Marketing material for professional investors and advisers only

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

Quarterly Fund Update
Third Quarter 2018

Portfolio characteristics Portfolio structure

Fund manager John Armitage (Egerton) Gross/net exposure (%)

Long Equities 112.6

Managed fund since 25 November 2009
Short Equities -45.4
Fund launch date 25 November 2009 Total gross exposure 158.0

Fund benchmark* MSCI World TR Net (local currencies) Total net exposure 67.2
Options (delta-adjusted) 0.0
Fund size $1,543 million
Total gross exposure (delta-adjusted) 158.0
Ongoing charge** 1.67% Total net exposure (delta-adjusted) 67.2
Number of positions*
Performance fee 20% excess return above EONIA +
1% subject to a High Water Mark Long 42
Source: Schroders, as at 30 September 2018. Short 90
*Please note the fund is benchmark unconstrained; index returns are
provided for reporting purposes only. Source: Schroders as at 30 September 2018. Figures are on a delta-
**The ongoing charges figure is as at 31 May 2018 and may vary from year adjusted basis.*Excluding index options and government bonds.
to year for the C Acc EUR share class.

Discrete monthly returns since inception (%)

C accumulation shares (EUR)
Year* Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2018 5.3 5.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 1.7 -0.7 -0.8 0.6 0.3
2017 15.0 2.6 1.6 1.2 2.9 3.6 -1.0 3.0 1.5 -1.4 2.7 -0.9 -1.4
2016 -3.7 -4.3 -2.5 1.8 -2.1 3.6 -3.6 2.7 0.4 0.8 -1.7 0.8 0.7
2015 8.3 0.9 1.7 1.0 -1.2 2.8 -0.4 4.3 -2.4 -1.7 3.6 0.3 -0.8
2014 3.4 -2.6 3.0 -2.1 -1.5 2.1 0.0 -1.0 2.1 0.0 1.2 2.0 0.3
2013 23.3 2.5 2.9 2.8 0.5 3.3 0.1 2.6 -2.7 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.6
2012 12.0 2.6 3.6 2.2 -0.0 -2.6 1.3 1.0 0.2 1.4 -0.6 2.3 0.2
2011 -4.2 -2.0 2.0 -1.4 1.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -3.4 -1.8 3.5 -0.4 -1.1
2010 14.4 -2.9 0.8 5.2 -0.0 -2.9 0.2 2.6 -0.7 4.7 3.2 -0.0 3.6
2009 1.8 - - - - - - - - - - -1.1 2.9
Source: Schroders as at 30 September 2018. NAV to NAV, net of fees. Fund launch date: 25 November 2009. *Year-to-date performance is shown for
years where monthly returns are not displayed for the full year.

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results, prices of shares and the income from them may fall as well as
rise and investors may not get the amount originally invested.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

1
Third Quarter 2018
Cumulative returns to 30 September 2018 (%)
C accumulation shares (EUR)
Since
140 3 months 1 year 3 years
launch
120
100 Schroder
0.1 5.6 20.3 101.0
80 GAIA Egerton Equity
60
40 MSCI World TR Net
5.3 12.3 46.3 143.9
20 (local currencies)
0 Source: Schroders as at 30 September 2018. NAV to NAV, net of fees.
3 months 1 year 3 years Since launch Fund launch date: 25 November 2009.

Portfolio Index Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future

results, prices of shares and the income from them may
fall as well as rise and investors may not get the amount
originally invested.

What happened in the market and portfolio

World equities had another quarter of good gains, led by US and Japanese stocks. The US, in particular, benefited from more nominal
growth than other regions, good earnings, and the corporate sector's willingness to invest, whether in stock buy-backs, M&A or capex.
Europe flat-lined, while it was surprising that the EM index was only flat, given the bear market in China, major problems in Latin
America, and the crisis in Turkey.

The fund performed poorly in the quarter. Its longs underperformed the market and its shorts rallied, after good returns (from both)
in Q1. This naturally prompted self-reflection.

