

Eggleston, B. (2014). Act Utilitarianism. In The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism

(pp. 125-145). Cambridge University Press.

Emmons, D. C. (1973, April). Act vs. Rule-Utilitarianism. Mind, 82(326), 226-233.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1977). Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Social Research,
44(4), 623-656.

Lyons, D. (1965). Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Smart, J. J. (1973). In Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.

Turner, P. N. (2015, October). Rules and Right in MIll. Journal of the History of Philosophy,
53(4), 723-745.