NAVA VS. NBI, G.R. NO.

134509, APRIL 12, 2005 remedy should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE: Although as a consequence of the decision in Fabian, appeals from the
orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now
cognizable by the Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the
Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with this Court
to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto, the SC has
held that the Court has jurisdiction over such petitions questioning resolutions or orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. Here, as Nava himself beseeched
the Court to consider his Petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, we shall treat
the same as one.
FACTS: The case subject of this Petition emanated from anonymous letter-complaints7
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao alleging that fake Equivalent
Record Forms (ERFs) of several teachers of the Davao City National High School were
made the bases for the Plantilla Allocation List (PAL) for calendar year 1988 and for the
teachers' corresponding promotion and salary upgrading. The Office of the Ombudsman
in Mindanao referred the matter to the NBI in Region XI (NBI-XI) and directed it to
conduct a fact-finding investigation.9 The investigation by the NBI-XI disclosed, among
others, the submission by a certain Myrna Rosales-Velez of a Service Record (DECS
Form No. 93) containing fabricated facts and the handing in of fake ERFs by other
teachers which were the bases of the PAL approved as correct by Nava who was then
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Regional Director for Region
XI.10 The NBI recommended the filing of appropriate charges against the teachers and
officials concerned.
Acting on the findings of the NBI, the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao, in a Joint
Resolution dated 23 October 1996, recommended the indictment of Nava before the
Sandiganbayan for Falsification of Official Documents thru Reckless Imprudence.
Thus, the filing of an Information against Nava and his co-accused Granada before the
Sandiganbayan on 20 November 1996.
Nava filed before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan a Motion for
Reinvestigation which was granted in a Resolution dated 22 September 1997. On 4
May 1998, Special Prosecution Officer Manuel A. Corpuz (hereinafter, Special
Prosecutor) recommended the dismissal of the charges against Nava and Granada for
insufficiency of evidence. This recommendation was, however, disapproved by the
Ombudsman. Hence, the instant Petition in which Nava contends that the Ombudsman
gravely erred or was "manifestly mistaken" in disapproving the recommendation of
dismissal of the case against him, which disapproval, he further avers, is based on an
erroneous conclusion drawn from "undisputed" facts which assumes the nature of a
question of law reviewable by this Honorable Court.
However, even assuming that this remedy was pursued, since there is nothing on record
to even suggest that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to have the case against Nava dismissed, the NBI insists that the Petition must fail.
Nava in his Consolidated Reply stressed that the instant Petition was filed on 3
September 1998 before the promulgation of the Fabian case on 16 September 1998;
and maintained that it was then his honest position that Section 27 of R.A. 6770 was
available as a remedy in non-administrative cases notwithstanding its silence on the
matter. In this instance, however, he posited that the Court of Appeals may likewise not
take cognizance of the Petition in light of the Court's ruling in Tirol, Jr. v. Justice del
Rosario, that the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted to an aggrieved party
in administrative disciplinary cases as ruled in Fabian is not available to a party
aggrieved by an order and decision of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding
probable cause to indict accused persons. Nava implored the Court to consider the
instant Petition instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as
the actuations of the Ombudsman amount to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not Nava's appeal should have been taken to the CA by way of a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: No. The SC held that THE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY AVAILS. Reiterating Tirol,
the SC held in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), that although as
a consequence of the decision in Fabian, appeals from the orders, directives, or
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now cognizable by the Court
of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with this Court to set aside the
Ombudsman's order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto, the SC has held that the Court
has jurisdiction over such petitions questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases. As Nava himself beseeched the Court to consider his
Petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, we shall treat the same as one.

