LEGAL ETHICS (A, 1-7)

A. PRACTICE OF LAW

1. CONCEPT

 Cayetano vs. Monsod

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment
was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet
the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should
have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.

Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.

3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various
positions in various foreign corporations.

4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations
until 1986.

5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes
practice of law?

HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,

a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than
in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely
described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the
average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different
legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in
this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation.
Justice Padilla dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in determining
what constitutes practice of law:

1. Habituality. The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
“practice of law” (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing
law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-
L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term “practice of law”. (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).

Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which
are related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents and giving legal advice, but he
only did so as isolated incidents.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his father’s law office. The
Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
“engaged” in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period.

What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate,
managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?

There is nothing in Monsod’s track record which will show that he Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years.
Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving
that legal advice of legal services, he was the one adviced and those services as an executive
but not as a lawyer.

 People of the Philippines vs Simplicio Villanueva

FACTS: In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of
Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston
Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva
the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that
according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased
to engage in private law practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for
free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.

 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic

FACTS: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic
because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in
Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of
specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it
is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his
staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors
and attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the
US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation
to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal
Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote
divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their
experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

A. Privilege

 Overgaard vs. Valdez

FACTS: Complainant, a Dutch national paid Respondent P900,000 to

represent him in several cases filed by, and against him. Despite
continued efforts to contact (via unanswered phone calls and e-mails)
respondent to inquire on the status of the cases. Later, Complainant
learned that Respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases
he filed. Further, Respondent failed to inform him that he was entitled to
prepare a counter-affidavit to answer the complaint for other light
threats. Worse, Complainant had no knowledge that there had

already been arraignment dates for the criminal cases against him, and
that warrants had already been issued for his non-attendance. Thus,
Lawyer Valdez committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility by having taken full retainer's fee and not
having done anything regarding Complainant Overgaard's cases to the
latter's prejudice and dismay.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent will be disbarred

HELD: In this case, SC finds that suspension for 3 years recommended by

the IBP is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and
omissions of Respondent Valdez. For violating elementary principles of
professional ethics and failing to observe the fundamental duties of
honesty and good faith, respondent has proven himself unworthy of
membership in this noble profession.

The PRACTICE OF LAW IS NOT A RIGHT, BUT A PRIVILEGE. It is granted

only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Lawyers must conduct themselves
beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients
or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.

 In Re: Edillon

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing

Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions ofthe Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment ofmembership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
towhich he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
hismembership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer
must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations
in which membershipis merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are
subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment ofannual dues. The Supreme Court in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the

State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities
thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay
their annual dues.

 Omico Mining and Industrial Corp vs. Vallejo

FACTS: On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent),

then a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, filed with said court
a complaint and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Judge
Amador T. Vallejos, against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and
Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as President
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging two
(2) causes of action. The first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of
stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants, and the
second, for the payment of his services as legal counsel for the
corporation.

Served with the corresponding summons and copies of the complaint,

the petitioners, as defendants therein, on June 10, 1973 filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in
that the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth
being that he is a resident of Quezon City where he has his permanent
family home; and, as to the second cause of action, the contract of
personal and professional services between plaintiff and defendants was
entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should have
been filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to the
stock certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with
respect to the contract of personal and professional services wherein it
was agreed that the plaintiff shall head the legal department of
defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation, the same is illegal,
void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of the Court of First
Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants
in default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering
judgment thereon.

HELD:

Respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the complaint is a

"useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing incorporated
therein is addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to the party concerned,
that is, the plaintiff or his counsel, as required by the rules. We do not
agree. The notice of hearing states the time and place of hearing, and a
copy thereof was sent through registered mail seven (7) days before the
date set for the hearing of the motion but actually received by plaintiff's
counsel one (1) day before said date, as per certification of the Quezon
City Post Office.

The period for filing responsive pleading commences to run all over again
from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial or deferment
of his motion to dismiss. Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default
while their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were,
therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of
the case on the merits, in their absence, without due notice to them of
the date of hearing, was a denial of due process. 23 Consequently, the
order of default, the judgment and the order of execution are patent
nullities.
 Noriega vs. Sison

FACTS: In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega

alleged that Sison as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name
“Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in private practice and
represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.

Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing

but the same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he
never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he
provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and
for free; that he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally
as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of
his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R.
Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when
the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the
“inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were
sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”,

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.

HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and

backed by evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant
disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed
an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a
lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly
and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney
to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private
practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for
his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends.
Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family
friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment
against him.

