NOT AT ALL

The exact time when a state may abridge the rights of a fit parent,
without a narrowly tailored compelling interest

Kyung Lee Trotter

Copyright © 2016 Kyung Lee Trotter.
All Rights Reserved. No part(s) of this book may be reproduced,
distributed or transmitted in any form, or by any means, or
stored in a database or retrieval systems without prior expressed
written permission of the author of this book.
ISBN: 978-1-62217-886-5
 Introduction

L
and of the free? Home of the brave? Liberty and justice for all? Not from where I’m standing. It’s
most definitely the home of the brave because I once signed on the “dotted- line” to die to protect
those virtues which I actually believed existed in America. But, as far as freedom and liberty, well,
I’ve learned such can easily be taken away with a stroke of a pen. And justice? Well, if it’s the government or
people in power that have taken your freedom away, don’t count on retribution. Nobody will do anything to
help you.
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided in Troxel v. Granville that a state involving itself in the
fundamental right of a fit parent was “not a problem.” This single declaration destroyed my life and the lives
of fit parents across America. The Court never gave this destructive decision a second thought.
This decision paved the way for grandparents and other third parties to drag fit parents to court and seek
forced visitation or permanent “custody” of a fit parent’s child, based solely on a judge’s discretion as to what
he or she felt was in the “best interests” of the fit parent’s child.
I’m one of those parents. My parental rights to my first born child were terminated by the state of Georgia
without the due process I was entitled to, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution—the infringement which the U.S. Supreme Court declared “wasn’t a problem.”
This book describes how the Court, entrusted to interpret and protect the constitutional rights of the
American people, succumbed to considerations other than the Constitution of the United States or prior
precedent, in order to serve a single group of people. I will break down the unconstitutional actions of the
Washington, Georgia, and United States Supreme Courts in deliberate actions in Troxel v. Granville, in order
to thwart the due process rights of fit parents and for the states to maintain their so-called grandparents
“rights” statutes on their books.
These unconstitutional grandparents’ “rights” statutes were never about staying close to grandchildren.
These statutes were a means for grandparents to seek revenge against, control, devastate, or completely destroy
a fit parent and the United States Supreme Court disarmed the fit parent in order to aid the grandparents to
do so.
Recently, a judge and court of appeals stood up for the constitutional rights of fit parents in Pennsylvania
and Alabama, respectively. Although Judge Harry Smail, Jr. of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania and
the justices of the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals are still heroes in my book, the United States Supreme
Court that decided Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) will not be shielded. There is no such thing as a
permissible way to infringe the due process rights of a fit parent. Either the state has a narrowly tailored
compelling interest to do so, or it doesn’t. There is no in-between. More importantly, the burden to prove
that such interest exists is not on the parent. It is squarely on the state.
This book is what I’ve learned while having to fight zealously, for four years, on my own, to restore my
rights and bring my child back home, to no avail. It describes the unspeakable practices, activities, and
system that the state of Georgia has in place to ensure that its third parties who utilize its statute Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) § 19-7-1(b.1) will be successful. This system also ensures that the
parents who are deprived will have no means to seek relief at any level, not state or federal lower, state or
federal appellate, and certainly not at the U.S. Supreme Court. I will break down the inconceivably corrupt,
beyond unethical, practices of this state’s court clerks, lawyers, judges and justices, in order to keep this
unconscionable system of depriving the Fourteenth Amendment rights of fit parents for profit afloat.
I will show many of my attempts to seek help from the traditional agencies or organizations which an
indigent, aggrieved person would turn to for help reversing this manifest injustice, committed against me
by this state, but show how each declined to help a good mother who served her country honorably for nine
years.
I would be continuing such service today, with my eyes upon retirement, but for this federally sanctioned
obliteration of my life.
While certain people frown upon those that supposedly don’t work hard enough to achieve that “American
Dream,” know that no matter how hard one works to change her economic circumstances, America’s system
of government is designed to oppress people like me and to keep that dream far out of reach. Ambitious,
able-bodied people cannot be successful, when the federal government has given states unchecked power, to
invade their homes and take their children away permanently without cause.
I am not a lawyer. That goal was cut short on August 12, 2011, when the state of Georgia terminated my
rights. As my pro bono attorney claimed she didn’t know how to do an appeal, my voyage upon my paralegal
degree as a life raft, into the hurricane sea of federal law and procedure, to secure justice for myself began.
I have not attended a real law school. However, as I understand it, law school teaches one how to read and
comprehend appellate cases. If I had a dollar for every appellate case that I’ve had to read, comprehend,
and apply to my facts with written arguments, every defendant named in my un-adjudicated, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, wouldn’t have to pay me the potential $96,000,000 in damages that they still owe me, for depriving my
Fourth, Fifth, and most importantly, Fourteenth Amendment rights under color of law. Such doesn’t include
the punitive damages I asked for, to discourage any other state that wished to damage the lives of fit parents
and their children in the manner explained herein.
So if anybody would like to verify my education, you may contact:

The University Of Money-Making Georgia

123 Go Along To Get Along Lane
HandsTied, GA 45678

Or you may call the Dean of the school at (404) KP-QUIET

 Disclaimer

I am not a licensed attorney. This book may not be construed as legal advice. Should you find yourself in
this kind of “dispute” over your children, please seek the aid of a licensed attorney. If you are in Georgia,
good luck.
 Dedication

This book is dedicated to Wendy Titelman and Dean Gottschalk. They were the first victims of Georgia’s
shenanigans that I found when I first started digging for answers. All three of us had the same Guardian Ad
Litem on our cases.
This self-proclaimed “dog on the hunt” has been “hunting” for far too long in Cobb County, Georgia.
Both Dean and I had this same GAL as well as the same judge.
Dean, you were right. There is another system. It’s just not “shadowy”; it’s overt.
This book is also dedicated to every parent who has been dragged to court and put on trial, under these
unconstitutional grandparents’ “rights” statutes, like accused criminals by grandparents in order for them to
take from you what is most precious to you—your children.
It is only a person of a depraved mind and malicious heart that would relentlessly and ruthlessly pursue
the separation of their own grandchild from his or her loving, nurturing parent.
 Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s

Introduction......................................................................................................................................iii
Disclaimer.......................................................................................................................................... v
Dedication........................................................................................................................................vii
Table of Authorities........................................................................................................................xiii
Appendix......................................................................................................................................... xxi

Chapter 1
The War on the Fundamental Liberty Interest of Fit Parents................................................. 1
Troxel V. Granville, The Red Carpet For “Grandparents’ Rights”................................................ 2
The Washington And U.S. Supreme Courts Rewrote § 26.10.160(3)......................................... 4
The True Federal Question ............................................................................................................ 10
The Process Due To The Parent’s Liberty Interest....................................................................... 11
The U.S. Supreme Court Deliberately Avoided
A Collision With Strict Scrutiny................................................................................................... 13

Chapter 2
The True Facts Of Trotter V. Ayres, 315 Ga. App. 7 (2012).................................................... 17

Chapter 3
The State Of Georgia Terminated My Parental Rights Without Due Process................... 27
Georgia Interprets Troxel As The State Having The Power To Terminate
The Rights Of Fit Parents Under A Sole Best Interests Standard.............................................. 27
The Clark Court’s Purported Constiutional Justifications
To Advance Its New “Bond” With The Child Process................................................................ 33
The Clark Court’s Lehr V. Robertson Claim................................................................................. 34
The Clark Court’s Quilloin V. Walcott Claim............................................................................... 35
The True Statuses Of The Fathers Of Clark V. Wade................................................................ 36
The Noncustodial, Unwed, Biological Fathers............................................................................. 38
The Nationwide Fallout Of Troxel V. Granville......................................................................... 38

Chapter 4
Georgia’s Subsequent Organized Crime................................................................................... 41
The Cover-Up Starts—The Georgia Supreme Court Shirks Its Exclusive Jurisdiction.......... 43

Chapter 5
The Cover-Up Continues To Federal Court.............................................................................. 47
The Gist of My Arguments On the Federal Level....................................................................... 47
The Georgia Sop.............................................................................................................................. 48
The Specific Shenanigans Of The Georgia Sop............................................................................ 51
Shenanigan 1: The Motion Into the “Round-File” Solution....................................................... 51
Shenanigan 2: Send In the Magistrate.......................................................................................... 52
— How the Magistrate Got Rid of My Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)....................................... 54
“…The Magistrate Judge Usurped His Authority Under 28 U.s.c. § 636(B)(1)....................... 54
Shenanigan 3: Search Your Own Precedent to Find Any Way to Deny Relief........................ 55
Shenanigan 4: If You’re a Judge Being Sued, Fuck the Federal Rules ...................................... 55
Shenanigan 5: Send In The “Big Guns”......................................................................................... 57
Shenanigan 6: When All Else Fails Just Sua Sponte Dismiss the Entire Action...................... 59
Shenanigan 7: Avoid the De Novo Review At All Times........................................................... 60
— My Reconsideration Of The Sua Sponte Dismissal of My Section 1983................... 61
 — “…The Court Overlooked The Separate Document And 150 Day Rules................. 61
— The Court Overlooked The Lack Of Finality Of
The District Court’s Order.............................................................................................. 61
— First Prayer For Relief...................................................................................................... 61
— The Court Overlooked The Fact That The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Hear
The Action......................................................................................................................... 62
— My Brief for The Dismissal of My Motion To Set Aside............................................. 63
— “Statement Of The Issues................................................................................................. 63
— Statement Of The Case.................................................................................................... 63
— II. Statement of the Facts................................................................................................. 64
— Standards Of Review........................................................................................................ 65
— Summary Of The Argument........................................................................................... 66
— Argument.......................................................................................................................... 66
— I. The District Court Claimed That It Lacked Jurisdiction, But Decided The Merits
Of The Action................................................................................................................... 66
— [II]. The District Court Erred In Applying The Domestic Relations Exception...... 67
— [IV]. The District Court Erred in Applying the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As A Fraud Exception Exists To Such............................................................................ 67
— [V]. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Apply Where
The Appellant Was Afforded No Reasonable Opportunity To Raise Her
Constitutional Claims In The State Court..................................................................... 68
— [VI]. The Federal Court Has Jurisdiction In Equity and Inherent Authority
To Hear And Determine Whether Fraud Upon The Court Occurred...................... 72
— Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 72
Shenanigan 8: When Composing Your Sua Sponte Order
Refer To the Cropped Facts and Then Apply Your Own Law To Those Facts........................ 73
— The Eleventh Circuit’s Bogus Review And Order........................................................ 73
Shenanigan 9: Don’t Forget The Footnotes.................................................................................. 74
Chapter 6
“So Let’s Do A Review”................................................................................................................. 77
In Short ............................................................................................................................................ 80
What Can Be Done?........................................................................................................................ 82
The Fbi Needs To Be Made To Do What The Taxpayers Pay Them To Do............................. 84
 Ta b l e o f A u t h o r i t i e s

CASES
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)....................................................................................... 13
Albra v. Advan, 490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007)............................................................................. 73
Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963)...... 4
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).................12, 15
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703(1992)...................................................................... 67
Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).......................................................................................... 58
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 (ED Pa. 1975)................................................................... 29
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).............................................................................4, 11, 12
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)........................................................................... 53
Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir.1993).................................. 62
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)....................................................................................... 7
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)......................................................................... 3
Bulloch v. United States , 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. Utah 1985).................................................. 72
Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001)............................................................................ 49
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)........................ 12
Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 94 S.E.2d 537 (1956)......................................................................... 3
Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009)....................................................................... 73
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).................................................................................. 62
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)............................................................................... 13
Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001)...........................................................28, 33, 34, 36, 49, 59, 80
Cochran v. U.S. Health Care Fin. Admin., 291 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 2002)................................. 73
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)............................................................................. 14
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)................. 62
Corrigan v. Bargala, 140 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.1998)........................................................................ 61
Custody of Smith...................................................................................................... 4, 5, 11, 15, 79
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)...................................................................................... 14
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Abrogated by Romer v. Evans, U.S.Colo., May 20,
1996)............................................................................................................................................ 8
Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162 (11th Cir. 1997)............................... 62
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22
(2005)......................................................................................................................................... 73
Fam.Ct.Act § 614.1...................................................................................................................... 31
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8....................................................................................................................... 53, 56
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12........................................................................................................................... 55
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54........................................................................................................................... 62
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60................................................................ ix, 21, 48, 49, 50, 54, 60, 63, 65, 68, 72
Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (C.A.9 (Cal.),1998)....................................................... 3
Ga. Code § 74-103 (1978)............................................................................................................ 35
Ga. Const. Art. VI.................................................................................................................. 44, 75
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017–18, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)..12, 39
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. Ga. 2001).........................................................65, 68
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, s 701................................................................................................................... 30
In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1 (1998)........................................................ 4, 5, 11, 15, 79
In re Dabrowski, 257 B.R. 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)................................................................ 50
In re Wolcott, 85 Wash.App. 468 (1997)......................................................................................... 4
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)............................................................................. 2
Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).............................................................................. 11
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).................................... 39
Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968)............................................................................................ 71
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)................................................................4, 11, 12
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. Cal. 2004)..................................................... 67
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)......................................................................................... 7, 11
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)....................................................................................34, 35
Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804 (C.A.11
(Fla.),2004)......................................................................................................................4, 11, 12
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)................................................................ 13
Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999)................................... 50
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).............................................................................. 52
Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576 (1st Cir.1994)........................................ 62
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)......................................................................... 4
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)............................................................... 1, 7, 8, 14, 37, 80
M.G.L.A. Const. c. 1, § 1, art. 4........................................................................................................ 5
Michael A. Inman.................................................................................................................... 3, 28
Michael A. Inman, Constitutional Law-Clear and Present Danger Test Applied to Over-
broad Unlawful Assembly Statute. Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d
477 (1971), 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmlr/vol13/i............................................................................................................................... 3
Mickens v. Tenth Judicial Circuit, 181 Fed. Appx. 865 (11th Cir. Fla. 2006)............................ 68
Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.1983)................... 62
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).................................................................... 15
National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 349 (1963)........... 7
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (U.S.N.Y.,1982).......................................................................... 3
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938)........................................................12, 32
Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 277 (1911).................................................12, 32
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–236
(3d ed.2004).............................................................................................................................. 53
7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23........................................................................ 71
Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633 (1971).....................................................................3, 9, 28
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (U.S.Ga.,1979)................................................................8, 27, 29, 32
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976)....................................................................12, 32
People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 (1903)............................................................................................ 8
Perdomo v. HSB Bank USA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46274 Only Lexis citation available....... 67
Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1997)......................................... 61
Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651 (1912)..................................................................................51, 72
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923)....................................................................7, 8, 37
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).......................................................................5, 6, 79
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 236 (1978)........................................................ 11, 34, 35, 36, 37, 81
Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 323 (9th Cir. 1996)............................................. 61
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)............................................................................. 11, 14, 16, 80
Rev.Laws, c. 75, § 137........................................................................................................................ 5
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145(1878).................................................................................. 8
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)............................................12, 16, 31, 37, 39, 79, 80, 81
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).............................................................................................. 3
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)............................................................................... 7, 8
Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1988)......................................................................... 53
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).................................................................... 13
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). (rev’d on other grounds).............................4, 11, 12
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)...............................................................................4, 11, 12
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)............................. 66
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)..........................................................................4, 11, 12
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)................................................................................... 1
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)................................... 12, 13, 14, 16, 30, 37, 39, 79, 80, 81
State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (1901)............................................................................................. 8, 11
St. Louis I.M. & S.R.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24 (1883).......................................... 62
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)................................................................................48, 50
Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (U.S. 1913)............................................... 8
Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005)........................... 73
Symantec Corp. v. Global Impact, 559 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2009)................................................. 61
Trotter v. Ayres, 315 Ga. App. 7 (2012)......................................................................................... 17
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).................................. 2, 5, 9, 11, 21, 27, 37, 41, 43, 67, 80
Uniform Superior Court Rule State of Georgia 24.9.4................................................................ 48
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)........................................................ 6
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454 (1995)............................................................ 3
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946)....................................... 72
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV........................................................................................................ 43, 44
U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (U.S.N.Y.,1987)........................................................................... 3, 79
U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (U.S.,2010)...............................................................................3, 9, 10
U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)...................................................................................... 3
Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2 (2015)................................................................................................ 38
Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)................................................ 50
Velazquez v. S. Fla. Fed. Credit Union, 46 Fed. Appx. 854 (11th Cir. Fla. 2013)...................... 65
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988)............................................... 3
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)................................................................................................. 13
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (U.S.Wash.,1997)..............1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 13, 16, 79, 80
Weldon v. Ballow, 2015 WL 6618983, at *6 (Ala.Civ.App.,2015)............................................... 81
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)................................... 7
Williamson v. Ward, 192 Ga. App. 857 (1989)............................................................................. 75
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).............................................................................................. 13
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).............................................................................4, 11, 12
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 636.....................................................................................................................54, 55, 60
28 U.S.C. § 1915...................................................................................................................52, 53, 54
18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (West)................................................................................................................ 42
§26.09.240........................................................................................................................................... 4
§ 26.10.160............................................................................................................................2, 4, 9, 10
28 U.S.C. § 636................................................................................................................................. 55
28 U.S.C. § 1291............................................................................................................................... 55
28 U.S.C. § 1331............................................................................................................................... 73
28 U.S.C. § 1332............................................................................................................................... 73
28 § U.S.C. 1915............................................................................................................................... 53
42 U.S.C. § 1983................................................................................................ 21, 48, 50, 52, 60, 64
Fam.Ct.Act § 614.1.......................................................................................................................... 31
Ga. Code § 74-103 (1978).............................................................................................................. 35
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, s 701................................................................................................................... 30
N.Y.McKinney’s Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 111-a, subds. 2-4...................................... 34
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-41............................................................................................................................ 68
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21....................................................................................................... 51, 68, 70, 74
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94....................................................................................................................... 44
O.C.G.A. §§ 15-14-5....................................................................................................................... 68
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-45....................................................................................................................41, 48
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1)................................................................................... 28, 31, 33, 42, 75, 80
Rev.Laws, c. 75, § 137........................................................................................................................ 5
Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2 (2015).................................................................................................. 38

Other Authorities
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–236 (3d ed.2004).53
7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23........................................................................ 71
Michael A. Inman, Constitutional Law-Clear and Present Danger Test Applied to Over-
broad Unlawful Assembly Statute. Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d
477 (1971), 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmlr/vol13/iss1/1................................................................................................................ 3, 28

Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8...........................................................................................................................53, 56
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.............................................................................................................................. 55
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.............................................................................................................................. 62
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.............................................................................................................................. 57
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60................................................................. ix, 21, 48, 49, 50, 54, 60, 63, 65, 68, 72
Local Rule 56.................................................................................................................................... 57
Uniform Superior Court Rule State of Georgia 24.9.4............................................................... 48

Constitutional Provisions
Ga. Const. Art. VI........................................................................................................................... 44
M.G.L.A. Const. c. 1, § 1, art. 4....................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV...........................................................................................................43, 44
 Appendix

My Motion To Dismiss..................................................................................................................... 1
Complete Brief For My 42 U.s.c. § 1983 Appeal.......................................................................... 12
First “Shrug-Off ” By The Department Of Justice....................................................................... 61
My Response To The Doj................................................................................................................ 62
Second “Shrug-Off ” By The Doj................................................................................................... 65
“Findings” Of The American Psychological Association........................................................... 66
Rejection From The Georgia Aclu................................................................................................. 68
Rejection Letter From The Nyclu.................................................................................................. 70
Rejection Letter From Massachusetts Aclu.................................................................................. 71
Rejection Letter From The Commonwealth Of Virginia Judicial Inquiry And
Review Commission................................................................................................................ 73
Transcripts Of The Virginia Judge’s Ruling.................................................................................. 74
Rubber Stamped Reply From The White House......................................................................... 79
Returned Certified Receipt From The White House.................................................................. 80
Latest Letter From The White House............................................................................................ 82
Letters To Congressman................................................................................................................. 83
Fees Made By The Guardian Ad Litem......................................................................................... 85
The “Custody Evaluator’s” Fee Specifications............................................................................ 115
Emails With Cbs Atlanta’s Jeff Chirico....................................................................................... 127
 Chapter 1
T h e Wa r o n t h e F u n d a m e n t a l
L i b e r t y I n t e r e s t o f F i t Pa r e n t s

T
here was a war on parental rights and that war was won. We, the American People, weren’t aware. The
American people remain unaware and parents who have their children with them only pity parents
like me who don’t. They don’t realize that their rights have also been clandestinely, unconstitutionally
abolished.
Grandparents didn’t think that we, fit parents, should have a liberty interest to our children anymore.
They wanted the fit parent’s liberty interest to change from so long as we are fit, we’re entitled to care, custody,
management, companionship and control of our children, to so long as they have a relationship with our
children, we should be made to preserve their relationship.
Grandparents wanted our fitness out of the equation. They wanted us to be made to do what was “best” for
our children, but no longer wanted us to have the power to decide what that was. Not only that, grandparents
wanted to be declared the new initiating powers as to when, as they felt, a parent wasn’t acting in their child’s
“best” interests—as opposed to the state’s child protective agency. This was a “tall order” and the states
fulfilled that order, by enacting “grandparents’ rights” statutes.
Such enactments by the states is a monumental deviation from America’s concept of ordered liberty.1
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that, “No State shall…deprive any
person of… liberty…without due process of law…” The “liberty” 2 of the fit parent was defined by the people
as a whole, as so important that it must be declared fundamental, as without it there could be no justice nor
order.

1 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (U.S.Wash.,1997).
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that
the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,“deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,” id., at 503, 97 S.Ct., at 1938 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54
S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”),
and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937).
2 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). “…we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own...”

1
 Kyung Lee Trotter
It is only when states have been practicing something for so long that it cannot later be said that such
practice offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 However, never in our history has
it been tradition for the states to start practicing something repugnant to that which is already protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to overrun and eventually phase out a protected right, for the benefit
of a single group of people. Nevertheless, this is exactly what’s happened.

Troxel V. Granville, The Red Carpet For “Grandparents’ Rights”

At quick glance Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) appears to reconfirm the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of fit parents, but don’t be fooled. It actually laid out the “red carpet” for grandparents to drag fit
parents to court and take their children. Here’s what this case really says and what this Court really decided.
The Petitioners of Troxel v. Granville, were the grandparents of the minors Natalie Anne and Isabelle
Rose Troxel, born to Brad Troxel and their mother, the respondent of the petition, Tommie Granville. The
couple broke up in 1991. Thereafter, Brad would visit their children. During Brad’s visits his parents would
also visit with the children.
Sadly, Brad committed suicide in 1993. Thereafter, the grandparents, the Troxels, in spite of Tommie
Granville’s offer of visitation, felt that they should have much more visitation with Granville’s children. They
brought suit in a Washington state Court requesting such increase in visitation. The state Superior Court
judge granted their request pursuant to Washington’s statute § 26.10.160(3) which merely says:
“…Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to,
custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best
interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances…”
Tommie Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s decision
and dismissed the Troxels’ action.
The Troxels appealed and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. It
found that § 26.10.160(3) (1) impermissibly interfered (2) “…with parents’ fundamental interest in care,
custody and companionship of their children…”
The Troxels then filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court. It affirmed the Washington Supreme
Court’s decision holding that the Washington statute was (1) breathtakingly broad (2) unconstitutional “as
applied” (3) and an unconstitutional infringement upon Granville’s fundamental liberty interest to her
children.
Both Courts mixed “apples with oranges”. When a Court speaks of a statute being “impermissible”
or having “sweeping breadth,” it’s an indication that the Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine to a
challenged statute.
The overbreadth doctrine is a standard of review used to assess the validity of a statute which affects
a person’s rights under the First Amendment. A statute that sweeps too broadly, as in “sweeps up” not

3 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31, 43 S.Ct. 9, 9-10, 67 L.Ed. 107 (1922) (“If a thing has been practised for two hundred
years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it”)
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2269, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (U.S.Wash.,1997)

2
 NOT AT ALL
only expressions under the First Amendment that present a clear and present danger,4 but also restricts a
substantial amount of forms of expressions that don’t, will be found by the reviewing Court as overbroad.5
Such a statute has a ratio of impermissible restrictions of forms of expressions, which substantially outweighs
those activities which the state has a legitimate interest in regulating, to protect the public.”6 Subsequently,
the reviewing Court will declare an overbroad statute wholly or facially invalid and strike it down in its
entirety7. The burden to show that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or may not be applied in any
permissible manner, is on the challenger.8
If the state legislature can rewrite an overbroad statute into a narrower version which will only regulate
the activity which falls under its legitimate public interest, then it may only be challenged “as applied” to an
individual challenger’s set of circumstances.9 A reviewing judiciary is only to interpret the constitutionality
of the statute or lack thereof. Rewriting the statute to a narrowly drawn version is the duty of the state’s
legislature.10
The overbreadth doctrine is limited to statutory challenges within the context of the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment.11 It is not the balancing test applied when state action threatens a fundamental

4 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).

5 New York v. Ferber, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3362, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (U.S.N.Y.,1982) “…a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth
unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications…” See also: Michael A. Inman, Constitutional Law-Clear
and Present Danger Test Applied to Overbroad Unlawful Assembly Statute. Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d
477 (1971), 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/12 “...overbreadth
may be conceptualized as legislative failure to focus explicitly and narrowly on social harms which are the valid concern of
government and are the justification for interfering with expressive activities.”…Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 859 (1970)…Is the statute too sweeping in its coverage?...”
6 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (U.S.Okl. 1973) “…we believe that the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep…”
7 U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) “…According to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially
invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.
8 U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (U.S.N.Y.,1987). A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.”
9 Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (C.A.9 (Cal.),1998). “…An as-applied challenge contends that the law is
unconstitutional as applied to the litigant’s particular speech activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application
to others…
10 U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (U.S.,2010) We “ ‘will not rewrite a ... law to conform it to constitutional requirements,’ ” id.,
at 884–885, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d
782 (1988); omission in original), for doing so would constitute a “ serious invasion of the legislative domain,” United States
v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 479, n. 26, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995), and sharply diminish Congress’s
“incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place,” Osborne, 495 U.S., at 121, 110 S.Ct. 1691. To read § 48 as the
Government desires requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation. See also: Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 638 (1971)
“It is the function of the judiciary to interpret statutes. Rewriting them is the function of the legislature”. citing. Caldwell v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 459, 94 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1956).
11 U.S. v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (U.S.N.Y.,1987) “…we have not recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v. Martin, supra, at 269, n. 18, 104 S.Ct., at 2412, n. 18. See also:

3
 Kyung Lee Trotter
liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional standard of review for a
challenged statute which threatens a fit parent’s fundamental liberty interest in her children is strict scrutiny.
Under this balancing test, the state has the burden—not the challenger—to prove that it has a “narrowly
tailored compelling interest,” which invokes its power as parens patriae, to do what is best for the parent’s
children. If the state cannot meet its burden, then the state may not infringe the liberty interest at all. 12
Notwithstanding that both Courts applied a doctrine that is not constitutionally applied to a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Amendment, both Courts found this statute facially
invalid. With such overbreadth test, that should have been the end of the review—albeit still the wrong
standard of review. However, it wasn’t. Instead, both Courts proceeded to take on the role as state legislature
and rewrite the statute. This is why both Courts applied the unconstitutional doctrine, so both would have an
opportunity to narrow the statute, an opportunity which would not exist under the strict scrutiny standard
of review.

