On

the Existence of Gods

by Dominic Saltarelli and Vox Day

Published by Castalia House

Kouvola, Finland
www.castaliahouse.com

This book or parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
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Copyright © 2016 by Vox Day

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Cover Image: From the ceiling of the Sala di Constantino, Palace of the Vatican, by Raphael
Cover Design: Vox Day
Version: 001
 Table of Contents

Cover
Introduction by Dominic Saltarelli
Second Introduction by Vox Day
Chapter 1: On the Existence of Gods
Chapter 2: On the Nonexistence of Gods
Chapter 3: The Judges Decide Round One
Chapter 4: Round Two
Chapter 5: The Judges Decide Round Two
Chapter 6: Round Three
Chapter 7: The Judges Decide Round Three
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Appendix: The Moral Landscape
The Irrational Atheist
SJWs Always Lie
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 Introduction

Are gods real? An interesting question, regardless of whether one thinks the
matter is settled or not. Unfortunately, too many people do consider the matter
settled one way or another and refuse to even address the subject. One such
individual is a certain Dr. Paul Zachary Myers, PhD, a well-known professional
atheist who, after claiming to have never encountered any good arguments for
the existence of gods in 2008, refused to debate Vox Day on the subject. Dr.
Myers chose instead to resort to the same tired rhetorical sniping that has
become an all-too-common substitute for actual discourse.
One would think admitting the possibility that something can be learned
from an ideological opponent would be a defining characteristic of any self-
styled “freethinker”. Alas, this was not the case, and the thrown gauntlet was
tragically left to gather dust.
In 2011, a fresh challenge was issued. Affectionately entitled the “PZ Myers
Memorial Debate”, Vox once again threw out an open invitation to the secular
community to defend their positions. Sadly, there were only a handful of
volunteers, which is one of the reasons I put myself forward.
I first heard about Vox when he published The Irrational Atheist in 2007, as
I was a lurker on the richarddawkins.net forum at the time. The general
consensus of the regular commenters was that Vox Day was just another
fundamentalist nutter and generally all-around-terrible person. My curiosity
piqued, I read The Irrational Atheist and began frequenting Vox’s blog, Vox
Popoli, as well. I had, of course, read the books he criticized in TIA: The End of
Faith by Sam Harris, The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, and God Is Not
Great by Christopher Hitchens. I found myself agreeing with half of what Vox
had to say, and disagreeing with the other half. He made some good points, but I
felt that he needed to be challenged on others.
So I stopped lurking and tried to rally the commenters over at
richarddawkins.net, as they seemed rather confident about their positions and
Vox was asking for a fight. I thought it would be fun to give him one. The
resulting experience was illuminating to say the least. Few of these militant
atheists had the spine to directly challenge anything Vox had written, and those
who did either gave up partway through, or provided arguments so shockingly
bad that I could only shake my head in disbelief.
During the course of this fiasco, I had read quite a bit from Vox’s blog and
discovered that I genuinely liked the man. He was funny, honest, and seemed to
actually care about getting facts straight and uncovering the truth. His
opponents, those individuals whose commentary I had up until this point been
reading solely for entertainment during my lunch breaks, were the exact
opposite. Viewing the interactions between the camps, I came to realize I was in
the wrong one. While technically an unbeliever myself, I found I had nothing at
all in common with the rabble that rabidly insisted Vox was a mustache-twirling
villain.
So when the opportunity to debate him directly was offered, I leaped at the
chance. Debates are an opportunity to put your own ideas to the test and try to
offer the world something new to chew on, and the atheist community appears to
be in a progressive state of intellectual atrophy. Perhaps that is why they are
called “progressives”. Regardless, I will not be one of those atheists who refuse
to put their own ideas on the line, wallow in self-certainty, and engage in nothing
but name-calling from behind the safety of a keyboard.
Debating the question ‘are gods real’ from the perspective of which
proposition is more likely based on the evidence leads one to think, really think,
about what a “god” actually is, or could be, whether there can be more than one
god, and most importantly, allows us to explore the many reasons why we
believe in anything intangible.
The topics covered range from the validity of evidence, the classification of
knowledge types, the likelihood of alien visitations, and the source of our moral
impulse, to the very definitions of Good and Evil. Fun was had by all.
Once Round Three had concluded, and the dust settled, I lost the debate. In a
big way. But nothing ventured, nothing gained. I’d like to thank Vox Day for
providing the opportunity to lose in such a dramatic fashion and the Dread Ilk
for not rubbing it in too much. I learned a lot from the exchange and hopefully
you, the reader, will too.

Dominic Saltarelli
27 February, 2016
 Second Introduction

As the readers of Vox Popoli know, I rather enjoy intellectual disputation.

Over the last twelve years, my blog has hosted debates on everything from the
ancient skepticism of Sextus Empiricus to the prospects for a Japanese invasion
of the West Coast and the form of the next financial apocalypse, fire or ice. I
believe there are few things more tedious than mindless concord or myopic hive
minds, which is why I warn my readers: “I don’t expect you to agree. I don’t
even expect you to understand.”
As will soon be obvious in the debate that follows, Dominic and I do not
agree on many things. But one thing we share is an interest in intelligent,
rational, and civil discourse of the kind that not only opens one’s mind to new
and different perspectives, but forces one to exercise it in defense of one’s own
beliefs, opinions, and assumptions. Dominic has a sharp, incisive, and frankly,
rather subversive mind, so it was not surprising to discover that he was able to
come at my arguments for the existence of gods from unusual directions that
were hard to anticipate.
This is seldom the case. Far too many atheists and Christians alike simply
parrot whatever an authority they recognize has asserted, usually without
understanding the argument they are presenting, and all too often, without being
aware that the argument was conclusively refuted long ago.
Now, one of the problems with written debate is that unless both participants
make a concerted effort to directly address the points the other is making, it
tends to become an exercise in two increasingly unrelated essay series. While
some of them, such as the brilliant Che Cosa Crede Chi Non Crede between
Umberto Eco and Cardinal Martini, are as edifying as they are entertaining, more
often they devolve into competitive whine-fests about who has mischaracterized
and misunderstood whom. Dominic and I were both determined to avoid that, as
well as the customary course of a Sam Harris debate, in which Harris writes
something, his interlocutor replies to what he wrote, and Harris responds by
complaining that what he wrote wasn’t what he actually meant, and moreover,
the other party should have known that.
(Seriously, it doesn’t matter if Harris is arguing with an atheist, like John
Derbyshire, a Christian pastor, such as Rick Warren, or a theologian, like
William Lane Craig. The debates all follow the same pattern. It’s bizarre. And it
never seems to occur to Harris that if he’s so regularly misunderstood by
everyone, the burden falls on him to articulate his thoughts more precisely.)
Hence the reason for the unusual structure of this debate. In order to avoid
the problems I’d observed in other debates, I wanted to see if I could come up
with a format that would be fair to both parties, and one that would also permit
neutral third parties to determine which of the two participants was presenting
the more persuasive case. Since it is always easier to find flaws in someone
else’s case than to construct and present an airtight argument oneself, I proposed
that we start simultaneously, then criticize the other’s argument without having
seen how the other party was criticizing our own one.
Both sets of argument and criticism would then be criticized by three judges,
one Christian, one atheist, and one agnostic, who would pronounce the winner of
that round. The winner was charged with attempting to advance his argument,
with the loser being given the chance to rebut it afterwards. The judges would
then adjudicate this second round, at which point the pendulum would continue
swinging in the initial winner’s direction or begin swinging back if the first-
round loser effectively rebutted the second-round argument.
The process worked very well, and while the judges occasionally got a little
more deeply involved in the debate than was intended, their contributions tended
to clarify and illuminate the arguments presented. There was even an amount of
unexpected hilarity when one of the judges went off the deep end, began arguing
with both sides, and was replaced by universal consensus.
So, although the existence or nonexistence of the divine is a matter that has
been debated many times before, don’t be under the impression that you’ve seen
it all before and are incapable of surprise. While this debate seldom rises to the
refined heights of the Eco-Martini exchanges, I daresay that it is no less
intellectually demanding. I hope you will find it both interesting and
illuminating. And if it happens to inspire any new thoughts on the subject on
your part, so much the better.

Vox Day
9 March, 2016
 Chapter 1

ON THE EXISTENCE OF GODS

—Vox

In order to make the case that the weight of the available evidence and logic
is more supportive of the existence of gods than of their nonexistence, it is first
necessary to define the two terms. In making my case for the existence of gods, I
am relying upon the definitions of “evidence” and “logic” as defined by the
Oxford English Dictionary. In the case of the term “evidence”, I am utilizing it in
a sense that encompasses all three of the primary definitions provided.

Evidence:

1. Available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or

proposition is true or valid.
2. Information drawn from personal testimony, a document, or a material
object, used to establish facts in a legal investigation or admissible as
testimony in a law court.
3. Signs or indications of something.

Logic:

1. reasoning conducted or assessed according to strict principles of validity

There is a vast quantity of extant documentary and testimonial evidence

providing indications that gods exist. This evidence dates from the earliest
written records to current testimonials from living individuals. While it is true
that the quality of this evidence varies considerably, it cannot simply be
dismissed out of hand anymore than one can conclude Gaius Julius Caesar did
not exist because one cannot see him on television today. Each and every case
demands its own careful examination before it can be dismissed, and such
examination has never been done in the overwhelming majority of cases.
For example, there are many documented cases of confirmed fraud in
published scientific papers. If we apply the same reasoning to published
scientific papers that some wish to apply to documentary evidence of gods, we
have no choice but to conclude that all science is fraudulent. But this is absurd,
as we know that at least some science is not fraudulent. Therefore, if one is
willing to accept the validity of published scientific papers that one has not been
able to verify are not fraudulent, one must similarly accept the validity of
documentary evidence for the existence of gods that one has not examined and
determined to merit dismissal for one reason or another.
Because it is intrinsically testimonial in nature, the documentary evidence
for gods has been impugned on the basis of studies concerning the unreliability
of eyewitness testimony for various reasons. However, this critical analogy
actually demonstrates the precise opposite of what it purports to show. Since
eyewitness testimony has been variously determined to be somewhere between
12 percent and 50 percent inaccurate, this means that between 50 percent and 88
percent of the testimonial evidence for gods should be assumed accurate, at least
concerning the correctly reported details of the divine encounter. The correct
interpretations of the specific details, of course, are a different matter.
One of the core principles of the historical method is that “the closer a
source is to the event which it purports to describe, the more one can trust it to
give an accurate historical description of what actually happened.” Blanket
rejection of the entire historical record that does not accord with the present
materialist consensus with regards to the universe turns this principle on its head
to such an extent that it can only be described as ahistorical. Moreover, it is
downright illogical given the dynamic nature of the materialist consensus,
especially when one takes into account how many times the material rejectionist
position can be confirmed to have been wrong whereas the historical record was
correct. The cities of Capernaum, Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Nineveh, and the
empires of Assyria and the Hittites are but six of many valid examples.
In fact, the material rejectionist position amounts to nothing more than a
time-limited appeal to technology. At one time, Man could not detect x-rays,
radiation, or distant planets because he lacked the necessary technology. At
present, Man cannot detect dark matter, the Higgs boson, other universes,
Heaven, Hell, alien life forms, or intelligent supernatural beings. These things
may or may not exist, for example, the scientists at CERN have excluded the
possibility of the Higgs boson particle from masses ranging from 145 to 466
GeV. But science has never managed to exclude the existence of gods from
anything, and unless one also rejects the existence of multiple universes and
other undetected concepts, one cannot reasonably reject the existence of gods.
Indeed, the acceptance of the possibility of the existence of the multiversal
and the rejection of the possibility of the supernatural makes no sense, given that
it is entirely conceivable that the two could be identical. It would be as difficult
for humanity today to distinguish between a technologically advanced being
from a different universe and “a superhuman being worshiped as having power
over nature or human fortunes”, which is how Oxford defines a god, as it would
for an ancient human to distinguish between a current U.S. Marine with air
support and a god.
Science itself lends support to the idea of the material existence of gods in
this universe when astronomical evidence taken into account. According to the
latest scientific consensuses, the universe is 13.75 billion years old, the Sun is
4.6 billion years old, the Earth is 4.54 billion years old, and homo sapiens
sapiens reached behavioral modernity 50,000 years ago. As there are a
conservatively estimated 200 billion stars in the galaxy and 100 billion galaxies
in the universe, this indicates that there has been sufficient time for at least 7,891
billion alien races to appear, evolve, and reach a higher level of technological
development than Man given the current ratio of 1.18 planets discovered per star.
And to paraphrase Arthur C. Clarke, any sufficiently advanced technology is
indistinguishable from godhood.
One could dismiss the numerical argument as a simple appeal to very large
numbers, except for the fact of a written historical record which repeatedly
describes contact with superhuman beings possessing power over nature and
human fortunes. When the mathematical odds indicate that advanced
technological aliens exist somewhere in the material universe and contact with
superhuman beings has been reported on tens of thousands of occasions, the
assumption that gods do not exist begins to look more like outright denial than
reasonable skepticism. When seen in this light, the failure of modern science to
detect gods in what the scientific consensus presently states is only 0.6 percent
of modern Man’s existence is analogous to the Aztecs assuming that because no
white men were seen during a given 201-day period between 1427 and 1519,
Cortés and the conquistadors did not exist. No doubt this would have seemed
like a perfectly reasonable conclusion, right up until the day Córdoba arrived in
the Yucatán.
So, there is evidence from history, mathematical probability from science,
and logic from the combination of the two which support the existence of gods.
However, the most powerful evidence for the existence of not only gods, but the
existence of one or more Creator gods, can be materially observed in Man
himself. Just as the existence of various phenomena can be correctly deduced
through the observation of senses and sensors designed to interact with those
phenomena even if a particular phenomenon remains unobserved, the presence
of an invisible sound wave can be deduced by the presence of an antenna and the
presence of a lawgiver can be deduced by the presence of prison guards. Hence
the importance of Man’s moral sense.
While some people throughout history have reported experiencing personal
contact with God, most have not. However, I am not aware of a single individual
who has denied ever experiencing any direct contact with evil. And by evil, I do
not mean mere bad fortune, physical pain, or the application of the various
principles of physics to suboptimal human action, but rather those self-aware,
purposeful, and malicious forces which intend material harm and suffering to
others and are capable of inflicting it. We are aware of this force in ourselves and
we can observe it in others. As anyone who has witnessed a child lie for the first
time knows, human evil is not an entirely learned behavior, it is at least partially
endogenous.
As a shadow requires the presence of a source of light in order to exist, evil
requires the presence of a source of good. What some call God is perhaps better
understood as the source of that good through which evil can exist and be
observed, by which I do not mean any subjective and experienced good, but
rather the objective and definitive good. But the only entity capable of dictating
an objective and definitive good with universal application is either a) the entity
that created the universe, or b) an entity given managing responsibility by the
creating entity. This is not a case of might makes right, but rather, conception
and creation necessitating constants.
Therefore, when we observe and acknowledge material evil, we must
correctly conclude the existence of a Creator God.


TO WHICH DOMINIC REPLIED

The opening argument for the positive existence of gods comes from the
mountain of eyewitness accounts of having experienced what they can only
describe as supernatural. Admittedly, no amount of handwaving theorizing that
so many people throughout history have been merely dishonest, crazy,
delusional, or suffering from temporal lobe epilepsy can stand up against the
sheer volume of accounts made, so dismissal simply is not an option. There is no
denying that there is something, possibly of a distinctly external nature, is
imposing itself on people throughout history causing them to report visitations
from gods, angels, demons. What was left out are the more recent and very
similar accounts of space aliens.
From space.
Early accounts of UFOs contain vague references to fires in the sky that are
wheel-like or circular. Examples of this are the flying Vimanas of the Sanskrit
epics, Ezekiel’s Wheel (which, from the description, sort of looks more like a V-
22 Osprey [landing gear and all] with an extra pair of wings and rockets
underneath the tilto-rotors, than a flying saucer), the mass sighting at Nuremberg
in 1561, and the Miracle of the Sun event in Portugal (1917). Attributing such
sightings to actual aliens rather than supernatural manifestations of the classical
sense does not occur until after pop culture had introduced alien life into the
public imagination.
Aliens seem to first have been introduced as forms of social commentary
coupled with an increasingly materialist worldview, from Voltaire’s Micromegas
(1752) as a vehicle for warning against anthropocentric hubris and a convenient
means to lampoon a few people he didn’t particularly care for, to H.G. Wells War
of the Worlds (1898) as a criticism of gunboat colonialism. Aliens as
entertainment took as many different forms as the people who subsequently
claim to have actually met them. Detailed descriptions of the aliens themselves,
and what subsequently happens to a person after meeting them, were all wildly
different, and a more consistent story does not emerge until after science fiction
literature and Hollywood have a crack at it, writing the scripts for such
experiences before people actually start having them.
The event that really popularized alien abductions and set the stage for the
flood of abduction stories that people have reported since is generally considered
to be the Betty and Barney Hill abduction (September 19, 1961), where the
couple recounts an alien abduction with many of the details pulled straight from
an episode of The Outer Limits which aired just 12 days beforehand, and the
1951 film, Invaders from Mars. From here, alien encounters have become
increasingly normalized with nearly everyone meeting “Grey” aliens with squat
bodies, thin limbs, huge heads and giant black unblinking eyes, the sort that we
have been exposed to by Hollywood now as the prototypical alien. Quite
different than the furry vagabonds who harassed Colonel H. G. Shaw in 1897.
And never mind that the case of Antonio Villas Boas did not occur until nine
years after the publication of Flash Gordon and the Adventures of the Flying
Saucers.
The evidence suggests that there is a very strong influence of belief and
disposition which not only influences how paranormal events are interpreted, but
how they are in fact experienced and remembered. Looking now at the
eyewitness accounts of visitations by gods and angels, and also of demon
possession, the first observation to make is that familiarity with the context is a
mandatory prerequisite for having the experience, just as no one remembered
being abducted by a Grey alien with giant unblinking eyes until after Hollywood
gave us Grey aliens with giant unblinking eyes.
Again, this isn’t to say that all the experiences are delusional, given the logic
that 50 to 88 percent of such accounts can be considered honest accounts by
people who are not crazy, simply that the actual explanation, the real source that
triggers these experiences, is something quite different, and let’s not forget
stranger, than what they appear to be to the eyewitness, given the sheer variety of
experiences and the undeniable influence of pre-existing cultures and beliefs.
After all, Barney Hill reported that one of the first things the aliens said to
him was to not be afraid. Something that anyone familiar with eyewitness
accounts of angelic visitations should recognize. However, Barney wasn’t visited
by angels bearing halos and white wings, and he did not recognize them as such,
he saw space aliens. This is not a different “interpretation” of details, these are
entirely different details, one of gods, the other of aliens.
This brings us to the second point, that of the materialist position rejecting
such accounts on the basis of the lack of an objective measuring tool which
would verify the validity of the accounts of gods made by the eyewitnesses is
ahistorical and the intellectual equivalent of burying one’s head in the sand.
Here, there is no disagreement. Rejecting something’s existence based on
nothing more than ignorance of similar phenomenon is an unsustainable
position.
However, included in this point, is the argument that gods are more likely
than not given that our gods could very well be aliens. Ironic, given what all I
just wrote, but worthy of being addressed separately. Combining the statistical
probability of alien life with the eyewitness accounts of paranormal visitors and
the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of “god” would lead one to believe
that the alien visitation explanation concocted over the past 110 years or so
(particularly in the last 50) is the more accurate description of real gods, and our
religions (with the exception of the Mormons) are clumsy attempts at describing
what we now have better tools for understanding, that we’re being visited by
aliens.
Maybe the Mormons are actually right and we should follow Matt Stone and
Trey Parker to the promised lands.
To address this, I would argue in turn this application of the Oxford
definition actually makes one group of men gods over others. For example, John
Frum, around whom a cult was formed, possessed, along with the rest of the
American military, the superhuman ability to bestow gifts of divine cargo upon
the residents of the island of Tanna. Squint at bit at the word “superhuman”, or
just take it in context of the situation, and the military service men whose actions
led to the creation of such cargo cults were, technically, gods.
And yet somehow, I doubt that proving other people exist, though, is the
purpose of this discussion. Furthermore, if we’re saying that technologically
advanced aliens are as god-like as anything in the universe, we should probably
just stop now.
But then we’d miss out on what I see as the actual argument, and what I
predict will be the real thrust from here on out. The final argument, that a real
creator God (with a big G) is necessary given the existence of real, objective evil
in the world.
Objective measurement is one where the point of reference does not move.
Here I believe we can all be in agreement that objective evil, as defined as a self-
aware, purposeful, and malicious force which intends material harm and
suffering to others and is capable of inflicting it, is quite real. It would be an
impossible task to actually prove that people have never or do not act with self-
ware, purposeful, and malicious intent to cause material harm and suffering to
others and are capable of inflicting it. This metric for evil is universally
recognized and it does not change. Some people go so far as to do it for its own
sake because it pleases them.
The logical chain that results in demonstrating a Creator God who is
necessary to establish the metric by which evil can exist and can be recognized
begins with the following statement:

“As a shadow requires the presence of a source of light in order to exist,

 evil requires the presence of a source of good.”

