Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: “That a Most Perfect Being Exists” (18-21

November (?) 1676)

[A VI 3, 578]

That a Most Perfect Being Exists

I call “perfection” every simply quality which is positive and absolute, i.e., which
expresses whatever it expresses without any limits.
But since a quality of this kind is simple, it is for that reason unanalyzable or
indefinable, for otherwise either it won’t be one simple quality but an aggregate of several,
or, if it is one, it will be circumscribed by limits, and therefore will be understood through the
negations of further progress, contrary to the hypothesis, for it is assumed to be purely
positive.
From this it is not difficult to show that all perfections are compatible with each
other, i.e. that they can be in the same subject.
For let there be a proposition of this kind: “A and B are incompatible” (understanding
by “A” and “B” two simple forms or perfections of this kind; it is the same if several are
assumed at the same time). It is evident that this proposition cannot be demonstrated without
an analysis of the terms “A” or “B” (either one or both), for otherwise their nature would not
enter into the reasoning, and incompatibility could be demonstrated equally of any other
things whatsoever as well as of them. But (according to the hypothesis) they are
unanalyzable. Therefore this proposition cannot be demonstrated of them.
But it certainly could be demonstrated of them if it were true, since this proposition is
not known through itself. Yet all necessarily true propositions are either demonstrable or
known through themselves. [A VI 3, 579] Therefore this proposition is not necessarily true,
i.e. it is not necessary that “A” and “B” are not in the same subject. Therefore they can be in
the same subject, and since this reasoning is the same with regard to any other assumed
qualities of this kind, all perfections are therefore compatible.
Therefore there is, or there can be understood, a subject of all perfections, i.e. a most
perfect being.
From this it is also evident that it exists, since existence is contained in the number of
perfections.
(The same can also be shown of forms composed of absolutes, if there are any.)
When I was at the Hague I showed this argument to Mr. Spinoza, who thought it to be
sound. Since he contested it at first, I wrote it down to describe it, and read this paper to him.

Scholium
Descartes’ argument for the existence of a most perfect being supposed that a most
perfect being can be understood, i.e. is possible. For with this supposed—that there is a
notion of this kind—it immediately follows that this being exists, because we have supposed
it to be such that it immediately contains existence. But it will be asked whether it is in our
power to suppose such a being, or whether such a notion really exists, and can be understood
clearly and distinctly without contradiction. For opponents will say that such a notion of a
most perfect being, or of a being existing through its essence, is a chimera. Nor is it enough
for Descartes to appeal to experience and allege that he clearly and distinctly senses
something like this notion in himself. For this is to break off from the demonstration, not
complete it, unless he shows a way in which others can also arrive at an experience of this
kind. For whenever we admit experience into what is being demonstrated, we should show

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others a way of bringing about the same experience, unless we want to convince them solely
by our own authority.

© Lloyd Strickland 2017