TSARIST VIOLENCE: THE USE OF FORCEFUL POWER TO ASSERT AND MAINTAIN

AUTOCRATIC CONTROL FROM IVAN III TO THE CRIMEAN WAR

Lewis Richardson
HIST 0301/History 264: Russian History and Culture
March 9th, 2018
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From the very birth of the Russian state and emergence of the Tsar, the struggle for

authority and dominance has been a tempestuous and holistically unconventional process that have

created a drastic contrast with its Western counterparts. Of course, feudalism as it was employed

via the ubiquitous system of serfdom is not unique to Russians; despite this, nowhere else in the

world has such a system been as heavily influential or possessed the same longevity as it was done

in Russia. Despite the dependence upon feudal serfdom in order to organize Russian society for

such a substantive period of time, the system certainly did not remain intact without a considerable

amount of manipulation by means of the all-powerful and sole (meaningful) governing authority

within the Russian state between the reign of Ivan III and the Crimean War — the Tsar. In a

Hegelian sense, it should appear as ironic that the tsar, being the deified ruler of the Russian people

in many accords throughout history, derived a large portion of his/her power from the wealth,

resources, and relatively state-controlled stability that came by way of the serfdom. Through the

use of effective, pointed violence, a number of tsars catalyzed the consolidation of their power and

solidification and preservation of autocracy as a social institution which is subservient to the

crown. Likewise, a multitude of weak and otherwise unwilling tsars have utilized violence in order

to govern serfs ineffectively which in turn prompted a challenge to their power and authority, often

leading to either a deposition or complete undermining of the power of the autocracy. In order to

codify the power of the autocrat, the use of effective and often arbitrarily dispersed violence has

served as the single most important weapon in a ruler’s arsenal in an effort to sustain the working

relationship between serfdom and the crown.

The normalization of violence in Russian society as a means of exercising autocratic

authority upon those in the peasant class is not unique to the reigns of later tsars leading up to the

Crimean War; in fact, the exercise of physically imposing force and subhuman treatment of the
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peasants hearkens back to the origins of Russia and laid the groundwork for the state as we know

it today. The origins of the Russian state, the Kievan Rus people, represent the starting place for

understanding the evolution of the Russian culture into its form upon Ivan III’s succession to the

throne in 1463.1 Prior to his succession, all of the Rus Principalities (with the exception of

Novgorod) which formerly existed as independent entities were conquered by the Mongol Golden

Horde in the 13th century and converted to vassal states who were forced to pay tribute to their

occupiers.2 As is characteristically true with any occupying force, the Rus people were not treated

particularly well and were seen largely as economic objects who were utilized solely to fill Mongol

coffers via tribute. Because tax collection was delegated by the Mongols to Rus people, eventually

Ivan I consolidated Moscow’s role as the primary tax collector, which in turn allowed him to amass

a large amount of wealth and power both personally and on behalf of Moscow. This in turn allowed

him to mount the first opposition to the oppressive Mongol rule, planting the seed for an

independent Rus state. Following the implosion of the Mongol Golden Horde in 1450, rule over

the Rus principalities was seized by Ivan III/the Great in 1462, which in turn led to the

establishment of an overarching and unified Muscovite Rus State.

The origins of Russian tsardom provide an incredible insight into the workings of the

government as it relates to the treatment of those in the peasant class following the establishment

of an independent state. As is true with the vast majority of upheavals resulting in an abolishment

of the governmental status quo in Western history, the movement away from one governing body

typically comes with modifications to the manner in which the state operates. It should stand to

reason that if oppression from the former government prompted a revolution then change would

1. Moss, Walter, A History of Russia Volume 1: To 1917, (Anthem, 2002), 67.

2. Moss, Walter. 72.
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occur in the system that follows. Interestingly, the reign of Ivan III came with the failure to

establish a uniquely Rus independent state apparatus which served the people outside of the newly

established autocracy (serfs). Instead, Ivan III utilized largely the same tribute based system that

the recently ousted Mongols used, with the primary substantive difference being his arbitrary

position ‘inside’ the Rus state as a seemingly legitimate ruler.3 Additionally, the state apparatus

which Ivan III did establish — a complete, unquestionable autocracy — was employed in such a

manner that it could only benefit the tsar wholly at the expense of the serfs. Herein lies the root of

internal Russian violence as a means to subjugate the peasant class to the crown and establish the

narrative of dominance by force that exists so pervasively throughout the next 400 years.

