Project Report on: -

NOISE POLLUTION AND ITS JUDICIAL

APPROACH

Submitted to: - Submitted by: -

Dr. Karan Ridhi Bansal

UILS 169/14 8th semester

Panjab University B.Com. LL.B. (Hons.)

Section C
 Acknowledgement

The project has been compiled by Ridhi Bansal, roll number 169/14 of 8th semester on the
topic ‘Noise Pollution and its Judicial Approach’. Apart from the efforts of myself, the
success of any project depends largely on the encouragement and guidelines of many others. I
take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the people who have been instrumental in the
successful completion of this project. I would like to show my greatest appreciation to Dr.
Karan for her guidance and support in completion of this project. I can’t say thank you enough
for her tremendous support and help. I would like to thank my friends for motivating me and
appreciating my work. I would also like to thank the library staff for providing relevant
materials.
 Table of Cases
Abdulla v Abdulla AIR 1924 Bom. 290 .................................................................................................22
Acbo-lasundari v Doman AIR 1926 Cal. 150 .......................................................................................18
Achutan v Achutan AIR 1941 Mad. 587 ................................................................................................22
Akkayya v Appayya, ILR (1947) Mad. 661 ............................................................................................ 8
Annamalai v Firm of Advocates AIR 1938 Rang. 258 .......................................................................22
Arjunlal Dhanji Rathod v Dayaram Premji Padhion, 1971 BLJR307 ............................................18
Atul Kristo Bose v Lyon & Co. (1887) 14 Cal. 457 .............................................................................. 9
B. Shambumal v State Bank of Mysore AIR 1971 Mys. 156 ...........................................................16
Babulal v Chandabai AIR 1989 Karnt. 221 ...........................................................................................11
Backhouse v Bonomi (1858) 9 HLC 503 ...............................................................................................21
Baikunth v Kesor AIR 1969 Pat. 160 ......................................................................................................12
Barodakant v Sookmoy, 1 W.R. 29 ............................................................................................................ 5
Bechu v Baldeo AIR 1933 Oudh 132 ......................................................................................................19
Beni Madhav v Chameli Devi AIR 1985 All. 89 .................................................................................16
Bhagwan v Madhav, 46 Bom. 1000 .........................................................................................................16
Dasharath v Gaynam, 45 Bom. L.R. 740 ................................................................................................19
Dharfria v Govind, 8 Bom. 99 ...................................................................................................................16
Durag v Pancha Pancham AIR 1939 All. 483 ......................................................................................... 1
Emperor v Nageshappa, 20 Bom. 543 .....................................................................................................11
Golab Koer v SyedMohammed, 2 P.L.T. 619 .......................................................................................20
Gordbandas v Bhulabhai, 34 Bom. L.R. 623 .........................................................................................19
Green v Humphreys (1884) 26 Ch D 474 ...............................................................................................13
Hemchand v Shive, 16 Bom. 716; Basawanewa v Shivappa AIR 1936 Bom. 289 ....................21
Hindu v Heramba, 13 C.L.J. 139 ...............................................................................................................18
Hossein v Asha Bibi AIR 1924 Rang. 123 ............................................................................................... 5
India House v Kishan N. Lalzvani AIR 2003 SC 2084 ........................................................................ 1
Iqbal Singh v A. V Subbarao AIR 1973 A.P. 193.................................................................................. 3
Jijibhoy v T.S. Chettyar AIR 1928 PC 103 .............................................................................................. 2
Kalyan Mai v Ahmadudin AIR 1934 PC 208 ........................................................................................12
Kishori Engineering Works v Bank of India AIR 1991 Pat. 194 ....................................................18
Laxman v Yadao AIR 1940 Nag. 401 .....................................................................................................17
Madhavdas v Jan Mahomed AIR 1942 Sind 37 ..................................................................................... 5
Mahabir v ADJ AIR 1982 All. 8 ................................................................................................................. 3
Mahadula v Chirangilal AIR 1963 M.P. 51 ...........................................................................................20
Nilamadhab v Kristodoss, 5 W.R. 281 ...................................................................................................... 5
P. Sreedevi v P. Appu AIR 1991 Ker. 76 ................................................................................................. 4
P.J. Johnson v Astrofied Armadorn [AIR 1999 Ker. 53 (F.B.) .......................................................... 9
Premlata v Lakshman AIR 1970 SC 1525................................................................................................ 8
Raja Bala v Krishnarav Ramchandra, 2 Bom. 273 ..............................................................................21
Ram Ditt. Ram Kissen v E.D. Sassoon & Co. AIR 1929 PC 103 ..................................................... 7
Ram Shau v Imdad, 511.C. 590 ................................................................................................................... 6
Re Marappa Gounder AIR 1959 Mad. 26...............................................................................................12
Roshan Lai v Chowdhury Bashir Ahmed AIR 1925 All. 138 ..........................................................22
S.T.O. v M.D. Abraham 1974 Ker. LT 244 ...........................................................................................12
Sampuran Singh v Srnt. Niranjan Kaur AIR 1999 SC 1047 .............................................................14
Sarat Chandra v Upendra Nath AIR 1927 Cal. 623 ............................................................................... 2
Seeti Kuti v Kunhi Patbunma, 40 Mad. 1040 ........................................................................................10
State of Orissa v. Krishnaprasa'd, 1973 Cuttack Law Times 1068 ........................................ 2
State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 960 ...................................................................... 1
T.P.K Nair v Union of India AIR 1999 Ker. 80...................................................................................... 8
Venkatachalam v Venkateswara AIR 1944 Mad. 33 ..........................................................................20
Venkataramayyar v Kothandaramayyar, 13 Mad. 135 .......................................................................13
Zafar Khan v Board of Revenue AIR 1985 SC 39 ................................................................................. 6
 Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................ 1
2. SECTION 12: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS .................................... 1
TIME REQUISITE FOR COPY ............................................................................................................ 2
SECTION 5 AND SECTION 12 ......................................................................................................... 3
3. SECTION 13: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN CASES WHERE LEAVE TO SUE OR APPEAL
AS A PAUPER IS APPLIED FOR..................................................................................................... 3
4. SECTION 14: EXCLUSION OF TIME OF PROCEEDING BONA FIDE IN COURT
WITHOUT JURISDICTION. ............................................................................................................. 4
REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 14 .................. 5
SECTION 14 APPLIES TO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS ONLY ............................................... 7
COMPARISON WITH SEC. 5 ........................................................................................................... 7
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SECTION 4, 12 AND 14 ............................................................... 7
5. SECTION 15: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN CERTAIN OTHER CASES ................................ 7
SECTION 15(1) ......................................................................................................................................... 7
SECTION 15(2) ......................................................................................................................................... 8
SECTION 15(3) ......................................................................................................................................... 8
SECTION 15(4) ......................................................................................................................................... 9
SECTION 15(5) ......................................................................................................................................... 9
6. SECTION 16: EFFECT OF DEATH ON OR BEFORE THE ACCRUAL OF THE RIGHT
TO SUE ............................................................................................................................................... 10
7. SECTION 17: EFFECT OF FRAUD OR MISTAKE ............................................................. 11
8. SECTION 18: EFFECT OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN WRITING ................................... 12
What is Acknowledgment? .................................................................................................................13
Principle of the Section .........................................................................................................................13
REQUISITES OF A VALID ACKNOWLEDGMENT ...........................................................14
CASE LAW ...............................................................................................................................................16
9. SECTION 19: EFFECT OF PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT OF DEBT OR OF INTEREST
ON LEGACY ....................................................................................................................................... 17
MODE OF PAYMENT ........................................................................................................................18
PART-PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL ..............................................................................................18
10. SECTION 20: EFFECT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR PAYMENT BY ANOTHER
PERSON ............................................................................................................................................. 19
11. SECTION 21: EFFECT OF SUBSTITUTING OR ADDING NEW PLAINTIFF OR
DEFENDANT .................................................................................................................................... 20
12. SECTION 22: CONTINUING BREACHES AND TORTS ............................................... 20
13. SECTION 23: SUITS FOR COMPENSATION FOR ACTS NOT ACTIONABLE
WITHOUT SPECIAL DAMAGE ..................................................................................................... 21
14. SECTION 24: COMPUTATION OF TIME MENTIONED IN INSTRUMENT............ 22
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 23
1. INTRODUCTION
Sections 12 to 18 of the Limitation Act deal with the computation of periods of limitation. In
other words, it points out how the period of time shown in the column II of the Schedule is to
be computed. In other words, what days or period have to be excluded from calculation of
period of limitation is pointed out by the above sections. No prayer or application is needed on
the part of a party for the exclusion of the time is by the section itself and it is the duty of the
court to exclude such time.
The rules as to computation of period of limitation laid down in the Act are not intended by the
legislature to apply only to periods of limitations prescribed by the Schedule, but apply also to
periods of limitation provided for by other enactments.1