The NBI pointed out that the instant Petition is one for review on certiorari pursuant to
Section 27 of R.A. 6770 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which provision of
law had already been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto and reiterated in
Namuhe v. Ombudsman. Pursuant to the Court's ruling, appeals from orders, directives
or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as the instant case is not an administrative disciplinary case, the proper
OROSA VS. ROA, G.R. NO. 140423, JULY 14, 2006
DOCTRINE:
 DOJ -> SOJ-> Office of the President -> CA via R43
 Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be
precise, his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the
decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA,
under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust
of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy
obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted
to before resort can be made to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would
be premature and precipitate; subject to defined exception, a case is susceptible
of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust administrative
remedies. Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President
in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from
rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before
any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
FACTS: On November 27, 1996, petitioner, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig
City Prosecution Office a complaint-affidavit charging respondent Alberto C. Roa,
likewise a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint, docketed in said office as I.S.
No. 96-5442, stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr.
Orosa" written by respondent and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental
Trading Post, a bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the
article delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a
licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the
examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to top the same.
In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as
it besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental
board examinations held in May 1994.
After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution,
dismissing petitioner's complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Acting on the appeal, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño issued a Resolution (Zuño Resolution), setting aside
the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for libel
against respondent. Accordingly, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, an
Information for libel was filed against respondent, thereat docketed as Criminal Case
No. 114517.
Adversely affected, respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On October 28,
1998, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuño Resolution and directed
the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the Information earlier filed with the RTC.
Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by the
Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of May 12, 1999.
Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 432 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 53190.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Resolution dated July 8,
1999, dismissed petitioner's petition for review. Partly says the CA in its dismissal
Resolution: “The Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not
among the quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders
or resolutions are subject to review by the Court of Appeals.”
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice
directing the prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case.
HELD: No. Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
bodies to the CA. Section 1 thereof provides:
Section 1. Scope.― This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act No. 6657, Government Service and Insurance System, Employees'
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under
Section 1 of Rule 43, albeit any suggestion that it does not perform quasi-judicial
functions may have to be rejected. However, its absence from the list of agencies
mentioned thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from the
coverage of said Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phrase "among these
agencies," thereby implying that the enumeration made is not exclusive of the agencies
therein listed.
There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the
list is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control4 lodged
in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control,
which even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief
Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members
of the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of their duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise,
his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the
Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within
the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to
the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject
to defined exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should
a party fail to exhaust administrative remedies. Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43
includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating
the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and
resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. VS. ALZUL, SECOND DIVISION, G.R. NO. 169501, JUNE 8,
2007
DOCTRINE:
 There can be no question that only the award, judgment, or final order or resolution
issued by the lower court or agency and appealed from has to be certified as
true.The second set of attachments refers to the "certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein."
Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having influence or
effect; going to the merits; having to do with matter, as distinguished from form."
Thus, material portions of the records are those parts of the records that are
relevant and directly bear on the issues and arguments raised and discussed in the
petition. They may include any of the pleadings that are subject of any issue,
documentary evidence, transcripts of testimonial evidence, and parts of the records
pertinent and relevant to the grounds supporting the petition. The attachment of the
material portions is subject to the qualification that these are referred to or cited in
the petition. Thus, only the material parts specified in the petition have to be
appended and that would be sufficient compliance with the rule as to form.
 Here, the petitioner claims respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 failed to
attach material documents of the records of the HLURB and the OP. Petitioner’s
postulation must fail. Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of
the petition if it is not accompanied by the required documents but simply
gives the discretion to the CA to determine whether such breach constitutes
a "sufficient ground" for dismissal. Apparently, petitioner was not able to
convince the CA that the alleged missing attachments deprived said court of the
full opportunity and facility in examining and resolving the petition. It has not been
satisfactorily shown that the pleadings filed by petitioner with the quasi-judicial
agencies have material bearing or importance to the CA petition. Such pleadings
could have been attached to the comment of respondent and hence, no prejudice
would be suffered. Thus, the CA did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or
oppressive manner by giving due course to the petition.
