A.C. No.

10373
[Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2280]

FLORA C. MARIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO ECHANEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint Affidavit for Disbarment dated August 25, 20081 filed by Flora
C. Mariano (Mariano) against respondent Atty. Anselmo Echanez (Atty. Echanez), for
violation of the Notarial Law by performing notarial acts on documents without a notarial
commission.

In support of her complaint, Mariano attached several documents to show proof that Atty.
Echanez has indeed performed notarial acts without a notarial commission, to wit: (1)
Complaint dated June 18, 2007;2 (2) JointAffidavit of Gina Pimentel and Marilyn
Cayaban dated May 8, 2008;3 (3) Affidavit of Ginalyn Ancheta dated May 8, 2008;4 and
(4) Joint-Affidavit dated May 8, 2008.5 Also attached to the complaint is a document
containing the list of those who were issued notarial commissions for the year 2006-2007
signed by Executive Judge Efren Cacatian of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City
where Atty. Echanez's name was not included as duly appointed notary public.6

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CED) ordered

Atty. Echanez to submit his answer to the complaint against him.7

Atty. Echanez moved for extension to file his Answer but nevertheless failed to submit
his Answer. Thus, the IBP-CBD, deemed Atty. Echanez to be in default.8

On July 24, 2009, during the mandatory conference, only Mariano appeared. The IBP-
CBD directed the parties to submit their position papers but again only JV1ariano
submitted her verified position paper.

In her position paper, Mariano maintained that Atty. Echanez is unauthorized to perform
notarial services. To support her allegation, Mariano submitted the Certificate of Lack of
Authority for a Notarial Act issued by Executive Judge Anastacio D. Anghad showing
that Atty. Echanez has not been commissioned as a notary public for and within the
jurisdiction of the R TC, Santiago City9 at the time of the unauthorized notarization on
May 8, 2008.10 Mariano likewise attached a Certification issued by

Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian, RTC, Santiago City enumerating those lawyers who
have been commissioned as notary public within and for the territorial jurisdiction of the
R TC of Santiago City for the term of 2007-2008, which does not include Atty. Echanez's
name.11

On May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued
a Resolution No. XIX-2011-273 remanding the case to the investigating commissioner to
refer the documents to the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela who
issued Atty. Echanez's notarial commission for proper verification.12

In its Report and Recommendation,13 the IBP-CBD found Atty. Echanez liable for
malpractice for notarizing documents without a notarial commission. The IBP-CBD
further noted that Atty. Echanez ignored the processes of the Commission by failing to
file an answer on the complaint, thus, it recommended that Atty. Echanez be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years and that he be permanently barred from being
commissioned as notary public.

In a Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-850 dated June 22, 2013, 14 the IBP- Board of
Gcwemors adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.

No motion for reconsideration has been filed by either party.

RULING

We concur with the findings and the recommended penalty of the IBP-CBD.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.15

In the instant case, it is undisputable that Atty. Echanez performed notarial acts on
several documents without a valid notarial commission. 16

The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized notarizations
was likewise sufficiently established by the certifications issued by the Executive Judges
in the territory where Atty. Echanez performed the unauthorized notarial acts.17

Atty. Echanez, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for
and in Cordon, Isabela, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not,
he further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's
oath. This transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."18

In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing
documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case
of Nunga v. Viray,19 a lawyer was suspended by the Court for three (3) years for
notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,20 the
respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing
several documents after the expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of
Laquindanum v. Quintana,21 the Court suspended a lawyer for six ( 6) months and was
disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years
because he notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired
commission. 22

Likewise, Atty. Echanez' conduct in the course of proceedings before the IBP is also a
matter of concern.1awp++i1 Atty. Echanez, despite notices, did not even attempt to
present any defense on the complaint against him. He did not even attend the mandatory
conference set by the IBP. He ignored the IBP's directive to file his answer and position
paper which resulted in the years of delay in the resolution of this case. Clearly, this
conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay
no man for money or malice.
In Ngayan v. Tugade, 23 we ruled that [a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint
against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office
in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Atty. Echanez's failure to attend the mandatory conference and to submit his Answer and
Position paper without any valid explanation is enough reason to make him
administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful directives of
the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof but more so because IBP is the Court-
designated investigator of this case.24 As an officer of the Court, Atty. Echanez is
expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but anorder which
should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the
IBP.25

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being
commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision with
a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the
Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5179

DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty.
Rene 0. Medina on December 10, 1999.2

Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped
respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car
and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa
ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left.4

Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of
respondent's car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0.
Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del Norte.6

According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."7 Respondent's

act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant
alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct. 8

Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit, 10 and a
letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro),
League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro
stated that respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus,
respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of
authority:

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao
City, committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.

