CIVIL LAW, PERSONS, FAMILY LAW, MARRIAGE, FRUITS OF MARRIAGE AND SPECIAL TOPICS ON FAMILY LAW

CASE DIGESTS SUBMITTED BY THE WEEK-END AND REGULAR CLASSES

Week 1 – Introduction to Civil Law, Persons, Introduction to Marriage

1.Ernesto Miguel B. Amores

TITLE: Tañada vs. Tuvera GR No. L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

DOCTRINE:

“Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as the public needs to be notified for the law to become
effective.

Publication is mandatory.

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed
for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition, absence of
any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties."

Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.

Respondents, on the other hand, further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates.

It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether publication in the Official Gazette is required to make the law effective considering the
clause in Article 2 “unless otherwise provided”.

RULING:

Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has

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ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the Official Gazette. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Thus, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

2. Ziasel C. Andales

Title: D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO [GR No.
137873 April 20, 2001]

Doctrines:

 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of

understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses
not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which
they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

 Article 3 of the Civil Code which states that, ‘ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith’ is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws..

Facts:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.

Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

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Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the
Civil Code after availing of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court rules in various cases held that claimants may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for
additional benefits under the other remedy.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent
remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with
the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election
acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to
hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent
any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.

It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights,
but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a
waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon
which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver
cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code is on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

In the case at bar, the private respondent’s case came under the exception because
she was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages
after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While
stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint,
the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in
nature."

Petitioner further argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system, private
respondent cannot claim ignorance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in allowing a choice
of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

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3. Rosane C. Apatan

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC., FILM

ADVERTISING MEDIA EXHIBITIONS, INC. (FAME), LUIS NEPOMUCENO, AMPARO
NEPOMUCENO, and JESUS NEPOMUCENO, respondents. G.R. No. 139479 Dec. 27, 2002

Doctrine:

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.

Facts:

Petitioner PNB granted respondents a 4 Million Pesos credit line to finance the filming of the
movie "Pacific Connection." The loan was secured by mortgages on respondents’ real and
personal properties. The credit line was later increased to 6 Million Pesos, and finally to 7.5
Million Pesos.

Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged

properties. Initially scheduled on August 12, 1976, the auction sale was re-scheduled several
times without need of republication of the notice of sale, as stipulated in the Agreement to
Postpone Sale, until finally, the auction sale proceeded on December 20, 1976, with petitioner
as the highest bidder.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the RTC Pasig, an action for annulment of foreclosure sale
and damages with injunction. Respondents contended that the foreclosure sale is null and void
because: (1) the obligation is yet to mature as there were negotiations for an additional loan
amount of P5,000,000.00; (2) lack of publication; (3) the purchase price was grossly inadequate
and unconscionable; and (4) the foreclosure proceedings were initiated by petitioner in bad
faith.

The court a quo ordered the annulment and setting aside of the foreclosure proceedings and
auction sale held on December 20, 1976 on the ground that there was lack of publication of the
notice of sale. This was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the posting and publication
requirements mandated by Act No. 3135

Ruling:

NO.

Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on real property
is specific with regard to the posting and publication requirements of the notice of sale.
Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with
since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceed without need of re-
publication and re-posting of the notice of sale. The SC is not convinced.

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.

While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public

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order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and
prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication
are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact,
personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary,
unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon
would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales

must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale at the very least voidable.

The SC also cannot accept petitioner’s argument that respondents should be held in estoppel
for inducing the former to re-schedule the sale without need of republication and reposting of the
notice of sale.

Records show that respondents, indeed, requested for the postponement of the foreclosure
sale. That, however, is all that respondents sought. Nowhere in the records was it shown that
respondents purposely sought re-scheduling of the sale without need of republication and
reposting of the notice of sale. Respondents, therefore, did not commit any act that would have
estopped them from questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale for non-compliance with Act
No. 3135.

4. Rosane C. Apatan

Title: ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Doctrine:
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

Facts:
Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female
and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex changed from male to female. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner explaining that it is consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.
Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA
rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not change in name and sex in the birth certificate is allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.

Ruling:
NO. The petition lacks merit.

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A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed on the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person
can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This was amended by RA 9048 –
Clerical Error Law which now allows change of first name administratively.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
No Law Allows the Change of Entry in the Birth Certificate as to Sex on the Ground of
Sex Reassignment

Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. Article 412 together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order.

The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary.
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of
a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is
denied.

5. Nina Grace G. Arañas

TITLE: CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP VS HON. ACCREDITED

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ET AL, GR NO. 182836, OCT. 13, 2009

PRINCIPLE:

Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already
has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

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FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner, and a member of respondent

NagkakaisangManggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) agreed between Continental and the Union. The said
agreement grants death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in case of death
of the employees’ legitimate dependents which includes parents, spouse, and children.
Hortillano’s claim was based on the death of his unborn child due to the premature delivery of
his wife on the 38th week of pregnancy. Petitioner granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave
but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death
and accident insurance.Continental Steel insists that the CBA did not cover the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality, claiming that death and status as legitimate
dependent were not present inHortillano’s case. Relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code, petitioner claims that only one with civil personality could die which means the unborn
child of Hortillanonever died because it never acquired juridical personality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant
to the provision in the CBA.

RULING:

YES. The reliance of petitioner on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misguided. Article 40 states that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not
significant herein. Articles 40-42 in the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in
connection to Article 37 of the same Code, which reads: Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost. We need not verify the civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a problem before us
whether the unborn child attained any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death
that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and
other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon
the latter’s death.

More importantly, Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Even though the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.

Furthermore, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. Petitioner
even defines a dependent as “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or
sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Hence, even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA
clearly states that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or
the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil

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personality, as petitioner contends. Thus, the term used which is child shall be understood in its
more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

6. Ramy D. Armenion

TITLE: ACEBEDO vs. ARQUERO, A.M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003

DOCTRINE:

Marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation."

FACTS:

 Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Brooke's Point, Palawan for immorality.
 Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC
Brooke's Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at
Bancudo Pulot, Brooke's Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,
was born to the two on May 21, 1989.
 By his Answer of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality,
claiming that it is "just a mere harassment and a product of complainant's hatred and extreme
jealousy to his wife."
 Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant's wife with the spouses
having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in
a "Kasunduan".

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of immorality.

HELD:

Yes. Respondent is guilty of immorality.

Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely
no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the
Family Code provides that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It is an institution of public order or policy,
governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the
parties.

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, enunciates the State's policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. That is why this Court
has firmly laid down exacting standards morality and decency expected of those in the service of the
judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the
public's respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as
private individuals. There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their private
morals.

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7. Ana Mae R. Avenido

Title: Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Doctrine/s:

The free exercise of religion protects practices based on religious grounds provided such practices
do not violate existing laws enacted in the reasonable exercise of the State's police power.

Facts:

Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The complainant
Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was
still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that
Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should
not be allowed to remain employed as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when
her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with
Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, she is a member of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society; that the conjugal arrangement was in conformity
with their religious beliefs, and; that the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her
congregation. Escritor further claimed that she had executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in
accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration makes the resulting union
moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is
allowed.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.

Held:

Respondent Escritor does not claim that there is error in the settled jurisprudence that an illicit
relation constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a government employee is held liable. Nor
is there an allegation that the norms of morality with respect to illicit relations have shifted towards
leniency from the time theprecedent cases were decided. The Court finds that there is no such error or
shift, thus find no reason to deviate from these rulings that such illicit relationship constitutes disgraceful
and immoral conduct punishable under the Civil Service Law. Respondent having admitted the alleged
immoral conduct, she could be held administratively liable. However, respondent invokes religious
freedom since her religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, has, allowed her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio
based on the church’s religious beliefs and practices.

While Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio conforms to the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, the cohabitation violates Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot interfere
with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in the same way that the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot
interfere with the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise of religion protects practices based
on religious grounds provided such practices do not violate existing laws enacted in the reasonable
exercise of the State's police power

8. Vernie Rose A. Bacalso

TITLE: PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents. G.R. No. 118978
May 23, 1997

Doctrines:

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Art. 52, Civil Code. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its
nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations during the
marriage.

Art. 216, Civil Code. The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects.

Art. 136, Labor Code. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall
be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

Facts:

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) initially hired Grace de Guzman,
specifically as a Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 as a reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever
Agreement which she signed with petitioner- company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991,
and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent’s services as reliever was again
engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during
both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services
were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner-
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job
application form that was furnished to her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the
portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991.When
petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia
M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to
explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s policy of
not accepting married women for employment. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992,which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for
illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio
City.
Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed
by petitioner. it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
Issue:

Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status is a ground to terminate the
services of an employee.

Ruling:

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee. On the other hand, it is recognized that an employer is free to
regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment,
from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided
by law.

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 In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of and the right against
discrimination afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way
she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other
words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting
her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause
for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of
duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should
never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

A requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a

bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job
would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of
spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a
no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants was regarded as unlawful
since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants.

Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending
as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all
accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true
that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they
may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s
policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and
subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations
between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they
are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. It goes on to
intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair
the interest or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy
against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation.That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in
order but imperatively required.

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9. Hope Cesely H. Baquero

TITLE: Marietta B. Ancheta vs. Rodolfo S. Ancheta G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

FACTS:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. They had eight children during their coverture. On 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home
and abandoned the petitioner and their children. The parties executed a Compromise Agreement where
some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children. The court
rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. In the meantime, the respondent
intended to marry again and filed a petition with the RTC of Naic, Cavite for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The respondent knew that
the petitioner was already residing in Cavite, but nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner
was residing in Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued
summons to the petitioner at the address stated. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the
petition by substituted service on the petitioner’s son, Venancio at his residence in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite.

The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition, respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant as in Default", was granted by the lower court and eventually declared their marriage void.
Then, the respondent and Teresita were married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang,
Cavite. Petitioner appealed to the CA on the ground of gross misrepresentation committed by the
respondent, and that the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack
of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She
further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from
psychological incapacity.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the Trial Court erred in declaring the petitioner in default and thereby declaring
marriage with respondent void on the ground of psychological incapacity;

b) Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. The CA failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that
it was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner,
on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in were not served on her. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final
order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.

Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her. However, if there is impossibility
of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him,
service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the
said Rules:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

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As gleaned from the petition, the summons was served on and received by Venancio, petitioner’s son.
When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement
was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any
effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. It turned out that Venancio had been residing at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the complaint and
was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the
said summons and complaint.

The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court
granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned
the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial
court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the
petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and
the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which states that in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the
preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now
Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. Therefore, petition
granted.

10. Mel-Lisanina A. Bautista

Title:Balogbog vs. CA, G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997

Doctrine/s:

1.) Presumption of Marriage - Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be
rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
2.) Although a marriage contract is considered as a primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage.

Facts:

Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who
died in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They had an older brother Gavino but he died in 1935 pre-deceasing
their parents. In 1968, Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting
against Leoncia and Gaudioso claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas
and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents.

Leoncia and Gaudioso claim they don’t know Ramonito and Generoso and proceeded to question
the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina.

To prove the validity of their parent’s marriage, Ramonito and Generoso presented Priscilo
Trazo, 81 years old, then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that
he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself
testified that she was handed a “receipt” presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was

13
burned during the war.

Leoncia for her part, claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office
did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified that there was no record of marriage of Gavino and
Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of
marriage certificate.
2. Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate children of Gavino.

Held:

The SC affirmed the decision of the CA in rendering Gavino and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus
entitle Ramonito and Generoso a third of their grandparents’ estate.

1.) Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be proven in accordance of Arts.
53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry)
since the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect.

The SC held that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having
been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this
country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and
the rules on evidence.

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary. Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it
is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.

2.) Legitimacy of Children

The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil Registry does not mean that
Ramonito and Generoso were not legitimate children. Their legitimacy was proved by testimony of
witnesses, including Catalina, the mother herself. Moreover, although made in another case, Gaudioso
admitted that Ramonito is his nephew. This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso as a
reliable declaration against interest.

Week 2 – Family Law, Valid Marriages

1. Vernie Rose A. Bacalso

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
167746. August 28, 2007

Doctrines:

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the
same Code.

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To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties.

Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect
the validity of the marriage; An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect
its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.

Presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. —Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

Facts:

A petition for annulment of marriagewas filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.

Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.They got married on
the same day. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona,
and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.
In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contractand its entry on file.
Respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite.Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.Respondent, in fact, has filed a
case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 60.Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of
merit.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio.

Ruling:

No. The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code,
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

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A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the
same Code.

Article 53 of the Civil Codewhich was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
parties states:

“Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite.The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.This
certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims
that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there
is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner—that they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel—will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the
officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the marriage.Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds.

16
The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

2. Babie Grace V. Bauyaban

TITLE: SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO G.R. No. 132529

DOCTRINE:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

FACTS:

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage,
SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total
of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the
said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as
certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage
on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD:

The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her

17
exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their
marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their
property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during
their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and
wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

3. Josephus T. Bernaldez

Title: Republic vs. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Doctrine/s:
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Facts:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that
his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit
in lieu of the marriage license requirement?

Held:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and
Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

4. Mario Dennis A. Calvo

Niñal vs. Bayadog [G.R. No. 133778] March 14, 2000

Doctrines:
1. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The exemption for a marriage
license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code.

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2. The 5-year period cohabitation should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.

3. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally

FACTS:

Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfa’s
death. Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license because they lived together
for 5 years and thus exempt from marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car
accident.

The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the
death of an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for declaration for nullity of
marriage’ (a.k.a. declaration of nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma
using the absence of a marriage license as a legal basis.

The lower court ruled:(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their
father’s marriage before the latter’s death.(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an
annulment proceeding were used as a basis to dismiss petitioner’s case.Petitioners disagree with
the decision and petitions for a review.

Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage is valid under the law.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that:

(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family
Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time
the marriage was contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab
initio. The exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the
Civil Code. It is not the one described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first
marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires five years. If the respondent took
into consideration the other years and months before the second marriage, then the
cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage. This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count
cohabitation. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
(4) Void and voidable marriages are not identical.A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having
never to have taken place. A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation
or prescription while a void marriage can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally.

Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. The action
or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.

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Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.

Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.

(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before
determining succession rights.Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.

5. Dalisay B. Isidro (Remarks – Regular Student assigned to make digest did not submit.)

Title: HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

Doctrines:

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years
[and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Facts:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him
on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were
born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were "separated."

20
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Held:

Yes. Not all of the requirements under Art. 34 are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in
their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge
of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal
principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.

6. Isha B. Corbeta

Title:De Castro vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

Doctrine/s:

1. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.
2. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
2
69166, declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.

21
 On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that
the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child."

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents
before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has
never seen nor acknowledged the child.

RTC’s Decision dated 16 October 2000, ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Thus, appeal ensued.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child
was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition thereto, the appellate
court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare
the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. Such action is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. Motion for
Reconsideration was not given due course.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

2. Whether or not the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent in an action for support.

Held:

1. NO, the marriage of the petitioner and respondent is INVALID. Under the Family Code, the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating
that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination.

Furthermore, the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five (5) years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.

2. YES, trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Niñal v. Bayadog,
the SC held:

22
 However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed
with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main
case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may
pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.

7. Rhobie S. Corbo

Title: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 / 366 SCRA
437

Laws Applicable: Art. 15 and Art. 26 par. 2 FC

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an
Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of
Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our
lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with
Editha Samson.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso factocapacitated him to
remarry.

RULING:
NO. The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the
records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcia’s
prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn
out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the

23
divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between
two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself

Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. In its strict legal sense, divorce means
the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types:

1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage

2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force

Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."

8. Ron Juko C. Dacudao

TITLE: ROEHR v RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceeds for the purpose
of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially setting aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues
of support and custody of their children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards
child custody and support.

24
RULING:

Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in
the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.

9. Lucks Mae Digaum

TITLE: Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000

FACTS:

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. On February 22, 1937, he married Paula Llorente in Nabua,
Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, he departed for the United States and was
later on admitted to US Citizenship while Paula stayed in the conjugal home.

He was granted an accrued leave so he went back to the Philippines to visit his wife. He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente. Paula later on gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the fathers name was left blank.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, the couple drew a written agreement to
the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos
salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2)
they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would
make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted
her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.

Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for divorce with which Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. The Superior Court of the State
issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce decree which later on become final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila who had no knowledge
of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the

25
marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife. Their 25 year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament with which he bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children. The will was admitted to probate but before the proceedings were
terminated, Lorenzo died.

Paula filed for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s property while on the other hand, Alicia filed
for the issuance of letters testamentary. However, the RTC rendered a decision in favor Paula on the
ground that the divorce decree obtained by the deceased husband was void thus sustaining the
validity of Paula’s marriage to the said deceased thus disqualifying Alicia who, in effect gained the
status of paramour.

Alicia appealed to the CA where the court a quo affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified it by
declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. This prompted Paula to file the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Lorenzo to Alicia is a bigamous marriage.

RULING:

No, it a valid subsequent marriage as the divorce decree obtained by the deceased was valid.

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time
of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

10. Airene C. Edaño

Title: Republic vs. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Doctrine/s:

26
 Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227),
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.

The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido and his spouse were married at the Philippines. Later his wife and son went to
the US. His wife became a naturalized US citizen. He learned from his son that his wife obtained a
divorce there which could allow her to remarry. She then remarried a foreigner.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
Yes.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2
of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.

27
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.

11. Kimberly Marie F. Esmeña

Title: Bayot vs. CA, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008

Doctrine/s:

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, husband could no longer be subject to a husband’s
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to wife. The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of
Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. As to the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning
capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Facts:

Vicente and Rebecca were married in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On
its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in
Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca’s
marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings
in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the
dissolution of the couple’s marriage and “leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements,” but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, settling the couple’s property relations pursuant to an
Agreement they executed. Said agreement specifically stated that the “conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.”

Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American
citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not
of Vicente. She filed petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix
in the amount of PhP 220,000.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved
for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca
interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ, and that, therefore,
there is no valid divorce to speak of. Vicente and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints
against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca,
on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss and granting Rebecca’s application for support pendente
lite; repsondent (Vicente) is hereby ordered to remit the amount of Php 220,000.00 a month to Petitioner

28
as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition. RTC further declared that as
to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca
does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above RTC order, Vicente went to
the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The CA issued the desired TRO. The appellate court granted, via a
Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Rebecca moved but was denied
reconsideration. Thus, Rebecca petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635. Pending
resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 (declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity with application
of support pendente lite), and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. To the CA,
the RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004
Resolution. Hence, Rebecca’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No.
163979.

Issue/s:

- Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

Held:

SC finds Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself
in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after
her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally
said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees. Third, being an
American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on
February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably,
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital
vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of
matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband’s
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the
Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. One thing is clear from a perusal of
Rebecca’s underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente’s motion to dismiss and Rebecca’s opposition
thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage. To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. With the
valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in
fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support
the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the
issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine

29
what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall
have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing consideration, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca’s right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind
of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for,
and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

12. Cheska Marie D. Geli

Title: Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate.
However, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must
first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.
Gerbert asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse.

Issue/s:

- Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Held:

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo
that:

30
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

13. Maria Monica A. Gula

TITLE: MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,

Respondent. G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

DOCTRINE:

“Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces: the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. On 18
November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were
subsequently consolidated.

Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent
alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. The trial court found that, in the first
place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal

31
in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA) who ruled against the petitioner.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still
holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by Orlando Catalan on his first marriage was valid.

RULING:

Yes.

It is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, this
Court had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. wherein it was held that:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

This principle was reiterated in Llorente v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as enunciated in Garcia v. Recio.

Wherefore, the petition is finally granted. The case is remanded back to the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan
for further proceedings.

Week 3 – Family Law, Void and Voidable Marriages

1. Cedric T. Gutierrez II

Title: Heirs of Jose Sy Bang vs. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009
NOTE: This is based a little on UP Law 2013 digest.

Doctrine/s:

It is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow
allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of
all other courts.

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari

32
Facts:

Parties to the case:

a.) Petitioners: Jose, Julian and Oscar are children of the deceased Sy Bang from his first marriage.
Other petitioners include Zenaida and Ma. Emma who are the wife and child of Jose.
b.) Respondents: Rosauro and eight others are children of Sy Bang from his second marriage with
his surviving spouse respondent Rosita Ferrera -Sy.

Sy Bang died intestate in 1971 and in an out-of-court conference, the children of both
marriages divided upon themselves the control and management of Sy Bang various businesses.
Certain controversies arose which prompted respondent Rolando to file a Complaint of Partition against
the petitioners. o Rosita Ferrera-Sy also filed a motion for payment of widow allowance. o From the time
of Sy Bang death until the filing of the motion in 1996, she claimed she was not given any widow
allowance. She cited Rule 83(3) of the RoC.

Petitioners argued that Rule 83(3) is granted only during the settlement of the estate and such
“allowance” shall be taken from the “common mass of property” during liquidation.
Since this case is a special civil action for partition under Rule 69, Rosita is not entitled to any widow
allowance.
The Court granted Rosita motion for payment of widow allowance.

Petitioners argued that Rosita had already executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving any claims
against the petitioners in exchange of a parcel of land and 1 million pesos. Respondents countered that
Rosita was no longer in full possession of her mental faculties when she signed the waiver.

Petitioners also argued that under Rule 83(3) a widow allowance can only be paid in an estate
proceeding. Even if the case for partition be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court
hearing the partition case had exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the allowance.
In the meantime, Respondents filed a joint petition for the guardianship of Rosita Ferrer-Sy where
Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named special guardian, filed before the guardianship court a motion to
order the deposit of the widow allowance.

The Court ruled in favor of the deposit of the widow allowance.

The petitioners all failed to comply with the ruling. They were all found guilty of contempt of
court.

The petitioners, who are now Zenaida and Emma, argued that they should not be made to pay the
allowance as they did not have any participation in the management of the businesses of Sy Bang. Also,
the said allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang and not from Jose or any of the latter heirs.
They also asked that the Court should equally divide the liability for the widow allowance between the
children of the first and second marriages.

They also raised the issue of the validity of Rosita marriage to Sy Bang. They claimed that the
documents proving such were falsified.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Guardianship court has exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the
widow allowance?
2. Whether or not the respondents are also liable for the payment of the widow allowance as heirs of Sy
Bang?

Held:

1. YES.

The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to
enforce payment of the widow allowance.

The “court” cited in Rule 83 (3) is the court hearing the settlement of the estate and it is this
court which has jurisdiction over the properties of the estate, to the exclusion of all the other courts.

33
 In a cited case, the court said that the Guardianship Court may order the delivery of the property
of the ward to the guardian only if the property clearly belongs to the ward or if the title has been
judicially decided.

2. NO.
The widow allowance is chargeable to the estate of Sy Bang and since petitioners are the one
holding the properties belonging to Sy Bang, they should pay for the allowance.

In order to effect a partition of properties (so that the other children may be made liable),
the issue of ownership or co-ownership must be first resolved in the action for partition.

In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

That the full extent of Sy Bang estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from
complying with court order on this issue. o Properties of the estate have already been identified, i.e.
those in the names of petitioners, thus these properties should be made to answer for the widow
allowance of Rosita. o In any case, the mount Rosita receives for support will be deducted from her share
of the estate.

DISPOSITION: In view of the delay caused by the petitioners in paying for the allowance, they
are ordered to pay the court treble the costs.

2. Dalisay B. Isidro

Title: MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,

respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

Doctrines:

Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage.

Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Facts:

Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.

Since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia
was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Respondent judge averred that he agreed to solemnize the marriage only because the groom
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is
located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua, and after being assured that they
would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day.

Issue:

34
Whether or not the judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license and outside of his jurisdiction at that?

Held:

Yes. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. While magistrates may at times
make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.

Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance
of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.

Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur is
contrary to law and he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

3. Rebecca I. Jordan

Title: Beso vs. Daguman, A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000

Doctrine/s:

Formal requisite of marriage: Authority of the Solemnizing Officer

In this case: Respondent Judge solemnized the marriage in his own residence which is outside his
court jurisdiction. Which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.

EXCEPTIONS: a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances:
(1) at the point of death;
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or
(3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

Facts:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority, FOR solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar.

That on August 28, 1997 marriage was solemnized by judge Daguman in his residence of J.P.R.
Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; That after the wedding, petitioners husband BERNARDITO
YMAN abandoned her without any reason at all;

Petitioner wrote to the City Civil Registrar to inquire about her Marriage Contract and was that
her marriage was not registered;

35
 Upon inquiry to Judge Daguman he informed all the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken
by Bernardito A. Yman; and that not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

The respondent averred with the following rationale:

(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and
Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy;
(b) Respondent believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the
law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;
(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report found that respondent Judge ". .
. committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined (P5,000.00) pointing out that:
As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer
within his area of jurisdiction.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the respondent Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage outside his court
jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the respondent Judge neglected his duty to register the marriage before the Local
Civil Register.

Held:
1. YES.
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan
-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
Calbayog.

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others,
that —

Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances:
1. at the point of death;
2. in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or
3. upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, none of the 3 are present.

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide
by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. He must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so.4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office
should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the hierarchy of
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity on its significance in

36
our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and
frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.

Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that —

However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.7

2. YES.

As solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to register the marriage of
complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Furthermore, The Judge is likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the
event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states—
Art. 23. — It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to
in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not
later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place
where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local
civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy
of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper
cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.

Respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged
with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody
are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. 9 However, the records show
that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part.

4. Marymar L. Jurolan

Title: MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006

Doctrines:

1. Suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
2. Calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case.
3. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.

FACTS:

The RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were
insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order where the
trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already
present at the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that doctor’s testimony failed to

37
establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she
arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential
marital obligations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:

No. Calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the
Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged
failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's
relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so)
was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented
with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was
a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper
and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type."
xxx. Dr. Dayan did not clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed
psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage.

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack
of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

5. Margaret B. Labella

TITLE: Antonio vs. Reyes GR No. 155800 March 10, 2006

38
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church
on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events
or things. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he
separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change,
he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child
with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code. The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage
null and void, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of
evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.

Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored
in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

HELD:
Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.

Hence, the court concluded that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her
to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological
incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts.

The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.

Furthermore, the case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;

Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;

Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;

39
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;

Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.

Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not
of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged.

6. Christine L. Imperial

Title: Ngo To vs. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009

Doctrine/s:
“after tracing the origin and development of jurisprudence relating to Article 36, the Court noted
that “(t)he resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual
by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. ... Far from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly,
the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. ...
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are
ample safeguards against this contingency .... The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number
of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.”