The relative underperformance of the fund’s longs reflected some significant China-related losses via Alibaba, Tencent, and Wynn, all
of which dropped sharply. Overall, however, consensus earnings forecasts for our names tended to rise through Q3 and the earnings
season; 4.3x as many beat our expectations as missed them, and 10 of our names raised guidance while five cut. This did not lead us
to conclude that, in aggregate, the fundamentals of our picks were wrong.

Our shorts tended to rally when they reported earnings, to the extent that we wondered if our analysis had been systematically poor.
The actual earnings picture as it emerged was, however, more balanced than the performance of the positions themselves; 26 shorts
beat our expectations, but 28 missed, and 17 of the fund's shorts cut guidance while 13 raised. Consensus 24-month forecasts for our
shorts tended to rise, but we are sceptical that these take into account the poor earnings quality of many of these businesses.

We have tried to re-assess and respond to earnings estimate changes and prospects, but have generally not covered names we are
short just because they rallied when their earnings quality remained poor.

Stock highlights
Tencent Holdings Limited (700 HK)
The fund has had a large position in Tencent Holdings Limited (“Tencent”) since 2015. We believe that it is uniquely positioned for the
“new economy” with an unrivalled portfolio of assets, many of which are under-earning.

Tencent is the leading developer and publisher of PC and mobile games globally, and Gaming generates 40% and 60% of its revenue
and EBIT respectively. The company has been very successful at developing and publishing hit games, with, for example, Honour of
Kings and the mobile version of PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds (“PUBG”), each of which has over 50 million daily active users (“DAUs”).
The mobile gaming business can continue to grow at a mid-twenties rate out to 2022, offsetting the slow and gradual decline of the PC
segment.

Weixin, Tencent's social network, is as central to the company, as it is to Chinese life. It has over 1 billion monthly active users (“MAUs”)
– a metric that grew 10% in the last quarter – and, we estimate, over 850 million DAUs, and is used for business and personal
communication, content consumption, payments and utility services. The average user spends over 75 minutes per day on the app and
Weixin has roughly 30% share of total internet time spent in China. Weixin’s value to Tencent is both as a powerful distribution tool for

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

2
Third Quarter 2018
its other business lines and as a vast and largely untapped advertising opportunity. Tencent monetises Weixin at around 15% of
Facebook’s monetisation of its Asia Pacific audience, despite the higher levels of engagement, which suggests that there remains
substantial upside.

Tencent operates the largest online video, music and literature platforms in China, which in aggregate are growing above 40%. It has
a near monopoly in music and literature, but vies for leadership in video with iQiyi, a Baidu subsidiary. Video is heavily loss-making,
because Tencent is investing in premium content and competition keeps subscription fees low (around $2/month). We believe it can
be profitable over time, however, as Tencent gains leverage on its content investments and the competitive environment stabilises.

Tencent also operates one of the leading mobile payment platforms in China. Weixin Pay has over 800m MAUs and in Q2 average daily
transaction volume grew 40%, and commercial transaction volumes grew 280%. This business is currently a drag on group profitability
because of the investments Tencent has made in promotions and a relatively high mix of unprofitable peer-to-peer transactions.
Profitability should improve, however, because commercial transactions have exceeded 50% of the mix, while Tencent has also begun
to earn high margin fees for third party financial products distributed on its platform.

Tencent's earnings and its share price have been hit recently by a confluence of headwinds. The regulatory body for gaming is being
restructured, which has prevented the company from monetising new games, including its hit game, PUBG, which has thus far been
cannibalistic to its existing gaming portfolio, without making a positive contribution of its own. At the same time, the financial services
business is losing the interest income it earned on restricted custody deposits, because of regulatory changes. This was a small but
high margin revenue stream that will trend to zero by January 2019.

These issues have led to concerns that the regulatory environment has turned against Tencent, while fears are also growing of a
macroeconomic slowdown in China in the face of the US trade war.