The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle
driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very
unbecoming of an elected official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it
is respectfully submitted that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such uncalled
for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.

Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the
Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.

Thank you very much for your attention and more power.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
 (Emphasis in the original)

Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19
Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14 In his Comment, 15
respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the incident happened while he
was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He further alleged that complainant's
reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car.17
When respondent alighted from his car to check the damage, complainant approached
him in an unfriendly manner. 18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his son
and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they
should wait for a traffic officer.20 Both parties agreed that they were both too busy to
wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic officer was present
during the incident.22

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on
radio programs by the Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle
driver.23 He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the
Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to
complainant.24 Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the
Provincial Governor.25

According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen
out of the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao City. 26 During the proceedings, respondent
explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a
weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained
that he went near respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part
of the settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any indemnity for the damage
caused by the tricycle to his car.29

Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated October 27, 2006 of the
Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by
Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties.31

On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report, and recommendation.32

Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I.
De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay
Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been
settled. 34

Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why the
complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory Conference was
reset to September 21, 2007.36

In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent

appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case exparte.38

In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the

penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct
and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the
suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty ( 60)
days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit
the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis in the original)

Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a
slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based
on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's
complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29,
1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct
and abuse of authority and should be held administratively liable.43

On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the
Resolution 44 adopting and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's
recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A "; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of
Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous
manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty
(30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the
Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.

We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively

liable.

There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened.48 He
stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case
and hints that this administrative case is politically motivated.49

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary
proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its
disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of misconduct are established.50
A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys
the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.51 Thus, the
burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52

In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of

evidence, 53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the
other."54

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines Board of Governors also adoptedfound that the slapping incident
actually occurred. 55
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and
notarized Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and
notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic
aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number.58

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama

gave weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith
in the legal profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act of slapping complainant.61
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted
this finding.

The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened

complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political
motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and motive. The
presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's
act. It reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from
lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not
tolerate the arrogance of and harassment committed by its officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints
of a character that disregards the human dignity of another.1awp++i1 Respondent's
question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"

("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the
profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a

stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court
and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to
submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the power to
impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a
public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain officers of the court.
63

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis. 64 They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination
of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a
means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court
officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65

Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor. 66

As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere

witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process
and the finding of administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings.
67

Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have
violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as

attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217725

GLENN A CHIONG and ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY, represented by NORMAN

V. CABRERA, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by
SPEAKER FELICIANO S. BELMOTE, JR.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
represented by ACTING CHAIRPERSON CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM;
ADVISORY COUNCIL, represented by UNDERSECRETARY LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE; TECHNICAL EVALUATION COMMITTEE,
represented by DOST SECRETARY MARIO G. MONTEJO; DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, headed by SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This petition for certiorari1 and/or prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, assails the constitutionality
of Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436,2 as amended by Section 93
of R.A. No. 9369,4 providing for the creation of an Advisory Council (AC) and a
Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC), on the ground that it encroaches on the
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) mandate to administer and enforce all laws
relating to the elections as provided for in Section 2( 1),5 Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.

The Facts

The factual background of this case dates back to the enactment of R.A. No. 8436 on
December 22, 1997 authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. On January 23, 2007, R.A.
No. 9369 was signed into law, amending R.A. No. 8436. Of particular relevance in R.A.
No. 9369 are Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 which calls for the creation of the AC and the TEC.

In Roque, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,6 the Court stated that the AC is to recommend,
among other functions, the most appropriate, secure, applicable and cost-effective
technology to be applied to the AES; while the TEC is tasked to certify, through an
established international certification committee, not later than three months before the
elections, by categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of its hardware and software
components, is operating properly and accurately based on defined and documented
standards.7

Nevertheless, almost eight years after the passage of R.A. No. 9369, and almost six years
after the conclusion of the 2010 elections, and just several months before the 2016
elections, Glenn Chong and Ang Kapatiran Party (petitioners) came to this Court to assail
the constitutionality of the creation of the AC and the TEC. According to the petitioners:
(1) the AC and the TEC are so patently incompatible with a functioning COMELEC; (2)
a mere AC should not be allowed to dictate upon the COMELEC in regard with the
technology to be applied in the AES; and (3) the recommendation of the AC for the
COMELEC to re-use the Precinct Count Optical Scan machines, Consolidation and
Canvassing System, peripherals, laptops, equipment, software, etcetera, in the 2016
elections, as well as its past actions, are patent nullities. In compliance with the Court's
Resolution8 dated June 16, 2015, the respondents submitted its Comment.9 Summing up
the arguments of the respondents, they essentially stated that: (1) the existence of the AC
and the TEC does not limit or prevent the exercise of the COMELEC's constitutional
mandate to enforce election laws; (2) the AC and the TEC merely ensure that the
COMELEC will put in place an effective AES that will clearly and accurately reflect the
will of the sovereign people; (3) the power to provide these safeguards is within the
authority of the Congress, whose power includes the power to ensure the faithful
execution of its policies; and (4) the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by
Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.

