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International Journal on World Peace
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN
XINJIANG: THE ETIM, CHINA, AND
THE UYGHURS
Christopher
Christopher P. Cunningham* Department
P. Cunningham* of Political
Department ofScience
Political Science
Northeastern
Northeastern University
University
360
360Huntington
HuntingtonAvenueAvenue
Boston,
Boston, Massachusetts,
Massachusetts,
02115 02115
USA
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
it of having a direct relationship with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Several
experts and specialists argue that the Chinese government has overstated
or embellished the case against the ETIM, perhaps as part of its effort to
win support from the international community in the post-September 11
environment. Nonetheless, it is also possible that China feels legitimately
threatened by instability and unrest in Xinjiang. Therefore, this article
also discusses China's strategic and material interests in Xinjiang that the
government has aimed to protect.
Notwithstanding the fact that instability in Xinjiang legitimately could
threaten (and at times has threatened) these interests, it is argued here that
Beijing has overstated the relative specific threat for terrorism posed by the
ETIM. (Although definitions of the word "terrorism" abound, here it will
be defined as "the deliberate creation
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
group found throughout Central Asia. The vast majority (8 million) live in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China, where they
represent the largest ethnic group but live alongside Kazakh, Kirghiz, and
Han Chinese inhabitants.2 Another half million Uyghurs live in the "western
Turkestan" states in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. In addition, there are roughly 150 thousand Uyghurs living
outside Xinjiang and western Turkestan, including Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Europe and the United States.3 In Xinjiang, Uyghurs
comprise about half the total population, followed by the Han Chinese
at 37 percent.4 While Han Chinese constitute the majority in most cities,
Uyghurs are predominant in the countryside; for those Uyghurs that do
live in cities, they tend to live in crowded, dense communities, reinforcing
their separate identity.5 ■■■■■
The presence of Islam in Xinjiang The Uyg
can be traced back to the 8th century. Muslim
The Uyghur Empire of that time lasted ethnjc
from 744 to 840 ad and was not based in throu
present-day Xinjiang, but in what is now ^ ^
the Republic of Mongolia.6 During this ..
time, subsequent khagans consolidated '
their power over the various Uyghur
clans, extending the Yaghlakar clan's domination ove
tribes. Over the next two centuries, the Uyghur Em
major regional influence. In fact, it was able essentia
to subsequent rulers of the T'ang dynasty, at a time
depended on Uyghur military support.7
However, this was not the period in which the
we see today emerged as a distinct ethnic group
fact, there is some scholarly debate about whethe
today as the Uyghurs is ancestrally directly descend
peoples described above.8 In the 11th century, for in
the east invaded central Asia and defeated the Tur
Turkish-speaking Chinese today actually descend f
Turkish tribes.9
By 1759, the Qing conquest of what was to becom
Manchu hegemony in the region, placing the Uyg
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
control. Although the Manchus ethnically were not Han, their expansion
into inner Asia had a long-term historical effect—it initiated the spread of
Han Chinese influence, culture, and population into the region.10 A century
later, in 1884, Xinjiang was officially incorporated as a Chinese province,
which also was when the Qing dynasty began calling the region Xinjiang,
meaning "new frontier." It was also around this time that British officials
in India coined the term "East Turkestan" to distinguish the region from
the lands ofWest Turkestan—i.e. the territories of current states Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, all of which had fallen under
Russian influence at the time.11 Inadvertently, the label later assisted a
growing movement for independence by China's Sunni Muslim, Turkic
speaking population.12
The Uyghurs' first assertion for
in 1884, Xinjiang was independence came in 1865 when Yaqub
Beg, a military official in the employ of
officially incorporated as
the Khanate of Koqand, established a
a Chinese province, which
Muslim state in Kashgaria that lasted
also was when the Qing
from 1864 to 1877. Although the state
dynasty began calling the
ended with Yaqub Beg's death and the
region Xinjiang, meaningChinese re-conquest of the region in
"new frontier."