2. SECTION 12: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Section 12 applies to suits, appeals and applications. The true effect of Sec. 12 is that the
periods referred to in the various sub-sections have to be added to the period of limitation for
ascertaining the last date for filing the appeal, etc. This section confers a substantive right upon
a party and it is the duty of the court to exclude the time when the case comes under the purview
of any of the sub-sections of Sec. 12.2
Section 12(1) provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or
application the day from which the period begins to run shall be excluded. Thus, if a pronote
is executed on 5th June, 1945, the last day for filing the suit will be 5th June, 1948 and not 4th
June, 1948, because the 1st day, i.e., 5th June, 1945 will not be taken into account in computing
the period of limitation which is three years in the case of a pronote.
Section 12(2) entails that In computing the period of limitation for an appeal, application for
revision/review or for leave to appeal, the following periods shall be excluded: (1) the
day on which the period begins to run, (2) the day on which the judgment was pronounced, (3)
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order, (4) the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of judgment.
The question whether the appeal preferred was in time or not should be considered on the basis
of information available from the copy of the judgment and decree filed along with the
memorandum of appeal and not from other copies which the party might have got and used for
other purposes with which the Court has nothing to do.3 It is only when an application is made

1
Durag v Pancha Pancham AIR 1939 All. 483
2
India House v Kishan N. Lalzvani AIR 2003 SC 2084
3
State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 960

1|Page
for certified copies of the judgment and decree for the purpose of filing an appeal, the appellant
is entitled to the time occupied by the office for preparing copies. In Commissioner of Sales
Tax v Madanlal4it was held that for the applicability of Sec. 12 it is not at all necessary that the
filing of the certified copies should be mandatory. Thus, even if there are no rules requiring
such copies to be filed along with the appeal, the time taken in obtaining of such copies will be
excluded.5
Further Section 12(3) provides that where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be
revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order,
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded
shall also be excluded.
Lastly Section 12(4) entails that in computing the period of limitation for an application to set
aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
TIME REQUISITE FOR COPY
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v Maharaj Narain observed that the expression
'time requisite' under Sec. 12(2) cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for
obtaining the copy or the minimum time within which a copy could be obtained. The appellant
is not required to apply for a copy immediately after the order is pronounced, he could have
applied it at the end of limitation period. The section lays no obligation on the appellant to be
prompt and diligent in his application for a copy of the order.
However the delay caused by the carelessness or negligence of the party in applying for a copy
or in paying the money required for making the copy cannot be excluded from computation.6
In cases where the period of limitation for filing the appeal is a very short one, the appellant
ought to be very diligent in applying for copies of the judgment and decree. Thus, any failure
in reasonable diligence which produces unnecessary delay at one or more of the several stages
in obtaining a copy of the decree, etc. will disentitle the appellant to claim the whole of the
time actually spent in obtaining the copy. The time unnecessarily occupied is not time 'requisite'
within the meaning of Sec. 12.7
Time requisite is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of the facts of each particular
case. No time limit is fixed for making an application for the certified copy. But such
application should have been made within the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal,
etc. (for which such copies are required) if the appellant is to avail the benefit of Sec. 12. In

4
AIR 1977 SC 523
5
State of Orissa v. Krishnaprasa'd, 1973 Cuttack Law Times 1068
6
Jijibhoy v T.S. Chettyar AIR 1928 PC 103
7
Sarat Chandra v Upendra Nath AIR 1927 Cal. 623

2|Page
N.D. Parthsarthy v State of AP8 it was held that an application made after the period is over
will not be of any avail to the defendant in exclusion of time under Sec. 12.
Time requisite cannot refer to any period antecedent to the applicant applying for copy of
decree, etc. (i.e. the time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order itself) and subsequent
to the period of the copy being ready for delivery. Thus the time in between the date when the
copy was ready and the date when the delivery was taken cannot be excluded under Sec. 12,
because under sub-sec. (2) what is material is not the date of delivery of copy but the date when
the copy was ready for delivery.9 The date on which it was ready is important, not the date of
collection by the counsel.
'Time requisite for obtaining copy of judgment or decree' starts from 'date of application and
ends when the copy is ready for delivery.' Where the original application filed for certified
copies was struck off by the trial court but it was restored by a subsequent application, the date
for computing the period of limitation is not the date on which the second application is filed,
but the date when the original application was filed. In other words, where dismissal of an
application for certified copy is cured by its restoration, the starting of "exclusion period" also
is thereby restored.10
SECTION 5 AND SECTION 12
Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied in making the computation of time provided for
under Sec. 12, and does not become applicable until after such computation has been made. In
computing the time requisite for obtaining copies, no allowance can be made for delay caused
by inability by reason of poverty, to pay the estimated cost of copies. But if the stamps are not
procurable, or the office is not open to receive payment of the estimated cost, allowance may
be made for the delay so caused. These and similar cause of delay may be considered under
Sec. 5 after computation has been made under the other sections.