The Washington And U.S. Supreme Courts Rewrote § 26.10.160(3)

All three appellate Courts construed what they thought the state legislature meant to write. The Washington
Court of Appeals focused on the “any person at any time” verbiage and declared that the legislature must
have forgotten to amend what either term meant.13 It claimed that it had to construe the language of the
statute with its literal meaning, however, where the statute would “lead to an absurd result,” it had the power
to construe what the legislature’s true intent was.14
The Washington Supreme Court came behind this Court and punted that claim. It declared that the
Court must construe the statute literally, as in, the statute meant exactly what it said and gave an extensive
history of the verbiage of the statute never changing whether under §26.09.240 or § 26.10.160, over a period
of several legislative sessions and approximately four decades.15 “Nevertheless,” it too defined what the
state’s legislative intent was but focused more on construing which state authority it meant, may abridge the
fundamental liberty interest of the parent.16

Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)”…Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling
of protected expression…”
12 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (U.S.Wash.,1997). “…the Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the
government to infringe ... ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 507 U.S., at 302, 113 S.Ct., at 1447. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children
and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 815 (C.A.11 (Fla.),2004). Laws that burden the exercise of a fundamental right require strict
scrutiny and are sustained only if narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388, 98 S.Ct. 673, 682, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d
600 (1969). (rev’d on other grounds) See also: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct.
412, 417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).
13 In re Wolcott, 85 Wash.App. 468 (1997).
14 Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963)
15 In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 1-13 (1998).
16 Meyer, at 399.

4
 NOT AT ALL
It construed that the legislature meant that the state, in its police power, may “intrude upon the private
realm of the family”17 and order visitation to grandparents. It hinged this claim on Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) based upon the state having the power to compel a parent to have his children
vaccinated. The case cited in Prince on page 166 concerning such compulsory vaccination, was Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). This case concerned a criminal statute, whereby the appellant claimed
that he should not be forced to comply with such a very spelled out, criminal statute—unlike the Washington
statute which was at issue in Troxel.18 The United States Supreme Court held that his liberty in his person,
was not absolute where such liberty would endanger the health of the community. In other words, although
he did have a constitutional right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, that private interest did not
hold up against the interest of the state to protect the Commonwealth, and his liberty didn’t entitle him to
infect those around him with smallpox. He willfully violated this law well within the rights of the state’s
police power to protect the safety of the community and as such he was arrested, jailed and his conviction
was upheld. The Washington statute at issue in Troxel v. Granville wasn’t a criminal statute, narrowly drawn
to protect the public from ill health, nor was Tommie Granville accused of committing such a crime.
The Washington Supreme Court also cited Prince, supra, itself as a basis to “intrude upon the family
life,” as in, the fundamental liberty interest of the parent, with its police power. In Prince, the mother had
had her child in the street proselytizing pamphlets for her and her child’s Jehovah’s Witness religious faith.
Massachusetts again, had very spelled out criminal statutes.19 Contrary to the Washington Supreme Court’s

17 In Re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 15 (1998). “…A parent’s constitutionally protected right to rear his or her children
without state interference, has been recognized as a fundamental “liberty” interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment…
Where a fundamental right is involved, state interference is justified only if the state can show that it has a compelling interest
and such interference is narrowly drawn to meet only the compelling state interest involved … In answering whether the
state visitation statutes at issue serve a compelling state interest we must understand the sources of state power to intrude on
family life. The state may act pursuant to its authority to protect citizens from injuries inflicted by third persons or to protect
its citizens from threats to health and safety. Thus, in the context of family life, the state’s police power gives it the authority…”
18 Rev.Laws, c. 75, § 137, authorizes the board of health of a city or town, if, in its discretion, it is necessary for the public health,
to require the vaccination and revaccination of all of the inhabitants thereof, and requires them to provide means of free
vaccination, and declares that whoever, being over 21 years of age, and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply
with such requirement, shall forfeit $5. Held, that such act was a valid exercise of police power as defined by M.G.L.A. Const.
c. 1, § 1, art. 4.
19 Prince, supra at 159. Sections 80 and 81 form parts of Massachusetts’ comprehensive child labor law.3 They provide methods
for enforcing the prohibitions of Section 69, which is as follows:
‘No boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or
any other articles of merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any
street or public place.’
Section 80 and 81, so far as pertinent, read:
‘Whoever furnishes or sells to any minor any article of any description with the knowledge that the minor intends to sell
such article in violation of any provision of sections sixty-nine to seventy-three, inclusive, or after having received written
notice to this effect from any officer charged with the enforcement thereof, or knowingly procures or encourages any minor
to violate any provisions of said sections, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars
or by imprisonment for not more than two months, or both.’ (Section 80)‘Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor
under his control who compels or permits such minor to work in violation of any provision of sections sixty to seventy-four,

5
 Kyung Lee Trotter
claim, the Prince Court rested its finding on the fact that what Prince’s child had done was a sale,20 as
thoroughly defined in the statutes at issue and that her claim of a Fourteenth Amendment protection to train
her child in her religion, was actually contained in the First Amendment’s freedom of religion.21 As such, the
Court found that the state, in its police power, had the authority to limit her freedom of religion, insofar as it
involved her allowing a girl under eighteen, to sell religious pamphlets on a public street.22 In both of these
cases, the state of Massachusetts had exercised its police power to protect the safety of the community and
the child, respectively.
Justice Murphy, however, wrote a very strong dissent against the Prince Court as to when the state may
exercise its police power in the context of freedom of religion and insisted that this case was not about child
labor. Prince was decided in the early 1940s, at a time when the Jehovah’s Witness faith was being persecuted
from many different angles.23 Justice Murphy expressed that perhaps such persecution didn’t end at the door
of the highest court. In his dissent he expressed that the Prince Court reduced a freedom of religion question
to mere child labor law and had this Court applied the constitutional clear and present danger test, it could
not have made its decision based upon hypothetical “evils.” In the context of freedom of religion under the
First Amendment, the state may not restrict the expression, unless “such a practice constitutes a grave and
immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child.” “The evils must be grave,
immediate, substantial.”24

inclusive, shall for a first offence be punished by a fine of not less than two nor more than ten dollars or by imprisonment for
not more than five days, or both.’ (Section 81)
20 Prince, Id. at 170. “…The court’s opinion said: ‘The judge could find that if a passerby should hand over five cents in accordance
with the sign on the bag and should receive a magazine in return, a sale would be effected. The judge was not required to accept
the defendant’s characterization of that transaction as a ‘contribution.’ He could believe that selling the literature played a
more prominent part in the enterprise than giving it away. He could find that the defendant furnished the magazines to Betty,
knowing that the latter intended to sell them, if she could, in violation of section 69. The judge could find that the defendant
permitted Betty to ‘work’ in violation of section 81…”
21 Id. “…The due process claim, as made and perhaps necessarily, extends no further than that to freedom of religion, since in the
circumstances all that is comprehended in the former is included in the latter…”
22 Id. “… (W)e cannot say that the evils at which the statutes were directed attendant upon the selling by children of newspapers,
magazines, periodicals, and other merchandise in streets and public places do not exist where the publications are of a religious
nature.’…”W)e cannot say that the evils at which the statutes were directed attendant upon the selling by children of newspapers,
magazines, periodicals, and other merchandise in streets and public places do not exist where the publications are of a religious
nature.’ 313 Mass. 223, 227, 228, 46 N.E.2d 755, 757.
23 Sergey Tokarev, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Religious Liberty, Civil liberties, July 19, 2012, http://uscivilliberties.org/themes/3992-
jehovahs-witnesses-and-religious-liberty.html
24 Prince v. Massachusetts, 64 S.Ct. 438, 446, 321 U.S. 158, 173 (U.S. 1944). In dealing with the validity of statutes which directly
or indirectly infringe religious freedom and the right of parents to encourage their children in the practice of a religious belief,
we are not aided by any strong presumption of the constitutionality of such legislation. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed. 1234, note 4. On the contrary, the human freedoms enumerated in the
First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt
to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid. It follows that any restriction or prohibition must be justified by those
who deny that the freedoms have been unlawfully invaded. The burden was therefore on the state of Massachusetts to prove
the reasonableness and necessity of prohibiting children from engaging in religious activity of the type involved in this case…
Id. at 174. If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there

6
 NOT AT ALL
The clear and present danger test confines the state, as Justice Murphy explained, to proving its interest
in protecting the public from the same.25 Before restricting freedom of religion, the child must have been
exposed to clear and present danger.26 Therefore, “harm” to the child, in Prince was actually clear and present
danger.
That’s actually a much higher burden for the state to meet than weighing its interest against a private interest
in a due process test.27 I mean, we’re not talking about the comfort or convenience of the public, whereby
First Amendment expression may be restricted by the state based on the restrictions’ “reasonableness.”28
The U.S Supreme Court, in Troxel, said that the state “impermissibly” interfered, and that “harm” needed
to be narrowly drawn into the statute. In such First Amendment context, “harm” isn’t left to arbitrary state
definition. Prior precedent of this Court says it’s clear and present danger.
As far as the Washington Supreme Court’s claim that Prince, supra at 166, defines the “private realm
of the family,” such is referring to the mother’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct the education and
upbringing of her child and her child’s freedom to receive such training. Prince cites three cases: West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, to support such fundamental liberty interests and solidifies that the
state may not encroach upon such interests. It was upon these findings that it defined the private realm of the
family, which the state could not enter.29 Such was a definition as to when the state as parens patriae, could

must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health,
morals or welfare of the child. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186…The
state, in my opinion, has completely failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or immediate danger to
any interest which it may lawfully protect… Id. at 174-175. It is claimed… that such activity was likely to affect adversely the
health, morals and welfare of the child. Reference is made in the majority opinion to ‘the crippling effects of child employment,
more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of
the street.’ To the extent that they flow from participation in ordinary commercial activities, these harms are irrelevant to
this case. And the bare possibility that such harms might emanate from distribution of religious literature is not, standing
alone, sufficient justification for restricting freedom of conscience and religion. Nor can parents or guardians be subjected
to criminal liability because of vague possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child. The evils
must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193, 86 L.Ed. 192.
25 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93-95 (1949).
26 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
27 Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 S.Ct. 448, 457, 336 U.S. 77, 93-94 (U.S. 1949). “…West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674: ‘The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears *94 when the specific prohibitions of
the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due
process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a ‘rational basis’ for adopting.
But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.’…”
28 National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 349 (1963).
29 Prince, supra at 166-167. The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and
to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing
it, have had recognition here, most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178.
Previously in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained the

7
 Kyung Lee Trotter
not infringe the fundamental liberty interests of the parent or the child. There was no such finding here, that
the state could “intrude upon” the fundamental liberty interests, in its police power.
As the Prince case goes on to explain that the family was not beyond regulation, it meant that even
though the aforesaid cases prevented the state from encroaching upon the parent’s rights, parents still had to
send their children to school. It was the parent’s duty to educate the child and the child’s right to be educated
and such duty was owed to the child and the community. The state as parens patriae may compel the parent
to perform his or her duty as a parent.30 The statute at issue in State v. Bailey, Id., was also a criminal statute.
So not only did this parent neglect the needs of his child, a rightful invocation of the state’s parens patriae
authority, he also violated a criminal statute. He too, was jailed for his criminal violation and his conviction
was upheld.
The final case offered to support the “intrusion upon the family claim” in the context of not being beyond
the state’s regulation is a case wherein a business enterprise had employed a minor under sixteen years of age,
in violation of its state statute prohibiting such employment. The child sued for injuries he had sustained and
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling in favor of the child. Here again, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the state was well within its right to prohibit employment of minors in a hazardous environment and
such did not contravene Fourteenth Amendment rights.31
With the exception of the suit for damages, all of the statutes at issue were criminal statutes. People
went to jail. Such were crimes committed and the two involving children were crimes committed against
their children. In both instances where a parent and his or her child were involved, the parents had either
subjected their children to an unsafe environment or neglected to care for the child, so much so, that both
parents were thrown in jail and their convictions were upheld as not repugnant to the Constitution. Even if
the statute at issue in Prince was one restricting freedom of religion, it would have no doubt been a criminal
statute or ordinance consisting of some sort of fine or jail time as a punishment. None of these cases were

parent’s authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child’s right to receive it, as against the state’s requirement
of attendance at public schools. And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children’s
rights to receive teaching in languages other than the nation’s common tongue were guarded against the state’s encroachment.
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra.
And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter. But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (Abrogated by Romer v.
Evans, U.S.Colo., May 20, 1996). And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard
the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control…The right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health
or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243, 63 L.R.A. 187, 98 Am.St.Rep. 666.13 …But it is said the state cannot
do so here. This, first, because when state action impinges upon a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless shown to be
necessary for or conducive to the child’s protection against some clear and present danger, cf. Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470; and, it is added, there was no such showing here…”See also, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,
585 (U.S.Ga.,1979).
30 State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (1901).
31 Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 34 S.Ct. 60, 61, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (U.S. 1913)

8
 NOT AT ALL
within the context of family law—except for the ones defining the true nature of the private realm of the
family—and none involved a bare-boned statute.
Tommie Granville was never arrested, or accused of neglecting the duty she owed to her children, which
would have invoked the state’s parens patriae power. Nor had she placed her children in an unsafe, public
environment, which would have invoked the state’s police power. The circumstances of Troxel v. Granville in
no way mirrored the circumstances of these cases.
Moreover, notwithstanding that the overbreadth doctrine is the wrong standard, whether it or the due
process test is required, both require that a statute be narrowly drawn or narrowly tailored, respectively.
After finding the Washington state statute § 26.10.160(3) to be “breathtakingly broad” and admitting
that Washington declined to narrow it, instead of striking it down, the U.S. Supreme Court also rewrote the
statute for Washington. Again, the United States Supreme Court isn’t in the business of writing statutes for
the states.32 Tommie Granville pointed that out.33 The Court chose to ignore this argument and rewrite it
anyway.
In rewriting the statute, the Court instructed that Washington establish a rebuttable presumption of the
fit parent’s ability to do what is best for her child and insert a threshold of “harm or potential harm.”34
It instructed that before overriding the decision of a fit parent regarding her child, that the state should
merely “give special weight” to her fundamental right to make the decision.35
It found that the state Court’s action was “nothing more than a simple disagreement between the court
and Granville concerning her children’s best interests”-as if it would have some kind of standing should it
disagree with the decision of a fit parent.
It then declared that it found no need to discuss a “precise” due process.36
At the conclusion of recomposing this statute, it then proclaimed that at that point the statute was only
unconstitutional “as applied” to Granville.37 A statute, under the overbreadth doctrine, cannot be facially
invalid and unconstitutional as applied.38
It is not the United States Supreme Court’s job to rewrite a statute, claim it then may be applied
constitutionally to more people than not, and then declare that as to the challenger, after the Court rewrote
it, that it’s only unconstitutional “as applied.” This Court, by rewriting the statute, seriously invaded the

32 U.S. v. Stevens, supra at 481; Owens v. Commonwealth, supra at 638

33 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari , (pg. 11). “…This Court is not in the business of providing parameters for
third party visitation statutes, yet that is what answering the societal questions posed by petitioners would require it to do…”
34 Troxel, at 57
35 Id, at 68
36 Troxel, at 58
37 Id, at 68
38 Troxel, supra at 81. “…In response to Tommie Granville’s federal constitutional challenge, the State Supreme Court broadly
held that Wash. Rev.Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp.1996) was invalid on its face under the Federal Constitution. Despite the
nature of this judgment, Justice O’Connor would hold that the Washington visitation statute violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment only as applied. Ante, at 2059–2060, 2060–2061, 2064 (plurality opinion). I agree with Justice
SOUTER, ante, at 2065–2066, and n. 1 (opinion concurring in judgment), that this approach is untenable…”

9
 Kyung Lee Trotter
legislative domain and sharply diminished Congress’s “incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first
place.”39
Such an exercise of power by the Washington Supreme Court, which was to reinterpret what the “liberty”
of the parent is and determine anew, which state power may infringe the right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, was an exercise of power no state Supreme Court has. Since when do state Supreme Courts
reinterpret the U.S. Constitution for the United States Supreme Court and since when does the U.S. Supreme
Court subordinate itself to such backwards “confoolery”—let alone affirm it?
The Troxel Court, while supposedly abandoning the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court,
simultaneously adopted the new process of narrowing the “breathtakingly broad” statute and adding a
“threshold of ‘harm’.” I don’t see how embracing the solution can abandon the process by which the lower
Court came to the solution. The Troxel Court mentions nothing about “intruding” or police power. However,
as this Court indeed embraced the Washington Court’s findings, it actually affirmed that if grandparents
want visitation under the state’s police power, they’ve got to prove a clear and present danger to the child.

The True Federal Question

Notwithstanding the actual issue, which is the bareness of this statute, the true federal question was:
Did the Washington Superior Court judge, pursuant to Washington’s state statute § 26.10.160(3), abridge
Tommie Granville’s liberty interest to her children, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, without due process, when the Court granted visitation to the Troxels?
What the Troxels actually asked in their so-called federal question was literally, did the Washington
Supreme Court err in finding that parental rights were “unassailable” by grandparents or other third party
relatives?
It’s interesting that they used such a word because that is exactly what this Court provided to
grandparents—the power to attack us, put us on trial and make us fight them for our constitutional rights. It
stripped us of our rights, stripped us of our protection under the Due Process Clause, and made it so we have
to defend ourselves and our children against a new, single fact-finding process to find “harm” and however
each particular state has defined what that “harm” is.
Let’s peel away all of the “gloobiddy-glop” and reveal what this statute really says.
§ 26.10.160(3): “…The court may order visitation, [to people who are not parents], when visitation may
serve the best interest of the child…”
That’s it. It contains no state interest, thus no authority, and no process to achieve the interest—and in
Granville’s circumstances, the process due, which would have been revealed, had the Washington and the
U.S. Supreme Courts applied the strict scrutiny test, was the fitness standard.
The state may not “intrude” anywhere.40 If it intends to exercise its police power to restrict how a parent
exercises her First Amendment rights with her child, in public, it may only do so to protect the child or
the public from clear and present danger. If it intends to exercise its parens patriae power it may do so in

39 U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 supra at 481

40 Prince, supra at 166-167.

10
 NOT AT ALL
circumstances of neglect—at least according to the cases referred to in Prince. In essence, pursuant to the
cases the Washington Supreme Court cited, the state’s choices to override the decision of the parent are:
proving an interest in protecting the child or the public from ill health, death,41 clear and present danger,42
or neglect.43 The Washington statute asserted none of these interests and again, I don’t see how granting
visitation to grandparents, would achieve any of them.

The Process Due To The Parent’s Liberty Interest

Washington state’s stance plummeted, on both ends, parens patriae and police power. This state had not
advanced an interest, at all. That being said, there were only two interests involved in Troxel v. Granville: that
of the state as parens patriae and that of the parent.
Once the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged the fit parent’s liberty interest, it had a duty to apply
the strict scrutiny standard of review, the constitutional standard to apply when a state statute threatens a
fundamental right.44 The state of Washington would not have passed that test. As it had not asserted any
interest, much less a narrowly tailored one, it was upon this failure that this Court had a duty to declare its
statute unconstitutional—and that is why it did not. Had this Court applied this test, it would have revealed
the constitutional truth, about every last states’ grandparents’ “rights” statutes—that none would pass this
test. Grandparents don’t have any “rights”—not in these United States’ Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court took another route to support its claim that the fit parent’s liberty interest was
merely a right to privacy within his or her family against the state’s police power,45 but ironically, it cited the
very case and very page that explicitly states that the best interests standard is not the constitutional standard
to apply between fit parents and third parties.46 This standard may only, constitutionally, be applied between
two fit parents.
Grandparents may wish for the “liberty” of the Fourteenth Amendment to include that of extended
family to their minor relatives, so that they may challenge the fit parent, as if they too are fit parents, but

41 Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, supra

42 Kovacs v. Cooper, supra at 93-95
43 State v. Bailey, supra.
44 Washington v. Glucksberg, supra at 721 (U.S.Wash.,1997); Reno, supra at 302, Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family
Services, supra at 815. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, supra at 388; Shapiro v. Thompson supra at 634, (rev’d on other grounds) See
also: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, supra at
216; Bates v. Little Rock, supra at 524; Sherbert v. Verner, supra at 406.
45 In Re: Custody of Smith, at 15.
46 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-304 (1993). The best interests of the child: ”a venerable phrase familiar from divorce
proceedings, is a…proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody.
But it is not traditionally the sole criterion—much less the sole constitutional criterion—for other, less narrowly channeled
judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others. Even if it were
shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best provide for the child’s welfare, the child
would nonetheless not be removed from the custody of its parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately.” See
also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 555, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978). Similarly, “the best interests of the child”
is not the legal standard that governs parents’… exercise of their custody…”

11
 Kyung Lee Trotter
the fact remains that there is no such “liberty” defined this way by this Court. Subsequently, not only do
grandparents not have standing to challenge a fit parent, pursuant to a best interest standard, neither does
the state. 47
Likewise, as much as grandparents would like the Constitution to say that it is their relationship with a
fit parent’s child that determines the process due to a parent, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment it is
not. It is the precise function of the state and the private interest which will be affected by the state’s action.48
However close a grandparent is to a fit parent’s child, the precise function of the state, which is that as parens
patriae and the due process it takes to trigger its power, has not changed.
When a state enacts a statute by which it will have the power as parens patriae, to override the liberty
interest of a parent, the state is subjected to the highest standard of review, again, the strict scrutiny test.49
The state has the burden to prove that the statute passes the test, unlike the overbreadth doctrine where the
challenger has the burden and the state has the leeway to simply narrow the statute. In order to pass the test,
the state must assert its compelling interest which necessitates that it exercise its parens patriae power to
abridge the parent’s liberty interest. As such interest is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it must prove that the means by which it will achieve its compelling interest, comports with
the process due to a parent, before an infringement takes place. Without this narrowly tailored compelling
interest, or passing this test, again, the state is forbidden from infringing the liberty interest at all.50
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748, 760-760 has already laid out, the two-step process due to a parent
before the state may infringe his or her liberty interest to do what is “best” for the parent’s child.51 It is only
when the state has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is no longer capable of deciding

47 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-601 (1982). [The parens patriae] “…concept does
not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot represent
themselves. In fact, if nothing more than this is involved-i.e., if the State is only a nominal party without a real interest of its
own-then it will not have standing under the parens patriae doctrine. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 96 S.Ct.
2333, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 58 S.Ct. 954, 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938); *601 Oklahoma
v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 277, 31 S.Ct. 434, 55 L.Ed. 465 (1911).
48 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972)”…‘(t)he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation’ and firmly established that ‘what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.’…” Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers
Union etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (U.S.N.Y.,1982). “Nature of process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns
on balancing of private interests affected by proceedings; risk of error created by state’s chosen procedure; and countervailing
governmental interest supporting use of challenged procedure.” U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
49 Washington v. Glucksberg, supra at 721; Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, supra at, 815 . See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, supra at 388, ; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 634 (rev’d on other grounds) See also: Skinner v. Oklahoma,
supra at 541; Korematsu v. United States, supra at 216; Bates v. Little Rock, supra at 524, Sherbert v. Verner, supra at 406.
50 Washington v. Glucksberg, supra at 721
51 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982). “The State bifurcates its…proceeding into “factfinding” and “dispositional”
hearings…”Id. at 760-761 (1982)At the factfinding [stage], the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are
adversaries…”“…After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the
dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge…But until the State proves parental

12
 NOT AT ALL
what is best for his or her child, in other words, when the parent is unfit.52 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
650-51 (1972) echoed the exact same thing.53 As such, no state shall abridge the fundamental liberty interest,
of the parent, without this due process. 54 The state may not skip over the first step or concoct some other
way that it deems fair in order to abridge the liberty interest.55
The fit parent doesn’t have to share his or her protected right to make decisions for his or her children
with anybody—least of all the state. That being said, there are no “disagreements” between fit parents and
judges. It’s not a joint project. It’s an inalienable right of the fit parent. There’s no “weighing” of what the
parent thinks is best versus what the state thinks. Nor is the liberty interest of the fit parent some stand-alone
presumption, rebuttable with a sole best interests standard. Most importantly, NO, the state may not invade
the homes of fit parents—with its police power—and make decisions for their children.

The U.S. Supreme Court Deliberately Avoided

A Collision With Strict Scrutiny

In advancing its use of the overbreadth doctrine in a review of a statute that threatened a fundamental
liberty interest, the U.S. Supreme Court left out key parts of the cases it cited, which would have implicated
strict scrutiny, in its holding such as its Washington v. Glucksberg citation: “..(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause has a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772…

unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.
Thus,… at the factfinding [stage], the interests of the child and his natural parents coincide...”
52 Id at 761-765 (U.S.N.Y.,1982) U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
53 Stanley v. Illinois, supra at 650-651.“…The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection…”
54 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
55 Santosky, supra at 755-757. The “minimum requirements [of procedural due process] being a matter of federal law, they are
not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the
preconditions to adverse official action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1262, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). See also
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1155–1156, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). Moreover, the degree
of proof required in a particular type of proceeding “is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary
to resolve.” Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284, 87 S.Ct. 483, 487, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966).8 “In cases involving individual rights,
whether criminal or civil, ‘[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’ ”
(citations omitted). This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—“clear and convincing evidence”—when
the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both “particularly important” and “more substantial than mere loss
of money.”(citations omitted)…the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a
variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with “a significant deprivation of liberty”
or “stigma.” 441 U.S., at 425, 426, 99 S.Ct., at 1808, 1809. See, e. g., Addington v. Texas, supra (civil commitment); Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S., at 285, 87 S.Ct., at 487 (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S.Ct. 147, 149, 5 L.Ed.2d
120 (1960) (denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1336, 1353, 87 L.Ed. 1796
(1943) (denaturalization).

