SPOUSES ALCANTARA v SPOUSES BELEN (April 25, 2017) that the CA incorrectly applied the law on land titles.
y applied the law on land titles. The appellate court
J. Sereno
Rule 45 Petition assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and
Resolution, which reversed the Decision of the RTC. The RTC granted the
entreaty of petitioner spouses Elvira and Edwin Alcantara for the quieting of
title and reconveyance of possession of Lot No. 16932 occupied by respondent
spouses Florante Belen and Zenaida Ananias.
2005, Spouses Alcantara filed before the RTC a Complaint against Spouses
Belen for the quieting of title, reconveyance of possession, and accounting of
harvest with damages. Petitioners argued that their neighbors, respondents
herein, had extended the latter's possession up to the land titled to Spouses
Alcantara, and usurped the harvests therefrom. Spouses Alcantara claimed
that they were the registered owners and Elvira traced her ownership to her
inheritance from her mother, Asuncion Alimon. In addition to the TCT,
spouses Alcantara also presented tax declarations of the property registered
to them, receipts, and other payments for real property taxes.
On the strength of a sales agreement called Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng
Lupa, respondents countered Spouses Alcantara's claims over the property.
Spouses Belen alleged that they bought the property from its prior owners.
Even though respondents did not have any certificate of title over the
property, they supported their claim of ownership with various Tax
Declarations under the name of their predecessors-in-interest. They also attack
the OCT of Asuncion Alimon claiming that fraud attended the issuance of a
Free Patent to her, considering that the Belens had occupied the property ever
since.
RTC gave more weight to petitioners’ evidence and declared them as the
absolute owners. It also went on to conclude that spouses Belen were claiming
a different lot.
On appeal to the CA, it declared that Asuncion Alimon was not a possessor or
cultivator of the subject land, a fact that voided the Free Patent issued to her,
as well as the resulting OCT and TCT. The appellate court additionally held
that Elvira Alcantara was not a legal heir of Asuncion Alimon.
The SC upheld the RTC that spouses Belen were laying claim over a different
lot from that owned by the spouses Alcantara. Even assuming that the Tax
Declarations of respondents pertain to the subject property, this Court finds
should not have set aside the RTC's appreciation of the certificate of title
registered to Spouses Alcantara just because Spouses Belen presented their
Tax Declarations. Based on established jurisprudence, we rule that the
certificate of title of petitioners is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their
ownership of the property. The irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses Belen
cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of Spouses Alcantara, as it is binding and
conclusive upon the whole world.
These Tax Declarations, together with the certificate of title presented by
petitioners, support their claims over Lot No. 16932. Therefore, the CA
incorrectly disposed of the property in favor of respondents, considering the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title submitted as evidence by petitioners.
petitioners.
Indubitably, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is
to quiet title to land and put stop forever to any question as to the legality of
the title. The CA went beyond the contents of the TCT and concluded that its
issuance was a nullity. It went on to declare the Free Patent issued to Asuncion
Alimon void and ruled that Elvira Alcantara was not a lawful heir of Asuncion
Alimon.
In Bagayas v. Bagayas, this Court reiterated that courts must refrain from
making a declaration of hcirship in an ordinary civil action because "matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights." Straightforwardly, the CA is precluded from determining the issue of
filiation in a proceeding for the quieting of title and accion reivindicatoria.
There is no allegation on record that, as regards the parties, a special
proceeding was instituted but was finally closed and terminated. In the
proceedings before the R TC, none of the parties exhaustively presented
evidence regarding the issue of filiation, save for the above-cited testimony of
Margarito Belarmino. Neither did the trial court make any pronouncement as
regards that issue. Given, therefore, the dearth of evidence and discussion on
filiation a quo, the CA should not have adjudicated the status of Elvira
Alcantara as a legitimate daughter or an adopted child in succeeding to the
rights of Asuncion Alimon.
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 1

CA reversed.
HERNAEZ JR v IAC (May 7, 1992)
J. Nocon
This petition seeks to review the decision of the IAC which held as void the
decision of the RTC declaring Teodoro Palmes Hernaez, Jr as the recognized
natural child of Teodoro Hernaez and entitled to P400 monthly support.
September 2, 1980, petitioner represented by his mother Evelyn Palmes, filed
a complaint with the then Juvenile and Domestic Court (now RTC) against
Teodoro Hernaez for acknowledgment and support with support pendente lite.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and awarded support as well as
attorney’s fees.
