Notes: In all three cases, the period of at least 6 years of inaction seems to be the

standard for determining whether there has been inordinate delay by the Ombudsman in
resolving the complaints against petitioners, resulting to a violation of their right to
speedy disposition of the cases against them. However, in Tatad vs Sandiganbayan,
which is repeatedly cited in the aforementioned cases, the SC said that a delay of close
to 3 years in the termination of the preliminary investigation is already violative of
petitioner's constitutional rights. The delay of 3 years, however, was held unreasonable
and unjustifiable because of the circumstances obtaining in the latter case. These
circumstances include: (1) the alleged "painstaking scrutiny" of the Tanodbayan of the
case records, which amounted to a double standard of treatment, (2) most of the
charges did not involve complicated and factual issues which justified the delay. All
these cases suggest, however, that only unreasonable and unjustifiable delay will violate
the right to speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the Ombudsman must be able to offer a
valid and well-grounded explanation for the delay. One valid explanation is that the delay
was due to causes directly attributable to the petitioner. That the delay was not objected
to by petitioner or that it was with his acquiscence are not valid reasons, as expressly
ruled in Cervantes vs Sandiganbayan.

Angchangco Jr. vs Ombudsman (GR No. 122728. February 13, 1997)

Facts:

 DOLE rendered a decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the sum of P1,281,065.505.
 A writ of execution was issued when the decision became final. It directed the
Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same.
 Petitioner, as the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution issued,
caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections from
its various clients
 Atty. Calo, president of NIASSI, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to
the enforcement of the writ of execution. Several employees of NIASSI also filed
letters-complaints against petitioner.
 The criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved, despite the
administrative aspect of the complaints having been dismissed by the Court. This
prompted petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution.
 With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss. This has not been resolved yet.
 As a result of the pending criminal complaints, petitioner's request for clearance in
order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied.
 Petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus seeking to compel the
Ombudsman to dismiss the complaints against him and to direct the Ombudsman to
issue a clearance in favor of petitioner.

Issue:

WON the issuance of mandamus is warranted in this case

Ruling:
Yes.

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge its duty
mandated by the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials and employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof."

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges
against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well
as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before
it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his
retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after
serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent
Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his
retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice
which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for.

Roque vs Ombudsman (GR No. 129978. May 12, 1999)

Facts:

 Petitioners Mabanglo and Roque are Schools Division Superintendents of DECS.

 Auditors from the COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by
the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices.
 Auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies and violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019), violations of COA
Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445
 Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao against several persons, including herein petitioners.
 The Complaint against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman in Mindanao way back on May 7, 1991, and that against Petitioner
Roque on May 16, 1991.
 On June 11, 1991, the said Office found the Complaints sufficient for preliminary
investigation. Significantly, no action was taken until after the lapse of almost six
years.
 For violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, the same Office recommended the filing of
an Information against Petitioner Mabanglo only on March 18, 1997, and against
Petitioner Roque only on April 30, 1997.
 On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus
premised on the allegation that "after the initial Orders finding the cases proper for
preliminary investigation were issued on June 1991 and the subsequent submission
of their counter-affidavits, until the present, or more than six (6) years, no resolution
has been issued by the Public Respondent and no case has been filed with the
appropriate court against the herein Petitioners.

Issue:
WON there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints against
petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a] speedy
disposition of cases

Ruling:

Yes.

Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated
by the Constitution 12 and Republic Act No. 6770, 13 to act promptly on complaints
before him. More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases filed against them. Although respondents attempted to
justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of
Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for
the latter to resolve the Complaints. 14 Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this
Court dismissed a Complaint that had been pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman for more than six years.

We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the Petition for Mandamus
became moot and academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were filed. The same contention was
rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that the long and
unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners was not
corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations.

Cervantes vs Sandiganbayan (GR 108595. May 18, 1999)

Facts:

 On March 6, 1986, one Pedro Almendras filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan
(predecessor of the Ombudsman) a sworn complaint against Alejandro Tapang for
falsification of complainant's "salaysay." The complaint alleged that Alejandro
Tapang made complainant sign a piece of paper in blank on which paper a
"salaysay" was later inscribed stating that complainant had been paid his claim in the
amount of P17,594.00, which was not true. In said complaint, Cervantes was also
implicated.
 On October 16, 1986, petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan an affidavit stating that he had nothing to do with the blank paper that
Almendras signed
 On May 18, 1992, more than six (6) years after the filing of the initiatory complaint
with the Tanodbayan, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Said
information charged petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes, together with Teodorico L. Ruiz
and Alejandro Tapang with violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act 3019.
 October 2, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash and motion to recall warrant of
arrest on the ground, among others, that the case against him had already
prescribed due to unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary
investigation. The Sandiganbayan in a minute resolution dated December 24, 1992
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
 Petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside the resolution of the
 Sandiganbayan. Said resolution denied petitioner's motion to quash the information
against him. Petitioner also sought to restrain or enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with his arraignment and trial.

Issue:

WON the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to quash for violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case.

Ruling:

Yes.

He was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case, a right guaranteed by
the Constitution. It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six (6)
years from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an information for
the offense with the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the complaint by stating that "no political motivation appears to have tainted
the prosecution of the case" in apparent reference to the case of Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan. The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, alleging
that, as in Alvizo, the petitioner herein was "insensitive to the implications and
contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of
the matter."

We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor's ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor
to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of
whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.