3. SECTION 13: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN CASES WHERE LEAVE TO

SUE OR APPEAL AS A PAUPER IS APPLIED FOR
Section 13 is a new section and it did not find place in the old Limitation Act of 1908.
According to Section 3, a suit is instituted in the case of pauper, when his application for leave
to sue as a pauper is made. If the application for leave to appeal as a pauper is rejected and the
applicant afterwards files an appeal in the regular way, at a time when the period of limitation
for filing the appeal has expired, the position under the old Act of 1908 was that the appeal was

8
AIR 1977 A.P. 37
9
Mahabir v ADJ AIR 1982 All. 8
10
Iqbal Singh v A. V Subbarao AIR 1973 A.P. 193

3|Page
treated as time barred because the date of the appeal was the date of filing the regularly stamped
memorandum of appeal and could not relate back to the date of filing the application for leave
to appeal. But, the Court could grant time in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 and the
appeal filed within the time granted could not be treated as barred by limitation. Now Section
13 of the new Act expressly provides that where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied
for but is not granted, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting in good faith,
his application for such leave shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed
for such suit or appeal and the Court may, on payment of the Court-fee, treat the suit or appeal
as having the same force and effect as if the Court-fees had been paid in the first instance.
No time limit has been set out in Sec. 13 and the court can extend time (for payment of court
fee) at its discretion to whatever extent it thinks fit. But it must be proved that the applicant
acted in good faith when he presented the application as pauper.11

4. SECTION 14: EXCLUSION OF TIME OF PROCEEDING BONA FIDE

IN COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
Sec. 14 provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which
the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a
court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where
the proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court
which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Sub-
sec. (2) similarly provides for an application.
Further Section 14(3) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order
XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall apply in relation
to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of the Order, where
such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in
jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.
The effect of Sec. 14 is not to render the suit after re-filing in the proper court a continuation
of the original suit, and consequently the limitation period has to be determined as if it was a
new suit, and the period will be that which was prescribed for the original suit, but excluding
the period during which the suit was being prosecuted bona fide in a wrong court. For example:
If the order returning the plaint is passed on the 4th May and the plaintiff is given time till the
30th June for presentation in the proper court, the period between 4th May and 29th June is to
be excluded under Sec. 14.

11
P. Sreedevi v P. Appu AIR 1991 Ker. 76

4|Page
A plaintiff can claim the benefit of this section only where the previous proceeding has been
brought by himself or by some person through whom he derives title to sue. 12 Where the
plaintiff and another person had brought the suit in one capacity, and the plaintiff alone brought
the other suit in another capacity, no deduction of the time spent in the previous suit could be
made.13 The defendant must be the same in both the proceedings. Where there are several
defendants in the second suit, and the former suit was instituted against only one of them, no
exclusion of time will be allowed.14
It is not necessary that plaintiff must have been prosecuting the previous proceeding as a
plaintiff. He is entitled to a deduction of the period of pendency of a former suit in which he as
defendant was urging the same claim as he afterwards prefers as plaintiff. All that is required
of a plaintiff to prove is that he prosecuted the previous civil proceedings in good faith.15
Moreover Section 14 will not be attracted when the plaint is filed in a wrong court out of time
i.e. not within the limitation period. This section applies to suits and applications only, and not
to appeals.
REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 14
1) That the Plaintiff had been prosecuting the previous suit with due diligence and in good
faith
Section 14 (based on justice, equity and good conscience) has to be liberally construed, but not
in disregard of the express words of the section. Unless there is sufficient material to come to
the finding that plaintiff has acted dishonestly and with lack of good faith he cannot be denied
the benefit of Section14. For proving absence of 'good faith' it is not necessary to establish that
the plaintiff was dishonest in filing the suit before the wrong court or that he did it mala fide.
If there is a lack of ‘due care and attention’ on the part of the plaintiff then the plaintiff cannot
be said to be acting in good faith. So, a plaintiff who was careless will not get the time before
a wrong court excluded in computing the limitation period.
A person who has resisted to the objection regarding non-joinder of parties at the initial stage
and also at the revisional stage and run the risk of proceeding with the suit without impleading
the necessary parties, cannot be said to act in good faith because he cannot be said to have
acted with due care and attention. Consequently, such person will not be entitled to benefit of
Sec. 14 for excluding the time spent by him in that proceeding in a fresh suit. 16 Further

12
Barodakant v Sookmoy, 1 W.R. 29
13
Hossein v Asha Bibi AIR 1924 Rang. 123
14
Nilamadhab v Kristodoss, 5 W.R. 281
15
Madhavdas v Jan Mahomed AIR 1942 Sind 37; Aildas v Sobhomal AIR 1938 Sind 50]
16
AIR 1972 SC 730

5|Page
ignorance of law by the plaintiff, which led to his filing the previous suit in a wrong court is
not an excuse and would disentitle the plaintiff to the protection under Sec. 14.17
It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravindranath Samuel Dawson v Sivakami18
that proceedings contrary to a clearly expressed provision of law cannot be regarded as
proceedings in good faith.
2) Matter in issue should be same
When the matter in issue in the previous and new suit is not the same, Section 14 is not
attracted. In Ajab Enterprises v Jayant Vogoiles & Chemicals,19 the plaintiff filed a winding
up petition before the company court. The time taken to prosecute such proceeding cannot be
excluded in computing the period of limitation for a suit against a company for recovery of
debt because the matter in issue in the suit and the winding up proceedings is not the same.
3) The court was unable to entertain that suit on account of defect of jurisdiction or other
cause of a like nature
The court in which the previous proceeding was prosecuted must have been unable to entertain
it by reason of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. Explanation to the Section
makes it clear that that misjoinder of parties or causes of action is to be considered to be a
'cause of a like nature' with 'defect of jurisdiction'. The words ‘other cause of a like nature’
with defect of jurisdiction means something incidental to the court itself, and not connected
with the default, negligence or laches of the plaintiff.20 And therefore, where the previous suit
was dismissed on the merits, or on the ground of limitation or res-judicata, or because the plaint
did not disclose a cause of action, or was badly framed, Sec. 14 cannot be availed of.
In Globe Transport Corporation v Triveni Engineering Works,21 where the respondents were
found to have in good faith pursued their claim before the Court of Civil Judge, Allahabad,
which was found to have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason of a clause in the contract
of carriage which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Court in the city of Jaipur, it was held
that the period during which they prosecuted their suit before the Court of the Civil Judge,
Allahabad would be liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing the
suit in the appropriate Court in Jaipur.