Teodoro Hernaez received the decision on May 31, 1984 and filed a notice of
appeal on June 29, 1984. This was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15
days under Sec 39 of BP 129. Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the decision has become final and executory.
Hernaez filed a Motion to Give Due Course to Appeal or Petition for Relief
which was denied for being filed out of time and not having complied with
Sec 3 of Rule 38. Through his new counsel, he filed another Petition for Relief
from Judgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of the lower
court. His wife and 6 children like wise filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with Motion to Intervene because they were not included as parties.
These motions were denied for lack of merit and because the decision has
already become final and executory.
Private respondents appealed, which was granted. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration which was also granted.
Private respondents filed a motion for clarification. The RTC said there is no
need for clarification.
Petitioner filed a motion to require Hernaez to deposit support in arrears or to
be cited for contempt.
During the hearing for the contempt, respondents’ counsel requested for 10
days within which to comply but instead filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an action for annulment of
judgment with preliminary injunction with the IAC. The IAC declared the
RTC’s decision null and void for lack of summons by publication being an
action in rem.
Petition thus instituted this Petition for Review contending that publication is
not necessary since it is not one of the instances cited in Sec 1 of Rule 72
requiring publication before jurisdiction can be acquired by the court.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The SC finds merit in the petition.
An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among
cases of special proceedings mentioned in Sec 1, Rule 72. Thus, such an action
should be governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions.
The case does not fall under Rule 105 since it applies only to cases under Art
281 of the Civil Code where there has been voluntary recognition, which is
absent in this case.
Respondent’s claim that notice of the action should also be given to the wife
and legitimate children of the putative parent is unmeritorious. First, in a case
for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same
is the putative parent himself. Second, implicit in both Arts 283 and 285 of the
Civil Code is the general rule that an action for compulsory recognition should
be brought against the putative father, except when the putative parent died
during the minority of the child, or when after the death a document should
appear which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child, in which cases the action is brought against the putative
parent’s heirs.
An action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Service of
summons on the putative parent is provided under Rule 14.
CA reversed.
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 2

CHING v RODRIGUEZ (November 28. 2011)
J. Reyes
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA’s decision
and resolution affirming the orders of the RTC.
Respondents filed a complaint against Stronghold Insurance, Global Business
Bank, Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Registers of
Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all other persons claiming rights or titles
from Ramon Ching and his successors-in-interest.
The complaint was captioned as one for Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity
of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of
[a] TRO and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondents’ causes of action:
First. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching.
Respondents Joseph and Jaime Cheng are allegedly the children of Antonio
with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne. Respondent Lucina
Santos claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The
respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and
Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate
was merely simulated. Antonio later died of a stab wound and Ramon was
identified as the prime suspect and he is now at large. From the foregoing
circumstances and upon the authority of Article 919 of the New Civil Code
(NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited,
hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second. Prior to the conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon as
the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an inventory of
the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real estate
properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally
transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two
other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which
were in Ramon's possession.
Third. Mercedes was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a
Global Bank Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of
Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium which were
registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to
Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete
shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing, from the estate of Antonio. Ramon
had convinced them to execute an Agreement and a Waiver which
stipulated the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the
amount of P22,000,000.00 but were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not
informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not received any
amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the latter's
total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name
through a forged document of sale. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in
Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the
latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished
into thin air through Ramon's machinations.
Fifth. Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of
the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new TCTs covering eight
real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to
the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to
post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may
eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant
Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant
Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part
of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at
an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose
of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's
estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate
of Antonio.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss alleging forum shopping,
litis pendentia, res judicata, and the respondent are not real parties in interest.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
The respondents filed an amended complaint impleading Metrobank as
successor-in-interest of Global Bank. They also added a seventh cause of action
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 3
asking to be declared as the owners of the CPPA issued by Philbank to
Antonio. The RTC admitted the amended complaint.
Petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim. RTC issued a
pre-trial order.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint alleging lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC because the suit partakes of the nature of a special
proceeding (declaration of heirs, disinheritance) and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss saying that the
action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties described
which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action.
As their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the petition saying that the allegations
were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The nullification of
the subject documents could be achieved in a civil case.