Facts:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on
January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled
that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did
not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed
before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to
personally examine respondent.

Issue/s:
- Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void?

Held:
The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and set
aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the

40
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.

7. Marje L. Legaspo

Title: BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

Doctrine:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In this case, the presumption has not been amply
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

Facts:
Petitioner (Benjamin) and respondent (Carmen) were classmates in medical school. They fell in
love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City. The couple begot six (6) children.
After being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only
two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered
from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter.
Respondent also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist, who concluded
that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear
indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist, who found
that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his
fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.
The RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the
course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to
Carmen.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial courts
finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically

41
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and
not on established fact.
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only more than five years
after she had filed her petition with the RTC. Thus, the CA issued an Amended Decision reversing its first
ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen is null and void by reason of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
No. The marriage of the parties is not null and void.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must
treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case.
In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.
Each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The court finds the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen
(18) years ago. Accordingly, the court reverses the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to

42
him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented
by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted
and must, perforce, prevail.

8. Mark T. Limbaga

TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA. G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

DOCTRINE:

Irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological

incapacity. Further, the Supreme Court laid down the specific guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila.
During the early years of their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and a father. This can be observed from his tendency to spend
more time with his friends on whom he squandered his money, his dependency from his parents
for financial aid and support, and his dishonesty toward his wife in regard to their finances.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel
had been the sole breadwinner of the family. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel
and their child, and had since then abandoned them.

Thereafter, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing Reynaldo’s psychological incapacity. She presented
evidence which consisted of her own testimony and that of her two (2) friends as well as of a
social worker, and a psychiatrist. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition and declared the
marriage void.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal
and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” constitutes

psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

In the present case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of

43
Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

The Supreme Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff; 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision; 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage; 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable; 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; 6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children; 7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; 8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.

9. Jessa Faith S. Lumantas

Title: Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Doctrine/s:

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological

incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal
laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Facts:

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was
indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. When arraigned, petitioner
entered a plea of "not guilty". During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from
1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the
Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was
no record of said marriage.

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this instant petition for review.

Issue/s:

44
- Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof
that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab
initio and without legal force and effect.

Held:

The prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence
of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form
of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which,
as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of
the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter
from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were
legally married. To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given
to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics
Office and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila would plainly show that neither document
attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such
a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there
is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar
as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence
presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked
any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.

Petitioner further argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was
subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. This argument is not
impressed with merit.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of the Article 340 of the RPC
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind,
there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The
State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of

45
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time,
while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a
deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.

SEPARATE OPINION (On Psychological Incapacity)

VITUG, J.:

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as
being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both
parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the answer must be in the affirmative. Void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their
nullity. As early as the case of People vs. Aragon this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised
Penal Code itself does not, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can
be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. In contrast to a voidable marriage which
legally exists until judicially annulled the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage,
being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.

A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The "psychological incapacity to
comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for
nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal
capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or
the like.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either
essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous
marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy.
The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous
marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to
the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the
part of the offender who had entered into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

46
10. Maria Theresa T. Macatangay

Title: SSS vs. Vda. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

Doctrine/s:

A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Such marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

Facts:

Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. More than 15 years, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance a petition to declare
Alice presumptively dead which was granted. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent). Bailon, who was a
member of the Social Security System and a retiree pensioner thereof, died. Respondent filed a claim for
funeral benefits. Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa
Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her
mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings,
paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the
SSS in support of her claims are spurious. SSS stopped the release of pension to respondent.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Bailon to respondent is bigamous?

Held:

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in

a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good
ab initio. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and
respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable
under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with
the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,” as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

11. Ma. Noelle A. Maico

TITLE: LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 145226, February
06, 2004

DOCTRINE:

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

FACTS:

47
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four (4) years. They lost contact for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. In 1991, Barrete filed petition for divorce in Ontario, Canada where she was
working at that time. The petition was subsequently granted by the court. In 1992, Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago. He then filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place. Morigo was charged with bigamy. He moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.

The trial court found Morigo guilty of bigamy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court. The CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy.

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by
a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.

The Court reiterated its previous decision in Mercado v. Tan that: A judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

12. Mario Dennis A. Calvo

Title: ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

48
Principles/Doctrines:

1. The validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by
a subsequent amendment of the governing law.

2. Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between
his late brother CresencianoAblaza and LeonilaHonato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted
that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him
a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action
had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the
proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code?

HELD:

YES.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise
to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in
force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage

49
already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.
Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed
by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein
of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and

2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM 02-11-
10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to
file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
explained how and when each might be impugned, jurisprudence under the Civil Code states
that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage, the effect of a
void marriageis as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no
legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral.

It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity
can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.

50
13. Lyvia M. Malate

TITLE: REPUBLIC V. GRANADA G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012]

DOCTRINE:

Even if the RTC erred in ruling that the respondent was able to prove her “well-founded
belief” that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no
longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when
a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The
same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”

FACTS:

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got
married in 1993.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. After nine
(9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively
dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. It argued that Yolanda failed to
exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on
appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.

51
HELD:

1.Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if
the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238,
247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can
be had. However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court
of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.

2. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what
is meant by a well-grounded belief.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by present spouse.

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother DiosdadoCadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner arguesthat if she were, she would have sought information from
the TaiwaneseConsular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan
or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition.

52
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded
belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to
declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

Week 4 – Family Law, Fruits of Marriage, Part 1

1. Arief A. Mamao

TITLE: CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-
appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L-
30977 January 31, 1972

DOCTRINES:

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself —actiopersonalismoritur cum persona.

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates
the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the
action and of the subject-matter of the action itself.

FACTS:

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. LapuzSy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934
and canonically on 30 September 1934. She discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949.

Petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz-Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. On 26

June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action.

RULING:

Yes, the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely
personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself —actiopersonalismoritur
cum persona.

53
 ... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage
is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place
during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead.

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action
abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the
action and of the subject-matter of the action itself.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing
a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims
would necessarily remain unborn.

2. Eisone Brix R. Manuales

TITLE: PACETE VS. CARRIAGA JR. G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321

DOCTRINE:

No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of

judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between
her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was
married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on
August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer,
which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’
evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time
to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980
which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis, and held null and void the marriage of Pacete to
Clarita.

HELD:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the

54
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for
legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion
of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments
of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or
not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to
see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”

3.Ron Stephane Maylon

Title: Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997

Doctrine/s:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent
to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity

Facts:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were got married. After the celebration of their marriage, they
went to proceed to the defendant’s [petitioner’s] house. There, they slept together on the same bed in the
same room for the first night of their married life. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant [petitioner] to join them.

But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room.

They submitted themselves for medical examinations to a urologist at the Chinese General
Hospital. The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.The plaintiff [respondent]
claims, that the defendant [petitioner] is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency, and he is capable of erection.

The trial court rendered a decision declaring as VOID the marriage between the petitioner and
defendant.

55
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not the failure to have sexual intercourse constitute Psychological Incapacity.

Held:
YES. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent
to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment
to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain
the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

4. Joreyna Mae T. Melicor

Title: LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. CA, LAMBERTO T. CHUA [G.R. No.
164401, June 25, 2008]

Doctrine:
The absolute community of property shall be liable to debts or obligations contracted during the marriage
by both spouses or anyone of them with the consent of the other. If, during the marriage, such debt or
obligation were contracted by only one spouse without the consent of the other spouse, the absolute
community of property shall be liable to the extent that the family or the spouses may have been
benefited.

Facts:
Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership in 1977 to engage in the marketing of liquefied
petroleum gas under the name Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite).

Shellite was registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto, although the partnership
arrangement called for equal sharing of the net profit.

After Jacinto Sunga's death, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth
Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua's consent.

56
Chua then demanded for accounting and winding up but petitioners failed to account. Thus, Chua filed a
complaint for winding up, accounting, appraisal and recovery of shares and damages with writ of
preliminary attachment with the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Chua. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

However, prior to the resolution made by the Court of Appeals, the sheriff of Manila levied upon
petitioner Sunga-Chan's property. In the auction sale of the levied lot, Chua was the winning bidder. So,
Chua moved for the issuance of a final deed of sale and writ of possession. A final deed of sale was issued
and later the RTC, via a Resolution, confirmed the sheriff's final deed of sale and ordered the Registry of
Deeds of Manila to cancel the TCT of sps. Sunga-Chan, granting a writ of possession in favor of Chua.

Issue:
Can the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Norberto Chan be lawfully
made to answer for the liability of petitioner under the judgment?

Ruling:
Yes, the community property is liable because the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the
assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued may reasonably be considered to have been
used for her and her husband's benefit.

Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall be liable for the
following:

(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however,
the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or
other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the
support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse,
the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse
upon liquidation of the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.

The spouses Lilibeth and Norberto Chan were married after the effectivity of the Family Code, so, their

57
absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse as
enumerated under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 94.

Moreover, the fact that the levied parcel of land is a community property of sps. Norberto and Lilibeth
Chan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the property. The said property is not
among those exempted from execution under Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Therefore, the issuance of the writ of possession for the questioned community property of spouses Chan
in favor of respondent Chua is valid.

5. Daryl Andrew C. Monteclar

Title: CORAZON G. RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO TORRES G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Corazon G. Ruiz is engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry. She obtained loans
from private respondent Consuelo Torres on different occasions, in the following amounts: P100,000.00;
P200,000.00; P300,000.00; and P150,000.00. Prior to their maturity, the loans were consolidated under
one (1) promissory note. The consolidated loan of P750,000.00 was secured by a real estate mortgage.
The lot subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to
Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos."

Due to petitioner’s failure to pay the principal loan of P750,000.00, as well as the interest payment,
private respondent demanded payment not only of the P750,000.00 loan, but also of the P300,000.00
loan. When petitioner failed to pay, private respondent sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
aforementioned real estate mortgage.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC, with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the sheriff
from proceeding with the foreclosure sale and to fix her indebtedness to private respondent to
P706,000.00.

The trial court granted the prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. It held that the real estate mortgage is unenforceable because of the lack of the
participation and signature of petitioner’s husband. It noted that although the subject real estate
mortgage stated that petitioner was "attorney-in-fact for herself and her husband," the Special Power of
Attorney was never presented in court during the trial.

On appeal, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the real estate
mortgage is valid despite the non-participation of petitioner’s husband in its execution because the land
on which it was constituted is paraphernal property of petitioner-wife. Consequently, she may
encumber the lot without the consent of her husband. It allowed its foreclosure since the loan it secured
was not paid.

Issue:

Whether the real property covered by the subject deed of mortgage dated March 20, 1995 is
paraphernal property of petitioner

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the real property covered by the
subject deed of mortgage is paraphernal property.

The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married
to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase

58
"married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed
to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.

Furthermore, registration of the property in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to
Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that such property was acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to
be conjugal. The property could have been acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and registered
only after her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts.

The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such presumption can apply, it must
first be established that the property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor
of conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar.

Thus, on the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said property was acquired
during the marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there is no showing as to when the property
in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its
nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse. The only import of the title is that
Corazon is the owner of said property, the same having been registered in her name alone, and that she
is married to Rogelio Ruiz.

6. Karen Abigail S. Monteron

Title: Hiyas Savings and Loans Bank vs. Cuna, G.R. No. 154132, August 31, 2006

Doctrine/s:

Article 151 of the Family Code:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.

Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.

The requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are
exclusively between or among members of the same family. It necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.

Facts:

Respondent, Alberto Moreno, filed a complaint against against his wife, Remedios, spouses
Felipe and Maria Owe, Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and petitioner, Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. for the cancellation of mortgage.

Petitioner contends that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any
contract of mortgage in its favor. Private respondent alleged that his wife conspires with petitioner Hiyas
and spouses Owe making it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage which is impossible because
he was then working abroad. Most importantly, it was only his wife, petitioner Hiyas and spouses Owe
who benefited from the loan.

On its part, petitioner Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action for the reason
that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that
private respondent’s failure to aver in the complaint that earnest effort was made towards compromise
prior to the institution.

59
 In his Comment, private respondent argued that Article 151 of the Family Code is not applicable
in the case because three of the defendants are not members of his family.

The trial court rendered its decision agreeing with private respondent that compromise is not
required before the filing of the case since it involves parties not members of the family. Reiterating in
Magbalate case1,
“If one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest
efforts towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the complaint, is
not a ground for motion to dismiss.”

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not earnest effort towards a compromise under Article 151 of the Family Code is
required before the filing of the case which involves parties not a member of the family.

Held:
NO.

The requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are
exclusively between or among members of the same family. It necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.

The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the
Family Code was taken explains:
“[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers.”

7. Ellen R. Nalia

TITLE: EDWIN N. TRIBIANA vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA,G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004

DOCTRINE:

In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age,
the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child.
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. This
rule has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, "No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."

FACTS:

Petitioner Edwin and respondent Lourdes are married with a daughter named Khriza Mae
(Khriza). Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their
conjugal home with their daughter.Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza
who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was
being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina.Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground
that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as
required by Article 151 of the Family Code.Lourdeshowever claimed that there were prior efforts at
a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File
Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
The Regional Trial Court denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss. It was affirmed by Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:

1
Magbalate vs. Gonong, G.R. No. L-44903, April 25, 1977

60
 Whether the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus
on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family
Code.