This statement is always taken at face value as axiomatically true, and is

always phrased as a light/dark dichotomy for illustration. I also happen to
disagree with it.
Objectively real evil is something we intuitively recognize by its qualities,
and I don’t see how any of the qualities that defines evil requires a source of
goodness to either enable or define it. Evil is a phenomenon that is recognized
through positive—or should I say, tangible?—action, not through negatives, as
opposed to the metaphor of evil being a shadow, a region where light (the Good)
doesn’t hit. Evil is always unpleasant for someone, that’s what makes it
objective, but leaping to the conclusion that it couldn’t exist without the
objective and definitive Good strikes me as awfully non-sequiteur, knocking the
base out of the argument that our ability to recognize evil necessitates the
existence of a custodian of the Good. Besides, calling Good and Evil laws
requiring a lawgiver is not only assumption, but in light of my opening
arguments, just too convenient as well.
I wouldn’t be at all suprised if our objective recognition of evil could be
completely redefined to be merely experiencing the color blue if all of humanity
were converted to a diet consisting exclusively of shellfish and Mellow Yellow.
Let me explain.
Right now, it is indisputable that our perceptions and attitudes are heavily
influenced, possibly even dictated, by what finds its way into our bloodstream.
High doses of anabolic steroids increase aggression, THC improves ones mood,
psilocybin makes you see things that aren’t there, and alcohol can significantly
affect what the imbiber considers to be proper behavior at her best friend’s
wedding.
The nutrients we derive from food fall under the same few categories: fat,
protein, carbohydrates, vitamins, and minerals. We all eat roughly the same
things due to the fact we all need the same kinds of dietary input to survive due
to the similarity of our bodies (which is also why it is safe to say we all see
colors in roughly the same way, philosophers and their “what if my blue is your
red?” be damned). Sugar is sweet, 50 degree Farenheit water is cold, and
someone who steals from someone else for purely personal gain is evil. The first
two are readily accepted facts across the board—thus objectively, the only
subjective aspect is “how sweet” or “how cold”—as being a consequence of our
common biology, yet the third gets a free pass as a universal law that we know
though our moral intuition, that would hold true even without us around. This
makes no sense.
I’m not saying that our common biology is the definitive answer as to why
we all perceive and recognize flavor, temperature, and evil, but it is just as good
an explanation, if not better, than jumping to the conclusion that our recognition
of evil is a window into some absolute moral law, much less saying that the very
act of recognizing it requires some corresponding Goodness. We know that what
we consume can and does affect our minds, personalities, and perceptions (such
as steriods, marijuana, mushrooms, and tequila), and for the most part we all
consume roughly the same categories of nutrients to survive (regular food, from
sweet potato to squid), so it’s unsuprising that we have some experiences and
attitudes that are common across the board.
So the existence of objective evil is not itself a definitive proof of a
lawgiver, it could just as easily be a secondary consequence of our biological
reliance on vitamin C or something equally unexpected. Given the theme of
human progress I highlighted in my own opening arguments, I would not be at
all suprised if our perception of evil ultimately is explained as a combination of
our diet, the wavelengths of the radiation that hits us from the sun, coupled with
a surprising discovery by someone who finally figures out why yawns are
contagious, but sneezing isn’t.
 Chapter 2

THE REASONS AND EVIDENCE THAT GODS PROBABLY DON’T

EXIST

—Dominic

First off, I see no need for a “first mover”.

I’m assuming gods refer to one or more concious beings who predate our
universe (at least one of whom being its creator), capable of creating something
out of nothing with concious intent. The being(s) necessitated by the
cosmological argument (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas…William Lane Craig, choose
whichever version you like, they’re all basically the same) something I’m
assuming all readers of this are familiar with, so no reason to summarize it.
However, the existence of the supernatural is necessary only by taking it as
axiomatically true that cause precedes effect, and therefore space-time is causal
and linear.
The majority of our experience confirms these assumptions as self-evidently
true, from daily living down to events that only quantum physics can describe,
thus making the existence of at least one god absolutely necessary. The problem
I have with this, though, is that there are other experiences which contradict
these assumptions, and ironically enough, are often relied upon as themselves
proof of the supernatural. Which, from my perspective, they ultimately
contradict.

Precognition (the artist formerly known as prophecy).

Exhibit A. Daryl Bem.

(See a paper recently published in the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology). Technically, the jury is still out on his results, as more rigourous
replication must take place first to verify the study.
Essentially, the case of Bem demonstrates that the future can affect the past
by reversing the order of conventional psychology tests and seeing statistically
significant results, the most amusing of which is the ability of subjects to find
porn. Subjects are placed in front of a computer with two selectable regions, and
are told to select one, where it is randomly selected by the computer for one of
the regions to display a blank wall, but the other will reveal a sexually
stimulating image. This test, as opposed to others which displayed less
interesting images, deviated significantly enough to warrant suggesting
precognition was in fact a possibility. The effect of being rewarded with a
sexually stimulating image was leaking back in time often enough to influence
its cause, that of selecting a region on the computer screen. Time itself is no
obstacle when it comes to finding porn on a computer.

Exhibit B: Mystery butter.

A Christian blogger who goes by the name of CL, in an ongoing attempt to

provide ever stronger arguments in favor of theism at his blog, The Warfare Is
Mental, offered up a personal story of his own as part of a series arguing favor of
his tripartite model of conciousness. He relays a story of a time when he clearly
remembered an event, right before it happened, apparently triggered due to the
zen-like state one enters when scooping up butter balls.

Exhibit C: Deja vu.

Deja vu is a phenomenon so common as to have its own term to describe it.
This is a feeling of disorientation that comes from the sensation of experiencing
the same event twice, somehow. If time was completely linear in all
circumstances, then how is it that people can have two experiences of the same
event bump into each other enough to disorient them? While one explanation
could be the processing delays in the brain that occur between a literal sensation
and the concious awareness of said event, such that at least two copies of the
same sensory stimuli drift through the brain, this is, at best, idle speculation.

Exhibit D: Dreaming the future.

Another phenomenon so common that I feel is safe enough to present as
evidence without needing to cite a reference. I even know someone personally
who routinely dreams things that happen the next day.
 Each exhibit presented here is evidentiary support to dissuade one from
automatically accepting that either cause necessarily precedes effect or that time
is linear in the strict sense, upon which the cosmological argument and the
necessity of gods rests. Time is usually linear and cause almost always precedes
effect, but not necessarily, the universe seems to be trickier than that.

Second, the cosmological argument itself is an attempt to eliminate the
problem of infinite regress that suffers from infinite regress.
Now, rather than thinking I’m resorting to the “Then what created God? Ha,
gotcha!” nonsense, it’s better to look at the original structure of the argument
first put forth, since the summary version that most people are familiar with is
vague enough to define God as an unstable particle. God is more than just a
source of energy, since the observation is that everything that has a direction was
pushed that way, yet an immediately observable exception to this is the
phenomenon of conscious intent as a source of motion. A body, (literally, a
human body) can be completely at rest, yet spurred to motion through conscious
effort.
This led to the conclusion that God, being defined as the unmoved mover, is
by necessity a conscious entity who chose to create the universe, since thought
itself is the most readily observable phenomenon that bridges the gap between
the purely abstract and the material. And the purest thought, then, would be
thinking about thinking, the first act that led to the creation of the universe and
needs no material source to give it a push. This, however, does not alleviate the
problem of infinite regression that was sought to be solved, as it only addresses
infinite regress of particle motion. This first thought, the one about thinking, was
thinking about what, more thinking?
Infinite regress. Do not pass Go, do not collect $200.

Lastly, the statement that “truth is stranger than fiction” is itself quite
persuasive.
Building on my rejection of the cosmological argument, I’ll further contest
that gods are not real simply because as an explanation, they are simply too
convenient. The truth of the matter, regardless of which great mystery being
discussed, is reliably something far stranger than whichever fiction is first
proposed.
The most obvious example of this was the painful transition from
Newtonion physics to quantum physics. Under the classical model, particles
were particles and behaved like particles, motion was consistent, and everything
ran its course, and all the mindless matter in the universe was reliably
deterministic. A simple explanation that is based on precisely what one would
expect of the world given nothing in our experience schizophrenically goes from
acting like a particle to acting like a wave, or mysteriously teleports from one
location to another. A simple explanation that turned out to be quite wrong.
Or one could go back earlier to the transition from geocentric to heliocentric
models of planetary motion. The simple explanation, that of the earth being
stationary with the sun rotating around it, turned out to be the fiction whereas the
truth was far stranger, namely the planet we sit upon, that doesn’t feel like it’s
moving at all, is in fact spinning around quite fast.
Recognition of an explanation as too simple, too convenient, or too obvious
is useful as a predictive tool as well. Healthy skepticism of the theory of
evolution by natural selection can be arrived at by recognizing the explanation
itself as an entirely self-contained and awfully neat little attempt at summarizing
the history of life on this planet. Personally I’d put money on the actual process
being something far stranger involving phenomenon that we don’t even have
words for yet and forces previously thought to have no impact on speciation
whatsoever.
This being said, postulating the existence of supernature beings is
abundantly obvious, to me at least, as being a convenient fantasy concocted as a
childish and superficial explanation for the origins of any and everything, from
the beginning of the universe to the strange bumping one hears in the attic. It’s a
fiction we’ve told ourselves for countless generations, and it is my firm belief
that the actual truth of the matter, from why or how the universe began (or just
always was) all the way down to experiences some people have communicating
with the dead, is something far stranger than any story we tell ourselves about
gods and ghosts.


TO WHICH VOX REPLIES

I feel that I must begin by congratulating my opponent for not only
producing a far more intriguing piece than I had reason to expect, but concocting
one that I suspect makes my case for the existence of gods look downright sane
by comparison. If nothing else, Dominic has produced a genuinely original case
for atheism.
I begin by correcting his assumption that gods must predate our universe or
be capable of creating something out of nothing. While at least one god must be
assumed to be the creator god that fits this definition if the universe was indeed
created, the vast majority of gods are not the creator and need not be capable of
creating anything out of nothing, much less predate the universe. I note that the
greater part of the gods described in the historical record do not fit Dominic’s
description here. By the definition he assumes, neither Zeus nor Athena would
qualify as gods, much less Baal, or Chemosh, or most of the other gods known to
have been worshipped in the course of human history.
The attack on the potential existence of the supernatural by denying cause
and effect is certainly an unexpected one. However, the assertion that the
existence of the supernatural depends upon the axiom that cause precedes effect,
or that space-time is causal and linear, is both incorrect and unsupported. While
there is plenty of reason to criticize both his self-evident assumptions and the
refutations of those assumptions, it is not necessary to do either because his logic
is flawed. It does not matter if the self-evidence of his assumptions are correct or
not, just as it does not matter if his subsequent case against those assumptions
are sufficient to reject them or not, because he has failed to do more than
nakedly assert a link between those assumptions and the existence of the
supernatural, much less between them and the existence of gods.
So, although I find them intriguing, I have nothing to say here about the
existence or non-existence of precognition, mystery butter, deja vu, or dreaming
the future, because none of them are relevant to this debate given the nonexistent
logical link between those four things and the existence of gods.
With regards to the second point, the problem of infinite regress as it relates
to consciousness rather than to particles, the problem was solved long ago by
Aristotle in Posterior Analytics. To summarize, the concept of infinite regress
depends upon an assumption that there is no way of knowing other than by
demonstration. But not all knowledge is demonstrative, because knowledge of
the immediate premises depends upon indemonstrable truths. Thus there is no
regress and the argument is defeated.
Furthermore, Dominic’s specific formulation contains two additional flaws.
First, even if we accept his definition of “the purest thought”, there is no rational
requirement that the first thought need be the purest one, therefore that first
thought need not be thinking about thinking, much less thinking about thinking
about thinking.
 Second, there is obviously no need for the first thought about thinking to
concern more thinking, as is evidenced by Decartes’s famous statement, “I think,
therefore I am”, because in the Decartesian formulation the first thinking about
thinking does not concern more thinking, but rather the existence of mind. The
regress ends and the appeal to the problem of infinite regress is once more
defeated.
As to the third point, I entirely agree that truth is stranger than fiction. I also
agree that turning to divine action to explain every unknown is too convenient to
be convincing, to say nothing of lazy, and I wholeheartedly concur that the true
explanation for the existence of life on Earth will almost surely be far stranger
than any of us presently imagine.
Nevertheless, convenience is not a serious argument against existence. 7-11
indubitably exists. Starbucks seemingly exists on every corner. Few things could
possibly be considered more convenient than Internet porn, which is available
24-7 around the entire planet, and yet it too can be confirmed to exist.
Convenience is not convincing, but it should not be taken as negating either.
Ockham’s Razor is certainly not a proof, but it is a useful rule of thumb, and
parsimony is usually considered to be a scientific positive when the relative
likelihood of two competing theories is being compared.
While I can hardly question what is or is not obvious to Dominic, I can
certainly point out that “obviousness to Dominic” is a subjective metric that is
not relevant in any way to anyone else. Had I argued that gods exist because
their existence is obvious to me, I would have expected his rebuttal to consist of
little more than pointing and laughing, because that is all that would have been
needed to dismiss such a feeble appeal to personal sensibilities. And since I have
already shown that his rejection of the cosmological argument is based on a false
foundation, it is obvious that his subsequent arguments are invalid to the extent
that they rely upon it.
However, his cited examples from the history of science are important,
because they underline a point that I made in my initial argument concerning the
dynamic nature of the materialist consensus and the limits which technology
places upon it. With the continued advance of technology and the concomitant
changes in Man’s future understanding of the universe that will come from that
advance, it is entirely possible that a belief in the material limits of the universe
which rejects the supernatural may well one day look as ignorant and crazy as a
belief in Newtonian physics which rejects quantum physics.
Now, it is always possible that the strange bumping in the attic is nothing but
the wind. And it may be convenient to say that what we see and what we hear is
seen and heard because it is actually there. But most of the time, that simple
explanation is true and our senses are observing things because those things are
real. The converse, on the other hand, is not necessarily true. Sometimes we
don’t see anything because they are not there. But often, we don’t see anything
because our eyes are closed.
 Chapter 3

THE JUDGES DECIDE ROUND ONE

The Christian

Overlooking his neglect for citations, Vox’s arguments respected scientific

methodology, consistency, and consensus, whereas Dominic’s arguments showed
flagrant disregard for the same. I’m not being harsh, but Dominic didn’t make a
single forceful argument for the non-existence of gods.
On the other hand, Vox’s argument from mathematical probability
established plausibility, but that isn’t sufficient to force the conclusion that gods
exist. Vox’s argument from moral evil wasn’t sufficiently developed to be
relevant. The clincher? Dominic conceded the forcefulness of Vox’s “plethora of
evidence” argument, which clearly tips the scale in Vox’s favor. However, it gets
worse for Dominic, because Vox’s “plethora of evidence” is also consistent with
Dominic’s “alien hypothesis,” and aliens are acceptable given the definition of
“gods” we’ve been supplied.
So, unexpectedly, both Vox and Dominic seem to have agreed that E/L-
>gods! Since Dominic was supposed to argue that E/L->no gods, it appears he
didn’t make his case and actually conceded Vox’s. Since our loosely-defined
concept of “gods” allows for any superhuman being worshipped as able to
control nature, I don’t see how Dominic could successfully argue that E/L->no
gods, unless, of course, he attributes Vox’s “plethora of evidence” to an
uncannily teleological “Northern lights” phenomena. Or mass delusion, but that
is unlikely as both these guys are levels above John Loftus.


The Agnostic

I am going to be brief and unspecific with my comments because I don’t
want to risk influencing the direction or content of the participants’ arguments
any more than absolutely necessary.

 1. The Ancient Astronaut Argument: Oh sweet Sitchin, I never expected this
when I signed on for the job. I’m not sure what I would have done with
Dominic’s Ancient Astronaut rebuttal had Vox not raised the specter. But Vox
did argue that there has been sufficient time for 7.9 trillion alien races to rise, so
I’m going to allow for now that an adequate response to Vox’s ‘plethora of
historical evidence’ is freaking flying saucers.
Moreover, Arthur C. Clarke may very well believe that a being with
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from godhood, but that
doesn’t do much for me. If it’s an excreting animal from another planet, it isn’t
much of a god in my book even if it does have some super duper ray gun or a
time traveling space ship. ET ain’t a god and neither is Jabba the Hut. I recall
that Marvin the Martian of Bugs Bunny fame had some badass technology, but
he isn’t a god in my book. I don’t know whether it would matter to me if had
Marvin had been worshipped as a god by some ancient Sumerians; I’ll leave it to
the debaters to sort this out if the debate goes in this direction.
I think Dominic addressed this adequately in the Cargo Cult reference. If
we’re going to accept that an air force regular flying a cargo ship in the south
pacific is a god, or that Marvin the Martian is a god, then the evidence and logic
for the existence of gods prevails, yea gods! I note that Vox is just doing some
table setting, but for now I agree with Dominic that people exist, so thumbs up to
Dominic on this one.