1877, his campaign set a precedent for
future Uyghur separatist movements to
appeal to religion and ethnicity.13 (These events also played out in the con
text of the "Great Game" between Britain, Russia and China.14) According
to one source, Muslims in Xinjiang at the time, who had suffered from
alien domination since the fall of the Moghul khanate in the 1860s, quite
naturally felt proud of what they had accomplished in briefly establishing a
Muslim state. They considered Yaqub Beg "a hero who brought their holy
war to its completion by creating an independent and regionally unified
Islamic kingdom."15
During the first half of the twentieth century, Uyghur separatists would
attempt several times to establish an independent homeland separate from
China. An "East Turkestan Islamic State," founded in Kashgar in 1933,
collapsed within three months.16 In 1945, the Uyghurs—this time with
the help of the Soviets—again attempted to assert their independence,
establishing the short-lived East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in Yining.17
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
However, when the Communists took Beijing in 1949, its leaders agreed
that the ETR would be incorporated back into Xinjiang, which as a whole
would be absorbed into the People's Republic of China.18
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
separatist activity, or the arrests of Uyghur activists from the early 1980s
until 1997. However, in April 1990, an armed uprising in Baren signaled
an uptick of ethnically-motivated violence inside Xinjiang. This transformed
the state's perceptions of the cause of violence in the region, and shaped
the approach that China would take regarding Xinjiang affairs for the next
two decades.24 Other incidents of ethnic unrest between 1990 and 1997
also alienated the national government, which now reconsidered the effects
of its "reform and opening" policies vis-à-vis Xinjiang, a province located
far away from Beijing but nearby other Central Asian republics.25 Then,
in 1997, a wave of separatist bombings in Beijing and Urumqi took place
on the anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's death, killing 12. The bombings,
subsequently blamed on Uyghur separat
After the September ists, signaled a new level of organization to
11 terrorist attacks in the separatist threat, assuming the charges
were true.26
the United States, the
China responded to the growing
Chinese government
unrest in a number of ways. In 1996,
seized the opportunity
the government enacted "Strike Hard"
to reframe its dispute
campaigns, or government operations
with the Uyghurs as a designed to fight crime and any threats
dimension of the global to stability by accelerating arrests, tri
war against terrorism. als, and sentencing of criminals. These
campaigns were aimed at all manner of
apparent wrongdoers throughout China;
in Xinjiang, they were directed at Uyghur separatists.27 Also in the mid
1990s, China was pushing for the transformation of the "Shanghai Five"
regional conference into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
eventually established in 2000. It has been argued that China's growing
concerns about separatist and militant activity led Beijing to urge the
SCO to reorient its focus from confidence-building measures and "border
demarcation" to trans-border threats such as radicalism, Islamic extremism,
and drug trafficking.28 Then, after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the
United States, the Chinese government seized the opportunity to reframe
its dispute with the Uyghurs as a dimension of the global war against ter
rorism.29 This action corresponded with the government's felt need "to
protect its porous borders from an influx of more violent forms of Islam
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
that they had trained in the tribal regions of Pakistan—an unusually spe
cific accusation possibly signaling China's growing impatience.45 Overseas
Uyghur groups disputed the ETIM connection and held the government
responsible for the attacks.
Beijing has not missed the opportunity of labeling its fight against Uighur
[sic] separatism as being part of the larger US-led global campaign against
terrorism. While it was unlikely that there is formal Sino-US arrangement
on this issue, it seems clear that there was an informal understanding. China
will support the global struggle against violent extremism, in exchange for
the US recognizing the Uighur's [sic] as part of that struggle 47
Another scholar also argues that the Chinese government was eager to
equate America's fight against Muslim radicals with its own, so as to receive
a "free hand" in dealing with (allegedly) foreign-assisted terrorists.48 No
doubt this connection became easier for China to portray after US forces
captured 25 Uyghur separatists in Afghanistan. However, the Pentagon
later concluded that the detainees, subsequently held at the US's military
prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, presented no threat to the United States
and could be released.49
A more compelling rationale to explain China's behavior involves
acknowledging China's many strategic, economic, and security interests
in the region. Strategically, Xinjiang is crucial because it shares interna
tional borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indian-controlled Kashmir. Xinjiang is also rich
in natural resources. It has large oil and natural gas reserves in the Tarim
and Dzungeria Basins. Eighty percent of China's reserves in gold, jade
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
and other precious metals are in Xinjiang.50 China is also cooperating with
neighboring states such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan
to implement new gas pipelines or connect to existing pipelines running
through Xinjiang.51 The region produces one third of China's petroleum,
two thirds of its coal, and one third of its cotton, and possesses several
of China's nuclear testing sites. Additionally, the only major passageway
to Central Asian countries passes through Xinjiang.52 This is important
because Central Asia, with a population of 60 million, offers a large market
for Chinese merchandise on its western borders, and trade between China
and the five republics has increased sixteen-fold between 1992 and 2005,
exceeding $8 billion in 2007.53 By acknowledging so many critical interests
in Xinjiang, it is easier to countenance how the state has been eager to con
front and put down a separatist move
Strategically, Xinjiang is ment threatening to sever the territory.
crucial because it shares It is, of course, both logical and widely
international borders accepted that most any country would
likely respond to a separatist or terrorist
with Mongolia, Russia,
threat by trying to defeat it, rather than
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
through negotiations or compromise.