RULING:
No, the court should not dismiss the petition for habeas corpus.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides: No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.

It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she
resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to
Edwin’s motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May
1998.
It goes further. In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a
child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has
legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of
tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family
Code, which states, "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." In this case, the child (Khriza)
was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.

Finally, barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to
habeas corpus proceedings where a person is "deprived of personal liberty." In such a case, Section
412 expressly authorizes the parties "to go directly to court" without need of any conciliation
proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where
the "rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."Therefore, the
Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwin’s contentions on the additional ground that
Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.

8. Jon Kristoffer L. Navarro

TITLE: PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III & THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, 2nd DIVISION, respondents. GR NO. 170829, NOV. 20, 2006

DOCTRINES:

CIVIL LAW; FAMILY HOME; The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. - The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an
unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.

Same; Same; Occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries”
must be actual. - The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather,
the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which
may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the
law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.

61
Same; Same; Beneficiaries of a family home enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code: Requisites to
be a beneficiary of the family home. - Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the
family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Same; Same; The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor; Rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. - Moreover, Article 159 of the
Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule
shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legal Support; Characteristics of legal support. - Legal support, also
known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.2 Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based
on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be
renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal;
(7) It is variable in amount.

Same; Property; Co-ownership; Partition; No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An action to demand
partition in imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. - The law does not encourage co-ownerships
among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners
should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these
situations from arising. As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,3 no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a
co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property.

Same; Same; Same; An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. - In Vda. de Daffon v.
Court of Appeals, we held that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If
the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and
should order the partition of the properties in the same action.

FACTS:

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On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.

Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V.
Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in
the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the
property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.

On October 3, 2002,4 the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner:
Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also
ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In
case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August 11,
2003,5 hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the
appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of
merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as
there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private
respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to
such partition on the sole ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

RULING:
YES.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely,
his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in
the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age.

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband
and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in
the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.

63
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.

If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years,
unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.

The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches
legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before
a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of
the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the
head of the family.

Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support
falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support
upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed
on the grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his
father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is
his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of
nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of
support under Art. 199.

The closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders
of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so
on.

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any
evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandsons legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which
shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the
10-year period ended in 1997.

With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.

64
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable
situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide
their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising.

As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property.

9. Don A. Noval

TITLE: Honrado v. CA GR No. 166333, November 25, 2005

DOCTRINE:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from
later claiming the exemption.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at
public auction.

FACTS:

Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
sum of money against Jose Honradoto collect the amount of P240,765.00 representing the total
price of veterinary products purchased on credit by Honrado from November 18, 1996 until June
30, 1997.

For failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was
declared in default. Premium was, thus, allowed to present evidence ex parte.

It turned out that the Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of
Calamba City for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143175 located in Calamba, Laguna, and the
house thereon, as their family house.In his petition, Honrado declared that his creditors were
Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J Agriculture Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela Merced, and that the
estimated value of the property was not more than P240,000.00.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Premium. Petitioner filed an appeal but was dismissed for
his failure to file his brief as appellant. Entry of judgment was made on April 26, 2000. On
October 10, 2000, Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The RTC granted
the motion and a writ of execution was subsequently issued.

The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-143175,and set the sale of the
property at public auction on April 4, 2001. Honrado was served with a copy of the notice of
such sale but he opposed the same.On May 17, 2001, the property was sold to Premium, the
highest bidder and the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued.

In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision on April 29, 2002, declaring the
property a family home.

On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under
Article 155 of the Family Code of the Philippines with the following contentions:

65
  the ruling of the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 35 in SP Case No. 489-1998-C,
declaring that the property in question is a family home, has already become final;
hence, it can no longer be disturbed.
 that the family home cannot be levied upon considering that the debt, which was the
basis of the judgment under execution, was incurred between the period from November
18, 1996 and June 30, 1997, or after the Family Code had been in effect. Hence, the
family home of the petitioner is exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family
Code.[

The petitioner further asserts that he and his family had been occupying the property as their
family home as early as 1992. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, his house was constituted
as a family home in that year. Thus, even if he failed to contest the levy on his property or move
for the lifting thereof, the same cannot be deemed a waiver of his right to claim the exemption of
his family home. He avers that his right cannot be waived, for it would be contrary to public
policy. He claims that the policy of the State, in conferring such exemption, is to allow a
particular family to occupy, use and enjoy their family home, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. Moreover, the waiver must be shown by overt acts and it cannot be
presumed from the mere failure to assert the claim for exemption within a reasonable time.

RTC rendered its judgment in favor of Premium. Honrado filed an MR which was denied on the
ground that Honrado is deemed to have waived the exemption. Honrado then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA.

In dismissing the petition, the appellate court declared that the petitioner failed to assert his
claim for exemption at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time thereafter.

Thus this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family home under Article 153 of the Family Code is exempt from execution
or forced sale in the case at bar.

RULING:

Petitioner’s contention holds no merit.

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming
the exemption.

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption,
the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted
to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;

In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be
made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable
time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or
before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority.

10. Eula J. Parawan

66
TITLE: VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, G.R.
No. 177703 January 28, 2008

DOCTRINE:

Article 159 of the Family Code imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the
family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed
by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law.

Facts:

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed a Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, against
Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties
of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first
wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife,
petitioner Vilma.

RTC rendered a Decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land by and among his heirs John
Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3)
each. The decision became final on March 15, 2004.

As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land, respondent sought its sale
through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. The public auction sale was reset when
petitioners refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. This prompted
respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying
that petitioners be declared in contempt.

The RTC denied the motion for the reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the
subject house included in the auction. Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA
granted the Petition for Certiorari

Issue:

Whether the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject land.

RTC: The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in his
complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof.

CA: On the other hand, citing Articles 440, 445 and 446 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the
deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the
land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership by his
heirs, the parties herein.

Held:

The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. But this
ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by
way of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The
Family Code. The subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling
reasons.

First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is
deemed part of the subject land to wit:

In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the
part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the
house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in
the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession.

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Second, there is no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is
owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of
the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house.

That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part
of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public
auction at this time. Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the
RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the exact nature of the subject house.

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together,
these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code.

Article 159 of the Family Code imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of
the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has
passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them,
this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel
the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the
family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it
stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs,
the parties herein.

11. Dave Edward V. Parilla

TITLE: SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO CABANG ALIAS DONDON versus MR. & MRS.
GUILLERMO BASAY G.R. No. 180587 March 20, 2009

PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:

The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the
conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It may
also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property. -Article 156 of the
Family Code

It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be
established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of
either spouse with the consent of the latter.

FACTS:

Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot.

On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the heirs of Felix Odong for
P8,000.00. Consequently, aTransfer Certificate of Title No. T-22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in the
name of plaintiff-appellants. The latter also did not occupy the said property.

Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse
possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees in the
cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. However, it turned out, when

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the Municipality of Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No.
7778 was used by the government as a public road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas
occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property against
defendant-appellees.

RTC ruled in favor of the defendants Holding that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the land
registered in their names, have been effectively barred by laches.

CA reversed the decision declaring the plaintiffs-appellants to be entitled to the possession of

Lot No. 7777 of the Molave Townsite, subject to the rights of the defendants-appellees under Articles
448, 546, 547 and 548 of the New Civil Code. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was
denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home, thus,
is not subject to execution.

HELD:

Supreme Court held in the negative. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it
was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property
owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc The
family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried
head of the family. In other words:

The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b)
the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It
cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be
established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of
either spouse with the consent of the latter.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary,
the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by
respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate
courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents.

All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue. Without doubt, the instant case
where the family home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy meant to
forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution of a final
judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation is mandatory
and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.

Petition is denied.

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12. Arnel R. Patatag

Title: Lam vs. Chua

Doctrine:

Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.

Facts:

Adriana Chua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against her husband Jose Lam before
the Pasay RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity. In this petition, Chua failed to claim and pray
for the support of their child, John Paul.

Prior to this action, they had long been separated in bed and board and their conjugal property had
been dissolved in a prior action before the RTC of Makati where they signed a compromise agreement
that they will contribute tribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.

The RTC of Pasay, affirmed by the CA, granted the petition of Chua and ordering Jose Lam among others
“to furnish monthly support in the amount of P20,000 to their child”.

Issue:

W/N-the award of support despite the compromise agreement signed before the RTC of Makati
whereby Jose Lam already held himself liable to give the amount agreed for the support of their child.

Held:

The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of
support is by no means permanent.

In Advincula vs. Advincula, we held that another action for support could be filed again by the same
plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant
was dismissed.

We further held in said case that: Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is
of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy
party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his
increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.

Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana,
as approved by the Makati RTC is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John
Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the
compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be
considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification,
depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.

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13. Katrina Camille A. Pedroza

Title: Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008

Doctrine/s:

To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if
this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service.

Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

Facts:

In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support
against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the
illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner
Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. According to petitioners,
Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez
allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores
added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.

A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines
Sur. Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother returned the
documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons. In 2000, the
court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int. President Garcia St., Zone 6, Signal Village,
Taguig, Metro Manila" upon petitioners' motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted
service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's
surname. Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer. On petitioners' motion, the trial
court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons.
Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address, but
these were returned as he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new address.

In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers, explaining that they had no ill-motive and that
Dolores gave a truthful testimony. The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations by
his silence. It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a public document, is
irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a
notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the court.Before the appellate court,
he argued that the trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over
his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly "excessive and
exorbitant." The appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was "defective" as there
was no explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect personal service.
Petitioners argued in their motion for reconsideration that any attempt at personal service of summons
was needless as Vasquez already left for abroad.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial
court with jurisdiction over his person.

2. Whether or not he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

Held:

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 To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if
this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that
overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts
expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if
they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in
the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his
home address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines
Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has
established a residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an
overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of
summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. ─ When any action is commenced against
a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.

Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other
methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on
a defendant-seaman. Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since the defendant was
temporarily out of the country. To proceed with personal service of summons on a defendant-seaman who
went on overseas contract work ─ would not only be impractical and futile ─ it would also be absurd.

In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because
previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were
evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty. Also,
the person who received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's
dwelling. There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as evidenced by his employment
contract, executed under the supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment and seafarer's
information sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead, his address in Metro Manila was what was correctly
mentioned in the alias summons that Bejer received. She must have informed Vasquez one way or
another of the suit upon his return in October 2000 after finishing his nine-month contract with Fathom
Ship Management.

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have the default order set aside. The
default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. He also had enough time to file a motion for
reconsideration. But he did nothing. The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at personal
service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in Camarines Sur to the final substituted service in
Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight months, a reasonable time long enough to
conclude that personal service had failed and was futile.

On the second issue, the trial court's order must also be sustained. Co-petitioner Laurence is
legally entitled to support from the respondent, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial court is
neither excessive nor unreasonable.

Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove
paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father
in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a
competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been
recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any
action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.

14. Christine Joymarie A. Perias

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Title: EDWARD V. LACSON vs. MAOWEE and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother
and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006

Principle:

Unlike any good father of a family, petitioner has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents with
support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a
neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is
thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done to the herein respondents who are no
less petitioner’s daughters.

Facts:

The sisters Maowee and Maonaa Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his
wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Petitioner left the conjugal home, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. They stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia
then with her mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an
apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. For a period of 18 years, shuttled from one
dwelling place to another not their own.

From the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying
initially on his commitment memorialized in a note to give support to his daughters. As things turned
out, however, Edward reneged on his promise despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same.
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Edward’s mother, Alicia
also gave small amounts to help in the schooling

In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for
support before the Regional Trial Court. In that complaint Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother,
averred that their father, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands,
has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure
and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As
she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to
P600,000.00.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to his daughter’s sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained,
however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect,
accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed financial constraint for his
inability to provide monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint.

RTC: granted the support pendente lite at P12, 000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment
and other conditions. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein,
ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18
years, of support in arrears.

Edward appealed to the CA.

CA: dismissed Edwards appeal, affirmed the RTC decision.

Edward moved for reconsideration.

MR: denied by the appellate court.

Issues:

Whether or not CA erred:

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1. When It Affirmed The Grant Of Support In Arrears From 1976 To 1994 and affirming the award even if
petitioner is not financially capable

2. When It Ordered Petitioner To Provide Support to Respondents Even If Petitioners Obligation To

Provide Support Had Already Been Completely Satisfied By The Proceeds Of The Sale Of His Exclusive
Property Which Were All Appropriated By The Respondents.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both daughters. It is his threshold
submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no
previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. To petitioner,
his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case, since only from
that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.

1. Petitioner’s above posture have little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over the fact
that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her
second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender
years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their
mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the
requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975.

It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and
in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would
pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support
owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been made
in this case and said so in its decision, thus:

From 1976, mother now and then went to their [paternal] grandmother’s house by their father and
asked for support; this notwithstanding their father’s commitment for this purpose which the latter
embodied in a note. For 21 years that they needed support, he complied with his obligation for only 2
years.

As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at
by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the
determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial
court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the varying needs of the respondents
during the years included in the computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved
by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.

2. The sale by Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the
petitioner would have this Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million
proceeds of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received from the sale
is more than enough to fully satisfy thus release him from complying with- the underlying judgment for
support, assuming ex gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support in arrears.