17
Ram Shau v Imdad, 511.C. 590
18
AIR 1979 SC 730
19
AIR 1991 Bom. 35
20
Zafar Khan v Board of Revenue AIR 1985 SC 39
21
(1984) 86 PLR 259 SC

6|Page
SECTION 14 APPLIES TO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS ONLY
Section 14 applies to civil and not criminal proceedings. This section makes no distinction
between a Civil and Revenue Court/Collector's Court. An application for mutation of names is
not a civil proceeding. It has been held that a proceeding before an arbitrator is a civil
proceeding, and in computing the period of limitation, an arbitrator should exclude the time
spent on prosecuting in good faith the same claim before another arbitrator without
jurisdiction.22
COMPARISON WITH SEC. 5
Section 14 confers a right on the applicant, while Section 5 confers discretion on the court.
Section 14 and Section 5, though independent, are not mutually exclusive. Under Section 5,
the court may condone the delay in filing an appeal in the correct court if the requirements of
Sec. 14 appear to have been satisfied and they are held to constitute a sufficient cause under
Sec. 5. The considerations of good faith and due diligence are more rigidly applicable under
Section 14 than Section 5. The reason why Sec. 14 is limited to courts of original jurisdiction
is merely, because the earlier section (Sec. 5) gives a large and more unfettered power in the
same behalf to Appellate Courts.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SECTION 4, 12 AND 14
Section 4 provides that despite the fact that limitation has expired on a day when the court was
closed, the suit, appeal, etc. may be instituted on the day on which the court re-opens. Section
4 does not extend or enlarge the period of limitation. The language of Section 12 and 14
however, clearly provides for the extension of the limitation period and, therefore, if after the
addition of period contemplated by Section 12 and 14 limitation expires on a day when the
court is closed, the suit may be filed on the re-opening day.

5. SECTION 15: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN CERTAIN OTHER CASES

Section 15 provides for exclusion of time where there has been an injunction, or notice has to
be given, or the previous sanction of the Government has to be obtained, or where a liquidator
has been appointed.
SECTION 15(1)
According to Sec. 15(1), where the institution of a suit or the execution of a decree has been
stayed by an injunction or order, the period during which such injunction or order is in force
can be excluded in computing the period of limitation for such suit or application. The day on
which such injunction or order was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn,
shall also be excluded. The object of Sec. 15(1) is to safeguard the interest of the person who

22
Ram Ditt. Ram Kissen v E.D. Sassoon & Co. AIR 1929 PC 103

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is precluded by an injunction or order of court from exercising a right of suit or execution of a
decree passed in his favour against his being injured or damnified on that account.
The words 'stayed by injunction or order' have reference to order of courts and not to a disability
to sue or to apply arising from other circumstances such as declaration of war. The execution
must have been stayed by an express injunction or order,23 and not by an implied order or a
collateral litigation. A party seeking to take advantage of Sec. 15(1) must show that he was
earlier restrained by an order from making the prayer which he is now making. But if he could
have done earlier what he is trying to do now, Sec. 15(1) will not be attracted to his case.
SECTION 15(2)
According to Sec. 15(2), if law requires that a notice should be given or consent or sanction of
the government or any other authority should be obtained before a suit is instituted, then the
period of such notice or the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be
excluded in computing the period of limitation for such suit. In excluding the time the day on
which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of
the order of the Government or other authority are both to be counted.
Sec. 15(2) is intended for cases in which the plaintiff is under a statutory obligation to give a
notice before he can institute a suit. When it is necessary under the law to give the person
intended to be sued notice of such intention the period between the service of the notice and
the expiry of the time prescribed for the notice is excluded in computing the period of limitation
for e.g. Sec. 80 of the C.P.C., 1908, which provides that no officer, etc., could be sued until the
expiration of two months next after the notice in writing has been given. 24 Under Sec. 15(2),
the notice must be a notice of suit and the enactment requiring the notice to be given must
prescribe the period of notice before the expiry of which the claimant cannot institute a suit.25
Sec. 15(2) will not be attracted where the plaintiff has no cause of action against the
Government.
SECTION 15(3)
According to Sec. 15(3), in respect of suits on behalf of an insolvent or a company in
liquidation, the period between the date of the filing of the petition for adjudication or winding
up and the appointment of receiver, liquidator, etc. and period of three months thereafter shall
be excluded in computing the period of limitation for suits by or on behalf of an insolvent's
estate or the company.

23
Akkayya v Appayya, ILR (1947) Mad. 661
24
T.P.K Nair v Union of India AIR 1999 Ker. 80
25
Premlata v Lakshman AIR 1970 SC 1525

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It is common knowledge that by the time a receiver or liquidator is appointed in insolvency or
liquidation proceedings, and the receiver or liquidator after getting information about the assets
and liabilities of the estate gets down to the task of realizing the assets of the estate, claims in
favour of such estate or company get barred to the detriment of the persons entitled to the
benefits of the assets. To avoid this hardship, it is provided that the period between the filing
of the petition for winding up or adjudication and the appointment of the receiver (including
interim receiver) or liquidator (including provisional liquidator) and a period of three months
thereafter (to enable him to acquaint himself with the affairs of the estate) should be excluded.
SECTION 15(4)
According to Sec. 15(4), if a purchaser at a sale in execution has to file a suit to recover
possession of the property purchased by him, the time during which the application to set aside
the sale was being fought out (i.e. prosecuted) will be excluded from computation.
SECTION 15(5)
According to Sec. 15(5), if a defendant has gone out of India i.e. has gone to some foreign
country/ from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government,
the time during which he remains outside will be excluded from computation.
The words ‘absent from India’ do not necessarily imply that the defendant was present in India
at the time the cause of action accrued or the period of limitation commenced to run. The sub-
section will apply equally to cases where the defendant was absent altogether from India at the
time of the accrual of cause of action, as to cases where he leaves India after the period of
limitation.26
In Sec. 15(5), the defendant is one who was at one time present in India and later has been
absent from India. A person who has never been in India cannot be considered as having been
absent from India.27
Sec. 15(5) has reference only to the absence of the defendant from the realm, not to that of the
plaintiff. A plaintiff out of the realm may prosecute a suit by his attorney. Further, the plaintiffs
voluntary or involuntary absence in a foreign country cannot bar the operation of limitation.
The defendant includes 'any person from or through whom the defendant derives his liability
to be sued.' In Turner Morrison Co. Ltd. v Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd, 28 a foreign
company, was carrying on business through a local company. It was in arrears of income-tax.
The local company paid those arrears of the foreign company. The suit was brought after the

26
Atul Kristo Bose v Lyon & Co. (1887) 14 Cal. 457
27
P.J. Johnson v Astrofied Armadorn [AIR 1999 Ker. 53 (F.B.)
28
AIR 1972 SC 1311

9|Page
limitation period of three years. The local company which was the plaintiff tried to claim the
benefit of Sec. 15(5). Held that a company is resident where it carries on its business and the
foreign company was carrying on its business in India and therefore it was not absent from
India. Consequently the benefit of Sec. 15(5) could not be given to the local company.