13
 Kyung Lee Trotter
This page actually says:

“…The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the “liberty” it protects includes
more than the absence of physical restraint. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct.
1061, 1068-1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (Due Process Clause “protects individual liberty against
‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them’
”) (quoting *720 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)).
The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1446-
1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Casey, 505 U.S., at 851, 112 S.Ct., at 2806-2807. In a long line of cases,
we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty”
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right; to direct the…upbringing of one’s
children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)…”

It especially left out what page 721 states: “…As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth
Amendment “forbids the government to infringe ... ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter
what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” 507 U.S., at 302, 113 S.Ct., at 1447.

This Court tailored the actual verbiage of the cases purposely omitting what would reveal that it had a
duty to apply the Strict Scrutiny standard of review.
It then replaced what the case actually said with what it claims Stanley v. Illinois was about, claiming that
the Stanley Court declared the liberty interest of the fit father in that case was to only to “make decisions
concerning” the care, custody, and control of his children.56
It cited page 651 but somehow missed page 650. Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 405 U.S. 645,
650-51 (U.S.Ill. 1972).

“…In considering this procedure under the Due Process Clause, we recognize, as we have in other
cases, that due process of law does not require a hearing ‘in every conceivable case of government
impairment of private interest.’ (citation omitted)…‘(t)he very nature of due process negates any concept
of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation’ and firmly established that
‘what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action.’ (citations omitted). The private interest here, that of a
man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children ‘come(s) to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’

56 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551. Pp. 2059–2060.

14
 NOT AT ALL
As one can clearly read the finding in Stanley was that the fit parent has an “interest in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children”—not to “make decisions concerning” the same. In
other words the father in Stanley wasn’t fighting to “make decisions” for his children. The issue was that the
state had taken his children. How could he make decisions for his children that were gone? Fully disclosing
the true nature of this decision, specifically, the actual interest of the parent and especially that absent a
“power countervailing interest” the state has a duty to protect this interest, again, would have revealed that
this Court should have been applying the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Obviously this Court took care to carefully omit the true liberty interest of the parent and the fact that
the state may not infringe such without a narrowly tailored compelling interest. It did so in furtherance of its
application of an unconstitutional standard of review and finding that the state of Washington merely had to
cure overbreadth as it would in the context of the First Amendment, and the state’s police power.
With this obviously, deceptive decision the war against the fit parent’s fundamental liberty interest was
won. It gave grandparents exactly what they asked for. It ordained them the new “initiators” under a best
interests of the child standard, and then left it up to the states to determine what the new process would be--
“in the visitation context”—as if such is separate from the parent’s liberty interest. The Washington Supreme
Court made the ridiculous argument that the states may “intrude into the family” with its police power.57
However, the actuality is it isn’t the state that initiates these actions; it is the grandparents themselves. This
is precisely what the Troxels argued for—and the U.S. Supreme Court granted it to them! Petition at 11: “In
grandparent and third party visitation cases, the grandparent or the third party initiates the ‘intervention’
[encroachment]… The state does not initiate these actions… This issue has not been squarely before this
Court. The boundary line should be drawn under the facts of this case… ”
The “issue” as in who has the power to act as parens patriae, dates all the way back to the “King’s Bench,”
at least as far back as the seventeenth century. Such has evolved in American jurisprudence as the “supreme
power of every state.”58 The Troxels actually argued that such power, which has been inherent in our
government from England to America for four hundred years, should be ordained to them—and the Court’s
decision granted them such power. The Court made a law that grandparents may initiate actions as they
deem will serve the best interests of the child. It left the states as the composers of legislation, but eliminated
the state’s requirement to assert and narrowly tailor a compelling interest. As it stands, grandparents and
other third parties—but mainly grandparents—have the power to initiate judicial actions to infringe the fit
parent’s liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As they are the new
initiators now they, instead of the state, have the burden under a mere, sole, best interest standard, to prove
that the state should exercise its police power to abridge the fit parent’s right to direct the upbringing of his
or her child.

57 In Re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1 (1998).

58 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, supra at 600 (1982).
At a fairly early date, American courts recognized this common-law concept, but now in the form of a legislative prerogative:
“This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State… lodged in the legislature [and] is a most
beneficent function ... often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves.” Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57, 10 S.Ct. 792, 808, 34 L.Ed. 481 (1890)

15
 Kyung Lee Trotter
In other words, this Court wrote a law which overruled Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-304 (1993),
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972), and
especially, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) and as a matter of fact, in overruling the same, it
declared that fit parents no longer have any liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, against the
state as parens patriae. Yet amazingly, these cases are still very much “good law.”
I guess our rights may only be assailed and infringed without due process “in the visitation context.” Well
guess what there is no “visitation context” provided by any prior precedent of this Court or any part of the
United States Constitution. The right is to establish a home and direct the upbringing of our children and
such encompasses the right to decide whether and when third parties may visit with our children.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirming false constitutional claims so that a protected, liberty interest may be
attacked without protection, suggests that the integrity of even our highest court, is impaired. Notice, despite
its unconstitutional “as applied” instructions, not another single “grandparents ‘rights’” statute has been
back before this Court in fifteen years. I highly doubt that an entire country of fit mothers and fathers and
seasoned attorneys have simply capitulated to this willful dereliction of duty and engagement of snatching
the very foundation upon which our country was built upon—from under us.
Had this Court applied the constitutional standard of review which is strict scrutiny, this preposterous,
slap in the face to the history of America’s government, the fit parent’s most basic human right, and what we
hold dear to preserve the concept of ordered liberty, would have never seen the light of day. Who gave this
Court this kind of power to go against what the People have regarded as fundamental, as well as a century
of prior precedent?
This Court is the People’s Court. We pay it—unless there’s something we don’t know— to uphold our
rights, especially those which are inalienable. This Court did not have the privilege to select another standard
of review, in order to advance what state legislations feel the Supreme Law of the Land should be, or what
one particular group of people desire to freight-train it into. Its concern—its job—wasn’t to rewrite a statute
to comport with some “bleeding heart” explanation about a “changing demographic.” Its job was to interpret
the Constitution.

16
 Chapter 2
T h e Tr u e Fa c t s O f Tr o t t e r V. A y r e s ,
315 Ga. App. 7 (2012)

M
y daughter’s paternal grandparents first attacked my rights in the state of Virginia, pursuant to
its Grandparents’ visitation statute, Va. Code § 20-124.2B when I filed for a divorce from my
husband in 2002. Whereas I thought that I could file the uncontested divorce that he and I had
agreed upon, whereby I would have physical custody, he would pay child support so as not to break him
financially, and neither of us would seek spousal support, his parents had other ideas. When my husband
decided that he no longer wanted the divorce, they took advantage of his delicate emotional state. They
“intervened” into the divorce under the guise of wanting visitation when in actuality, they had hoped that
the judge would award them custody, as a judge had the power to do so in his discretion, under the same
statute. It was at this point that I was introduced to the term “three-way-contested” divorce. From there I
learned that I not only had to fight my husband for custody of my daughter; I had to fight his parents too.
Soon, I will provide the procedural history of my now thirteen-year plight. However, right now, allow me
to explain the event that culminated into me being robbed of my right to raise my child.
Before my then husband deployed to Kuwait, we had decided to separate and upon his return, get a divorce.
Our child, of course, remained behind with me. My then husband was going to Kuwait for approximately a
year. Within that time he started to write me asking for a reconciliation. However, I felt that we should stick
with what we had agreed upon, because our relationship had broken down beyond reconciliation. He didn’t
take that very well. As a result, he stopped contacting me—not even to check on our child.
He had been the sole manager of our finances. Therefore, I had no idea that we were in debt. I found out
as soon as he left and I began to struggle to catch up with our finances. I had to max out our credit cards. I
had to sell our precious possessions like gifts that were given to us, such as porcelain, crystal, anything—just
to keep the lights on, and anybody who’s lived in Virginia knows that Virginia Power doesn’t make deals
like Con-Edison. You either pay the whole bill or you end up in the dark. When valuable possessions to sell
ran out, I had to take out payday loans just to survive to my next paycheck. Every payday I was basically
re-borrowing my entire paycheck, less the costs of the loans. He didn’t send us a dime.
While he was gone, I allowed his parents to come to Virginia, pick up my daughter and take her to New
Jersey for visits. This happened probably three times throughout the entire time that her father was away.
On at least two occasions they called me and told me that due to their military missions, they were unable
to bring her back at the times we had set. I told myself that it was okay because they were her grandparents

17
 Kyung Lee Trotter
but deep down inside, I felt a little uneasy. I should have followed my gut. We also spent my child’s second
birthday and Christmas together. That was the extent of their relationship with my daughter at the time
My daughter’s father returned from his deployment with a “bang.” He never informed of his exact date
of return. One day as I was driving back into the gate of Fort Eustis, Virginia, my phone rang. It was him.
He only had one thing to say to me: “Come and say goodbye to your daughter.” It turned out that he gone to
the babysitter’s, retrieved our child and decided—without discussing anything with me—that he was taking
her with him to New Jersey for thirty days of leave. He had no clothes for her. Here’s where he involved his
parents.
I followed him to New Jersey to try to resolve the issue and explain to him that such irrational actions
couldn’t take place. We argued with his father present and his father began to mediate. In the end, his father
convinced me to let him have her for the thirty days and promised that, even if he had to hand-deliver her
back to me himself, that she would be returned. I agreed to this. I didn’t agree to be completely cut off from
her for the entire thirty days.
While I was staying with my parents in New York, I tried to call her several times, but her father would
not let me speak to her. I went out to visit her one day and found her acting not as her normal happy self, and
even noticed that her shoes were on the wrong feet. I had made an agreement and realizing that my husband
was no longer going to “play nice” in the divorce, I was cautious not to renege on that. Against my better
judgement I left her there for another week.
Again, the next week, the same thing. Every time I would call my husband would either hang up on me,
say something ugly and then hang up, or not answer the phone at all. Finally, I had had enough of him using
our daughter to hurt me. I decided that I was going to get her. I called his parents on their cell phones to let
them both know that things had changed and I would be coming to get my daughter as just a courtesy. They
were both aware of my plans.
The night my mom and I set out from New York to New Jersey, we ran into heavy traffic, as the New
Jersey Turnpike tends to have during rush-hour. As a result, we didn’t get to their house until about ten
o’clock p.m. Both of their vehicles were parked in their driveway. I rang their doorbell several times, but they
would not answer. So I drove up the street to the WaWa and called them from a payphone. My daughter’s
step-grandmother picked up the phone. When I asked why they wouldn’t answer their door she screamed,
“We are in the bed!” I let her know that she needed to get my child ready because I was coming back down
the street to get her. Her father was nowhere to be found.
My daughter’s grandfather answered the door and let us in. He offered us a seat. My mom sat, but by then
I was angry at the way her grandmother had just spoken to me. I preferred to stand. My baby emerged at the
top of the stairs, still wearing her pajamas. When I asked why she was still in pajamas, the argument between
her grandmother and I ensued. At some point she raised her finger, pointed at me and commanded “Don’t
you raise your voice to me!” I, being a grown-ass woman and there to retrieve my child, simply responded,
“I don’t have to.” With that, I picked my daughter up and left with her.
That was a Friday. Silly me, I chalked the situation up to a family spat, that we would soon get over and
things would return to normal. I had no idea the kind of evil, ruthless, people I was really dealing with.
By Monday morning I received the infamous “Word to Wise” email from my daughter’s grandfather. In
it, he painted me as coming to their home, kicking down their door and raising a raucous. He said that my

18
 NOT AT ALL
daughter left with a “look of horror” on her face, which was simply untrue. He depicted me as an incapable
mother, having to call on them constantly to help raise my daughter. He informed me that his wife had
contacted my commanding officer, and my CO, was really interested in the fact that I, a Sergeant at the time,
had supposedly kicked down the door of two commissioned officers. They were in the Air Force Reserves
and not on duty at the time the call was made. He ended this colorful, belligerent email with the assurance
that they were “not amused,” dot, dot, dot.
The next thing I knew, the uncontested divorce that I had filed was turned into contested. My husband
concocted grounds that I had abandoned him. His parents then “intervened” petitioning for visitation of my
daughter. My daughter’s grandfather, a lawyer, was obviously well aware that these “grandparents’ rights”
statutes were on the state law books, whereby grandparents could attack fit parents, irrespective of the
Fourteenth Amendment. With shock and awe, that is exactly what they did.
At the time I didn’t know that I was in check mate; I had nowhere to move on either side. On one side,
under the divorce and custody best interests standards, I had to battle my husband, the only other parent with
a constitutionally protected right to my daughter and on the other side, yet another best interests standard,
whereby I had to battle his parents. I had no idea that while I was battling my husband, the constitutional
way, that on the other side, my liberty interest to my daughter was being deprived, without due process.59
I was boxed in, at the total mercy of the state and its discretion alone, with no rights and protection. Even
if I had prevailed against my husband, the state could still take my daughter away and “award her” to her
grandparents. It was and is, a vicious, deliberate, lose/lose, setup.
My daughter’s paternal grandparents, with their “intervention”, were able to take over the whole divorce.
All my husband had to do was sit back with a smug smirk on his face and watch the show.
After, I had no choice but to capitulate to their visitation demands and they secured an order, their lawyer
used this order as a weapon, to continuously drag me back and forth to court on meritless contempt charges,
so that she could later present me to the judge as “uncooperative.” She harassed me by phone, in writing,
and at my various duty stations by calling my commanders (even making a personal trip to my Army post
to meet with one of commanders), in the hopes of destroying my military career. That way, she could then
present to the judge that I no longer had a financial means to take care of my daughter. This was actually
what she had advised me in a conference we had at the first hearing, where I was unrepresented. She said
that as my career was “in the toilet” I should just give in. I did, hoping that they would take their visitation
and leave my baby and me alone, but again, they had other plans. She also stalked me, sending me ominous
messages such as “We’re well aware of your connecting flight,” referring to a deployment I had been assigned
to, and informing me after they had kidnapped my daughter the first time and went into hiding, that they
“would be more than happy” to bring my child, to my connecting flight to say goodbye to me.
They continued dragging me back and forth to court and dragged the divorce out for four years. At
the hearings, they often came to court with droves of their family members to impress the judge with their
“strength in numbers” display, so as to make it appear that I was such a bad person that they needed all of
this moral support. In essence, they controlled the case; I was divorcing them.

59 Reno supra at 303-304; Santosky, supra at 748, 760-761

19
 Kyung Lee Trotter
In the end, their efforts paid off. The judge granted my daughter’s father physical custody. Along with
citing my military service as a reason why I shouldn’t continue to have physical custody, he remarked that
the case was “replete with show causes”—the grandparents’ meritless, unsubstantiated show causes.
Whereas I had been my baby’s primary caregiver, this judge strictly reduced my contact with her to
summers, every other Thanksgiving and Christmas, Spring Break, and any time that I was back in the United
States on leave—at her father’s discretion. In essence, I was reduced from her loving, daily nurturing mother,
to an insignificant, distant relative.
Whereas as my mother—my daughter’s maternal and natural, grandmother, which this woman who has
been raising her is not, told me that she felt like she wanted to scream at the inconceivable end result, my
ex-husband’s father sat on his side of the bar, haughtily and victoriously, bellowing with laughter along with
both of the opposing attorneys.
About a year later, they all moved to the state of Georgia. Unbeknownst to me, my ex-husband turned
the daily care of my daughter over to his parents and in fact, moved into their basement away from her.
His parents claimed that they didn’t know that he was selling drugs from their basement. When the
police kicked their door in and raided their house, they then kicked him out, but kept my daughter. Neither
one of them picked up the phone to tell me that my child had been in danger or had experienced such a
traumatizing event, nor did either of them inform me that her father was gone from their home. When I
found out, I ended up having to file to resume physical custody of her, against her father—who was nowhere
to be found.
Once again, these grandparents were right there, “intervening”, or should I say “initiating” from the
sidelines, wielding yet another “grandparents’ rights”/best interests of the child statute, Georgia’s O.C.G.A. §
19-7-1(b.1). Only under this one, they had the power to seek “custody” altogether.
This time they were able to have my rights terminated altogether—based upon one particular group’s
agenda—sanctioned by our highest Court that the fact that I was fit shouldn’t matter anymore. These new
“initiators,” who had committed a crime against me, were given the right to put me on trial as a defendant,
in order to take my daughter from me, period.
They were only required to prove that so long as I didn’t preserve their new family unit—consisting of
them and my child that they had kidnapped—60 that I was incapable of doing what was “best” for my child.
This was the precise finding of the Georgia Court, that I was fit, but incapable of doing what was “best”
for my child. The Georgia Court found that my daughter’s grandparents’ relationship with her was now so
important, that is was “primary” and “significant” over mine with her, and if I couldn’t respect their newly
established “bond” with her, that I was, again, incapable of doing what was best for my child. With that
finding, he removed my child from my home and terminated my legal rights.
As if this hadn’t been crazy enough—and believe me, I’ve barely scratched the surface of what I had go
through—here’s the procedural history of what happened. Here’s what one won’t read in the Georgia Court
of Appeals’ so-called order:

60 Someone please tell me. What else would you call keeping another person’s child, in your home, clandestinely, for a long a
period of time, without the legal parent’s knowledge or permission?

20
 NOT AT ALL
The most comprehensive way to explain what has taken place is to provide the facts from my Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(3)(d)(3) and (b)(4), filed under my 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It was a motion to set aside the “Final Order
On Custody” as procured by “fraud upon the court” and therefore void. These facts are pretty much the same
for all three of the federal actions I had to file.
I did not delete the citations to the exhibits that I cited for those who will actually go and look up the action.
However, such exhibits are not included in this book. I refer to myself as the “Movant” and the grandparents as
“Respondents” as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, one may initiate an action for relief by filing a motion.
One would not believe the cinematic ordeal I have suffered, just fighting for my rights to my own child.
I fought what culminated into the termination of my parental rights, for twelve years, including the four in
Georgia, on the state level, to the United States Supreme Court, back down to the federal court and then to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals—all for rights that I already have, protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But for the unspeakably, unconstitutional decision of Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000), none of this would have ever happened to me or my daughter, and I would have not been
robbed of my right to raise her.
___________________________________________________________________
“…The Movant [me] and the father of her child, Michael D. Ayres Jr. are both veterans of the United
States Army. While her divorce from Michael Ayres Jr. was pending in the state of Virginia, she was
awarded temporary physical and legal custody of her daughter.

The Respondents [the grandparents] had intervened under the guise of wanting visitation of the
child.

On or about February, 2004, the Movant’s attorney at the time was served for a modification of the
custody order by the father. The Movant’s own attorney, purposely did not inform her, at a time when
she was serving overseas, that he had been served for the said hearing. The attorney also ill-advised
her that she had to fire him in order to invoke her rights under the then, Soldiers and Sailors Act and
sent her a document to sign relieving him of his representation. She signed it and sent it back, only
to find out that her own attorney, had waltzed into the courtroom on the day of the hearing with the
document, handed it to the judge and when the judge asked him if Ms. Trotter would be attending
the hearing, he answered, “I don’t know.” Subsequently, the father, on March 4, 2004, was awarded
sole temporary physical and legal custody. The attorney has since been sanctioned by the Virginia
Bar Association. (See Exhibit A).

On March 21, 2005 the Movant was able to regain legal custody and visitation of her daughter, but
the judge ruled that the father would retain physical custody permanently, as he didn’t know where
she would be from year to year due to her military service, and therefore, she was unstable.

On or about August 2006, the father moved to Georgia, into the home of the Respondents, his father
and step-mother.

21
 Kyung Lee Trotter
The Movant discovered on or about December 2009, that the Respondents, Michael D. Ayres Sr. and
Teresa Covington-Ayres (the Ayres), had clandestinely kept possession of her child in their home,
after they had ejected the child’s father from it, for causing their home to be raided by police for
illegal drug trafficking. The Ayres had kept up their clandestine operation for on or about two years,
by pretending that the child’s father still lived in the home, coaching the child to lie to her mother and
also by gaining access to the father’s email, pretending to be the father and coordinating visitation
with her mother.

The Movant first sought the aid of the Cobb County Police Department, to retrieve her child. The
police officers, after speaking to Michael Ayres Sr. in his home, refused to enforce the criminal statute,
O.C.G.A §16-5-45, Interference With Legal Custody, and instead, directed her to civil court.

The Movant then filed for an emergency hearing to have her child returned to her immediately; however,
the senior judge who presided over the hearing, informed her that Interference With Legal Custody
was not considered an emergency in the state of Georgia. He then, directed her to file for custody from
the father. On or about December 2009, the Movant subsequently, filed a petition to regain physical
custody of her child from the father, in the Superior Court of Cobb County Georgia. The case was
assigned to Judge Carlton Latain Kell and the case was set for May 5, 2010 five months later.

The Ayres, Michael Ayres Sr., an attorney himself, ran back to the state of Virginia and filed for
custody of the Movant’s child there. The Ayres’ attorney who had represented them in Virginia, Amy
Pohorence, Van Fossen (Van Fossen), without license to practice in the state of Georgia, represented
the Ayres, by filing thirty seven pages of documents from the Virginia court, and writing an Ex Parte
letter to Judge Kell.

On or about March 2010, the Movant received a notice containing several pages listing civil cases to
include her own, informing her that due to Judge Kell’s inundated docket, another judge would have
to hear the listed cases.

On or about April, the Movant attempted to exercise her visitation rights to her child to which the
Ayres responded with a demand, that the child would not be released to her without her first assuring
them that her child would be returned to them.

On April 5, 2010, the Movant filed for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Two separate sheriff ’s deputies charged with serving the pleadings, made “multiple” attempts (See
Exhibit B) to the Ayres’ home, but failed to leave the pleadings at their home. Subsequently, on April
15, 2010, the Ayres intervened into the custody proceedings, this time, petitioning for custody of
the child themselves. The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus remained on the docket, in the same
court, for the duration of the proceedings which lasted for on or about nineteen months.

22
 NOT AT ALL
Diane Woods (Woods) was appointed Guardian Ad Litem for the child on May 4, 2010 upon the
Ayres’ motion. The Ayres paid all of her fees ultimately totaling approximately twenty-four thousand
dollars.

The first hearing was held on May 5, 2010. The father was successfully served for the first custody
hearing, but did not appear, and was declared a fugitive from justice. The first judge presiding over
the case, the same judge that had heard the emergency hearing, heard testimony from a psychologist
concerning the mental state of the child and considered her recommendation that although the Ayres
had broken the law to acquire the child, removing the child from their home would be detrimental to
the child’s emotional state. The judge rejected such testimony and ruled in favor of the mother. The
child was returned to her mother’s care where she remained for on or about thirteen months and the
Ayres’ visitation was dramatically and strictly reduced to promote bonding time between the mother
and her child.

By May 6, 2010, Woods wrote a letter suggesting to the parties that they enter into a Consent Order
to have the Movant in particular, undergo a psychological evaluation. Woods specifically stated in
her letter: “I’m not sure that she [Dr. Appleton] knows if there will be long term harm to the child if
the child is permanently placed with Ms. Trotter.” (See Exhibit C). Woods also fully acknowledged
in the said letter, that the Movant’s attorney would be confused as to why she was requesting such
an evaluation. The letter specified that the Ayres would pay all of Dr. McGarrah’s fees as well. Woods
did her own research of the school that the child would attend in New York, and sent her proposed
modification consisting of much more visitation for the Ayres.

Judge Kell then took over the case. Unbeknownst to the Movant, Judge Kell shared a special
relationship with the Ayres’ attorney, Debbie C. Pelerose (Pelerose) and the firm which Woods
belonged to, Huff, Woods and Hamby. Both attorneys/firms had contributed five hundred to one
thousand dollars to Judge Kell’s election/reelection campaigns and held fund raisers every year
since on or about 2008.

By May 25, 2010, Woods filed a Motion in the court for the Movant to undergo the evaluation, this
time claiming that “all parties” needed to be examined. The Movant objected to having to undergo
a psychological evaluation, but Judge Kell ruled in favor of the Ayres without explanation. In his
order, he specified that upon the conclusion of the evaluation, the evaluator, Dr. Nancy McGarrah
(McGarrah), was to file her written report into the trial court and provide the same to all counsel.

On or about July 2010, Woods flew to New York and assessed the Plaintiff ’s home. At the end
of Woods’ visit to Ms. Trotter’s home, Woods informed the Ms. Trotter that she approved of her
parental abilities and had observed Kiara in a state of happiness. However, Woods went on to explain
that despite her findings and at the insistence of the Ayres, she would still make her undergo the
psychological evaluation.

23
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Also, on or about July 2010, the Ayres filed an emergency hearing claiming that the Ms. Trotter was
neglecting her child.

On August 27, 2010, at the second hearing that was scheduled on the docket as final, the Ayres
second attempt to gain custody of the child failed.

The Movant complied with the judge’s order and underwent the evaluation, consisting of at least
five hundred written questions and two separate oral sittings with McGarrah. McGarrah, did not
conclude from her testing that the Movant possessed any mental or psychological defect that would
hinder her ability to continue caring for her child. On or about May 2011, upon completion of the
evaluation, McGarrah did not compose, file or disseminate a written report, but instead, proposed to
make an oral recommendation to Judge Kell, after agreeing to attend a meeting between the parties.
At the meeting McGarrah informed the parties that she would be recommending that the child be
removed from her mother’s care.

The Movant’s attorney became less eager to represent her, and eventually withdrew from the case.
She acknowledged the fact that McGarrah had not complied with the judge’s order to submit and
disseminate a written report. (Exhibit D)

The Movant’s second attorney, Ms. Keisha Steed, took her case pro bono. On or about June 2011,
Ms. Steed filed five motions viz.: Motion to Dismiss; Motion to Compel Custody Evaluator’s Report
and Motion for Contempt and Sanctions; Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing; Petitioner’s
Motion to Compel Court Evaluator to Attend Final Hearing Scheduled to be Heard on Aug 4,
2011 (If Petitioner’s Motion for Continuance is Not Granted); and Motion for Custody Evaluator
Nancy McGarrah, PhD. to Appear in Court Instanter. Judge Kell did not rule on any of the said
motions. Ms. Keisha Steed, stayed in constant contact with the Movant reporting her efforts to
secure rulings from Judge Kell but kept expressing that she wasn’t receiving any response. (Not
surprisingly, at this time Ms. Steed has refused to supply an Affidavit confirming those efforts or
her suspicions of fraud.) (Exhibit E) Instead, on or about July 27, 2011, Judge Kell ordered all of
the parties into an impromptu deposition of McGarrah. Judge Kell did not order that McGarrah
had to attend the hearing.