Petitioner’s above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it assumes as a
fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his exclusive property. But, as the CA aptly observed,
there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction mentioned by is a conjugal property

74
or his exclusive property, as in fact respondent’s mother asserts that she and petitioner had separately
sold their respective shares on said property. Also, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale
aforementioned. Petitioner’s suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them
and may be set off for what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at
best gratuitous and self-serving.

Petition is denied CA decision is affirmed.

15. Maria Cristina K. Quiron

TITLE: Sps. Prudencio Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim

G.R. No. 163209 October 30,2009

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, support includes whatever is necessary to keep a person alive.
This is highlighted by the term “indispensable” in Article 194. However the clause “in keeping
with the financial position of the family” determines the amount of support to be given. The said
clause therefore eliminates the distinction between natural support and civil support in
Article 194. Natural support has been understood as the basic necessities.

FACTS: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son
of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the
house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards
family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered
the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward
whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court
described a very compromising situation.

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140
(trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly
support of P6,000 pendente lite and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to
Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision but
of Court of Appeals affirmed the latters decision. Hence the reason for petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision. However it modified the appealed
judgment by limiting petitioners liability to the amount of monthly support
needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.

The Supreme court further stated that the governing text are the relevant provisions in
Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority
of which the petitioners relied upon. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other concerns including
the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although
the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the
child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's
lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to
parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to
provide sufficient support.

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The amount of support Edward is able to give is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This
inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the
ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the
anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to
give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond.

On the other hand, Petitioners are precluded to avail the alternative option under Article 204 as amended
which provides that:

The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204will secure to
the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which,
for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed,
Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast
insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the
exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application. Therefore denying the petition and affirming
the prior decisions of the court.

Week 5 – Family Law, Fruits of Marriage Part 2

1. GEMMA C. RAMIREZ

TITLE : AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT. CORP., petitioners, vs. C.A. and SPS. CHING, respondents
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent –husband is the Vice-President of a corporation who executed a security agreement
making himself jointly and severally answerable with his corporation’s indebtedness to Petitioner. For
failure to pay the loan, a case for collection of sum of money was filed against both the corporation and
respondent-husband whom the trial court favorably ruled upon. Pending appeal, a writ of execution
was issued on motion of petitioner of which, 3 of respondent-spouses’ conjugal properties were
subjected to auction sale.

In a petition for injunction against petitioners, respondent-spouses alleged that the judgment cannot be
enforced against their conjugal partnership on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of their conjugal partnership. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued.

Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals which the latter granted thus paving the way
for the auction sale in favor of petitioner as the lone bidder. Petitioner then sought the dismissal of the
petition for injunction on account of its becoming moot and academic. Respondent-spouses opposed
arguing that where a third party claim ownership of the property attached, a different legal situation is
presented and that in this case, two of the real properties are actually owned in the name of the
respondent-wife who is a non-party to the case.

Motion to dismiss was denied. Hence, trial on the merits proceeded with private respondents
presenting several witnesses while petitioner did not present any evidence. Trial court declared the sale

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on execution null and void. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the assailed decision holding that
the loan procured was for the advancement and benefit of the corporation and not for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered “for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
2. Whether or not a surety agreement or accommodation contract entered into by the husband in
favor of his employer included therein?

HELD:

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ".
. . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot be categorized as falling within the context of
"obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred
that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed
to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains. What is apparent from the facts of the case is that the judgment debt was contracted by or in
the name of the Corporation and appellee-husband only signed as surety. The debt was clearly a
corporate debt and respondent-appellant’s right of recourse against appellee- husband as surety is only
to the extent of his corporate stockholding. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of
the family of petitioners-appellees.

Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in
dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

2. Marion Thursday A. Regudo

TITLE: Ching v. CA, G.R. No. 12464, February 23, 2004

DOCTRINES:
Properties acquired by the parties during the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal in nature; and that such presumption subsists even if the property is
registered only in the name of one of the spouses

The signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is

not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was

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 persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean
that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan.

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money
against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching
requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the
payment of the loans.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a
Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out
of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established. Furthermore, the
indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

During the hearing of the motion, Encarnacion T. Ching adduced in evidence her marriage
contract to Alfredo Ching to prove that they were married on January 8, 1960; the articles of
incorporation of Citycorp Investment Philippines dated May 14, 1979;and, the General
Information Sheet of the corporation showing that petitioner Alfredo Ching was a member of the
Board of Directors of the said corporation and was one of its top twenty stockholders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans
guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching.

RULING:

No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals,we held that it is not even
necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As
long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are
presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties
were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be
considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during
the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
the same.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000
shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in
its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was
incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of
the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal
partnership property of the petitioners.The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that
the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.The barefaced fact that the
shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines
solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.

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The CA, likewise, erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-
husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The appellate
court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI
under Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code.
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3]of the Family Code of
the Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement as security for
the payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private respondent in the amount
of P38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
ruled "that the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession.
It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was
persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that
he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty."

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses.Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should
appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code
to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit.The
husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks
to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.

It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of
PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the
petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through
the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband’s career would be enhanced should PBMCI
survive because of the infusion of fresh capital.

However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The
benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.

This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives
services to be used for his own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that
it is such a contract that is one within the term "obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Thus:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "…
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to
be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

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 The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-Perez and G-
Tractors, Inc. are not controlling because the husband, in those cases, contracted the
obligation for his own business. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a
surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.

3. Jurdelyn C. Repaso

Title: Villanueva vs. CA, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Doctrine/s:

A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the
live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The
presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first.Otherwise, there is no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing.

Facts:

Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been
married to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely,
Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue
City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City,
and Consolacion, Cebu.

In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas,
then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties. Defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no
properties of her own from which she could derive income.

In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have
to raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because
they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27,
1985 and until the present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who
has been receiving the income of these properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to
negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told
defendant, Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the
latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter.

Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement
was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by
plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement
but no settlement was reached by the parties.

Further, plaintiff’s witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by tax
declaration marked Exhibit T was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the
time of purchase of the property, defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood. The trial court
rendered its Decision in favor of Eusebia. The trial court applied Article 116 of the Family Code, which
reads:
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.

The trial court ruled that the documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute solid
evidence which proved that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas. This
made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties. Thus, the trial court ruled that
Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. On the other hand, the trial court
found that petitioners failed to meet the standard of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject
properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita presented no factual
solidity to support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152exclusively with her own money.

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 Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the trial court. The appellate court
found that Pacita failed to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that the subject
properties are conjugal. The appellate court dismissed Pacitas defense of prescription and laches since she
failed to have the issue included in the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer with her co-petitioners.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not the properties acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicolas Retuya and
Eusebia Retuya are conjugal.
Held:

YES. The Supreme Court had held that the properties acquired during the existence of the marriage
of Nicolas Retuya and Eusebia Retuya are conjugal. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October
1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and
Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was
purchased on 4 October 1957.The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not
conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an
obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive
property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and
convincing. Petitioners failed to meet this standard.

The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is
both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot
work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to
exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from
7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias
death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject
properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.

Finally, petitioner’s reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. A reading of
Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-in
partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The
presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Simply put,
proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the
acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her
own money, or that she actually contributed her own money to acquire it.

4. Clieford A. Rivera

TITLE: THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and

EDILBERTO CAMAISA,respondents.

Doctrine:

The disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires
thewritten consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.

Facts:

Petitioner negotiated with respondents' spouses Camaisa for the sale of the latter's properties. The subject
properties - apartment in Makati and in Rizal - are conjugal. Petitoner alleged that during the negotiations
she and the spouses came to an agreement as to the price and terms of payment. However, on a separate

81
occasion, only the petitioner and respondent husband were present in the contract signing. After
respondent husband signed the contract, petitioner gave him downpayment, and gave him the contract so
tha this wife can sign it. However, respondent wife refused to sign the contract. Petitioner filed a
complaint for specific performance.

Issue:

Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife’s written
consent?

Ruling:

No. Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.

The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.

5. Gerlyn Mae C. Sayson

TITLE: PELAYO v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 141323. June 8, 2005

DOCTRINE:

A wife's consent to the husband's disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit
or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or
approval was indeed given

FACTS:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA
Resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

David Pelayo conveyed to Melki Perez two parcels of agricultural land situated in Panabo, Davao
through a Deed of Sale which was witnessed and signed by Loreza Pelayo, wife of David Pelayo, and
another one.

Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses on account
of which Perez' application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Tagum, Davao was denied. Perez then asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed
but she refused, hence, he instituted a complaint for specific performance against her and her husband.

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 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action,
citing Section 6 of RA 6656 which provides that contracts executed prior thereto shall "be valid only
when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of
this Act."

The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the dismissal and remanded the case
for further proceedings.

On appeal, petitioner Pelayo argued that the deed was without his wife Loreza's consent
premised under Art. 166 of the Civil Code thus the deed is null and void.

The CA then ruled that by Lorenza's signing as witness to the execution of the deed, she had
knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given her consent to the same; that herein
petitioners failed to adduce sufficient proof to overthrow the presumption that there was consideration
for the deed, and that petitioner David Pelayo, being a lawyer, is presumed to have acted with due care
and to have signed the deed with full knowledge of its contents and import. The CA reversed and set
aside the RTC Decision, declaring as valid and enforceable the questioned deed of sale and ordering
herein petitioner LorenzaPelayo to affix her signature on all pages of said document.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Does the signature of the wife as witness to the deed of sale constitutes marital consent to the
conveyance of the lot in question?

RULING:

YES, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA, ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to
the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to
the contract of sale.

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or
implied. A wife's consent to the husband's disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be
explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such
consent or approval was indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed
of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of
said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and
consented to the sale.

Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was
still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent
to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable.

Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon
an action brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained. In the present case, despite
respondent's repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale,
showing respondent's insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for
annulment of the deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a complaint for specific performance
on August 8, 1991 when petitioners brought up Lorenza's alleged lack of consent as an affirmative
defense. Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered into without Lorenza's consent, we find it quite
puzzling why for more than three and a half years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek the
nullification of the assailed contract.

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 The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza knew of the full import of
the transaction between respondent and her husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of
sale, she, in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal property.

6. Mar. Teresa B. Siega

Title: Sps. Alinas vs. Sps. Alinas, G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008

Doctrine/s:

The administration & enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse.In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Facts:

Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving
to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A with a
bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house. These two lots are the subject of the present petition.

Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas and respondent Victor Alinas are brothers. Petitioners allege that they entrusted
their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be
remitted to the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were
believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was mortgaged as
security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot896-B-9-B with the house was mortgaged to the
SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said
properties.

Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of respondent
spouses.

Records show that after Lot 896-B-9-A was extra-judicially foreclosed, Title to said property was issued in the
name of mortgagee RBO on November 13, 1987. A Deed of Installment Sale of Bank's Acquired Assets was executed
and RBO conveyed said lot to respondent spouses who eventually was issued a Title over said lot.

Lot 896-B-9-B was also foreclosed by the SSS . the Ex-Oficio City Sheriff of Ozamis City issued a Certificate
of Sale over said property in favor of the SSS.However, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney signed
by Onesiforo in favor of Victor, the latter was able to redeem, on the same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS for the
sum of P111,110.09, thus, a Certificate of Redemption was issued by the SSS.

Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Salelikewise selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent
spouses. The records also show a notarized document date whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother
Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot. In
the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and
assigns have or may have over the subject property. By virtue of said documents a Title was issued covering Lot 896-
B-9-B in the name of respondent spouses.

Thus, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City a complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent spouses.

RTC ruled that Plaintiffs have not proven that they entrusted defendant spouses with the care and administration of
their properties ; Plaintiffs have not proven their allegation that defendant spouses agreed to pay rent of P1,500.00 a month for
the occupancy of plaintiffs' house, which rent was to be remitted to the SSS and Rural Bank of Oroquieta to pay off plaintiffs'
loan and to keep for plaintiffs the rest of the rent after the loans would have been paid in full; Plaintiff Onesiforo's allegation
that defendants concocted deeds of conveyances with the use of his signatures in blank is not worthy of credence
thus declaring respondents Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building (bodega) standing
thereon.; declaring petitioners Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-B with the house standing
thereon, plaintiff Onesiforo's sale thereof to defendants spouses without the consent of his wife being null and void and
defendant spouses' redemption thereof from the SSS not having conferred its ownership to them; ordering petitioners

84
to reimburse respondents the redemption sum of P111,100.09, paid by them to the SSS (without interest as it shall be
compensated with the rental value of the house they occupy) within sixty days from the finality of this judgment;

Only respondent spouses appealed to CA . The CA affirmed the decision granting respondent spouse of the Title
of the lot with bodega and modified the rest.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the transfer and issuance of Title of Lot no. 896-B-9-A (with Bodega) to respondent spouses valid
2. Whether or not the transfer and issuance of Title of Lot no. 896-B-9-B( with petitioners’ house) to respondent
spouses valid
Held:

1. YES.

It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative relief can be granted to a party who did not appeal.
Hence, not having appealed from the RTC Decision, petitioners can no longer seek the reversal or modification of the trial
court's ruling that respondent spouses had acquired ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A by virtue of the sale of the lot to them by
RBO.
Petitioners do not assail the validity of the foreclosure of said lot but argues that respondent spouses merely redeemed the
property from RBO. This is, however, belied by evidence on record which shows that ownership over the lot had duly passed
on to the RBO, as shown by TCT No. T-11853 registered in its name; and subsequently, RBO sold the lot with its
improvements to respondent spouses. Needless to stress, the sale was made after the redemption period had lapsed. The trial
court, therefore, correctly held that respondent spouses acquired their title over the lot from RBO and definitely not from
petitioners.