The petitioners thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. The
SC resolves to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing
them to file their reply to the respondents’ Comment/Opposition to the
instant Petition.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
partake of the nature of a special proceeding.
Disinheritance can be effected only through a will. Thus, while the
respondents sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will effecting it was ever
mentioned. Thus, it does not partake of a special proceeding and does not call
for the probate court’s exercise of limited jurisdiction.
The respondent’s prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes’
prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not
on the declaration of their status as Antonio’s heirs. Even without the necessity
of being declared as heirs, the respondents have standing to seek nullification
of the instruments in light of their claims that there was no consideration for
their execution and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed
fraud against them.
The nullification of the documents could be achieved in an ordinary civil
action. The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may
not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter
still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to
have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking
cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues
raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be
threshed out in a special proceeding.
Petition denied.
REPUBLIC v CA and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC (May 6, 2005)
J. Carpio-Morales
RTC granted the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente Jomoc filed by Apolinaria Jomoc. The trial judge cited Art
41, par 2 of the Family Code which provides that for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse
present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Notice of Appeal. Noting that no
record of appeal was filed and served as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a),
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special
proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of
disapproval having been denied, it filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple
or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal. It held:
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration
of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 4
 court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition
is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or
decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by
filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the
instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the
trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente
Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of
right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that
the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared
presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent
marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary proceeding,
following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. There is no
doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under
the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on
Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
CA reversed.
SHEKER v ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER (December 13, 2007)
J. Austria-Martinez
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. Petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission
due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of
certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00,
as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner
in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate
on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach
a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach
a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the money claim based on the said
grounds. Petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not
entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern
special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum
shopping? The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and
other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money
claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present
case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 5
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion
for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the
proper disposition of the properties of the estate. A money claim is only an
incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a
separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require
a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that
the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against
an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her
in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket
fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the
payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court
had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the
estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against
the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the
estate.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City,
while counsel for respondent and the RTC are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance and realized that
it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation may be considered as
superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section
11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of
substantial justice
Petition granted.
HILADO v CA (May 8, 2009)
J. Tinga
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May
2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto, and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of
his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. The first was then pending with the RTC Bacolod with petitioner
Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second was then pending
with the RTC Bacolod with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
Julita was appointed as administrator and she included in the inventory of
liabilities the above civil cases.
Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of her husband. RTC denied the
manifestation/motion.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed it.
Hence, they filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. The settlement
of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings
under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72
further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings
filed by the administrator of the estate. We are mindful of respondent’s
submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a
creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be.
Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court
processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 6
contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and
orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by this Court. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes, the The Court ruled that
petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court records in the
intestate proceedings. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to
the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent
than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require
notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will
be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to
interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time
and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing
for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,
the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 82. All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners
should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
Petition denied, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such
notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
HAGANS v WISLIZENUS (September 13, 1920)
J. Johnson
Original petition for a writ of certiorari presented in the Supreme Court.
The only question is whether or not a judge of the CFI in special proceedings
is authorized to appoint assessors to fix the amount due to an administrator
or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
Respondent judge, in his demurrer, argues that Act No. 190 permits him to
appoint assessors in special proceedings. The petitioner contends otherwise.
Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit
the appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of
Act No. 190. Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in
writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such
application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is
expressly authorized by said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find,
upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, that a distinction is made
between an "action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an
"action" means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every other remedy
furnished by law is a 'special proceeding." In view of the interpretation given
to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature itself, we are
driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a
"special proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it
did not mean "special proceeding."
"An action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying
legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact Illustrations of special
proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings for the
appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to
perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for
admission to the bar, etc., etc.
We are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge
of the CFI is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer
is hereby overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 7
hereby ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge appointing
the assessors described in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and
set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
VDA DE MANALO v CA (January 16, 2001)
J. De Leon, Jr.
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife Pilar and their 11
children. Respondents, who are 8 of the children, filed a petition with the RTC
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate and for the appointment of their
brother Romeo as administrator. The trial court set it for hearing, directing the
publication of the order for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila and directing service by registered mail upon the
heirs named. The trial court issued an order of default which it later set aside.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through
counsel, culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion seeking: (1) to set
aside and reconsider the Order which denied the motion for additional
extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their
affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and
(4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition only for the purpose of considering
the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative
defenses said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over their persons
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator for hearing
The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.