The Issue

The crux of this petition is whether Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as
amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369, insofar as they provide for the creation of the
AC and the TEC, are unconstitutional for allegedly being violative of Section 2(1),
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The petitioners conclude that with the creation of the AC and the TEC, pursuant to
Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the Congress undermine the independence of
the COMELEC and infringe upon its power.

The Court, however, finds that the petitioners' thesis finds no support in the evidence
presented. A careful examination of the assailed provisions would reveal that the AC and
the TEC's functions are merely advisory and recommendatory in nature. The AC' s
primordial task is to recommend the most appropriate technology to the AES, while the
TEC's sole function is to certify that the AES, including its hardware and software
components, is operating properly, securely and accurately, in accordance with the
provisions of law.

The functions of the AC are recommendatory, as can be gleaned from the assailed
provision itself in Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436 which provides that the functions of the
AC are merely to recommend, to provide advice and/or assistance, and to participate as
nonvoting members with respect to the COMELEC's fulfillment of its mandate and
authority to use the AES, and which in all instances, is subject to the approval and final
decision of the COMELEC. On the other hand, the TEC's exclusive function is to certify,
through an established international certification entity to be chosen by the COMELEC
from the recommendations of the AC that the AES, including its hardware and software
components, is operating properly, securely, and accurately, in accordance with the
provisions of law.

The Court has conspicuously observed that the petitioners expediently removed in their
petition the following paragraph when they quoted Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369 which
amended Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436, which recognizes the authority of the COMELEC
to enforce the said laws:

Nothing in the role of the Council or any outside intervention or influence shall be
construed as an abdication or diminution of the Commission's authority and responsibility
for the effective development, management and implementation of the AES and this Act.

Evidently, the AC and the TEC were created to aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its
mandate and authority to use an effective AES for free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible
and informed elections. The actions of the AC and the TEC neither bind nor prohibit the
COMELEC from enforcing and administering election laws.
Moreso, the AC and the TEC are not permanent in nature. This is evident in Sections 8
and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended.1awp++i1 The AC shall be convened not later
than 18 months prior to the next scheduled electoral exercise, and deactivated six months
after completion of canvassing, while the TEC shall be immediately convened within 10
days after the effectivity of R.A. No. 9369; however, the TEC shall make the certification
not later than three months before the date of the electoral exercises.

Lastly, the petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the assailed provisions are valid and constitutional since they failed to present
substantial evidence to support their claim.

Besides, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9369 has already been upheld by this Court in
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List
v. COMELEC. 10 In the said case, therein petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 9369 violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, claiming that the title of R.A. No.
9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial
provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. They further alleged
that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the
subject matter of R.A. No. 9369. The Court then sustained the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9369 holding that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified
code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
Moreso, the assailed provisions dealing with the amendments to specific provisions of
R.A. No. 716611 and Batas Pambansa Bilang 88112 are likewise germane to the subject
matter of R.A. No. 9369.

Settled is the rule that every law is presumed valid.13 Courts are to adopt a liberal
interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to
have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law.14 To strike down a law as unconstitutional,
the petitioners have the burden to prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate a law based on baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also
of the executive which approved it.15

All told, the Court finds no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a
pronouncement that Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 9
of R.A. No. 9369, are unconstitutional and void. The power to enforce and administer
R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369, is still exclusively lodged in the
COMELEC, and the AC and the TEC may not substitute its own opinion for the
judgment of the COMELEC, thus:

In sum, the Congress created the [AC] and the TEC not to encroach upon the exclusive
power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer laws relating to the conduct of the
elections, but to (1) ensure that the COMELEC is guided and assisted by experts in the
field of technology in adopting the most effective and efficient [AES]; and (2) to ensure
clean elections by having disinterested parties closely monitor the COMELEC in
procuring systems that operate properly, securely, and accurately. As such, it is apparent
that, through the [AC] and the TEC, the Congress merely checks and balances the power
of the COMELEC to enforce and administer R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No.
9369. It does not, however, substitute its own wisdom for that of the COMELEC.16

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 218363

ENGR. ARTEMIO A. QUINTERO, JR., GENERAL MANAGER, CAUAYAN

CITY WATER DISTRICT (CCWD) CAUAYAN CITY, ISABELA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the evised Rules of Court seeks to reverse
and set aside the July 18, 2014 Decision1 and the March 9, 2015 Resolution2 of the
Commission on Audit (COA), which affirmed the April 25, 2011 Decision3 of the COA
Regional Office No. II (Regional Office), upholding Notice of Disallowance (ND) No.
2010-01-101,4 dated March 9, 2010, representing the overpayment of salary and year-end
bonus of petitioner Engr. Artemio A. Quintero, Jr. (Quintero), the

General Manager (GM) of Cauayan City Water District (CCWD).