2. The Argument from Evil: Dominic says, “I believe we can all be in
agreement that objective evil…is quite real”, and then proceeds as if Objective
Evil is a subjective thing, i.e. “it is indisputable that our perceptions and
attitudes are heavily influenced, possibly even dictated, by what finds its way
into our bloodstream… alcohol can significantly affect what the imbiber
considers to be proper behavior at her best friend’s wedding”.
Dominic’s rebuttal is perilously close to attacking the premise of Objective
Evil by feigning agreement, and that doesn’t quite suit my tastes. If our “moral
sense” is indeed based on some objective thing, then what a drunken chick at a
wedding may consider to be proper behavior is entirely irrelevant. If our “moral
sense” is dependent upon our perceptions and attitudes, it’s not an objective
thing. I can’t give Dominic credit for this rebuttal until this confusion is rectified.
Vox’s opening is still standing in my book.

3. Effect before Cause Argument: Vox says, “the assertion that the existence
of the supernatural depends upon the axiom that cause precedes effect or that
space-time is causal and linear is both incorrect and unsupported.” I agree.

4. Problem of Infinite Regress Point and Counter-point: If I found these
sorts of arguments on the question compelling, or even mildly interesting, I
wouldn’t be the designated agnostic judge in this debate. Dominic’s opening
case in this regard didn’t do anything for me and I don’t fault Vox for my
complete disinterest in whether the case was rebutted. TL;DR, draw

5. Truth is Stranger than Fiction: I’m somewhat sympathetic to this
argument, but only because I think Dominic is heading more towards making a
case for agnosticism rather than the case that’s actually on the virtual table. Let’s
just say that any argument that is anything like “X isn’t real because the reality is
some mysterious thing about which we are completely ignorant” isn’t going to
do a whole lot for me as it pertains to the debate on the table, even if I empathize
with the argument outside of this specific debate.
Vox’s response is adequate I suppose. I was also reasonably certain that the
first round was going to Vox before I scrutinized his rebuttal to The Truth is
Stranger argument and Vox didn’t say anything in the rebuttal to change my
mind.

Round to Vox.


The Atheist

First, let me thank the debaters for their contributions to this perennial
debate. That both could produce novel arguments on this well-worn issue is a
marvel. Moreover, the respectful tone that both champions have maintained thus
far is testament that, despite the great degree of name-calling currently exhibited
by both sides in this era of New Atheism, an interesting, illuminating, and
entertaining exchange of ideas remains possible.
I will announce my choice for the winner of each round of debate, after
giving a summary and examination of the respective offerings of the debater. I
have erred, in my evaluations, on the side of being overly critical. I hope no one
finds this to be a sign of disrespect: it is intended as precisely the opposite.

 Opening Statement - Dominic

Dominic’s opening salvo consists of three arguments. Two of these are
anticipatory of the theist’s arguments: first, he denies the necessity of a prime
mover, and second, he argues the cosmological argument is invalid as it is victim
to an infinite regress, antipathy towards which is what is supposed to drive that
argument in the first place. I examine these in turn, before moving on to the
third, positive argument.

Argument 1: There is no need for a first mover.

Dominic argues that a first mover is only necessary if space-time is causal
and linear, and we have reasons to believe that it is not entirely so.
I’m not entirely sure it’s true that linearity is necessary for the first mover
argument. Rather it’s the causality prong that bears the burden. If God exists out
of time, which seems to be the typical conception, then he doesn’t exist “before”
the cause in anything but a very strained sense of “before”. Now, to be sure, all
these mysteries of timelessness are a problem for the first cause argument
proponent as well, importing as he does everyday “timeful” intuitions to a
timeless realm, and I imagine there are significant points to be gained by the
atheist in that area. But that’s something we’ll have to examine if it comes up.

Regardless, Dominic attacks the linearity of space-time by giving evidence
against that conception:

1. A recent paper by Daryl Bem that shows some psychic ability in

participants, particularly as regards pornography.
2. An anecdote wherein a Christian claims to have had a prescient vision.
3. The phenomenon of deja vu.
4. Mantic dreams.

Again, even if we grant the truth of this non-linear version of space-time, I

don’t see it much aids against the prime mover argument. Say it’s proven an
effect may precede its cause: if such, we can imagine our prime mover no longer
necessarily preceding his creation, but perhaps even succeeding it. God may
exist after the end of the universe, and thence he reached back and caused the
universe. This slightly altered cosmological argument seems to pack the same
punch, as, as I’ve said, it’s the connection of cause and effect that matters, not
the temporal relation between the two.

But let us assume that non-linearity would be a significant wrench in the
works for the cosmological argument. Even so, I find Dominic’s evidence
strikingly weak. With all due respect to the visionary, I think we’re perfectly
entitled to cut his subjective experience out of the data set as a mere anecdote.
Bem’s paper is interesting, but recent, and an outlier. I would be happy if it turns
out to have identified something true, but given the long failure of research to
find evidence of such things, I think a large amount of skepticism is required
here. As to deja vu, which I experience quite often, I’m similarly skeptical here.
As mystical and delightful as the phenomenon is, my guess is it’s just a short in
the brain’s memory apparatus.
As to prescient dreams, Dominic felt the phenomenon widespread enough
not to need a reference. I disagree.
So I think the evidence offered for non-linearity is weak at best, and the
issue perhaps entirely irrelevant.

Argument 2: The cosmological argument suffers an infinite regress.

I have never heard this counterargument before. Dominic runs through the
conventional cosmological argument, and points out that thought itself is the
phenomenon that most easily crosses the abstract and the material, and thus it
was a thought of God that bridged the gap. The first thought, he asserts, was a
thought about thinking, as that would be the purest thought. But what was the
thinking that that thought was about about? More thinking? Hence, an infinite
regress.
But I see no reason to think the primordial thought of God would be about
thinking. If that’s truly the purest thought—and I don’t see why that is either—
then why would God have to think that and nothing else?
Moreover, I’m generally skeptical of infinite regress arguments. Despite
Zeno’s Paradox, arrows do manage to reach their destinations, so either that is an
illusion of some sort, or there’s something wrong with the argument. The latter
seems more likely. And I’m tempted to use a similar counterexample here.
Thinking about thinking leads to an infinite regress, perhaps: nonetheless I can--
and I imagine y’all can as well--think about thinking. I’m doing it right now.
Infinite regress, or no, I can do it, so either an infinite regress must be possible,
or for some reason, this really isn’t an infinite regress.

Argument 3: The truth is stranger than fiction.

This is the only positive argument against the existence of gods. If the
previous two counterarguments succeeded and there were no other pro-theistic
arguments, we would be left with only agnosticism. I’m not faulting Dominic
here, as the topic of the debate was never sharpened into anything as clear as
“there are gods”, but was left rather murky as “the evidence for and against
gods”. Still, as his contribution to the evidence against gods, for which argument
he is presumably the proponent, this doesn’t do much.
Dominic’s point here is that gods are simply not strange enough to be the
real answer. Reality has to be far stranger than that.
The adjective “strange” verges on the dangerously subjective. Imagine
hearing Christian orthodoxy without prior exposure. God gives birth to a third of
His tripartite-self, speaking to that fraction of himself and ultimately sacrificing
it in order to remove the ancient taint of ingestion of a forbidden fruit. Eldritcher
stories are imaginable, but when heard with fresh ears this one’s pretty weird. I
recall C.S. Lewis pointing out this very oddness in Mere Christianity.
Dominic gives various examples of weirdness proving true, such as quantum
physics (which is certainly the best example) and heliocentrism. Many more
examples could be added: evolution, the germ theory of disease, genetics, and so
on. But there is surely some selection bias here since a discovery must be, almost
by definition, of something weird. Otherwise a discovery isn’t necessary in the
first place.
Why is it bright during the day and dark at night? Answer: the sun shines
during the day. There is nothing weird about that. All the commonsensical
functions of the world don’t draw attention; the point being that truth is often
quite a bit less strange than fiction. We just don’t notice it. The chicken probably
crossed the road because chickens walk and roads are things that are sometimes
walked over.
Moreover, simple strangeness doesn’t really bear on the issue of theism vs.
atheism. Yes, it may be that reality is much stranger than imagined. But that
reality may have a God or it may not. If there is a God, then He may well be
something far stranger than anything we’ve imagined (and many Christians
would happily agree), but nevertheless, He’s still God. Or there may be no God,
and reality is, alone, something far stranger than anticipated, and many atheists
would happily agree with that. But in that case, there still won’t be a God.
So I don’t think this argument succeeds.
Dominic also says postulating the existence of supernatural beings is
abundantly obvious as being a convenient fantasy concocted as a childish and
superficial explanation of any and everything. This may be true, but it’s mere
assertion, and it can be dismissed as such.

Opening Statement - Vox Day

Vox begins by widening evidence to its full dictionary definition, in contrast
with the niggardly conception that many of the New Atheists hew to. Essentially
his conception of evidence allows in testimony, whereas others would limit
evidence to the purely scientific. There’s usually some sort of vulgar
verificationism or falsificationism appealed to by the atheist here, but such an
appeal is naive.
With this wide definition, Vox Day points out the vast quantity of evidence
for gods throughout time.
It’s hard to quarrel with this and I don’t. Even if such evidence is flawed in
some way, it must be dealt with. While Day defends this proposition at some
length, with examples, as I largely agree I won’t detail his defense. I only note
that the defense is sound, and the examples—the Hittite Empire, Nineveh, the
Higgs boson—are felicitous.
Vox makes the interesting observation that the supernatural universe may
coincide with some part of the multiverse, and an inhabitant thereof may well be
the gods we seek. That could be.
There’s also another interesting observation worth quoting:

When the mathematical odds indicate that advanced technological aliens

exist somewhere in the material universe and contact with superhuman
beings has been reported on tens of thousands of occasions, the assumption
that gods do not exist begins to look more like outright denial than
reasonable skepticism. When seen in this light, the failure of modern
science to detect gods in what the scientific consensus presently states is
only 0.6 percent of modern Man’s existence is analogous to the Aztecs
assuming that because no white men were seen during a given 201-day
period between 1427 and 1519, Cortés and the conquistadors did not exist.
No doubt this would have seemed like a perfectly reasonable conclusion,
right up until the day Córdoba arrived in the Yucatán.

This is clever and I’ve never heard it before. It is somewhat weaker than it
seems at first blush as it neglects a salient feature of our evidence for gods: it is
as our ability to measure reality and record history has improved that our
evidence for the supernatural has begun to wane. Now, as Vox points out, rightly,
this could be a momentary blip. Human history is no lengthy thing in the greater
scheme of the universe, and the gods that be may simply be busy elsewhere—
nevertheless, the inverse correlation is suggestive.
Vox goes on to make an argument from evil, essentially: 1. evil exists; 2. the
existence of evil "requires the presence of a source of good"; 3. the only entity
capable of dictating an objective and definitive good is the creator entity or His
agent. Hence, God, exists. Fans of William Lane Craig will recognize this move.
I don’t find this persuasive, for at least two reasons. One, I simply don’t
think evil exists. There are things I would describe as morally wrong, but all I
intend by that judgement is to express my subjective dislike of such things.
Many do not share my intuition here, as it’s a common feeling that good/evil has
a universal, timeless aspect that other, more petty likes and dislikes or ours lack.
I share this impression, but I resolve it by denying its validity. Others don’t, and
for them, this argument has a weight that should be respected.
Nevertheless, the other steps of the argument strike me as of dubious
validity as well. Why, for example, should “good” be taken as the fundamental
quality and not “evil”? Perhaps all good requires a perfectly evil being, after all.
Nor is it as self-evidently clear to me as it is to Vox that evil is the sort of thing
only defined in contrast with its opposite, ala heat and cold.
Nor is it clear that a creator gets to define morality. On a smaller scale, I
think few believe this as regards, for example, parents and their children. We
would rightly balk at the parent who claimed to able to define the morality of his
ilk, creator or no.
Nor is it clear to me why the creator (or his agent) must be the one
propounding moral law. Suppose the creator were not morally perfect (nothing
seems to demand that He be so, save Anselm’s shaky metaphysics), and that
another god, one who didn’t create, existed. Now suppose the latter were
perfectly moral. Surely it is the latter god to whom we’d look to as the
propounder of morality, creator or no.
Now it may be the vast power of the Almighty means the rules are different
when we’re dealing with an ex nihilo creation. But that argument remains to be
made.
 Bottom line, this move may go through, but it’s not clear that it must without
more information.
Note that our debaters have shot past one another here. Dominic attacked the
cosmological argument, but Day didn’t rely on that (unless it’s implicit in his
discussion of a creator God). Rather, Day’s main evidence is testimonial.
Of all the claims, it seems to me that it is this, Day’s mustering and rescuing
of testimonial evidence, that is the strongest thus far adduced. Thus, the round
goes to Day.


Dominic - First Rebuttal

Dominic’s rebuttal is attractive, clever, and funny. Rather than dispute Day’s
insistence on the validity of much testimonial evidence, Dominic glibly accepts
it, but points out it misses something important: historical accounts of aliens.
Dominic then treats us to a brief history of the concept of extraterrestrials and
the rise of abduction accounts.
Moreover, Dominic argues, it is more likely that the testimony for gods
through the ages was actually imperfectly grasped accounts of encounters with
extraterrestrials. Such beings are statistically probable, as Fermi pointed out. I
am somewhat disappointed that Dominic didn’t seize on evidence of Elvis
sightings and make the parallel argument that all testimony for gods through the
ages was actually imperfectly-grasped accounts of the King.
But aliens, however powerful, are not gods, Dominic argues. They are no
more gods than the technically advanced men worshipped by the famous cargo
cults were gods in relation to their devotees. I agree.
The extraterrestrial argument is a fresh argument. John Shook mentions
aliens in his debate with William Lane Craig, but he certainly doesn’t develop
the theme as fully as Dominic does. It’s hard to dislike the argument; it would at
least resolve the Fermi paradox. If this were a common counterargument, I’d
give the common responses to it. But it’s new to me, so I’ll leave it to Day.
Day’s testimonial evidence arguably dispatched with, Dominic moves onto
the (reverse) argument from evil.
Dominic defines evil in a fairly non-controversial matter, essentially willful
infliction of harm and suffering, then examines Day’s metaphor of light and
dark, and pointedly disagrees with it.
Dominic first disputes that evil is purely a negative thing, a mere absence of
good. Evil, says he, is “recognized through positive… tangible… action.”
He says the objectivity of evil is a result of it being unpleasant for someone,
and that, presumably, is enough to impart objectivity. No lawgiver is needed.
I find this an uncomfortable expansion of what it means for something to be
objective. If objectivity can be achieved by merely having an effect on a person,
it’s hard to see what couldn’t be objective. Take any of our stereotypical notions
of subjectivity: is Glee a good TV show? Now surely if anything is subjective,
it’s this. And yet, there is a measurable effect of Glee on its viewers: we can
clock laughter, survey boredom, gauge serotonin release, etc. Does this render
the quality of Glee an objective fact? Surely it can’t, if objectivity and
subjectivity are to mean anything.
Nonetheless, Dominic’s statement that “Good and Evil laws requiring a
lawgiver is [an] assumption” is well taken. The atheistic moral realist can claim
that morality is simply a fact of the universe, a brute fact, on a par with basic
physical laws. The origin of those physical laws is problematic, but it at least
gives the realist some precedent.
Moreover, Dominic seems to agree with me that morality is not objective in
the commonly held sense of the term.
He argues that morality is not, in principle, different from other human
sensitivities, such as to heat and to sweetness. Why, he asks, should evil be
elevated to the level of universal law, when we don’t do the same with heat and
sweetness? Essentially, the argument seems to now be: Man’s moral sense has
enough in common with things we consider simply subjective to be rightfully
considered subjective itself. Thus he rejects the first plank in Day’s argument
from evil: that evil exists. Sure, Dominic thinks evil exists, but not in the
objective, universal sense that Day does and many others do.
I realize that Dominic is agreeing with my own stated view here, and it’s
somewhat ironic that I’m now going to critique that belief, but here goes.
Yes, it may be that “morality” is no more objective than heat and sweetness.
Nonetheless, there is a very common hunch that it is, even among atheists.
Witness Sam Harris’s latest— and abysmal—attempt to produce an atheistic
account of objective morality. What are we to do with this intuition? It may be
wrong, but why is it at all? Why indeed, as Dominic himself asks, do we elevate
morality to universal law?
I don’t know the answer. But regardless, the simple fact of the matter is that
we do elevate morality to universal law. Why? Well, perhaps there’s some
evolutionary psych explanation. But there’s another possibility, one that is far
simpler: perhaps morality simply is universal, while sweetness and heat
sensation are not.
In sum, Dominic produces an insightful, if partly problematic, critique of
Day’s two arguments for God. Again, though, even if entirely successful, this
only leaves us as agnostics.


First Rebuttal - Vox Day

Vox begins by pointing out Dominic’s definition of gods as beings predating
this universe is unnecessarily restrictive, and historically inaccurate. Only the
creator God need precede the universe: the vast menagerie of others gods have
no such requirement, and historically are seldom described as such. Day gives
the example of Olympians, who patently were not creators.
Still I wonder if these non-creator gods really qualify as gods, or if they are,
as Dominic argued, merely superior beings. That is to say, are these non-creator
gods nothing more than the technologically advanced humans that the cargo
cults centered around? Dominic dismisses them as unworthy of consideration for
this debate because of this identity: he may well be right to do so. It may be that
the Creator is the only suitably godlike being worth debating.
Even were that so, however, Vox defends the Creator as well. Vox dismisses
Dominic’s evidence for the (partly) non-causal nature of time as irrelevant. I had
much the same criticism in my review of Dominic’s opening argument, and so
agree with Day here. However, Vox does little more than simply assert this
irrelevancy and some more illustration would have helped.
I do disagree, however, that it is completely irrelevant. It may well be
irrelevant to the vast majority of gods, but, the cause and effect and linearity of
time does bear on the issue of the creator God, if no other. At least, Dominic
argues it does and needs to be addressed. We thus have a set of dueling
assertions here, with Dominic asserting relevancy and Day denying it, with little
other exploration.
Moreover, the nature of cause and effect—unlike linearity—strikes me as an
intimately important part of the cosmological argument. Witness any of Craig’s
presentations, which invariably start with something like: "Premise 1:
Everything that begins to exist has a cause." Now if there were a counterexample
to this, that would be pertinent. Nonetheless, Dominic does not, psychic porn
notwithstanding, present any such counterexample that I can see. Perhaps Vox
simply disagrees that violations of causality in our universe have any bearing on
that initial premise. If so, I’m sympathetic, but I’m not convinced.
Assertion or no, as I largely agree with Vox’s stance. It’s tough to fault it.
Moreover, Dominic’s assertion was the counterargument to an argument that Vox
didn’t actually make, so Vox is within his rights to wave it away.
Vox goes on to dispute Dominic’s argument about the infinite regress present
in the Creator’s first thought. He echoes some of my criticisms and adds more
besides, and I think largely carries the day here. I’ll move on in the interests of
avoiding pleonasm.
Vox goes on to critique Dominic’s sole positive argument for atheism, his
“truth is stranger than fiction” argument. Vox and I agree here that the metric is
disappointingly subjective. Indeed, I find many of Vox’s criticisms here, as well,
coincide with mine, so I won’t repeat them at length. I will only sum them up
briefly: 1. strangeness is subjective; 2. strangeness functions equally well as an
argument against the current scientific, materialist consensus, as it does to the
current theological consensus.
Day points out, rightly:

Had I argued that gods exist because their existence is obvious to me, I
would have expected his rebuttal to consist of little more than pointing and
laughing, because that is all that would have been needed to dismiss such a
feeble appeal to personal sensibilities.

