lnrernarional Journal q~lnrerudrurol Relarions. Vol. IO. pp. 75-92. 1986 0147-1767/8613.00+ .

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Printed in the USA. All rights reserved. Copyright 0 1986 Pergamon Journals Ltd.

REASONS FOR THE LACK OF ARGUMENTATION

AND DEBATE IN THE FAR EAST

CARL B. BECKER

University of Hawaii

ABSTRACT This essay examines Chinese and Japanese attitudes towards speech
communication, particularly in public settings. Social. linguistic, and philosophical
perspectives are used to explain the absence of dialogue and debate. Section one
argues that geodemographic factors influenced East Asia to exalt human-centered
hierarchies over propositional truth in their thought systems. Section two looks at the
hieroglyphic character andgrammaticalpresuppositions of Chinese and Japanese, to
explain a mind-set more oriented towards imagery and sympathetic understanding
than to definition and distinction. Section three traces the views of the leading East
Asian philosophies towards oral communication- Confucianism, Taoism, Zen
Buddhism, and the Ming-chia (School of names), respectively-finding yet other
grounds for East Asian rejection of argumentation. This essay does not intend to
imply the superiority of Western logic or thought patterns to East Asian ones.
Rather, it is intended to alert a Western audience as to the culture-boundedness of
Western appreciation of discussion and debate, as well as to the deep-seated Sino-
Japanese prejudices against these communication styles.

China and Japan have been much in the spotlight recently, for their
political and economic dominance in Asia. Japan is already counted among
the world’s industrial leaders, and China is also undergoing rapid moderniza-
tion. Both countries have adopted the forms of Western governments, media,
and communications systems. Yet communications on a person-to-person
level operate under very different premises than in the West. Western Asia-
watchers expect that Asian languages are very different from Western
languages, and then try to compensate by careful translation and interpreta-
tion techniques. What they often fail to understand until too late, however, is
that both the content of the dialogue and the assumptions about what
represents acceptable and proper communications are very different in the
Orient than in the West.

Carl B. Becker is Assistant Professor of Asian Curriculum Research and Development at the
University of Hawaii.

This paper was first presented at the International Communication Association Convention in
San Francisco, May 14, 1984. The author is grateful for criticisms and suggestions from editors
and colleagues in this research.

75
76 Carl B. Becker

In particular, the use of public speaking for the debating of conflicting

viewpoints, especially popular in election years in the West, has generally
been unacceptable in the Orient. This essay will examine the attitudes of
Chinese and Japanese towards speech communication in public settings.
While there are many differences between China and Japan apparent today,
they share common cultural backgrounds and assumptions in the areas
which we shall consider as contributing to their common aversion to public
debate. We shall focus specifically on three areas of oriental culture which
have tended to discourage argumentation: (1) social history; (2) linguistic
features; and (3) philosophy and religion. A longer book might identify
important subtle distinctions between China and Japan on each of these
subjects, but for the purposes of our study, we shall argue that the same
factors have functioned in both societies to downplay the importance of
argumentation and debate.

1. SOCIAL HISTORY

(a) China and Japan have been densely populated, labor-intensive rice-
growing cultures since ancient times. Their survival depended upon the
peaceful cooperation of people in each community for the irrigation and
planting of rice. The people were unable or unwilling to change their
vocations and residential areas, for both geographic and political reasons, so
there was little change in their life-patterns from year to year. The cycles of
planting and harvest continued inexorably, and there was little room for
radical experimentation with new methods of agriculture, for if a new
method failed, some of the populace would likely starve. When travel and
change were thus minimized, experience could be accumulated only through
the repetitions of years, and the one who had the most experience was
naturally the village elder. When a flood or plague threatened the com-
munity, the elder was the one consulted about what worked best against such
problems when they last occurred some decades previously.
Through such historical evolution, China and Japan developed hier-
archical societies in which the very notion of two people being absolutely
equal became almost inconceivable. Age became equated with authority, and
even twins addressed each other as “older brother” and “younger brother,”
depending on who emerged a few minutes earlier. Age and rank became the
unquestioned basis for distinction of inferior and superior. Once the superior
person had been identified by age and rank, his word was taken as law,
without further logical examination.

Superiority in society and status in the governing class was the important thing. A
one-sided obedience of the lower class to members of the upper class was empha-
sized.. . This line of thought was easily accepted by the Chinese, because from
ancient times, Chinese society was based upon an order constructed upon the
discrimination of classes. (Nakamura, 1964, pp. 264-265.)
 Reasons 77

Such societies left little room for the development of ideals like “liberty,
equality, or individuality.” (Nakamura, 1964, pp. 205207.) Authority and
obligation proceeded not from reason, but from the superior status of the
elderly and the superior power of the landed class.
This perception of the world as a vertical hierarchy rather than as a
community of equals is nowhere better reflected than in the Chinese
translations of Indian Buddhist texts. Chinese scribes literally rewrote many
Sanskrit sums (scriptures), changing phrases such as “he opened his eyes
without looking to his master for help” into Chinese phrases reading, “he
listened to his master’s teaching and accepted it as true.” (Nakamura, 1964,
pp. 208-212). Indian treatises in which students questioned or out-reasoned
their masters were rewritten, since such a phenomenon was incomprehen-
sible to the Chinese. Geneologies were faked, and convoluted histories were
composed to support some doctrines, not on the grounds that they made
logical sense, but so that they could be traced back to some historical master.
In extreme cases, whole scriptures were forged:

A thought theoretically explained and defended is not sufficient to convince the

ordinary Chinese. To make the ordinary Chinese accept it, it is necessary to base it on
the authority of books. Thus, many forged sutras produced in China were always
claimed to have been made in India. If they came to be suspected of having been
produced in China, they would at once be regarded as lacking truth and authority
[not because India was respected for truth, but because it had older Buddhist
geneologies]. (Nakamura, 1964, pp. 269-70.)