In order to go about establishing the narrative of tsarist dominance over the serfs, Ivan III

first had to lay out a quasi-legal framework for serfdom which legitimized the violent enforcement

and the swift punishment of dissidents. He achieved just this with the Restrictions on Peasant

Movement where it is written: “And whoever should leave [monastery estates] on other than St.

George’s Day, I am ordering you to return him. Do not accept people during the rest of the year…

you may accept him only during two weeks of the year…”.4 Furthermore, Ivan the Great solidified

such assertions in his Sudebnik, a law code written in 1497, when he wrote: “And peasants may

leave a canton, or [go] from village to village, once a year, for a week before and after St. George’s

Day in Autumn.”5 Such legal restrictions like the decrees and law code, while not inherently

violent, justified the violence that would be brought upon the peasant class by tsars to follow.

3. Moss, Walter, A History of Russia Volume 1: To 1917

4. Ivan III, “Restrictions on Peasant Movement”, Translated by Robert Mitchell and
Nevill Forbes. In Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 850-1700, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn. Gulf
Breeze: Academic International Press, 2000.
5. Ivan III, “The Sudebnik [Code of Law] of Ivan III, 1497”, Translated by Robert
Mitchell and Nevill Forbes. In Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 850-1700, edited by Basil
Dmytryshyn. Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 2000.
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Further, both of these documents established the immense reduction of peasant autonomy in

exchange for a strengthened autocracy by way of adding stability to the turbulent Russian

landscape.

Following Ivan III, the most blatant examples of the use of violence as a means of

subjugating serfs to the will of the crown arose from Ivan IV and his brutal Oprichnina

government. More often known as Ivan the Terrible because of his reputation for brutality, his

personal arm of the state known as the oprichniki functionally satisfied the role of Ivan’s personal

police force and enforced his policies with zeal. In a foreigner’s description of the Oprichnina, the

unchecked power of the oprichniki was described when it was written:

A person from the oprichnina could accuse someone from the zemshchina of owing him a
sum of money. And even if the oprichnik had never known or seen the accused from the
zemshchina, the latter had to pay him immediately or he was publically beaten in the
marketplace with knouts or cudgels every day until he paid. No one was spared in this… 6
Such an arbitrary form of enforcement worked effectively for Ivan IV if only because those in the

zemshchina, a vast majority of the population, including all serfs, did not possess the means to

begin to oppose the rule of the autocracy. Doing so would likely lead to the death and destruction

of all in the relative vicinity of the action. Looking to the account of Ivan’s punishment and

largescale massacre of people of all classes in Novgorod in 1570, his actions personally and

through his oprichniki demonstrate his ideal distribution of justice when it is written: “The Tsar

commanded… citizens of every rank be brought before him, together with their wives and

children. The Tsar ordered that they be tortured in his presence in various spiteful, horrible, and

inhuman ways.”7 The text continues in saying:

6. “A Foreigner Describes the Oprichnina of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1565-70)”

7. “Ivan the Terrible’s Punishment of Novgorod in 1570”, Translated by Robert Mitchell
and Nevill Forbes. In Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 850-1700, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn.
Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 2000.
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The Tsar ordered that their wives and children be brought to the Volkhov bridge, where a
high platform had been erected. He commanded that they be chained on the arms and legs
and that the children be tied to their mothers and then be thrown from the platform into the
waters of the Volkhov River… When the people, men and women of all ages, surfaced,
they were stabbed by the soldiers… In a horrible manner they were submerged without
mercy in the depths of the river, and abandoned to a terrible and bitter death.8
It is important to bear in mind that such a graphic and merciless attack on the peasants and people

of all classes was completely unjustified and unnecessary, as it was brought about by the mere

suspicion that the city of Novgorod and their Archbishop had pledged allegiance to Polish-

Lithuanian protection. It was not a form of retributive justice; it was simply a raw display of

authority and dominance over the peasants. This attack not only demonstrates the strengthened

power of the autocracy relative to the reign of Ivan III less than 100 years ago, but it also reveals

the reduction of any semblance of personal autonomy that the serfs may have experienced prior.