 Tejan vs. Cusi

FACTS: In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan

challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No. 59 of said court
involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of
the Philippine Bar.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C.
Tajan, he was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours
why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for
preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing
factual averments which petitioner knew were false. Apparently not
satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter filed
and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and, together
with Adm. Case No. 58 against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course thereto
and set the same for hearing.

Petitioner contends that respondent Judge has no authority on his own

motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension
of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and
originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance.
Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of first
instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the
Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the
complaint.

ISSUE:

HELD: The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal
profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in
that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration
of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the
manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to
him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition
that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon
his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts
of misconduct that he has become unfit to continue with the trust
reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust
and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may
and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and
the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend
members of the bar.

It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members

of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and
the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. This is for the
protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the
administration of justice.

Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or

suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him,
to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court).

 Schware vs. Board of Bar Examiners

 Marcos vs. Chief of Staff

FACTS: Alleged that the AFP Military Tribunals unlawfully excluded

MARCOS and CONDORDIA from their right to appear as counsel on the
ground that they are DISQUALIFIED/EXEMPTED/INHIBITED from SEC 17,
Article 17 of the Constitution which provides that No Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially
interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Congress during his term of office and he shall not appear as
counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case
wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is
the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee
of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office…”

ISSUE: WON the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17

of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners in the two cases. YES.

HELD: Marcos and Concondia are disqualified to appear as counsel for

accused in court-martials. AFP did not unlawfully excluded their rights.
Hence, petitions for mandamus are denied with costs. Words “any court”,
used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel “in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,” refers not only
to civil, but also to military courts. General meaning must prevail over
restricted meaning UNLESS the nature of the subject matter clearly
indicates that limited sense is intended.It would be a bar to another
prosecution for the same case which would result to DOUBLE JEOPARDY.“
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime,
its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the
issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of
which it may legally take cognizance. Restricting our decision to the
 above question of double jeopardy, the plaintiff in error, having been
acquitted of the crime of homicide, could not be subsequently tried for
the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.” In
Sec 17, it is obvious that the reason of prohibiting appearance of
members of the Senate/House of Representatives as counsel for the
accused in court-martials, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil
courts, because the independence of civil courts’ judges is guaranteed by
our Constitution.

B. Profession, not business

 Directors of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot

FACTS: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps

people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and
publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal
consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential.
The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued
Bayot for Malpractice.

Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he

admitted the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to
never repeat the act again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The
advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The
Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his
promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad,
the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

 In the Matter of Petition for Authority to Continue the Use of Law

Firm Name

FACTS: The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition

praying that they beallowed to continue using, in the name of their firm,
the names of their partner who passed away. One of the petitioners’
arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name in so far as
Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists which recognizes
that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members
of the firm. They also stated that the continued use of a deceased
partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice
in the legal profession of most countries in the world.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes” is allowed to sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of their firm.

HELD: NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the

American Bar Association stated the following:

“The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when

permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
that no imposition r deception is practiced through this
use.” No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a decease
d or former partner’sname in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm
names, under Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior
partners in a firm. Firm names in the Philippines change and evolve when
partners die, leave or a new one is added. It is questionable toad the new
name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased one since they
have never been, technically, partners in the first place. When it comes
to the arguments of
the petitioners stating that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the d
eceased partner’sname, this is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned
custom as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not applyin the
Philippines. The petition filed herein is denied and petitioner is advised
to drop thename “OZAETA” from the firm name.

 Linsangan vs. Tolentino

FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against

Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help
of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance
and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To
support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of
James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to
sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for loan of P50, 000.00.
Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in
his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.

HELD: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.
Such actuation constitutesmalpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule
2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule
proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of
legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to
gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial
evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s
law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respond
ent clearly solicited employmentviolating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for t
he exercise of the Court’sdisciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in
this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold
the nobility of the legal profession.

Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his

legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatibl
e with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business
2. QUALIFICATIONS

 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic (same case)

 In Re: Cunanan

FACTS: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up
to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

HELD: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to
1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It
was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953
to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based
under the following reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to
the end of World War II;

2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;

3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who

may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to
 repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress
under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and

4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953.
Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress
to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

 In Re: Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay

FACTS: In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for
him to take advantage of Canada’s free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in
2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
9225 of the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he
returned to the Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved
and limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege
to practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed
to have never been terminated.

But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after
reacquisition?

No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of
law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
 Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of
the Philippine bar.