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, China also fears that instability in
Pakistan, and Indian
Xinjiang will threaten economic invest
controlled Kashmir.
ment. Due to Deng Xiaoping's deci
Xinjiang is also rich in sion to develop China's eastern coastal
natural resources. regions before the western regions, the
poverty gap between eastern and west
em China has widened.54 As of2002, 90 percent of those living under t
poverty line in China lived in its western frontier.55 Xinjiang has fared bet
than other western provinces, such as Gansu and Ningxia, but it also host
the largest urban-rural gap in terms of wealth, underscoring the reality th
most of China's poor reside in the countryside.56
It must be said that Beijing sees economic improvements and inves
ment as the very tool that can undermine agitation efforts for indep
dence, and in recent years it has committed vast amounts of resources
economic development via its Great Western Development Strategy. "T
attempt to use economic tools to address ethnic separatism in Xinjia
reflects the Chinese government's longstanding belief that most peop
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
Uyghurs included, primarily want a good economic life for themselves and
their children."57 With stability in mind (or at least one of the motivating
factors), the government has spent $125 billion building infrastructure in
China's West, including a south-to-north water diversion, a west-to-east
power transmission, the Qinghai-Tibet railway, and twelve new highways
in Xinjiang connecting to Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan.58
These development projects are strategic and deliberate. "The underlying
idea is that if western regions, most notably Xinjiang, have sufficient devel
opment, then the minorities will prosper, be less restive, give less support
for separatist activities, and be more integrated into the fortunes—both
economic and political—of China."59 At the same time, China is mindful
that instability could threaten investment from the outside. "Beijing fears
[the Xinjiang separatists]... because the mere possibility that they may
cause disruption creates an impression of social instability in Xinxiang and
dampens foreign investment."60
However, some scholars have suggested that China's Great Western
Development plan has produced contradictory results. For example,
Clarke argues that in attempting to ensure the "security" of outer regions
such as Xinjiang, these actions in fact are generating "dynamics of insecu
rity" amongst the region's Uyghurs and other non-Han ethnic groups.61
Becquelin similarly argues that "the dynamics of penetration and resistance
between the centre and what still remains an indigenous periphery can
be expected to generate at the same time both increased sinicization and
increased ethno-national unrest."62
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
In sum, China has aimed to protect several economic and political interests
in Xinjiang using a variety of methods—some coercive, others meant to
foster cooperation amid hope for a more prosperous future. Thes policies
assume that enhanced economic prosperity will placate the Uyghurs, and the
strategic development that has taken place in the region is partly intended
to help achieve this pacification. Finally, China is resistant to increasing
self-determination rights because of the signal it might send to other dis
sident groups. For these reasons—not to mention the broader cultural,
ideological, or political arguments that can be made regarding China's need
to concentrate power—Beijing is unlikely to surrender any real control to
the local population, nor is it likely to accommodate groups or individuals
that it perceives as threats to the state.
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
is attempting to wipe out the Uyghur language and culture, and that it
has detained and executed thousands of Uyghurs in secret. Uyghurs in
the diaspora call for greater independence and self-determination rights
for Xinjiang—although Kadeer has deliberately sidestepped the issue of
independence.67
It is also true that ethnic tensions appear to have worsened throughout
the 2000s, particularly between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. This culminated
in the Urumqi riots that broke out in July 2009, killing 197 people (mostly
Han) and injuring 1700. These riots stemmed from Han-Uyghur tensions
generally, but were sparked by an incident of possible "cultural misunder
standing" a few weeks earlier in Guangdong Province in southern China,
when a factory ex-employee alleged that
six Uyghurs had raped two Han workers From the pojnt of vjew
at the factory." of the Uyghurs, the
What to make of all this! According ^ critjca| is8ue is
to Ogden, the threat perceived by the
T — * j , K , j Chinese government s
Uyghurs does not have as much to do T ,
with territory or dreams of independence »«PP™?»»" <>» cu
per se, but rather with the extinction of a religious fr
their culture.69 It has been suggested that
Beijing is suspicious of the Islamic character of the Uyghur id
thus more willing to repress its traditions or allow the cultural u
to erode, in part by facilitating the migration of Han Chinese to
ince.70 Meanwhile, Muslims in Xinjiang perceive the government
as state interference in religious worship and a deliberate campai
Uyghur culture. In Ogden's words:
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
Ethnic conflict with the local Han, ineffective policies for Xinjiang's
development, and incompetent Han cadres in the party and state leader
ship (few of whom ever bother to learn the Uyghur language) are at the
root of Uyghur antagonism toward the Chinese state and the desire for
independence. Uyghurs also resent the fact that the income of the Han
is so much higher than their own, that the Han enjoy advantages denied
to the Uyghurs, that there are so many Han migrants, and that Beijing is
exploiting Xinjiang's considerable mineral wealth to develop the rest of
China without enriching Xinjiang itself.73
In line with this viewpoint, the increasing intensity of the Uyghur problem
can be seen to be self-inflicted. Though deeply speculative, it is a worthy
question to ask whether Uyghur terrorism would even exist if Chinese
policy in Xinjiang had been more sensitive to Uyghur culture.74
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
against Islamic militancy, including reports from state media sources that
China had destroyed an ETIM training camp in Xinjiang.76 Perhaps the
most dramatic effect of 9/11 was the government's decision to publicize its
confrontation with the Uyghurs. Previously, Beijing had been tight-lipped
about specific terrorist attacks in Xinjiang that had intensified throughout
the 1990s, culminating in the wave of attacks in 1997.77 In contrast to
then, China was now waging a full-scale media campaign against Uyghur
separatism, framing the effort as an important front of the global war against
terror worthy of Western support.
