CASE DIGESTS

INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS

People vs Grey (GR no. 180109 July 26, 2010)

Facts:

 An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San
Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando
Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal government, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by other
supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

 Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the existence of probable cause,
and, in an Order dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable cause was
supported by the evidence on record. He then issued warrants of arrest against respondents
and all but one of their co-accused.

 Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA, alleging that Judge
Navidad gravely abused his discretion in issuing the February 20, 2007 Order, and seeking
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that
the filing of the murder charges against them on the basis of perjured statements coming
from their political opponents' supporters "smacks of political harassment at its foulest form."
Respondents pointed out that the criminal complaint was filed barely two months after
Joseph Grey declared his intentions to challenge incumbent Congressman Reynaldo S. Uy,
a former ally, in the May 2007 congressional elections

 CA issued a TRO and subsequently rendered a decision making the TRO permanent,
ordering that warrants of arrest be set aside, and dismissing the criminal case without
prejudice.

Issue:

WON the issuance of the TRO was warranted

Ruling:

No.

The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in this jurisdiction. It is an established

doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest
requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of
society.
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down exceptions to this
rule, among which are:

Xxxx

Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);

Xxxx

Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, political persecution or political
motives may have impelled the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this
Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing of the charges is politically motivated
cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support
the charges.

In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before
him, determined that there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the
provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses,
found probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor
was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.

Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve
to justify the nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been
sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof.

Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have adduced absolutely no proof of the
perceived political persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have not shown any
evidence of such a grand design.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. If, as respondents
claim, there is no evidence of their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily be granted.
Thereafter, the credibility of the prosecution's and the accused's respective evidence may be
tested during the trial. It is only then that the guilt or innocence of respondents will be
determined. Whether the criminal prosecution was merely a tool for harassment or whether the
prosecution's evidence can pass the strict standards set by the law and withstand the exacting
scrutiny of the court will all be resolved at the trial of the case.

Yupangco Cotton Mills Inc vs Mendoza (GR no. 139912 March 31, 2005)

 Yupangco, through its property manager, Marylen A. Bartolome, filed on 20 February 1996 a
Complaint/Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan against respondents
Sheriffs Timbayan and Masilungan, Mendoza, Boy Raymundo, and a certain Protacio,
alleging that they forcibly entered the Artex Compound (which was registered in the name of
Yupangco) and forcibly opened the padlocks, chains and wooden barricades of the doors of
certain buildings and carried away truckloads of generators, machines, equipment, motors
and fabrics. This is in connection with the writ of execution issued by the NLRC to satisfy the
 judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter in favor of the Samahang Manggagawa ng Artex
Union (SAMAR) regarding their claims for backwages.

 Yupangco charged the above-named persons for robbery with intimidation and robbery with
the use of force upon things under Arts. 293, 294 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

 The city prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice upon review found probable cause to file
robbery charges against respondents.

 The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA. The CA granted the
petition and set aside the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice and Chief State Prosecutor,
respectively, and directing the RTC of Malabon, Branch 74, to dismiss the criminal cases
against respondents. The basis for the CA's ruling is the lack of probable cause for filing
robbery charges against respondents.

Issue:

WON the CA is correct in holding that no probable cause exists in this case

Ruling:

Yes.

The general rule is that the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of
the prosecutor. This Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the
filing of information against the supposed offender.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is whether the determination of probable cause was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final.

This policy of non-interference, however, admits several exceptions, to wit:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.
Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun
vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil.
202);

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty,
33 Phil. 556, Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil.
1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616)

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Catelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and

j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438).

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriquez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953). (cited in
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.

In the case at bar, the determination of whether robbery was committed, most especially by
respondent sheriffs, has to be related to the orderly administration of justice, and more
importantly, the unhampered performance of the sheriff's role in our judicial system.

Respondent sheriffs cannot be reproached, much more charged with robbery for their faithful
compliance with the writ of execution. So long as the officer confines his acts to the mandate of
the writ, he is not liable; but all of his acts that are not as justified by the writ are without
authority of law.