 In Re: Gutierrez

FACTS: Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco
in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a
portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was
released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of
Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely
remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon
the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in
defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal
mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved
is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

 De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces

FACTS: This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar.
It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary public, Vailoces, on
December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last
will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and
daughter. Consequently the probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered
decision denying probate to the will. This decision e final. On the basis of this decision a
criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three
attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental where
after trial, they were found guilty and convicted On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision with regard to Vailocess but modified it with record to his co-accused. As finally
adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of
public document defined and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and as
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate Penalty ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayoras maximum, with
the accessories of the law, finest and costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces
began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party instituted
the present disbarment proceedings.
 In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered against him
in the criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive
evidence, the charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on
the part of herein complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be
tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent will be disbarred

HELD: The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime which
resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais,
Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for
such defense can only be availed of when he is placed in the predicament of being
prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein, within the meaning of Section 9,
Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a
criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its
purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence" (In repose confidence"(In reMcDougall, 3 Phil. 77). Thus,
respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to this effect, our Clerk of
Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.

3. APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS

A. Law student practice (Rule 138-A)

Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized
law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall
be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and
in behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications
between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by
the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
 Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the
standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to
provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.
(Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).

B. Non-lawyers in courts

a. Cases before the MTC: A party to the litigation, may conduct his own case or litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule
138, RRC);

b. Before any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally. But if he gets
someone to aid him, that someone must be authorized member of the Bar (Sec. 34, Rule
138, RRC)

Note: A non-lawyer conducting his own litigation is bound by the same rules in conducting
the trial case. He cannot after judgment, claim that he was not properly represented.

c. Criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not
available, the judge may appoint a non- lawyer who is a:

i. Resident of the province; AND

ii. Of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense; (Sec. 7, Rule
116 RRC)

d. Any official or other person appointed or designated to appear for the Government of the
Philippines in accordance with law. (Sec. 33, Rule 138 RRC) Note: Such person shall have
all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said
government has an interest direct or indirect. (Sec. 33,Rule 138, RRC)

C. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals

a. Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if:
i. They represent themselves; OR
ii. They represent their organization or members thereof; (Art 222, PD 442, as
amended) (2002 Bar Question) iii. If they are duly accredited members of any
legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice, or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. (Lapena, 2009)

Note: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees under Article 222 of the Labor Code for not
being a lawyer. (Five J. Taxi v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994)

b. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral
Court. (Sec. 9, Act no. 2259)
  Tapay vs. Bancolo

FACTS: Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He
likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his
tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which provides:

CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bancolo shall be suspended

HELD: Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although
he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a
non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. For
violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension
from the practice of law for one year.

D. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing

1. Proceedings before the Small Claims Court -No attorney shall appear in behalf of or
represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant (Sec. 17,
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases)

Note: If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense
and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an
attorney to assist that party upon the latter’s consent (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases).

2. Proceedings before the Katarungang Pambarangay - during the pre-trial conference

under the Rules of Court, lawyers are prohibited from appearing for the parties. Parties
must appear in person only except minors or incompetents who may be assisted by their
next of kin who are not lawyers. (Formerly Sec. 9, P.D. No. 1508; Sec. 415, Local Government
Code of 1991, R.A. 7160)
4. SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OR APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY

1. Declaratory relief;
2. Petition for Injuction;
3. Contempt of court;
4. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an
attorney to the damage of a party;
5. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment; or
6. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer or government official.

A. Lawyers without authority

 In Re: Petition to Sign in the B.M. No. 2540 Roll of Attorneys, Michael Medado
FACTS: Petitioner Michael Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year 1979,took
and passed the same year’s bar examinations and took the Attorney’s Oath, failed to sign
the Attorney’s Roll. After more than 30 years of practicing theprofession of law, he filed
the instant Petition on February 2012, praying that hebe allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. Medado said that he was not able tosign the Roll of Attorneys because he
misplaced the notice given to him and hebelieved that since he had already taken the
oath, the signing of the Roll ofAttorneys is not urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer.The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting clarificatoryconference on
the matter recommended to the Supreme Court that the instant petition be denied for
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys?

HELD: Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law. The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of Attorneys
because such action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is reserved to the most serious
ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

“A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, becauseeveryone is

presumed to know the law and its consequences.”

Although an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts he could no longer claim it as a valid justification by the moment
he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record. His action of
continuing the practice of law in spite of his knowledge of the need to take the necessary
steps to complete all requirements for the admission to the bar constitutes unauthorized
practice of law. Such action transgresses Canon 9of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in theunauthorized practice of
law

 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co.