On August 4, 2011, the Ayres played Dr. McGarrah’s three-hour deposition and entered into the
court as evidence against Ms. Trotter. On August 5, 2011, Van Fossen testified for the Ayres and
Pelerose entered all of the documents she had brought with her from the Virginia court as evidence.
Woods was not questioned as a witness, but gave oral argument asserting McGarrah’s credentials
as an evaluator and argued that although she saw no problem with Ms. Trotter’s parental abilities,
she couldn’t go against McGarrah’s recommendation that the child be removed from Ms. Trotter’s
care.

24
 NOT AT ALL
Judge Kell then ruled that based on McGarrah’s report, a written version of her deposition, that the
Ayres had proven a significant risk of long term to the child. He then granted the Ayres sole legal and
physical custody of the child permanently. Judge Kell composed a twenty six page order consisting
of a Procedural History, Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law.
Keisha Steed withdrew from the case and the Movant appealed Pro Se.

On or about October 5, 2011 the Movant was summoned by Judge Brantley to appear for the Habeas
Corpus which was scheduled for November 14, 2011. The Movant did not appear.

On October 13, 2011, Judge Kell, sua sponte, initiated a sudden action for child support against the
Movant. She appeared at the hearing but learned that the Ayres did not wish to request child support.
Judge Kell then ordered all counsel into his chambers, expressing that he wanted to discuss “the
status of this case.”

When she tried to secure the transcripts from the court reporter, the court reporter informed her that
Pelerose had instructed her to withhold the transcripts and not file them into the court. The Cobb
County Superior court clerk also informed the Movant that the first two sets of transcripts from the
first two hearings, were “misplaced” and remarked that such misplacements happened frequently in
that court. Subsequently, the clerk did not transfer any transcripts to the appellate court.

Justices Anne Elizabeth Barnes, Christopher McFadden, and A. Harris Adams immediately accused
the Movant of violating the Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 25(a)(1), citing: “...many pages of the
procedural and factual background section contain no citation of such parts of the record or transcript
essential to a consideration of the errors complained of.” (Exhibit F) The Justices went on to insult
the Movant remarking that she lacked the ability to communicate coherently. The Justices refused to
review seventeen of the Movant’s enumerations of error which asserted her violated constitutional
rights, citing that they needed the transcripts and claiming that the Movant’s Notice Of Appeal didn’t
request the transcripts. The Justices referred to the Movant’s constitutional enumerations as merely
“several related enumerations of error.” The Justices ruled that McGarrah’s failure to submit a timely
report didn’t harm Ms. Trotter. They referred to the twenty-six page custody order as their basis
for affirming Judge Kell’s order. The Justices defended Judge Kell’s failure to rule on the Motion to
Dismiss in particular, stating that he had “expressly denied” the said motion in the footnote on the
first page of the Final Order On Custody. They declared the statute O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 constitutional,
where the Movant hadn’t attacked it. The Justices denied each and every one of the Movant’s motions
including the one which implored them to take Judicial Notice of the Habeas Corpus. The Justices
then published their order on the law books, omitting material facts, such as the fact that the Ayres
had violated a criminal statute to acquire the child, only referring to the child as “being raised” by
the Ayres. They also excluded the fact that the child had been back in the Movant’s custody for on
or about thirteen months prior to the third trial. The Justices themselves went on to apply their own
case law to their scarcely reported material facts.

25
 Kyung Lee Trotter
On or about three days after the Justices affirmed Judge Kell’s decision, the first two sets of transcripts
were miraculously recovered and transferred to the Georgia Court of Appeals, along with the Movant’s
Amendment to her Notice of Appeal, requesting the first two sets of transcripts and asserting the
difficulties she was having with securing the third set. The Justices denied reconsideration.

The Movant appealed all the way to the United States Supreme Court. There was no response to the
Movant’s Petition for Certiorari until the last midnight hour, at which time Brock, Clay, Calhoun &
Rogers, LLC, by way of designated attorney Nancy Ingram Jordan, filed “Waiver of right of respondent
Michael D. Ayres, Jr. to respond....” The Movant now knows that Judge Kell was an attorney for Brock,
Clay, Calhoun & Rogers from on or about 2000 to at least 2007 and he has been a shareholder of the
entity since on or about 2002. (See Exhibit G). Certiorari was denied.

Brock, Clay, Calhoun & Rogers, LLC also contributed monies to Judge Kell’s election/reelection
campaigns since on or about 2008…”

26
 Chapter 3
T h e S t a t e O f G e o r g i a Te r m i n a t e d
M y Pa r e n t a l R i g h t s W i t h o u t D u e P r o c e s s

T
he Cobb County Superior Court judge found, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), that although I
was fit, I was incapable of doing what was “best” for my child. He found that it didn’t matter that
the grandparents had broken the law. They had developed a “bond” with my child and if I didn’t
continue to foster that “bond”, I was “harming” my child. As such, he declared that he had the power as
parens patriae—to remove my child from my home, terminate my custodial and legal rights, permanently
and award “full custody”, to her grandparents. We’ve already discovered that the state, as parens patriae,
may only inject itself into the private realm of the family, if it has a compelling interest in protecting the
child from neglect. The other way that it has the same authority is if the parent has abused the child,61 or in
other words, if the parent is unfit.62 This Court had no such compelling interest in my case, nor is its statute
narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest. Therefore, this Court terminated my parental rights, without
due process.

Georgia Interprets Troxel As The State Having The Power To Terminate

The Rights Of Fit Parents Under A Sole Best Interests Standard

The state of Georgia took the Troxel decision to a whole “nother” level. In interpreting its grandparents’
statute, O.C.G.A.§ 19-7-1(b.1), which is one to take custody from fit parents altogether and “award”
such custody to grandparents, it did exactly what the Troxel Court instructed it to do. It disregarded the
fundamental liberty interest of the fit parent and the state’s burden to show that it had acquired parens
patriae authority to terminate the parent’s rights, and merely cured overdbreadth. However, this state isn’t
claiming to be “intruding in its police power.” Instead it claims to be acting in its parens patriae authority. It
didn’t realize that in citing Troxel v. Granville, which affirmed the Washington Supreme Court’s decision, it
was actually saying that it has a right to intrude upon the private realm of the family, in its police power—and
terminate the rights of fit parents.

61 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 585 (U.S.Ga.,1979). “…parents retain a substantial, if not dominant, role in decision, absent
finding of neglect or abuse and traditional presumption that parent act in best interests of child applies…”
62 Santosky, supra at 748, 760-761; Stanley, supra at 650-651.

27
 Kyung Lee Trotter
It explicitly declares that although Troxel was about visitation, that it was indeed instructive on custody
as well.63 So the state of Georgia is using instructions, which only paved the way for its police power, to
restrict forms of exercising rights under the First Amendment, to terminate parental rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Georgia Supreme Court did exactly what the Washington Supreme Court had done. It read into a
statute that its legislature had written, what wasn’t actually there. Its statute reads like this:

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1):

(b.1) ….in any action involving the custody of a child between the parents or either parent and a
third party limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or
adoptive parent, parental power may be lost by the parent, parents, or any other person if the court
hearing the issue of custody, in the exercise of its sound discretion and taking into consideration
all the circumstances of the case, determines that an award of custody to such third party is for
the best interest of the child or children and will best promote their welfare and happiness. There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the child or children for custody
to be awarded to the parent or parents of such child or children, but this presumption may be
overcome by a showing that an award of custody to such third party is in the best interest of the
child or children. The sole issue for determination in any such case shall be what is in the best
interest of the child or children.

No judge in his sole discretion, has the power to terminate a fit parent’s rights. That’s number one.
Such a ludicrous suggestion defies logic and boggles the legal mind. Moreover, nobody knows what “taking
into consideration all of the ‘circumstances’” means. Neither does a lay person know what a “rebuttable
presumption” is. In essence, a lay person, reading this statute, would have no idea, what conduct of his,
will constitute him “harming” his child, thus cause him to lose his right to custody of his child for good.64
Further, no lay person should have to go and look up Clark v. Wade, only to find even more vagueness, to
wit, some third party, upon showing a “bond” could cause him to lose his child forever.
From this vague statute with no specifics or definitions of its terms, somehow the Georgia Supreme
Court saw what the legislature meant for the “presumption” to be. It said that the legislature meant that it
was: (1) the parent is a fit person entitled to custody; (2) a fit parent acts in the best interest of his or her child;

63 Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 603-604 (2001).“…although Troxel addresses the issue of child visitation and not custody, I believe
it is instructive and supports my conclusion that O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1) as written is constitutionally valid…”
64 Michael A. Inman, Constitutional Law-Clear and Present Danger Test Applied to Overbroad Unlawful Assembly Statute.
Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d 477 (1971), 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 239,19 (1971), http://scholarship.
law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/12

28
 NOT AT ALL
and (3) the child’s best interest is to be in the custody of a parent.65 This must be the state “according special
weight,”66 to the parent’s liberty interest.
It, then, miraculously saw that the legislature meant that the third parties needed to prove “long term,
physical or emotional ‘harm,’ as Troxel also instructed to insert, and through its crystal ball, it also saw that
the elements to find “harm” were: (1) who are the past and present caretakers of the child; (2) with whom
has the child formed psychological bonds and how strong are those bonds; (3) have the competing parties
evidenced interest in, and had contact with, the child over time; and (4) does the child have unique medical
or psychological needs that one party is better able to meet. It got all this from a statute which only says, “The
sole issue for determination in any such case shall be what is in the best interest of the child or children.” I
don’t see any of these instructions in this vague statute and even if such were in it, the statute would still be
void of the process due to the parent when the state, in its parens patriae power, intends to sever the parent-
child relationship and terminate parental rights and void of what the state’s compelling interest is.
The Georgia Supreme Court latched on to the empty “presumption that the parent acts in the best
interests of the child” verbiage of Troxel and then redefined what it takes to rebut that presumption. Parham
v. J.R. actually outlines what the presumption of a parent really is. A parent is presumed, due to the natural
bond she has with her child, to do what is best for her child. This case explains that such presumption may be
rebutted, but only after a parent has demonstrated that he or she has neglected or abused his or her child.67
Thus the “harm” to rebut the presumption that the parent is fit and as such will act in the best interest of his
or her child is abuse, or neglect.
From pages 65-66, the Troxel Court gives this big, long explanation of what the liberty interest of the
fit parent is, but never once mentioned how prior precedent of this same Court has determined what the
substantive process due to the parent is before a state may abridge it.
Notwithstanding that this state Supreme Court rewrote this statute for its legislature as well, nevertheless,
like I argued in my petition to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2012, third parties can’t get passed the first element
of Georgia’s “rebuttable presumption.” Element (1) states that the parent is fit thus entitled to custody. Once
this state Supreme Court recognized such constitutional truth it stifled itself. It ended its assessment of the
constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) under the Due Process Clause, right here—without even having

65 Clark, supra at 593.

66 Troxel, supra at 58. “..The problem here is not that the Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight
to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interests…”
67 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (U.S.Ga.,1979) “…parents retain a substantial, if not dominant, role in decision, absent finding
of neglect or abuse and traditional presumption that parent act in best interests of child applies…” Id. at 602-603. “…The law’s
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 447; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries
on American Law * 190.
3 As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the
incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. That some parents “may at times be acting against the interests of their
children” as was stated in Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039, 1047–1048 (ED Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S.
119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52 L.Ed.2d 184 (1977), creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of
human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the *603 child’s best interests...” Id. at 602-603.

29
 Kyung Lee Trotter
to go any further. It had already applied the strict scrutiny test to the parent’s fundamental liberty interest
and concluded what the right of the fit parent was, in one sentence. It could have just said “Affirmed” and
gone on about its day.
The process due when a state threatens the liberty of a person, again, must first determine what the precise
function of the state is and the private interest which will be affected by the adverse action of the state.68 This
state surely identified the private interest, but skipped the first part of the assessment. It skipped the first part
because it didn’t have a precise function to proclaim. Therefore, this interpretation and rewriting of what its
legislature meant, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “off the back.” We can’t
even begin to apply the due process test because half of what we need to compare is missing. It’s hard for me
to even continue writing because I just stifled myself with this point. What else is there to say?
I can provide a perfect example of a state proclaiming its goal. It too is in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
652 (1972). The state of Illinois in its statute, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, s 701—2, had made its goal “quite plain”:

“…Illinois has declared that the aim of the Juvenile Court Act is to protect ‘the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community’ and to ‘strengthen
the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when
his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal…”

This is an excellent example of the function of the parens patriae and goal of the state. Notice that it
covers both the welfare of the child and the welfare of the public; thus there is no need to resort to the state’s
police power. Unfortunately, Stanley is a “landmark case” because the means by which it intended to reach
this goal, the “narrowing” of this statute, the process, resulted in the exact opposite of what it proclaimed it
was aiming to achieve.
Parents could rest assure in Illinois that the state would not come and snatch their children out of their
homes for good, without actually acting on the narrowly tailored needs to. – That is, so long as the home
belonged to a “parent” which despite this eloquent goal, it had another statute that proclaimed that an unwed
father was not. A “parent” in Illinois was a married mother or father, a survivor of either or an illegitimate
mother, and included any adoptive parents.69 However, as one can see, the state statute, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37,
s 701—14, did not include an illegitimate father—not even one who had lived with and provided for his
children for nineteen years, as the father in this case had. As a result, whereas “parents,” as defined by this
state, were entitled to the due process of a hearing and a finding of neglect before the state could terminate
their parental rights, the unwed father was not a “parent,” therefore not entitled to the same process. The
state didn’t need to prove an unwed father unfit; it only had to prove that he was unwed, in order to take his
children from him permanently.70 With this presumption at law, the state of Illinois proclaimed that the fact

68 Stanley v. Illinois, supra at 650-651.

69 Id. at 650.
70 Id. Under Illinois law, therefore, while the children of all parents can be taken from them in neglect proceedings, that is only
after notice, hearing, and proof of such unfitness as a parent as amounts to neglect, an unwed father is uniquely subject to the

30
 NOT AT ALL
that he was fit was “irrelevant”.71 In other words, an unmarried father was an unfit father. With that process
in place, when the mother of this father’s children died, the state of Illinois had the power to just take his
children and make them wards of the state and that is exactly what it did.
The U.S. Supreme Court found that this “process,” or lack thereof, of presuming this unwed father was
unfit, thus giving the state the power to remove his children from his care, care that he had provided to them
for nineteen years, and make them wards of the state, in no way, shape or form served its proclaimed goal to
protect children. As a matter of fact, the Court found that this “process” spited its goals.72
Unlike Illinois, the state of Georgia proclaims no goals in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1). It proclaims this
undefined process, or “rebuttable presumption,” to achieve nothing for the child or the public, and then
places such “process,” under an explicitly proscribed standard between a parent and a third party—the best
interest standard.73
Nevertheless, in following the Troxel Court’s instructions and supposedly, merely curing the overbreadth
of its best interests standard, when in actuality this statute is horridly vague, it declares: “

“…Through the inclusion of such presumption in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1), together with the
restriction on the third parties authorized to petition for custody, the General Assembly avoided the
constitutional pitfalls in the Washington statute in Troxel.”74…”

Well, no it didn’t. It dove head-first off of an unconstitutional cliff—and for nineteen years it has been
taking fit, custodial, and legal parents—like me—and their children, with it.
The interest at stake is a fundamental liberty interest, commanding the test of strict scrutiny-not the
overbreadth doctrine-whereby the state must prove it has a narrowly tailored compelling interest, to
take custody from a parent, permanently. When the state properly asserts a narrowly tailored compelling
interest, the battle is between the state and the parent75—not between parents and grandparents or any other
third party. The United States Supreme Court has never sanctioned such replacement of the state as the
authoritative interest—with a private party—in order to abridge a liberty interest.

more simplistic dependency proceeding. By use of this proceeding, the State, on showing that the father was not married to
the mother, need not prove unfitness in fact, because it is presumed at law.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 652. “…We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody
of fit parents…”
73 Reno, supra at 303-304.
74 Clark, supra 605.
75 Santosky v. Kramer, supra at 759-60 (U.S.N.Y.,1982) The factfinding does not purport—and is not intended—to balance the
child’s interest in a normal family home against the parents’ interest in raising the child. Nor does it purport to determine
whether the natural parents or the foster parents would provide the better home. Rather, the factfinding hearing pits the State
directly against the parents. The State alleges that the natural parents are at fault. Fam.Ct.Act § 614.1.(d). The questions disputed
and decided are what the State did—“made diligent efforts,” § 614.1.(c)—and what the natural parents did not do—“maintain
contact with or plan for the future of the child.” § 614.1.(d). The State marshals an array of public resources to prove its case
and disprove the parents’ case. Victory by the state not only makes termination of parental rights possible, it entails a judicial
determination that the parents are unfit to raise their own children.

31
 Kyung Lee Trotter
With this statute, the private interest at stake, just like in Stanley, supra, is the permanent loss of the
parent’s right to custody, care, management, companionship and control of his or her child and from that
devastating result, the state of Georgia may not divorce its process, especially with no goal to begin with.76
This state has the audacity to claim that taking a child from her parent and giving her to grandparents
isn’t severing the parent-child relationship because after the grandparents have finished prosecuting the fit
parent and in Georgia’s case, proven “clearly and convincingly,” with purchased “evidence” from a GAL, while
the parent has no protection, that the Court graciously allows the parent to retain “significant rights.” These
“significant rights” consist of granting her visitation of her own child, whom she has not been adjudicated
and found to have abused or neglected, thus unfit to continue raising. In essence, this state violates the parent
and then says to her: “We haven’t violated you. We haven’t taken anything from you. We still allow you to visit
your own child and as we still graciously grant you these residual ‘significant rights,’ we are not required to
give you the process due to you, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”77
A parent stripped of her right to have custody of her child is a parent stripped of her liberty interest.
Therefore, constitutionally, this state’s means to achieve such a result most definitely must comport with the
process due to the parent,78 thus pass the strict scrutiny test. Again, this statute doesn’t have two interests to
even begin the test.
In closing and addressing Georgia’s proclamation:

“…trial courts should… go beyond the parent’s… present fitness to encompass the child’s own
needs…”79

The only thing this state has the power to “go beyond”, is the parent’s unfitness.80 When the parent is fit,
the child’s interest is already “encompassed.”81 Going “beyond” the parent’s fitness is going beyond the child
and his intact welfare.
Absent a narrowly tailored compelling interest, this state has no standing,82 as parens patriae and in this
state’s case, this statute mentions absolutely nothing about “harm or potential harm,” nor does it mention
anything about protecting the child or the public from clear and present danger, ill health, or death,83 nor
is it claiming to achieve protecting the child from neglect or abuse.84 Moreover, I certainly do not see how

76 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (U.S.Ga.,1979). “…What process is constitutionally due cannot be divorced from nature of ultimate
decision that is being made…” U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
77 Clark, supra at 595.
78 Parham v. J. R., supra at 585. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
79 Clark, supra at 598:
80 Santosky, supra at 748, 760-761; Stanley, supra at 650-651. Parham, supra at 585.
81 Santosky, Id.
82 Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 96 S.Ct. 2333, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387
(1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
83 Prince, supra at 166-167.
84 Santosky, supra at 748, 760-761; Stanley, supra at 650-651. Parham, supra at 585.

32
 NOT AT ALL
terminating a fit parent’s rights and supposedly “awarding custody” to grandparents—when they have no
right to custody in the first place—would achieve any of these interests.
This state under this statute has no power and no standing to do anything with anybody’s children—least
of all those of fit parents. What this state is doing and has been doing for nineteen years, ripping helpless
children out of the homes of their good, fit mothers and fathers, is a reprehensible, spat in the face of what
America regards essential to ordered liberty. America regards that it is a basic, human right for one to be able
to raise, love and nurture his own natural children.

The Clark Court’s Purported Constiutional Justifications

To Advance Its New “Bond” With The Child Process

Notwithstanding that this state’s statute is unconstitutional—like I said—it went to great lengths, beyond
the Troxel Court, basically rendering blatant lies, to make taking a child from a fit parent and giving her to
grandparents, appear constitutional. Allow me to break the lies down.
We already know that without a narrowly tailored compelling state interest, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1) is
an unconstitutional infringement of the fit parent’s liberty interest to have custody of her child. However, the
state of Georgia came up with all kinds of nifty ways to appear compliant with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Let’s explore the unethical lengths that the Georgia Supreme Court went to, to try to make taking a child
from a fit parent sound constitutional.
Let’s look at the overview of its decision.

Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001):

The Habersham and Rockdale Counties Superior Courts (Georgia) awarded appellees non-custodial
fathers custody of their children after holding that the “best-interest-of-the-child” standard of
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-1(b.1) was unconstitutional. In a consolidated action, appellants maternal
grandparents challenged the judgments.

OVERVIEW: In both actions in the consolidated appeal, the minor children were living with
appellants when appellees, single, noncustodial fathers, sought custody. In both cases, the trial courts
determined that it would be in the children’s best interest to remain with appellants, but awarded
custody to appellees on the ground that the “best interest of the child” standard of Ga. Code Ann. §
19-7-1(b.1) was unconstitutional.

On appeal, the instant court reversed, holding that § 19-7-1(b.1) was constitutional as applied
to custody disputes between a noncustodial parent and a third party.

The court interpreted the best interest standard to mean that the third party had to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the child would suffer physical or emotional harm if custody were
awarded to the biological parent.

33
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Once the showing was made, the third party then had to show that a custody award to him would
promote the child’s welfare and happiness.

The Clark Court’s Lehr V. Robertson Claim

To justify their claim that the United States Supreme Court set precedent that the state may apply the best
interest standard between a parent and a third party, and even sever a parent-child relationship with it, the
Clark Court cites exactly two cases: Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)” and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
236 (1978). The premise the Court makes for its decision with both of these cases is that the said fathers are
putative with no parent-child relationship, therefore, the best interest standard is constitutionally allowed.
The Court, claims that in Lehr v. Robertson, the putative father was denied his request to vacate an
adoption order of his child based solely upon the absence of the parent-child relationship.

Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 593 (2001):

“…In cases dealing with the rights of unwed fathers, however, the Court refused to adopt unfitness as
the sole standard for enforcing a biological father’s due process rights, instead distinguishing between
a developed parent-child relationship and a potential relationship… in Lehr v. Robertson, where
the putative father had assumed no parental responsibility, the Court concluded that his biological
link did not merit the same protection…”

This is misleading. The Lehr v. Robertson Court’s primary focus was the biological father’s potential
relationship and whether or not the statute at issue, N.Y.McKinney’s Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 111-a,
subds. 2-4, had provided enough protection for it. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-263 (1983).

“…In this case, we are not assessing the constitutional adequacy of New York’s procedures for
terminating a developed relationship. Appellant has never had any significant custodial, personal, or
financial relationship with Jessica, and he did not seek to establish a legal tie until after she was two
years old. We are concerned only with whether New York has adequately protected his opportunity
to form such a relationship…”

So, as you can see, the decision may have been based in part on the putative father not having a relationship
with his child, but the Court far from distinguished between a developed parent-child relationship and a
potential relationship. Nor did the Court express that his biological link did not merit protection.
The state of New York with its statutory scheme in N.Y. McKinney’s DRL § 111-a, subds. 2-4 had in fact
provided the putative father, heightened protection of his liberty interest to his child. The scheme provided
him an opportunity to be heard, in an action wherein his natural child stood be adopted, by simply mailing
a postcard into the putative father registry.

34
 NOT AT ALL
Quite opposite from the Clark Court’s claim, the Lehr Court felt very strongly about the importance of
providing a natural father with the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child and if he didn’t grasp
that statutorily secured opportunity, then his right to decide what was best for his child held little weight.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983):

“…The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to
listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.

The father in Lehr failed to grasp the “opportunity” given to him. Nevertheless, the state of New York had
in fact provided him that opportunity and heightened protection for his biological link and liberty interest.

The Clark Court’s Quilloin V. Walcott Claim

Let’s move on to the Clark Court’s supposed justification under Quilloin v. Walcott.

Clark, supra at 594:

“…In Quilloin v. Walcott, a case arising out of this state, the Supreme Court rejected the unwed father’s
contention that he was entitled to an absolute veto over the adoption of his child absent a finding
of his unfitness. Instead, the Court concluded that the unwed father’s substantive due process rights
were not violated by rejecting his petition to legitimate the child and finding that the stepfather’s
adoption was in the child’s best interest. The Court noted that the case did not involve the breakup
of a “natural family,” a biological father who had ever sought custody of his child, or the placement
of the child with a new set of parents. “Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full
recognition to a family unit already in existence…”

Here again, the state of Georgia itself had provided a heightened protection for a putative father and the
father had again, failed to utilize that statutory protection for his liberty interest.

“…Under Ga. Code § 74-103 (1978), a natural father can have his child legitimated by court order.
Section 74-103 provides:

A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of
the county of his residence, setting forth the name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of
the mother; and if he desires the name changed, stating the new name, and praying the legitimation
of such child…Upon such application, presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring

35
 Kyung Lee Trotter
said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as if born in
lawful wedlock, and the name by which he or she shall be known…”

The Court of Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978) held:

Stepfather of illegitimate child petitioned to adopt the child. The Superior Court, Fulton County,
granted adoption, and natural father appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia, 238 Ga. 230, 232
S.E.2d 246, affirmed. The natural father appealed. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Marshall held that:
(1) natural father’s substantive rights under due process clause were not violated by application of
the “best interests of the child” standard where natural father had not petitioned for legitimation at
any time in 11-year period between birth and filing of adoption petition, child had always been in
mother’s custody and adoption petition was filed over eight years after mother married…

So, both of these states—including Georgia—had provided a heightened protection of the liberty interests
of putative fathers, but these particular fathers had failed to utilize those protections. Those were putative
fathers.

The True Statuses Of The Fathers Of Clark V. Wade

Now, let’s go back to examining the fathers of Clark v. Wade.

Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 588 (2001):

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Both of these appeals concern a custody dispute between a single, noncustodial parent and relatives
who have physical custody of the child…

STOP. Really? So these relatives had legal court orders in their hands granting them custody already? So,
why were they in court to begin with? Hmm.
Let’s continue.

S00A1610. Clark v. Wade.

Warren Wade was born in 1994 to Melissa Wright and Douglas Wade and has lived with his maternal
grandparents, Margie and James Clark, since 1995...