Venus vs Desierto (GR no. 130319 October 21, 1998)

Facts:

 Pursuant to a Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution, petitioner Mayor went to Manila,

negotiated with the Board of Liquidators and offered to buy a lot on a government-to-
government basis. The Board rejected the offer, and a public bidding shall be conducted
instead. Thereafter, petitioner returned to his town and informed the SB thereof of the
denial. Later, petitioner went back to Manila at his personal expense and requested the
Board to postpone the public bidding. However, the Board did not accede. He then
submitted his personal bid which turned out to be the highest bid. The property was thus
sold to him and a Deed of Sale was executed.

 Private respondents then charged petitioner with violation of par. (h) of Sec. 3 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. They alleged that in contravention of the SB Resolution and
 Authority, in evident bad faith and for the sole purpose of self-interest, petitioner bought the
lot in his name and for personal gain.

 The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas recommended the dismissal of the
complaint. Then Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, however, disapproved the resolution.
Thereafter, a reasonable ground to charge the Mayor for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
was found, and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner, however, was
allowed to file a motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor. As a
result, a Resolution was issued recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause. However, Ombudsman Desierto disapproved this recommendation, and thereafter,
the Sandiganbayan set the date for petitioner's arraignment.

Issue:

WON the petitioner can invoke any of the exceptions to the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of
prohibition.

Ruling:

Yes.

Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either
through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There
are, however, settled exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, 29
to wit:

Xxxx (see exceptions in previous case)

In the main, petitioner submits that the facts here do not make out even a prima facie case for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. We agree.

As shown by the procedural antecedents, the Office of the Ombudsman has not been at all
certain in its position. Initially, no less than the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Hon. Arturo
C. Mojica, found no ground to believe that petitioner had violated Sec. 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. However, then Ombudsman Vasquez disagreed, in view of the possibility of a
violation of Section 3(e) thereof, because of the "pervading showing of bad faith on the part of
the [petitioner] in maneuvering to acquire for himself a piece of property which he himself knew
to be badly needed by the Municipality." Subsequently, and conformably with this observation of
Ombudsman Vasquez, the case was remanded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas and re-assigned to Graft Investigation Officer Tanco who thereafter found a prima facie
case for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. This time, the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas concurred with such finding. Upon review thereof, Special
Prosecution Officer III Orlando Ines agreed with this finding and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. The Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, in turn, agreed with
Ines and the information was forthwith filed.

Upon a subsequent re-assessment of the evidence as a consequence of petitioner's motion for

reconsideration, another Special Prosecution Officer, Victor Pascual, found that petitioner had
not violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. He thus recommended dismissal of the
case for want of probable cause and the filing of the corresponding manifestation to inform the
Sandiganbayan of the result of the motion for reconsideration. In this instance, the Special
Prosecutor himself concurred with the finding. However, the Ombudsman disapproved the
recommendation as he found that probable cause existed, but opted to “allow the court to find
absence of bad faith.”

This marginal note of the Ombudsman simply meant that he believed that petitioner was in bad
faith. However, good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil
Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith which, according to the Commission,
springs from the fountain of good conscience. Therefore, he who charges another with bad faith
must prove it. In this sense, the Ombudsman should have first determined the facts indicative of
bad faith. On the basis alone of the finding and conclusion of Special Prosecution Officer III
Victor Pascual, with which the Special Prosecutor concurred, there was no showing of bad faith
on the part of petitioner. It was, therefore error for the Ombudsman to "pass the buck," so to
speak, to the Sandiganbayan to find "absence of bad faith."