They contend that: (1) venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) share of the surviving spouse as
included in the intestate proceedings; (4) absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise; (5) no certification of non-forum shopping. CA dismissed the
petition.
The only issue raised is whether or not the respondent CA erred in upholding
the questioned orders of the RTC which denied their motion for the outright
dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of
the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of
the petition but that the same have failed. They aver that the petition is actually
an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out
that it contains certain averments which, according to them, are indicative of
its adversarial nature (how Antonio Manalo is managing the estate to his own
advantage).
The petitioners aver that the petition should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has
not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article
222 of the Civil Code (now 151 of the FC).
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
scrutiny of the petition belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on
February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of
his said death. These are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition also contains
an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (now
respondents) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo.
Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial
to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 8
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose
of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in
an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that
the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is
determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to
have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by
simple strategem. So, it should be in the instant petition for settlement of
estate.
Petitioners argue that even if the petition were to be considered as a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section
1(j) vis-a-vis Article 222 would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal
by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 which provides that the rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Petitioners contend that the term proceeding is so broad that it must
necessarily include special proceedings. The argument is misplaced.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035.
This provision is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another
in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law
affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether
at law or in equity. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to
make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to
breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.
Petitioners are not being sued for any cause of action as in fact no defendant
was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is
a remedy whereby they seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate
of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.
Petition denied.
NATCHER v CA (October 2, 2001)
J. Buena
May RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as
to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs? Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the decision of the CA which
reversed that of the RTC.
Spouses Graciano and Graciana were registered owners of a parcel of land.
Upon Graciana’s death, Graciano and his 6 children entered into an
extrajudicial settlement where Graciano received 8/14 and each child received
1/14. Graciano later donated most of his share to his children and was left with
447.6 sqm. This was divided into 2 lots, the first lot sold to a third person.
Graciano later married petitioner Natcher and during the marriage, sold to her
the 2nd of his 2 lots. Respondents then filed a complaint before the RTC Manila
alleging that Natcher employed fraud, misrepresentation, and forgery to make
it appear that Graciano executed the deed of sale and thus impaired their
legitimes.
The RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and that it is likewise an
invalid donation. However, it may be regarded as advanced inheritance to
Natcher.
The CA reversed the RTC, ruling that it is the probate court that has the
jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The SC concurs with the CA and finds no merit in the petition.
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 9
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding.
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application
of specific rule. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of
the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 9, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of
the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir. While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when
it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
The RTC in this case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority
to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of Natcher, inasmuch as the case for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. The RTC was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
The Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In
essence, it is procedural question "which may be waived". There is no waiver
on the part of respondents inasmuch as the 6 children even assailed the
authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner. This Court
has consistently enunciated the long-standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet
if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the
present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of
procedure governing the settlement of the estate (computing net estate,
legitime, etc) of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to
sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds
that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue
of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of
Graciano Del Rosario's estate.
CA affirmed.
II. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
A. Venue and Process
FULE v CA (Nov 29, 1976)
J. Martin
What the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
means.
Virginia Fule filed with the CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration
for the estate of Amado Garcia. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix. RTC granted.
Preciosa Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the order
appointing Virginia as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction.
She thus prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate.
Pending this, she filed a motion to remove Virginia as special administratrix
alleging that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading
and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia has adverse interest
against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix
and as officer of the court.
The notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the CFI Laguna was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 10
1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
Preciosa later received a “Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator” filed by Virginia which modified the original petition
in four aspects (allegation of Amado’s residence as Laguna, removal of
Preciosa’s name as heir, alleged spouse Carolina Carpio waiving rights in faor
of Virginia). The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by
Preciosa for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on
the CFI Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because
the original petition was deficient.
Preciosa filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions raising
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia in the estate, and
disqualification as special administratrix.
Virginia filed an omnibus motion. Praying for authority to take possession of
the properties as well as to secure cash advances. Preciosa opposed, saying
that the power of a special administratrix is limited to making an inventory.
RTC judge denied Preciosa’s motion for reconsideration and admitted the
supplemental petition of Virgnia. Judge also said that administratrix had
already been authorized in a previous order to take possession of all papers
and certificates of title with the Canlubang Sugar Planters.