2. NO

The Court finds it patently erroneous for the CA to have applied the principle of equity in sustaining the validity of
the sale of Onesiforos one-half share in the subject property to respondent spouses.
Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question
occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code.

The CA ruling completely deviated from the clear dictate of Article 124 of the Family Code which provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made
by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety.

In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to
injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal
property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife,
as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The
fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a
notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of
the sale.

However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, the Court agrees
with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the
amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of filing of the complaint.

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7. Lucks Mae Digaum

Title: Maquilan vs. Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409. June 8, 2007

Facts:

The husband and the wife once had a blissful life but ended when the husband discovered that his wife
had an illicit affair with his paramour which prompt the former to file a case for adultery against the two
and was later on convicted for adultery.

The husband, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT which was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On
Compromise Agreement.

The husband filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and
the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement on the ground that he was not
intelligently informed by his lawyers as to the consequences and effect of a compromise agreement but
the same. This was elevated to the CA via petition for certiorari but the same court a qou dismissed the
petition, hence the appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the compromise agreement was valid.

The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that
prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the
conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share
should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case.

Where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while
Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding
where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.

The Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains
between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among
those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially
approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must
stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal

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partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family
Code.

8. Roger Benjamin D. Solon

Title: ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003

Doctrine:
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry during their
cohabitation shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.

Facts:

This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed
by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati in March 1997.

After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property, excluding from the conjugal property, among others, Suite 204 of the LCG
Condominium bought by respondent Bruno Fehr with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite
204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was
purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-
ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.

Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated October 5, 2000 that since the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership
should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to
Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couple’s cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
respondent.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the October 5, 2000 Order of the trial court. Later
petitioner withdrew the notice of appeal and instead filed on the following day a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the said Order.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26, 2001, dismissed the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the property in question is governed by Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, said
property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

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In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the
household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party’s "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has
not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in
his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply
with essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July
26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should
be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.

9. Marietes M. Sumampong

Title: LUPO ATIENZA v. YOLANDA DE CASTRO G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006

Doctrine:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies
to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.( Article 148 of the Family code)

Facts:
Sometime in 1983,Petitioner, the President and General Manager of the two corporations hired
the services of the Respondent as the accountant thereof. Their relationship became intimate and
despite petitioner being a married man, they eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later
part of 1983, where two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their

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relationship turned sour until they parted ways.On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a
complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City.He alleged that the subject property was acquired during his
union with respondent as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.
The trial court ruled in favour of the petitioner but on appeal was reversed, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not he questioned property is owned by them in co-ownership as this was bought
at the time of their cohabitation.

Ruling:
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. Favorable relief can
be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. In
making proof of his case, Lupo , diverted the burden imposed upon him to Yolanda by painting her as a
shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property, a mere attack on the
financial capacity of the latter. That contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell
dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer datedApril 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said
property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name
of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that
other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However,
as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to
warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the
Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to
present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as
here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property
from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.

10. Misaellee M. Tejano

Title: Navarro vs. Escobido, G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009

Doctrine/s:

The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is
married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.

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 RE: Administration and enjoyment of conjugal properties
No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of
administration or any act that does not dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.

Facts:

KAREN T. GO is married to GLENN O. GO. She is also the registered owner of KARGO
ENTERPRISES.

KARGO Enterprises entered into a lease agreement with option to purchase with Roger Navarro
for 2 motor vehicles. The lease agreement was entered into and signed by Glenn Go as the manager. On
September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro.

In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no
cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase. The
RTC initially dismissed the case but reconsidered its earlier ruling and ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go
as a party to the case. It held that “acting on the presumption that Glenn Go’s leasing business is a
conjugal property, Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against
Navarro”.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion. Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name
of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to
the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn
Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a cause of action.

According to Navarro, the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it assumed that the
leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of Glenn and Karen Go. Since Karen Go is the registered
owner of Kargo Enterprises, the vehicles subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the
RTC gravely erred when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest?

2. Whether or not the motor vehicles are conjugal properties?

Held:

The petition has no merit.

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the
real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action
because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of
Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial
court to consider in a trial on the merits.

We find it significant that the business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of Karen T. Go,
who described herself in the Complaints to be "a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES."
That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each other is a fact never brought in issue in the case. Thus,
the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registered in the name of a married woman, a fact material
to the side issue of whether Kargo Enterprises and its properties are paraphernal or conjugal properties.
To restate the parties’ positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Go’s paraphernal
property, emphasizing the fact that the business is registered solely in Karen Go’s name. On the other
hand, Karen Go contends that while the business is registered in her name, it is in fact part of their
conjugal property.

The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is

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married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Our examination of the records of the case does not show any proof that Kargo
Enterprises and the properties or contracts in its name are conjugal. If at all, only the bare allegation of
Navarro to this effect exists in the records of the case. As we emphasized in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal
partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear.23 [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a
sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property.

Article 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property, provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership

property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

xxx

This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in
managing their conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the
consent of the other before performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or
encumber their conjugal property.

Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife
shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In
the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code
provision on partnership for guidance.

A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses’ circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific
partnership property.

The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:

(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement
between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess
specific partnership property for partnership purposes; xxx

Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the
properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or special
provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title," we find further support in
Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect
to the co-owned property.

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant
to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete

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relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.25 [Emphasis supplied.]

Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover
possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is consistent
with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on
behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question
without the other spouse’s consent.

11. Mark Jason S. Tirol

TITLE: MARYWIN ALBANO-SALES VS MAYOR REYNOLAN T. SALES AND COURT OF APPEALS GR. NO.
174803 JULY 13, 2009

DOCTRINE:

There were matters of genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property
relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage.

Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common properties
without the husband’s consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which
have to be addressed in order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and
distribution of properties due to each party.

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from civil case filed by Marywin Albano Sales against her husband,
Mayor Reynolan T. Sales, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties,
and civil case filed by Mayor Reynolan T. Sales for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The two
cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

On January 4, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage of Marywin and Reynolan void
on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It also ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and directed them to liquidate, partition and distribute their common property within 60
days from receipt of decision, and comply with FC 50, 51, and 52 as may be applicable.

On June 16, 2003, after the decision became final, Marywin filed for execution and a manifestation
listing her assets with Reynolan for partition. Reynolan opposed the motion arguing that the RTC
Decision had ordered the distribution of their common properties without specifying what they were.
He also claimed that Marywin has no share in the properties she specified because said properties were
the fruits solely of his industry. He added that their property relations should not be governed by the
rules of co-ownership because they did not live together as husband and wife. He also alleged that
Marywin appropriated the rentals of his properties and even disposed one of them without his consent,
in violation of Article 147 of the Family Code. Accordingly, he prayed for the deferral of the resolution of
the motion for execution, maintaining that no partition of properties can be had until after all the
matters he raised are resolved after due notice and hearing.

On September 3, 2003, RTC set the case for hearing on September 25, 2003 and ordered the reception
of evidence on claims.

On November 24, 2003, Marywin filed a reiterative motion for execution to implement the decision and
to order partition of common properties.

On November 28, 2003, reiterative motion was heard in the absence of Reynolan and his counsel. RTC
issued an order approving the proposed project of partition. Clerk of court ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance to distribute 8 town house units.

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On December 16, 2003, Reynolan moved to consider RTC’s order, prayed for its reversal, and
reinstatement of the order of reception of evidence before partition. Marywin opposed Reynolan’s
motion on the ground that issues of alleged fraudulent sale and non-accounting of rentals were already
waived by Reynolan when he failed to set them up as compulsory counterclaims in the case.

On April 12, 2004, RTC denied Reynolan’s motion for reconsideration. t ruled that reception of evidence
is no longer necessary because the parties were legally married prior to its nullification and the fact that
they begot a son whom they raised together proved that their connubial relations were more than
merely transient.

On July 26, 2006, CA rules in favor of Reynolan and remanded the case to lower court for reception of
evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred when it entertained respondent’s appeal from an order granting the issuance
of a writ of execution.

RULING:

NO.

What is being questioned by respondent was not really the January 4, 2000 Decision of the RTC
declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity, but the Orders
of the trial court dividing their common properties in accordance with the proposed project of partition
without the benefit of a hearing. The issue on the validity of their marriage has long been settled in the
main decision and may no longer be the subject of review.

There were matters of genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property
relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Allegations regarding
the collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husband’s
consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in
order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to
each party.

The extent of properties due to respondent is not yet discernible without further presentation of
evidence on the incidental matters he had previously raised before the RTC. Since the RTC resolved
these matters in its Orders dated November 28, 2003 and April 12, 2004, disregarding its previous order
calling for the reception of evidence, said orders became final orders as it finally disposes of the issues
concerning the partition of the parties’ common properties. As such, it may be appealed by the
aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal

The decision of the CA is affirmed and the instant case is remanded to the lower court for further
reception of evidence.

12. Ada Bonita Tohay

TITLE: SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADOvs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL

DOCTRINE:

“Civil liability arising from the criminal liability of slander is not chargeable against the conjugal
partnership because it does not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

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FACTS:

The Spouses Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol. Said action
originated from Erlinda’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by
petitioners. The Trial Court favored the Sps. and the decision became final and executory.

The trial court issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to collect the sum of 40K as payment
for the damages out of the goods and chattels of Erlinda. And if the personal properties are not sufficient,
then the deficiency shall be taken from the lands and buildings of Erlinda. The Sps. became the highest
bidder and a certificate of sale was subsequently issued to them.

Almost a year later, Romulo (respondent), the husband of Erlinda, filed a complaint for annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff.

Respondent alleged that they did not exhaust the personal properties of Erlinda. The Petitioners on the
other hand contended that they acted on a valid writ of execution.

RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and remanded the case to the RTC. The
CA denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner’s hence, this instant petition.

The petitioners mainly argued that the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and that the husband is liable for the tort committed by his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal property is liable for the tort committed by the wife.

RULING:

No.

There is no dispute that the contested property is conjugal in nature.

Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the conjugal property
cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by her.

13. Juris Angeli S. Toledo

Title: ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO  G.R. No. 178044 (January 19, 2011)

Pertinent Provisions and Discussions:

 For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

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 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

Facts:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent
failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to
the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the
family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

Ruling of the Trial Court:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147
of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Yes.

Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

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The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted. Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Article 45
of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are
valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property
in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is
not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

14. Parker F. Trias

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TITLE: Munoz v. Ramirez G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010

PRINCIPLE:

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is
Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses. When the value of the paraphernal property is considerably more than the
conjugal improvement, said paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.

FACTS:

Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential house and
lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City (subject property), covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of
the petitioner. The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No.
1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents).

On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No.
1427, with Erlindas consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a
P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions
of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story
residential house on the lot.

On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.

On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage
transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioners name were falsified.

The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the
respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject
property because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges;
the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year, during which period (from
May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly
rental of P500.00; when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the
one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 1993;
when the respondents failed to pay the monthly rentals despite demand, he filed an ejectment
case against them with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, on
September 8, 1993, or sixteen days before the filing of the RTC case for annulment of the deed
of absolute sale.

During the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC decided the
ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to vacate the subject property, to surrender its
possession to the petitioner, and to pay the overdue rentals.

In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific examination
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseos purported signatures in the Special
Power of Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April 29, 1992,
showing that they were forgeries.

97
 The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the
subject property since it was registered in Erlindas name; the residential lot was part of a large
parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlindas parents; it was the
subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for annulment of sale, before the RTC, Branch
158, Pasig City, filed by the surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado Ramirez,
Erlindas brother; and, as a result of a compromise agreement, Amado agreed to transfer to the
other compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda, their rightful shares of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal.

RULING:

Paraphernal or Conjugal?

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous
title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and
be the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive
paraphernal property.

The CA misapplied Article 158 of the

Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas

We cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and
Calimlim-Canullas.

As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on
conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property
relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by
those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256.

Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family
Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides
the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting
increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the
entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.

Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the
time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not
necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit
were forgeries was immaterial

98
 Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the
contract between the parties.

Week 6 – Family Law, Fruits of Marriage, Part 3, Special Topics in Family Law

1. Liljoy C. Udtohan

TITLE: JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother,
CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V.
DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper
parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or
in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

FACTS:

Petitioners were born during the marriage of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus. In a notarized
document, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged them as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that
petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent

HELD:

The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners’
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the
decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot
be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.

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2. Mylene M. Ocat

Title: Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

Doctrine/s:

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow
from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. In this case, Gerardo Concepcion
has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo, being no such parent-child relationship between
them.

Facts:

Petitioner Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. After a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's relationship turned out to be short -lived. Gerardo filed a
petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years
before he married Ma. Theresa she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled
and that Mario was still alive.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result.

The custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma.
Theresa moved for reconsideration of the decision insofar only as that portion of granting petitioner
visitation rights and maintained that the child's surname be changed to Almonte, her maiden name.

The trial court denied the motion. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. CA denied the
petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court. Ma. Theresa moved for reconsideration. The appellate
court resolved the motion by reversing it's earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of
Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. Gerardo moved for a reconsideration but
the same was denied.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not Jose Gerardo is an illegitimate child of Gerardo.