We acknowledge Tencent is facing challenges at present, but we believe the headwinds are fundamentally short-term in nature. We do
not yet see compelling evidence that Beijing has turned hostile to Tencent and we believe that the strong secular drivers of Tencent’s
businesses will support earnings growth, even in the face of a weaker macroeconomic environment.

We have already begun to see progress in the gaming regulatory environment, as Tencent has obtained approval to monetise certain
new games through the new “green channel” process. Gaining approval for PUBG may prove more difficult, given the game is Korean
in origin and Korean content has been restricted because of geo-political tensions, but we do not believe this undermines the long-
term potential of the gaming business. The loss of interest income will be a revenue headwind for the next four quarters, but Tencent
hopes to offset this with the ramp up of commercial transactions and distribution fees.

Tencent continues to see exceptionally strong usage growth across its products. We believe that the headwinds to earnings peaked in
the most recent quarter and that a valuation of 23x 2020 earnings is attractive for a company that can compound revenue and earnings
in excess of 25% over the next four years.

Alibaba Group Holding Limited (BABA US)

Alibaba Group Holding Limited (“BABA”) is the dominant ecommerce retailer in China, with over 70% market share, and it is using the
earnings from this highly profitable platform to address new markets and to strengthen its ecosystem.

The Taobao and Tmall ecommerce platforms are at the core of the ecosystem; these are marketplaces, through which BABA earns both
advertising and commission revenue. These business lines represent 60% of revenues (around $32 billion in total) and have “adjusted
EBITA” margins of roughly 70%. BABA is still gaining ecommerce market share, despite its scale, and has several drivers, we believe, to
sustain its growth.

BABA continues to add users at a torrid pace, with MAUs growing 20% to 634 million in the last quarter. Despite rapid user growth,
spending per user continues to rise – in fact average annual spend of a typical Taobao user has quadrupled over five years.

There is ample potential for BABA to monetise this deep user engagement more effectively. Over 50% of traffic is now recommendation-
driven, and yet recommendations currently do not generate revenue. Advertising volumes can rise, with engagement, and BABA can
continue to extract higher pricing from merchants through improved ad targeting capabilities. The business has, moreover, a broad
secular tailwind from the shift of consumption online, and competes with an unmodernised retail sector.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

3
Third Quarter 2018
BABA is taking advantage of this profitable and growing revenue stream to expand into adjacent opportunities and to enhance its core
offering.

Offline retail is a $4 trillion market in China, which the company is addressing through its innovative Hema stores. These double up as
both a grocery retail outlet and a local fulfilment centre and are multiples more efficient than traditional offline stores. BABA is also
partnering with offline retailers to license technology and data to improve their operations, which should bring in high margin
management fees.

BABA is the leader in the Chinese public cloud market, with a 45% market share. Although China is behind the West in moving to public
cloud, the continued shift to cloud computing is almost inevitable. BABA has a first-mover advantage here, leaving it well positioned to
capture a large portion of what is likely to be a vast market. BABA cloud is growing at over 90% and is roughly breakeven.

BABA owns a 33% stake in Ant Financial, the financial technology company. Ant Financial has over 620m MAUs and earns 50% of its
revenue from its payments business, 40% from its technology partnerships and 10% from financial services. It is a market leader and
is set to enjoy rapid growth from the surge in digital payments and digital finance more broadly in China. Ant Financial recently raised
$14 billion at a $150 billion valuation.

The company is also investing to strengthen its retail ecosystem. It has built out a “smart logistics” platform through its subsidiary,
Cainiao, which has helped to reduce average delivery times by two-thirds, and recently acquired Ele.me, an online food delivery
platform. Ele.me is heavily loss-making, reflecting the ramp in its business and competition from Meituan, but this is a $40 billion
market, and BABA's investments could pay off handsomely when competitive dynamics stabilise.