Just so. It is not per se an invalid step to take something merely as sensually
obvious—this is what my belief in the external world ultimately comes down to
—but to assert this and merely nothing else would not do much to carry one’s
burden of persuasion. Note that Craig in his debates will rightly mention the
testimony of the Holy Spirit as evidence for God, but he never rests his entire
defense on this one prong, and usually spends most of his time elsewhere. While
he believes it to be the strongest argument, he also realizes it’s not persuasive to
those who don’t already agree with him.
If my review here is rather brief, it’s because by and large I find little to fault
Vox for here, and for a reason: I had many of the same reactions to Dominic’s
arguments. While Dominic’s rebuttal was inventive, Vox’s was less so. But I
can’t fault Vox for this. The reason it was less inventive is because a less
inventive response was required to address Dominic’s opening arguments.


 CONCLUSION: ALL THREE JUDGES AWARD THE FIRST ROUND TO
VOX. VOX NOW HAS TO OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE HIS ARGUMENT
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GODS, TO WHICH DOMINIC WILL RESPOND.
 Chapter 4

ROUND TWO: ON THE EXISTENCE OF GODS

—Vox

As there has been some public confusion about the debate concerning the
existence of gods rather than being limited to the existence of the Christian God,
I will point out that the focus on the existence of small-g gods, plural, has always
been the case. In his initial post on Pharyngula that inspired my original debate
challenge three years ago, PZ Myers demanded to see “some intelligent
arguments for gods”. He wrote: ”Somebody somewhere is going to have to
someday point me to some intelligent arguments for gods, because I’ve sure
never found them.”
My challenge to him reflected that, as I replied: “It is my contention that
there is not only substantial evidence for the existence of gods, but that the logic
for the existence of gods is superior to the logic for the nonexistence of them as
presented by yourself, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett, to
name a few.” Any objections to the original subject of the debate turning out to
be the subject of debate are not only spurious, but entirely nonsensical.
Furthermore, if we accept the commonly cited argument for atheism
articulated by Stephen F. Roberts as valid, when we understand why Dominic
dismisses all the other possible gods, we will understand why he dismisses the
Christian God. The atheist position that Dominic is championing is not defined
as disbelief in the existence of the Christian God, but as disbelief in the existence
of all gods. To his credit, Dominic understands and accepts this, and everyone
would do well to follow his example.
In the first round, Dominic correctly conceded two significant points. They
are as follows:

1. There is something, possibly of a distinctly external nature, is

imposing itself on people throughout history
2. Objective evil, as defined as a self-aware, purposeful, and malicious
 force which intends material harm and suffering to others and is capable of
inflicting it, is quite real.

Although Dominic has not taken issue with it, others have complained that
the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of gods is excessively broad. This is
not the case. Most dictionaries similarly distinguish between God and gods,
sometimes more specifically than Oxford, and many even define the concept
more broadly. For example, Merriam-Webster defines “god” thusly:

1. capitalized : the supreme or ultimate reality: the Being perfect in

power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped as creator and ruler of the
universe
2 : a being or object believed to have more than natural attributes and
powers and to require human worship
3 : a person or thing of supreme value
4 : a powerful ruler

The second Merriam-Webster definition is helpful because its use of the

term “believed” points to the important aspect of the potential confusion
between technologically advanced space aliens and gods. While one could get
technical and assert that a mistaken belief in the divinity of a technologically
advanced individual is sufficient to prove the existence of gods as per the
dictionary definitions, this is not an argument I am making. Dominic is correct to
suggest proving other people exist is not the purpose of this discussion. Nor is it
to prove that technologically advanced aliens may be god-like or that Hu Jintao
is a god.
My purpose in citing a correct dictionary definition of gods and the potential
confusion of aliens for them is merely to show that the intrinsic difficulty in
distinguishing between a genuine supernatural deity and a technologically
advanced natural entity renders reliance upon the science-based materialist
consensus an inherently invalid metric.
The known possibility of confusion does not mean that perception counts as
actual objective existence, it means that the perception of gods and/or aliens, and
more importantly, the means of perceiving them, are unreliable and therefore
cannot be appealed to as if they are conclusive, or even meaningful in this
specific regard. The failure of science to detect supernatural gods is no more
significant than its failure to detect natural aliens, and combined with the
potential for confusing the two, this means science is an intrinsically unreliable
means of determining what historical evidence for the existence of gods and/or
aliens is valid and what is not.
Therefore, the science-based materialist consensus is incapable of judging
the mass of available historical evidence for gods.
In support of this conclusion, I note that in the previous round, I showed that
the failure of modern science to detect gods during only 0.6 percent of modern
Man’s existence is analogous to the Aztecs assuming that because no white men
were seen during a given 201-day period between 1427 and 1519, Cortés and the
conquistadors did not exist. But this analogy actually tends to understate the
actual situation because a) not all individuals living in the era of modern science
are scientists and b) not all scientists operate in fields that potentially concern the
detection of gods.
According to the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
there are 5.8 million science and engineering researchers in the world, which
means there are approximately three million scientists out of the 6.85 billion
people on the planet, assuming a relatively equal division between scientists and
engineers. Even if we generously assume that this ratio of 1/2283 of the
population can be applied to the entire era of modern science from 1600 AD to
2011 AD, this means that a more precise analogy requires concluding that
because 6,570 of the estimated 15 million Aztecs did not see any white men
during 201 days between 1427 and 1519, Cortés and the conquistadors did not
exist.
In light of this statistical reality, it is worth recalling that despite eyewitness
testimony and historical evidence dating back 2,325 years to the Apadana of
Xerxes at Persopolis in 424 BC, scientists did not credit the existence of the
okapi for the first three-quarters of the modern scientific era, despite the fact that
an estimated 15,000 okapis still live in the wild today. And given how we are
informed that 90% of the matter in the universe still remains undetected, it
should not be a mystery that no scientists have managed to find any gods in the
10% of the universal matter they have so far managed to locate.
Furthermore, it is incorrect to say that as our ability to measure reality and
record history has improved, our evidence for the supernatural has begun to
wane. And here I will turn to Dominic’s excellent point about the way in which
the general shift in the nature of reports of the scientifically inexplicable have
increasingly tended to reflect the aliens of science fiction rather than the gods of
history.
Since I have already demonstrated that science cannot distinguish between
the former and the latter, one cannot reasonably say that our evidence for the
supernatural has begun to wane; if anything it has increased in recent decades
because the testimonial evidence for the supertechnological is indistinguishable
from the testimonial evidence for the supernatural. At this point, we have no idea
if ancient evidence for gods is more indicative of technologically advanced
aliens than current evidence for technologically advanced aliens is indicative of
ancient gods.
All we know now is that there is a long and consistent record of evidence of
something with superscientific abilities imposing itself on people throughout
history, a record that not only preceded the era of modern science, but continues
right through it to the present day.
This does not mean that gods exist. This does not mean that aliens exist.
This does not mean that aliens broadly defined as gods exist. This merely means
that the weight of the historical evidence strongly indicates that aliens and/or
gods exist, that the lack of scientific evidence for either gods or aliens is almost
completely irrelevant concerning the fact of their existence, and that it is at least
conceivable that supertechnological aliens, transdimensional beings, and
supernatural gods are actually one and the same thing.
However, it should be noted that even iron-clad scientific proof of the
existence of gods would not be sufficient to prove the existence of a creator god,
still less the existence of a Creator God, and less yet the existence of the
Christian Creator God who has provided Creation with moral laws as well as
physical laws. The destruction of the materialist case for nonexistence is not
tantamount to proving the case for existence and there is no way to make the
logical leap from the evidential support for the existence of gods and/or aliens to
the Ten Commandments and Jesus Christ dying on the Cross for the sins of Man.
A very different case is required.

Since Dominic has already acknowledged the existence of evil as defined
above, I shall endeavor to explain why the analogy of light and shadow is correct
and how the existence of evil suffices to prove the existence of a creator god
worthy of the more significant term God. I acknowledge that this argument will
hold no water for those who reject the existence of evil or consider all events to
be nothing more than meaningless and dynamic arrangements of atoms over
time. However, I have observed over the years that the vast majority of those
who claim not to believe in evil nevertheless speak, write, and act in a manner
that completely contradicts their asserted non-belief, therefore the axiom should
be considered legitimate for most.
The first assent having been granted, the two steps in the logic that still need
to be demonstrated here are a) that the existence of evil requires the presence of
a source of good, and, b) that the only entity capable of dictating an objective
and definitive good is the Creator or His agent. Due to the word limit, I shall
concentrate my efforts on the demonstrating why the existence of evil requires
the presence of a definitive Good, and how that strongly implies existence of a
Creator.
To determine if the existence of evil requires the presence of a source of
good, we must first consider what the existence of evil requires. At a bare
minimum, it is apparent that evil requires an actor, an action/event, and a sensate
victim. One does not consider a hurricane to be evil although it is an event and
there are victims because there is no actor. One does not consider a man telling
lies to the mirror to be evil because no one is deceived; there is no victim. And
one does not consider a man smashing a stone into pieces to be evil because
although there is an actor, an action, and a victim, the victim is not sensate.
However, of the seven deadly sins, wrath, greed, sloth, pride, lust, envy, and
gluttony, only gluttony even requires an action for its commission. The others
are states of consciousness that may or may not lead to action. Now, obviously to
insist that the seven capital vices of Christianity are evil would be special
pleading, but I cite them only to highlight the way in which an evil state of
consciousness usually precedes the evil act regardless of what the evil act may
be. So, we must conclude that evil requires either an actor, an action, and a
sensate victim or an actor and a state of consciousness in which committing an
action is desired. Such states of consciousness are not crimes, of course, since
the law requires action, and usually, material injury before it is concerned. And
yet, those who admit to the existence of evil uniformly consider these intentional
states of consciousness to be evil even when the actor remains completely
inactive. It is not merely the pedophile’s actions which are evil, but also his state
of consciousness previous to any subsequent evil actions.
So, evil is fundamentally a matter of consciousness, which at this point in
time places it beyond the current ability of the science-based materialist
consensus to examine. But those who have experienced such states of
consciousness already know that the materialist explanation for cause-and-effect
are insufficient, even before taking Dominic’s suggestion of occasional
exceptions to it into account. Consider the differences between the moralities of
a plant which lacks the capacity to consider consequences or a moral sense, an
animal which lacks a moral sense and a Man who possesses both the capacity to
consider consequences as well as a moral sense.

Plant: Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law.

Animal: Do what thou wilt, with due regard for the policemen around
the corner.
Man: Do what is right.

Man’s consciousness observably has at least three aspects, as unlike animals,

which operate according to a simple utilitarian dualism, Man has an additional
sense which acts as an internal brake upon his desires in addition to the external
brake imposed by other parties. It is this sense which caused Freud to develop
his theory of ego, id, and superego, and it is possession of this sense which
explains why we hold men responsible for actions that animals are permitted.
When Man contemplates an action, he is capable of taking at least three elements
into account.

1.His desires.
2.The potential consequences
3.The morality of his action

The sense that is required for the third step is what I referred to in the
previous round as the antenna that is indicative of the existence of some form of
transmission. It is usually referred to as conscience, or in religious terms, the
“still small voice”, and it is something that is simultaneously internal to the
consciousness and outside the desires and the awareness of consequences. It is
most noticeable when it is in opposition to the alignment of the two other aspects
of the state of consciousness.
Materialists assume that this third element does not exist and is merely a
variable result of combining the first two elements, but their opinion is irrelevant
at this point since they are still wrestling with the question of the material
existence of consciousness itself. Should they ever manage to sort that out, it
will of course have to be taken into account, but until then the science-based
materialist consensus is no more significant than the cartoon of the proverbial
devil and angel sitting, sight unseen, on one’s shoulders, whispering into one’s
ears. Only observations, history, and logic are relevant here.
Given our observation that this sense exists and that it picks up signals that
may or may not be produced internally and which are known to frequently
contradict the two other elements, we must decide if it is more likely that the
signal is internally or externally generated. Freud’s theory and its variants is the
most established of the various internal models, but nearly 100 years of the
consistent failure of psychoanalysis and its theory of the unconscious mind
suggest that external generation is more likely, especially when one considers the
external model’s relative success in comparison with the internal model when
everything from suicide rates to life expectancy are compared.
Moreover, neither the materialist perspective nor the internal model can
account for the difference between the rapid rate of claimed moral evolution
observed in the United States with regards to homosexuality and the very small
variations in moral sensibilities observed across societies separated by
geography as well as the full extent of the historical record.
If we accept that the signal is externally generated, the next question is the
extent of the signal. Due to the relatively small range of variations in moral
sensibilities, we can see that this signal has a vast scope in terms of time as well
as space. The transmitter, then, must be able to transcend the material to at least
the same extent that human consciousness does, it must be capable of reaching
the utmost expanses of humanity both geographically and temporally, and it
must be relatively stable. And it because it is departures from the signal that
result in states of consciousness that we have shown to be evil, it is obvious that
such states can only exist insofar as the signal also exists.
In the absence of the signal, which is the objective and definitive Good, or if
one prefers, the Moral Law, neither the state of consciousness nor the actions of
the actor can rise above the animal level, and therefore cannot be considered
evil. The Law can only be broken if the Law exists. Evil can only exist in the
presence of the Good.
Now, the signal need not be a signal per se. It could also be a pre-
programmed implant, in which case we would speak of the implanter rather than
the transmitter. But regardless, the almost uniformly observed existence of
Man’s moral sense throughout history proves that so long as we accept four
conditions, then the existence of evil logically indicates the existence of a
definitive moral law that is as constant and as arbitrary as most, if not all, of the
physical laws of the universe. The four necessary conditions are:

1. Evil exists
2. Potential differences between one’s consequentially safe desires and
one’s moral sense can be observed
 3. The moral sense is informed by a source external to the conscious
mind
4. Man’s moral sense has not greatly changed over time

And because this definitive moral law is constant and arbitrary, there must
be a lawgiver capable of both defining and transmitting it. It should be readily
apparent that the term more customarily used for the lawgiver is God, who as the
Creator of the universe has both the authority and the ability to define the
arbitrary constants of the moral law in the same way He has defined the
constants of the physical ones.


TO WHICH DOMINIC REPLIES


First off, I would like to thank Vox for letting me off the hook for having to
wrack my brain to come up with a sufficiently entertaining argument to prove a
negative. It was my mistake to overlook the topic of the debate being towards
“gods” rather than the preconceived yet popular notion of “God”. So any
references to a creator God, the cosmological argument, or out-of-context
quoting of Aristotle pointing out how the teaching method of a competing school
is poor because it suffers from infinite regress by trying to rely on demonstration
alone, are all being dropped as not germane to the topic at hand.
In summary, Vox’s argument thus far is twofold, the first providing the
foundation for the second.

(A) There is (1) a mountain of testimonial evidence of interaction with

gods, (2) testimonial evidence is generally reliable, thus (3) it is ahistorical
and denialist to dismiss all such testimonial evidence, and therefore the
evidence suggests gods are real.
(B) (1) Evil exists, (2) potential differences between one’s
consequentially safe desires and one’s moral sense can be observed, (3) the
moral sense is informed by a source external to the conscious mind, and (4)
Man’s moral sense has not greatly changed over time, then the existence of
evil logically indicates the existence of a definitive moral law that is as
constant and as arbitrary as most, if not all, of the physical laws of the
universe.
 The conclusion of (B), that this law means a lawgiver who meets the
definition of God, is an element, or at least subset of the set of likely "gods"
established by (A).
Both arguments require all of A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, and B4 to each be
true statements for the evidence to support the logic that gods are more likely
than not. Establishing that, contrary to the arguments presented, there is evidence
showing A3, B3, and B4 are each false statements will invalidate the conclusions
drawn by both (A) and (B).
Further, because this is the point of the debate, “not A3” being the true
statement supports the separate line of argument I presented originally that there
is valid logic and evidence for the non-existence of gods, which I will seek to
clarify herein, and by clarify I mean dumb down my original argument enough
so that people aren’t laboring under the impression I was actually arguing for the
existence of aliens rather than calling me out for making the argument from
incredulity. Which is what it primarily was, with the exception that I gave actual
reasons to be incredulous.

A3: it is ahistorical and denialist to dismiss all such testimonial evidence

The true statement would be that it is ahistorical to dismiss all testimonial
evidence out of hand. Vox provides several good examples of why this statement
is true, including the existence of okapis and the empire of Assyria to name two.
However, testimony of personal contact with gods is a class of testimony, clearly
defined by being an experience of the apparently supernatural, out of the
ordinary, and demanding of an explanation. This is precisely why I introduced
the relatively recent phenomenon of alien abductions. It is a class of testimony
that is equivalent to and practically indistinguishable from testimony of
interactions with gods, as opposed to testimony of interactions with the
mundane. By presenting evidence that we have every reason to dismiss
testimonial evidence of alien abductions due to the fact that pre-existing cultural
influence both precedes and largely defines what is later reported by alien
abductees, and the same can thus be said of angelic visitations, demonic
possession, and ornery leprechauns.
A3 is false.
The only argument Vox has presented that A3 is true are increasingly
elaborate ways of saying absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. I
completely agree that this is true. However Vox’s responses thus far regarding
A3 have been against an imaginary materialist-consensus opponent who
dogmatically insists that gods aren’t real because he hasn’t personally poked one
with a stick.
My argument, from the very beginning, has been that testimonial evidence
for gods in particular is easily dismissed for the exact same reason that testimony
for alien abductions can be dismissed. That it would have been silly for a
hypothetical group of Aztecs to deny the existence of hostile Spainards before
ever meeting a white man is intentional obfuscation, because Vox’s own
argument is entirely dependent on the idea that the gods have in fact been met.
The response to my objection is not to hem and haw and say, “well, we don’t
know everything you see, so, it... uh, could be.” We may not know much of
anything, but we do know each other pretty well. If we didn’t, Vox’s entire
argument regarding the existence of evil would be impossible to make.
The only response that actually addresses my argument would be to show
me someone who is possessed by a demon that spits on both the cross and the
name of Christ who has never heard of Christianity or been exposed to anything
christian. Show me someone recounting an experience of being sexually
molested by little grey aliens with big heads and huge hypnotic eyes who’d
never heard of or been exposed to Hollywood films or other popular culture
sources that tell us what aliens do and what they look like. There has been no
such showing yet.
That we don’t know everything is irrelevant. That aliens who may exist that
may yet further be mistaken for gods is irrelevant. We have established thus far
that “not A3” is a true statement, given my evidence that this is such and Vox’s
complete lack of any rebuttal. Because A3 is false, the conclusion drawn from
(A) is also false.

B3: the moral sense is informed by a source external to the conscious mind

Vox’s argument here involves correlating the moral impulse, the objective
Good, with a signal that imposes itself on our conscious decision making
process, with the significance of the analogy being that the signal is external and
universal, crossing time and space to affect everyone. Vox dashes his own
argument to pieces by stating:

it is something that is simultaneously internal to the consciousness and

outside the desires and the awareness of consequences.
 and

It could also be a pre-programmed implant, in which case we would speak

of the implanter rather than the transmitter.