On March 28, 2008, the Board of Directors (BOD) of CCWD passed Board Resolution
No. 004, Series of 2008,5 which upgraded the monthly salary of the GM from
P25,392.00 to P45,738.00 on the basis of Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9286.6
The CCWD's Plantilla of Personnel and Salary Adjustment was thereafter submitted to
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for approval. After going over the
plantilla, the DBM informed Quintero through a letter that although Section 2 of R.A.
No.

9286 empowered the BOD of L WDs to fix the compensation of the GM, it should
comply with the compensation standardization policy laid down in R.A. No. 6758 or the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL). 7

After the COA'S audit and advice,8 on December 2009, Quintero voluntarily stopped
receiving his salary based on the adjusted rates.9 On March 9, 2010, the COA, through
Auditor Mercedes V. Reyes, issued ND No. 2010-01-101 disallowing the overpayment in
Quintero's adjusted salary, which amounted to P364,659.50.10

Disagreeing with the findings of the COA Auditor, Quintero appealed before the COA
Regional Office.

The Regional Office Ruling

In its April 25, 2011 decision, the COA Regional Office upheld ND No. 2010-01-101 and
stated that the BOD of CCWD should have taken into consideration the provisions of
R.A. No. 6758 or the SSL when it issued the resolution fixing the salary of its GM. The
Regional Office pointed out that if it were the intent of the Congress to exempt the local
water district (LWD) from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758, then it should have expressly
provided it in R.A. No. 9286.

Also, the COA Regional Office disagreed with Quintero that the upgraded salary of the
GM was subject to Section 7 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 81111 on non-diminution in
the salary of incumbent employees. The Regional Office noted that the provision of the
E.0. presupposed that the basic salary given was sanctioned under the law because no
vested right could be derived from the upgrading of salary made in contravention of the
law. It explained that the BOD of CCWD could upgrade Quintero's salary of
P25,392.00, but it should be within the provision of R.A. No. 6758 which fixed it at no
more than P35,615.00 a month for the year 2008 and 2009.

Unsatisfied with the decision, Quintero appealed before the COA.

The COA Ruling

In its July 18, 2014 decision, the COA upheld the decision of its Regional Office.
Although it agreed with Quintero that the BOD had the authority to fix the compensation
of the GM, it stated that the said authority was not absolute as the compensation of the
GM should conform to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, or the SSL, and to existing rules
and regulations. Further, the COA reiterated that no vested right could be derived from
the salary increase of Quintero as it emanated from an erroneous interpretation of law.

Aggrieved, Quintero moved for reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied
by the COA in its March 9, 2015 resolution.

Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

A] WHETHER OR NOT COA _COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECLARING THAT THE CCWD BOARD HAS NO AUTHORITY TO FIX
THE SALARY OF THE GENERAL MANAGER, THAT RA 9286 IS NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE SSL.

B] WHETHER OR NOT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT RECOGNIZING THAT SECTION 23 OF PD 198, AS AMENDED BY RA
9286, IS NOT AN EXCEPTION TO THE SSL.

C] WHETHER OR NOT ENGR. ARTEMIO A. QUINTERO SHOULD BE

HELD LIABLE TO REFUND THE AMOUNT RECEIVED AND
DISALLOWED.12

Basically, the main issue to be resolved is whether the salary increase of Quintero was
rightfully disallowed by the COA.

Quintero argues that by the express provision of Section 23 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 198,13 as amended by R.A. No. 9286, the BOD of L WDs is empowered to fix the
compensation of its GM. He claims that this legislative grant of authority is clear and
unequivocal. He posits that in enacting R.A. No. 9286, Congress knew of the provisions
of the SSL but it still chose to delegate to the BOD of L WDs the authority to fix the
compensation of the GM. Thus, he concludes that the salary of the GM cannot be limited
by the SSL provision because to do so will diminish the authority bestowed upon the
BOD of L WDs. Quintero also avers that R.A. No. 9286, a later law, repealed the SSL, a
prior law, because the provisions of the latter were inconsistent with the provisions of the
former. He further stated that his salary as fixed by the BOD of CCWD was valid
because it should be deemed an exception from the coverage of the SSL.

Quintero then points out that the LWDs did not receive any budget from the DBM or the
national government and, therefore, it might be deemed from the provisions of P.D. No.
198 that the BOD ofLWDs had the full authority to fix the compensation of its GM. He is
of the view that his salary could not be adversely affected even with the provisions of the
SSL claiming protection under Section 7 of E.O. No. 811 on diminution of salaries. He,
nevertheless, insists that in the event that his adjusted salary would be ultimately
disapproved, he should not be required to refund the same on the basis of good faith.