FACTS: On February 10, 1975, [respondent] Rosario T. Alzul purchased from
[petitioner] B.E. San Diego, Inc. four (4) subdivision lots. [Respondent] took immediate
possession of the subject property, setting up a perimeter fence and constructing a
house thereon. On July 25, 1977, [respondent] signed a "Conditional Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights" which assigned to a certain Wilson P. Yu her rights
under the Contract to Sell. [Petitioner] was notified of the execution of such deed. Later
on, the Contract to Sell in [respondent’s] name was cancelled, and [petitioner] issued a
new one in favor of Yu although it was also denominated as "Contract to Sell No. 867".
On July 4, 1979, [respondent] informed [petitioner] about Yu’s failure and refusal to pay
the amounts due under the conditional deed. She also manifested that she would be
the one to pay the installments due to respondent on account of Yu’s default.
1st Case - Respondent commenced an action for rescission of the conditional
deed of assignment against Yu.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Alzul.
CA: Affirmed.
SC: Denied the Petition for Review by Yu and affirmed the CA’s decision.
On February 17, 1989, [petitioner] notified [respondent] that Contract to Sell No. 867
was declared rescinded and cancelled. On April 28, 1989, the subject lots were sold to
spouses Carlos and Sandra Ventura who were allegedly surprised to find the annotation
of lis pendens in their owner’s duplicate title.
2nd Case- Sps. Venturafiled an action for Quieting of Title with Prayer for
Cancellation of Annotation and Damages.
RTC: ruled in favor of the Sps. Ventura.
CA: Reversed.
SC: Affirmed. MR was filed but was subsequently denied.
On July 12, 1996, an Entry of Judgment was issued. In an attempt to comply with the
Supreme Court’s directive, herein [respondent] tried to serve payment upon [petitioner]
on August 29, 1996, August 30, 1996 and September 28, 1996. On all these dates,
however, [petitioner] allegedly refused to accept payment from [respondent].
On November 11, 1996, [respondent] filed a Manifestation in GR No. 109078 informing
the Supreme Court that [petitioner], on three (3) occasions, refused to accept [her]
payment of the balance in the amount of Php187,380.00. On January 29, 1997, a
Resolution was issued by the Supreme Court referring the case to the court of origin for
appropriate action, on account of [respondent’s] manifestation. On October 21, 1997,
[respondent’s] counsel wrote a letter to [petitioner] citing the latter’s refusal to accept
her payment on several occasions. It was also mentioned therein that due to its refusal,
[respondent] would just consign the balance due to [petitioner] before the proper judicial
authority.
3rd Case - Thinking that an action for consignation alone would not be sufficient to allow
for the execution of a final judgment in her favor, [respondent] decided to file an action
for consignation and specific performance against [petitioner] before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board on March 12, 1998.
HLURB: Dismissed the case.
OP: Dismissed for being filed out of time.
CA: Reversed the decision.
Thus, this petition.
Petitioner claims respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 failed to attach material
documents of the records of the HLURB and the OP. They cry foul that none of the
pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP found their way into the CA petition. It prays
that the CA petition should have been dismissed under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 due to the
lack of needed attachments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s petition before the CA is sufficient.
HELD: YES. On the procedural issue, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. assails the
sufficiency of respondent Alzul’s CA petition as the latter, in violation of the rules,
allegedly lacked the essential and relevant pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP.
Section 6 of Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:

SEC. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall x x x (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true
copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other
supporting papers; x x x
The above proviso explicitly requires the following to be appended to a petition: 1)
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order, or resolution appealed from; 2) certified true copies of such material portions of
the record referred to in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.
Obviously, the main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and
evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the CA all the orders,
resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that
are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the
case records of the lower court. The rule is the reviewing court can determine the merits
of the petition solely on the basis of the submissions by the parties14 without the use of
the records of the court a quo. It is a fact that it takes several months before the records
are elevated to the higher court, thus the resulting delay in the review of the petition.
The attachment of all essential and necessary papers and documents is mandatory;
otherwise, the petition can be rejected outright under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
To prevent premature dismissals, the requirements under Sec. 6 on the contents of the
petition have to be elucidated.
First, there can be no question that only the award, judgment, or final order or resolution
issued by the lower court or agency and appealed from has to be certified as true.
The second set of attachments refers to the "certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein."
Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect;
going to the merits; having to do with matter, as distinguished from form." Thus, material
portions of the records are those parts of the records that are relevant and directly bear
on the issues and arguments raised and discussed in the petition. They may include
any of the pleadings that are subject of any issue, documentary evidence, transcripts of
testimonial evidence, and parts of the records pertinent and relevant to the grounds
supporting the petition. The attachment of the material portions is subject to the
qualification that these are referred to or cited in the petition. Thus, only the material
parts specified in the petition have to be appended and that would be sufficient
compliance with the rule as to form.
It would be prudent however for the petitioner to attach all parts of the records which
are relevant, necessary, or important in whatever way to be able to reach the resolution
of the issues of the petition. The availability of such documents to the ponente and
members of a Division can easily provide the substance and support to the merits of the
grounds put forward by the petitioner. Moreover, the processing time for the review and
resolution of the petition is greatly abbreviated, thereby obviating intolerable delays.
Lastly, it has to be explained whether the material portions of the records have to be
certified as true by the clerk of court or his/her duly authorized representative as
provided in Sec. 6 of Rule 43. If strictly required, the rule to require attachment of
certified true copies of the material portions will surely make the preparation of the
petition more tedious, cumbersome, and expensive. It should therefore be construed
that merely clear and legible copies of the material portions will suffice. The rules on the
different modes of appeal from the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies to the CA
reveal that it is only Rule 43 that specifically states that the material portions to be
appended to the petition should be certified true copies. Rule 41 of course does not
require attachment of the pertinent records since the entire records are elevated to the
CA. Rule 42 on petition for review from the trial court in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
to the CA speaks of plain copies of the material portions of the record as would support
the allegations of the petition.16 Even Rule 45 on appeal by certiorari from the CA to
this Court simply speaks of material portions of the records without indicating that these
should be certified true copies. Rule 46 on original cases to this Court only requires
plain copies of the material portions of the records. Finally, Rule 65 on special civil
actions requires only copies of relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents.
From the foregoing premises, the inescapable conclusion is that only plain and clear
copies of the material portions of the records are required under Sec. 3 of Rule 43. This
finding is buttressed by our ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where it was held that only
judgments or final orders of the lower courts are needed to be certified true copies or
duplicate originals.17 There is no plausible reason why a different treatment or stricter
requirement should be applied to petitions under Rule 43.
The last requirement is the attachment of "other supporting papers." Again, it is only in
Rule 43 that we encounter the requirement of annexing "supporting papers" to the
petition. This can be interpreted to mean other documents, pictures, and pieces of
evidence not forming parts of the records of the lower court or agency that can bolster
and shore up the petition. While not so specified in Sec. 3 of Rule 43, it is inarguable
that said papers must also be relevant and material to the petition; otherwise, the
attachments would be mere surplusages and devoid of use and value.
Petitioner’s postulation must fail.
Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition if it is not
accompanied by the required documents but simply gives the discretion to the CA to
determine whether such breach constitutes a "sufficient ground" for dismissal.
Apparently, petitioner was not able to convince the CA that the alleged missing
attachments deprived said court of the full opportunity and facility in examining and
resolving the petition. It has not been satisfactorily shown that the pleadings filed by
petitioner with the quasi-judicial agencies have material bearing or importance to the
CA petition. Such pleadings could have been attached to the comment of respondent
and hence, no prejudice would be suffered. Thus, the CA did not exercise its discretion
in an arbitrary or oppressive manner by giving due course to the petition.
In addition, it was noted in Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz that the CA Revised Internal Rules
provide certain flexibility in the submission of additional documents:

When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of copies,
the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to complete the
annexes or file the necessary number of copies of the petition before docketing the
case. Pleadings improperly filed in court shall be returned to the sender by the Chief of
the Judicial Records Division.

In Rosa Yap Paras, et al. v. Judge Ismael O. Baldado, et al., the Court preferred the
determination of cases on the merits over technicality or procedural imperfections so
that the ends of justice would be served better.