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Court of Appeals (GR no. 119322 June 4, 1996)

Facts:

 In essence, the complaints in I.S. Nos. 93-508, 93-584 and 93-17942 charged private
respondents with fraudulent tax evasion or willfully attempting to evade or defeat
payment of income tax, ad valorem tax and value-added tax for the year 1992, as well
as for the years 1990-1991.
 The Commissioner assessed against Fortune the total amount of P7,685,942,221.66
representing deficiency income, ad valorem and value-added tax for the year 1992 with
the request that the said amount be paid within thirty (30) days upon receipt thereof.
Fortune on September 17, 1993 moved for reconsideration of the assessments.
 The fraudulent scheme allegedly adopted by private respondents consisted of making
fictitious and simulated sales of Fortune's cigarette products to non-existing individuals
and to entities incorporated and existing only for the purpose of such fictitious sales by
declaring registered wholesale prices with the BIR lower than Fortune's actual wholesale
prices which are required for determination of Fortune's correct income, ad valorem, and
value-added tax liabilities.
 Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City, praying that
the complaint of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the orders of the
prosecutors in I.S. No. 93-508 be dismissed or set aside, alternatively, the proceedings
on the preliminary investigation be suspended pending final determination by the
 Commissioner of Fortune's motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the August 13,
1993 assessment of the taxes due.
 The trial court issued an order granting the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.

Issue:

WON respondent Court of Appeals in its decision correctly ruled that the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 88) did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing four (4) orders directing the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
restraining petitioner prosecutors from continuing with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos.
93-508, 93-584 and 93-17942 wherein private respondents were respondents.

Ruling:

Yes.

In issuing the questioned orders granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial
court believed that said orders were warranted to afford private respondents adequate
protection of their constitutional rights, particularly in reference to presumption of innocence,
due process and equal protection of the laws. The trial court also found merit in private
respondents' contention that preliminary injunction should be issued to avoid oppression and
because the acts of the state prosecutors were without or in excess of authority and for the
reason that there was a prejudicial question.

Contrary to petitioners' submission, preliminary investigation may be enjoined where

exceptional circumstances so warrant. In Hernandez v. Albano and Fortun v. Labang, injunction
was issued to enjoin a preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint against them before the prosecution and alternatively, to
suspend the preliminary investigation on the grounds cited hereinbefore, one of which is that the
complaint of the Commissioner is not supported by any evidence to serve as adequate basis for
the issuance of the subpoena to them and put them to their defense.

Indeed, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial and also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trials.

As found by the Court of Appeals, there was obvious haste by which the subpoena was issued
to private respondents, just the day after the complaint was filed, hence, without the
investigating prosecutors being afforded material time to examine and study the voluminous
documents appended to the complaint for them to determine if preliminary investigation should
be conducted. The Court of Appeals further added that the precipitate haste in the issuance of
the subpoena justified private respondents' misgivings regarding the objectivity and neutrality of
the prosecutors in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and so, the appellate court
concluded, the grant of preliminary investigation by the trial court to afford adequate protection
to private respondents' constitutional rights and to avoid oppression does not constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

Paredes vs Sandiganbayan (GR no. 108251 January 31, 1996)

Facts:

 The cases originated in a complaint filed on January 23, 1990 by Teofilo Gelacio, then
vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Charged with petitioner Paredes, Jr., who
was then the provincial governor, were petitioner Mansueto J. Honrada, clerk of court of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and Atty. Generoso
Sansaet, counsel of petitioner Paredes, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 1393 of the MCTC.
 In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of court Honrada, in conspiracy with
petitioner Paredes, Jr. and the latter's counsel Atty. Sansaet, certified as true a copy of a
Notice of Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes on
July 9, 1985, showing that an arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and
issued a certification dated March 24, 1986 to that effect when in truth no arraignment
had been held in that case. In support of his allegation, Gelacio submitted a Certification
issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño of the MCTC to the effect that Criminal Case No. 1393
had "never reached the arraignment stage" before it was dismissed on motion of the
prosecution.
 On the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft
Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, recommended on
February 24, 1992 that petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of
Public Documents. Her recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar
Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, who, upon the recommendation of Erdulfo
Querubin of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, approved the filing of three
informations for falsification of public documents against Paredes, Jr., Honrada and
Sansaet with the Sandiganbayan.
 The present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction was then filed to enjoin the
trial of the criminal cases.
 Petitioners contend, among others, that the cases were filed for political harassment and
there is in fact no prima facie evidence to hold them answerable for falsification of public
documents.

Issue:

WON the criminal prosecution should be enjoined on the allegation that the complaint was filed
by petitioner's political enemies to harass him.