In its Comment, 14 dated October 5, 2015, the COA countered that R.A. No. 9286 did
not impliedly repeal the SSL because an implied repeal was disfavored by law. It noted
that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 only changed the last sentence of
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 to state that the GM should not be removed from office
except for cause and after due process.

The COA explained that R.A. No. 9286 did not give additional power to the BOD to
determine the compensation of the GM beyond the rate prescribed by the SSL and, as
such, no inconsistency was created as regards the power of the BOD to fix the salary of
the GM. It likewise opined that R.A. No. 9286 did not constitute an exception to the
coverage of the SSL.

Moreover, the COA assailed Quintero's claim of good faith contending that no sufficient
evidence on record was available to establish that the latter received the disallowed
amount in good faith. It also held that good faith was raised for the first time on appeal
because Quintero' s position before the COA Regional Office was that he had acquired a
vested right over the adjusted salary.

In his Reply,15 dated February 29, 2016, Quintero alleged that the Congress, by virtue of
its Joint Resolution No. 4, 16 expressly recognized that R.A. No. 9286 was inconsistent
with the SSL. Due to the inconsistency, he argued that there could be no other conclusion
but that R.A. No. 9286 had amended provisions of the SSL which was incongruous
therewith particularly the authority of the BOD to fix and determine the salary of the GM.

Quintero once again invoked good faith claiming that he was a mere recipient of the
salary and that there was neither evidence nor any allegation that it was he who caused
the increase of his salary beyond the limit provided under the SSL. He manifested that the
BOD merely relied on the provisions of R.A. No. 9286 and that he immediately stopped
the processing of his adjusted salary when so advised by the COA sometime in 2009.

The Court's Ruling

Central to the resolution of the issue at hand is the power of the BOD to fix the
compensation of its GM, as vested by Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by Section
2 of R.A. No. 9286.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 reads:

At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter practicable, the Board shall
appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his
compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the Board.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286 amended Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, which now provides:

At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter practicable, the Board shall
appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his
compensation. Said officer shall not be removed'from office, except for cause and after
due process.

A reading of the above-cited provisions reveals that R.A No. 9286 reiterated the power of
the BOD to set the salary of the GM and that it merely amended the provisions of P.D.
No. 198 to provide the GMs with security of tenure preventing their removal without
cause and due process. Indubitably, the Congress empowered the BOD of LWDs to fix
the salary of its GM.

Quintero views this power to be immutable as the BOD may fix the salary of its GM even
beyond the limits prescribed by the SSL. The COA, on the other hand, concedes that the
BOD of CCWD has the power to increase Quintero's salary. It opines, however, that this
power is not an unbridled power and the salary to be set by the BOD must always be
within the standards set by the SSL.

The question on whether the salaries of GMs of LWDs are covered by the provisions of
the SSL is not a novel one as it had long been laid to rest by the Court. In Mendoza v.
COA (Mendoza), 17 the Court categorically ruled that the LWDs must observe the limits
provided in the SSL in fixing the salaries of their GMs, to wit:

The Salary Standardization Law applies to all government positions, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, without qualification. The exception to
this rule is when the government-owned or controlled corporation's charter specifically
exempts the corporation from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. To resolve
this case, We examine the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198 exempting water
utilities from the Salary Standardization Law. The petitioner asserts that it is Section 23
of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, which grants water utilities this exemption.

Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, promulgated on May 25, 1973, was originally
phrased as follows:

Section 23. Additional Officers. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general
manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define - their duties and fix their
compensation. Said officers shall service at the pleasure of the board.

On April 2, 2004, Republic Act No. 9286 was passed amending certain provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 198, including its Section 23, thus:

Sec. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general
manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall
not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process.

We are not convinced that Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, or any
of its provisions, exempts water utilities from the coverage of the Salary Standardization
Law. In statutes subsequent to Republic Act No. 6758, Congress consistently provided
not only for the power to fix compensation but also the agency's or corporation's
exemption from the Salary Standardization Law. If Congress had intended to exempt
water utilities from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law and other laws on
compensation and position classification, it could have expressly provided in Presidential
Decree No. 198 an exemption clause similar to those provided in the respective charters
of the Philippine Postal Corporation, Trade Investment and Development Corporation,
Land Bank of the Philippines, Social Security System, Small Business Guarantee and
Finance· Corporation, Government Service Insurance System, Development Bank of the
Philippines, Home Guaranty Corporation, and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation.