Although vastly more ‘enlightened’ than Ivan IV, Peter the Great employed violence in a

pointed manner throughout his rule to solidify the position of the autocracy despite his increasingly

liberal Western ideas concerning serfdom. Perhaps the most pragmatic and zealous of the Russian

tsars, his fist was absolute in all matters as emphasized by his reaction to the streltsi revolt in 1698

in an outcry against Peter’s westernization of Russian culture. Although the streltsi were not serfs,

armed guards within the Russian military, their punishment is pivotal to the establishment of a

narrative of dominance by the autocracy which can be cross-applied to those lower on the social

hierarchy like peasants. An eyewitness account of the punishment of the streltsi describes the

torment in great detail:

Three hundred and thirty at a time were led out together to the fatal axe’s stroke, and
embrued the whole plain with native but impious blood; for all boyars, senators of the

8. Ibid.
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realm, dumnyi diaks, and so forth… had been summoned by the Tsar’s command to… take
upon themselves in the hangman’s office.9
At this time, Peter the Great was still in his late-adolescent stages and had already been imposing

such heinous forms of enforcement of the autocracy’s power. Additionally, he forced government

officials and boyars, those who held serfs throughout Russian society, to execute treasonous

offenders as an obvious power move. Such a graphic display of swift justice for dissenters from

his reign demonstrated his strengthening of the autocracy even at the expense of the noble class,

which in turn caused a great deal of strife for the serfs in Russian society.

Building on this Peter’s legacy, Catherine II (the Great) further enshrined serfdom as a

necessary and proper social institution even amidst a bloody revolt and largescale efforts to weaken

the power of the crown throughout her reign. The Pugachev Rebellion was perhaps the largest and

most significant insurgence of any kind to meaningfully question the narrative of serfdom. Led by

a Cossack named Emelian Pugachev, the rebellion took place around southeast central Russia

between 1773-1774 and was primarily an effort to release serfs from their bondage. As a result of

the group’s mass slaughter and rape of the nobility as well as the destruction of their holdings

across the countryside, Catherine II described the freedom fighters as “a troop of vagabonds like

himself”10 which were “inhumanely depriving the inhabitants of their possessions. and even of

their lives.”11 More significant to understanding the evolution and relationship between the

autocracy and serfs, the legitimacy of the rebellion were garnered through the false claims that

9. Korb, Johann Georg, “The Revolt and Punishment of the Streltsi in 1698: An
Eyewitness Account”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil
Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999.
10. Catherine II, “Catherine II’s Manifesto against Pugachev, December 23, 1773”, In
Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze:
Academic International Press, 1999.
11. Ibid.
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Pugachev was actually the late Tsar Peter III, although he was murdered upon Catherine II’s

ascension to the throne.12 On this accord, Pugachev penned an “Emancipation Decree” in July of

1774 under Peter III’s name which granted “[freedom] to everyone who was formerly in serfdom

or in any other obligation to the nobility.” 13 Such a claim demonstrates that even though serfdom

was viewed as a widescale evil at the time of the rebellion, the autocracy was absolute in the minds

and hearts of even the most radical Russians. Upon Pugachev’s defeat, Catherine dealt with the

perpetrators in question brutally upon their arrest to deter any other peasants from revolting.

Despite this, it should remain incredibly relevant that the very creed of serfdom and the infallibility

of the crown had been checked in a significant manner which would have lasting effects leading

into Tsar Nicholas I’s reign.

Tsar Nicholas I was perhaps the least well equipped to utilize violence as a means to sustain

the autocratic nature of the crown, as under his reign the question of serfdom was led down the

road which inevitably brought about the rise of the October Revolutions in the early 20 th century.