Ruling:

No.

Firstly, that the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a
criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary
investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard.
Their evidence, as well as that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail.

Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such
discretion is clearly shown to have been abused. There are instances, constituting exceptions to
the general rule, when this Court will intervene in the prosecution of cases. (See digest of
Yupangco vs Mendoza for an enumeration of the exceptions.) But none of the exceptions are
found here.

Secondly, to warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the

extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant
possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the
prosecution is handled by the Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that petitioner
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is the subject of persecution by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur,
it has not been alleged, much less shown, that his enemies have influence and power over the
national prosecution service.

To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the
private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a
scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and disrepute.
For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation, be
said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine objectively and impartially the
existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what is essentially his
province.

Tetangco vs Ombudsman (GR no. 156427 January 20, 2006)

Facts:

 On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on
January 26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial
assistance to the chairman and P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District
I. Allegedly, on March 5, 2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of
the financial assistance from the City of Manila when such disbursement was not
justified as a lawful expense.
 In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal
of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction
over the case and the same case had previously been filed before the COMELEC.
Furthermore, the Complaint had no verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.
The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and justified, the same being
supported by disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit and accounting.
 The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
evidence and merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation.

Issue:
WON the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Complaint

Ruling:

It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's determination
of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as
to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
contemplation of law.

In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable
cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the
disbursement for financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful
expense. Complainant did not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an original
appropriation of the amount used for the financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from
the appropriation it was intended for.

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. de los Angeles (GR no. L-27829 August
19, 1988)

Facts:

 Respondent Timoteo Sevilla, proprietor and General Manager of the Philippine

Associated Resources (PAR) was accorded the right to import Virginia leaf tobacco for
blending purposes and exportation by them of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
PVTA and farmer's low-grade tobacco.
 Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract for the importation and counterpart
exportation of tobacco.
 Republic Act No. 4155 was passed and took effect on June 20, 1964, authorizing the
PVTA to grant import privileges at the ratio of 4 to 1 instead of 9 to 1 and to dispose of
all its tobacco stock at the best price available.
 As a result of such law, the contract between respondent and petitioner was amended to
give the respondent certain privileges under said law, subject to specific conditions, one
of which was that respondent Sevilla would open an irrevocable letter of credit No. 6232
with the Prudential Bank and Trust Co. in favor of the PVTA to secure the payment of
the balance of the purchase price for respondent's purchase of PVTA tobacco, drawable
upon the release from the Bureau of Customs of the imported Virginia blending tobacco.
 While respondent was trying to negotiate the reduction of the procurement cost of the
2,101.479 kilos of PVTA tobacco already exported which attempt was denied by
petitioner and also by the Office of the President, petitioner prepared two drafts to be
drawn against said letter of credit for amounts which have already become due and
 demandable. Respondent then filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against the petitioner in the amount of P5,000,000.00.
 Respondent Sevilla claims that petitioner demanded from him a much higher price for
Grades D and E tobacco than from the other awardees; that petitioner violated its
contract by granting indiscriminately to numerous buyers the right to export and import
tobacco while his agreement is being implemented, thereby depriving respondent of his
exclusive right to import the Virginia leaf tobacco for blending purposes and that
respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the release of the amount of
P800,000.00 from the Letter of Credit, upon his posting a bond for the same amount.
 Lower court issued an order dated November 3, 1967, restraining the defendant PVTA
from issuing any Certificate of Authority to export or import to any persons and/or entities
while the right of the plaintiff to the balance of his quota remains valid, effective and in
force; and enjoining defendant PVTA from opening public bidding to sell its Virginia leaf
tobacco during the effectivity of its contract with the plaintiff.
 No notice was given to petitioner before the writ was granted.

Issue:

WON the order of November 3, 1967 exceeded the proper scope and function of a writ of
preliminary injunction and thus the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

Yes.