6. SECTION 16: EFFECT OF DEATH ON OR BEFORE THE ACCRUAL

OF THE RIGHT TO SUE
Section 16(1) provides that where a person who would, if he were living, have a right to institute
a suit or make an application dies before the right accrues, or where a right to institute a suit,
etc. accrues only on the death of a person, the period of limitation shall be computed from the
time when there is a legal representative of deceased capable of instituting such suit, etc.
Sub-sec. (2) relates to cases in which such cause of action accrues against the estate of the
deceased or accrues on the death of a person (i.e. when there is a legal representative of the
deceased against whom the plaintiff may institute such suit or make such application).
Sec. 16 adopts the general principle that limitation cannot run unless there be a person who can
sue or who can be sued.29 The expression ‘capable of suing’ is the equivalent to ‘not under
legal disability to sue as mentioned in Sec. 6. Thus, the mere existence of a legal representative
of the deceased is not sufficient for the purpose of Sec. 16.
The section applies to suits and applications but not to appeals. The section also does not apply
to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption and to suits for possession of immovable property or
of a hereditary office [Sec. 16(3)], because the application of this section to such cases would
tend to create insecurity of title. Sec. 16(3) ensures security of title. Sec. 16(1) does not apply
to suits for possession in view of Sec. 16(3).
Sec. 16 is not applicable to cases where death occurs after right to sue accrues. Where a cause
of action has accrued to or against a person during his life-time, time continues to run under
statute, notwithstanding his death, whether or not a legal representative is in existence who
could sue or be sued.30
Legal representative includes an heir, administrator or an executor. In all cases where there is
an executor he can, sue or be sued on behalf of the estate even before obtaining probate of the
will. Consequently, in such cases, there will be no postponement of limitation under Sec. 16.
An administrator derives his title solely under his grant, and cannot sue before he gets the letters
of administration.

29
Seeti Kuti v Kunhi Patbunma, 40 Mad. 1040
30
Section 9

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7. SECTION 17: EFFECT OF FRAUD OR MISTAKE
Section 17(1) provides where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of
limitation is prescribed by this Act, (a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the
defendant or respondent or his agent; or (b) the knowledge of the right or the tide on which a
suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c)
the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or (d) where any
document nedessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently
concealed from him; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant
has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence have discovered it;
or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or applicant first had the means of
producing the concealed document or compelling its production.
The proviso to Sec. 17 lays down that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a bona
fide purchaser i.e. a person who purchased property for valuable consideration without
knowing at the time of purchase that any fraud or mistake had been made or that the document
had been concealed. Thus, no suit could be instituted (or application made) to recover or
enforce any charge against or set aside any transaction affecting any such property.
Sec. 17(2) provides that where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the
execution of a decree/order within the limitation period, the court may on the application of
judgment-creditor made after the expiry of said period extend the period for execution of
decree/order. However, such application must be made within one year from the date of
discovery of fraud or the cessation of force, as the case may be.
The principle behind Sec. 17 is that the right of a party defrauded cannot be affected by lapse
of time so long as he remains in ignorance of the fraud which has been committed. But as soon
as the circumstances constituting the fraud become known to him, subsequent lapse of time
will operate as a bar. Sec. 17 is limited to suits and applications (including execution petition)
only. It does not apply to appeals. It also does not apply to criminal cases.31
Sec. 17 is an enabling section which postpones the starting point of limitation for suits and
applications. Once limitation started running subsequent acts of fraud would not prevent
running of time. Thus, there must be fraud at the time when the cause of action arises.32
The term 'fraud' as used in this section is to be such fraud as is essential ingredient of the cause
of action. Mere silence is not fraud. The mere withholding of information which ought to be
communicated to the party entitled is not a fraud, unless it is withheld with the direct purpose

31
Emperor v Nageshappa, 20 Bom. 543
32
Babulal v Chandabai AIR 1989 Karnt. 221

11 | P a g e
of throwing the plaintiff over the period of limitation. Thus, in order to constitute ‘fraud’ there
must be some abuse of a confidential position, some intentional imposition or some deliberate
concealment of facts. It has been held that if the plaintiff could've discovered the fraud or
mistake with due diligence that will be sufficient to start the limitation running against him.33
The fraud mentioned in this section must be committed by the party against whom a right is sought
to be enforced i.e. the defendant or his agent. If the fraud has been committed by a third person,
this section will not apply, unless he is the agent of the party.
'Mistake' means doing of an act under an erroneous conviction, which act, but for such
conviction, would not have been done. Mistake is not mere forgetfulness, it is a slip made, not
by design but, by mischance.
The date of knowledge of fraud or mistake is to be excluded from computation of limitation
period.34
BURDEN OF PROOF: If the plaintiff claims exemption on the ground of fraud on the part of
the defendant, he must prove the fraud.35 The court will not presume it from the mere existence
of suspicious circumstances. When the plaintiff proves it then the burden shifts upon the
defendant/respondent to show that the plaintiff had clear knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud at a time which is too remote to allow him to bring the suit.
Under Sec. 17(1), the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant
has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
It follows that if the plaintiff or applicant is aware of his right to seek relief he cannot claim the
benefit of Sec. 17 by alleging that he was prevented by fraud of the defendant to exercise such
right. What the Sec. 17 concerned itself with is the knowledge of the right and not the exercise
of it.36

8. SECTION 18: EFFECT OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN WRITING

Section 18(1) provides where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for suit or
application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of
such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property
or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh
period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
In terms of sub section (2) where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral

33
S.T.O. v M.D. Abraham 1974 Ker. LT 244
34
Baikunth v Kesor AIR 1969 Pat. 160
35
Kalyan Mai v Ahmadudin AIR 1934 PC 208
36
Re Marappa Gounder AIR 1959 Mad. 26

12 | P a g e
evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; however, subject to the provisions of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence of its contents shall not be received.
What is Acknowledgment?
An acknowledgment is an admission by the writer that there is a debt owing by him, either to
the receiver of the letter or to some other person on whose behalf the letter is received, but it is
not enough that he refers to a debt being due from somebody. In order to take the case out of
the statute there must, upon the fair construction of the letter, read by the light of the
surrounding circumstances, be an admission that the writer owes the debt.37
An acknowledgment must be one from which an absolute promise to pay can be inferred, or
an unconditional promise to pay the specific debt, or that there must be a conditional promise
to pay the debt and evidence that the condition has been performed. An acknowledgement of a
conditioned liability will not give a fresh start so long as the condition remains unfulfilled.
Principle of the Section
Sec. 18 is based on the principle that the bar of imitation should not be allowed to operate in
cases in which the existence of a claim is acknowledged by persons who are under the liability.
Every acknowledgement affords a new proof of the existence of debt. So, the rules of limitation
which are partly based upon the tendency of evidence to disappear, would not be allowed to
obscure the essential justice of a case which is that the defendant having obtained an advantage
to which he is not entitled should be compelled to pay it back.
Sec. 18 do not enlarges the period of limitation but a fresh period begins to run form the date
of acknowledgment. For example a period of three years is prescribed by the Indian Limitation
Act for an ordinary oral debt. After expiry of 2 years, the debtor gives a written
acknowledgment, say a letter signed by him to the creditor saying that he is sorry for the debt
not being paid yet. A fresh period of 3 years will start from the date of the letter. It is important
to note that the day on which the acknowledgment is made will have to be excluded in
computation vide Sec. 12, Limitation Act, and, General Clauses Act. The date of delivery of
the acknowledgement is not the starting point. Oral evidence is permissible to show that the
writing bears a wrong date by mistake.
If an acknowledgement is made in favor of a minor, the new period of limitation is to be
computed from the date when the plaintiff attains majority. 38 Under this section, an
acknowledgement is not limited in respect of a debt only; it may be in respect of "any property