During hearing, Virginia presented the death certificate showing Amado’s
residence at the time of his death as Quezon City. Preciosa presented the
residence certificate of Amado at the time of his death showing that 3 months
before his death, his residence was Quezon City.
Preciosa filed a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the CA to annul the proceedings or to vacate the
orders. CA annulled the proceedings.
Virginia’s motion for reconsideration being denied, she elevated to the SC on
appeal by certiorari.
Preciosa was then appointed as special administratrix in CFI Rizal. Virginia
thus filed a petition for certiorari with TRO. A restraining order was issued.
The SC dismissed both the appeal and the petition for certiorari. Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, […], in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, […].”
Section 2, Rule 79 demands that the petition should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege
all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is
relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of
kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate
and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73, specifically the clause "so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience
to the parties.
The far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it
refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules —
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 11
domicile in the technical sense. As generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia and Preciosa on the residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. Virginia claims his
residence is in Calamba, Laguna while Preciosa claims that it is in Quezon
City.
We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado was Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia
herself and also by Preciosa shows that his last place of residence was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained 3 months before his death;
the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of
Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of
titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents
that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia’s
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 states: "When improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us
the CA had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia as special
administratrix, Preciosa did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the CFI Laguna, but availed of a mere
practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse,
while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance
of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment
of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized
and the CFI Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and
instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the CFI QC for the
continuation of the proceedings.
Petitions denied.
EUSEBIO v EUSEBIO (Dec 28, 1956)
J. Concepcion
Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI Rizal a petition for his appointment as
administrator of his father’s estate, Andres. He died on Nov 28, 1952, residing,
according to the petition, in QC. Respondents opposed to the petition stating
that they are the illegitimate children and that Andres was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Court granted Eusebio’s petition. Respondents thus
appealed.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was,
and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had
his home, as well as some other properties. As his heart was in bad condition
and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided in QC, Andres bought
a house and lot in said City. He suffered a stroke while transferring his
belongings, for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his residence until
Andres was brought to the UST Hospital. Andres then contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said
hospital. He died 2 days later of heart failure at the age of 74. He never stayed
or even slept in the house he bought.
It being apparent that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over 70 years, the presumption is that he
retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 12
proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is
retained until a new domicile is gained". The following are conditions to
establish a new domicile: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Andres was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had
been in QC several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to
whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears
to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-
appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon. Moreover, said
appellee did not introduce the testimony of Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose
advice, presumably, the house and lot were purchased, and who, therefore,
might have cast some light on decedent’s purpose in buying said property.
This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay
permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.
The decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San
Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed
by virtue of which the QC house and lot was conveyed to him, less than a month
before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence.
The residence certificates used by the decedent in acknowledging said deed
before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the
marriage contract signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo
mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva 2 days prior to his demise, stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. At any rate, the presumption in favor of
the retention of the old domicile — which is particularly strong when the
domicile is one of the origin as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as
regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal
had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should,
accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's
petition.
CFI reversed.
JAO v CA (May 29, 2002)
J. Ynares-Santiago
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The
decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
Perico instituted a petition for letters of administration before the RTC QC and
later moved to be appointed as special administrator claiming that his brother
Rodolfo was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. Rodolfo moved for
the dismissal on the ground of improper venue claiming that their parents
resided in Angeles City, Pampanga. As their health deteriorated, they stayed
with Rodolfo in QC solely to obtain medical treatment.
Perico countered that the death certificates conclusively declare that their last
residence was in QC. Rodolfo filed a rejoinder claiming that he gave the
information on residence in good faith and honest mistake. Case was archived
for lack of response from both. RTC designated Justice Carlos Sundiam as
special administrator.
Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss was denied. He thus filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for review.
In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay
therein permanently. While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to
be physically present in QC for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they
never adopted QC as their permanent residence. The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different in that the decedent therein passed away
while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
QC. While he was able to acquire a house, he died even before he could
move. We ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence ---
in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his
residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in QC was just
temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred
to petitioner’s QC residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 13
respondents’ assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some
three to four years before they died in the late 1980s. The decedents respective
death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time
of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that
time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be
Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We
agree with the appellate courts observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over
their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the
time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at
the time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not
to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
to permanent residence or domicile.