BABA's investments in retail and what it sees as the broader digital ecosystem are suppressing its earnings growth in the short-term,
but are reinforcing its retail dominance, opening up vast new markets and should support sustained longer-term growth.

Like Tencent, BABA’s share price has suffered recently from concerns about a macroeconomic slowdown and increased regulation, in
particular an ecommerce law that will levy taxes on ecommerce merchants, and China-related 'malaise'. The ecommerce law is a
negative, but we think its impact will be relatively small: the larger merchants on Tmall are already registered for tax, while a significant
proportion of the merchants on Taobao fall below the minimum threshold. China's economy is slowing, but we feel that continued
solid wage growth and the secular shift of consumption online will support robust growth; online retail sales have been resilient and
China has shown signs of moderating its fiscal tightening.

At 20x 2020 earnings for compound earnings growth in excess of 30%, we think the shares offer substantial upside.

North American Railroads

The fund has steadily built its exposure to the North American railroad industry throughout 2018 and has significant holdings in
Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd (“CP”), CSX Corporation (“CSX”) and Union Pacific Corporation (“UNP”).

Our investments have been stock-specific, but the sector is benefiting from some powerful overarching themes.

The rails are operating within a solid volume backdrop. A robust North American economy, high commodity prices and improved global
growth have resulted in strong import, export and domestic freight volume growth. Rails are 5x as fuel-efficient as trucks, so high and
rising oil prices have helped their market shares. Volumes have strengthened through 2018, with Q3's +4.8% the strongest since 2014.

Pricing is also very strong. Transportation capacity is tight across all modes, and particularly in trucking. Driver shortages are limiting
capacity and inflating costs (the industry is having to pass on to its customers 10%+ wage hikes), while regulation (in the form of the
now mandatory Electronic Logging Devices, which track hours of service to prevent drivers from working more than 11 hrs/day) is also
limiting supply. Higher truck rates and constrained capacity provide the rails with a great pricing umbrella.

The rails are domestic earners and have been significant beneficiaries of tax reform, which has enhanced their cash-flows, and their
ability to accommodate capital spending and greater returns to shareholders, as well as take on higher leverage (although it should
be noted that all are solidly investment-grade with high levels of interest coverage). UNP, for example, is set to shrink its share count
by circa 20% over the next 3 years.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

4
Third Quarter 2018
CP’s volume growth significantly lagged that of its main competitor Canadian National Railway “CN”, over the last 15 years, because of
a significantly higher cost base and poor service. It became, however, a poster child for turnaround when new management, led by
Hunter Harrison, implemented Precision Scheduled Railroading (“PSR” - see below), between 2012 and 2016. The company's costs were
cut dramatically and its service improved.

Management has latterly focussed on readying the business for volume growth, so that it can leverage its Toronto to Calgary to
Vancouver length of haul advantage (of roughly one day of travel), and the many initiatives it has underway are ready to ramp.

CP has more natural traffic to gain from CN than the reverse, and customers may be prompted to address the split of their volumes
between the two carriers as a result of the significant service disruption which CN experienced in 2017-2018.

CP has a unique opportunity to grow its crude-by-rail business for several reasons. It serves all the key Canadian oil sands production
basins. Production is set to grow over the next 3 years. Pipelines are full and pipeline expansions are continually delayed, so CP can
capture this incremental growth. Crude represents circa 5% of revenues today and, we believe, may triple over the next 3 years.

CP’s revenue growth should come at high incremental margins: its average train utilisation is only 75% so it can add volumes without
train starts (which are a key driver of costs). It has a unique opportunity to invest in its grain fleet, as a result of which grain carried per
train may grow by 40% between 2018 and 2021. We think we saw an early glimpse into the power of CP's new growth model with its
Q3 numbers, which it pre-announced at its Investor Day: volumes grew 13%, revenue grew 19% and EPS grew 40%.

CP is the smallest Class 1 railroad in North America, and will likely be the fastest growing. Its management team is widely regarded as
the best in in the industry, and would be a strategic asset to any rail.