FACTS: The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo,

entitled, "PAFLU,et al, vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of
Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement
with back wages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision
became final On 18 October1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the
winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's hen equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty.Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila andTenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney’s fees for 25% of
their back wages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a “Petition for Award of
Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed
by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer. The award of 10% to
Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of Muning shall be voided

HELD: Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated

Laborers ‘Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March
1968, that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-
lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case. The
reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as
an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed
to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that
non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. The weight of the reasons
heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney’s fees should suffice
to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of
Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special
jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and
cannot justify an exception.

 Ciocon-Reer vs. Judge Lubao

 FACTS: Complainants alleged that the 30-day period within which to submit memoranda
expired on 6 November 2008. Since the defendants failed to submit their memorandum
on 6 November 2008, complainants alleged that they should be deemed to have waived
their right to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the case. Yet, four
months passed from 6 November 2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make his decision.

Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is
engaging in the practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this
Court to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for
unauthorized practice of law.

Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubaos failure to submit his
comment on time to complainants’ administrative complaint is a violation of the existing
rules and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards his alleged
unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade
the issues at hand.

ISSUE: Whether or not Karaan is liable for indirect contempt

HELD: Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person assuming
to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable
for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty
of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both.

 Noriega vs. Sison (same case)

 Beltran vs. Abad

FACTS: Mr. Elmo Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio Beltran, President of the Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association, of practising law without being admitted to the Bar. Abad
admitted that during the time he was waiting for his turn to take the Oath he was made
to sign his Lawyer’s Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar. He was told by Atty.
Mendoza, Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court that the Chief Justice wanted to talk to
him regarding the Answer he made for a complaint. He was told to answer the reply and
he filed it with a prayer to be fit to become a member of the Bar. He already paid his
membership fees and other assessments in the belief that he was already admitted to the
Bar in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law

 HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The
right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one
who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without license. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has
narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice
law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The
regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00)
pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve
twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

 US vs. Durban

FACTS: In 1914, a lawyer named Salvador Laguda filed a petition before the Iloilo CFI
recommending that he is appointing Cesareo Durban as his procurador judicial (legal
representative). The judge of the CFI approved the petition. The authority granted to
Durban, a non-lawyer, is limited to the following: appear in matters signed and presented
by Laguda with his own signature and when the latter should send the said Durban to
attend to such matters; that the said Durban should have no authority to make contracts
to represent any person in any justice court; that all contracts and appearances should be
made by Laguda, and that the latter could send Durban to represent him in courts; and
finally that said Durban should not collect any sum for any service.

In one instance however, Durban agreed to represent one Eustaquia Montage in litigating
her claim over a P20.00 worth parcel of land. Durban charged for appearance fees; he
even won the case. Montage paid Durban a total of P50.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not Durban engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1919, says:
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in the occupation of appearing
for or defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without being first authorized
for that purpose by the judge of the Court of First Instance.
Durban acted beyond the authority granted him; he was likewise in violation of the
provision above.
5. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW

 Ramos vs. Rada

FACTS: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte.
He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as
follows:

Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, that
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government…

Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on

December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated
in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation.

His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against
Rada which was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.

Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment.

It was not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has
at all impaired his efficiency as messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe
regular office hours.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII

HELD: Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12
of Civil Service Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand.

The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his
entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his situation, it
would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment
his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging
in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without
forseeable detriment to the Government service.

His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must
secure a written permission from proper government authority.

 Omico Mining and Industrial Corp vs. Vallejo (SAME CASE)

 PP vs. Villanueva (same case)

a. Prohibition or disqualifications of former government attorneys

Rule 6.03, Canon 6, CPR - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.

b. Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions

Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of Law in the
Philippines:

1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court (Rule 148, Sec.
35, RRC).
2. Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid.)
3. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109).
4. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and
assistants (Art. VIII Sec. 15, 1987 Constitution).
5. Members of the Constitutional Commission (Art IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987
Constitution)
6. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2nd par), 1987 Constitution)
7. All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90).
8. Those prohibited by special law

Public Officials with Restrictions in the Practice of Law:

1. 1. No Senator as member of the House of Representative may personally

appear as counsel before any court of justice as before the Electoral Tribunals,
as quasi-judicial and other administration bodies (Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987
Constitution).
2. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160, Sec. 91)Sanggunian members
may practice their professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they
shall not:
1. appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;
2. appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office;
3. collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official;
4. use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
 3. Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving
pension from the government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which
the Government, or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in
a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of
an offense in relation to his office.