Ok, so after all that about it being a still quiet voice most likely external in
nature, it could equally just as well be an integral part of us that is just another
influence on our decision making process. Why Vox would invalidate his own
argument so completely is a mystery, but of no concern to me. This admission by
Vox that the moral impulse is internal to the conciousness (and no weaseling out
by saying I don’t understand the part about it being identified most easily
through opposition to other parts of the conciousness, [notice how I italicized
“parts”, that’s the kicker]) and likely a result of our physical structure is simply
admitting B3 is not true. Our morality is just as much a part of us as any other
part of our conciousness that influences decision making.
B3 is false.

B4: Man’s moral sense has not greatly changed over time

Vox himself admits there has been a "rapid rate of claimed moral evolution
observed in the United States with regards to homosexuality". I could leave it at
that. Since this is what I was expecting from the very beginning, though, I will
go ahead with what I had at the ready. Man’s moral sense greatly changes on a
regular basis, even within the span of a moment. In fact, man’s moral sense
completely reverses itself and actively pushes us towards evil so often we have a
word for it. This single word invalidates B4, and demonstrates that “not B4” is
the true statement.
Vengeance.
Retribution and revenge can be considered as evil in a great many situations.
But just as often we call it justice. Objective evil has been defined, it is:

A self-aware, purposeful, and malicious force which intends material harm

and suffering to others and is capable of inflicting it, requiring either an
actor, an action, and a sensate victim or an actor and a state of
consciousness in which committing an action is desired.

A man who gets his hands on the boy who raped his daughter meets every
single clause of the definition presented above. Yet both the man and what
happens next is not evil, it is justice. Depending on who you ask, of course. Evil
is suddenly not evil when the victim deserves it, this is what our moral sense
tells us, yet meeting out justice and punishment satisfies every single criterion
for objectively identifying evil presented.
Trying to argue at this point that our sense of justice is itself a consistent a
part of the moral sense by pointing to the grand scheme of history and how it’s a
component that has always been a part of our cultures is to avoid the issue at
hand. The argument is that there is an objective and consistent Good that we can
sense with the morality identifying part of our conciousness, and exceptions or
violations to this universal Good are how we recognize evil. But I have shown
that the moral sense itself completely reverses course and calls evil, the Good,
on a regular basis. Time to put Mere Christianity down; C.S. Lewis can’t help
you now.
B4 is false.

Having shown that Vox’s argument for the existence of gods is false, it is
apparently still incumbent on me to make a positive case for the non-existence of
gods, again.
The theme of my presentation was titled “truth is stranger than fiction”, for
which I did what I could to divorce any personal feelings on the matter from the
attempt to establish the pattern, and only afterwards finally admitting that I’ve
noticed the pattern myself and found it persuasive. The hypothesis which I
sought to prove being that for any new experience or phenomenon, when man
attempts to explain the phenomenon using the tools for understanding at his
disposal, the first attempt (and sometimes 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc…) at explanation is
almost invariably wrong. Test it if you like. Find a young child, turn the tables,
and be the person to ask them how babies are made.
The examples I provided showed this pattern through history. When
physicists were first exploring the atomic and subatomic, they went in with the
expectation that little particles couldn’t be all that different from big ones, with
experimental results very quickly overturning that assumption. Similarly with
the first impression regarding what revolved around what in the solar system.
Another example would be the phlogiston theory of fire, because that extra
weight had to go somewhere. Then there was “luminiferous aether” to fill up the
universe with something that could carry these pesky light “waves”.

It’s not terribly relevant to the debate, but consider the case when applying
this hypothesis to a prevailing “first explanation for a great mystery” that has not
yet been officially scrapped. Take Dark Matter, the idea that the universe is
mainly composed of just more matter that it so happens we can’t see or detect
any direct way, but it’s got to be there, because nothing else could account for
these gravitational anomalies. I expect it to be consigned to the dustbin of history
along with the tachyon soon enough. Those most likely to do it being a vocal
fringe group of plasma cosmologists challenging this first attempt at an
explanation.
So, to make myself absolutely crystal clear on the matter, the hypothesis is:
For any new experience or phenomenon, when man attempts to explain the
phenomenon using the tools for understanding at his disposal, the first attempt at
explanation is almost invariably wrong.
I thought I was being clear before when I came out and explicitly said “great
mystery” rather than rely on context alone to convey that the explanations that
fall under the domain of this hypothesis were those that required imagination to
fill in the missing details.
The response received so far to this argument has been a dismissive wave of
“obvious to Dominic does not make it true”. The counter examples being
perfectly mundane references to Starbucks and Internet porn. No imagination is
necessary to postulate the existence of either, and the retort so far has been
remarkably asinine. There is no need to rely on extrapolation to paint a complete
picture when ascertaining either Starbucks or Jenna Jameson is real.
Given that I have supported the hypothesis with historical evidence, and that
there has been no attempt at all in refuting it, the evidence suggests that the
hypothesis is true. Applying it to the concept of “gods”, we see that for Man’s
experiences of what he has deemed supernatural throughout history, “gods” was
the first explanation. This first explanation is an extrapolation using the tools for
understanding at man’s disposal at the time to explain a new phenomenon, and is
consequently most likely the incorrect explanation. Gods are not real because the
true reason for the eyewitness testimony that they are based on is something else
entirely.
Let me also make it clear here and now that whatever that something else
would happen to be, I neither know nor care, nor is it required to be singular in
nature or anymore conscious than gravity. The only case I’m making is in
regards to the one thing it isn’t. Further, attempting to claim that this argument
does not disprove any and all potential gods rather than those identified thus far
is outside of the scope of this debate.
 Chapter 5

THE JUDGES DECIDE ROUND TWO

The Christian

Vox did not persuasively demonstrate his argument from moral evil.
Dominic failed to show either A3 or B3 false. B4 seems irrevocably tied to
subjectivity, hence it is still up for grabs. Dominic did not persuasively
demonstrate his hypothesis that the first attempt at an explanation is almost
invariably correct, nor did he attempt to account for the fact that testimony is
distinct from explanation. I declare this round a draw.


The Agnostic

Gods and Flying Saucers: Vox does a sufficient job arguing the notion that it
is conceivable aliens, transdimensional beings, and gods are all the same thing in
his opening. Indeed I think Vox presents a compelling case that the “science-
based materialist” approach is an “inherently invalid metric” akin to trying to eat
a bowl of tomato soup with chopsticks. His position on the metric seems aimed
at pre-empting the usual arguments about scientific evidence, but my mind went
in a slightly different direction.
Specifically, since we might say that science-based materialism is for the
study of the natural world, evidence of a thing that is beyond the grasp of that
materialism is, by definition, extra-natural, for lack of a better term. Vox’s
modestly stated conclusion that it is “at least conceivable” that extra-natural
things have been messing with us for a long, long time is therefore acceptable.
Dominic says he means to dumb down his original argument enough so that
people aren’t laboring under the impression he was actually arguing for the
existence of aliens. That’s a shame, because frankly I found his counter-
argument based on the existence of aliens relatively more compelling, in the
context of this debate, anyway.
Dominic also states that “by presenting evidence that we have every reason
to dismiss testimonial evidence of alien abductions due to the fact that pre-
existing cultural influence both precedes and largely defines what is later
reported by alien abductees, and the same can thus be said of angelic visitations,
demonic possession, and ornery leprechauns.”
Whatever the underlying objective reality may be, I think it’s quite
reasonable to imagine that stories of angels and demons and stories of anal-
probing aliens are stories cut from essentially the same cloth. Whatever is
happening here, it is entirely sensible that there is a bit of cultural context at play,
that those experiencing the phenomena filter it through the lenses of their
respective worldviews. That people interpret strange events through the familiar
does not make the phenomena, whatever it may be, any less strange or
ubiquitous.
My hang up with Dominic, then, is not that I disagree with the idea it is no
coincidence that cultural references precede the reported phenomena. Instead, I
don’t agree that this is sufficient reason to dismiss all of these reports as if
they’re lies concocted by mad men rather than the result of people trying to
explain something wholly unfamiliar to them, something which is at least
conceivably extra-natural.
So long as the premise that “something, possibly of a distinctly external
nature, is imposing itself on people throughout history” remains substantially
unchallenged—and indeed, the premise is stipulated in Round One by Dominic
—the counter-argument that witnesses filter these strange phenomena through
the lenses of their respective worldviews is a wholly inadequate rebuttal to Vox’s
position, however valid the counter-argument may be. In other words, Dominic
has done one hell of a job in making the wrong argument.
Dominic concludes that A3, the statement that it is ahistorical and denialist
to dismiss all such testimonial evidence, is false. I disagree. Interpretations of
these phenomena may very well be culturally dependent, but it is nonetheless
ahistorical and denialist to dismiss said evidence. So long as there is plausibly
some external phenomena at play, a phenomena which is not detectable in the
scientific-materialist realm, then we don’t have reason to dismiss the evidence
for this extra-natural phenomena as far as it relates to the question.
Accordingly, it is at least conceivable that supertechnological aliens,
transdimensional beings, and supernatural gods, are actually one and the same
something. The Gods and Flying Saucers section goes to Vox, with bonus points
to both participants for not making me declare whether I take Erich von Daniken
seriously.

Evil Detection: Let me begin by observing that an argument with internal
contradictions is logically inferior to an argument that stays true to its premises,
by definition.
In Round One, Dominic states that “we can all be in agreement that
objective evil…a self-aware, purposeful, and malicious force…is quite real.”
Evil, per Dominic, is unequivocally objective. It exists independent of individual
thought; its being is not dependent upon perception.
In Round Two, Dominic states that the answer to a question of whether
something is evil depends upon “who you ask, of course.” Evil, in other words,
is in the eye of the beholder, it’s subjective. The reality of evil is that which is
perceived.
So, Dominic has unequivocally stated that evil is objective and he has
unequivocally stated that evil is subjective. I suppose Dominic could be arguing
that objective evil is an elephant and we’re a bunch of blind guys groping said
elephant, but I can’t quite tease this argument out of his writing.
For what it’s worth, I tend to think of good and evil and morality and such as
a matter akin to aesthetics, a very subjective thing. But I’m not the one debating,
and I haven’t stipulated an objective evil.
Inasmuch as Vox stays true to the stipulated premise, Dominic’s is the
logically inferior argument in my book. This bodes well for Vox and poorly for
Dominic.
This may seem like quibbling on my part, but had Dominic not stipulated the
objective nature of evil at the onset of Vox’s argument, Vox likely would have
proceeded on a different course…that is, the first battle of this line of argument
may very well have been whether evil is objective or subjective in nature. Vox
cannot be faulted for not fighting a battle he has already won. A premise is not
attacked by feigning agreement.
I note that Dominic stated elsewhere in Round One that “evil is always
unpleasant for someone, that’s what makes it objective.” Let’s suppose that a
man arms himself with an AK-47 and heads for a playground, fully intent upon
slaughtering as many kids as possible. We don’t know whether he’s going to
reach his target or whether he’s going to get hit by a bus and die long before
harming a single soul. Do we quibble about whether the man’s well-armed intent
is evil? Of course not. Evil is easily recognizable in the malicious will, not only
in the tangible outcome. To the small extent Dominic’s argument treats evil as an
objective phenomenon, his “objective” standard of evil is feeble in my view.
 Dominic hasn’t adequately staked out a position on the nature of evil, or, one
could say he’s inadequately staked out too many positions. He does a premature
victory dance when he cites Vox’s statement that the “still small voice” is
something internal to the conscious, something that could be a pre-programmed
by an implanter.
I initially had a small problem with Vox’s wording here, but it’s a pretty
small problem. If someone were to say that we hear all sounds internal to the ear,
it wouldn’t follow that the person necessarily believes that there is no external
signal creating that sound. The relevant question is in regards to the origin of the
signal, and in the very next paragraph Vox states that “we must decide if it is
more likely that the signal is internally or externally generated.”
Vox then discusses Freud’s theory and its variants, and how this ostensibly
indicates an externally generated signal is more likely. I don’t have an opinion
on whether this discussion is worthwhile or not, but I think that this is the
discussion that Dominic needed to target, which he did not.
Dominic states that “meeting out justice and punishment satisfies every
single criterion for … identifying evil presented.” I don’t think so. I think most
us understand the difference between righteous anger and being plain mean.
Malice and justice aren’t the same thing, it doesn’t matter who you ask,
especially if you’ve already stipulated that objective evil is something upon
which we can all agree.
Dominic claims that B3 is false. I don’t think he’s adequately made the case.
As for B4, it seems that so long as we agree that objective evil is real, it
shouldn’t be any great surprise to us to find that man’s moral sense is more or
less constant across history. Had Dominic not stipulated objective evil, I imagine
it may have been necessary for Vox to show that this has been the case, but with
the stipulation this particular question is no longer terribly germane in my view.
Dominic does a so-so job arguing not-B4, but his argument is a step behind and
trumped by the fact that he’s already stipulated the more relevant concern.
I frankly struggle with the argument-from-evil myself. Does it follow that
our visceral aversion to objective evil (if indeed evil is objective) is evidence of
g(G)od? I don’t know, but it’s at least a plausible explanation, as good as any
other in the absence of a reasonably compelling rebuttal. Inasmuch as Dominic’s
rebuttal has been inconsistent, to say the least, with the stated premise of
objective evil, I can’t grant it much weight.

First Explanation: The first attempt at explanation is almost invariably
wrong, or why is it that you always find the thing you’re looking for in the last
place you look?
So what does this mean to us? It means that we wouldn’t attempt a second
explanation if we were satisfied with the first, we wouldn’t attempt a third
explanation if we’re satisfied with the second, we wouldn’t attempt a (n+1)th
explanation if we were satisfied with the nth.)
I think Dominic’s argument suffers from a lack of coherency.
In his opening in Round One, Dominic argued that the truth about gods is
likely something far stranger than our current understanding. He wrote, “gods
are not real simply because as an explanation, they are simply too convenient.
The truth of the matter, regardless of which great mystery being discussed, is
reliably something far stranger than whichever fiction is first proposed.”
The emphasis here is plainly on the strangeness of that which comes next,
not on the order in which the explanations appear. Regarding Newtonian and
quantum physics, Dominic says, “A simple explanation that is based on precisely
what one would expect of the world given nothing in our experience
schizophrenically goes from acting like a particle to acting like a wave, or
mysteriously teleports from one location to another. A simple explanation that
turned out to be quite wrong.” On geocentricism versus heliocentricism,
Dominic states, “The simple explanation, that of the earth being stationary with
the sun rotating around it, turned out to be the fiction whereas the truth was far
stranger…”
Dominic concludes his opening round, “…postulating the existence of
supernature beings is … a convenient fantasy concocted as a childish and
superficial explanation for the origins of any and everything … and it is my firm
belief that the actual truth of the matter… is something far stranger than any
story we tell ourselves about gods and ghosts.” Again, the emphasis is on the
strangeness of the subsequent explanation and the First Explanation hypothesis
is scarcely implied much less plainly stated.
In the second round, referring this very argument, Dominic states, “The
hypothesis which I sought to prove being that for any new experience or
phenomenon, when man attempts to explain the phenomenon using the tools for
understanding at his disposal, the first attempt (and sometimes 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
etc...) at explanation is almost invariably wrong...Given that I have supported the
hypothesis with historical evidence, and that there has been no attempt at all in
refuting it, the evidence suggests that the hypothesis is true.”
This is unreasonable nonsense in my estimation, inasmuch as one cannot
reasonably expect a refutation of an argument which has not previously been
made.

With respect to the question of Ancient Aliens, in his 1st round rebuttal,
Dominic writes, “…the argument that gods are more likely than not given that
our gods could very well be aliens. … Combining the statistical probablity of
alien life with the eyewitness accounts of paranormal visitors and the Oxford
dictionary’s definition of "god" would lead one to believe that the alien visitation
explanation concocted over the past 110 years or so (particularly in the last 50) is
the more accurate description of real gods, and our religions … are clumsy
attempts at describing what we now have better tools for understanding, that
we’re being visited by aliens.”
Notwithstanding his earlier commentary on the cultural factor in the
interpretation of anal probing aliens, I believe a reasonable person could
reasonably interpret this as an argument that the gods of yore were, in fact, flesh
and bone alien beings. If Dominic does not agree with the argument he put forth,
it was necessary for him to say so.
In the second round Dominic says, “…there is valid logic and evidence for
the non-existence of gods, which I will seek to clarify herein, and by clarify I
mean dumb down my original argument enough so that people aren’t laboring
under the impression I was actually arguing for the existence of aliens.” The
problem here, obviously, is not that the opening argument was too profound for
comprehension, but rather that he was very much arguing that the historical
record from round one is (plausibly) better explained by alien visitation.
This is more than quibbling over style on my part, as I in my opinion it
points to a lack of coherency, especially when coupled with his confusion over
the objective vs subjective nature of evil.

Good show, gents. Overall I give the round to Vox. His argument is thus far
the more tightly constructed of the two.


The Atheist

Round Two: Vox Day

Vox begins by addressing some of the complaints various commenters have
had with the topic of the debate. To be clear, I don’t question whether the topic
of the debate is being adhered to, only whether it is an adequate topic of debate
if it would allow in, inter alia, space aliens.
Day clarifies that the similarity between gods and advanced non-godly
creatures is merely to show the failure of the materialist metric that cannot tell
the two apart. Fair enough. It may also be a failure in the specificity of our
definitions.
Says Day: “The failure of science to detect supernatural gods is no more
significant than its failure to detect natural aliens, and combined with the
potential for confusing the two, this means science is an intrinsically unreliable
means of determining what historical evidence for the existence of gods and/or
aliens is valid and what is not. Therefore, the science-based materialist
consensus is incapable of judging the mass of available historical evidence for
gods.”
Some of the language is ambiguous here. Day’s conclusion that the science-
based materialist consensus is incapable of judging the mass of available
historical evidence for gods is correct so far as it means the science-based
materialist consensus is incapable of judging whether the mass of available
historical evidence is specifically for gods, or for aliens. The wider conclusion
that some readings would supply—science can’t deal with the historical
evidence for gods, full stop—is too ambitious.
Day reiterates his previous metaphor with the Aztecs, which, with the
provisos I allowed previously, is still good. He says the analogy understates the
actual situation because “a) not all individuals living in the era of modern
science are scientists and b) not all scientists operate in fields that potentially
concern the detection of gods.” He develops this theme at length, using a clever
example about the okapi, statistics about the prevalence of scientists in the
population, and dark matter.
He actually understates his case with the latter, by only considering dark
matter and not dark energy. When taking dark energy into account as well, the
amount of energy and matter in the universe we’ve actually been able to detect is
a mere 4 percent of the total. I wholeheartedly agree that it’s amazing how little
we know.
Day disputes my observation that “as our ability to measure reality and
record history has improved, our evidence for the supernatural has begun to
wane.” He uses Dominic’s evidence of aliens as a counterexample, saying that it
doesn’t matters that aliens are not gods, since science can’t distinguish the two,
they might be and we wouldn’t know. I do not find this at all convincing. Yes,
there are UFO sightings, but I have never heard any particularly reliable account
that didn’t seem anywhere near as plausible, anywhere near as one percent as
plausible as alternate explanations such as lying or hallucination.
Day observes that the vast majority of those who claim not to believe in evil
nevertheless act as if they do. I don’t know what evidence he could have for this.
Take two people, one who believes murder is objectively bad, and another who
believes murder is abhorrent, but only subjectively. Both people could act
identically, and we’d have no means of telling who was who unless we
questioned them on the issue. I never eat eggplant, because I hate it. Someone
who believed eating eggplant was evil would presumably act much like I do.
That’s no proof that I actually believe in the evilness of eating eggplant.
But I granted that most believe morality is objective, even if I don’t, so we
can skip over this. Day argues that evil requires an actor, an event, and a sensate
victim. He also argues consciousness is required. This is all fine.
Day then says consciousness is beyond current science. I agree. Nonetheless,
there are other solutions that save materialism here: Dennett’s view that
consciousness is a persistent illusion would solve the problem as well as any, if
only it could take account of the rather large datum of the first-person
perspective. McGinn’s mysterianism would also leave us with materialism. But I
won’t harp on these, as I don’t find them persuasive.
At any rate, after some exploration of the issue, we come to the issue of
whether morality is internal or external. Day’s evidence here strikes me as weak.
That psychoanalysis fails to provide a consistent account of morality is true, but
not news. Modern accounts of morality using game theory and evolutionary
psychology are stronger candidates. Day’s statement that the rapid rate of
evolution of morality in the US and the overall uniformity in moral senses across
societies otherwise separated is unexplainable by materialism is an assertion I
see no reason to accept. If our moral sensibilities had simply evolved before the
large scale dispersion of the human race, then it’s no more surprising that we
should have the same morality than that we should all be interested in
heterosexual sex.
As to the rapid evolution of morality lately, fashion sense has evolved
rapidly at the same time, yet I’ve met few who would argue therefore that
fashion must have an external non-material source. I’m not sure what sort of
morality we would expect if it were entirely material or internal, and if it would
differ from what we observe.
 Nonetheless, as I’ve conceded, most don’t agree with me. Some will even be
unnerved that I would compare morality with clothing fashion. So I’ll proceed
with the axiom that morality is objective.
And so I’ll also accept Day’s argument, arguendo, that as morality is as
arbitrary and constant as any of the laws of physics, we can say it’s a similar law.
I have no problem accepting this as a brute fact but I’m afraid I just don’t see the
force of the argument: laws exist, thus a lawgiver is necessary. This seems to me
almost an equivocation on the term law: which means something quite different
in the cases of the Internal Revenue Code vs. F = MA.