Wait, was Douglas Wade living with them? What happened between 1994 and 1995? Where was he? What’s
the exact time frame?
Let’s move on.

36
 NOT AT ALL
When Warren’s parents divorced-Scuurrrt! That was the sound of a needle being ripped off of a playing
record. So now we know whereas the Clark Court has made arguments based on the purported lack of
fundamental rights for putative fathers- which clearly weren’t the holdings of the cases- Warren Wade wasn’t
even a putative father. He was a divorced father. 85 Therefore, his liberty interests in his child were already
concrete, without him having to take any further steps, unlike the fathers in Lehr, and Quilloin.
Okay. Now let’s read on to see about this next father.

Clark, supra at 589:

S00A2014. Driver v. Raines.

“…Justin Casey Veal was born in 1992 and is the child of Dawn Driver and John Raines, who never
married. The child has lived with his mother and maternal grandparents most of his life…”

What’s “most of his life”? Did Raines have a relationship with his child or engage in his rearing?

“…The state sought child support from the father in 1995; the father filed a petition for legitimation
in 1996…”

Scuurrrt! Wait. So this father, unlike the father in Quilloin, utilized the state of Georgia’s protective statute.
So too were his liberty interests to his child, established.
Let’s move on.

“…and Justin lived with his father from June 1996 to January 1997…”

Scuurrrt! So, obviously John Raines had not only legitimated his child, but he had a full, daily, caregiving
relationship with his child. So much for the “putative father with no parent-child relationship” theory. Keep in
mind that there is no such thing as a “putative” mother.
The rest of the Court’s cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports the fundamental liberty interests
of fit parents. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923), Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). What’s amazing is, the Court
also cited Santosky v Kramer-- three times-- and somehow still missed the two-step, substantive due process
component, protected under the 14th Amendment, that a judge must follow, before he may terminate a
parent’s fundamental liberty interest to his child. It cited Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-748 (1982),
Clark at 594, Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755-756, Clark at 599 and even ended with [Santosky,] 455 U.S. at 758-761,
Clark, ibid, and this particular citation includes the explicit instructions! It also, in citing Quilloin v. Walcott,

85 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978) ”…A divorced father…will have borne some full
responsibility for the child’s rearing.”

37
 Kyung Lee Trotter
skipped over page 255, that clearly states that a best interests standard may not be applied between a third
party and a fit parent in the first place.

The Noncustodial, Unwed, Biological Fathers

This Court also went out of its way to appeal to the emotions of people. If one reads this entire case, one
will notice that these fathers are repeatedly referred to as “noncustodial,” “unwed,” or “biological,” for the
purpose of immediately diminishing their worth in their children’s lives, in comparison to the third parties.
While reading a decision which starts out like this, one immediately starts to develop a contempt for these
noncustodial, biological fathers. For the record, the word “biological” appears a total of thirty-five times in
the decision. The words “unwed” and “noncustodial” both appear eight times. By the end of this case, these
fathers are worthless.
The superior court judge also referred to me as “biological.” Yes, biological, starting out married to my
daughter’s father, breastfeeding my child every four hours, and subsequently, after her father and I separated,
becoming her sole caregiver for the next three years of her life—that is, before I was attacked for the first
time by her paternal grandparents with the state of Virginia’s grandparents’ visitation statute, Va. Code §
20-124.2B.86

The Nationwide Fallout Of Troxel V. Granville

This practice of the States, repugnant to America’s concept of ordered liberty, in the advancement of the
interests of grandparents, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s solidification of the same, has begotten parents like
me. No one would believe that a four-year-old baby, who had been in the care of her fit mother since birth,
could be ripped out of her mother’s arms, even while her mother was serving her country, but this is indeed
what happened to me. Over the last fifteen years since the Troxel decision was rendered, “grandparents’
rights” have gone horribly wrong.
I was victimized—twice—by these so-called “rights.” The first time I tried to keep custody of my child
in Virginia, and the second time when she was taken altogether, in Georgia. As a result, for the last eight
years, these grandparents, with these state “rights” have replaced me and instead, they’ve enjoyed raising my
child—my federal right.
In 2015, she turned sixteen. She has grown up without me. I have been robbed of her first day of school,
the loss of her first tooth, twelve birthdays—her coming into womanhood.

86 By the way, this Virginia statute now mirrors the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1.
Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2 (2015). B. “In determining custody, the court shall give primary consideration to the best interests
of the child. The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents, when appropriate,
and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing their children. As between the parents, there shall be no
presumption or inference of law in favor of either. The court shall give due regard to the primacy of the parent-child
relationship but may upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be served
thereby award custody or visitation to any other person with a legitimate interest. The court may award joint custody or sole
custody.

38
 NOT AT ALL
I am treated like a stranger with no value. My right to direct her upbringing as in what her religion will
be, how she’ll be educated, what kind of medical care she’ll receive, what her morals and values should be,
was literally written away by the state of Georgia, with a “Parenting Plan.”
I have lived with the stigma of people’s assumption that since I don’t have custody of her, I must be
a terrible mother. The alphabetical format of dictionaries has been altered so that “unfit mother” will go
between murderer and rapist. Being looked upon in this way is just about like living with being convicted of
a crime you didn’t commit.
I have no pictures of my daughter hanging on my wall because to look at her is too painful. Since March
4, 2004, I have stood at the door of her various rooms, staring, dismayed at her empty, neatly made, non-
slept-in bed, as if she has died. No state has the right to put a good mother in mourning.87
My child has been robbed of being raised by her own natural mother. She has been robbed of her right
to have a relationship with me for the past twelve years. I know for a fact that such has had a psychological,
if not psychiatric effect on her, because contrary to how her grandparents might want to kid themselves, I
am still her mother. I know her. I have known her since I carried her in my womb and she is not well after
they’ve ravaged her stability and her mind to program and poison her against me.
She has been robbed of knowing her other two younger siblings and of having a relationship with them.
Her little sister, whom she had been requesting for quite some time, doesn’t even know who she is. In that
respect, my other two children too, have been robbed of having their big sister.
My parents—all three of them—have been robbed of having their relationship with their granddaughter.
In their zealous, relentless pursuit to take her from me, her paternal grandparents seemed to have forgotten
that she has other grandparents on my side—not to mention her natural paternal grandmother.
She has been robbed of her right to know all of my family, including five aunts and uncles and sixteen
first cousins, one whom she is particularly close to. She had a family. She was ripped away from that family.

87 Santosky v. Kramer, supra at 758-759 (U.S.N.Y.,1982). “The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’ ” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262–263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017–18, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 646, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Whether the loss threatened by a particular
type of proceeding is sufficiently grave to warrant more than average certainty on the part of the factfinder turns on both the
nature of the private interest threatened and the permanency of the threatened loss. Lassiter declared it “plain beyond the need
for multiple citation” that a natural parent’s “desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children’ ” is an interest far more precious than any property *759 right. 452 U.S., at 27, 101 S.Ct., at 2160, quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 651, 92 S.Ct., at 1212. When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks
not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it. “If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of
deprivation.... A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore,
a commanding one.” 452 U.S., at 27, 101 S.Ct., at 2160.

39
 Chapter 4
G e o r g i a’ s S u b s e q u e n t O r g a n i z e d C r i m e

T
he Georgia judge, pursuant to their unconstitutional statute and this lying Court, violated my most
basic fundamental right: my right to continue raising my child, so long as I was fit.88 As this statute
was enacted on April 2, 1996, this state began terminating the rights of fit parents, four years before
Troxel was even decided and has continued to willfully deprive the constitutional rights of parents, under
color of law for the last nineteen years. Moreover, in my case in putting me on trial to defend my rights, the
“expert witnesses” made money, while willfully conspiring to deprive my constitutional rights, under color
of law.
Varieties of concocted, new processes isn’t all that has arisen from Troxel v. Granville. O.C.G.A. §
19-7-1(b.1)’s vagueness as to what “circumstances” the state will consider to find “harm,” along with meeting
Clark’s clear and convincing evidence standard has precipitated a lucrative enterprise.89 Where, oh where,
does a lawyer get this “clear and convincing evidence” to prove that a fit parent doesn’t act in her child’s best
interests? This poses quite a dilemma. The Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.9.4, fixes that dilemma. It grants
a hired Guardian Ad Litem, the power to make the fit parent undergo a “custody evaluation,” whereby the
“expert” fabricated findings of the “evaluator,” will then be used as “evidence” against the fit parent.
The grandparent’s lawyer had tried and failed to meet this burden at the first trial. She had brought in the
first psychologist to testify within the nineteen-month of proceedings. This psychologist had been counseling
my daughter since on or about August 2009, four months before I even knew that her grandparents had
taken her from my ex-husband, kicked him out into the street, kept my daughter, but didn’t tell me that her
father was gone from their home, or why. This first psychologist, testified that although the grandparents
had violated the criminal statute O.C.G.A. § 16-5-45, “Interference With Legal Custody,” my request to have
the Court recognize my liberty interest and resume physical custody of my child would cause my daughter
“significant long term emotional harm.”
The first judge to hear the case resisted this “expert testimony” and stuck with what he knew to be
constitutional—returning my child to my care—and that is exactly what he did.
At the second trial, their attorney returned, this time making assertions under the fitness standard. She
alleged that now that my daughter was back at home, that I was neglecting her and not providing her basic
needs. The second judge rejected that strategy and my daughter remained home.

88 The professional, military training in me would love to put that in better terms, but instead, such calls to be said as it is.
89 Clark, supra at 599.

41
 Kyung Lee Trotter
So how then, was she successful on the third try, thirteen months after my daughter had been back in my
care? She presented the judge the exact same things that she had presented the first time. The only difference
was that she had a new psychologist. However, this psychologist was saying the exact same thing that the first
one had said—that during the time that the grandparents had my daughter in their home, illegally, they had
developed a “bond” with her. Subsequently, under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1), if she could prove that breaking
this bond “would harm” my child, the state had the authority to act as parens patriae, to decide what was best
for my daughter. So what was this miraculous factor that made the second judge change his mind, hearing
the same reasoning that the first judge had heard and rejected? I’ll tell you what it was. It was the third
choice for desperate third parties who fail to meet this burden—the paid, Guardian Ad Litem, paid “custody
evaluator” and the third party’s lawyer’s prior campaign contribution to the judge.
These grandparents had motioned for a Guardian Ad Litem before in Virginia. However, they had
done so much damage by themselves, that they didn’t need to deploy this alternative. Until my rights were
terminated after two tries and only on the third try, after the guardian was appointed, I didn’t realize that
they had intended to resort to this criminal means of obtaining a victory in Virginia if they had to, there as
well. This option is obviously well known to these people.
Willfully terminating parental rights, under color of law, is a federal crime.90 Collecting campaign
contributions to later conspire to willfully deprive and making money while conspiring to willfully deprive
constitutional rights, under color of law, well, that’s a whole other criminal “ballgame.”
Both the GAL and the custody evaluator in my case charged $300 per hour for their services. (See
Appendix). The evaluator charged a deposit of $1,250, per person before she would even initiate her services.
The fee for a deposition, which she attended, was $350 per hour. In her “agreement” letter, she estimated
that the average cost per family for an evaluation, involving several family members, is generally between
$6,000-$12,000, including “time necessary to prepare a written report but exclusive of time in court and/or
depositions.” Her deposition in my case, as the superior court judge failed to rule on the motions to make
her comply with his order, was three hours. That’s $1,050.
The GAL’s fees totaled $22,034.80 by the end of the proceedings and she demanded her money six times
over the course of the proceedings. (See Appendix).
So let’s say the evaluator charged $12,000 along with an additional $1,050 for her three-hour deposition.
That means she made $13,050. Add to what the GAL made and the total is $35,084.80. Keep in my mind
that we have no idea how much the grandparents’ attorney made. Now, just imagine if these two have five
O.C.G.A. 19-7-1(b.1) cases in one year. That comes out to $175,424. Now, multiply that by nineteen years
and you get $3,333,056. This is just a hypothetical scenario containing only one set of an evaluator and a GAL
earning money under this unconstitutional statute. How many other sets are there in Georgia making this
kind of money? Also, remember that this scenario does not include attorney’s fees which are undoubtedly
much, much more.

90 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (West). “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, …willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights,…secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States,…shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”

42
 NOT AT ALL
How many parents and families have been “evaluated” by a “custody evaluator” or GAL under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-1(b.1) over a course of nineteen years, under an intentionally enacted, unconstitutional statute? I
won’t pretend to be proficient in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), but
what I do know is there’s a potential, nineteen-year pattern of perpetrators in the state of Georgia, who have
violated the federal, criminal statute 18 § U.S.C. 242, by depriving the substantive due process rights of many,
many, many different fit parents, time and time and time again. I also know that the money being made, in
one form, are the campaign contributions that judges who preside over these cases, receive from lawyers
who take these cases and then appear before the same judges. In another form are the tremendous amounts
of fees that the lawyers who take these Clark cases make. The fourth form are the colossal amounts of fees
collected by Guardians Ad Litem and “custody” evaluators or other “expert witnesses,” appointed by these
judges, so that they may concoct the reports or testimony needed by the third parties, who have motioned
for their appointments, which will fill in the “circumstances” needed under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1). That
sounds like a big moneymaking fest going on down there.
Bringing unconstitutional orders to fruition in this organized fashion and then covering such up
consistently, by foreclosing access to the courts, makes this all a highly organized crime, spanning back
nineteen years, with an unknown but likely vast amount of perpetrators, including judges, justices and
legislators, and undoubtedly, an equally vast amount of victims. I’m only one. A few others have contacted
me over these last four years. How many more of us are there?
I’m pretty sure my brain has had enough of deciphering convoluted legal theories, without having been
to law school. So in the name of my health and sanity, I draw the line at what I’ve already done. However, I’m
also pretty sure that somewhere out there, there is some lawyer who is proficient in racketeering law, who is
licensed, and who could make one hell of a mass case out of this whole mess.

The Cover-Up Starts—The Georgia Supreme Court Shirks Its Exclusive Jurisdiction

The difference between my case and Troxel v. Granville is at least Tommie Granville got an appeal. The
state of Georgia decided that I wasn’t getting an appeal. As a matter of fact, I wasn’t getting any kind of way
to seek relief, not on the state or the federal level.
I appealed directly to the Georgia Supreme Court, making these arguments, clearly challenging the
constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1.):

“…the Appellant’s Legal and Custodial parental rights have been terminated, in that the Appellant
has been stripped of all legal custody of the child…”

“…The Appellant contends further that the Appellant’s parental rights have been terminated, in that
a fit parent’s rights are defined in the U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution) and Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57…”

“…The Mother contends that a removal of custody from [her] and award of ‘Full Legal Custody’ to
the Grandparents because the Mother showed hostility towards the Grandparents does not constitute

43
 Kyung Lee Trotter
clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct as prescribed in O.C.G.A. 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)
or egregious conduct pursuant to O.C.G.A. 15-11-94 (B)(iv)…”

“…WHEREFORE, The Appellant prays as follows:

(b)That this court reverse and remand this case back to the Superior Court for a proper adjudication
where the Mother will have to be proven unfit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-4,
or…the U.S. Const. Amend. XIV…”

The Georgia Supreme Court, under its state constitution, is vested with exclusive jurisdiction when an
appellant questions the constitutionality of a law.91 Although the state of Georgia’s Supreme Court is vested
with this exclusive jurisdiction, this court shirked its duty, deprived my right to an appeal in the correct
appellate court, and instead defended the state, by taking a stand for the statute itself. It declared:

“…‘custody’ of the child was awarded to the grandparents…”

“…Although she asserts that this Court has jurisdiction because the case concerns constitutional
questions…Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals involving mere application of unquestioned
and unambiguous constitutional provisions…”

It then transferred my appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals which obviously had no jurisdiction to
review the assertions I was making. This Court then affirmed the Superior Court’s decision without reviewing
any of my constitutional Enumerations of Error, as it had conspired with the grandparents’ attorney to
withhold the transcripts of the third trial, and then remarked:

“…To the extent that Trotter argues that the legal standard prescribed in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) is
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held otherwise, see Clark, 273 Ga. At 599 (V),
and this court is constitutionally bound by the decisions of our own Supreme Court”.

As one can plainly see this Court was fully aware that I had questioned the constitutionality of the
statute, and as such it had no business conducting its half-assed review.
The Georgia Supreme Court shirked its exclusive jurisdiction two more times, once when I petitioned
for certiorari and the third time by denying reconsideration.
I then filed my Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The grandparents had
no lawyer and they did not file a pro se response. That’s when, at the last minute, the politically influential,
and wealthy law firm, that the Superior Court judge used to work for, and owned shares in, stepped in. It

91 Ga. Const. Art. VI, § VI, Para. II (2015) PARAGRAPH II. “Exclusive appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court
The Supreme Court shall be a court of review and shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the following cases: (1) All…
cases in which the constitutionality of a law… has been drawn in question…”

44
 NOT AT ALL
filed a Waiver, fraudulently claiming to be representing my daughter’s father and supposedly on his behalf,
waived his intent to respond to my petition, unless the Court ordered him to do so. My daughter’s father
had not participated in any of the proceedings. He had not made a single appearance, as he was declared a
“fugitive from justice”. So if he did appear he would have been arrested. At no time did any counsel appear
on his behalf and he did not appeal on the state level, when his rights were also terminated.
Such shenanigans ended my attempts at relief at the state level, but the cover-up continued on to the
federal level.

45
 Chapter 5
T h e C o v e r - U p C o n t i n u e s To F e d e r a l C o u r t

T
hat’s me. It was about one o’clock in the morning. I was taking snoozes in between printing out the
fourteen copies required for whatever I was filing into the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals at
that time. I asked my boyfriend to take a picture of me. I wanted America to see the status of our
Constitution and our country. I wanted to catch a moment of the chaotic, exhausting hell I went through,
fighting for rights that I already had. This is what it looked like. Every time I see this picture I get tired and I
can hear the only sound in the room: the whirring of my printer.

The Gist of My Arguments On the Federal Level

So many different legal theories could be applied to these same set of facts. However, regardless of the
particular criterion applied for relief, the gist of my argument was that the state judge had terminated my
parental rights. It was not a “custody” matter. He had taken away my legal and custodial rights, permanently,
without finding me unfit. As such, this judge had acted without subject matter jurisdiction, and inconsistently
with due process.
He had removed my child from my home from 1,099 miles away after she had been back in my care for
thirteen months. Therefore, he also lacked home state and continuing exclusive jurisdiction. As a result,

47
 Kyung Lee Trotter
not only was the order void, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, but he was and still is, liable to me for the monetary
damages I requested in my 42 § U.S.C. 1983.
He was and is not immune; he fit and fits the criteria under Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) like
a glove.92
All of the defendants named had helped the grandparents succeed, by thwarting every single state and
federal substantive and procedural due process right I was entitled to, on the trial and appellate levels.
Consequently, they too were liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiring to deprive and depriving my rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, inter alia.
As the grandparents’ attorney and the Guardian Ad Litem were attorneys, thus officers of the court, but
both along with all of the others named in my independent action, had come to a meeting of the minds to
obstruct the integrity and judicial machinery of the court, the order was also void as procured by an extrinsic
fraud upon the court. That was my primary substantive argument.
My procedural due process argument was that the grandparents had had my child in their home, illegally
and instead of prosecuting them under Georgia’s criminal statute O.C.G.A. § 16-5-45, these people were
enabled to make the new, illegal family unit that they had created official, by buying my daughter.
They had lost at the first trial. They had lost at the second trial and when they couldn’t stand losing
anymore, they deployed their other choice available in the state of Georgia. They avoided the law altogether
and purchased the court order that they wanted.
I not only challenged the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) again, but also challenged the
Uniform Superior Court Rule State of Georgia 24.9.4. I argued that this rule, was the conduit by which those
who sought to buy a court order, could employ a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). As I’ve mentioned before,
under this rule, the GAL then has the power to recommend that a fit parent be “evaluated” psychologically,
in matters of “custody”, in order to determine whether or not he or she acts in the best interest of his or her
children. Of course the GAL hand-picks the “custody” evaluator, as in my case and whatever this “expert
witness” reports to the judge as to what is best for the child is what the judge orders. Period.
It is a way, I argued, to make a parent build a case under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), against himself, via
subjecting him to an unwarranted violation of his privacy and his person. It is akin to giving a criminal
judge the power to order an innocent man, accused of murder, to go out to the crime scene with a vial of his
blood, sprinkle it about, touch everything—including the murder weapon—and then have him return to the
court to combat the testimony of forensic experts. Sound insane? It is. This is what a judge under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-1(b.1) coupled with the Uniform Superior Court Rule State of Georgia 24.9.4, has the power to do to
a fit parent—for a price.

The Georgia Sop

The Georgia state judges, state justices, federal judges, federal justices, lawyers, court clerks, and state
Attorney General, will do anything to continue to keep such a tremendous scandal from being revealed to
the public. This is why they have established a system to foreclose any viable action or appeal.

92 Judge will...be subject to liability only when he has acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction.

48
 NOT AT ALL
This system of foreclosing access to the Courts has become highly efficient, as if each judge and justice
reaches for a Standard of Operating Procedures, (or as it’s called in the Army an “SOP”), when faced with
any action requesting relief from this ongoing crime. Apparently, every judge and justice has a copy. This
SOP contains an arsenal of weapons for the judge or justice to swiftly deploy and eradicate the enemy—the,
violated, injured citizens of this state.
The last time I saw my daughter was Christmas, 2014. As everything I’d filed had been foreclosed from
going forward in the state of Georgia, I was going to force the grandparents to register their “custody order”
in the state of Massachusetts and there, I would have challenged its validity.
When I told the grandfather that I had no intentions on sending my child back to them, he sent me a
barrage of threatening emails right before he called the police on me.
It was surreal. I looked out of my window and saw squad cars covering my lawn as if I was the criminal.
They came into my home, citing the grandparents “custody order” which the grandfather had faxed to them—
all twenty-six pages of Clark v. Wade reasoning—about how their “bond” with my daughter superseded my
liberty interest to continue having custody of her.
For the most part, the police were respectful and understanding, but they explained that it was their duty
to ensure that as far as they could see, a lawful custody order was honored. (Although we know this order is
far from lawful). In other words, the Millis, MA police department did exactly what the Cobb County police
department should have done.
That’s what I was thinking as I sat in my kitchen and an officer escorted my daughter to collect her things.
When she came back downstairs, she sat in the living room. I started to get up and go towards my living
room. That’s when an officer stopped me, as if they needed to protect her from me- like I was a danger to her.
She came to the kitchen to say goodbye to me, clutching the empty locket that I never got a chance to put a
picture of she and I in, and then she was gone.
At that point I broke down. I could tell that the officer who had stayed behind in the kitchen with me
had a heart, because he couldn’t even bear to turn around and look at me. He just stood frozen, with his back
towards me.
In one of the grandfather’s berating emails, before he sent the police to my house, he said something that
stuck with me. He said something to the effect of: “I don’t know who told you that our order is void, but until
a judge declares that it is, which none has, you are obligated to comply with it.”
It’s funny. I had argued in my Motion to Set Aside for Fraud Upon The Court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3),
(d)(3) and (b)(4) and my Motion To Vacate, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), that because the Superior Court judge
had acted without jurisdiction and inconsistently with due process,93 that his order was void, even before

93 Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). Generally, judgment is void, warranting relief from judgment under civil
procedure rules, if court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of subject matter, or of parties, or if it acted in manner inconsistent
with due process of law, or was powerless to enter judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.

49
 Kyung Lee Trotter
reversal,94 and that vacating it was a “mere formality.”95 But, now I realize in reading the cases cited in
footnotes 93, 94 and 95, although all is true, all of the provisions still require a judge to act.
I realize now that the grandfather, was pompously, informing me that he was above the law. He was
assuring me that he was confident in the efficiency of this cohesive system, basking in being in control and
laughing at my attempts to seek relief.
Even though I had started noticing the same patterns of shenanigans happening to my actions over and
over again, and I knew that whatever I filed would meet the same fate, I kept filing for relief.
As I’ve already mentioned, I appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, appealed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals and then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court again.
I filed for reconsiderations in both courts and then I appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
I filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain relief for my deprived constitutional rights, and formally challenged
the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), inter alia. I filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (d)(3) and (b)(4),
to set aside the “Final Order on Custody,” as procured by Fraud Upon the Court and a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
(4) to vacate the “final” order as void for lack of jurisdiction and as rendered inconsistent with due process.
I filed appeals and reconsiderations for all three of those actions.
I also filed two Petitions for Writs of Mandamus, one when the federal judge refused to do his job on the
Motion to Set Aside for Fraud Upon the Court and to make him recuse himself from my 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and one to make the magistrate hold a hearing and to make the same judge exercise his jurisdiction in my
Motion to Vacate—all to no avail.
I have cited and argued every procedural rule, court rule, statute, state and federal case under the sun
including Twombly, Liteky, Rooker-Feldman, Stump v. Sparkman, Hazel-Atlas, Bell v. Hood- all of the fun
ones. I started to count every law or case that I had cited from day one-but that would take a legal team. It is
an impossible mission for one person.
Oh yeah, I forgot to mention I had read that:

“…A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the
parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order
procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided
that the party is properly before the court.96

So when this same Georgia federal judge, who somehow was presiding over all three of my actions, just
sat on my Motion to Set Aside for Fraud Upon the Court, for months doing nothing, I flew out to Chicago
where the initial precedent for such relief was set. I felt that if this order was void that everybody had

94 “…The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal….” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920).
95 In re Dabrowski, 257 B.R. 394, 406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001). “…there is an exception to the application of Rooker–Feldman. It
exists when the state court judgment is void… The rationale for the exception, in part, is that because a void judgment is null,
vacating such a judgment is a mere formality and does not intrude upon the notion of mutual respect in federal-state interests.”
96 Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999)

50
 NOT AT ALL
jurisdiction and nobody jurisdiction because there was nothing to have jurisdiction over. Therefore, any
federal judge could set aside a void order, especially one which is “manifestly unconscionable.97 I would love
for lawyers to weigh in on this concept.
At the hearing in Chicago, the judge and I went back and forth on jurisdiction. He kept cutting me off
any time I tried to speak. So I walked out on him. Even though that felt great, I was waiting for him to order
me into contempt, but he didn’t. The whole courtroom, including him, just sat silently when I left.
I wanted to be able to show that I had done it all. I can now tell you with certainty, I have filed every
action possible for relief. No judge will act.

The Specific Shenanigans Of The Georgia Sop

Here are the common shenanigans that the judges and justices turn to.