37
Green v Humphreys (1884) 26 Ch D 474
38
Venkataramayyar v Kothandaramayyar, 13 Mad. 135

13 | P a g e
or right" which is the subject-matter of the suit e.g. the taking of account of a dissolved
partnership.
The distinction between an "acknowledgement" under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act and a
"promise" under Sec. 25 of the Contract Act is of great importance. Both must be in writing
signed by the party or his agent authorized in that behalf, and both create a fresh starting point
of limitation. But while an acknowledgement under the Limitation Act is required to be made
before the expiration of the period of limitation, a promise under Sec. 25 of the Contract Act
may be made after the limitation period. Such a promise would amount to a new contract.
REQUISITES OF A VALID ACKNOWLEDGMENT
1) Acknowledgment must be made before the expiration of limitation period The
acknowledgment must be made after the period of limitation has begun to run and while it
is actually running. In other words, an acknowledgment may be made before the expiry of
limitation period as extended by the operation of Sec. 12 or 14 of the Act. If the limitation
has already expired, it would not revive under Sec. 18. 39 The onus lies on the creditor to
prove that the acknowledgement was made within time.
2) Acknowledgment of liability must be in writing - Hence an oral acknowledgment is not
sufficient. Similarly, a mere payment of sum of money towards the debt is not sufficient
under this section although such payment may be intended as an acknowledgment of debt.
3) Acknowledgment must be signed by the person making the acknowledgment or by his duly
authorized agent - Thus, a telegram cannot constitute a sufficient acknowledgment as
telegrams are not signed by the parties sending them. Signed initials instead of full
signature do not affect the legality of acknowledgment. Under the General Clauses Act,
'sign should, with reference to a person who is unable to write his name, includes his mark.'
Unstamped acknowledgement is not acknowledgement. An improperly stamped
promissory note cannot be admitted in evidence to prove acknowledgment of liability in
order to save limitation. An acknowledgement need not be in the handwriting of the maker,
but it must be signed by him or his agent, otherwise it will not be valid. In the case of
acknowledgement made by an agent, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the agent
was duly authorized by the defendant to make an acknowledgement of a liability on his
behalf.
The authorization of agent need not be in writing, it can be implied viz. a guardian is an
agent duly authorized to make acknowledgement. An acknowledgement by one partner of

39
Sampuran Singh v Srnt. Niranjan Kaur AIR 1999 SC 1047

14 | P a g e
 a partnership firm saves limitation against the other partners. An acknowledgement made
by one of the active directors of the company is a sufficient acknowledgement. However,
an acknowledgement by one co-mortgagor/co-owner shall not extend the period of
limitation against the other co-mortgagors/co-owners. On the death of the debtor, an
acknowledgement of debt by the legal representative of the debtor may be treated to be a
valid acknowledgement for filing a suit against the legal representative.
4) Acknowledgment must be made by the party against whom any property or right is claimed
or by some person through whom, he derives title or liability - It is sufficient if the
acknowledgment has been made by a person against whom the right is claimed in suit. It is
not necessary that at the time when the acknowledgment is made, such person must have
an interest in property in respect of which acknowledgment is given. An auction-purchaser
derives his title from the judgment-debtor. Thus an acknowledgment made by the latter will
be binding on the former.
5) Acknowledgment must be in respect of the particular property or right claimed in the suit
or application - Thus, unless it is shown that the right acknowledged is identical with the
right claimed in suit, the section will not apply. Where the defendant owes several debts to
the plaintiff and acknowledges in respect of a debt and it is not possible to identify the debt
acknowledged with the one claimed in suit, the acknowledgment will be ineffective.
6) Acknowledgement applies only to suits and applications (other than execution)-
Explanation (c) to the section provides that An application for the execution of a decree or
order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right thus, Sec.
18 is not applicable for execution of decree.
7) Acknowledgment need not be express, it may be by necessary implication - Explanation
(a) to the section provides that an acknowledgment may fail to specify with exactitude the
nature of the property or right (e.g. exact sum due); or the man acknowledging the liability
may couple his acknowledgment with a statement that the time for performance, delivery,
enjoyment or payment of the property or right has not arrived; or claims that he also has
claims against the plaintiff by way of set-off; or even the fact that the acknowledgment is
not addressed to the creditor himself but to a third party will not detract from the value of
acknowledgment for purposes of Sec. 18.
The acknowledgement is not required to be made to the creditor or the person entitled to the
right or the property; it may be made to any person, even to one who has no connection with
the creditor. An acknowledgement to whomsoever made is a valid acknowledgement, if it be

15 | P a g e
an acknowledgement pointing out with reasonable certainty to the liability in dispute or the
rights out of which that liability arises as a legal consequence.
CASE LAW
Acknowledgment means a definite admission of liability; it is not necessary that there should
be promise to pay; the simple admission of a debt is sufficient. 40 An acknowledgement or
liability need not be express; it may be by implication. The acknowledgement must distinctly
and definitely relate to the liability in respect of the right claimed.41
A document in which the mortgagee merely acknowledges having received possession of the
mortgaged land would not constitute an acknowledgment of liability, in respect of the
mortgagor's right to redeem the land.42
It is settled law that an admission contained in the pleadings of another proceeding made in the
circumstances of the case may constitute acknowledgement against the maker thereof.43
In M/S Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills V The Aluminium Corpn. Of India Ltd the appellant-
company sent to the corporation a statement of account claiming Rs. 2,94,000 as due to it. The
corporation did not denied its liability to pay but challenged the correctness of amount claimed
by the appellant-company and sent a counter-statement. A letter was written by the secretary-
cum- chief accountant of the corporation in the process of adjustment and reconciliation which
contained the statement that "after all the above adjustments the position will be as per
statement attached", i.e. that there was a balance of Rs. 1,07,447 due and payable to the
appellant-company. The appellant-company filed a suit claiming amount, but the corporation
contended that suit was barred by limitation. It was contended that the said letter did not amount
to an acknowledgment under Sec. 18, moreover the person who wrote it had no authority to
make any such acknowledgment for and on behalf of and binding on the corporation.
The court observed that the statement on which the plea of acknowledgment is founded need
not amount to promise and need not include the exact nature of the liability. The mere statement
expressing jural relationship between parties does not constitute acknowledgment, it must be
shown that it was made with the intention of admitting such jural relationship subsisting at the
time when it was made. Such an intention need not be in express terms and can be inferred by
implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. In the present
case, if the letter were to be looked at in the background of the controversy between the parties
(which was limited to the question as to the correctness of the amount claimed by the appellant-