The aforementioned East Turkestan report released by the Chinese
government less than a year after the September 11 attacks was among
the most critical of these public awareness efforts. In this document, the
government alleges that East Turkestan
terrorist forces were responsible for over
Uyghurs widely are
200 acts of terrorism that killed 162 and
dissatisfied with the
injured 440 throughout the 1990s and
rampant corruption
early 2000s.78 The government contends
and incompetence they
that Uyghur separatist groups grew sur
perceive in the provincial
passingly vicious throughout the 1990s.
government.
This following passage is illustrative of
this point:
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The document alleges that Uyghur terrorist forces carried out explosions,
assassinations, attacks on police and government officials, crimes of poison
and arson, and "establishing secret training bases." It details several terror
ist incidents under subheadings for each of these accusations. The name
of a separatist group called the East Turkestan Liberation Organization,
or ETLO, appears frequently. Western scholars on Xinjiang were familiar
with this group, which had been seen previously as the perfunctory front
for Uyghur separatist violence inside Xinjiang.
However, the government also alleged the involvement of a heretofore
unknown separatist organization, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
More startling, the report accused ETIM of having direct terrorist links
to Osama bin Laden:
The "East Turkistan" terrorist organization based in South Asia has the
unstinting support of Osama bin Laden, and is an important part of his
terrorist forces. The "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" [ETIM] headed
by Hasan Mahsum is supported and directed by bin Laden. Since the
formation of the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement," bin Laden has
schemed with the heads of the Central and West Asian terrorist organiza
tions many times to help the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces in Xinjiang
launch a "holy war," with the aim of setting up a theocratic "Islam state"
in Xinjiang.80
The document accused ETIM of having held meetings with al Qaeda and
having received from al Qaeda financial support, arms and ammunition,
and transportation and telecommunications equipment. It also alleged that
al Qaeda had directly trained "East Turkistan personnel" at bin Laden's
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Finally, it asserted that ETIM cells
were operating in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Chechnya, an
accusation China would repeat in a separate report to the United Nations.81
For Xinjiang specialists, the report provided a groundswell of new
allegations and links into the murky world of Uyghur separatism inside
Xinjiang. Among the most controversial accusations was the alleged link
between ETIM and al Qaeda. Further media reports have shed some light
on the relationship between the two groups. In 2004, a Uyghur activist
named Abdullah Kariaji, the alleged vice chairman of ETIM, told the Wall
Street Journal that ETIM members had met bin Laden in 1997, where they
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Two things can be ascertained from this video. The first is that the more
radicalized Uighur have begun to adopt the jihadi tactics, if not ideology.
The second is that the Chinese government is running out of time if it
wants to contain the Uighur struggle.92
Gunaratna and Pereire also assert that the ETIM was responsible for numer
ous terrorist attacks, including assassinations and explosions, going back to
1996—more than five years before the Chinese government acknowledged
its existence in the East Turkestan report.93 As recently as 2008 Gunaratna,
who has been widely quoted in newspapers about terrorism in Xinjiang,
reported that the ETIM is based in Pakistan, is under the protection of al
Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, and has adopted the ideology of global
jihad.94
Beijing has a long history of falsifying data, [experts] say, and since
September 11 the Chinese have repeatedly tried to paint their own
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
These scholars argue that the government has overstated the relative threat
posed by the ETIM, and that those purporting a connection between the
ETIM and al Qaeda too often have based their arguments on an uncritical
reading of China's claims. Clarke, for example, has scrutinized the specific
incidents of violence provided in the East Turkestan report, and found
that the number of dead and injured is substantially less than the figures
previously reported.96 He also argues that Gunaratna and Pereire exagger
ate ETIM's weapons and resource capabilities, its ties with al Qaeda, and
its terroristic activity to date.97 Millward
is also critical of Gunaratna and Pereire,
noting that they appear to rely primarily SC 0 arS ar9ue
on China's "East Turkestan" report, and that the government has
not independent sources.98 Millward sepa- overstated the relative
rately points out that the East Turkestan threat posed by the
report, through frequent use of generic ETIM, and that those
terminology such as "East Turkestan purporting a connection
forces," seems to suggest that all terroris- between the ETIM and
tic activity in the report was the work "of al Qaeda too often have
a single, unified terrorist organization"; based their arguments
however, a closer reading of the report on an uncritical reading
reveals that this is not the case.99 Finally, of China's claims,
he assesses that the report, and related
government documents, are wholly unreliable, containing "much inaccu
rate, questionable, and contradictory reporting and slanting conclusions
reflecting ulterior agendas."100 Gladney is similarly critical of Wang's case
study; he criticizes that Wang "seemingly takes the earlier reports regarding
ETIM at face value, and does not refer to any historical or political studies
by specialists on Xinjiang or the Uyghur."101
Shichor and Gladney both point out obvious disparities in China's
stated views on Xinjiang before and after September 11, underscoring
the amount of framing that was taking place.102 Just days before 9/11,
Xinjiang's Communist Party secretary stated that the destructive activities
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
Second, the ambitions and objectives of Uyghurs are not consistent with
those of Islamic jihadist groups. In particular, the case can be made that
Uyghur separatists are motivated not by religious fanaticism or ideologi
cal fervor, but by nationalistic and separatist desires. Too often, scholars
have taken for granted that Muslim Uyghurs possess jihadist intentions,
without citing hard evidence of any true Uyghur predisposition to jihad
ist motivations. While many point to the fact that certain Uyghur groups,
including alleged members of the ETIM, trained in Afghanistan and even
met bin Laden during the 1990s, there remain many "unknowns" about
this relationship, including whether the two groups trained together or
operated independently, if their training camps were shared, the type of
training that al Qaeda provided the Uyghurs and, perhaps most impor
tantly, if the lessons imparted were ideological as well as tactical. One such
example is a book chapter written by Christoffersen.111 Christoffersen makes
a number of good points about differing conceptions of Uyghur identity.