Held:

No, the petition was denied.

Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. Article
167 provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between the husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precede the birth of the child.

In this case there is no such evidence, thus presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo
stands. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within the valid marriage. For reasons of public decency and morality, a married
woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the
child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. Jose Gerardo is a
legitimate child thus shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Theresa, in

100
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in a way.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. In this case, there being no
such parent-child relationship between them, thus, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose
Gerardo.

3. Mariejoy C. Vasquez

Title: De Dios vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008

Facts:

Juan de Dios and Teofilo Carlso are the compulsory heirs of the Spouses Felix B. Carlos and
Felipa Elemia, between the two brothers are the 6 parcels of land as their inheritance from their parents.

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. This agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teolfilo Carlos in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other heir, petitioner, Juan de Dios.

Teofilo Carlos died in May 13, 1992 intestate, leaving a widow , Felicidad Sandoval and son
Teofilo Carlos II, the respondents.

After the demise of Teofilo, respondent Felicidad Sandoval and petitioner, Juan de Dios entered
several agreements for the partition of the six parcels of land. Four of the six parcels of land were
partitioned by the parties during 1994.

In 1995 however, petitioner commenced an action against the respondent grounded on the
following causes of action: (A.) declaration of nullity of marriage of Felicidad Sandoval and the
deceased brother, Teofilo Carlos (B) status of the child, (c) recovery of property, (d) reconveyance,
(e) sum of money and damages.

Respondent answered that her marriage to Teofilo was valid even if there was no marriage license
on her marriage certificate , and Teofilo Carlos II is the illegitimate child of her deceased husband from
another woman.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment,
submitted documents such as Live Birth of the child, in the certificate Teofilo and Felicidad as the
designated parents.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not the nullity of marriage can be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.

Held:

The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on
the pleadings or summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment is disallowed. Basis for the
ruling is A.M. No 02-11-10 SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages

4. Cletus G. Villamor

Title: CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents
(G.R. No. 124814/October 21, 2004)

101
Principle:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Facts:

Respondent Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos, filed a
petition for recognition and support against the here-in petitioner.
Respondent alleged that while working as a house-help with the petitioner, petitioner brought her to
Bacolod City where they had sexual intercourse and that encounter is repeated in some other date. She
further alleged that; petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos. She was
demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos but petitioner refused, denying the alleged
paternity and insisted that she was already pregnant when they had sex.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of the respondent despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL
CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-
APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;

Ruling:
The petition is granted.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxx xxx xxx

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the
local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and
they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

102
The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

5. Angeline C. Ygaña

Title: WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-
LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,

Facts:

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case
which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao
against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao.

That, Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten
(10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William
Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together
in the company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital.
During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born
baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the
account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billys birth certificate.

xxxSince birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized
and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported
Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Respondents testified that their parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally
married.[16] Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until
she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why
any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house
in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. xxx. Linda described him as very conservative and a
strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As
a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He
suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally
separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the
couple obtained any annulment of their marriage.

The trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao
sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with
the deceased.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court.

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Issue:

May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?

Ruling:

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate.[22] The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue
of the mother.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[24] provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage,
and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of
the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:1) By the impotence of the husband;2) By the fact that
husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;3) By the serious
illness of the husband.

xxx

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it
bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of
the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set
forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right
of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the
one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the
then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.

6. Marie Angelee V. Ygnacio

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Title: Arbolario vs. CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003

Facts:

Juan Arbolario was married to Catalino Baloyo. They have one child, Purificacion. Records show
that Juan cohabited with a certain Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the petitioners
Voltaire, Lucena, Fe, Exaltacion and Carlos (the “Arbolarios”). They were all born before 1951.
Agueda, sister of Catalina had two children (Antonio and Irene). Antonio was precedecease by
his three daughters (Ruth, Fe, Goldelina).

In 1951, Agueda, Catalina, Eduardo, Gaudencia and Julian (children of Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan), executed a Delaration of Heirship where Gaudencia, a sister of Catalina, conveyed her
share to her niece Irene and nephew Purificacion.

In 1987, Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina (the “Colincos”), believing themselves to be the only
surviving heirs of Anselmo and Macaria executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition.
The Colincos filed a case to recover a portion of the land from respondents Rosalito Rodriguez Salhay
and Carlito Salhay, who allege that they are lessees of Purificacion and had been in possession of the land
from 1971-1978. While the case was on trial, The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the
Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus
voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to
the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be
included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot.

Issue/s:
- Whether or not the Arbolarios could inherit from their half-brother Purificacion.

Held:

Petitioners argued that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before it was ever executed, and
concluded that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Juan and Catalinas only
daughter, Purificacion.

A review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas death was intercalated. The
first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to
make it look like a 0.

There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios marriage to Francisca
Malvas was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does
not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman
who bore his children.

Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally
ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a
presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be
convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered
into.

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.[15] It
stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate.[16] Petitioners, however, failed to prove
the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca
Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.

7. Rhea C. Yray

Title: Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Himalayan City, Negros Occidental , G.R. No. 181174, December 4,
2009

Doctrine/s:

105
  In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiation.
 It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as
Pablito Sicad Braza, were married on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo
Josef and Janelle Ann on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo on June 4, 1980.

Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille
Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her
and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth
certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following
entries:

Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL

TITULAR
Date of Birth: 01 January 1996
Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular
Father: Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the
Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997
Annotation: "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza
on January 13, 1997"
Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents
on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known
as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza

Ma. Cristina obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on
April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial
Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for:
(1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation,
the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza";
2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, tosubmit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and
3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate
and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick,
and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.

Held:

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 No. The petition fails.

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo
and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003,
and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases of Cario v. Cario, Lee v. Court of Appeals, and Republic v. Kho
is misplaced.

8. Carol Q. Solatorio

Title: Dapar vs. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880. September 27, 2004

Doctrine/s:

Use of Surname

The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests of
the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the
usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1)
there is an actual use of anothers name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of
anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person.

The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the representation
that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wifes status, which gives rise to an action for damages.

Facts:

Sometime in 1966, Spouses Gloria and Mario Biascan were married in civil rights in Quezon City
and had four (4) children.

Mario Biascan worked in Saudi Arabia and met Zenaida Dapar, who was then working as a domestic
helper which ripened into an intimate relationship. Both being lonely in a foreign land, Zenaida and
Mario became lovers, which resulted in the latters failure to give support to his wife and family.

Zenaida returned to the Philippines in 1981. Upon Marios return to the country, he joined Zenaida to
live in a rented house. They opened a joint account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on March
30, 1982. Mario returned to Saudi Arabia in February 1984, while Zenaida stayed behind and worked in a
garment factory. He remitted his earnings to Zenaida, and the latter deposited the said amounts in their

107
joint savings. These remittances were credited in the said account, as well as others coming from
Zenaidas relatives who were also working abroad.

Mario and Zenaida then bought a lot in Caloocan City.

On November 15, 1993, Gloria L. Biascan filed a complaint against Zenaida for annulment of title,
reconveyance, and damages in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
16184 and alleged among others that:

7. That the defendants use of the surname Biascan is a usurpation of surname under Article 377 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines, and as such, plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario M.
Biascan, is entitled to recover damages from defendant;

And prayed among others:

3) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) Philippine
Currency, as damages for usurping the surname Biascan which rightfully belongs to the plaintiff;

Anent Zenaidas use of the surname Biascan, the trial court ruled that Gloria was not entitled to
damages since Mario consented thereto.

On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled in favor
of Gloria

Issue/s:

- Whether or not Zenaida is liable to respondent Gloria Biascan for damages for usurpation of the
surname of respondent Mario Biascan under Article 377 of the Civil Code.

Held:

NO. Gloria Biascan is not entitled to an award on the claim for damages for the petitioners
alleged usurpation of her husbands name.

The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests
of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the
usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1)
there is an actual use of anothers name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of
another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person. None of the foregoing exist in the case at
bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. In
fact, the trial court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the petitioner to use his surname, viz:

On the other cause of action referring to the use by Zenaida of the family name Biascan for which
damages is prayed for by the plaintiff, there is evidence to show that defendant Mario Biascan was the
one who suggested, and in fact authorized Zenaida Dapar to use said family name. It would appear that
the very first time that Zenaida Dapars name had the surname Biascan was when defendant Mario
Biascan had executed the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment in Saudi Arabia,
wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by the
defendant on April 7, 1982 and which also showed that his effective date of employment in Saudi Arabia
was April 1982 and to expire on February 1984 (Exhibit A). This is an extrajudicial admission that would
not allow proof to the contrary. Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the preparation of said
document. Moreover, when the contract to sell and the deed of sale of the property in question were
executed, Zenaida Dapar used the surname Biascan and defendant Mario Biascan did not object to the use
of such surname. Also, in the joint bank account with the PNB Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar
Biascan is described as a joint depositor.

Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the surname Biascan because she was instructed
by her co-defendant to do so and she thought the latter was not married. She only became aware of his
civil status a few years later after their living together in 1981.
The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-defendant Mario Biascan was allowed by the latter
and in no case could it be considered usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-defendant Zenaida Dapar
can no longer be held liable for damages for the use thereof.

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 The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the
representation that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wifes status, which gives rise to an
action for damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57306 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent Gloria Biascan is
DISMISSED on the ground of res judicata. The counterclaims of the petitioner against respondent Gloria
Biascan are DISMISSED. No costs.

9. Marymar L. Jurolan

Title: MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and RICARDO V. QUINTOS, G.R. No. 143351 September 14, 2000

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 370 of the Civil Code. Under this Article, a married woman may use (1) her
maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname; (2) her maiden first name and
her husband’s surname; or (3) her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she
is his wife, such as Mrs.

FACTS:

VILLAROSA and QUINTOS were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May 1998 synchronized national and local
elections. On 27 May 1998 the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA as the
winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes.

On 4 June 1998 QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA contesting the results of
the election in all the 882 precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro on the
following grounds: (1) the ballots were misread and counted in favor of protestee; (2) there was
rampant substitute voting, i.e., persons other than the registered voters voted; (3) violence and
intimidation were committed by protestee and her followers against known supporters of
protestant to enhance protestee’s candidacy; 4) previously prepared ballots for the protestee
were deposited in the ballot boxes; and (5) illiterate Mangyan voters voting for protestant were
assisted by self-appointed assistors of protestee, who wrote "JTV" on the ballots contrary to the
instruction of said illiterate voters. Thus, ballots bearing "JTV," "JTB," "GTV," "GTB," "Jitivi,"
"Gitivi," "Jitibi" and "Gitibi" on the line for Representative were classified as ballots for
VILLAROSA, which the revisors of QUINTOS objected to. Likewise, ballots bearing "Girlie" on
the line for Representative were classified as votes for VILLAROSA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE "JTV" VOTES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF AMELITA C.

VILLAROSA.

RULING:

NO.

Explaining this duty of the courts, then Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion, former Chief
Justice, stated:

The facts established in this case, strengthened by the admission of the parties at the
preliminary conference conducted by the HRET on 6 August 1998 and during the oral argument
before the Court on 15 August 2000, lead us to no other conclusion than that the use by
VILLAROSA of "JTV" as her nickname or stage name, as indicated in her Certificate of
Candidacy, was a clever ruse or ploy to make a mockery of the election process. Therefore, the
HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling that "JTV" votes should not be
counted in favor of VILLAROSA. They are stray votes.

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Here are the facts:

1. The husband of petitioner is Jose Tapales Villarosa.

2. Jose Tapales Villarosa was elected Representative of the Lone Legislative District of
Occidental Mindoro in the 1992 and 1995 elections, thereby serving two full terms.

xxxxx

6. "JTV" refers actually to the initials of Jose Tapales Villarosa.

7. Before VILLAROSA filed her certificate of candidacy on 27 March 1998 for the 11 May 1998
elections, VILLAROSA never used "JTV" as her nickname or stage name. Her nickname was
"GIRLIE." In her affidavit dated 16 April 1998 which she filed with the Provincial Election
Supervisor, she requested that she be allowed to insert in her Certificate of Candidacy the name
"GIRLIE" between her given name Amelita and the initial of her maiden surname C so that her
name would read in full as follows: "MA. AMELITA "Girlie" C. VILLAROSA."

8. In said affidavit of 16 April 1998, VILLAROSA solemnly declared under oath that she was
known as "GIRLIE" Villarosa in every barangay of the Province of Occidental Mindoro.

xxxx xx

From the foregoing, the following conclusions are beyond dispute:

First, "JTV" represents either the initials or the nickname of Jose Tapales Villarosa.

Second, VILLAROSA was never generally or popularly known as "JTV." She was generally or
popularly known as "GIRLIE." Clearly then, since "JTV" remains to be either the initials or
nickname of Jose Tapales Villarosa, who was the incumbent Congressman during the election
and campaign periods for the 11 May 1998 elections, votes entered or written as "JTV" cannot be
considered as votes for petitioner. The votes "JTV" or any variations thereof are, therefore, stray
votes.

It would be the height of naivety to believe that, indeed, "JTV" is petitioner’s nickname, or that
she used it for any other purpose than to ride on the popularity of her husband to mislead the
voters, especially the less informed.