40
B. Shambumal v State Bank of Mysore AIR 1971 Mys. 156
41
Bhagwan v Madhav, 46 Bom. 1000
42
Dharfria v Govind, 8 Bom. 99
43
Beni Madhav v Chameli Devi AIR 1985 All. 89

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company as also the correspondence which ensued in regard to it) it would be impossible to
say that the letter and the statement of account enclosed therewith was merely explanatory, and
did not amount to an admission of the jural relationship of creditor and debtor and of the
liability to pay the amount found due at the foot of the account on finalisation.
It was contended that since the letter called for confirmation of the amount of Rs. 1,07,447, as
being the balance due to the appellant-company and as the appellant-company failed to confirm
it, the admission of liability was conditional, and therefore cannot operate as an
acknowledgment. The court, however, observed that the present case is one of an admission of
a subsisting account and the jural relationship and the liability to pay whatever amount would
be found due on finalisation of accounts. There is no condition subject to which the admission
was made which remained unperformed.
The fact that a person is the secretary, chief accountant and holder of power of attorney of the
debtor would not by itself or cumulatively make him a person duly authorized. Also the fact
that he carries on correspondence for the debtor would not make him a person duly authorized.
In order to be deemed to have an authority to acknowledge a liability, he must be one who had
the authority either to take loans on behalf of the principal or to discharge the liability of the
principal. In the present case, besides his function as the secretary-cum-chief accountant, he
was authorised to finalise the accounts between the parties, to settle differences between them,
etc. Thus he had the implied authority to make the acknowledgment. The court thus held that
the suit is not barred by limitation in view of the acknowledgment provided by the letter.

9. SECTION 19: EFFECT OF PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT OF DEBT OR

OF INTEREST ON LEGACY
Sec. 19 provides for the computation of the period of limitation when a payment on account of
debt or of interest on legacy is made. To attract the operation of Sec. 19, two conditions are
essential: first, the payment must be made within the prescribed period of limitation44 and
secondly, it must be acknowledged by some form of writing either in the handwriting of a payer
himself or signed by him. If there is no acknowledgment in the required form, the payment by
itself is of no avail. A written or signed acknowledgement is the only mode of proof of the
payment. Once the conditions are fulfilled a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from
the time when the payment was made.
The principle underlying the section is that such payment implies an admission of a right and
an acknowledgment of the corresponding liability. The term 'person liable to pay debt' includes

44
Laxman v Yadao AIR 1940 Nag. 401

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not only a person who is personally liable but also a person who is not personally liable but
whose interest in the family property is liable.
MODE OF PAYMENT
This section does not specify any particular mode or form of payment and there are many
modes in which payment may be made. Payment under Sec. 19 may be made not only in money
but in any other medium that the creditor may choose to accept. Payment in kind may be made.
It may be noted that if the endorsement is not by the debtor but by the creditor that would not
amount to payment to attract Sec. 19. In Today Stationers & Gift Centres v Allahabad Bank45,
it was held that mere entry by the bank in its books of account of the interest due to the debtor
would not stop the time running because such unilateral entry by the bank was not based on
mutual transactions.
Where a cheque is signed by the debtor and addressed to the creditor in part-payment of the
principal, and the cheque is honoured, Sec. 19 is complied with. If the cheque is dishonoured,
the limitation would not be saved, as it is not a valid payment or acknowledgement of the debt
within the meaning of this section.46
PART-PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL
Sec. 19 covers any part-payment by debtor though the debtor had not made it clear whether the
payment was towards the interest or towards the principal as such. When a payment is made
without specifying whether it is for the interest or the principal, it depends on the act of creditor.
Where there are several debts and payment of interest has been made by the debtor without
specification, the payment may reasonably be attributed to the debts which are thus saved from
limitation.47 Where the debtor was making part-payment the limitation would run from the last
made part-payment.48
Payment of part of the mortgage debt made by one of the mortgagors will give a fresh start of
limitation to the mortgage not only against the mortgagor making the payment but also against
all the mortgagors,49
In Ramchandra v P.S. Patil50, it was held that if a part-payment is made within the period of
limitation, the mere fact that the writing evidencing the payment was made after the expiry of
limitation period, would not render such hand-writing useless for the purpose of saving a claim
from the limitation bar. But while it is not necessary that the written acknowledgment should

45
2004 (1) ICC 166 (P&H)
46
Arjunlal Dhanji Rathod v Dayaram Premji Padhion, 1971 BLJR307
47
Hindu v Heramba, 13 C.L.J. 139
48
Kishori Engineering Works v Bank of India AIR 1991 Pat. 194
49
Acbo-lasundari v Doman AIR 1926 Cal. 150
50
AIR 1973 Bom. 163

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be made prior to the expiry of limitation period, it is essential that such acknowledgment
whether made before or after the limitation period should be in existence prior to the institution
of the suit.51

10.SECTION 20: EFFECT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR PAYMENT

BY ANOTHER PERSON
Sec. 20 is an explanatory as well as supplementary section to Sections 18 and 19 and does not
constitute an exception in the case of either of these sections. It deals with the effect of
acknowledgement or payment by another person. The section is only concerned with question
as to who can keep alive a right which is not time-barred and not as to who can revive a time-
barred debt. According to sub-sec. (1), the expression "agent duly authorized in this behalf" in
Sections 18 and 19 shall, in the case of a person under disability, include his lawful guardian,
committee or manager or an agent duly authorized by such guardian, committee or manager to
sign the acknowledgment or make the payment. The expression "lawful guardian" is not limited
to a guardian appointed by the Court but also includes any person entitled to act as guardian
under the personal law of the minor.52 But, a de facto guardian is not a lawful guardian within
the meaning of this section and has no authority to acknowledge a debt.53 Sub-sec. (2) declares
that one of several joint contractors, partners, executors, mortgagees, will not render the other
joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees chargeable under an acknowledgment or
payment made by him or his duly authorized agent. The word 'chargeable' in Sec. 20(2) means
every kind of chargeability and includes liability as to property; it is not limited to personal
liability only. However if it is shown that a co-partner had authority, express or implied, to
make the acknowledgement on behalf of himself and his co-partners; the acknowledgement
will be binding on them all. 54 The same rule applies to co-debtors. The clause only abolishes
the doctrine of implied agency. Further Sub-sec. (3) (a) provides that an acknowledgment
signed by or a payment made, in respect of any liability, by any limited owner of property (e.g.
widow) governed by the Hindu law, shall be a valid acknowledgment or payment, against a
reversioner succeeding to such liability. Lastly sub-sec. (3)(b) provides that the manager of a
Hindu joint family can make acknowledgment and payment so as to save limitation in regard
to liabilities which are binding on the family. Such payment or acknowledgment must be
deemed to be made on behalf of the family. However any acknowledgement of a debt made by

51
SANT LAL v KAMLA PRASAD (AIR 1951 SC 447)
52
Bechu v Baldeo AIR 1933 Oudh 132
53
Dasharath v Gaynam, 45 Bom. L.R. 740.
54
Gordbandas v Bhulabhai, 34 Bom. L.R. 623.