Christoffersen might overreach in asserting that Uyghur separatists who
trained in Afghanistan during the 1990s acquired "The darker side of [a
pan-Islamic] vision," which she later defines as the dream that Central
Asia could break away from non-Muslim Russian, Indian, and Chinese
domination and form a Central Asian caliphate.112 It is true that during the
1990s, some Uyghurs trained in Afghanistan and committed violent acts
against China. However, the evidence suggesting that large numbers of
Uyghurs identify with the establishment of a "caliphate" is not made clear.
Christoffersen also suggests that after their training, these Uyghurs returned
home to Xinjiang to "wage jihad in China."113 She does not, however, fully
explain her definition of the term "jihad" (another term, like "terrorism,"
that can be notorious for taking on different meanings), the relevance of
jihad to the so-called "pan-Islamic vision," or the exact connection of any of
this to the Uyghurs.114 So while Christoffersen's overall analysis of Uyghur
identity provides an intriguing commentary on the subject, her specific
references to connections between the Uyghurs and Islamic fundamental
ism might have profited from more specificity. More to the point of this
analysis, attributing the Uyghur presence in Afghanistan as clear evidence
of a jihadist link does not sufficiently explain the Uyghurs' motivation.
The position taken here is that there is little direct evidence to support
the argument that Uyghurs accept the tenets of Islamic fundamentalism, or
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
that groups like the ETIM are committed to jihadist goals such as defeating
the West or establishing a multi-state Islamic caliphate. More often, scholars
have found that Uyghurs have been stirred to action by their conviction
to establish an East Turkestan independent state for ethnic Uyghurs.115
For example, Chang argues that "The latest wave of Uighur separatism
has been inspired not by Osama bin Laden, but by the unraveling of the
Soviet Union, as militants seek to emulate the independence gained by
some Muslim communities in Central Asia."116 It is true that many Uyghurs
see their Islamism as central to their identity;117 and yet, there is not much
evidence to suggest that Uyghur nationalism crisscrosses or overlaps with
Islamic fundamentalist claims, or that other Chinese Muslims identify with
Uyghur nationalism. Instead, the nature of their campaign has taken on a
decidedly ethnic rather than religious orientation.
This is not to say or suggest that
all Uyghurs feel uniformly about their
Claims of a specific
identity and religion. Nor is this meant to
organizational link
deny that Uyghurs have adopted terror
between al Qaeda
ist tactics to pursue these goals; only that
and the ETIM have
their objectives do not closely resemble
never been sufficientlythose of Islamic fundamentalist groups
demonstrated.