Congress could have amended Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198 to expressly
provide that the compensation of a general manager is exempted from the Salary
Standardization Law.
However, Congress did not. Section 23 was amended to emphasize that the general
manager "shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process."18

[Emphases Supplied]

Applying the pronouncements in Mendoza, the Court cannot counterance Quintero's

position that the provisions of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, should be deemed
an exception to the SSL. In amending P.D. No. 198, R.A. No. 9286 merely provided
security of tenure for the GM but it did not state that the LWDs were to be exempt from
the coverage of the SSL. If Congress indeed intended to exempt the LWDs from the SSL,
it could have easily provided for an exemption clause similar to the charters of other
government-owned and controlled corporations which were legislated to be exempt from
the provisions of R.A. No. 6758 or the SSL.

Moreover, R.A. No. 9286 did not repeal the SSL. Neither was there an express provision
repealing the SSL nor can repeal be implied in this case.1âwphi1 An implied repeal
transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws, and
occurs only when there is an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy in the terms of
the new and the old statute.19 It must be remembered that repeal by implication is
disfavored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all
laws existing on the subject, the congruent application of which the courts must generally
presume.20

Contrary to Quintero's claims, no irreconcilable inconsistency exists between the SSL

and R.A. No. 9286 to warrant the conclusion that the latter impliedly repealed the former.
The two seemingly contradicting laws may be harmoniously construed in such a manner
that the power of the BOD of LWDs to fix the salary of its GM is still recognized. This
power, however, is subject to the limitation that the salary set must be within the rates
prescribed by the SSL.

Good faith exempts responsible officers from making a refund

The Court, nevertheless, finds that Quintero need not refund the amount subject of ND
No. 2010-01-101 on the basis of good faith. In Mendoza, the Court exempted the
responsible officer from refunding the disallowed amount on the basis of good faith, to
wit:

The salaries petitioner Mendoza received were fixed by the Talisay Water District's board
of directors pursuant to Section 23 of the Presidential Decree No. 198.1âwphi1
Petitioner Mendoza had no hand in fixing the amount of compensation he received.
Moreover, at the time petitioner Mendoza received the disputed amount in 2005 and
2006, there was no jurisprudence yet ruling that water utilities are not exempted
from the Salary Standardization Law.

Pursuant to De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, petitioner Mendoza received the

disallowed salaries in good faith. He need not refund the disallowed amount.21

[Emphasis Supplied]

Similar to the above-quoted case, Quintero had no hand in fixing the amount of the salary
he received as it was fixed pursuant to the resolution issued by the BOD of CCWD. Also,
at the time his salary increase was approved, there was no categorical pronouncement yet
from the Court that the LWDs were subject to the coverage of the SSL.
WHEREFORE, the July 18, 2014 Decision of the Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that Engr. Artemio Quintero, Jr. is absolved from refunding the
amount covered by Notice of Disallowance No. 2010-01-101.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10675

DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), complainant Datu Ismael Malangas (complainant) instituted this verified
complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Paul C. Zaide (respondent lawyer).

Factual Antecedents

Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of

trust, and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics2 in relation to the complaint for
damages (Civil Case No. 6380 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Lanao del Norte at
Iligan City) that he filed against Paul Alfeche (Alfeche) and the NEMA Electrical and
Industrial Sales, Inc./Melanio Siao (NEMA). Complainant averred that on March 6, 2003,
he figw·ed in an accident while crossing Quezon Avenue, Iligan City, when two vehicles
hit and pinned him in· between them, causing him to lose consciousness; that he was then
brought to a hospital where he was confined for four months; that he was later transferred
to other hospitals where he underwent different major operations for which he spent more
than Pl.5 million; and that despite the operations, he remained crippled and bed ridden.

Because of these, he engaged respondent lawyer's professional services to prosecute his

complaint for damages against therein defendants Alfeche and NEMA; that he gave
respondent lawyer P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing fees; that
respondent lawyer made him believe that the amount of P50,000.00 was needed as filing
fees in order to commence a P5 million-damage suit covering the accrued and anticipated
damages caused by the accident; that subsequently, respondent lawyer filed on his behalf
a complaint for damages before the RTC of Iligan City, thereat docketed as Civil Case
No. 6380; that respondent lawyer then furnished him (complainant) with a copy of said
Complaint seeking to recover damages in the amount of P5 million; and that to assure
him that the complaint had indeed been filed, this complaint was stamped "received" by
the RTC.

According to complainant, he later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been
dismissed by the RTC because of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent
lawyer did not attend two hearings in the case, and also because respondent lawyer did
not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed therein by NEMA; that on
account of this, he asked respondent lawyer to file a Motion for Reconsideration, only to
find out later that respondent lawyer not only did not file a motion for reconsideration
from the Order of dismissal issued by the RTC, but worse, respondent lawyer instead
filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel effectively leaving him without counsel to
prosecute his case; and that after this, he sent a relative to the RTC, where he further
discovered through this relative that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint filed
by respondent lawyer was only P250,000.00, and not PS million, as stated in the copy of
the Complaint given to him by respondent lawyer.