More specifically, Section 5 of Rule 58 requires notice to the defendant before a preliminary
injunction is granted unless it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be
heard on notice. Once the application is filed with the Judge, the latter must cause an Order to
be served on the defendant, requiring him to show cause at a given time and place why the
injunction should not be granted. The hearing is essential to the legality of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. It is an abuse of discretion on the part of the court to issue an injunction
without hearing the parties and receiving evidence thereon (Associated Watchmen and Security
Union, et al. v. United States Lines, et al., 101 Phil. 896).

In the issuance of the Order of November 3, 1967, with notice and hearing notwithstanding the
discretionary power of the trial court to issue a preliminary mandatory injunction is not absolute
as the issuance of the writ is the exception rather than the rule. The party applying for it must
show a clear legal right, the violation of which is so recent as to make its vindication an urgent
one (Police Commission v. Bello, 37 SCRA 230). It is granted only on a showing that (a) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damages (Pelejo v. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 665).
Injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law (Allundorff v. Abrahanson, 38 Phil. 585)
or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation (SSC v. Bayona, et al., L-
13555, May 30, 1962).

Any alleged damage suffered or might possibly be suffered by respondent Sevilla refers to
expected profits and claimed by him in this complaint as damages in the amount of FIVE Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00), a damage that can be measured, susceptible of mathematical
computation, not irreparable, nor do they necessitate the issuance of the Order of November 3,
1967.

Pascual vs Dumlao (AM No. MTJ-01-1350 July 20, 2001)

Facts:

 An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Cesar M. Dumlao in connection with
three forcible-entry cases.
 The three cases were assigned to respondent Judge Cesar M. Dumlao. On the same
day (December 4, 1995) the cases were filed, respondent judge issued a Joint Order,
directing the issuance of a temporary restraining order against herein complainants
enjoining them from committing further acts of dispossession against the therein
plaintiffs.
 Complainants moved for a reconsideration on the ground that it was issued in violation
of this Court's Circular No. 20-95. But respondent judge in another order, dated March
26, 1996, denied the motion for reconsideration for being moot and academic on the
ground that the effectivity of the TRO had expired without an injunction issued against
complainants who in fact remained in possession of the subject premises.
 Complainants filed this administrative complaint against respondent, accusing the latter
of bad faith and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the Joint Order, dated December 4,
1995, directing the issuance of the temporary restraining order, and the Joint Order,
dated March 25, 1996, granting the motion to deposit the harvest in violation of Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 and Rule 15, §§4 and 5 of the Rules of Court
 Commenting on the allegations against him, respondent maintains that he issued the
temporary restraining order without prior hearing "to avert any harm, injuries or even
death as what usually happens during the land preparation period." He claims that
complainants were subsequently heard on the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Issue:

WON Judge Dumlao correctly issued the TRO

Ruling:

No.
Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive right or interest. It is
granted only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot
be remedied under any standard compensation. Its issuance rests upon the existence of an
emergency or a special reason before the main case can be regularly heard. It is for the party
requesting an injunction to demonstrate clearly the presence of one or more of the grounds for
its issuance.

The allegations in the complaints in the three cases as above-quoted are insufficient to justify
the issuance of a temporary restraining order. As correctly pointed out by complainants in their
first motion for reconsideration, irreparable injury does not have reference to the amount of
damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted.
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in clear terms requires that a grave and irreparable injury
should exist, or may occur, to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order without a
hearing. What is more, complainants were in possession of the lands and the effect of the TRO
was to dispossess them of the land, if not to transfer possession thereof to the plaintiffs.
Respondent's failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the TRO
constitutes grave abuse of authority prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

Respondent says that the disputed land is agricultural and that injuries, or even death, are
suffered during the "land preparation period." But if complainants were in possession of the
lands, it is those seeking to oust them from possession of the lands who should be restrained
rather than complainants. In any event, this does not excuse him from his failure to ascertain the
factual basis for his issuance of the assailed temporary restraining order. Nor does it appear
that within 72 hours of the issuance of the TRO he called the parties and heard them on the
matter of injunction in order to minimize any possible prejudice to complainants.