Shenanigan 1: The Motion Into the “Round-File” Solution

We now know that these nineteen years of “disputes” between parents and third parties, have actually
been nineteen years of deprived rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, along with a colossal
amount of money made. Given the aforementioned ramifications of this state’s unchecked power, no judge
or justice in Georgia would dare to act. Every judge in Georgia who has even thought about acting probably
shit their pants and decided otherwise.
In other words, Judge Kell knew what he was doing. He had no intentions on being that judge who
exposed the “goings on” in Georgia. Had he ruled on my Motion To Dismiss, wherein I had asserted my
constitutional right to the fitness standard, he would have initiated the scandal. He would have exposed
the unconstitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), the intentional violation of the Supremacy Clause, by
the Georgia General Assembly, and all nineteen years of his colleagues who had rendered unconstitutional
orders. He would have exposed all of the Guardians Ad Litem, “expert witnesses” and lawyers, who had
profited for nineteen years, bringing these nineteen years of willful deprivations of constitutional rights to
fruition. Therefore, when he received my Motion to Dismiss, he deployed Shenanigan 1. He tossed it into
the “round file.”
He read it though. I know he read it because right before the third trial started, he looked me right in my
eyes and said, “The standard is the best interest standard.” I suppose this was his “expressed” denial that the
Georgia Court of Appeals miraculously affirmed.
I can tell you what he said because of course, I was there in the courtroom. However, I’m still trying to
figure out how the justices of the Georgia Court of Appeals were so sure of what he had “expressed,” when
like they said, they had no transcripts. Moreover, his “expressed” denial would have been fine had O.C.G.A.
§ 15-6-21 not commanded him to rule on a written motion- with a written order.
Both the federal judge and the Eleventh Circuit also, fully utilized this shenanigan, but we’ll have to come
back to that.

97 Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 657 (1912)

51
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Shenanigan 2: Send In the Magistrate

The Magistrates Attempt to Get Rid of My 42 §U.S.C. 1983

I was still completely naïve in believing that somehow my experience with the state courts wouldn’t be
the same as requesting relief from the federal courts. I wish one could have seen my face when I received my
first response from the magistrate assigned to my 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After I had ripped the letter open, my
excitement quickly turned to utter confusion. I was dumbfounded, reading that my Motion to Proceed in
forma pauperis had been granted- but only to be sent to the federal judge to be dismissed as having no merit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, in other words as a “frivolity,” according to the magistrate.
Before I go on let me point out under what circumstances a magistrate may recommend a dismissal
of a complaint filed by a pro se litigant, wishing to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Notice that the choices are enumerated for particularity: frivolity, failure to state a claim, and immunity.
That’s it. I won’t touch on malicious because it doesn’t apply to me.
The magistrate claimed that he was forwarding my complaint because he had found it to be a frivolity.
However, he went on to “…insist that [I] amend [my] eighty-three-page complaint…”
This particular language has nothing to do with a complaint having no merit. In claiming that he was
recommending a dismissal for a frivolity, but recommending that I amend my complaint, he actually declared
that I had failed to state a claim. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).

“…(1) Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) does not preclude district courts from granting leave to
amend when dismissing in forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim…”

Yes. I know. It says “Prison Litigation Reform Act” and I’m not a prisoner. That was my first argument,
but look at how 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) reads:

(a)(1) Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement
of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

52
 NOT AT ALL
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person
is entitled to redress.

There seems to be some deliberate “wiggle-room” left as to how this section can be interpreted and
applied. Are we talking about a prisoner or a person?
Anyway, out of eighty-three pages, he couldn’t find enough factual heft to determine that my complaint
met the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, (2007).

“…Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the
... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’ (citation omitted)…a complaint…does not need
detailed factual allegations,…(citation omitted)…a plaintiff ’s obligation to provide the… ‘grounds’
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief ’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do,(citation omitted)… Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (‘[T]he pleading
must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a
legally cognizable right of action’)…on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact) (citations omitted) (‘Rule 12(b)(6) [or in my case, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)
(2)(B)(ii)] does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual
allegations’); (citation omitted)… (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears ‘that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely’)…”

I can tell just by this declaration by the magistrate: “The factual narrative of the complaint begins in
2000…” that he didn’t even read the complaint. My husband and I were not divorcing in the year 2000. I
didn’t file for a divorce until 2002.

“Statute of limitations” is nowhere in the enumerated choices that a magistrate has under 1915.
Nevertheless, the magistrate goes on to assert the defense that the statute of limitations for me to
bring my suit had run against Defendant Amy Van-Fossen, the attorney that had represented the
grandparents in Virginia. He completely disregarded my argument in the complaint that the acts or
omissions committed by the defendants, were a “continuous conspiracy” starting from 2002. Scherer
v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1988). “…Statute of limitations…to recover damages caused by civil
conspiracy, did not bar consideration of allegations from which jury could infer agreement entered
outside limitations period. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 4, 5; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986…”

Does anyone see in 28 § U.S.C. 1915, the power to recommend dismissal because the magistrate feels
that the defendants named in the conspiracy, in his opinion, are not state actors, but “’private citizens”?
No? Neither do I, but this was the next reason given by the magistrate for the federal judge to dismiss as a
“frivolity.”

53
 Kyung Lee Trotter
He then goes on, although purporting to be recommending dismissal for a “frivolity” to declare that
all of the judges and “others carrying out the orders of a court…” were immune— completely disregarding
every fact and legal argument I made in my complaint.
After commingling all of three distinct legal theories, and asserting a defense, he suggests that the federal
Court sua sponte, require me to refile a “more definite statement.” Again, this is failure to state a claim
language. Assessing a complaint for plausibility only deals with the facts of the complaint. It does not involve
a magistrate applying law to those facts, arbitrarily, and it most certainly does not involve assertions of
defenses.
He then finalizes his recommendation for a “frivolity” by suggesting that the court order me to “excis[e]
the claims that are clearly barred by the statute of limitations” which would have killed my claim that all
of the actions were a continuous conspiracy. He recommended that I “excis[e] the claims against ‘private
citizens,’” effectively eliminating the Ayres and Van-Fossen from the claims, which, of course after that, there
are no claims. He even goes way out of the constraints of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, suggesting there was “no evidence
of a conspiracy with a government actor.” Wow. I didn’t know that a magistrate could go beyond the face of
the complaint and have his own private trial- all by himself!
He ends with recommending to the federal judge that I also “excis[e] my claims against parties that are
‘clearly immune from suit,’” or at least according to him.
So, this magistrate assessed the face of my complaint for plausibility and then recommended that I strip
my complaint until it failed to state a claim. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t think that this is the function
of the federal magistrate.
In response to this nonsense, I simply paid my filing fee. The district judge had no choice but to vacate
his order. However, the magistrate was still busy.

How the Magistrate Got Rid of My Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)

I had requested that the “Final Order On Custody” be vacated as void for lack of subject matter, home
state and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and as rendered inconsistent with due process.
The magistrate basically fixed the state judge’s lack of jurisdiction and inconsistency with due process,
with his own act, lacking jurisdiction. The district judge had the audacity to then dismiss my action with
prejudice and adopt this R&R—rendered without jurisdiction. Not only was this judge not going to do his
job, but he was going to forbid me from ever seeking again, to have this void order vacated, by adopting a
void recommendation.
Here’s an excerpt from my Petition For Writ of Mandamus explaining what the magistrate had done.

“…The Magistrate Judge Usurped His Authority Under 28 U.s.c. § 636(B)(1)

I. The magistrate judge had no authority under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) to hear a FRCP 60(b)(4)
. When a district court is faced with the question of whether or not an order was void upon its
inception the judge may however, refer the matter to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 636 (b)
(3). Nevertheless, the magistrate’s power is still limited. He may only hold an evidentiary hearing
and it is only after having held an evidentiary hearing that he can make a R&R to the district court

54
 NOT AT ALL
judge. Whether the Petitioner consented to the magistrate conducting a hearing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 (c), which she did not, or the district court simply assigned the matter without the consent
of the Petitioner and the Respondents, either way, he has to hold an evidentiary hearing . He has
no authority to skip over the evidentiary hearing, address the merits of the action, assert a defense
and then after arbitrarily addressing the merits, recommend to the district court judge that the
motion be Denied, (again, not “Dismissed” as the district court’s order states) for lack of the power
to address the merits. The magistrate judge claimed that the district court had no jurisdiction to
hear the motion, but once he declared that The Order was a “child custody decree” and not a TPR
rendered in the wrong court, as the Petitioner had asserted, he touched on the merits of the action.
A dismissal doesn’t touch on the merits and the magistrate usurped his authority by addressing
the merits of the action, and then submitting a R&R to the district court judge, without holding an
evidentiary hearing.…”

I had filed this petition with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to force the magistrate to hold a
hearing, which brings me to the third shenanigan.

Shenanigan 3: Search Your Own Precedent to Find Any Way to Deny Relief

Of course the Eleventh Circuit denied my petition, citing that Georgia’s remedy for a usurpation
of power is an appeal. “Mandamus relief is not warranted in this case. Because the district court
entered a final judgment, Trotter can seek this Court’s review of the order dismissing her Rule 60(b)
(4) motions through a direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291…”

How in God’s name can an adoption of an R&R, rendered without jurisdiction, be final—let alone
appealable?
The Eleventh Circuit took just enough time to render a ruling, for my time to file a Notice of Appeal to run
out. When I asked them to construe my petition as an appeal, of course they said that my time had run out.

Shenanigan 4: If You’re a Judge Being Sued, Fuck the Federal Rules

I knew things were going to continue to go badly when Judge Kell and the state Attorney General, instead
of returning their waivers of summonses to me so that I could file them into the court, (the correct procedure
of accepting a waiver) they filed their own waivers into the court themselves: a total “fuck you” to me.
They then went on to file a forty-four page “Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss,” which was actually both an
Answer and Rule 12(b) motion, whereby they could assert defenses, but at the same time, avoid responding
to every single allegation of my complaint with an admission or denial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12:

(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted
in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by
motion:
(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

55
 Kyung Lee Trotter
(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;
(3) improper venue;
(4) insufficient process;
(5) insufficient service of process;
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and
(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.

A motion asserting any of these defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is
allowed.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8:

(b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials.

(1) In General: In responding to a pleading, a party must:
(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and
(B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.
(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of
the allegation.
(3) General and Specific Denials: A party that intends in good faith to deny all the allegations
of a pleading--including the jurisdictional grounds--may do so by a general denial. A party
that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny designated
allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted.
(4) Denying Part of an Allegation: A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of an
allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest.
(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information: A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the
effect of a denial.
(6) Effect of Failing to Deny: An allegation, other than one relating to the amount of damages,
is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a
responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.
(c) Affirmative Defenses.
(1) In General: In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or
affirmative defense, including: estoppel;…

They were determined to disregard the actualities of my complaint and steer it in a direction that worked
better for them. Whereas as I had sued Judge Kell in his individual capacity, the two of them decided that he
was in his official capacity as the state. As a matter of fact, although the attorney general was actually the one
sued in his official capacity as the state, for prospective relief, the two of them teamed up and decided that
they were both the state and one party.

56
 NOT AT ALL
Along with the affirmative defense of estoppel, they argued that as Judge Kell was the state, suit against
him was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. They asserted that as he was the state, that I had failed to serve
the state, ante litem notice.
They then went on to defend the so-called constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), but we’ve already
discussed that haven’t we? We now know that this statute doesn’t exist. So… how could he be acting in his
“official” capacity under a nonexistent statute?
They also tossed every weapon possible at me including: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Domestic
Relations Exception, and Failure to State a Claim—all which slide down the drain, given the unconstitutionality
of the statute itself.
Moreover, on top of them dictating how the legal process was going to go, here you had an individual
person—not a judge—who should have retained his own private counsel to defend himself, being defended
by another defendant, all on the Georgia tax-payer’s dime.
In their zealous, joint “Pre-Answer,” they made a particular blunder. They admitted that my child had, in
fact, been removed from my home.
Up until that point, no one had admitted that crucial fact. The Georgia Court of Appeals had gone
through great lengths to keep that fact out of their order.
A removal, like we’ve already thoroughly examined, is not “custody.” He had admitted to indeed acting
without subject matter jurisdiction as outlined in the state of Georgia’s statutes, and he had indeed severed
my custodial relationship with my child, without due process. For those acts, again, he was not immune
and he was not the state. The state of Georgia has since overhauled their domestic relations statutes,
especially to get rid of the word “deprived”, but such does not affect what the laws were at the time of
my case.
Recognizing the victory they had just served me on a silver platter, I filed for Summary Judgment.
Their counsel completely botched her response, failing to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Rule
56.1B.(2). The case should have ended there, with my child being returned to my home, Judge Kell’s order
being rendered void, him paying me the $3,000,000 dollars that I requested in damages and the declaratory
and injunctive relief I had asked for against the state attorney general, granted.

Shenanigan 5: Send In The “Big Guns”

That wasn’t happening. Rather than rule in my favor, fork over a total of $96,000,000, as there were
twenty-nine defendants, repeal O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) and initiate the “ginormous” scandal, the district
judge sent me my out of time summonses. I guess he figured he’d give some more attorneys a crack at me.
Once again in came the “Big Guns”: then Brock, Clay, Calhoun and Rogers, LLC., now, Gregory, Doyle,
Calhoun and Rogers LLC. Once again, this had been Judge Kell’s former employer, a firm he owns—and the
defendants themselves, defending the grandparents and their lawyer.
They handed me the same crap that Judge Kell and Sam Olens had handed me. All they did was give me
a chance to enhance the same arguments I had already made when I replied to them, especially my response
to their assertion that I had failed to state a claim:

57
 Kyung Lee Trotter
“…In order for the Plaintiff to survive the said Rule 12(b) (6) Motion To Dismiss, under FRCP 8, her
complaint must be well-pleaded in order to be assumed as true. The Court will not assume as true,
formulaic recitations of elements, bare-naked assertions or legal conclusions. The Court will then
determine whether the allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief. When a pleading
alleges a conspiracy, as the Plaintiff ’s does, plausibility is pleading enough factual heft for the Court
to not only infer the possibility of a meeting of the minds to deprive constitutional rights, but the
Court must not be able to come to any other lawful possible, alternative which would also explain the
parallel actions of the defendants…”

In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the court ultimately found that the carriers’ reaction
to their interdependence upon each other and the market, could have suggested a meeting of the
minds to violate the Sherman Act, but it could also have been and was more likely that it was a
natural reaction by any carrier corporation given the market.

Id. at 553:

“...Even conscious parallelism, a common reaction of firms in a concentrated market that recognize
their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions
is not in itself unlawful. The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without
more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line
with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market…”

Unlike in Twombly, regarding the parallel misconduct of the defendants named in the Plaintiff ’s
complaint, there is no alternative, lawful explanation for fifteen state officials to fail to comply with
at least ten procedural statutes, countless substantive statutes and an endless amount of case law,
all specifically pleaded and cited by the Plaintiff, which are certainly not all inclusive below, and no
alternative explanation for the following parallel, unlawful actions…”

(I then listed all of the facts of the complaint against each defendant with bullet points.)

“…The Plaintiff ’s aforesaid bullet points and specific paragraphs expounding on those points are
far from bare assertions or conclusory allegations of agreements at some unidentified point. The
Plaintiff has not only pointed to specific points of agreement, but has provided more than enough
heft that a preceding agreement is plausible.

In regards to the Court inferring that a preceding agreement is plausible, the Plaintiff respectfully
invites the Court to fill in the blank. Unlike in Twombly, Id. and Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
682 (2009), where the defendants’ parallel conduct were inferred to be lawful, natural reactions,
similar to actions taken shown in history under similar circumstances , the aforementioned and

58
 NOT AT ALL
well-pleaded, tremendous amount of calculated, parallel, unlawful actions of so many defendants,
which resulted in the Plaintiff ‘s child being removed from her home and her legal rights terminated
, after she was found fit, in a Superior Court, where the matter was not one of an adoption, could just
as well be________________. If the Court cannot fill in the blank, as in Twombly and Aschcroft, then
the Ayres’ Motion To Dismiss should be denied.

The Court can only infer that such unprecedented, parallel unlawful, misconduct suggests that there
was indeed a preceding agreement to conspire to remove the Plaintiff ’s child from her home, under
color of O.C.G.A. §19-7-1 and Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001), in spite of every possible procedural,
substantive and constitutional law applicable, which such are thoroughly and specifically cited in her
complaint [pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Plaintiff gives an abundance
of further factual enhancement. Her factual allegations are far from bare, “He hurt me and I want
justice” allegations. The Plaintiff ’s complaint is replete with factual material thoroughly elaborating
on the bullet points above and then some. Her claims are not formulaic recitations of elements of
a claim, far from unadorned, and certainly not naked assertions. She has provided enough heft to
nudge the court’s inference of a conspiracy from possible to plausible…”

The federal judge deployed Shenanigan 6.

Shenanigan 6: When All Else Fails Just Sua Sponte Dismiss the Entire Action

The “Big Guns” had basically thrown the exact same “defenses” and arguments that Judge Kell and Sam
Olens had thrown at me. I made the argument that there was no alternative, legal explanation for the all of
the defendants’ acts or omissions. I then moved to disqualify the state attorney general’s office as Judge Kell’s
counsel and to vacate all of the pleadings that the office had filed on his behalf. I guess after that argument
and those two motions, the federal judge had had enough of me and my ability to understand the law. He
was going to get rid of me and my case once and for all.
The defendants’ arguments had not changed much from what the magistrate had first asserted. Because
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) was supposedly constitutional, a question that should have been answered by the
Georgia Supreme Court, Judge Kell was acting in his official capacity, therefore he was the state. As the
state he was immune—and so were everybody who worked for him and was appointed by him. Because
everybody who was appointed by him had “quasi” immunity, including the GAL and the evaluator, then the
Ayres and Van-Fossen weren’t state actors. Because the subject matter was “custody” and not a termination
of parental rights, my suit was barred by the Domestic Relations Exception. Because the state judges and
justices had addressed and ruled on my claims that my constitutional rights had been violated, like Judge
Kell “expressly” ruling on my motion, the Georgia Supreme Court shirking its exclusive jurisdiction, and the
Court of Appeals exercising jurisdiction it didn’t have, my suit was “inextricably intertwined” with all three
of those state actions—as well as “estopped.” Subsequently, because of all these things, my suit failed to state
a claim.

59
 Kyung Lee Trotter
To avoid having to actually assess my complaint for plausibility, as well as rule on my ten motions,
five replies and two responses, which addressed all of the said absurdities, the district judge simply sua
sponte dismissed the entire action. He went all the way back to the beginning of the case and reasserted the
magistrate’s order that he had vacated. He too, argued for the defendants, commingled many standards and
claimed he lacked jurisdiction while granting motions at the same time. It was just a big mess. It’s a good
thing that I looked up the 150 Day Rule because that’s about how long it took me to untangle it all. It’s best if
one just reads my brief in the Appendix.
He deployed the same shenanigan for my Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3),(d)(3) and (b)(4), probably angry that
the Eleventh Circuit had found that he had indeed let too much time pass without acting on this action.
He sua sponte dismissed this action too, again asserting that he lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Domestic Relations Exception. You may see my full argument for this
dismissal below. For now let’s move on to Shenanigan 7.

Shenanigan 7: Avoid the De Novo Review At All Times

I was entitled to three de novo reviews. The first one that the federal judge should have conducted, was
after I had objected to the magistrate’s R&R, he rendered without jurisdiction on my Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).

28 U.S.C.A. § 636 (b)(1)(C)(2): A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.

He did not conduct a review and simply adopted the magistrate’s illegal R&R.

The Eleventh Circuit avoided conducting a de novo review of my 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by deploying both
Shenanigans 1 and 6.
After I had filed my brief and Appendix, all of the defendants filed collective “Motions To Dismiss,”
claiming that my appeal was untimely and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction. They also filed Motions
To “stay” their briefs pending the Courts rulings.
I not only responded that there was no federal rule of procedure to “stay” a brief, but I argued, that as
the district judge had failed to set out his judgments on separate documents, that my “appeal clock” had not
begun to run until 150 days from the date the judgements were entered on the docket and as such, my notice
of appeal was, indeed, timely.
This time to avoid acting in my favor, the Court tossed the Appellees’ motions into the “round-file”,
thereby ridding themselves of my responses containing arguments which showed that my appeal was timely.
The Court then sua sponte dismissed my appeal reasserting exactly what the Appellees had asserted—that
my Notice of Appeal was untimely.
I filed for a reconsideration. Here it is.

60
 NOT AT ALL
My Reconsideration Of The Sua Sponte Dismissal of My Section 1983

“…The Court Overlooked The Separate Document And 150 Day Rules

The issue of jurisdiction may be raised by the Court, sua sponte, or a party. See Symantec Corp. v.
Global Impact, 559 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (order) (appellate jurisdiction); Phaneuf v. Republic of
Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1997) (appellate jurisdiction); Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car,
97 F.3d 319, 323 (9th Cir. 1996) (district court jurisdiction). The Court overlooked and disregarded
the fact that the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction to wit, the timeliness of the Appellant’s Notice Of
Appeal, had already been raised by the Appellees and what’s more, responded to by the Appellant.
As the Appellees had already raised the issue of jurisdiction, there was no reason for the Court to
re-raise the issue sua sponte and much worse, disregard the Separate Document and 150 Day Rule
arguments asserted by the Appellant, as to the timelines of her Notice Of Appeal. Moreover, just as
the Court sua sponte, raised the issue of jurisdiction, it could have, sua sponte, raised the Separate
Document requirement and the 150 Day Rules. Corrigan v. Bargala, 140 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1998):

Although neither party raised the separate judgment requirement of Rule 58(a)…, we may sua sponte
bring this issue to the attention of the parties…

Bargala speaks to a situation where the parties had not raised the separate document issue. Here,
in this instant appeal, the parties had raised and argued it on the Appellees’ motion. Yet, the Court
overlooked and disregarded both chances it had to recognize the points of law, which was sua sponte
and as the Appellees had already raised the issue.”

The Court Overlooked The Lack Of Finality Of

The District Court’s Order

In assuring itself of its own jurisdiction, the Court also checks the lower Court’s order for finality. Had the
Court, in missing its two chances to recognize that the district Court’s order contained fourteen judgments,
not set out on separate documents and its [Docs 57 and 58], should have also been set out on separate
documents, it would have also discovered that the district Court’s order is not final. The district Court did
not render any judgments for any of the Appellant’s claims for which she asked for declaratory relief, [Doc
10, Pages 59-61], which were reflected in the First through Eighth Prayers For Relief, especially the First.
[Doc 10, Page 59]:

First Prayer For Relief

In that the Plaintiff was a custodial parent and had a consistent relationship with her child, the
Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to the termination standard, before
her liberty interest to her children can be terminated by any court and any other relief this Court
deems fit.

61
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Pursuant to Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633-34, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945): “A
‘final decision’ generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment. St. Louis I.M. & S.R.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24,
28, 2 S.Ct. 6, 8, 27 L.Ed. 638. Hence, ordinarily …appellate review may be had only upon an order or
judgment disposing of the whole case, and adjudicating all rights…”

The Court should have also raised Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) sua sponte. Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd.
of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997).

…Although neither party raised the issue in its brief, we consider the propriety of Rule 54(b)
certification sua sponte because such certifications implicate the scope of our appellate jurisdiction.
See Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir.1993). Federal courts
have an independent obligation to police the constitutional and statutory limits on our jurisdiction.
Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir.1983)…

In checking for finality, the Court overlooked that in failing to render judgments on the declaratory
claims, the district Court rendered judgments of some but not all of the claims, but failed to certify such
judgments and state that there was “no just reason for delay”. Again, …final judgment is proper only after
the rights and liabilities of all the parties to the action have been adjudicated. Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville
Bd. of Educ., supra at 167. Moreover, in instances such as this, when the factual underpinnings of the
adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are intertwined, courts should be hesitant to employ Rule 54(b). Id
at 167 citing Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1994). The district Court
rendered judgments for some but not all of claims, yet, didn’t certify such under Fed. R. Civ. 54(b) and it
should not have, as all of the underpinning claims are intertwined. The Court overlooked all of these points
of law. Not only did the district Court fail to set its judgments out on separate documents, it failed to certify
its judgments that it failed to set out on separate documents, and all this after first finding that it lacked
jurisdiction to decide anything at all.

The Court Overlooked The Fact That The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Hear The Action

The Court overlooked the fact that this appeal should have gone to a merits panel, not a motions panel.
As the Court in its ruling has given the Appellant direction to file a motion for reconsideration, the Appellant
concludes that such is what took place. The Appellant had already filed her brief (and her Appendix). The
Appellees had failed to file their briefs. The “briefs were in”. This appeal was ripe to be forwarded to a merits
panel and argued, and the Appellant had requested oral argument. A merits panel should have not only
decided the Appellees’ motions along with the Appellant’s responses to such, but would have found that
the district Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appellant’s claims, which is precisely what
the appeal is about. Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given
them.” Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47

62
 NOT AT ALL
L.Ed.2d 483. The district Court failed in that obligation. This Court’s jurisdictional issue is bound up with
the merits of the appeal.
A federal court of appeals, upon receiving an appeal, checks whether the appeal is timely, the order
being appealed is final and the jurisdiction of the Court below . The issue of timeliness had already been
raised by the Appellees and responded to by the Appellant. Should the Court still deem the district Court’s
order final, the Appellant’s Notice Of Appeal was timely as the district Court failed to set out its judgments
in separate documents. However, the district Court’s order is not final and appealability cannot be found
without certifications under Fed. R. Civ. 54(b) and with claims still lacking judgments…”

***********************************************************

My Brief for The Dismissal of My Motion To Set Aside

Here’s my brief I mentioned before as promised. I felt it was important to include this brief concerning
the federal judge’s assertions of the abstentions, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Domestic Relations
exception. During my legal research, I found countless federal courts hurling these two particular weapons
at pro se litigants, who had sought relief for their deprived constitutional rights during a custody case. This
brief will tell you exactly when these two doctrines don’t apply to a federal action, which has arisen out of a
custody matter. This inclusion goes beyond unconstitutional parent v. third party “disputes”. This is for every
parent who has had sought relief in federal court, from a family court order procured by fraud upon the
court.

“Statement Of The Issues

In a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 action, for relief from a state court order procured by fraud upon the court,
whether the domestic relations exception and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine preempts the district
court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appellant’s matter.