CSX was the least profitable US rail when an activist campaign led to the installation of Hunter Harrison as CEO in March 2017, to
implement precision scheduled railroading (PSR). PSR entails the tight scheduling of rail services, so that trains consistently run on time
to a formal schedule; when implemented correctly, PSR has led to major improvements in asset utilisation, significant cost reductions,
and reduced capital intensity.

Mr Harrison subsequently died, and Jim Foote, who worked at CN, is running CSX.

The transformation of CSX under Harrison and Foote has been spectacular. CSX has generated over 1000bp of margin expansion in
just under 18 months, has shed fixed assets, and cut its capex significantly (by circa .40%). The group is likely to achieve its 2020 profit
margin target early, and still sees significant potential to cut costs and run its business more efficiently. We suspect that CSX could
reach a margin well above its 2020 goal; alternatively, it may leverage a cost base significantly below its main competitor, Norfolk
Southern, to accelerate volume growth (as CN did against CP from 2005 to 2015).

Our profit forecasts embed 2% per annum volume growth and a 57% Operating Ratio (“OR” - the inverse of a profit margin, so lower is
better) by 2020, on which basis we think CSX shares are attractive, but we feel that they are likely to be beaten.

UNP is America's largest railroad (it has over 32,000 route miles of track). Its financial performance since 2004 has been extremely
strong: its OR has dropped (i.e. improved) by 25 points from 88% to 63%, its ROIC has grown from 5.3% to 13.7% and EPS has
compounded at 18%.

UNP has been able to deliver this performance because of the unique characteristics of its franchise, which is widely regarded as the
best in the industry. UNP's average length of haul is longer than the other rails, so that its costs should naturally be lower, it has the
highest percentage of captive business, which should enable better pricing, and its Mexican and chemicals exposures, amongst others,
should yield superior volume growth. Management has always maintained that its franchise allows, and that it should earn, the highest
margins and returns of any US railroad – which it did for a long period.

However, UNP's strong financial performance has been driven by price, rather than productivity. It has lagged the other rails, by very
wide margins, on every key productivity metric over the last 10 years – for example, its GTMs (gross tonne miles of cargo carried) per
employee have been flat over the last decade, whereas this metric is up >30% at CP, CSX and CN.

This lack of productivity growth has been shown in sharp relief by the company's poor performance over the last year, and the fact that
CSX, which has a far less optimal rail network than UNP, is now both more profitable and faster-growing than its more advantaged
peer – and seems likely to continue to draw away from UNP on both counts.

UNP made the decision last month to remove its COO and move to PSR.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

5
Third Quarter 2018
We believe that a successful implementation of PSR could drive over 10 points of margin expansion at UNP, yielding significant share
price upside.

PSR is difficult to implement at a railroad. CN, CP, and CSX brought in new management to make the significant operational changes
and engineer the cultural revolution that is necessary. UNP has not chosen to do this, but we feel that the board is committed to
returning to best-in-class status.

Outlook and strategy

Our core stock-picking beliefs and assumptions have changed little in 2018 (or over the last few years).

The corporate world is, we feel, short of revenue growth, partly reflecting the disruptive impact of the current industrial revolution,
which is reshaping industries, threatening incumbents, and throwing off winners. Accordingly, our focus is on companies which can
avoid being disrupted and grow durably, while we seek to capitalise both on disrupters and on the disrupted.

This is, to us, a challenging macro environment for investors to navigate, and we are somewhat cautious about stocks overall. We feel
that two key issues can affect the financial and economic landscape.

The US has embarked on confrontation with China, in response both to its trade/business practises, and to its emergence as a
superpower; perhaps this is a struggle for supremacy. This comes at a time when the limits of China's domestic infrastructure driven
growth model are becoming clearer. Domestic stimulus will require careful implementation if China is to avoid capital outflows and
significant RMB depreciation. The ramifications of mis-execution would clearly be significant.