Round Two Rebuttal: Dominic Saltarelli

Dominic formalizes the logic of the debate. I agree with his presentation of
A. I’ve also given reasons why I think B doesn’t succeed, even as plotted. He
goes on to attack necessary planks in both arguments.
Dominic says he wasn’t arguing aliens existed, only that the evidence is on a
par with evidence for gods. The implication is Dominic thinks the evidence is
weak for aliens, but Day has taken it as support for his argument in his
contribution above. There’s obviously a disagreement on the validity of such
evidence.
Dominic argues that the extraordinary nature of testimony for gods makes it
different from other testimonial evidence, and more akin to alien encounters. I
agree. Indeed, Day seems to agree as well. The only difference is Dominic—and
I—think this is a shot against the evidence for gods, Day concludes the opposite.
So there’s a prior parties are bringing to the table in which they differ: their
personal views of testimony of alien encounters.
Dominic says that Day’s Aztec metaphor is obfuscation. I disagree. It’s
simply not relevant to this branch of the argument. Day says that alien
encounters continue the evidence for ancient gods would be one reason to not
deny the evidence of past encounters with gods. But that gods may simply be
absent, in much the same way whites were from Aztecs, is another, and better,
independent defense of past testimonial evidence. And Dominic seems to
concede the point here when he says it would be silly for Aztecs to deny the
existence of white men. Is he thus admitting it would be similarly silly to deny
the existence of gods? Again, Dominic seems to be arguing for agnosticism, not
atheism.
Dominic demands evidence of aliens or gods that arises independently of the
cultural milieu it supports. Fair enough. How about a risen Christ from people
whose only conception of resurrection was to be at the End of Days?
Were I Day, my response would be something along the line of sure, people
will color their experiences with the divine with trappings taken from their
culture. But that’s just them trying to understand something far beyond their ken.
People who first saw the sun imagined it was a guy in a chariot. Nevertheless,
that they put it in terms of the familiar doesn’t show the sun doesn’t exist.
Dominic argues that morality is not objective, and moreover, that Vox has
admitted as much. Vox, says Dominic, admitted it could be an implant and that
gave the game away. Well, no, not exactly. The game is who’s the more likely
implanter, evolution or God or some tertium quid.
Dominic argues morality, contra Vox, does change often.
I find something distinctly weird in both arguments here. See, if morality is
just another evolved chunk of us, we would expect uniformity in it. So I would
expect Dominic to be arguing for a stable morality. And if morality is just
hanging out there, perfected, then I would expect our morality to change to more
closely approximate that ideal morality with time, in the same way our
understanding of physical laws has changed with time—thus I’d expect Vox to
argue for a fluid morality. But both are doing the opposite, at least at times.
Dominic then argues vengeance disproves a stable morality. I don’t find this
at all convincing. Dominic seems to think calling vengeance an exception to the
general law against, e.g., murder, is to somehow give up the claim that morality
is objective. I can’t see why, anymore than granting the law that things fall at the
same rate has an exception when there’s air resistance gives up the objective
existence of gravity.
In sum, I think the criticism of testimonial evidence does invalidate
argument A. I don’t think B goes through because B1 is false. Even if B1 is true,
I don’t think the law requires a lawgiver, so I don’t think B goes through
anyhow. But Dominic’s arguments have been against B3 and B4, and I’m not
convinced either criticism has been sound.
Still, we need a positive argument to get to atheism, which Dominic
presents. It is simply his weird argument again, so I will repeat my first response,
which I still feel works.

Moreover, simple strangeness doesn’t really bear on the issue of theism vs.
atheism. Yes, it may be reality is much stranger than imagined. But that
reality may have a God or may not. If there is a God, then He may well be
 something far stranger than anything we’ve imagined. Or there may be no
God, and reality is far stranger than anticipated.

Dominic says his point was that the first explanation is usually wrong. Well,
yeah. Otherwise, there wouldn’t be a second explanation. When the first
explanation works, we pay no attention. That gods were the first explanation
seems a gross simplification. And it’s not exactly like others didn’t try
materialism as an early explanation either. See De Rerum Natura.
What is subjective is the guess at what the next explanation, the successful
one, the weird one, will be. Dominic has got a hunch it’s an atheistic
explanation. So, here’s my original explanation, altered to face Dominic’s
revision:

Moreover, the simple wrongness of the first explanation doesn’t bear on the
issue of theism vs. atheism. It may be that the second, weirder explanation
involves a god. It may be that the second, weirder explanation doesn’t
involve a god. Still weird, still second, still correct in either case.

Dominic argues that the existence of other gods not thus far touched upon is
beyond the scope of the debate. I have no idea if this is true or not. The only
topic I’ve seen thus far is “The first PZ Myers Memorial Debate features
Dominic Saltarelli vs Vox Day and concerns the evidence and logic for the
existence or nonexistence of gods.” That’s vague, but “gods” suggests a fairly
wide net. Moreover Day seems quite explicit that he’s talking about as many
gods as possible. The debaters are welcome to clarify the topic.
In sum, Day’s A argument fails, the B argument fails, but I’m less certain
about that, and Dominic’s positive argument that there are no gods fails as well.
We’re left with agnosticism, which I suppose, to be cheerful about it, means both
parties lose.
Still, all in all, I think Dominic made the better case.

CONCLUSION: WITH THE JUDGES SCORING THE ROUND 1-1-1, IT
WAS DECIDED THAT THE TIE SHOULD GO TO DOMINIC. DOMINIC NOW
HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE HIS ARGUMENT FOR THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF GODS, TO WHICH VOX WILL RESPOND.
 Chapter 6

ROUND THREE: THE REASONS AND EVIDENCE THAT GODS

PROBABLY DON’T EXIST

—Dominic

Thus far, there are three arguments at play, what I have identified as A and
B, presented by Vox which are respectively for the existence of gods and for a
creator/custodian God, and my own argument that gods are an explanation that
fall under the domain of the following hypothesis:

For any new experience or phenomenon, when man attempts to explain the
phenomenon using the tools for understanding at his disposal, the first
attempt at explanation is almost invariably wrong.

Gods being a first attempt at explaining supernatural experiences, thus most

likely wrong, and therefore gods do not exist.
Regarding B3, I previously stated that Vox admittedly defeated his own
argument by stating that the moral sense is an integral part of our conciousness
and our selves. In hindsight, I can see how this could lead one to assume I did
not understand that Vox was not equivocating the moral sense with the moral
impulse, but rather saying that a part of us was picking up signals from an
external source. Similar to saying that the eye is a part of us, but what the eye
perceives is not. However what I did not emphasize well enough the first time
was that Vox had also asserted the following, where the third element is
considering the morality of an action:

Materialists assume that this third element does not exist and is merely a
variable result of combining the first two elements, but their opinion is
irrelevant at this point since they are still wrestling with the question of the
material existence of consciousness itself. Should they ever manage to sort
that out, it will of course have to be taken into account, but until then the
science-based materialist consensus is no more significant than the cartoon
 of the proverbial devil and angel sitting, sight unseen, on one’s shoulders,
whispering into one’s ears. Only observations, history, and logic are
relevant here.

What is missing here is that not only do materialists not have a complete
model of what constitutes conciousness, no one does. Ignoring this inconvenient
fact allows Vox to frame the question of the source of our moral impulse into one
of either “Freud’s theory and its variants” representing the possibility that the
signal is internally generated or that the signal comes from a source that is
genuinely separate from our conciousness. This is a false dichotomy.
Applying my own hypothesis to groundbreaking theories and ideas in
addition to new experiences, Freud’s id, ego, and superego are about as likely a
representative of conciousness as the first periodic table of the elements Earth,
Air, Water, and Fire was representative of matter. Rejecting the notion that all
things are composed of varying parts of those four elements does not mean that
the world and everything in it is not made out of elements of some sort, but that
is just sort of choice one is left with if Vox’s statements regarding the nature of
conciousness and the moral impulse are taken at face value.
Because Vox has no better idea of what constitutes conciousness than
anyone else, admitting that the moral sense is a part of our conciousness
immediately puts it on par with any other urge or desire that is already accepted
as part of our conciousness due to ignorance of the source of said other urges and
desires. In fact, Vox’s own argument regarding the external nature of the source
of the signal could just as justifiably be applied to our sense of heterosexual
attraction to the opposite sex (relatively stable continuity across time and space)
or any other sensibility that we share in sufficient quantity, but no one is
questioning whether that signal is internally generated or not. It is just another
desire, a consequence of biology, and accepted as an internally generated part of
us.
So, admitting that our moral sense is another part of our conciousness while
having no idea what conciousness is composed of amounts to admitting B3 is
false. The moral impulse that informs it need not be any more external in source
than any other desire or motivation that leads to action or state of mind.

Regarding B4, I don’t see how there is any more to add, since any objections
to the argument can only be an objection to the definition of evil so far agreed
upon.

Regarding A3, however, one of Vox’s statements concerning the suggestive
weight of evidence was:

All we know now is that there is a long and consistent record of evidence of
something with superscientific abilities imposing itself on people
throughout history, a record that not only preceded the era of modern
science, but continues right through it to the present day.

What I have been trying to establish thus far and will elaborate further upon
here is that even this statement is presumptuous. The reasons people have been
witnessing gods could be that gods are real, or that they are really
technologically advanced aliens, or that they are some special sort of
plasma/energy based lifeform that evolved alongside humanity, future humans
with time travel technology, or sufficiently common environmental factors that
cause some to experience waking dreams with common attributes but differing
details. Without further context, each of these are equally plausible explanations,
especially in light of the fact Vox admitted the first three could very well be one
and the same based on our inability to differentiate between each, stating:

This does not mean that gods exist. This does not mean that aliens exist.
This does not mean that aliens broadly defined as gods exist. This merely
means that the weight of the historical evidence strongly indicates that
aliens and/or gods exist, that the lack of scientific evidence for either gods
or aliens is almost completely irrelevant concerning the fact of their
existence, and that it is at least conceivable that supertechnological aliens,
transdimensional beings, and supernatural gods are actually one and the
same thing.

Which is precisely half of my point, and has been from the beginning. That
what we think or later interpret to be gods could very well be something else,
something that isn’t a god. The other half of my point being that the evidence
aside from the testimonies themselves strongly suggests that we have in fact
gotten it wrong, and that the experiences which result in testimony for the
existence of gods is in reality attributable to something other than gods.
An analogy used by religious apologists in arguing against strict scientific
materialism that I have seen used often enough in the past is an analogy
comparing people to fish. If you have a lake full of fish, those fish only know
breathing water, other fish, and whatever else is in the lake with them, as the lake
is their universe.
The argument made by apologists being that the fish are in no way justified
in denying the existence of a fisherman due to their complete inability to even
comprehend what a fisherman is or interact with him, since he’s never jumped
into the lake with them, only cast baited hooks, nets, and disturbed the surface of
the water with his toes. The fish only have supernatural events of baited hooks
appearing from heaven and mind boggling appendages briefly churning the sky
then disappearing.
Similarly with people, we have supernatural experiences of our own that
cannot be explained by what’s here in the lake with us. This is where I part with
the apologists.
The chances that the fish would be able to correctly understand that the
source of the supernatural events is actually a fisherman, or something even
remotely like a fisherman are non-existant. What I have sought to prove is that
we really are just like the fish of the analogy, as can be seen through the
introduction of one piece of evidence after another:

1) transition from Newtonian to quantum physics

2) transition from geocentrism to heliocentrism

3) phlogiston

4) luminiferous aether

5) Dark Matter (a prediction)

6) a challenge to anyone to get a small child who hasn’t yet been taught
how reproduction works to explain how babies are made

When we try to explain something using less than all of the necessary
details, we get it wrong. We are consistently and reliably wrong.

Now, I am talking about the very concept of gods, I cannot stress this
enough. The gods of our mythology, the imagined gods people actually believe
in, the idea we have in our heads when the term “gods” is used in a sentence
when talking about these actual gods, rather than using the term as a synonym
for “exceptional”, that is the topic of this debate. The concept of gods are what
we first postulated to explain the inexplicable. Consequently, the concept itself,
is wrong. Reality is something else entirely. (Disclaimer: this is not a statement
of hard fact but a statement of belief based on the weight of evidence)
Lastly, here I must address the rebuttals to this argument. No much else to
say on the matter other than to scour history books and populate an absurdly
long list of theories and explanations that ended up being wrong. The only
criteria for inclusion being whether they fall under the domain of the hypothesis
presented in Round Two.

First, “just because it’s the first explanation, that in no way establishes for a
fact that said first explanation is wrong, in fact nothing really stops us from
getting it right the first time.”
I never said it was an established fact, just that it is most likely the case.
Presenting a hypothetical situation where someone somewhere gets it right the
first time is ignorant and cowardly. The basis for the debate has been which case
has a greater weight of evidence supporting it, I have provided a great deal
supporting my position, and with a bit of time could produce a great deal more.
Countering evidence with none whatsoever is absurd.

Second, “gods are by definition supernatural and inexplicable, so of course
we’ll get the details wrong, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t real.”
The atheist judge, in his previous evaluation said: “Sure, people will color
their experiences with the divine with trappings taken from their culture. But
that’s just them trying to understand something far beyond their ken. People who
first saw the sun imagined it was a guy in a chariot. Nevertheless, that they put it
in terms of the familiar doesn’t show the sun doesn’t exist.” For some reason, he
was under the impression he was disagreeing with me here, but he made my
point quite well. Yes, there is a Sun out there, but it sure as hell isn’t a guy in a
chariot. It is something else besides a god.

Third, “if it looks like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, then it’s a duck.”
This also does not fall under the domain of the hypothesis my argument rests
on. If a person has never been to a coffee shop before, but is already familiar
with all the factors that together result in a coffee shop—monetary transactions
over a counter, the smell of coffee, styrofoam cups, cramped seating
arrangments, and annoying people with laptops—it is not a new phenomenon
that requires him to extrapolate from what he knows to fill in any details. All the
necessary details are right there for first-hand observation.

Lastly, I realize that the hypothesis presented is a very rough draft, and
needs a fair amount of revision to more accurately reflect my position. However
I feel I’ve made my case even without it, and that should suffice for now.


TO WHICH VOX REPLIES

I begin by noting that I tend to agree with Dominic that in most cases, Man’s
first attempt to explain a new phenomenon using the tools for understanding at
his disposal tends to be incorrect. Dominic’s use of the word “invariably” can be
excused as rhetoric and I will not offer pedantic objection to it. The principle
Dominic is articulating is not only sensible, it is entirely in line with my own
observation that appeals to the science-based materialist consensus are
intrinsically limited by the present state of technology, and it is largely supported
by history in general and the history of science in particular.
That being said, it does not apply to the question of the existence of gods.
Dominic has committed a category error in attempting to appeal to this Principle
of Initial Error.

While the Principle of Initial Error could theoretically be applied to the

historical appeal to gods to explain natural phenomena, (although I note Dominic
did not actually provide any support for his assertion that gods are a first attempt
at understanding anything, natural or supernatural), it cannot reasonably be
applied to what he characterizes as “a first attempt at explaining supernatural
experiences”.
First, it is a matter of easily establishable fact that the concept of gods are
not an attempt at explaining most supernatural experiences, either initial or
subsequent. Astrology, ESP, clairvoyance, telekinesis, telepathy, ghosts,
reincarnation, necroparlance, and demon-possession have nothing to do with the
existence or nonexistence of gods. Gods may be one of many aspects of the
supernatural, but they are largely unrelated to any means of explaining the
majority of supernatural experiences. The connection is tangential; for example,
one European survey reported that 60 percent of those who do not believe in
gods nevertheless believe in the existence of the supernatural.
 More importantly, gods could not have originally been conceived as an
explanation for supernatural experiences because the concept of gods long
predates Man’s distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Dominic’s
assumption that gods are an attempt at explaining supernatural experiences is
incorrect and therefore his conclusion based on that assumption is also incorrect.
Based on the sheer number of creator gods identified throughout the course
of human history, it is much more reasonable to conclude that the primary reason
the god concept exists is to explain the phenomenon and purpose of material
existence. And throughout the 50,000 years of modern Man’s existence, divine
creation still remains the first and foremost hypothesis explaining it, with one
brief and partial exception during the 17 years in which Fred Hoyle’s Steady
State theory was formulated, embraced, and rejected by the cosmological
community.
Even so noteworthy an atheist as Richard Dawkins, after arguing that “the
most ingenious and powerful crane so far discovered is Darwinian evolution by
natural selection” freely admits that “We don’t yet have an equivalent crane for
physics.” Nor do we have one for the readily observable existence of life.
While Ockham’s Razor is a heuristic, not a proof, it is at least as reliable as
Dominic’s Principle of Initial Error. And since Ockham’s Razor recommends the
selection of the hypothesis that makes the fewest new assumptions, it dictates the
selection of the only serious and lasting hypothesis that Man has ever produced
in preference to the others. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the only
two concepts that could loosely be considered as competing hypotheses at this
point in time, the multiverse concept and Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis,
are functionally identical to the creator god hypothesis.
As I have previously pointed out, from Man’s perspective there is no
meaningful distinction between a) a conventional creator god, b) a
technologically advanced creator being from another dimension, and c) a
programmer of Man’s virtual world.
In conclusion, I note the irony of Dominic’s appeal to the historical record in
an attack on a significant aspect of it. This alone should be sufficient to
invalidate the aspects of his argument that depend upon the Initial Error
principle.