Challenging complainant's allegations, respondent lawyer claimed that complainant was

in fact a client of the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices, a law firm that he joined way
back in 2002, right after he passed the Bar Examinations; and that as a junior associate in
that law fim1, he only received appearance fees in attending to complainant's civil case.
Respondent lawyer specifically denied that he received an acceptance fee of P20,000.00,
and explained that complainant was already an established client of the law office he was
working for.

As regards the amount of damages, respondent lawyer claimed that in the Complaint he
filed before the RTC, he was even reluctant to ask for P250,000.00 in dan1ages, as
complainant's hospital bills did not reach this amount; but that he nevertheless prayed for
this amount because he was anticipating that complainant would incur additional
expenses as a result of the accident. According to respondent lawyer, the complaint
which embodied a prayer for PS million in damages "was clearly maneuvered to create
an impression that (he, respondent lawyer) defrauded the complainant."3

Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending the
hearings set by the RTC in said Civil Case No. 6380, and that although he also
intentionally filed no opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, these matters were
initially agreed upon between him and complainant after he (respondent lawyer)
discovered that NEMA' s car did not in fact hit complainant, because NEMA's car was
not illegally parked where it was at the time of the accident; that although complainant
was aware of these facts, complainant suddenly changed his mind~ and insisted on
continuing with the case against NEMA, and pressing for the claim of P5 million in
damages, because complainant believed that NEMA had more leviable properties than
the other defendant Alfeche. According to respondent lawyer, he also found out that
despite the fact that Alf eche had already settled with complainant, the latter still
persisted in pursuing the civil case against Alfeche;4 that at this point, he realized that
complainant was acting under the compulsion of greed in pressing for the continuation of
the case against his adversaries; and that because of these reasons, he decided to
withdraw from the case as complainant's counsel.

Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero oft11e IBP Commission

on Bar Discipline submitted his Report and Recommendation5 dated January 29, 2013
finding respondent lawyer guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he
recommended a penalty of two years suspension against respondent lawyer.
Commissioner Cachapero found complainant's allegations more credible than respondent
lawyer's explanations, thus –

Respondent further mentioned that he has been handling cases for or against Complainant
since he embarked on law practice and has never received acceptance fee from
Complainant. He pictured himself as giving out pro bona services to Complainant for two
(2) years. However, he may have contradicted his declaration in this regard when in his
Answer he mentioned that he received P7,000.00 for docket fee and the rest was paid as
advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done by him at the hospital.6

As regards the true amom1t of damages sought in said Civil Case No. 6380,
Commissioner Cachapero had this to say:

The undersigned deems the complainant's tale plausible enough. The aforesaid page
containing a statement of claim amounting to P5,000,000.00 shows impeccably that it
was typed simultaneously with the rest of the pages of the complaint. There is no
showing that it was merely inserted as a supplement or addition after taking out a genuine
page of the same. It is a constituent part of the complaint which could only have been
printed and/or typed by the respondent or his agent.

Respondent claimed that the insertion of the page (page 8) was 'maneuvered' by
Complainant. If tliese were true, what would have motivated Complainant to do such a
'switching' act? None. In fact, following his discovery of the same, he conducted himself
out like a man wronged. He wrote respondent twice in September 2004 (September 1 and
9, 2004) and castigated respondent for his switching act. Surprisingly, respondent did not
care to take the matter up with complainant through letter or personal confrontation. To
the undersigned, respondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from Complainant
reveals a subtle affumation of his fault in this regard.7

Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling

of complainant's case, citing the RTC's Order of July 1, 2004, to wit-

In this regard the record will show that as early as May 18, 2004, plaintiffs counsel was
furriished a copy of said motion, but for reasons only known to him no comment or
opposition was registered by plaintiff In fact, if only to afford plaintiff [a chance] to
countervail movant's motion, last May 24, 2004, as prayed for, plaintiffs counsel was
given ten (10) days to file an Opposition, but sad to say, until now, not\vithstanding the
lapse of practically 37 days no opposition, neither a comment was filed by plaintiff. With
this development the Court will have to confine its scrutiny solely on the motion to
dismiss of movant.8

Action of the IBP Board of Governors

Via Resolution No. XX:-2013-91,9 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A', and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and
Negligence to Complainant, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of
law for two (2) years.,

On January 11, 201410 respondent lawyer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution. But in its Resolution11 of May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent lawyer's Motion for Reconsideration.

Our Ruling

After a careful review of the records, we find respondent lawyer guilty of professional
misconduct and of violating Canons 1, 12 16, 13 and 1814 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Not only do we find complainant's version more credible but we
also note the glaring inconsistencies in respondent lawyer's allegations.

Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza Macabangkit Law
offices, "he has NO participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving
to the office."15 But, as pointed out by Commissioner Cachapero, respondent lawyer
himself admitted that he received "P7,000.00 for the docket fees and the rest [was paid]
as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done [by] him at the hospital."16
Because of this admission, it can be concluded that respondent lawyer received fees "for
his services" from the complainant himself Further bolstering the fact that respondent
lawyer did in fact receive fees for his professional services are complainant's demand
letters17 - one received on September 1, 2004 and another delivered by registered mail
on September 9, 2004 -asking respondent lawyer to return the amount of P20,000.00
acceptance fee and to account for the docket fees paid to the RTC of Iligan City. To
these, respondent lawyer merely replied that he "was made to understand that the 'docket
fee' in Alfeche case is part of [respondent's] claims"18 without denying that he had
received such an1ount. The complainant was thus constrained to conduct his own
investigation against his own lawyer, in the course of which he discovered that of the
P50,000.00 alleged filing fees that he gave respondent lawyer, only P2,623.60 was paid
by respondent lawyer to the RTC. As Commissioner Cachapero aptly stated in his Report
and Recommendation,19 "[r]espondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from
[c]omplainant reveals a subtle affirmation" that he, indeed, received the acceptance fee.

Finally, respondent lawyer's former law partners belied his clain1 that he did not receive,
as in fact it was the law firm which received, the an1ounts paid by the complainant. In
their Joint Affidavit,20 lawyers Leo M. Zaragoza and Alex E. Macabangkit averred that
"the payment made by complainant to Atty. Zaide belongs to him exclusively and we do
not interfere in the arrangement x x x and we do not [have] any share thereof. "21

Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal
to return the amount paid in excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated
Rules 16.01and16.03 of the CPR, to wit:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good
fai1h in dealing wit the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship."22 Any lawyer who does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take
the consequences of his waywardness.

As regards the alleged switching of page 8 of the complaint, respondent lawyer claimed
that it was complainant who switched the pages "to create an impression that respondent
lawyer defrauded the complainant."23 He asserted in his Motion for Reconsideration that
he came to learn of the PS million claim only during the disbarment proceedings and that
he ''thought it was a joke as respondent lawyer was NOT able to attend the preliminary
conference at the IBP Cagayan de Oro City, where he could have seen the document. "24
That respondent lawyer seems to find it hard to get together with himself is shown by the
fact that on the very same page of his Motion for Reconsideration, he himself admitted
that "when respondent lawyer was told of the amount, he asked the clerk of the office to
change it to a more reasonable and realistic relief, which was eventually heeded, which
respondent lawyer was NOT aware that herein complainant was able to get a draft copy
prepared by the office."25 To borrow Commissioner Cachapero' s apt observation, this
obvious contradiction renders his defense doubtful, to say the least. Notably, respondent
lawyer's former law partners also belied his claim that Loma B. Martinez, the person who
supposedly typed the Complaint, was a personnel of their law firm. In their Joint
Affidavit, they contended that "Loma B. Martinez was never our Office Staff. She never
prepared any pleading in the office for any of us including that of Atty. Zaide."26

Respondent lawyer's transgressions did not end there. By his deliberate failure to file a
Comment on or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in said Civil Case No. 6380,
and by his failure to appear at the hearings in connection therewith, respondent lawyer
unduly delayed the case as the trial court had to postpone the hearings thereon, and this,
in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar as NEMA was concerned. As
previously mentioned, the RTC had to put off for 37 days its ruling on NEMA.'s Motion
to Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the same. Yet, despite
the 10-day extension given to him, respondent lawyer still failed to appear at the hearings
or file the appropriate pleading. These failings are clearly offensive to Rules 18.0327 and
18.0428 of the CPR. If respondent lawyer's claim that he and complainant had indeed
agreed to drop the case against NEMA were true, then he as an officer of the court should
have saved the Court's precious time by at least promptly manifesting his lack of
objection to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss. This he did not do.

Given the gravity of the offenses imputed against him, and considering that this is his
second administrative case,29 respondent lawyer's defense that he was a young lawyer
when he went astray, hardly merits sympathy from this Court.1âwphi1 Surely respondent
lawyer could not have been unaware that when he took the solemn oath to become a
member of the bar, he did so not only to enjoy the rewards and privileges of an attorney
and counsellor at law, but he also took upon his shoulders the heavy burden of
responsibility and duty that a full-fledged membership in the Philippine Bar necessarily
entailed. Respondent lawyer could not have been oblivious of the fact that the exercise of
a right or privilege is always encumbered with the burden of responsibility and duty.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
two (2) years effective immediately. Atty. Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly
return to complainant the sums given to him as acceptance fee and docket fees in the
amount of P70,000.00, from which should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid as
docketing fees.

SO ORDERED.