like al Qaeda. As Ogden makes clear, "for
those Uyghurs who have engaged in ter
rorism, they are not motivated by religious fanaticism but, rather, a desire
to achieve a concrete, pragmatic goal: Xinjiang's secession from China."118
It is notable that when the Uyghur detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were
questioned intensively, according to their transcripts, they did not profess
Islamic fundamentalist views, but rather, they admitted to fighting for "East
Turkestan's independence."119 It is also worth noting that in conducting
interviews with hundreds of Uyghurs, Bovingdon found that, prior to 2002,
the "more practical Uyghurs" believed that outside intervention was neces
sary "and that they hoped it would come from the United States"—hardly
the average mindset found in a culture supportive of AI Qaeda.120
Third, it has never been sufficiently demonstrated that a substantive orga
nizational link between al Qaeda and the ETIM exists. From the evidence
available, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusion about relations
between the two organizations. Clarke concludes that most evidence
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
suggesting "clear and significant links" between the ETIM and al Qaeda
or the Taliban are at best "circumstantial and fragmentary."121 It is true
that some Uyghur terrorist groups at one point may have received some
financing from terrorist organizations in the Islamic world. It is also true
that some Uyghur separatists allegedly were allowed to train in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, where they received limited arms training.122 But there is not
good evidence that ETIM and al Qaeda sustained a formalized relation
ship, beyond Kariachi's claim that Uyghur separatist leaders met with bin
Laden and received permission to open training camps in 1997, four years
before the September 11 attacks.123 Even as it concerns the presence of the
Guantanamo Bay Uyghurs in Afghanistan, Clarke raises the possibility that
they were forced to live there as a result of China's crackdown on separatist
activists, or that they were simply in transit to other Central Asian states at
the time of their detainment. Clarke notes that some of the Uyghur detain
ees that were released have told journalists that they fled to Afghanistan
nearly a decade ago because Afghanistan was the only neighboring country
at the time that wasn't returning Uyghurs back to China.124
Clarke's arguments are interesting if also speculative; however, critics
of the ETIM-al Qaeda connection theory can perhaps find firmer ground
when comparing al Qaeda and ETIM tactics. For the most part (at least
according to what is known), attributed ETIM attacks have not tactically
resembled or imitated attacks by al Qaeda or other well-known jihadist
groups. There have been no reliable reports of suicide bombings.125 In the
case of ETIM-alleged attacks, civilian casualties, so much a trademark of
al Qaeda attacks, have not been high in number; in fact it has been argued
that the timing and location of ETIM attacks suggest that the attackers
intentionally were aiming to limit the number of civilian casualties.126 Given
these tactical dissimilarities, it is problematic to suggest that ETIM members
received extensive training at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
A possible exception to this argument was the occurrence of bus explosions
in Kunming and Shanghai in July 2008. Responsibility for this attack was
claimed by a group called the Turkestan Islamic Party, a possible successor
group to the ETIM. For its part, the Chinese government actually denied
that those explosions were related to terroristic activity.127
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
To the Chinese state, caution was the appropriate response in the face of
a threat. This is not wholly out of the ordinary. It can be stated plainly
enough that most European states traditionally have thought defensively
about internal threats of terrorism or separatism; for example, Britain's
reaction to the breakout of ethnic violence in Northern Ireland in the
1970s, or Spain's approach to separatists in the Basque region. While the
pervasiveness of acting cautiously does not justify China's treatment of the
Uyghurs or its exaggerated claims about the ETIM, it does add context
that is necessary to understand China's decision-making.
There are also material reasons for the state's cautious approach to
Xinjiang in the form of China's many economic and security interests.
Expanding into Central Asia, China has opened six overland routes since
1991 running directly through Xinjiang and connecting the region with
other Turkestan states. Connections with these states offer new economic
opportunities to China, but these states also possess their own Muslim
populations sympathetic to the Uyghurs. Beijing is wary of sympathetic
groups in other states supporting Uyghur militants from the outside.
China also fears that unrest in Xinjiang would lead to a decline in outside
oil investment, jeopardize infrastructure construction, or decrease other
forms of foreign investment. China's leaders worry that separatism, if not
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The problem is that some of the Xinjiang activists do in fact use violence
to achieve their goals. Distinguishing between genuine counterterror
ism and the repression of minority rights can thus be difficult, as can be
determining which acts of terrorism are "international" and which are
purely domestic.131
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
It thus far has been asserted that China has overstated the relati
posed by the ETIM, as well as its supposed links to al Qaeda. H
the Urumqi riots demonstrated, the potential for social unrest in
is very real, and therefore the threat of terrorism in the gener
originating from individuals, a different organization, or other
cannot be discounted. This is not to suggest that Beijing wi
major challenges to its control in Xinjiang; that is unlikely.132 N
the circumstances under which organized terrorist activity co
are obviously important to the government and to internatio
ers. This article ends by contemplating four conditions that w
violent Uyghur separatist groups to endure or even flourish in X
will assess the likelihood of each condition.
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
Although the Chinese security forces and the intelligence service have been
effective against ETIM and other groups by conducting numerous arrests
and clampdowns, the Uighur militants' presence overseas—from Central
Asia to West Asia and in Europe—is enabling the groups to survive. ETIM
has emulated groups, such as the Chechen terrorists, to exploit Western
human rights and humanitarian concerns.139
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COUNTERTERROR1SM IN XINJIANG
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
to feel that its security is threatened is when its "we" identity is perceived
to be in danger, whether this is objectively the case or not. It is therefore
possible that a wide range of state actions, "from restrictions on the use of
language or dress, control or closure of places of education and worship,
to the deportation or killing of members of the community," could foster
new violence and radicalize the Uyghurs.145 Elsewhere, Ogden identifies
general conditions that allow terrorism to thrive. In perusing through this
list, at least three stand out as applicable to the way that Uyghurs perceive
the way they are treated: 1 ) an ethnic, national, or religious group perceives
a regime is treating it unjustly or exploitatively, 2) a victim group feels
oppressed by a majority group and that it has lost land, its language, and/
or its right to religious and ethnic practices, and 3) the regime does not
allow group members to speak freely and often jails or executes its members.