In his attack on B3, the assertion that the moral sense is informed by a
source external to the conscious mind, Dominic commits a logical error when he
concludes that Man’s present failure to understand consciousness necessarily
places the moral sense on par with our other urges and desires. There is simply
no basis for this leap of logic. He also fails to understand that in referring to the
moral sense as a third aspect of consciousness I was not limiting its existence to
the human consciousness. This should have been obvious since I made an
explicit distinction between the internal and external models.
So, not only did I not defeat my own argument, but the assertion that I did
makes it clear that Dominic did not understand it. While the moral sense is
integrated into human consciousness and is at least partially accessible to it, my
entire argument is based upon the observable fact that it is often in a state of
opposition to human desires and therefore cannot be dismissed as just another
competing one.
It is true that no one has a complete model of what constitutes
consciousness. But I clearly did not, as Dominic asserts, ignore “this
inconvenient fact”, since I stated that examining the nature of consciousness is
presently “beyond the current ability of the science-based materialist consensus”.
And while it would be a false dichotomy to note that either Freud’s theory
represents the possibility that the signal is internally generated or the moral
impulse must come from a source that is genuinely separate from our
conciousness, I never proposed any such dichotomy.
I cited Freud’s theory in order to show a) even materialists recognize the
third observable aspect of consciousness, and I cited its legacy of failure to
demonstrate b) the materialist internal model cannot be assumed to be correct. In
support of the likelihood that the external generation for the impulse was more
likely than the internal, I also cited the external model’s greater success in
modifying human behavior, the divergence between the rates of moral evolution
when viewed from societal and historical perspectives, and the observed spatio-
temporal range of the relatively static moral impulse.
After doing some research, I realized that my case may actually be stronger
than originally presented because I was thinking of the moral sense as being
wholly accessible to the human consciousness, but this is not the case. As it
happens, Dominic contradicted both the current scientific consensus as well as
his own statement that no one has “a complete model of what constitutes
conciousness” when he declares the moral impulse “is just another desire, a
consequence of biology, and accepted as an internally generated part of us.”
If this were true, Freud and his successors would not have had to construct
their tripartite model in the first place and various moral researchers such as
Lewis Petroninovich, John Mikhail, and Marc Hauser would not concur that
“much of our knowledge of morality is... based on unconscious and inaccessible
principles for guiding judgments of permissibility”. Emphasis mine. Were the
moral sense nothing more than one of many biologically driven desires as
accessible to the human consciousness as any other, there would be no need for
wide-ranging efforts across several scientific and philosophic fields to explain
the experiential and observable divergences from the simple two-level
materialist model.
The scientifically established fact that parts of our moral sense are not even
accessible by our conscious mind is further support for the external model, even
if it falls well short of providing proof of it. Few researchers in the area would
agree; despite this inaccessibility they simply assume it is an artifact of
biological evolution even though their attempts to locate either a moral organ or
an area of the brain devoted to moral reasoning have thus far proven fruitless.
But the present consensus shows it cannot be reasonably said that the
observation of how our moral sense somehow interacts with our conciousness
without knowing precisely what conciousness is composed of or the nature of
that interaction is in any way tantamount to an admission that B3 is false.
Dominic’s case against the assertion that the moral sense is informed by a
source external to the conscious mind is both logically flawed and incorrect
according to the current scientific consensus.

Moving on to the next issue, Dominic is content to stand pat on his previous
assertion that B4 was false because “Man’s moral sense greatly changes on a
regular basis, even within the span of a moment.” However, this too stands
contrary to the current science. In his book Moral Minds, Marc Hauser refers to
language in explaining the distinction between Man’s core moral faculty and the
various moral grammars that can be observed in societies separated by time and
space. Although we speak a variety of languages that sound very different, the
differences are superficial in the sense that they serve the same purpose and
depend upon precisely the same linguistic faculty.
The moral changes to which Dominic refers are mere grammatical
transformations, and as such, they are not relevant to the core question of the
unchanging moral faculty. B4 states that Man’s moral sense has not greatly
changed over time, a statement which clearly refers to the moral faculty, not the
various moral grammars, and it does not require that the many billions of
expressions of that moral sense over the vast expanse of history have all been
identical.
 Hauser summarizes the way in which the moral faculty utilizes the various
moral grammars on page 44 of Moral Minds: “The point here is simple: our
moral faculty is equipped with a universal set of rules, with each culture setting
up particular exceptions to those rules.” Later in the book, he also underlines one
of my earlier points about the speed of moral evolution when he refers to the
famous silver fox breeding experiment of Dmitry Belyaev and notes how the
observed speed of intense selection “sets up a significant challenge” to the
conventional materialist perspective on the evolution of the human mind.
Since the conclusions of the various scientific researchers into morality
show that Dominic’s statement about the dynamic nature of man’s moral sense
was false, this, combined with his previous concession concerning the existence
of objective evil, is sufficient to support the conclusion that since Man’s moral
sense has not greatly changed over time, the existence of evil logically indicates
the existence of a definitive moral law that is as constant and as arbitrary as
most, if not all, of the physical laws of the universe.
Dominic spends the greater portion of his argument in what superficially
appears to be an attempt to regain lost ground previously conceded in the initial
round by an appeal to his Principle of Initial Error. But this is not actually the
case, as his return to A3 and my “weight of evidence” argument demonstrates
that there is actually a surprising amount of common ground in our opposing
positions concerning the existence of gods.
The difference is that Dominic fails to understand that the theistic concept of
gods, and even the Christian concept of God, is much broader than he imagines.
The Christian cannot reasonably insist that he knows much about the specific
nature and character of God in light of how the Apostle Paul, who actually
claimed to have encountered the risen Lord Jesus Christ on the road to
Damascus, subsequently wrote in 1st Corinthians, “For now we see through a
glass, darkly.”
This is very much in keeping with the earlier words of the Psalmist, who
wrote: “Great is the Lord and most worthy of praise; his greatness no one can
fathom.” And in the book of Job, Elihu outright states that God is “beyond our
understanding”. This ignorance of the divine is also applicable to the many
pagan gods, about whom Man possesses even less information.
Thus when Dominic writes “That what we think or later interpret to be gods
could very well be something else, something that isn’t a god,” he is not so much
arguing for the nonexistence of gods as he is revealing a failure to understand
what a god is and why any being would be considered worthy of worship. I will
not belabor the dictionary definition by quoting it again, but instead note that a
god is primarily worshipped for one of three reasons. First, because the god
merits worship due to being the lord and maker of the worshipper, second, for
the material benefits that the god can grant to the worshipper, and third, because
the exceptional power of the god is feared.
Now, even if the supernatural is eventually discovered to be synonymous
with the natural, (as in the case of aliens from this universe), the
transdimensional, (as in the case of aliens from a different universe), or the real
(as in the case of a programmer responsible for creating our virtual universe),
such beings are not only potentially worthy of being acclaimed as genuine gods,
but in the case of the latter, are potentially worthy of being recognized as the
legitimate Creator God. It is the definitive elements of godhood that are the
significant aspect of the existential argument here, not the assumed supernatural
element, much less the peripheral paranormal phenomena that the supernatural is
said to involve, since our understanding of the supernatural is a limited and
dynamic one involving “that which is presently believed to be beyond natural
limits”.
Gods are not synonymous with the supernatural, and I note that even
definitive evidence that the supernatural exists, such as reliably replicable
scientific experiments supporting the existence of telepathy, just to give one
example, would not suffice to prove the existence of gods.
This also addresses the second half of Dominic’s point, which is that “the
experiences which result in testimony for the existence of gods is in reality
attributable to something other than gods.” But theists readily admit our
understanding of the nature of the divine is far from perfect. And not only is that
understanding imperfect, it is quite reasonably capable of encompassing a
significant portion of the alternatives Dominic has posited. Not all natural aliens
could be gods, but natural aliens that created the human race would at the very
least bear a strong claim to legitimate status as creator gods. Not all
transdimensional aliens need be gods, but extradimensional aliens that created
our universe would doubtless merit the title.
And, of course, a computer programmer who created the simulated universe
in which we are the player-characters would, by definition, be our Creator God,
although in that case his world would be the natural and ours would not be the
natural, but rather the virtual.
The difficulty, and what in some cases may be the impossibility, of
distinguishing between gods, natural aliens, transdimensional aliens, and
computer programmers isn’t a valid argument against the existence of gods. It is
merely an object lesson in the importance of not leaping to conclusions or
placing inordinate confidence in a tool that is inadequate for the task at hand.

A significant aspect of my argument that I believe both Dominic and the
judges have thus far failed to recognize is that I have not only, as the atheist
judge mentioned in his comments on the first round, rescued testimonial
evidence, but have also unseated the current science-based material consensus
from its presumed position of authority with regards to its capacity for
determining the validity of testimonial evidence. Dominic is correct to say that
Man is consistently and reliably wrong with regards to his various explanations
for various phenomena, but he is incorrect to say this in defense of strict
scientific materialism for the obvious reason that science itself is subject to
precisely the same problem!
Dominic is somewhat unfortunate in this regard because his argument might
have superficially appeared more convincing as recently as two weeks ago,
before the physicists at CERN announced the potential overturning of what
scientists had long assumed was one of the fundamental laws of the universe, the
cosmic constant. [NOTE: The OPERA team subsequently determined that an
incorrectly attached fiber optic cable was responsible for the anomaly. As of the
date of publication, the speed of light was still intact.]
Whether repetitions of the neutrino experiment confirm that the speed of
light can be exceeded or not, the unexpected announcement that the speed of
light limit has been broken underlines the fact that a dynamic, technology-based
temporal snapshot simply cannot serve as a reliable arbiter of what is possible
and what is not possible, or even what exists and does not exist. Science, and the
materialist consensus based upon it, are clearly incapable of providing a valid
means of assessing historical evidence in general and the testimonial evidence
for the existence of gods in particular.
The concept of gods are not what Man first postulated to explain the
inexplicable, but rather to explain the observable. The concept is not wrong, it is
rational, it is necessary, and it remains entirely viable in light of the reality in
which we perceive ourselves to exist. Since there is no reason beyond personal
incredulity and the present absence of scientific evidence to deny the existence
of gods, the significant body of historical evidence is more than sufficient to
support the conclusion that gods exist.
 Chapter 7

THE JUDGES DECIDE ROUND THREE

The Christian

What I attempted to do in order to judge this round was to identify the
specific attacks from Dominic, and the corresponding counter-arguments from
Vox. Since Vox was on the defense, he merely had to counter the attacks in order
to fulfill his responsibilities. The shortened forms displayed here should not be
understood as capturing the argument but merely showing which part of the text
I am talking about.

1. Dominic: No one has a complete model of what constitutes conciousness.

Vox: Mentioned it to demonstrate b) the materialist internal model cannot be
assumed to be correct.
Vox: (in Round 2) but their opinion is irrelevant at this point.

Verdict: Successfully countered. Claim of irrelevancy is not a claim of your
own explanation’s superiority.

2. Dominic: admitting that our moral sense is another part of our
conciousness while having no idea what conciousness is composed of amounts
to admitting B3 [“that the moral sense is informed by a source external to the
conscious mind”] is false

Vox: we must decide if it is more likely that the signal is internally or
externally generated. And because this definitive moral law is constant and
arbitrary, there must be a lawgiver capable of both defining and transmitting it.

Verdict: Vox defined the “signal” (the only part he claimed was external) as
where the moral sense’s information comes from, calling it moral law and merely
calling its externality more likely. Not certain. Dominic just took what Vox had
explicitly admitted and pronounced the claim, not unsatisfactorily proven, but
false. Had it been the former, there could be sensible further debate about the
evidence.

3. Dominic: Freud vs. external moral law is a false dichotomy.

Vox: Freud’s theory and its variants is the most established of the various
internal models

Verdict: Models, plural, means admitting several options. No dichotomy.

4. Dominic: heterosexual attraction to the opposite sex is internally
generated and is just another desire, a consequence of biology.

Vox: If this were true, Freud and his successors would not have had to
construct their tripartite model in the first place.

Verdict: Vox’s answer doesn’t hold water. Sexual attraction comes from id, as
opposed to ego, according to Freud’s model. These are already two separate
processes of mind, both seemingly pure biology. If we can have two, we could
have three.

5. Dominic: Without further context, aliens, plasma beings and time
travellers are equally plausible explanations.

Vox: It is merely an object lesson in the importance of not leaping to
conclusions or placing inordinate confidence in a tool that is inadequate for the
task at hand.

Verdict: The agnostic option is in the middle, and doesn’t do the atheist any
more good than it does the theist. What Dominic needs in order to do anything
useful is to look at the options that don’t involve gods and argue why they are
more plausible than the others. Nor does the mere existence of those options do
any good to Vox, but he is not listing them to that end.

6. Dominic: The concept of gods are what we first postulated to explain the
inexplicable. Consequently, the concept itself, is wrong.

Vox: But theists readily admit our understanding of the nature of the divine
is far from perfect.

Verdict: Successfully countered. It was particular gods with particular
features, responsibilities and names, which were arguably postulated to explain
such things. Any of those things not only can be wrong, but must be in the
overwhelming majority of cases. It is enough to satisfy Dominic’s principle.

Round Three goes to Vox


The Agnostic

The first attempt at explanation is almost invariably wrong.

Dominic opens by restating his hypothesis as it relates to the question at
hand. I find the argument specious and most unconvincing. The argument that
kicks Newtonian physics in the ass is quantum physics, not the fact that helio-
centricism later replaced geocentricism.
Even if we grant that “gods” was indeed the first attempt to explain being,
and even if we grant that Dominic may have meant something more akin to
“otherwise inexplicable” instead of “supernatural”, the argument does not
compel me in the least. The question is whether evidence and logic for gods is
stronger than the evidence and logic for no gods, and it simply does not follow
that many people having been wrong about many other matters means that other
people are wrong on this very specific matter.
Vox’s rebuttal is almost as unconvincing as Dominic’s, but I give it to him
on a head-to-head basis. Vox states: “While the Principle of Initial Error could
theoretically be applied to the historical appeal to gods to explain natural
phenomena…it cannot reasonably be applied to what he characterizes as ‘a first
attempt at explaining supernatural experiences’”.
Agreed. The concept of “gods” is mostly an explanation of being, not so
much an explanation of ethereal phenomena. Indeed, Dominic’s choice of
wording here is unfortunate and I can’t fault Vox for arguing Dominic’s
argument as-is. I note Dominic is extrapolating from a universal rule, and
accordingly it’s certainly Dominic’s prerogative to amend his hypothesis in the
future. In such an event, Vox will be back to square one in my view.

Proposition B, aka Vox’s Argument from Objective Morality

Dominic states that morality is just another desire. I’ve already noted that I
tend to view morality as a subjective thing, something akin to aesthetics, and yet
even I wouldn’t go so far as to say that it’s just another desire. Our appreciation
of beauty is certainly more than just another desire, hardly on par with certain
carnal urges. I’ve already hit Dominic on this issue for two rounds, though, so
for now I’ll let it go.
Vox’s appeal to the current scientific consensus is sufficient; because we all
know that the current scientific consensus is almost invariably correct. Edge to
Vox.

Ancient Aliens

If a person were to tell me that the square root of negative-one is not the
imaginary number i, but instead something which makes even less sense to me,
I’d probably allow that he may have a point, and then ask that person to never
bother speaking to me again.
In Round One, Dominic states, “There is no denying that there is something,
possibly of a distinctly external nature, is imposing itself on people throughout
history causing them to report visitations from gods, angels, demons.”
Responding to a more generalized rewording of this stipulation by Vox,
Dominic says, “What I have been trying to establish thus far and will elaborate
further upon here is that even this statement is presumptuous. The reasons
people have been witnessing gods could be that gods are real, or that they are
really technologically advanced aliens…”
In other words, he’s affirmed the statement which he now calls
presumptuous and he’s made it abundantly clear that he’s not arguing for the
existence of aliens, so what does that leave?
It leaves us with some things external to our world, some things that have a
superscientific quality, and some things which have, from time to time, been
worshipped as gods. Some things which may very well be to us as we are to fish.
Some things which is presently beyond our understanding. Whatever these
things may be, they’re coming awfully close to satisfying the OED’s definition
of gods in my view.
 Vox’s response that theists do not claim to have a perfect understanding of
god(s) is perfectly adequate.

Once again I think Vox’s arguments are simply tighter, sharper, and more
coherent on the whole. Round Three to Vox.


The Atheist

Dominic continues his argument that the first explanation is usually wrong.
Nothing he says, however, is new, and I continue to disagree with it.

He does address me at one point, and while I don’t want to intrude on the role of
the debaters, I feel that at least addressing why I don’t think his counter
addresses my point will illustrate why I don’t find his argument convincing at
large. Moreover, Day makes similar points in his rebuttal. I said:

Sure, people will color their experiences with the divine with trappings
taken from their culture. But that’s just them trying to understand something
far beyond their ken. People who first saw the sun imagined it was a guy in
a chariot. Nevertheless, that they put it in terms of the familiar doesn’t show
the sun doesn’t exist.

To which Dominic responded: “For some reason, the atheist judge was under
the impression he was disagreeing with me here, but he made my point quite
well. Yes, there is a Sun out there, but it sure as hell isn’t a guy in a chariot. It is
something else besides a god.”
But that wasn’t my point. My point was the mere fact that we explain things
in term of the known doesn’t prove that there isn’t something out there to be
explained.
Dominic then said:< “Show me someone recounting an experience of being
sexually molested by little grey aliens with big heads and huge hypnotic eyes
who’d never heard of or been exposed to Hollywood films or other popular
culture sources that tell us what aliens do and what they look like.”
I can tell, the existence of aliens because people who claim to have
encountered aliens explain those encounters in terms familiar to them. But this
would be the same as denying the existence of the sun based on the fact that
people used familiar terms to describe it. Yet the sun clearly exists. Ergo, this
argument would prove entirely too much.
Note the fact that the sun is not a chariot in the sky is completely irrelevant.
Of course it isn’t. But the operative fact is that the sun exists, despite our folk
explanations of it. Gods, gods, or aliens, what have you, may exist in the same
fashion, though we early on explained Him as astride Merkabah.
Dominic continues to harp on gods being the first explanation implies
they’re wrong. What he doesn’t seem to grasp is that “God” is not a unique
answer that was conceived for all time in Bronze Age Israel. The Christian God
has greatly evolved since the gods of the Ancient Greeks, as has *Dyēus phter
himself. Aquinas’s God is not Zeus.
So I’m perfectly willing to accept that the first answer is nearly always
incorrect, but I don’t think that has any weight on the argument. Just because our
first stab at what a God is is wrong doesn’t mean that God doesn’t exist, which is
what Dominic wants to infer. God just isn’t what was described by our first
hypothesis. In the same way, our first stab at science was wrong, but that doesn’t
mean science as a whole is a failed hypothesis. Better hypotheses will be
presented with time, just as more plausible gods are presented with time.
So while we can heartily accept Dominic’s observation that the first
explanation is usually wrong—and it seems Day does as well—I don’t think that
takes us where Dominic wants it to.
So, respectfully, I think the argument fails. In fact, I think Dominic has
attacked arguments out of context at least twice now. He attacks Day’s Aztec
argument, but not for the purpose for which Day advanced it. In the same
fashion, he appreciates my sun-chariot argument as supporting his claim that the
first explanation is wrong. But my argument was not addressed at that particular
argument of his, so whether or not it supports it is besides the point, it is aimed
elsewhere.
Dominic makes other points. He says the failure to explain consciousness
does not mean that morality is external to humankind. I agree entirely. And Day
seems to as well. But, and here I agree with Day, this certainly does not show it
to be internal to humankind either. Day cites the failure to explain our moral
sense through traditional models as pointing to something external.
And well he should, because this is quite suggestive, and will be until:

1. a model of our morality produced through naturalistic processes is

convincingly demonstrated
 2. we find ourselves willing to accept that evolution produces some
counterintuitive things that we, through lack of evidence and repeatability,
may never be able to fully explain.