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the Karta after the disruption of the joint family cannot save the creditor's claim from becoming
time-barred against the other members.55

11.SECTION 21: EFFECT OF SUBSTITUTING OR ADDING NEW

PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT
Clause (1) of Sec. 21 lays down that a suit in which a party is subsequently joined (substituted
or added) shall be deemed to be instituted as regards him (new party) on the date of his joinder.
A party cannot be added after the expiry of the period of limitation. The proviso to Sec. 21(1)
clothes the court with the discretion to condone the delay in filing the application for addition
of parties after the period of limitation provided the same is made bona fide and good cause is
shown thereof. Clause (2) further provides that sub-sec. (1) shall not apply to a case where a
party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the
pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or vice versa. In Venkatasubbamma
v Veeravadra56 it was held that no question of limitation would arise under Sec. 21 in the case
of transposition of parties as the change of position does not affect limitation in so far as a party
who was already on record. Further, Sec. 21 has to be taken into account for adding a necessary
party but the provisions of Sec. 21 will not apply in cases of adding a proper party against
whom no relief is sought for by the plaintiff.57 In case of misdescription of parties, where it is
clear from the facts as to the person who intends to sue or is intended to be sued but is described
wrongly, it can be corrected by the court at any time as there is no addition of new party to
attract provisions of Section 21. Lastly the section is is confined to suits only and does not
include an appellate/revision stage or proceedings in execution58 of the decree made in the suit.

12.SECTION 22: CONTINUING BREACHES AND TORTS

Section 22 enunciates that in the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a
continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during
which the breach or the tort continues. Thus the right to sue arises at every moment of the time
during which the breach continues. The object underlying this section is to prevent multiplicity
of suits and to enable one suit to be brought for all loss suffered during the whole period the
breach continued. A 'continuing' cause of action is one arising from the repetition of acts or
omissions similar to those in respect of which an action is brought. Thus the refusal of a wife

55
Venkatachalam v Venkateswara AIR 1944 Mad. 33.
56
Venkatasubbamma v Veeravadra AIR 1961 A.P. 495.
57
Mahadula v Chirangilal AIR 1963 M.P. 51.
58
Golab Koer v SyedMohammed, 2 P.L.T. 619.

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to return to her husband, and allow him the exercise of conjugal rights, constitutes a continuing
wrong, giving rise to constantly recurring cause of action.59
In the case of a continuing tort, the wrongful act complained of creates a continuing source of
injury and is of such a nature as to render the person doing it responsible for the continuance.
However, damages is not (as it is in cases under Sec. 23) of the essence of action. The act
complained of is wrongful in itself. Further the section applies to contracts which oblige a party
to them (contracts to adopt a course of action during the continuance of the relation covered by
the contract). A breach of a covenant for quiet possession is a continuing breach. 60 Further a
continuing breach must be distinguished from successive breaches, as for instance, failure to
pay rent, interest, or other sums payable periodically. Here, each successive breach constitutes
an independent cause of action which is liable to become time-barred after the prescribed
period, reckoned from the date of such breaches; and although one suit may be brought in
respect of several breaches, yet one cannot recover anything in respect of those breaches which
happened beyond the prescribed period reckoned back from the date of the suit.

13.SECTION 23: SUITS FOR COMPENSATION FOR ACTS NOT

ACTIONABLE WITHOUT SPECIAL DAMAGE
Under Sec. 23, in the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action unless some specific injury actually results therefrom, the period of limitation
is to be computed from the time when the injury results.
For instance A owns the surface of a field. B owns the subsoil. B digs coal thereout without
causing any immediate injury to the surface, but surface subsides. The period of limitation in
the case of a suit by A against B runs from the time of the subsidence61 The effect which this
section causes in the operation of the statute of limitation is not to extend or to restrict any
period of limitation, but to modify the date or time from which the cause arises.
Where an act is rightful in itself i.e. unless and until damage results from it to another, the right
of action is not complete and the time therefore does not run until the damage is sustained. But
where the wrongful act itself gives rise to a cause of action, Sec. 23 does not apply; Sec. 22
applies then. Where the defendant threw sulphuric acid on the plaintiff's face, which resulted
in the loss of his one eye, the act of the defendant was itself sufficient to give rise to a cause of
action for damages for personal injury. Time would run from the date when the act of throwing

59
Hemchand v Shive, 16 Bom. 716; Basawanewa v Shivappa AIR 1936 Bom. 289.
60
Raja Bala v Krishnarav Ramchandra, 2 Bom. 273.
61
Backhouse v Bonomi (1858) 9 HLC 503

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sulphuric acid was committed and not from the date when the specific injury (i.e. loss of eye)
resulted.62
This section applies not to suits based on contract, but to suit based on tort. The breach of
contract per se gives rise to a cause of action and time begins to run from the date of the
breach.63
In Dwarkanatb v Corporation of Calcutta,64 a municipality caused subsidence of the plaintiff s
house by carrying on certain excavations. The right to sue accrued from the happening of the
damage caused by the subsidence. A second or further subsidence may give rise to a second
cause of action. Each separate specific injury caused by an act constitutes fresh cause of action,
and separate period of limitation will run for each.

14.SECTION 24: COMPUTATION OF TIME MENTIONED IN

INSTRUMENT
All instruments shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be made with reference to the
Gregorian calendar. For instance a Hindu makes a promissory note bearing a native date only,
and payable four months after date. The period of limitation applicable to a suit on the note
runs from the expiration of four months after date computed according to the Gregorian
calendar.
The section creates no presumption as to the date of documents, but merely provides that
periods of limitation shall be worked out according to the Gregorian calendar.65
If a starting point is to be calculated as so many months or so many years from a particular
date, the point must be calculated according to the Gregorian calendar. But, if the starting point
is otherwise fixed by the stipulation itself, as for instance, where the intention was that the
interest should be payable at the expiry of six months according to the Hindu Calendar (i.e. on
a particular date, and not at the expiry of six months) and that the cause of action should arise
on default, this section is not applicable.66

62
Abdulla v Abdulla AIR 1924 Bom. 290
63
Annamalai v Firm of Advocates AIR 1938 Rang. 258
64
18 Cal 91 (99)
65
Achutan v Achutan AIR 1941 Mad. 587
66
Roshan Lai v Chowdhury Bashir Ahmed AIR 1925 All. 138

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 Bibliography

Books
C.K. Takwani, Civil Procedure, Eastern Book Company (8th ed. 2017)

Sarkar, Code of Civil Procedure, Wadhawa Publications (11th ed. 2006)

1 Justice SA Kader, U.N. Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription,

LexisNexis (12th ed. 2006)

Bare Acts
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Universal Law Publication.

The Limitation Act, 1963, Universal Law Publication.

Websites
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com

http://www.hanumant.com

http://www.indiankanoon.org

http://www.legalservicesindia.com

http://www.manupatra.com

http://www.shareyouressays.com

http://www.supremecourtcases.com

https://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal

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