Both the settlement court and the CA found that the decedents have been
living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior
thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on
record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents
physical presence in QC, but also other factors indicating that the decedents
stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial
showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous
apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule
4, Section 2, on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the
former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of
serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement
of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the
place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the
decedents properties are located. Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates
between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special
proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, residence, in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held
that venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly
laid in the QC court.
Petition denied.
MALIG v BUSH (May 31, 1969)
J. Makalintal
Appeal by the plaintiffs from CFI.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint, alleging that they were acknowledged natural
children and only heirs in the direct line of deceased John Bush with his
common-law wife Apolonia Perez. They allege that defendant, by falsely
alleging that she was the legal wife, secured her appointment as
administratrix. The defendant submitted a project of partition which excluded
the petitioners. Petitioners prayed to annul the project of partition.
Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata, and
statute of limitations. Petitioners opposed. The court denied the motion to
dismiss. Defendant filed her answer specifically denying all material
averments.
Defendant later filed a motion to dismiss claiming that it is only the probate
court which can take cognizance. CFI dismissed the complaint not on that
ground but because the action had prescribed.
May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion
to dismiss?
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 14
In the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and
statute of limitations, was denied because those grounds did not appear to the
court to be indubitable. The second motion reiterated none of those grounds
and raised only the question of jurisdiction. In dismissing the complaint upon
a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio, without
offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point. In fact, the court did not
even state in its order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why
in effect, without any evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed
its previous ruling that the ground of prescription was not indubitable.
In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it was held:
“The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may dismiss
upon the court's own motion an action is, when the 'plaintiff fails to appear at
the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.”
The foregoing ruling is applicable in this case, because although a motion to
dismiss had been presented defendant the resolution of the court granting the
same was based upon a ground not alleged in said motion. But assuming that
the lower court could properly consider the question of prescription anew, the
same still did not appear to be indubitable on the face of the allegations in the
complaint. The defendant cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides
that an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced
only during the lifetime of the putative parents. The said provision is not
applicable, since the plaintiffs do not seek acknowledgment but allege as a
matter of fact that they "are the acknowledged natural children and the only
heirs in the direct line of the late John T. Bush." Whether or not this allegation
is true will, of course, depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial.
The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground posed in her
motion to dismiss, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court formerly in
force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, […]
The foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter
really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to
preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing
so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts."
In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition
already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate
proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the
plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud,
they have been deprived.
Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant,
this Court believes that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without
a hearing on the merits.
CFI reversed.
MALOLES II v PHILLIPS (Jan 31, 2000)
J. Mendoza
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of CA which ruled
that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr.
Arturo de Santos.
Dr. Arturo de Santos, during his lifetime, filed a petition for the probate of his
will. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs and he had named in his will
as soled legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation. RTC Makati
issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. Dr. de Santos later
died.
Petitioner filed a motion for intervention claiming to be the only child of Dr.
de Santos’ sister and that as nearest of kin, he prayed that letters of
administration be issued in his name. Meanwhile, executrix Patricia de los
Reyes Phillips filed a motion for letters testamentary with the same branch
(Branch 61) but later withdrew it. She later refiled and it was docketed to
branch 65. The judge issued an order appointing her as special administrator.
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 15
Branch 65 judge later ordered the transfer of the case to Branch 61. Branch 61
judge likewise returned the records to Branch 65. Branch 65 later decided on
the case to expedite proceedings.
Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner’s motion to intervene. Respondent
moved for reconsideration but was denied. She filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA which set aside the RTC’s decision.
Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 did not
terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will and argues that the
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful
heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules
of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully
act upon private respondent’s petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled
that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity
of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The
cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts
cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the
principle of ambulatory nature of wills.
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall
govern. Miso
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be
necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. – […]
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator
has been explained by the Code Commission. Thus, after the allowance of the
will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch
61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule
73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge
Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that Branch 61 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the
deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites
Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, […]”
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons Indeed, the jurisdiction over
probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over
P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs
to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different
branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. It is
noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the
petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar
other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso
v. Ramolote. Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 has jurisdiction over the petition.
Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the
nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 16
material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the
proceedings before Branch 65, the CA held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the
decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter[…]
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised
for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene,
and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. - Any person interested in a will may state in writing the
grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named
therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice,
shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same
time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based
on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to
respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give
bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping
when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still
pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted,
and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts,
and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was
filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his
will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed
by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the
purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put
into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and
delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly,
there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during
the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.