Although he attempted to take reactionary measures to limit the serf’s ability to dissent as

evidenced in his Manifesto on Peasant Unrest in 1826, Tsar Nicholas was wholly incompetent at

taming the Russian people through traditional, tried and true methods of violence. 14 In the 1826

Manifesto, Nicholas makes it very clear in a variety of manners that serfs should “fulfill all of their

obligations according to the law and obey their appointed superiors submissively,” 15 though the

12. Moss, Walter. A History of Russia Volume I: To 1917

13. Emelian Pugachev (under the name Peter III), “Pugachev’s ‘Emancipation Decree,’
July 31, 1774”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn,
Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999.
14. Nicholas I, “Nicholas I’s Manifesto on Peasant Unrest, May 2, 1826”, In Imperial
Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic
International Press, 1999.
15. Ibid.
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enforcement of such a decree was lackluster judging from the resulting dissent that occurred from

the newly formed Russian intelligentsia. Accordingly, Tsar Nicholas attempted to tighten

restrictions on learning so as to deter dissent in an 1827 restriction which stated that serfs should

only be educated in topics “essential to their well-being so they can then improve agricultural,

handicraft, and other enterprises.”16 Despite this, the autocracy had faced its largest challenge yet

in the noble class. Herzen, a free member of the nobility, issued a statement in 1853 urging nobles

to “Save yourselves from serfdom and peasants from bloodshed,”17 claiming that serfdom was on

its last legs and swift action was necessary to preserve their social status and well-being. In truth,

it was likely Nicholas’ own fault that he essentially lost control of the peasant class and nobility

throughout his reign. The use of arbitrarily dispersed violence paired with an increasingly educated

population and growingly restless serf population would have been a recipe for an explosion of

the autocracy. Additionally, the onset and eventual defeat in the Crimean War did not help his case

in any way. Nonetheless, it is significant that his inaction resulted in the figurative death march

leading up to 1917’s eventual destruction of the autocracy in its entirety.

All things considered, the evolution of the relationship between the autocrat and his/her

subjects in the serf classes can ultimately be measured by the level of violence which is dispersed

by the crown. From the perspective of the tsar, it was holistically rational and necessary at times

to utilize violence to maintain a stable, working relationship with the serfs, especially considering

the turbulent environment geographically and politically that the state is surrounded by. The

16. Nicholas I, “A Restriction on Educational Opportunities for Nonprivileged Members

of Russian Society, August 1827”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by
Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999.
17. Herzen, “Herzen’s Appeal to Russian Nobles, June 1853”, In Imperial Russia: A
Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic International
Press, 1999.
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movement from the barbaric and often criticized Ivan III and Ivan IV to the enlightened and

Westernized Peter the Great and Catherine II describes the movement towards an increased

autonomy for serfs; despite the use of violence in the latter two reigns, the lack of an element of

capriciously awarded brutality is synonymous with the increase of autonomy for the lower classes.

Despite this, the catastrophe that was Tsar Nicholas I’s reign was characterized by a politically

reactionary move in an attempt to regain some semblance of control, though the social mechanisms

and modernization of Russia had rendered such policies useless. In light of these observations, it

should be incredibly clear that moving forward into Russian history following the Crimean War,

the old ways of effectively governing Russia were far gone.

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Bibliography
“A Foreigner Describes the Oprichnina of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1565-70)”

Catherine II, “Catherine II’s Manifesto against Pugachev, December 23, 1773”, In Imperial
Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic
International Press, 1999.
Emelian Pugachev (under the name Peter III), “Pugachev’s ‘Emancipation Decree,’ July 31,
1774”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf
Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999.

Herzen, “Herzen’s Appeal to Russian Nobles, June 1853”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book,
1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press,
1999.
Ivan III, “The Sudebnik [Code of Law] of Ivan III, 1497”, Translated by Robert Mitchell and
Nevill Forbes. In Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 850-1700, edited by Basil
Dmytryshyn. Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 2000.
Ivan III, “Restrictions on Peasant Movement”, Translated by Robert Mitchell and Nevill Forbes.
In Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 850-1700, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn. Gulf Breeze:
Academic International Press, 2000.

“Ivan the Terrible’s Punishment of Novgorod in 1570”, Translated by Robert Mitchell and Nevill
Forbes. In Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 850-1700, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn. Gulf
Breeze: Academic International Press, 2000.
Korb, Johann Georg, “The Revolt and Punishment of the Streltsi in 1698: An Eyewitness
Account”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn,
Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999.

Moss, Walter, A History of Russia Volume 1: To 1917, (Anthem, 2002).

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Society, August 1827”, In Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil
Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1999.

Nicholas I, “Nicholas I’s Manifesto on Peasant Unrest, May 2, 1826”, In Imperial Russia: A
Source Book, 1700-1917, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, Gulf Breeze: Academic
International Press, 1999.