Nevertheless, the list is expansive and includes several other conditions not
applicable. Ogden only introduces it as a starting point to her own discus
sion; its significance should not be overplayed.146
Human Security theory as applied by Clarke, and to a lesser extent
the conditions under which terrorism thrives, provide a more credible
lens through which to view China's treatment of the Uyghurs. The strike
hard campaigns implemented by the government in the 1990s, followed
by multiple crackdowns and arrests rounding up suspected terrorist sub
jects, have poisoned the relationship between Uyghurs and the Chinese
state. Amnesty International has reported that these roundups have led to
hurried trials and summary executions of large numbers of Uyghurs. One
estimate suggests Xinjiang has the highest number of executions in all of
China, most of them Uyghurs, averaging 1.8 per week.147 The following
description of a scene in Xinjiang, in the run-up to the Beijing Olympic
Games, offers a glimpse of the extent to which the government conducts
itself in Xinjiang as a "heavy" presence:
In the build-up to the games and particularly since these latest incidents
[i.e. the pre-Olympic attacks attributed to the ETIM], residents of Kashgar
and Kuqa say many suspected of militancy have been arrested. Helmeted
police cruise the streets of Kuqa at night in open-topped jeeps. A driver
in Kashgar erupts with a tirade against China's leaders—as "fascists" who
do nothing but "bully" Uyghurs.148
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
[The Chinese government] cannot ignore the minzu areas since disparities
of income and social opportunity will breed resentment against the Han
majority and increase pressures for self-government. Alternatively by imple
menting a development strategy that requires a large influx of majority
population, many of whom will have higher levels of education and better
economic connections than the minzu populations, they will create a dual
economic and social structure with strongly ethnicized characteristics.154
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CONCLUSION
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Notes
* I thank Suzanne Ogden, David Schmitt, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful
comments. This article was first researched and written in fall 2009 and spring 2010, and has
since been updated.
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
16. For more detail on this movement and more generally Xinjiang in the 1920s
and 1930s see Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords & Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A
Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986).
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
17. Gladney, "Islam in China," p. 456. The ETR was supported from the
beginning by the Soviet Union, which has led some to argue that the episode
represented less a rebellion or revolution than it did an incident engineered by the
Soviets. In this respect see David D. Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: the Tininß
Incident (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999).
18. David Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow; John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan
Islamic Movement," p. 573.
19. Michael Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang: Human Security
and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism," Terrorism and Political Violence,
20 (2008): p. 276.
20. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China."
21. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang,
China," Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35, no. 1 (2008): p. 17.
22. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 276. Another scholar
describes the Catch-22 for the Chinese government thusly: "Government religious
reforms were intended to quell Uyghur disaffection with Chinese rule and cause
Uyghurs to develop more harmonious sentiments for the Han Chinese. However,
the Chinese [were] caught in a dilemma: when they allow or encourage it, Uyghurs
become more content with the government but their strengthened Islamic practice
leads them to feel more separate from and apathetic towards Chinese society." See
Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyjjhur Nationalism along China's Silk Road
(New York: Colombia University Press, 1997): pp. 47-8.
23. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 276.
24. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 15.
25. Michael E. Clarke, "Xinjiang in the 'Reform' Era, 1978-91 : The Political
and Economic Dynamics of Dengist Integration, Issues & Studies, 43, 2 (2007):
pp. 39-72. Credit is also due to an anonymous reviewer in strengthening this
particular point.
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
29. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror,'" pp. 10-11. Chung is careful to note,
however, that Beijing was uncomfortable about the interventionist precedents
set by the United States campaign in Afghanistan, precedents that the Chinese
government has generally opposed. See p. 10.
30. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 17.
31. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror,'" p. 11.
32. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism."
33. Christian Tyler, Wild West China (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 2003): pp. 244-245. Some suspect that the Bush administration acquiesced
to China's position on the ETIM because of the need for getting Chinese support
in the looming conflict with Iraq. See also Mackerass 2005, pp. 12-13
34. See Dru C. Gladney, "Xinjiang," in Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey S.
Murer, eds., Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism (New York: Taylor and Francis,
2006): p. 234 and footnote 36.
35. James Millward, "Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence
Mark a Turning Point?" Central Asian Survey, 28, no. 4 (2009): p. 348; Gardner
Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia
University Press): p. 112.
36. The title of this document has been translated elsewhere as "East
Turkistan Terrorist Forces Exposed."
37. Economist, "Chinastan," September 6: p. 54.
38. Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, p. 136.
39. John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 568.
40. Ibid.
44. The nature and source of this attack has been widely disputed.
Chinese government has produced little evidence proving that the attac
indeed the work of Uyghur terrorists. Additionally, video of the attack tak
a bystander at the scene, which appears to show two men of Han Chinese
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
than Uyghur descent at work, casts further doubt on the government's claims.
For more on the disputed nature of this case, see Edward Wong, "Doubt Arises
in Account of an Attack in China," New Tork Times, September 29, 2008: A5.