Petition denied.
URIARTE v CFI (May 29, 2000)
J. Dizon
Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari against the
respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, CFI Negros, and CFI
Manila praying that the orders be annulled: that of Negros dismissing the first
instituted special proceeding, and that of Manila denying the omnibus motion
to intervene and to dismiss the latter-instituted special proceeding. Injunction
was granted. Petitioner later filed a pleading called supplemental petition for
mandamus. Resolution was deferred until original action is taken up on the
merits.
Petitioner filed with CFI Negros for the settlement of the estate of the late Don
Juan Uriarte y Goite alleging that he was a natural son and was the sole heir
and that he had instituted a petition for compulsory acknowledgment during
the decedent’s lifetime.
Higinio filed opposition to the petition questioning Vicente’s capacity and
interest. Juan Uriarte Zamacona later commenced another special proceeding
with the CFI Manila for the probate of the alleged will of the decedent and
likewise filed a motion to dismiss the Negros case.
Petitioner opposed, contending that CFI Negros was first to take cognizance
and has thus acquired exclusive jurisdiction. CFI Negros thus dismissed the
special proceeding before it.
The questions are: (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing the
special proceeding, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not the
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 17
special proceeding notwithstanding proof of the prior filing in the Negros
Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First
Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that
is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons
— whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such
subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular CFI
where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73, which provides
that the estate of an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that
of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the CFI in
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction.
In the case before Us, these CFI are the Negros and the Manila Courts.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte
Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan
Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court or was entitled to commence the
corresponding separate proceedings in the Manila Court.
He should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in
a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion in the already
pending special proceedings. But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will
being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed
the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We cannot accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to
consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961
when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila
Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he
filed with the Manila Court an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene
and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to
that date; thus, enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five
months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to
assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila
Court would put a premium on his negligence.
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute civil case (acknowledgment) until it is finally determined, or
intervene in the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it
has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the
question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said
court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or
should be declared his acknowledged natural child.
Writs prayed for denied.
RODRIGUEZ v BORJA, et al (June 21, 1966)
J. JBL Reyes
Petitioners petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to CFI
Bulacan for refusal to grant their motion to dismiss of the special proceeding
which it took cognizance without jurisdiction.
It is alleged by petitioners that CFI Bulacan has no jurisdiction to try the case
in view of the pendency of another action for settlement of the estate of Rev.
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in CFI Rizal which was filed ahead.
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in
the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida
Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and
Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine
the alleged will but later withdrew; that on March 12, 1963 (8am), petitioners
filed before the CFI Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Fr. Rodriguez and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 (11am) Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation
of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 18
that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of
the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time
of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
CFI denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few
hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early
as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of
Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan. Reconsideration having
been denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally
on Rule 73, section 1: “[…] The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. […]”
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became
vested upon the delivery thereto of the will on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and
place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably
to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may
act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition
for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after
the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when
the will was delivered.
Petitioners object that CFI Bulacan did not have jurisdiction because the
decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We cannot disregard Fr.
Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-
1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout
some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail
would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in
previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law
upon all CFI, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction. Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or
that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan. That is
sufficient in the case before us. The estate proceedings having been initiated
in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled
to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case
of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (court to first take
cognizance).
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One
is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal was in bad faith,
patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence
awarded it by the Rules. The other reason is that, in our system of civil law,
intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
CFI Bulacan entitled to the priority in settlement.
Writ for certiorari denied.
BERNARDO v CA (Feb 28, 1963)
J. Barrera
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died
and his will was admitted to probate by the CFI Bulacan. Hermogena later
died and she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
The executor filed a project of partition adjudicating Eusebio’s estate among
the testamentary heirs except Hermogena whose share was allotted to her
relatives. These relatives opposed the project of partition claiming that ½ of
the properties in Eusebio’s will belonged to the conjugal partnership.
Executor filed a memorandum alleging that the respondents had no standing
to question the validity of the donation. The probate court declared the
donation void and disapproved both projects of partition.
The executor filed a motion for new trial, contending that the probate court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents’ claim involving title to
the properties. This was denied.