Policy normalisation presents greater challenges to investors. US monetary policy has been extraordinarily stimulative for 9 years and
is now shifting. The US is raising interest rates according to a transparent and telegraphed path. A benign/positive scenario for stocks
would be that corporate earnings growth continues and offsets higher discount rates, but the equity market would still be vulnerable
to yield spikes/bond market scares and faster than expected rate rises.

The effects of liquidity withdrawal, however, are far more pervasive and significant than just on the valuation of stocks. Low interest
rates and aggressive monetary stimulus can allow/have facilitated the build-up of debt and capital misallocation, and have given many
low quality businesses a free pass. It is disturbing that so many EMs have blown up when US interest rates are so low, and the
combination of the end of free money and higher oil prices can easily lead to further accidents. So far, economic strength, capital
repatriation, and, perhaps corporate leadership, have insulated the US from the travails of the rest of the world, but one wonders for
how long it can remain the 'last man standing'.

Risk Considerations
The capital is not guaranteed. The value of the fund will move similarly to the equity markets. Emerging equity markets may be more
volatile than equity markets of well established economies. The title of securities may be jeopardised through fraud, negligence or
mere oversight in some countries. However the access to such markets may provide a higher return to your investment in line with its
risk profile. The fund may hold indirect short exposure in anticipation of a decline of prices of these exposures or increase of interest
rate where relevant. The fund may be leveraged, which may increase the volatility of the fund. The fund may not hedge all of its market
risk in a down cycle. Investments into foreign currencies entail exchange risks. Investments in money market instruments and deposits
with financial institutions may be subject to price fluctuations or default of the issuer. Some of the invested and deposited amounts
may not be returned to the fund. The investments denominated in a foreign currency of the share-class may not be hedged back to
the currency denomination of the share-class. The share-class will be positively or negatively impacted by the market movements
between those currencies.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

6
Third Quarter 2018
Performance attribution as at 30 September 2018*
Summary performance attribution Month (%) Quarter (%) Year to date (%)
Long Equity 1.1 3.3 12.4
Short Equity -0.6 -3.1 -3.6
Corporate Bonds 0.0 0.0 0.0
Index Options 0.0 -0.3 -0.8
Currency 0.0 -0.2 0.4
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 0.4 -0.4 8.3

Top 5 contributors Type Country Sector Quarter (%)

Microsoft Long United States Information Technology 0.8
Safran Long France Industrials 0.7
Union Pacific Long United States Industrials 0.7
Airbus Long Netherlands Industrials 0.6
Canadian Pacific Railway Long Canada Industrials 0.5

Bottom 5 contributors Type Country Sector Quarter (%)

Wynn Resorts Long United States Consumer Disc. -0.7
Tencent Long Hong Kong Information Technology -0.7
24th Century Fox Long United States Consumer Disc. -0.5
Undisclosed Short United States Consumer Disc. -0.4
Alibaba Long China Consumer Disc. -0.4

Region Month (%) Quarter (%) Year to date (%)

Europe ex UK 0.4 0.9 4.2
United Kingdom -0.3 -1.0 -0.3
North America 0.7 2.2 11.0
Pacific ex Japan -0.1 -0.5 0.0
Japan -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Emerging Markets 0.0 0.0 -0.5
Other (including FX Hedging, Options) -0.3 -2.0 -5.8
Total 0.4 -0.4 8.3

Sector Month (%) Quarter (%) Year to date (%)

Consumer Discretionary -0.7 -1.7 -1.6
Consumer Staples 0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Energy -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Financials 0.2 1.0 2.4
Healthcare -0.2 0.0 -0.3
Industrials 1.1 2.6 6.0
Information Technology 0.1 0.0 6.8
Materials 0.0 0.1 0.9
Telecommunication Services -0.1 0.0 0.3
Utilities 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other (including FX Hedging, Options) -0.4 -2.1 -5.7
Total 0.4 -0.4 8.3
Source: Schroders. *Analysis expressed on a gross of fees basis using a total return methodology. The impact of any currency movement at security
level is reflected within each of the relevant strategies. All data is rounded to one decimal place; as such, any small discrepancies can be attributed to
this.