Statement Of The Case

This appeal involves an independent action for relief for Appellant, Kyung Trotter, from a state court
order which was procured by fraud upon the court. The district court sua sponte dismissed Kyung
Trotter’s action, holding that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the domestic relations exception and
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

I. Course of Proceedings

On July 15, 2013, Kyung Trotter filed (Doc 1), Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis with her Motion
to Set Aside Final Order on Custody and All Orders Rendered After March 4, 2004 along with a
Memorandum of Law In Support of such. On July 30, 2013 the application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis was submitted to the magistrate, Judge E. Clayton Schofield. On August 16, 2013, Ms.

63
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Trotter paid her filing fee and on the same day the aforesaid Motion To Set Aside was docketed as
(Doc. 4). On October 2, 2013, the Appellant filed a Motion to Withdraw her application for in forma
pauperis status (Doc. 2). Such was submitted to the Magistrate on October 16, 2013. On October
18, 2013, the Appellant filed a Motion to Withdraw her (Doc. 4) which was (Doc. 5). On October
21, 2013, the district Court granted Ms. Trotter’s (Doc. 2). On October 22, 2013, the district Court
terminated the case.

On October 31, 2013, Ms. Trotter filed a Motion for a Separate Document (Doc. 6). On 31, 2013, she
also filed a motion to withdraw her (Doc. 5).

On December 2, 2013 (Docs. 6 and 7) were submitted to the district Court.

On August 4, 2014 the Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with this Court and application
to proceed in forma pauperis. The application was granted on September 25, 2014. This Court held
that the district Court had closed the case without issuing a final, appealable order, that the district
Court unduly delayed resolving the motion and invited the district Court to respond by October
27, 2014. On September 30, 2014, (Doc. 9) the district Court sua sponte dismissed the Appellant’s
(Doc. 4) holding that it did not have jurisdiction pursuant to the domestic relations exception and
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district Court did not file its response to the granted application
by October 27, 2014.

The Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal with the district Court (Doc 10) and application to proceed
in forma pauperis (Doc. 13).

On October 28, 2014 the district Court denied the Appellant’s (Doc. 13), holding that it had ruled
that it didn’t have jurisdiction and that the Appellant had not filed her appeal in good faith.

The Appellant paid her filing fee (Doc. 17) on November 12, 2014 and now proceeds.

II. Statement of the Facts

After Ms. Trotter’s attempts to raise her constitutional rights in the state trial and state appellate
courts were thwarted, by various forms of failures of the officers of the courts and others to follow
procedural, substantive and constitutional law as described in (Doc. 4), the Appellant filed for relief
from the “final” order rendered by the state trial court and application to proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc 1). On July 15, 2013 she filed both the said action and her action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
docketed in the district court as No.: 1:13-CV-2344 (the 1983). Although both actions were filed on
the same day, the 1983 was docketed in the district court, but (Doc 1) was not. After several phone
calls by the Appellant to the clerk’s office, to inquire as to why the independent action had not been
docketed, finally on July 30, 2013 the court docketed (Doc. 1), fifteen days later. Her application to

64
 NOT AT ALL
proceed in forma pauperis was submitted to the magistrate, however, such sat for an additional sixteen
days with no action. On August 16, 2013, she paid her filing fee and on the same day (Doc 1) was
docketed as (Doc 4). On October 2, 2013, as the Appellant had paid her filing fee and no action had
been taken on her application for in forma pauperis, (Doc.1), the Appellant motioned to withdraw
the application (Doc. 2). Fourteen days later, on October 16, (Docs. 1 and 2) were submitted to the
magistrate judge. However, after ninety days of unexplained non-action, the Appellant had lost faith
in the integrity of the court. As such, she filed (Doc. 5), motion to withdraw her action.

On October 21, 2013 the district Court combined both of the Appellant’s actions, her request for relief
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and her suit for damages, declaratory relief and a constitutional challenge
to a state statute, Docket No. 1:13-cv-2344, on one order (Doc. 3). Taking jurisdiction of the 1983,
it denied her motion for appointment of counsel and request for class action status (Doc. 4). Also
accepting jurisdiction over her independent action, he also granted her (Doc. 2) of the said action.
The very next day, October 22, 2013, the district Court terminated her independent action, without
rendering a final order.

Completely bewildered at the combination of the two actions on one order, on October 31, 2013, the
Appellant asked for separate documents (Doc. 6). She also requested to withdraw her (Doc. 5) which
was (Doc. 7). Nearly two months later, on December 2, 2013, (Docs. 6 and 7) were submitted to the
district Court. The district Court since October 21, 2013, took no further action. The magistrate did
not take any action the entire time.

On August 4, 2014, the Appellant filed her Petition for Writ of Mandamus in this court, Docket No.:
14-13483, against the district Court and motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted
on September 25, 2014. This Court held that the district Court had closed the case without issuing a
final, appealable order, that the district Court unduly delayed resolving the motion and invited the
district Court to respond by October 27, 2014. It never responded. Instead on September 30, 2014
the district Court sua sponte dismissed the Appellant’s independent action, invoking the Rooker-
Feldman abstention and claiming that the domestic relations exception preempted Ms. Trotter’s
action.

Standards Of Review

This Court reviews questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d
1327, 1331-1332, (11th Cir. Ga. 2001). It also reviews dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, de novo. Velazquez v. S. Fla. Fed. Credit Union, 46 Fed. Appx. 854, 856,
(11th Cir. Fla. 2013).

65
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Summary Of The Argument

The district Court cannot be without jurisdiction and adjudicate the merits at the same time. The subject
matter of the Appellant’s independent action is fraud upon the court not domestic relations. The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not bar an action where one is alleging extrinsic fraud nor does it bar an action when
a state trial litigant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to raise her federal claims in the state court.
Moreover, the district court has inherent jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter of fraud upon the
court.

Argument

I. The District Court Claimed That It Lacked Jurisdiction, But Decided The Merits Of The Action

At no time between July 15, 2013 and September 25, 2014, did the district Court question its
jurisdiction over the Appellant’s independent action. It was not until fourteen months later and
after this Court had granted her IFP on the mandamus, and invited the district Court to respond,
that suddenly, the district Court sua sponte, decided it didn’t have jurisdiction and dismissed the
Appellant’s independent action.

Pursuant to Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007): “…jurisdictional
questions ordinarily must precede merits determinations in dispositional order…” The district Court,
while claiming it lacked jurisdiction, made a judgment on the merits. Ms. Trotter’s main contention
in her independent action is that the state court order isn’t an order at all, but void ab initio as her
child was removed from her home and her parental rights were terminated in the wrong and a
tainted court. The state of Georgia clearly and statutorily differentiates between removing a child
from a parent’s home and a matter of child custody, the two different sets of due process it takes for
either and the two different courts each matter belongs in. By deciding that Ms. Trotter was asking
the district Court for a review, it concluded that the order was valid and that a review could even be
taken from it. While claiming that it did not have jurisdiction, the district Court found that the order
was valid not void ab initio as the Appellant contends, that her rights were not terminated, that the
judicial machinery of the state trial court itself was not defiled, that no procedural, substantive or
constitutional laws were thwarted by the state trial judge or any officers of the state court- but that it
was merely a custody case in a state trial court. “…[A] federal court generally may not rule…on the
merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit
(subject-matter jurisdiction)…Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause; it
may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits of the case.…Dismissal short of
reaching the merits means that the court will not “proceed at all” to an adjudication of the cause…Id.
The Court cannot be without jurisdiction but have jurisdiction to decide the merits at the same time.

66
 NOT AT ALL
[II]. The District Court Erred In Applying The Domestic Relations Exception

The district Court dismissed the Appellant’s independent action for relief from a state court order,
which was procured by fraud upon the court. It claimed that it lacked jurisdiction because “the whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child belongs to the laws of the
states and not to the laws of the United States.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703(1992).
In other words, the Court invoked the domestic relations exception. First of all, it is not the child’s
father who has Ms. Trotter’s child, but her child’s paternal grandparents (the Ayres), a whole different
constitutional “ballgame” which such matters are in fact left up to the United States and such liberty
interest against third party relatives, is in fact secured under the U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Second, in actuality, the domestic relations exception “…divests
the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” Id. The Appellant
didn’t ask the district Court to issue a divorce, alimony or child custody decree. Rather, the Appellant
sought relief from a state court order which was procured by fraud upon the state court. Because
the Appellant’s independent action for relief from an order procured by fraud upon the court “…in
no way seeks a divorce, alimony or child custody decree…” the District Court erred in applying the
domestic relations exception.

[IV]. The District Court Erred in Applying the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

As A Fraud Exception Exists To Such

The district Court applied the Rooker-Felman Doctrine, claiming: “This [C]ourt cannot provide
appellate review over state court decisions.” Notwithstanding that once again, the district Court
has declared that the state court order is valid, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply where
the Appellant made allegations that extrinsic fraud had been committed upon the state trial court.
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3659 (9th Cir. Cal. 2004):

At first glance, a federal suit alleging a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court might
appear to come within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It is clear that in such a case the plaintiff is
seeking to set aside a state court judgment. But for Rooker-Feldman to apply, a plaintiff must seek not
only to set aside a state court judgment; he or she must also allege a legal error by the state court as
the basis for that relief. A plaintiff alleging extrinsic fraud on a state court is not alleging a legal error
by the state court; rather, he or she is alleging a wrongful act by the adverse party.

In that the Appellant did not assert legal error, but made allegations of extrinsic fraud, the district
Court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

The district Court may argue that the Eleventh Circuit doesn’t have a fraud exception. However,
this Court has recently embraced the possibility that it agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s position. In
Perdomo v. HSB Bank USA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46274, this Court, differentiated between state

67
 Kyung Lee Trotter
court proceedings where a party had presented claims of fraud on the court, and the state court had
heard, adjudicated and decided the claims already, and on the contrary, for instance, one like Ms.
Trotter’s action:

Even if the exception were recognized it would not apply in this case since the Perdomos presented
evidence of fraud to Florida’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and the state court was unconvinced by
the evidence….Defendants provide state court filings indicating the Perdomos raised the issue of
fraud with the state trial court in the answer to the initial foreclosure complaint in 2008. …The
Perdomos subsequently asserted fraud in a motion to vacate void judgment…and in a motion for
re-hearing to vacate void judgment for fraud upon the court based on newly dis-covered evidence…
The present record does not support an application of the exception as the same fraud arguments
were unsuccessfully asserted in state court, so there is no risk the state trial court was the victim of
any deceit... Accordingly, the fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—if one even exists in
this Circuit - is not applicable.

Unlike the Perdomos, the Appellant’s independent action indeed asserted that the state trial court
was the victim of deceit. The Appellant’s state court record will show that the trial judge filed and
distributed no written order for the Appellant’s Motion To Dismiss, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21
and prior to the third illegal trial. The state court record will also show that Kim Elias, the court
reporter, failed to file the third set of transcripts, albeit of an illegal trial, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§
15-14-5, 5-6-41(e). See (Doc. 4 Pgs. 21-22). The district court record shows that these two specific
instances of fraud are far from [all-inclusive] as to the unconscionable scheme committed, fully
described in the Appellant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, to remove her child from her home and terminate her
legal rights, without due process.

Moreover, she did not unsuccessfully raise the same fraud claims in the state trial court. So
the fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, if one exists in this Circuit, is indeed
applicable.

[V]. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Apply Where

The Appellant Was Afforded No Reasonable Opportunity To Raise Her
Constitutional Claims In The State Court.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine would only apply to the independent action if the state trial Court
had actually adjudicated Ms. Trotter’s constitutional claims. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17136, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1056 (11th Cir. Ga. 2001). “The [Rooker-
Feldman] doctrine extends… to constitutional claims …adjudicated by a state court…” Ms. Trotter
cannot claim legal error of that which was never adjudicated. Pursuant to Mickens v. Tenth Judicial
Circuit, 181 Fed. Appx. 865, 872, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 12514 (11th Cir. Fla. 2006):

68
 NOT AT ALL
“…A federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment if the federal claim
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. However, even if
a claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judgment, the doctrine does not apply if the
plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings….”

In other words, for claims to be inextricably intertwined the Court had to actually hear every issue,
every assertion and more importantly, the very federal claims being raised in the federal court. The
state trial Court did not.

This Court has a test to determine whether the Appellant had an opportunity to raise her federal
claim[s] in the state proceedings. Id.:

Thus, for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar a district court’s jurisdiction, the following four criteria
must be met: (1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court; (2) the prior state
court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; the party seeking relief in federal
court had a reasonable opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state court proceedings; and (4)
the issue [**21] before the federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably
intertwined with the state court’s judgment.

In regards to element (2), the state trial Court’s order cannot be said to be final as not only was it
procured by fraud upon the court, the Appellant has filed in the district court that it was rendered
with a lack of jurisdiction and inconsistent with due process.

The state trial judge is an officer of the court. In a course of a civil procedure, when a party loses,
that party must seek an interlocutory appeal and be successful, in order to get a chance to adjudicate
the same matter again. That didn’t happen. The state trial judge allowed the Ayres to come back
to the state court not once, but twice, without having filed or successfully secured remands on
interlocutory appeals. Moreover, the state trial judge purposely, failed to rule on five motions, all in
which the Appellant had asserted her constitutional rights, including and most importantly, her right
to maintain her fundamental liberty interest to her child. In her Motion to Dismiss, she plainly and
specifically asserted that her child was back in her home and any attempt by the judge or the Ayres
to continue to pursue the matter, constituted an attempt to remove her child from her home, and
would constitute a termination of her legal, parental rights. She also asserted that such a matter, one
of a termination of parental rights, did not belong in Superior Court, but in the Juvenile Court and
the only standard that could be applied to remove her child from her home and terminate her legal
parental rights, would be the fitness standard. The state trial Court did not adjudicate nor rule on
that motion. (See Doc. 4, Pg. 16). The procedural statute O.C.G.A. §15-6-21 as to motions, does not
permit state trial judges to “expressly deny” a written motion. See (Doc 4. Exhibit L, Pgs. 6-7). It must
render a written order for a written motion- or be impeached.

69
 Kyung Lee Trotter
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21:

O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21 for impeachment (b) In all counties with more than 100,000 inhabitants, it
shall be the duty of the judge of the superior, state, or city court, unless providentially hindered
or unless counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant agree in writing to extend the time, to decide
promptly, within 90 days after the same have been argued before him or submitted to him without
argument,…all other motions of any nature. (c)When he or she has so decided, it shall be the duty
of the judge to file his or her decision with the clerk of the court in which the cases are pending and
to notify the attorney or attorneys of the losing party of his or her decision…If any judge fails or
refuses, unless providentially hindered or unless counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant agree
in writing to extend the time, to obey the provisions of subsections (a) through (c) of this Code
section,…such conduct shall be grounds for impeachment and the penalty therefor shall be his
removal from office.

No written order in the state court record for the Motion To Dismiss exists.

Once the state trial judge allowed the Ayres to come back into the Superior Court without having had
secured remands from either state appellate courts, and then failed to adjudicate five written motions
and render five written orders, it failed to follow the rules of the court, thus committed a fraud upon
the state court. Because the state trial Court failed to follow the rules of the court the Appellant was
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to raise her constitutional claims before it.

It was the trial Court’s duty to follow the rules of the court. Its failure to follow the rules of the
court constitutes a fraud upon the court as an officer of the said court and obstructed the judicial
machinery itself. Instead, the machinery in action, was a collective effort of the Guardian Ad Litem
(the GAL), the Ayres’ attorney, and the judge, all officers of the court, to thwart every procedural,
substantive and constitutional law that protected Ms. Trotter and her fundamental liberty interest,
to continue to have physical and legal custody, and care and control of her child, so long as she is fit.

The true “losers” in the state court were the Ayres. They failed to meet their burden of proof under
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 , when they went before Judge Brantley at the first trial. They failed again before
Judge Kell (the state trial judge) to prove their allegations that Ms. Trotter had neglected her child,
which was the fitness standard, at the second trial. It’s bad enough that they were allowed to come
back the second time, with the right standard, (but still the wrong court unless they were asking to
adopt Ms. Trotter’s child, which they were not), but the state trial judge allowed them to come back a
third time and reinstate the burden of proof required under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1. The state trial Court
then embraced the corrupt machinery that the GAL and Ms. Pelerose (the Ayres’ attorney) had set
into motion, which was to meet this burden by any means necessary, meaning unethically, and more
importantly, engaged in such himself by failing to rule on the Appellant’s five motions where she had
asserted her constitutional rights, before the third illegal trial.

70
 NOT AT ALL
After this feverish and unprecedented effort to thwart any and all substantive, procedural and
constitutional law, Ms. Trotter once again was not afforded her right to raise her constitutional
claims at the state appellate levels either. The Ayres’ attorney, when she realized that Ms. Trotter
had appealed, instructed Kim Elias, the court reporter, to fail to file the third set of transcripts,
even though Ms. Trotter had every right to have access to those transcripts. Again, the opportunity
to raise have her constitutional claims was thwarted. The state trial judge, the Guardian Ad Litem
and the Ayres’ attorney, all officers of the court, all knew that the Ayres had not filed any successful,
interlocutory appeals before coming back before the state trial court -twice. The state court record
shows that in the first set of transcripts, from the trial where Judge Brantley had returned Ms.
Trotter’s child to her care and removed physical custody from the father, Ms. Pelerose made it
clear that she knew she had to file an interlocutory appeal before she could come back before the
court- because she clearly asked Judge Brantley for an “Immediate Review”, which he promptly
denied. Yet without having successfully appealed, she went back before the court for a second and
a third time.

“Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to “embrace that
species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers
of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of
adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore’s
Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The Seventh Circuit further stated “a decision produced by
fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”

Even though the Georgia Court of Appeals had the first two sets of transcripts, clearly showing Ms.
Trotter’s victories, it took no action although clearly, the Ayres had never filed any interlocutory
appeals with it, and it had never remanded either action for them.

The state trial judge and the state appellate courts, cannot engage in failing to follow the procedural
rules of the courts, support and facilitate other officers engaged in obstructing the judicial machineries
of the said courts and then claim that the orders rendered from these tainted courts, are final or
enjoy any of the doctrines which preserve finality. The state trial Court’s order as it committed and
the other officers of the court, committed a fraud upon it, are void ab initio and any order rendered
thereafter, including the appellate orders, are also void ab initio.

The lack of elements (3) and (4) are encompassed in the argument above. The only element that the
district Court can argue is (1).

Because of the extrinsic fraud committed by the parties in the state court(s), as described in her
independent action, the Appellant was afforded no opportunity to have her rights adjudicated or to
raise her constitutional claims in the state trial court, the state appellate courts, or even in the United
States Supreme Court. As such, the inextricably intertwined provision of the Rooker-Feldman

71
 Kyung Lee Trotter
doctrine does not apply and even if it did, the Appellant was afforded no opportunity to raise her
constitutional claims in the state trial court as the state trial court did not adjudicate her claims.

[VI]. The Federal Court Has Jurisdiction In Equity and Inherent Authority
To Hear And Determine Whether Fraud Upon The Court Occurred

Contrary to district Court’s erroneous applications, the Court indeed had jurisdiction to hear and
determine the Appellant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 action. “It is beyond question that…a federal court may
investigate a question as to whether there was fraud in the procurement of a judgment.” Bulloch v.
United States, 763 F.2d 1115,1121 (10th Cir. Utah 1985) citing Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root
Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 90 L. Ed. 1447, 66 S. Ct. 1176 (1946). The district Court has inherent
jurisdiction in equity. As afore-described, such power doesn’t fall short just because the fraud is
alleged to have been committed upon a state court or it is a state court order that is in question.

From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that…
under certain circumstances, one of which is after discovered fraud, relief will be granted against
judgments… This equity rule, which was firmly established in English practice long before the
foundation of our Republic, the courts have developed and fashioned to fulfill a universally
recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross
to demand a departure from rigid adherence to the term rule…where the occasion has demanded,
where enforcement of the judgment is “manifestly unconscionable,” Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651,
657 (1912), they have wielded the power [**1001] without hesitation…

Continued enforcement of this fraudulently procured, void ab [initio] order is manifestly

unconscionable. Not only have the Ayres gotten away with interfering with Ms. Trotter’s legal custody
and as a result of such crime that they were never charged with, she had been separated from her
child for approximately four years, but now because of the fraud on the state courts, she has been
separated from her child and deprived of her constitutional right to raise her child, for an additional
three years- all while always a good, fit mother and never adjudicated unfit. It is passed time to
solidify what a licensed attorney pointed out three years ago- that something “wrong,” went on in
the state trial court. See Exhibit K. It is passed time to correct this unprecedented, grave miscarriage
of justice of separating a fit mother from her child, fraudulently, corruptly, and without due process.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district Court’s order and remand the action
with instructions to exercise its inherent power and consider all of her averments, along with the
evidence submitted to it.

******************

72
 NOT AT ALL
Shenanigan 8: When Composing Your Sua Sponte Order
Refer To the Cropped Facts and Then Apply Your Own Law To Those Facts

When the judges or justices rendered their orders of dismissal, they all seemed to reiterate the same set
of concocted “facts,” a severely cropped version of the facts that I had actually asserted, ignore all of my legal
arguments and then apply their own law to their own cropped facts. I left them out here because I got tired
of reading the lies:

The Eleventh Circuit’s Bogus Review And Order

“…She argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the court from reviewing the state
court’s judgment because she sought relief not from legal error but from extrinsic fraud. The district
court rejected that argument and dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. This is Trotter’s appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Sweet
Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005). We may affirm a district
court’s decision for any reason supported by the record. Cochran v. U.S. Health Care Fin. Admin., 291
F.3d 775, 778 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002).

The district court properly dismissed Trotter’s action. To begin, Rule 60(b) is not the appropriate
vehicle to initiate an action in federal court. See Albra v. Advan, 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007 )
(“[A]lthough we are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, we nevertheless
have required them to conform to procedural rules.”) (quotation marks omitted). But even construing
Trotter’s Rule 60(b) motion liberally as a complaint, we cannot discern a basis for the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Trotter asserted that various individuals violated her due process rights, but the
motion did not name those individuals as defendants. She did not assert any federal claims against
the Ayreses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To the extent she asserted state law claims against them, she failed
to allege diversity of citizenship or an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See id. § 1332. And
even if Trotter’s allegations had presented a federal question or established diversity of citizenship,
the district court would have lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. That doctrine bars a state-court loser from later enlisting a federal district court to reverse
her state court loss. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct.
1517, 1521–22 (2005). It applies when: (1) the plaintiff was the loser in state court, (2) the plaintiff
is complaining of an injury caused by the state court’s judgment, (3) the state court’s judgment was
“rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,” and (4) the plaintiff is “inviting district
court review and rejection” of the state court’s judgment. Id. We must also find that the claims barred
by the doctrine were actually brought in state court or are “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court’s judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
All of those conditions were met here. Trotter lost in state court and complained of an injury — the
loss of custody — caused by the state court’s judgment. The judgment was rendered well before she

73
 Kyung Lee Trotter
commenced proceedings in the district court, and she asked the court to review and reject it. Finally,
to the extent we can discern Trotter’s claims, it is clear that they were “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court judgment because a ruling in her favor would have effectively nullified it.

[Foonote]: Trotter contends that the custody order is exempt from Rooker-Feldman because it was procured through fraud
on the court. Even if this Court had recognized a fraud exception to that doctrine, which it has not, Trotter’s argument is little
more than a claim that the state court result was wrong and the only possible reason for it was fraud. That argument is without
merit.

Affirmed.

Short and sweet, mission accomplished. Well, there it is: orders procured in Georgia by means other than
the law and procedure are okay.
Notice that the Court promptly deployed Shenanigan 7, immediately ridding themselves of their duty to
conduct a de novo review and instead finding a way to affirm what the lower judge had decided. Hmm. Is
that the purpose of an appeal? Is the appellate process for the People or the judge?
As far as nullifying the “judgment,” well we know that there isn’t a statute so there isn’t a “judgment” to
nullify.

Shenanigan 9: Don’t Forget The Footnotes

When deliberately thwarting my constitutional assertions, Judge Kell and the justices of the Georgia
Court of Appeals both placed footnotes on their orders, so that they could later claim that they had in fact
addressed them.

After failing to rule on five of my motions, including the Motion To Dismiss, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 15-6-21, the Superior Court judge placed a footnote on the “Final Order On ‘Custody’” to cover
his bases: “…Plaintiff also filed a motion to dismiss ‘immediately prior’ to trial which the Court has
reviewed and considered. That motion to dismiss is denied for all of the reasons contained in this
order. Defendants proffered sufficient evidence for the matter to go forward and the case would not
have been properly decided as a matter of law…”

First of all, I filed my Motion To Dismiss on June 20, 2011. The third trial, wasn’t until August 4, 2011.
Therefore, he had six weeks, prior to that third trial, to render a ruling and comply with O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21.
Second, what about the other four motions he failed to rule on?
Third, how can a motion filed six weeks prior to a trial, be denied for reasons supposedly found after the
trial?
Fourth, the grandparents weren’t “Defendants.” They were Intervenors. They made me the “Defendant.”
Fifth, exactly when was it that the grandparents “proffered enough evidence”—before the trial?
Lastly, if this “judge”, had ruled on my motion prior to the trial, there wouldn’t have been a “matter”
left to try. The motion only gave him two choices. Either he had to prosecute the grandparents for basically

74
 NOT AT ALL
kidnapping my child, or he had to recognize my constitutional rights and make them prove me unfit—which
they could not do. Either way they would have lost.
This is why he did not rule on my motion. He did not rule on my motion because he, couldn’t. That
is what my lawyer meant when she kept saying to me, “Maybe he felt his hands were tied”. They were.
These “grandparents”, who had failed to meet their burden, (notwithstanding its unconstitutionality), under
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1)—twice--had already paid the GAL and the “custody evaluator” to insure that they
would meet it the third time. He couldn’t eliminate them from the “dispute” after “all the work done”—and
paid for.
I wrote that motion by the way. All my lawyer did was sign it and file it. You see, I had gone through these
shenanigans before with these people in Virginia. This time, I was going to have a record of the unethical
tactics and practices.
My Army combat training has never left my mind. Know your enemy. I knew them, therefore they
wandered right into my “kill-zone.” Kaboom.
Like I mentioned in the beginning of the book, the Court of Appeals also utilized Shenanigan 9 twice.
On their first order granting my discretionary application, they wrote: “…The Mother filed the application
in the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this Court because it did not involve matters of divorce
or alimony or otherwise invoke the Supreme Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”
Yet, in their next order, upon their illegal review, while averting my constitutional Enumerations of
Error, they wrote:

“…To the extent that Trotter argues that the legal standard prescribed in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) is
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held otherwise, see Clark, 273 Ga. At 599 (V),
and this court is “constitutionally bound by the decisions of our own Supreme Court”. Williamson v.
Ward, 192 Ga. App. 857, 858(1) (386 SE2d 727)(1989). See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec…”

Blah, blah, blah. It’s funny: while this Court was researching their own Constitution to find ways to
absolve the Georgia Supreme Court for shirking their duty and my right, they missed Ga. Const. Art. VI, §
VI, Para. II, which clearly states that they didn’t have the authority to address my assertions at all.
All three of these footnotes were for the sole purpose of purporting to have addressed my constitutional
contentions. So keep in mind that footnotes are very important. Be sure to cover all of your bases for appeal
purposes.
There is no way to describe the wrong that this state has committed against me. It’s obvious from the
way I was treated when I tried to seek relief in the courts, that in these judge’s minds I’m not a human being,
let alone a citizen with rights. These officials in this state believe that they can take whatever they want from
me—including my child—and there’s nothing that I can do about it.
Let’s throw it out on the table. There’s no “due process” owed to me and how dare I, a black woman, know
how to read the law, much less interpret it and assert my rights to white, Southern judges. This isn’t just about
me not having a law degree or a lawyer. This is Georgia, we’re talking about. From the countless time that
these judges deprived my rights as described throughout this book, and basically told me to fuck-off after
having violated me, it’s obvious that to them that I’m just another nigger.