The plea that the voters’ intention must prevail is misplaced. It assumes that those who wrote
"JTV" actually intended to vote for petitioner. This could be true only if the person who actually
owns the nickname or the initials "JTV" were not (a) VILLAROSA’s husband, (b) the incumbent
Representative who had won as such in both the 1992 and 1995 elections, (c) generally and
popularly known as "JTV" when he ran and campaigned for Representative in both elections in
the same legislative district where VILLAROSA ran in the May 1998 elections. But since these
were the immutable facts, the voters who wrote "JTV" or variations thereof had no other person
in mind except the then incumbent Representative, Jose Tapales Villarosa, or the very person
whom they have known for a long time as "JTV."

xxxxx x

Since "JTV" undoubtedly refers to the initials or nickname of VILLAROSA’s husband, Jose
Tapales Villarosa, who was, let it be stressed again, the incumbent Representative of the district
in question at the time of the election for his successor, neither reason nor rhyme can support or
justify a claim that "JTV" votes were intended for petitioner VILLAROSA.

Article 370 of the Civil Code, which VILLAROSA invokes, provides no relief for
her. The article enumerates the names which a married woman may use. One of
them is "her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs." If VILLAROSA had availed herself of this, as she suggested in
her petition and during the oral argument, then her name would be "MRS. JOSE
TAPALES VILLAROSA." If for expediency and convenience she would use the

110
initials of her husband, then her name, in initials would be "MRS. JTV." Yet, on this
point, VILLAROSA even attempted to confuse us. During the oral argument on 15 August 2000
she tried to convince us that "MRS. JTV" is also her nickname. x x x x x x

Furthermore, since votes for "GIRLIE" written in the space for Representative were in fact
claimed by VILLAROSA and credited in her favor, then the HRET correctly ruled that "JTV"
votes or variations thereof, under the idem sonans rule, cannot be counted for VILLAROSA
because only one nickname or stage name is allowed.

From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her
certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of
her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question whom she wanted to
succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is essential in
preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua propia. No one should be
allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.

10. Dalisay B. Isidro (Remarks – Regular Student assigned did not submit case digest.)

Title: JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE
SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City, Respondent G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

Doctrine:

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.

Facts:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-
year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.

They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents until Dominique died. After almost two months, Jenie,
who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of
the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live
Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and
Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits
attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet
unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting,
pertinent portions of which state that Jenie was his wife and that she is pregnant.

The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for
registration of the child’s name for the reason that the child cannot use the surname of his father
because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child as required under Republic Act No. 9255.

Petitioner maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of

paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255.

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Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR
CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S SURNAME.

Held:

Yes. In the present case, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of
the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in
his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and
"NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim
of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father.

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Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving
questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which
the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic.

The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his
Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.

11. Republic Act No. 9255 February 24 2004

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR

FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child."

12. Mark Limbaga

Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Doctrine:

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child
are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Facts:

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

The trial court granted petition for adoption but denied petitioner’s motion to allow the child to
use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name, holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.

Issue:

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Whether or not an illegitimate child may, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name.

Held:

Yes. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. However, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
child’s mother as his middle name.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother… xxx. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
…xxx. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.

13. Arief A. Mamao

Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES. G.R. No.
100835 October 26, 1993

Take note that Republic Act 8043 otherwise known as "The Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"
is not yet effective at the time this case was decided.

DOCTRINE:

Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily
confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as
well as support and successional rights.

In proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social
and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been
designed.

FACTS:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married
Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country.

On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC of Angeles City, to
adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita,

114
who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as
their parents, gave consent to the adoption.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY
HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

RULING:

YES, the lower court erred in its decision. Hence, the petition is GRANTED and the
decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt. The Family Code of the
Philippines is explicit.

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/ her
Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). But she may not adopt alone
since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be
read along together with Article 184. As amended by EO 91, PD No. 603, had thus made it
mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was
silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family Code has resolved any
possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the
spouses.

The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized
that James Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the
proceedings. This view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status
that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and
duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise
of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and
successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to
the parties.

We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an
adoption can bring not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children
themselves. We also realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is
given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the
law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the law is clear and no
other choice is given, we must obey its full mandate.

14. Daryl Andrew C. Monteclar

Title: In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155

Facts:

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Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who
were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born
in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle
name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to
Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be
discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot
just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julian considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he
could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

Issues:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held:
YES.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.

15. Don A. Noval

TITLE: HERBERT CANG vCOURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 105308; September 25, 1998

DOCTRINES:
 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.
 It would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter,
taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and
spiritual needs of the child.
 Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.There should be proof that he had so emotionally

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 abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if
they were given to adopting parents.

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which petition was approved by the trial court. Herbert, thereafter,
left for the US. There, he sought and was granted a divorce from Anna Marie. In the
same divorce decree, sole custody of the 3 minor children were given to Anna,
reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert. Petitioner subsequently got married to an
American and became a naturalized American citizen. Thereafter, he divorced his wife
and never got married again.

The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children.
Herbert, upon learning of the same, went back to the Philippines to contest the
adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court.

CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay
monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the 3 minor children can be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
 Whether or not petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his
consent to the adoption unnecessary.

RULING:

Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by
the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child.

Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the
decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."

No.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
"any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment.

Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account

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the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
child. The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs
more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort
that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had
so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents.

The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more
important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not
only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person they
could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs

16 Arnel R. Patatag

Title: In re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

Doctrines:

(1) The use of the word shall in Section 7 (c), Article III of RA 8552 means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly.

(2) Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. It is only one of the legal effects of adoption.

Facts:

Spouses petitioner Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Due to their eagerness to have
a child, they have registered Michelle P. Lim and Jude Michael P. Lim as if they were the their (spouses’)
children. Both were of unknown parents and were barely both 11 years old when entrusted into their
custody. Michelle born on March 15, 1977 while Michael on August 1, 1983.Unfortunately Lim died in
1998. Two years thereafter, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American Citizen.

Petitioner, availing the amnesty given under RA No. 8552 to those individual who simulated the
birth of a child decided to adopt the children and filed petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael.
At the time Michelle was already 25 years old and was already married, while Michael was 18 years old
and seven months old. Both Michelle and Michael gave their consent to the adoption. Olario likewise
gave his consent executed in an affidavit.

The trial court denied the petition on the ground that since petitioner has already remarried, the
petition should have been filed jointly with her new husband as required under Section 7 (c), Article III of
RA No. 8552.

In her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner argued that mere consent of the husband
would suffice as joint adoption is merely for the purpose of joint exercise of parental authority. And
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority, joint parental authority is
not anymore necessary.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can adopt singly.

(2) Whether or not the argument of the petitioner is tenable.

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Rulings:

First issue –
No. The law is explicit. Section 7 (c), Article III of RA 8552 reads:Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed and
not falling in any of the three exceptions above, must jointly adopt.

Second issue –

No. Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.Parental
authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Adoption is not only for the purpose of joint exercise of joint parental authority. Parental
authority is just one of the legal effects of adoptions. Other legal effects are as follows: (1) sever all legal
ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but
not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right
of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.

17. Gemma C. Ramirez

Title: MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO

C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO
SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents
G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

Doctrine:

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

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Facts:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the
parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents,
petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent
suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left
the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus and Custody, for which the trial court issued an order which directed petitioners to
produce and bring before the Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January
31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged
from restraint.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied. Consequently, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial
court’s orders.

Held:

No. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial
court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce
the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory
order precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.

This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing
of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present
case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own
child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years
of age.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003.
Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the
trial court.

18. Gerlyn Mae C. Sayson

Title: AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY
HIRSCH G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007

Principle:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "in all actions concerning

120
 children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.

Tender- Age Presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.

Facts:

Franklin and Agnes were married and established conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan. Their marriage was blessed by a child named Simone, born on December 21, 2002. In
2005, the couple started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin
insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes came to their conjugal home in
Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati
City for a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter discovered that neither Agnes nor
their daughter Simone would be coming back to Boracay.

Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals for Agnes to
produce Simone in court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for habeas corpus and after a series
of hearing promulgated that the custody of Simone shall be jointly exercised by Agnes and Franklin.

Agnes filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
filing of petition for certiorari by the Petitioner Agnes.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
custody of the minor child to both parents.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the custody of the minor child to both Agnes and Franklin.

The Supreme Court cited that the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration (emphasis supplied)." The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.

The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity,
or affliction with a communicable disease.

In the case at bar, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for
her minor child. There was no compelling reason that has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mother’s custody.

19. MARK JASON S. TIROL

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Title: JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P.
MIGUEL, respondents. G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004

DOCTRINE:

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of
custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

FACTS:

Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents to obtain custody
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.

The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate.
The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in
Japan.

Respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be
allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that
they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents
did not bring him back as promised by them.

Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the petitioner was deported from Japan under the
assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction
of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines,
he has not been gainfully employed. The custody of the child, according to respondent Loreta P.
Miguel was entrusted to petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that
even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents, she has already been
living separately from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit
affair with another woman until his deportation.

She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of
availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to
send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she has no intention of
staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or
as often as she could.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner should be granted the custody of the child

HELD:

No.

Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted,
have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his
birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s
recognition of him.

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There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it except
in the cases authorized by law.

Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise.

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease.

20. Parker F. Trias

TITLE : JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V,

respondent [G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005]

PRINCIPLE:

Article 211 of the Family Code: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over their children. In the case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary. A mother's authority is subordinated to the father's. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties.

Article 213 of the Family Code: No child under seven years of age shall be separated from his
mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

FACTS:

The court consolidated and considered two appeals by former husband and wife Crisanto
Rafaelito Gualberto V and Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto regarding their divorce and the custody of
their child.

Crisanto had filed for divorce and custody of their child - Rafaello. Joycelyn failed to appear at
the court proceedings and the judge awarded custody to Cristiano after having considered
evidence that Jocelyn was having extramarital lesbian relations and that she did not care for and
was witnessed slapping her child. It was further held that her parental authority was
subordinated to that of Crisanto under Article 211 of the Family Code. Jocelyn challenged this
decision, which was reversed and she was granted custody on the basis that, according to Article
213 of the Family Code, a minor child shall not be separated from his mother unless a court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

At the next instance, the Court of Appeal annulled the second court order on procedural
grounds and returned custody to Crisanto until Jocelyn’s motion was decided on again. In the
current case, both parties petitioned the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal's ruling.

ISSUE:

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Whether the Court of Appeal violated Article 213 of the Family Code when it awarded custody
of the child to Crisanto and was it Article 213 or Article 211 which applied in this case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that in cases concerning minor children below the age of 7, Article 213
of the Family Code takes priority as it is in the best interests of a young child to be cared for by
his mother unless 'compelling' reasons are presented for a court to order otherwise. As no such
reasons were presented or proved, custody was awarded to the mother.

The Supreme Court said that the general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its reason in the basic need of minor children for their
mother’s loving care and that this rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a
mother has her baby torn away from her. Any exception to this rule can only be made for
‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child, but such cases must indeed be rare.

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to
deprive Joycelyn of custody. The mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason
to deprive her of custody, but sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental
neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful
to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.

It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted her
from exercising proper parental care. It was, therefore, not enough for Crisanto to show merely
that Joycelyn was a lesbian, but he had to also demonstrate that she had carried on her
purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. However, in the current
case, there was no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities
or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.

21. Angeline C. Ygaña

Title: REYMOND B. LAXAMANA vs. MA. LOURDES* D. LAXAMANA G.R. No. 144763,
September 3, 2002

Facts:

This is another sad tale of an estranged couple’s tug-of-war over the custody of their minor children.
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983.The
union was blessed with three children twin brothers Joseph and Vincent, born on March 15, 1985, and
Michael, born on June 19, 1986.[2]

All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent and he underwent to several confinement until on
April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner already drug-free. Despite several
confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened
and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became
violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent.

Thus, on June 17, 1999, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house
of her relatives. On August 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 107, the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children.

On September 27, 1999, petitioner filed in the habeas corpus case, a motion seeking visitation rights over
his children.[10] On December 7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an order

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granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological
examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed to submit the case for
resolution after the trial courts receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination.

On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three
children to respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner.
Hence this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding
their custody to respondent.

Held:

In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children, the contending parents
stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest of the
child. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live
with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing
parents.[15]
xxx
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the
agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report
of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that
said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is
insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare
of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family
and the youth.[17] While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as
to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is
not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to
show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral
and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at
the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent
they want to live with. xxxThe trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the
agreement of the parties to submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.

xxxWhere, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in
whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to
present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that
no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of
the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be
the custodian of the children

22. Dalisay B. Isidro

Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent

G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005

Doctrine:

Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
whether made by the highest court of the land.

There is a big difference between having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the

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denial of the appeal for lack of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the
issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter
to this Court on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until this Court makes the
final pronouncement.

Facts:

Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go
back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria was
compelled to work abroad.

Nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family
Code.

The RTC found the petition with merit and granted its imprimatur to the petition. Judgment was rendered
declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family
Code but subject to all restrictions and conditions provided therein.

Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of Article 247 of the
Family Code, the Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines, nevertheless filed a
Notice of Appeal.

Acting thereon, the RTC had the records elevated to the Court of Appeals, who treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case, affirmed the appealed RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not it was proper on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order
the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

Held:

No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
Section 247of the Family Code are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the
part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records
of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive
death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.

The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As it
were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous
appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the
judgment was not appealable.

---xxx end xxx---

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