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results, prices of shares and the income from them may fall as well as rise
and investors may not get the amount originally invested.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

7
Third Quarter 2018
Portfolio positioning as at 30 September 2018 (%)
Top 10 long positions

Holding Sector Weight (%)

1 Twenty-First Century Fox Consumer Discretionary 9.6
2 Airbus Industrials 8.1
3 Union Pacific Industrials 6.6
4 Safran Industrials 5.3
5 Microsoft Information Technology 5.2
6 Charter Communications Consumer Discretionary 4.6
7 Adobe Systems Information Technology 4.5
8 CSX Industrials 4.1
9 Tencent Information Technology 4.0
10 Blackstone Group Financials 3.7

Top 5 short positions Country allocation

Sector Country Weight (%) Sector Net Weight (%)

1 Consumer Discretionary US -4.1 United States 41.3

-1.0 France 15.2

2 Industrials US
Germany 5.6
3 Information Technology US -0.9
China 5.2
4 Financials NL -0.9
Canada 4.1
5 Consumer Staples US -0.8 Hong Kong 3.5
Source: Schroders.
Luxembourg 1.6
Sector allocation
Singapore 0.5
Sector Net Weight (%)
Italy 0.4
Industrials 23.6
Switzerland 0.2
Information Technology 21.8 Finland -0.1
Financials 13.8 Taiwan -0.2

Consumer Discretionary 13.1 Denmark -0.2

Belgium -0.3
Materials 4.2
Sweden -0.6
Energy 0.4
South Africa -0.9
Real Estate 0.2
Spain -0.9
Telecommunication Services -0.2 Netherlands -1.2

Utilities -1.1 Australia -1.2

Health Care -2.6 United Kingdom -1.3

South Korea -1.5
Total 67.2
Japan -2.0
Source: Schroders. Analysis based on market exposure as a percentage
of total fund size excluding currency forward contracts.
Total 67.2

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

8
Third Quarter 2018
Important Information:
This document does not constitute an offer to anyone, or a solicitation by anyone, to subscribe for shares of Schroder GAIA (the “Company”). Nothing in
this document should be construed as advice and is therefore not a recommendation to buy or sell shares.
Subscriptions for shares of the Company can only be made on the basis of its latest Key Investor Information Document and prospectus, together with
the latest audited annual report (and subsequent unaudited semi-annual report, if published), copied o which can be obtained, free of charge, from
Schroder Investment Management (Europe) S.A.
An investment in the Company entails risks, which are fully described in the prospectus.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results, prices of shares and the income from them may fall as well as rise and investors may not
get the amount originally invested.
Egerton has expressed its own views and opinions in this document and these may change.
Schroders will be a data controller in respect of your personal data. For information on how Schroders might process your personal data, please view
our Privacy Policy available at www.schroders.com/en/privacy-policy or on request should you not have access to this webpage.
This document is issued by Schroder Investment Management Ltd., 1 London Wall Place, London, EC2Y 5AU, who is authorised and regulated by the
Financial Conduct Authority. For your security, communication may be taped or monitored.
The fund is currently closed for new subscriptions; however, to the extent that capacity becomes available new subscriptions will be considered.
To the extent you wish to subscribe in the fund, when there is available capacity, please contact Schroder Investment Management (Europe)
S.A. who can explain the process and your name can be added to a waiting list which will be considered on a “first come first served” basis.
Third Party Data Disclaimer: Third party data is owned or licensed by the data provider and may not be reproduced or extracted and used for any other
purpose without the data provider's consent. Third party data is provided without any warranties of any kind. The data provider and issuer of the
document shall have no liability in connection with the third party data. The Prospectus and/or www.schroders.com contains additional disclaimers which
apply to the third party data.

Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity

9
Third Quarter 2018