Does this show that God is the rule-giver? No. But coupled with evidence
that God exists and has given rules, it is not nothing.
Vox repeats much of my own response to Dominic’s argument. His attack is
far-ranging, and, though there are parts of it I disagree with—that science may
have unexplored frontiers does not suggest to me it doesn’t have substantial
authority in saying what does and does not exist—I think on the whole his
response the stronger. Vox seems to back off of previous statements that evil
implies God, now content to say it implies external morality, whatever its
provenance may be. But even if morality can exist without a creator,
nonetheless, that it does exist gives one some pause in denying a creator entirely.


CONCLUSION: WITH THE JUDGES SCORING THE THIRD ROUND 3-0
IN FAVOR OF VOX, THAT BROUGHT THE DEBATE TO AN END WITH VOX
WINNING TWO OF THE THREE ROUNDS.
 Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

—Vox

It is said that a man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still.
And despite the manifold accomplishments of human logic, science, and
engineering, Man remains a rationalizing animal, not a rational one. So, it is
unlikely that a single reader of this book had his opinion on the existence or the
nonexistence of gods altered to any significant degree by this debate.
But that does not mean these discussions are unprofitable. One thing I
suspect will be very clear to every reader, regardless of his inclinations, is how
difficult it is to convincingly prove even what we consider to be the simplest,
most basic assertion. Just as the most fervent believer in God finds it hard to
accept that his passionate, personal relationship with the Creator of the universe
means nothing to the dubious atheist, the unquestioning science fetishist finds it
unsettling when the skeptic correctly observes the ways in which the
philosophical limits and human corruption of the scientific method render some
of his assumptions equally unfounded.
Ironically, it is the party who takes the least amount of interest in the subject,
and puts the least amount of effort into understanding it, who has the strongest
rational position on the matter of gods. The agnostic’s position of “we don’t
know and I don’t care” may be exasperating to atheists and believers alike, but at
present, it cannot be denied that it is the most logically sound one.
That being said, I believe that gods exist. And as a believer, a Christian, to
be specific, I also believe that so-called monotheism is fundamentally a
misnomer, as not only is a being powerful enough to rule the world worthy of
being called a god, but there would be no need for God to have given Man the
Second Commandment if there were, in fact, no other gods at all. The idea that
this divine commandment was merely a metaphor is the sort of myopic idea that
only the historically-ignorant, temporally-biased, materially-obsessed modern
mind could produce.
 As to what the precise nature of those gods might be, I have no idea. All we
can say with any degree of certainty is that the universe is considerably less
simple and straightforward than our ancestors believed it to be, and than most of
us now believe it to be. But even if we are merely some form of superdigital
intelligences running in an unimaginably vast simulation, the universe is no less
wonderful, our feelings are no less genuine, and the Creator no less worthy of
praise than if our existence is as material as we assume it to be.
And evil is no less objective, no less real, than our instinctive abhorrence of
its true face when it reveals itself shows it to be.
It is the real and material presence of evil that causes me to find Christianity
a useful and necessary model of our imperfectly understood reality, in much the
same way that Newtonian physics remains a useful and necessary model in a
quantum universe. Even the most nihilistic atheist observably makes use of a
quasi-Christian moral framework when attempting to navigate the world, for all
that he will vociferously deny doing so. Moreover, the ideas that the universe has
an underlying structure, that it has coherent laws that the human mind can come
to understand, that it has purpose, and that it is progressing from a beginning to
an ultimate end, these are all ideas that necessarily presuppose the existence of
gods, if not God.
Reality, it is said, is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go
away.
While I have thus far failed to make a conclusive case for the existence of
gods, I am nevertheless pleased to have shown Dr. PZ Myers’s contention that
there are no good arguments for them to be false, as I believe I have
demonstrated to the satisfaction of all three perspectives, believer, nonbeliever,
and disbeliever, that the arguments for their existence are observably superior to
the arguments for their nonexistence.
But regardless of whether you find my arguments, or the arguments
presented by Dominic, to have been the more convincing, I hope this discourse
will inspire you to open your mind to more of the myriad possibilities that lay
before us in Man’s continuing quest to better understand this mysterious,
marvelous place in which he finds himself.

In closing, I should like to offer some unsolicited advice to those who
subscribe to one of the three philosophical perspectives concerned, atheism,
agnosticism, and Christianity.
To the atheist: Understand the difference between scientody, scientistry, and
scientage—the scientific method, the profession of science, and the
scientific knowledge base—and recognize that each of the three branches of
science are intrinsically limited in their ability to explain the world around
you. And never forget that the word that best describes reliable science is
not consensus, but engineering.

To the agnostic: It is intellectually justifiable, and even laudable, to refuse

to claim knowledge that you do not possess. But actions based on axioms
are justifiable too, so long as those axioms remain potentially viable, and it
is not unreasonable to utilize a time-tested and functional model as the
pragmatic basis of one’s practical philosophy. Don’t sit in darkness because
you cannot fully comprehend electricity.

To the Christian: Remember that you cannot serve the Truth by evading,
obfuscating, or denying the truth. Neither science nor reason are the
enemies of faith, they are nothing more than tools that help Man better
understand a Creation that is not only stranger than we know, it is very
likely stranger than we can reasonably imagine.
 Appendix: A Review of The Moral Landscape by Sam
Harris

Sam Harris’s first two books were commercial successes and intellectual
failures. Riddled with basic factual and logical errors, The End of Faith and
Letter to a Christian Nation served as little more than godless red meat snapped
up by unthinking atheists around the English-speaking world. His third book,
The Moral Landscape, is also a challenge to established wisdom, but it is a much
more sober, serious and interesting book than its predecessors.
The basis for the book is Harris’s own neuroscience experiments, in which
he tested his hypothesis that when hooked up to an fMRI scanner, the human
brain would produce an observable difference in its activity when contemplating
non-religious beliefs than when considering religious beliefs. As it happens, the
hypothesis was found to be incorrect, as the same responses were elicited from
both the believing group and the non-believing group for religious and
nonreligious stimuli alike.
In The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris courageously attempts to address the
Problem of Morality that has plagued atheist philosophers since Jean Meslier
failed to realize the obvious consequences of his declaration that every rational
man could imagine better moral precepts than Christianity possessed. As Harris
notes, in the absence of a morality derived from a religion, scientists and other
secularists have concluded that all morals are relative and there is therefore no
objective basis for preferring the moral precepts asserted by one individual to
those put forth by another, regardless of how monstrous those precepts might
appear to a third party.
This is why, aside from few irrelevant rhetorical flourishes and one
inexplicable personal jihad, Harris’s arguments in the book are predominantly
directed against his fellow non-believers rather than the theists he customarily
targets.
To his credit, Harris explicitly recognizes that he is making a philosophical
case, not a scientific one. This is a significant improvement upon the first wave
of New Atheist books, including Harris’s own pair, in which the various authors
presented their intrinsically philosophical cases in pseudo-scientific guise.
However, there are three fundamental flaws that pervade the book. First, Harris
appears to have followed the lead of Richard Dawkins by presenting bait-and-
switch definitions in lieu of logically substantive arguments. He repeatedly
utilizes the following logical structure:

1. Admittedly, X is not Y.
2. But can’t we say that X could be considered Z?
3. And Z is Y.
4. Therefore, X can be Y.

But this is an incorrect syllogism and faulty logic. X cannot be Y for the
obvious reason that it has already been established and admitted that X is not Y!
In fact, Harris commits the propositional fallacy called Affirming the
Consequent in this crude attempt to violate the Law of Non-Contradiction.
He should know better. Either his clumsy sophistry blinded him to the illogic
or he is being shamelessly deceptive, for as Aristotle wrote: “The most certain of
all basic principles is that contradictory propositions are not true
simultaneously.”
For example, in one attempt to get around David Hume’s is/ought
dichotomy, Harris readily admits that “good” in the sense of “morally correct” is
not objectively definable, and that what one individual perceives as good can
differ substantially from that which another person believes to be “good.” So, he
suggests the substitution of “well-being” for “good” because there are numerous
measures of “well-being”, such as life expectancy, GDP per capita, and daily
caloric intake, that can be reduced to numbers and are therefore objectively
quantifiable.
After all, everyone understands what it means to be in good health despite
the fact that “health” is not perfectly defined in an objective and scientific
manner. Right?
However, even if we set aside the obvious fact that the proposed measures of
well-being are of dubious utility—life expectancy does not account for quality of
life, GDP does not account for debt, and more calories are not beneficial to the
overweight—the problem is that Harris simply ignores the way in which his case
falls completely apart when it is answered in the negative. Which is to say, no,
we simply cannot accept that “moral” can reasonably be considered synonymous
with “well-being” because it is not true to say that which is “of, pertaining to, or
concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between
right and wrong” is equivalent to “the condition of an individual or group, such
as their social, economic, psychological, spiritual or medical state”
Harris’s second habitual flaw is one that was previously exhibited in his first
two books. And that is to act as if admitting that a problem with his reasoning
exists is somehow tantamount to resolving the problem in his favor. He appears
to grasp that his philosophical consequentialism suffers from the same
democratic problem that caused philosophers to abandon Benthamite
utilitarianism as a prospective substitute for morality—nine out of ten
individuals involved in a gang rape agree that the activity enhances their well-
being—but he simply chooses to ignore the problem. In the notes, he justifies
this gaping hole in his argument by declaring that the conceptual developments
that have taken place since John Stuart Mill died in 1873 “are generally of
interest only to academic philosophers.”
That’s likely true, but it doesn’t excuse such a blatant evasion of a known
refutation nor does it help the self-confessed consequentialist deal with the
potentially nightmarish consequences of utilitarian totalitarianism.
The third pervasive flaw is what after three books has become recognizable
as Harris’s customary intellectual carelessness. Time and time again, he makes
statements of fact that are easily disproved by the first page of a Google search.
For example, in an attempt to explain that all opinions need not be equally
respected and that not all competing responses to moral dilemmas are equally
valid, he brings up the subject of corporal punishment:

There are, for instance, twenty-one U.S. states that still allow corporal
punishment in their schools. … However, if we are actually concerned
about human well-being, and would treat children in such a way as to
promote it, we wonder whether it is generally wise to subject little boys and
girls to pain, terror, and public humiliation as a means of encouraging their
cognitive and emotional development. Is there any doubt that this question
has an answer? Is there any doubt that it matters that we get it right? In fact,
all the research indicates that corporal punishment is a disastrous practice,
leading to more violence and social pathology—and, perversely, to greater
support for corporal punishment.

– Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape

But “all the research” shows nothing of the kind. Sweden’s rate of child
abuse increased nearly 500 percent after a legal spanking ban was instituted in
1979 and is significantly higher than that of the United States. In Trinidad, a
paper titled “Benchmarking Violence and Delinquency in the Secondary School:
Towards a Culture of Peace and Civility” concluded that a ban on corporal
punishment in school had led to indiscipline and even physical attacks on
teachers. Dr. Robert E. Larzelere of Oklahoma State has also published
annotated studies showing that what little scientific evidence has been produced
to support anti-spanking bans is not sound. One need not have a position on
corporal punishment to recognize that Harris did not, in fact, ever look into the
relevant research he cites so blithely.
This failure to correctly establish a factual premise and build from it is found
throughout the book; Harris makes a habit of beginning with a conclusion and
belatedly attempting to justify it with a statement of fact that is often dubious,
and is occasionally downright wrong.
Here is another example of classic Harrisian illogic of the sort that litters the
book from a recent Wired interview:

WIRED: Hasn’t religion made some people behave more morally?

HARRIS: The problem is that religion tends to give people bad reasons to
be good. Is it better to alleviate famine in Africa because you think Jesus
Christ is watching and deciding whether to reward you with an eternity of
happiness after death? Or is it better to do that because you actually care
about the suffering of your fellow human beings?

Note that Harris doesn’t actually answer the question, but implicitly accepts
the assertion that religion has improved some people’s moral behavior. And
observe that he fails to acknowledge two things: a) the morality or immorality of
human behavior is primarily to be found in the act, not the motivation for the act,
and, b) there is no reason to believe that the two motivations Harris mentions are
mutually exclusive, in fact, there is substantial evidence to indicate that the two
motivations usually operate in harmony. It’s a false and irrelevant dichotomy;
isn’t it better for people to be good for what Harris believes are bad reasons than
for them to be bad?
Moreover, one cannot truly appreciate the degree to which this response
demonstrates Harris’s inimitable incoherence if one hasn’t read the section of the
book in which he declares himself to be a consequentialist. Apparently he is that
rare breed of consequentialist who doesn’t care about the consequences.
Harris is to be congratulated, however, for being a man about the
disappointing results of his neurological research. I helped him by reviewing and
refining a few of the religious questions for the fMRI experiments he performed
—in my opinion, the questions were both reasonable and fair—and as it turned
out, his hypothesis that there would be an observable difference in brain activity
when contemplating factual beliefs versus religious beliefs was falsified. This
was his conclusion:

Our study was designed to elicit the same responses from the two groups on
nonreligious stimuli (e.g., “Eagles really exist”) and opposite responses on
religious stimuli (e.g., “Angels really exist”). The fact that we obtained
essentially the same result for belief in both devout Christians and
nonbelievers, on both categories of content, argues strongly that the
difference between belief and disbelief is the same, regardless of what is
being thought about.

What Harris neglects to mention here is that it also indicates that there is no
difference between the two categories of belief, thus removing from his potential
arsenal what he had hoped would be a substantive scientific argument in his war
on religious faith. If he had been able to show there was an observable material
difference between the two types of belief, he would have used that to make a
case for the superiority of one over the other, which I assume was the primary
motivation for the experiment.
That being said, his experiments did produce some interesting results,
including the fact that it appears to give atheists a sense of pleasure to deny
religious statements. So, ironically, Sam Harris would appear to have produced
the first scientific evidence in support of my hypothesis that it is often the
personality that causes the atheism rather than the other way around. On which
note, I would be remiss indeed if I did not quote to the following comment from
the appendix:

Given my experience as a critic of religion, I must say that it has been quite
disconcerting to see the caricature of the overeducated, atheistic moral
nihilist regularly appearing in my inbox and on the blogs. I sincerely hope
that people like Rick Warren have not been paying attention.

—Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape, Chapter 1 Note 2

On the downside, Harris’s repeated attacks on Dr. Francis Collins are

unseemly as well as irrelevant to his topic; one wonders what his editor was
thinking to permit such a lengthy tangent that is more representative of a Victor
Hugo novel than a serious work of scientific philosophy. While the Nobel
laureate’s trivial scientific achievements do happen to render one of Harris’s core
arguments unviable, that doesn’t suffice to account for Harris’s decision to
devote nearly an entire chapter of a five-chapter book to an irrelevant attack on a
single individual.
Still, Sam Harris is to be lauded for taking the moral bull by the horns and
bravely attempting to make the case for the possibility of a secular and scientific
morality. The Moral Landscape raises some interesting questions and provides
the reader with more than a little food for thought.
Nevertheless, the reader is forced to conclude in the end that the
philosophical argument for a science-based morality presented in The Moral
Landscape is observably even more incorrect than the now-falsified scientific
hypothesis that served as the original inspiration for the book.

closing time


SCIENCE FICTION
Awake in the Night by John C. Wright
Awake in the Night Land by John C. Wright
City Beyond Time: Tales of the Fall of Metachronopolis by John C. Wright
Somewhither by John C. Wright
Back From the Dead by Rolf Nelson
Big Boys Don’t Cry by Tom Kratman
Hyperspace Demons by Jonathan Moeller
On a Starry Night by Tedd Roberts
Do Buddhas Dream of Enlightened Sheep by Josh M. Young
QUANTUM MORTIS A Man Disrupted by Steve Rzasa and Vox Day
QUANTUM MORTIS Gravity Kills by Steve Rzasa and Vox Day
QUANTUM MORTIS A Mind Programmed by Jeff Sutton, Jean Sutton, and
Vox Day
Victoria: A Novel of Fourth Generation War by Thomas Hobbes

FANTASY
One Bright Star to Guide Them by John C. Wright
The Book of Feasts & Seasons by John C. Wright
Iron Chamber of Memory by John C. Wright
A Magic Broken by Vox Day
A Throne of Bones by Vox Day
The Wardog’s Coin by Vox Day
The Last Witchking by Vox Day
Summa Elvetica: A Casuistry of the Elvish Controversy by Vox Day
The Altar of Hate by Vox Day
 The War in Heaven by Theodore Beale
The World in Shadow by Theodore Beale
The Wrath of Angels by Theodore Beale

MILITARY SCIENCE FICTION
There Will Be War Vol. I ed. Jerry Pournelle
There Will Be War Vol. II ed. Jerry Pournelle
There Will Be War Vol. III ed. Jerry Pournelle
There Will Be War Vol. IV ed. Jerry Pournelle
There Will Be War Vol. IX ed. Jerry Pournelle
There Will Be War Vol. X ed. Jerry Pournelle
Riding the Red Horse Vol. 1 ed. Tom Kratman and Vox Day
Riding the Red Horse Vol. 2 ed. Tom Kratman and Vox Day

NON-FICTION
4th Generation Warfare Handbook by William S. Lind and LtCol Gregory A.
Thiele, USMC
A History of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to William S. Lind by Martin van Creveld
Equality: The Impossible Quest by Martin van Creveld
Four Generations of Modern War by William S. Lind
On War: The Collected Columns of William S. Lind 2003-2009 by William S.
Lind
Transhuman and Subhuman: Essays on Science Fiction and Awful Truth by
John C. Wright
Astronomy and Astrophysics by Dr. Sarah Salviander
Compost Everything: The Good Guide to Extreme Composting by David the
Good
Grow or Die: The Good Guide to Survival Gardening by David the Good
SJWs Always Lie: Taking Down the Thought Police by Vox Day
Cuckservative: How “Conservatives” Betrayed America by John Red Eagle
and Vox Day
On the Existence of Gods by Dominic Saltarelli and Vox Day

CASTALIA CLASSICS
The Programmed Man by Jean and Jeff Sutton
Apollo at Go by Jeff Sutton
First on the Moon by Jeff Sutton

AUDIOBOOKS
A Magic Broken, narrated by Nick Afka Thomas
Four Generations of Modern War, narrated by William S. Lind
A History of Strategy, narrated by Jon Mollison
Grow or Die, narrated by David the Good
Extreme Composting, narrated by David the Good
Cuckservative, narrated by Thomas Landon


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