6. LAWYERS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT

1. Solicitor General

The Sol Gen, in his discretion, may pursue any of the following actions:
1. Prosecute
2. Not to prosecute
3. To abandon a prosecution already started; or 4. To take a position adverse to the
people of the Philippines in a criminal case or to that of a government agency or official,
when he believes that justice will be served by taking a different stand.

2. Any person appointed to appear for the government of the Philippines in accordance with
law. (Sec. 33, Rule 138 RRC)

7. LAWYER’S OATH

 Sebastian vs. Calis

FACTS: After an investigation, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis was found to have deceived
the complainant Marilou Sebatian by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents, that despite spurious documents, nothing untoward would happen to her. He
also guaranteed her arrival in the U.S.A. and even promised to refund the fees and
expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. The IBP Board of Governors found
the respondent guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court concurred with the resolution of the IBP saying that deception and
other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. The lawyers oath is not
mere facile words, draft and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable. For his act respondent Dorotheo Calis was disbarred and his name was ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The respondent was also ordered to pay the amount
of P114,000.00 representing the amount collected from the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Calis was guilty of gross misconduct; thus, be disbarred.

HELD: Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers
relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere
 facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. The
Court has sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of
the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. The Court must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during
good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared
by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. Here, it is worth
noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and
his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of
unprofessional conduct. Thus, the Court finds no hesitation in removing respondent
Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and
unconscionable conduct toward complainant.

Wherefore, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

 Pheschem Industrial Corp vs. Atty. Surigao

FACTS: Pheschem has been operating a limestone quarry in Palompon, Leyte on a 25-year
mining permit since 1985. Toward the end of its said permit, it allegedly encountered
harassment from the town officials when it tried to renew the same, although it also
surmised that its troubles began after it refused passage through its quarry to the logging
trucks owned by the Chairman of Barangay Liberty. The chairman retaliated by charging
them 100 pesos per truck that entered the quarry site. When Pheschem refused to pay,
the chairman blockaded the quarry site.

Pheschem sought the help of Atty. Surigao, then Vice-Mayor of Palompon, but instead of
helping the former, Atty. Surigao joined the blockade. Not only that, in a dialogue he called
between Pheschem and the barangayofficials, Atty. Surigao harangued Pheschem with a
litany of complaints from the barangay residents.

Unable now to haul limestone from its present quarry site, it opened a new quarry. But
again, Atty. Surigaoand other town officials blocked and stopped its operations.
Undaunted, Pheschem opened a third quarry, but the attorney and other officials seized
two of Pheschems dump trucks. Also, the mayor claimed thatPheschem violated its
environmental compliance certificate. The mayor also claimed that the permit was for
 quarrying rock asphalt, and not limestone which was the type of mineral in the new
vicinity.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be dismissed?

HELD: The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to
local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegation is embodied in the general
welfare clause, Section 16, of R.A. No. 7160. Rather than this Court penalizing the
respondents for their supposed abusive and arbitrary actuations not befitting the moral
character required of members of the bar, there is ample showing that their conduct was
pursuant to the diligent performance of their sworn duties and responsibilities as duly
elected officials of the Municipality of Palompon, Leyte. They therefore deserve
commendation, instead of condemnation, and not just commendation but even
encouragement, for their vigilance and prompt and decisive actions in helping to protect
and preserve the environment and natural resources of their Municipality.

 Barenguer-Landers vs. Carranza

FACTS: A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for
deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity
of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the
effect that her own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs
except herself, when, as a matter of fact, the deceased was survived by four other
daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he introduced the same in
evidence. Carranza raises the defense that he had nothing to do with the preparation of
the affidavit. The report of the solicitor general confirmed that Carranza had nothing to
do with it. However, respondent testified as to his being not very meticulous about the
petition because there was neither private nor government opposition thereto.
Respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not properly inform himself
of the evidence he was going to present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to
proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to
confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for Relief.
Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having] caused confusion
and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence therein containing a false
statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the family litigations
between his client and complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and
that] respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of
office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of Court.There is something
unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then Solicitor General Barredo that
there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in
evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to be false, in the
preparation of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception
obviously cannot be sustained.
 ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carranza violated his oath for prolongation of the cadastral
suit.

HELD: A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken
lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if
courts cannot rely on the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers,
insofar as the presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as
unfortunately happened in this case, even without any intent on the part of a member of
the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not be allowed to
escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.

Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case,
betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge
thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that
he has not consented to the doing of the falsity. Respondent Pedro B. Carranza is
reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much
more severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, through any of the
district judges, is hereby directed to administer in public the reprimand thus imposed on
respondent Pedro B. Carranza.

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