On appeal to the CA, the CFI was affirmed. Thus, the present petition for
review by certiorari.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule,
question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 19
exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court
may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when the
parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit
to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted,
said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the
consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration
may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding,
provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
The matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to
the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of
the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership
in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course,
the widow, now represented by her heirs who have been substituted upon
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are
no third parties whose rights may be affected.
Petitioners contend that they have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the
question of ownership of the disputed properties. On the contrary, it is
undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition and
thus themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties —
which is well within the competence of the probate court — and just because
of an opposition thereto, they cannot thereafter withdraw either their
appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the
question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself,
during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties
in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an
extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities
cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have
knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs
the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of
the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that
such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has
not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
CA affirmed.
JIMENEZ v IAC (April 17, 1990)
CJ. Fernan
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced
four (4) children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles.
During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of
land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with
whom he begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno,
Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez
died on August 11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Virginia Jimenez then filed before the CFI Pangasinan to be appointed as
administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses. Respondent
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr filed a motion for the exclusion of his father’s name and
his father’s siblings inasmuch as they are children of Lino and Consolacion
and have already received their inheritance consisting of the 5 parcels of land.
Virginia was appointed as administrator and filed an inventory of the estate,
including the 5 parcels of land. Respondent moved for the exclusion of these
properties as it had already been adjudicated to them. They presented
testimonial and documentary evidence while Virginia presented none.
Probate court ordered the exclusion of the parcels of land. Virginia went to the
CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA dismissed.
2 years later, petitioners filed an amended complaint before the RTC
Pangasinan to recover possession/ownership of the 5 parcels. Respondents
opposed on the ground that it was barred by prior judgment. The RTC
dismissed the case on res judicata.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA which was
denied. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate)
the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and
whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present action for the recovery
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 20
of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the negative, is
the present action for reconveyance barred by prescription and/or laches?
We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and
ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can
only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's
findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is
necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. The patent
reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. Res
judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions.
There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower
court which cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence at a full-
blown trial and which make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among
others, the alleged admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed of sale
is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of adjudication, there being no
showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion
Ungson had been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of
the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could
have been effected.
CA reversed.
MARCOS II v CA (June 5, 1997)
J. Torres, Jr
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the
settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are still
unresolved, the latter issue being now before this Court for
resolution. Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on
Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and
properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate of
the will of the late president.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The CA ruled that the
deficiency assessments for estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and
the estate of the deceased President Marcos have already become final and
unappealable, and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying
upon the properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said tax
obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of the
Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of
properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void
for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due
upon the estate of the deceased. Petitioner goes further, submitting that the
probate court is not precluded from denying a request by the government for
the immediate payment of taxes, and should order the payment of the same
only within the period fixed by the probate court for the payment of all the
debts of the decedent.
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect
internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate
proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment
and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the
same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and income
taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented
in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should be paid
immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to decide
whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled
is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and limited jurisdiction.
"Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One,
by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount
of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another
remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all
property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax,
is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or
transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate.”
BAUTISTA Spec Pro Digests | Furia | 21
It is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a
settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the
collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau
erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties allegedly
owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required to seek first
the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the
pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate
settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same
can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement
court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator
of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested
in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the
petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the
assessment and collection of the estate tax.
The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the prescriptive
period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax Code. The
deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory, and
demandable, the same can now be collected through the summary remedy of
distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
CA affirmed.
ALIPIO v CA (September 29, 2000)
J. Mendoza
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a fishpond in Bataan. He later subleased the
fishpond to spouses Alipio and spouses Manuel. The first installment was
duly paid but only a portion of the 2nd installment was paid. Romeo thus sued
the spouses for the collection of the said amount before the RTC Bataan.
Purita Alipio moved to dismiss on the ground that her husband had passed
away. She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then
provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule
3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied,
and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action
was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
RTC denied the motion saying that Purita was herself party to the contract and
could be independently impleaded. Petitioner appealed to the CA but was
dismissed.
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the
sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is
one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership.
As held in Calma v. Taedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint
for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership
can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made
in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal
property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers
of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement
of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de
facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.
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From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the
Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's
husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the
issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on
whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate. Private respondent
cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios
with those against the Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack
of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios'
conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be
paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having
jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other
court.

Petition granted.

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