Idolor vs Court of Appeals (GR no. 141853 February 7, 2001)

Facts:

 To secure a loan of P520,000.00, Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent

Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.
 Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking. Thus, respondent Gumersindo De
Guzman filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the
parties’ agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage.
 The mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the
highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
 Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint for
annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents,
Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage.
  The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents, the
Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of
a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the
De Guzman spouses
 The Court of Appeals, on petition for certiorari, annulled the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction.

Issue:

WON the respondent Court erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from causing the issuance of a final
deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private
respondents.

Ruling:

No.

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before
an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must
be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; (2) the act against which the
injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence, the existence of a right violated is
a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should
be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has
attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said
right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of
the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation.

In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary
right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction.
It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent
Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the
registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or
before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of
sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought
to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2)
days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party
seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought
— in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

Miriam College Foundation vs Court of Appeals (GR no. 127930 December 15, 2000)

Facts:

 Petitioner Miriam College Foundation, Inc., through its Discipline Committee, imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon herein private respondents, members of the editorial board
of the Miriam College's School Paper "Chi Rho" and the magazine "Ang Magasing
Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho." The School described the September-October 1994 issue of
the said publications "vulgar,""indecent,""gross,""explicit,""injurious to young readers,"
and devoid of all moral values."
 The students filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning
the jurisdiction of the Miriam College Discipline Board over them.
 The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the school from
enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal orders.
 Both parties moved for reconsideration, but the trial court eventually dismissed the
petition.
 Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Court, however,
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. On May 19, 1995,
respondent appellate court issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the public
respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.
 The appellate court declared the RTC decision as well the students' suspension and
dismissal, void. Hence, the present petition by Miriam College.

Issue:

WON the CA should not have proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of the case, the
petition being moot and academic since more than one year have passed since May 19, 1995
when the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the
dismissal and suspension on petitioners

Ruling:

No.

Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the CA should not have
proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of the case.

We find that the case is not moot.

It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining order,
not a preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA ever issued a preliminary
injunction.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain
from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to
preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until
it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. Under the former sec. 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by §5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a
temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the
expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary
order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order
would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to
that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued;
hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules
of Court.

This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the rule prevailing when
the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995. By that time respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and
Joel Tan had already served their respective suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to
respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome Gomez, Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary
Renacido all of whom were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation
privileges were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty
days. It can hardly be said that in that short span of time, these students had already graduated
as to render the case moot.

Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughout the pendency of the case
or that what is issued was a preliminary injunction. In either case, it was error on the part of the
CA to assume that its order supposedly enjoining Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and
suspension was complied with. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. To determine the moot character of a question before it, the appellate court may receive
proof or take notice of facts appearing outside the record. In the absence of such proof or notice
of facts, the Court of Appeals should not have assumed that its TRO was enforced, and that the
case was rendered moot by the mere lapse of time.

Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein deny that the case has become moot
since Miriam refused them readmission in violation of the TRO. This fact is unwittingly conceded
by Miriam itself when, to counter this allegation by the students, it says that private respondents
never sought readmission after the restraining order was issued.

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Alonte vs Savellano (GR no. 131652, 131728 March 9, 1998)

Facts:

 Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna and Buenaventura

Concepcion were charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn Punongbayan.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
 The petition for change of venue was granted and the case was raffled to respondent
judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her "decision to
abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty when arraigned and
waived pre-trial.
 Immediately following arraignment the prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to
the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance and that she has no interest in
further prosecuting the action. The Prosecution then manifested that the State had no
further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She then moved
for the "dismissal of the case" against both accused-petitioners.
 The two accused did not present any countervailing evidence, did not take the witness
stand nor admitted the act charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge said
that "the case was submitted for decision."
 On December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered convicting petitioners of rape.

Issue:

WON due process in criminal proceedings was observed here

Ruling:

No.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a)
that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles
find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural
due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."

The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court. The Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that
each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be
given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.

Judge Savellano claimed in his comment that none of the counsels for the accused cross-
examined the rape victim and thus they waived the right to do so.

It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver
of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The
Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have
been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties
have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by
respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the
Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the
legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.