45. Michael Wines, "Deadly Violence Strikes Chinese City Racked by
Ethnic Tensions," New Tork Times, August 1,2011 : A3; "Chinese Police Kill Two
Suspects in Xinjiang Violence," New Tork Times, August 2, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/08/03/world/asia/03brief-kashgar.html (July 3, 2012);
Marianne Barriaux, "China Blames Unrest on Pakistan-Trained 'Terrorists,'"
Agence France-Presse, July 31,2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/
article/ALeqM5iz6noUEGx2847p7_Jwqnwx7fHLhg (July 3, 2012).
46. See Gladney, "Xinjiang"; Chung, "China's War on Terror"; Christian
Tyler, Wild West China: the Taming of Xinjiang (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2003).
47. Rohan Gunaratna and Kenneth George Pereire, "An AI Qaeda Associate
Group Operating in China?" China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4 no. 2 (2006):
p. 56.
48. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror,'" p. 11.
49. Robin Wright, "Chinese Detainees Are Men Without a Country,"
Washington Post, August 24,2005: p. A01. In point of fact, the detainees endured
a complicated legal path toward their release because the US has chosen not to
send them back to China but has refused to allow them to enter the United States
and has had difficulty finding other countries to accept them. Following relocations
of several of the detainees to Sweden, Bermuda and Palau, there are five detainees
who remain incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay at this time.
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59. Ibid.
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parenthood and other social affairs, with the aim of carrying out separatist and
sabotage activities."
71. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China," p. 232.
72. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 21.
73. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China," p. 232.
74. Ibid., p. 247.
75. Economist, "Chinastan," p. 54; Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in
Xinjiang," p. 294.
76. See "Police Destroy Islamist Camp, Killing 18," China Daily, January
8, 2007. Cited in Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 21.
77. In fact it was illegal even to mention the term "East Turkestan" prior to
the release of the East Turkestan report. See Gladney, "Xinjiang," p. 226.
78. Information Office of the State Council of People's Republic of China.
2002. "East Turkistan" Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.
Government Report. January 21, 2002, http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml (March 29, 2010).
79. Information Office 2002, section I, para. 8.
80. Information Office 2002, section III, para. 6
81. John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 577.
82. David S. Cloud and Ian Johnson, "Friend or Foe: In Post-9/11 World.
Chinese Dissidents Pose US Dilemma," Wall Street Journal. Cited in Clarke,
"China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 293.
83. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," pp. 293-294.
84. Ibid., p. 283.
85. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 23.
86. John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 574.
87. In point of fact, Wang provides little evidence for his assertion that a
high number of Uyghurs join the mujahedeen.
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111. Gaye Christoffersen, "Islam and Ethnic Minorities in Central Aisa: The
Uyghurs," in Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azizian, eds., Islam,Oil, and
Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11 (Lanham: Rowan and littlefield, 2007):
pp. 45-59.
112. Ibid., p. 52.
113. Ibid., p. 54.
114. Ibid. She later references "reliable reports" that Islamists have been
"known to lop off' the heads of Han PLA soldiers and place them on stakes along
roads in Xinjiang, but it is not clear if the reference to brutal methods is meant to
qualify her use of the term "jihad"; she also does not identify the source of these
reports.
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certain individuals tied to al Qaeda demonstrates that the ETIM and al Qaeda
are affiliated organizationally and ideologically, and that the ETIM poses a direct
threat to American interests.
127. Jim Yardley and Ian Urbina, "China Doubts Bus Blasts are Linked
to Separatists," New Tork Times, July 27, 2008: http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/27/world/asia/27bus.html (March 29, 2010).
128. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," p. 11.
129. Gladney, "Islam in China," p. 459.
130. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," pp. 8-10. In
this respect, Clarke points out that the exchange of views between Uyghurs and
the government takes on a cyclical quality. Uyghurs see the government as using
the war against terrorism as a means of "eroding" their culture and religion. The
government, of course, claims its crackdown is not directed at any ethnic group,
religion or culture, but at criminal activity, and that cracking down on this activity
will serve the interests of Xinjiang's different ethnic groups. The Uyghurs then
insist that the root cause of violent activity is the government's harsh and repressive
policies, which the government discounts by contending that any separatist move
ment is considered treason thereby justifying harsh measures, including policies
restricting the activities of Uyghurs or the execution of pro-independence activists.
See Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 279.
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138. Gunaratna and Pereire, "An Al-Qaeda Associate Group," p. 58. Pereire
also accuses diaspora groups of placing members in Europe to study the tactics
and technologies of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in Iraq. See Pereire, "Jihad in
China," p. 2.
139. Pereire, "Jihad in China," p. 3.
140. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror,'" p. 9.
141. Gladney "Islam in China," p. 458. On the same page, Gladney also notes
that "the growing influence of'cyber-separatism' and international popularization
of the Uyghur cause concerns Chinese authorities, who hope to convince the world
that the Uyghurs do pose a real domestic and international terrorist threat."
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150. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," pp. 13-14,
16.
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