75
 Kyung Lee Trotter
Times haven’t changed one goddamned bit in the South. I can tell you that when I read their orders,
when I read their responses, I could hear their hatred; I could hear their anger at the fact that I knew what I
was talking about.
I know, first-hand, what it’s like to be treated as if you are inferior. After a while it dawned on me that it
was silly, continuing to ask what might as well be a bunch of Klansmen sitting on benches, for justice.

76
 Chapter 6
“ S o L e t’ s D o A R e v i e w ”

W
ell, in response to Washington State, NO, the state may not “intrude” into my home and do
anything with my children, so long as I am fit. If the state wants to do anything with my children
in its parens patriae power, it must come forth with a compelling interest as to why it needs to
come into my home and how it intends to make decisions for my children must comport with the process
due to my fundamental liberty interest in my children, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
when the state enacts a statute which threatens my protected rights and I challenge the constitutionality of
that statute, the constitutional, test to assess the statute is the strict scrutiny test.
If it wants to regulate what I do with my children in a compulsory manner, under its police power, it
again, must come forth with a narrowly drawn compelling public interest, as in ill health, death, clear and
present danger, or the comfort or convenience of others—none of which visitation to grandparents will
accomplish. Neither is not allowing grandparents visitation abuse or neglect to my children. Moreover, in
all of these instances where the interest is the state against the parent/child, I fail to see how any outcome
equates to “rights”—for grandparents. That being said, let’s call it what it is. None of this has anything to do
with the best interests of the child, but everything to do with giving grandparents “rights” they don’t have.
Washington State wished to keep its bare, unconstitutional statute on its law books, which apparently
in one form or another, has been on them since 1973—over four decades--longer than I’ve been alive. This
statute was finally exposed to the federal government—ironically by a set of grandparents who wished to
steamroll a mother and take more than the visitation that she had offered them —that they didn’t have a
constitutional right to have and she didn’t have to give them in the first place!
To fix this situation where these grandparents had revealed the true nature of the statute, which is power
to grandparents to attack a fit parent and take visitation, while there’s nothing the parent can do about it,
the state and federal government inverted their powers. The Washington Supreme Court reinterpreted the
liberty of the fit parent protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal function, belonging to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The federal government, the U.S. Supreme Court, to accommodate the state, then turned
around and rewrote the statute—a state legislative function.
The state with its redefinition of what the parent’s right was, merely privacy subjected to the regulation of
the state’s police power, then assessed the process actually due to a parent, under the overbreadth doctrine,
a standard of review or test applied to challenge statutes of police power which restrict First Amendment
rights.

77
 Kyung Lee Trotter
The state then buttressed its new definition and process with a police power case, involving a parent
and a child—that had nothing to do with the overbreadth doctrine. Nevertheless, the state Supreme Court
applied the doctrine, to a statute that said nothing, by rewriting it and then found, pursuant to its newly
written statute, that it was only unconstitutional – as applied.
The U.S. Supreme Court then affirmed the whole gamut, stayed quiet about the whole police power and
intrusion into the family thing, but adopted applying the overbreadth doctrine, to a fundamental liberty
interest. However, it found the statute wholly invalid on its face. To save it, the Court indeed adopted the
process founded upon the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court, that it had a right to intrude upon
the private realm of the family in its police power, rewrote the statute by giving its own instructions and then,
declared a statute it had found to be facially unconstitutional, merely unconstitutional “as applied.”
So we’ve got all kinds of constitutional rights, standards of review, tests, powers and processes, all stirring
in one pot, to fix a statute, granting states an undefined power to just give grandparents visitation of a fit
parent’s children.
As a result of the “dish” served up, I unknowingly walked into a federally sanctioned “kill-zone” when
I filed for a divorced from my husband, in Virginia. Subsequently I, a fit, custodial mother, serving my
country, was separated and alienated from my child.
The state of Georgia, having taken these federal “instructions” and run with them, proclaiming that it
had the right not to grant visitation—but terminate parental rights altogether—finished off what Virginia
started and took my child and rights from me altogether, under a sole best interests standard—and gave her
to her paternal grandparents under this unconstitutional standard—permanently. As a result of both of these
states following the “instructions” of the United States Supreme Court, I have been stripped and robbed of
my right to raise my daughter and maintain my relationship with her, for the last thirteen years.
Not only has Georgia followed the instructions of the U.S. Supreme Court, when grandparents fail to
meet the burden they’ve created to take children from fit parents, the grandparents may utilize another
system, whereby the state has the right to order the fit parent into a so-called “custody evaluation,” by way of
appointing a Guardian Ad Litem.
The fit parent is compelled by the state, to divulge private facts which may then be concocted by the
“evaluator” into a “report”, as to how the fit parent doesn’t act “in the best interests of his or her child.” The fit
parent is then put on trial—by the grandparents—and made to defend his or her liberty interest, by trying to
refute the “expert” testimony—a futile effort.
The state Court then rules on this “expert” testimony, alone. The services of the Guardian Ad Litem and
the “evaluator” are all paid for by the grandparents, seeking to take the child.
Such scheme has become a very lucrative enterprise and any parent who tries to seek relief, will be
completely shut-down, shut-out and foreclosed, by a cohesive, impenetrable system of judges, justices and
lawyers, all covering each other’s backsides.
Did I miss anything? Oh yeah! In my case, the grandparents’ attorney had made undisclosed, campaign
contributions to the state Court—even though he was appointed to his bench, by the Governor.

78
 NOT AT ALL
There’s no way to narrow a statute in order for the state to infringe the right, because in any way attempted,
the parent is still fit. The right is still fundamental, thus cannot be infringed at all without a narrowly tailored
compelling interest.98
The rights of fit parents when it comes to infringement by the state, doesn’t fall under police power as
the manner in which regulation of freedom of speech may be permissible. It falls under the power of the
state as parens patriae, to protect a child, when a parent has triggered the need for it to step in and do so—in
other words has demonstrated that he or she is unfit to care for that child. Curing overbreadth has got
nothing to do with the state’s parens patriae power. A state narrowing a statute in order to constitutionally
exercise its police power, under the overbreadth doctrine, will only allow the state to regulate freedom of
speech—because that’s what the overbreadth doctrine is limited to.99 If such regulation has anything to do
with “harm” to a child, this harm is clear and present danger.
The substantive due process for the state to exercise its parens patriae power, in the best interest of the
child, has not changed whether it be for making a decision as to who may visit with a fit parent’s child or
whether or not a parent can keep custody of his or her child. The state must find by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is no longer fit to make decisions concerning the welfare of their child.100 The state
may not assess that fitness under a sole best interests standard.101 It must assess that fitness with the two-step,
fact-finding and dispositional process outlined in Santosky v. Kramer.102 If after that process, the state finds
an unfit parent, it is only then that the state acquires its power to decide what is best for the child—because
the parent is no longer fit to do so.103 There is no need for the state to take care of a child who has a fit parent
or to protect a child from his or her fit, parent. Thus no parens patriae interest exists when the parent is fit.
To be clear, the state most certainly may not abridge the liberty interest of the fit parent, protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—with its police power—as the Washington Supreme
Court found,104 not in the context of freedom of speech or otherwise. The Washington Court advanced
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, as an example of the state infringing the parent’s liberty interest
with “its police power.” This was in no way the nature or finding of the case and according to Justice Murphy,
Washington hinged its oppressive decision upon another oppressive decision.

98 Washington v. Glucksberg, supra at 721 (U.S.Wash.,1997).

99 U.S. v. Salerno, supra at 745
100 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S.N.Y.,1982). Clear and convincing evidence standard adequately conveys to fact finder
level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process in proceedings in which state
seeks to completely and irrevocably sever rights of parents in their natural child. (citations omitted) U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 5, 14.
101 Reno, supra at 303-304
102 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982). Id. at 760-761 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972)
103 Id.
104 In Re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 15 (1998).

79
 Kyung Lee Trotter
In Short

Grandparents don’t have any “rights” and neither do any other third party relatives to a fit parent’s
children.
The United States Supreme Court rendered a calculated, unconstitutional decision on purpose, to
advance the interests of grandparents. God help America. This isn’t something that anyone could have ever
suggested was even possible to me while I was serving in uniform.
The best interests standard may not be applied between a fit party and a third party—period. Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-304 (1993).
Without a narrowly tailored compelling interest, the state may not infringe the liberty interest of the fit
parent—regardless of the process it concocts. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). If any state
claims that its narrowly tailored compelling interest, is to protect the health and welfare of the child, it cannot
constitutionally, do so, under a sole, one step, fact-finding only, best interests standard, where the parent is
still found fit. This is an unconstitutional proclamation and goal.
Where the state has no narrowly tailored compelling interest, there is no need to even discuss Due
Process, as two competing interests, to wit, the state’s versus the private interest, must first exist, to invoke a
need to determine the proper Due Process. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-651 (1972).
It is only the unfitness of the parent which invokes the state’s interest as parens patriae to do what is best
for that parent’s child. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748, 760-761 (1982). Therefore, the “threshold of
harm”, is unfitness and that has not changed.
If the parent has not triggered this powerful countervailing interest, then it is the state’s duty to protect
the liberty interest of the fit parent. Stanley, supra at 650-651.
Nowhere in the Troxel decision will one find the words “narrowly tailored compelling interest” or
“powerful countervailing interest.” Nor will anyone find the fact that Reno v. Flores says that the best interests
standard may not be applied between a parent and third party in the first place. The half-truths of the case
are a deliberate, unconstitutional advancement of grandparents’ “rights,” where under the Constitution there
are none, against a fit parent.
The liberty interest of the fit parent is to establish a home and direct the upbringing of her children.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This liberty interest is paramount so long as the parent is fit.
There are no competing interests.105 There is no “balancing act.” There is no “alignment against” this interest.
As a result, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) is unconstitutional. There are no “happy mediums” to
strike between the liberty interest of the fit parent and the state that wishes to infringe the interest, without
due process.

105 Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 601 (2001). Hunstein, Justice, concurring specially. I concur in the majority’s decision that
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1) is constitutional but write separately because I reject the majority’s finding that in order to save
the statute from constitutional challenge we must engraft onto the best interest of the child standard a categorical rule that
authorized third parties who seek custody of a child must always first demonstrate that parental custody would harm the child.
This precondition is not constitutionally required because the statute, as written and intended to be applied by the General
Assembly, properly balances the competing constitutional interests of parents, children and the State.

80
 NOT AT ALL
In regards to the state of Georgia’s interpretation of the same, again, no state may act as parens patriae
in the best interest of a child, without finding a natural parent unfit, first. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
760-761 (1982). O.C.G.A § 19-7-1 (b.1), doesn’t require this process. It is a single process whereby the judge
applies a sole best interest standard. It makes the fit parent and his child adversaries at the fact-finding stage
and gives the state immediate authority, it doesn’t have. Therefore, it also, is unconstitutional.
The instructions of both cases are a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Subsequently, this statute is unconstitutional thus does not exist.
Moreover, each state that has statutes like this, is in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
Every single defendant, named and unnamed, in my 42 U.S.C. 1983 is indeed, liable monetarily or
prospectively, to me. If you don’t believe me because I don’t have a law degree, just ask Judge Smail and the
Justices of the Alabama Court of Appeals.106 They agree with me.
The so-called “Final Order On Custody” is indeed void and it was void upon its inception. So is every
order rendered under any state’s similar statute and as far as fraud upon the court, well, I think we’re way
passed fraud at this point.
Moreover, Georgia’s highest state, federal district or appellate courts’ admission that it has, for nineteen
years, deprived the liberty interests and violated the due process rights of natural parents and their children
and rendered nineteen years’ worth of orders, void ab initio, just as mine is, would have exposed its criminal
activity to the entire country, along with all of the money that’s been made within this extensive timeframe.
So they all covered it up. Plain and simple.
The aforesaid shenanigans are far from all-inclusive. However, they are neither here nor there, given the
unconstitutionality of the statute itself and the unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme Court decision from which it
derives. I just thought I’d show some of the outrageous modus operandi that the judges and justices used in
order to cover up what Georgia has been doing for nineteen years.

106 Weldon v. Ballow, 2015 WL 6618983, at *6 (Ala.Civ.App.,2015). “In this context, therefore, the Constitution requires that a
prior and independent finding of parental unfitness must be made before the court may proceed to the question whether an
order disturbing a parent’s ‘care, custody, and control’ of his or her child is in that child’s best interests.
“The state’s compelling interest is limited to overruling the decisions of unfit parents. As the United States Supreme Court said
in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), it is only ‘[a]fter the State has established parental
unfitness at that initial proceeding, [that] the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and
the natural parents do diverge.’ 455 U.S. at 760. Unless the parents are shown by clear and convincing evidence to be unfit, the
state’s interest is not compelling: ‘[T]he State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the
custody of fit parents.’ Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). All ‘parents are constitutionally
entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.’ 405 U.S. at 658. In the absence of
clear and convincing proof that a parent is unfit, the state’s basis for intervention through the judicial system evaporates. ‘The
State’s interest in caring for the children is “de minimis ” if the father is in fact a fit parent.’ Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248,
98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978).”
73 So.3d at 644. The main opinion further stated:
“Because parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children, the law also presumes parental ‘care, custody, and
control’ to be superior to that of third persons under ordinary circumstances....
“ ‘....’
“... That same presumption is applicable to cases involving visitation with nonparents.”

81
 Kyung Lee Trotter
What Can Be Done?

What can be done?” Nothing—so long as special interest money continues to buy our government away.
Don’t call the GBI. I called several times explaining what happened to me and other parents. It took no
action.
Don’t call the FBI, although its website boasts that it will take action under 18 § U.S.C. 242; when I called
them I was told by the duty agent that such arising out of family courts “isn’t something that ‘we’ would get
involved with.” It is this agency’s job, paid for by the taxpayers’ dollars—the fit parents—to not only “get
involved” but to prosecute perpetrators, especially those making money while violating this federal statute.
The refusal of the very government agency that could put a stop to what’s going on, and whose job it is to do
so, let’s you know the dire, broken, state of our government.
Don’t write the Department of Justice. They’ll tell you that they “don’t have power to supervise the courts.”
Don’t complain to the Judicial Qualifications Commission. They’ll tell you that they’ve done an
investigation and found that the judge was just doing his job.
Don’t complain to the State Bar Association. They’ll find that they’ve done an investigation and the
lawyers were just doing their jobs.
Don’t report the “custody evaluators” to the American Psychology Association. Need I repeat myself?
Don’t write to senators or congressmen. Hoping to hear back from them is a fantasy.
If you’re thinking of the last resort, don’t write the President. I wrote the President in 2012, right after
my Petition For Writ of Certiorari was denied by U.S. Supreme Court. I was so devastated, so hopeless,
depressed, and broken, that I told him that I was going to kill myself. Nobody wrote me back. Since then,
having found the strength to go on, for my other two children, despite how these “grandparents’ rights”
statutes have ravaged my life, I’ve written him at least four times.
One time I did received what seemed to be a generically produced, letter back, claiming concern, but
not addressing the matter I had written about. I almost got excited at the signature until I realized it was a
rubber stamped “Barack Obama.” During the last letters, I thoroughly explained that the state of Georgia was
selling court orders under an unconstitutional statute and that as a result, good parents like me, were losing
custody of our children permanently, without due process, for a price. I also explained that I had nowhere
else to turn because relief through the courts was being deliberately foreclosed by the perpetrators. Once
again I signed the letter “One of Your Veterans.” On November 2, 2015, I received the latest response that had
absolutely nothing to do with what I wrote. In it the Mr. Obama explained that he was fighting for “a more
fair and balanced criminal justice system.”—What the fuck?!
He spoke of racial profiling and disparities between those convicted of crack cocaine charges as opposed
to powder cocaine. He then spoke about his dedication to helping the formerly incarcerated reenter society
with programs that help them find jobs. He ended with giving me a link to the white house civil rights
department. I don’t know who’s reading his letters for him, but whoever it is must either be illiterate or
specialize in thwarting crises that would beget a federal or nationwide scandal.
At one time during the 2012 election I called one of his campaign offices. I was astonished at the fact
that the person who answered the phone and listened to me, told me that he reads his own letters. This is
obviously a lie.

82
 NOT AT ALL
This President flew all the way to Africa to tell another President to do something about the corruption
in his country, when he won’t even address the corruption happening right here, in his own country. While
he’s vying for a legacy, once he’s out of office, all I’ll remember is all of this happened on his watch and he
didn’t do anything about it.
I wrote Michelle too, appealing to heart as a mother. I received no response from her either.
They both graduated law school.
Don’t ask the mainstream media to cover the injustices. I’ve called reporters from New York to
Massachusetts to Georgia. I’ve called and sent out so many emails to reporters over the last thirteen years
and I always get the same gut-wrenching answer, “I’m sorry, but that’s not something we can cover.”
Jeff Chirico, a former investigative reporter for CBS Atlanta, was going to report my story. He was the
reporter he actually broke the story of how corrupt the family courts are in Georgia. He reported a series of
stories involving suspected improprieties taking place.
The scandal started with the divorce of R&B singer, Usher, and his wife, Tameka Raymond. One of the
subjects was the “special relationships” between judges presiding over divorce cases and the lawyers who
were appearing before them.
The alleged “special relationship” was that Usher’s attorney had contributed money to the campaign of
the judge presiding over his divorce, but the judge did not disclose such to the parties nor recuse herself. It
was believed that these contributions influenced the outcome of his case, which was Usher gaining custody
of his children.
I contacted Mr. Chirico on November 1, 2012 asking how I could check the campaign contributions of
the judge who had presided over my case. He was the one who actually helped me to start putting “two and
two” together. Before him, all I knew was that something wasn’t right.
He gave me the website for the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission.
Low and behold, as outlined in my facts, I too was a victim of “special relationships.”
I stayed in touch with Mr. Chirico over the phone and by email. He seemed eager to cover to my story,
collecting court documents and everything. Then on August 28, 2013, he dropped the heart-breaking bomb
on me. His office had gotten new management and he was no longer sure if he could cover my story.
He lifted my spirits again approximately a year later, aligning himself with Deb Beacham, Founder and
Executive Director of My Advocate Center Inc., once again, ready to cover my story. However, once again, it
never happened. As of today Jeff Chirico no longer works for CBS Atlanta and doesn’t even reside in Georgia
anymore, for reasons unknown.
I can’t tell you why he didn’t cover my story, but here’s Deb Beacham’s take on the hindrances inflicted
upon the media:

“…Like so many law abiding citizens we do not expect to be confronted with and damaged by
unethical practices when we ask the family court to protect us.  We are told “guardians” of children
must perform and act in good faith, but many do not. We are told lawyers must uphold their fiduciary
duty to us, but many do not.

83
 Kyung Lee Trotter
After my experience I began researching and realized how bad the issues are and how many families
are being damaged - unnecessarily.

I founded My Advocate Center, Inc., a Georgia Non-profit Corporation, as a mission to help educate
the public and to work with professionals and policymakers to close the loopholes that allow these
damages to occur. 

We are seeing that money is being spent to run interference and to block news media stories, so
books like this one and the sharing of content on social media, websites and as we are doing on Pro
Advocate Radio are critical.  We must protect our Constitutional rights, including freedom of speech
and right to due process…and our right to love, nurture, provide for and protect our own children.
Our focus is on the needs of children, which are being denied en masse.

It is my hope that our news media will pick up this thread, review the evidence and see the enormous
damages for what they are, and then report fully and on an ongoing basis until our families and
children are safe…”

Don’t ask the ACLU for help. They purport to defend the constitutional rights of Americans- just not the
ones that have been deprived by lawyers, judges and legislators.
I made a personal trip to the Massachusetts branch, asking for help. I spoke to the Executive Director at
least twice over the phone, who pondered helping me. However, in the end she said that it would be difficult
because the matter was “custody.” I called them again recently, thoroughly explaining the crisis again. This
time they didn’t even call back. They sent a rejection via email.
I also contacted the New York branch, the NYCLU, to no avail and of course, the Georgia branch sent me
an immediate rejection. (See Appendix)

The FBI Needs To Be Made To Do What The Taxpayers Pay Them To Do

The federal government needs to act- yesterday. No more excuses about who doesn’t have authority
to supervise the courts, or this or that. If one of the checks and balances of America is compromised, the
tax-dollars of the American people pay for a solution—not a black hole where nobody has an answer or no
one wants to get involved, and as a result the citizens of America are left to continue to be violated and suffer.
The state of Georgia should not be allowed one more millisecond to conceal this egregious, horrendous,
endless, line of unspeakable, injustices, for money.
Unless this state has ceded the Union again, it must adhere to federal law, just like every other state. It is
bad enough that it has irreparably injured an unimaginable amount of people, but to willfully, foreclose the
avenues rightfully available to its people to seek relief, and willfully and fraudulently foreclose access to the
courts in order to “save face” and their asses beseeches the wrath of any and all federal, consequential actions
available for such brazen offenses. However, with the very agency refusing to “get involved,” the citizens of

84
 NOT AT ALL
Georgia and the American under the oppression of the grandparents’ “rights” statutes of other states, will
remain deprived and stripped of their basic liberty, having and keeping their children so long as they are fit.
These judges should be impeached. These lawyers should be disbarred and the DOJ or the FBI needs to
initiate a full, criminal investigation.
When you peel back all of the layers of jurisdiction—as in who lacked it, who had it, who didn’t, who
shirked it. When you think about GALs who should be representing children, choosing instead to bolster
their own financial interests, or think of the lawyers thwarting the appeal process and find out it’s all for
profit under an unconstitutional statute, at this alone there isn’t enough air in the lungs of all of America to
take the gasp of disbelief. Then when you find out that the products for sale are innocent children and the
victims are good mothers and fathers, and their children, one has to finally ask the question. What state is
our country really in? Do we still have checks and balances in our federal government—or are we now a
country of just checks written by special interest groups to our federal and state elected officials?

85
 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASSACHUSETTS LEGAL
INTAKE

Many people contact ACLUM because they believe their civil rights have
been violated. Our Legal Intake volunteers and our Intake Attorney gather needed
information to present to attorneys for evaluation.

Attorneys carefully review every legal intake. Based on that review, we

determine whether ACLUM is in a position to provide the help a person requests.

ACLUM is a private, nonprofit organization. We are not a government

agency. Nor are we a legal aid or public defender’s organization that represents as
many individuals as possible. Rather, ACLUM’s purpose is legal reform on behalf
civil liberties. We conduct broad public education campaigns. We work with the
Massachusetts legislature to protect against threats to our civil liberties.

We also respond to requests for legal help. We offer information in response

to specific inquiries. We help people assert their own rights and sometimes advocate
on their behalf. When we can't help, we refer people to other organizations that may
be able to help them. Finally, we take on a very small number of Massachusetts-
based impact lawsuits. We select cases that will defend or extend fundamental civil
liberties and civil rights and that will affect a large number of people.

ACLUM does not generally assist in these types of cases:

• divorce or custody cases • contract matters
• property disputes • wills
• complaints about lawyers or judges • building code issues
• housing disputes • criminal cases (rare exceptions for
• tax problems priority or 1st Amendment issues)

Every year, we receive hundreds of requests for legal assistance. Many of

these requests mention true civil liberty violations or serious injustices. Our
inability to assist everyone is not a judgment on the merits of any one complaint.

An important note about deadlines: All legal claims have time deadlines, or
statutes of limitations. Deadlines are different depending on who violated your
rights and which rights were violated. If you do not meet the deadline, the law may
prohibit you from pursuing your claim in court. To protect your rights, please
consult an attorney promptly to find out what deadline may apply to your case.

Resources for finding a lawyer on reverse side. 

ACLU Foundation of Massachusetts • 211 Congress Street • Boston, MA 02110

4/21/15
(617) 482-3170 • Fax: (617) 451-0009 • Website: www.aclum.org
 FINDING A LAWYER

Massachusetts Bar Association Referral Service (MBA)

20 West Street
Boston MA 02111
(617) 654-0400

Boston Bar Association Referral Service (BBA)

16 Beacon Street
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 742-0625

Attorneys you contact through the MBA or BBA will charge no more than $25 for
the first half hour of consultation.

National Lawyer’s Guild Referral Service

14 Beacon Street, Suite 407
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 227-7008
NLG attorneys provide free initial phone consultation

Your county bar association’s lawyer referral service

Justice Bridge Legal Center

274 Franklin Street/67 Batterymarch Street, Lower Level
Boston, MA 02110-3110
(617) 860-3414
A legal incubator program of the UMass School of Law. Legal representation
for civil matters in the greater Boston area by new attorneys in good
standing, who carry professional liability insurance and consult with retired
judges and other experienced mentors within the incubator program.
Income eligibility: Discounted legal services to about $50/hr for clients at
250% to 300% of the Federal Poverty Level (about $60,000/yr family of four).

JustiServ, Inc.
http://www.justiserv.com
274 Franklin Street
Boston, MA 02138
info@justiserv.com
(786)-487-5266
A web-based tool provides people the information needed to find an
experienced, local lawyer who fits with their budget and their specific needs.

ACLU Foundation of Massachusetts • 211 Congress Street • Boston, MA 02110

Fax: (617) 451-0009 • Website: www.aclum.org
4/21/15