Naturally, a society which cannot conceive of a student questioning a master,

(even in a foreign culture) but feels compelled to rewrite scripture to
eliminate such situations, is not going to tolerate debate and argumentation
within its own borders. Societies which are so impervious to reason that they
have to forge scriptures to give authority to arguments are not about to give
impartial hearing to contrary opinions.
Since the individual could not be heard nor recognized on his own,
without support from classical authorities and social status, there developed
the additional tendency towards standardization over individuality. Free
thought and individual expression were discouraged, giving way to the safer
and surer domain of classical quotation. This attitude can already be seen by
the time of Confucius, 2500 years ago. Throughout Chinese history, there
were purges and book-burnings, when all but the few texts approved by
officialdom were destroyed, and possession of contraband books carried the
death penalty (Goodrich, 1935, pp. 39-42). Thus, the thought-control of
Mao’s China was nothing new to the Chinese. In such circumstances, safe
ritual phrases tend to take over from self-expression. This influence con-
tinues to be pervasive even today in both cultures. Speeches at weddings are
among the few times that an oriental is ever expected to address a large
number of people. Research has shown that these speeches are almost
78 Carl B. Becker

invariably composed of standardized phrases within standardized formulae

and structures (Saito, 1973). Japanese word-processors have prestored a
hundred set greetings and phrases from which the operator can compile
complete letters without ever thinking up a sentence on his own. Thus, there
is little self-expression expected even within these most mundane and
politically innocent of occasions.
(b) Conversely, in the world of politics, the uses of speech were more
frequently ad hominem than rational. More than once did outlying states
lose favor with or risk invasion from China and Japan by improperly
addressing their interlocutors. Jobs could be forfeit by injudicious criticism,
while political favors might be curried through flattery. Political friends and
enemies were divided along personal, rather than ideological lines. One of the
greatest intellects of 19th century Japan, Yukichi Fukuzawa, wrote that it
was hard for him to comprehend the system of western political parties and
amicable argumentation:

It was beyond my comprehension to understand what these [political enemies] were

fighting for, and what was meant, anyway, by “fighting” in peace time.. . these
“enemies” were to be seen at the same table, eating and drinking with each other. 1
could not make much sense out of this. (Fukuzawa, 1934, pp. 142-44.)

In Chinese and Japanese eyes, taking opposite sides of an argument

necessarily meant becoming a personal rival and antagonist of the one who
held the other side. The more important concomitant of this idea was that if
one did not wish to become a lifelong opponent of someone else, he would
not venture an opinion contrary to the other person’s opinions in public.
Even the legal system was set up in such a way that it avoided direct
confrontations and made no demands on logical brief-building. While private
property rights existed, no freedoms nor personal rights were guaranteed by
law, and all power rested with the court (Nakamura, 1964, p. 214).

Chinese court procedure was not characterized by the development of judicial

dialogue between the accused and the accuser. The reason is that the Chinese judge
was not an arbitrator between two groups, but an official who took evidence from
both sides, and then sent out his own underlings to examine the truth of the
statements made by both sides. (Nakamura, 1964, p. 189.)

The danger of “frame-ups” in such a system must be obvious, although they

are not unknown to the judicial systems of the West, either. The more
important consequence from the viewpoint of communication theory is that
there never developed a “spirit of controversial dialogue,” nor a “tradition of
free public debate.”
In this political tradition, truth is taken to mean a quality of manhood, not
the accuracy of propositions alone. Men could be arrested and imprisoned
on the basis of suspicious character: even today, Chinese and Japanese police
 Reasons 79

may detain and interrogate people for “suspicious behavior” in “unsavory

neighborhoods.” At the same time, few people are convicted on techni-
calities, if their overall character testimony is good. Sine-Japanese thought
had no standards for matching propositions with other propositions (co-
herence) or with other states of affairs in the world (“correspondence tests of
truth”). Rather, they maintained the idea that a man whose actions and
character followed through on his commitments, and were in line with his
way of speaking, was a “true man” or a “man of truth.” Instead of the
affirmation or negation of particular propositions, Chinese and Japanese
thought starts with the “aura,” “feeling,” or “ring” of truth which is
embodied, not in a particular set of hieroglyphs or spoken sounds, but the
whole being of the person (Scharfstein, 1974, p. 139).
(c) A concomitant to the view that truth is not propositional but humanly
embodied is found in the oriental concerns with harmony and beauty over
logic. The first and tenth articles of the Constitution of Prince Shotoku,
adapted from China to unify Japan in 604 A.D., are studied to this day by all
Japanese schoolchildren:

Harmony is to be valued [from the Analem] and an avoidance of wanton opposition

is to be honored. All men are influenced by partisanship, but there are few who are
intelligent . . . . Let us cease from wrath and refrain from angry looks. For all men
have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. Their right is our wrong, and our
right is their wrong [from the Tao-te Ching] . . . . How can anyone lay down a rule to
distinguish right from wrong? So.. . let us follow the multitude and act like them.
(Nihongi, 1896, suppl., pp. 128-31.)

In this central document of Japanese history, both formative and reflective of

Japanese values, many points emerge clearly: the prizing of harmony over
correctness; the thoroughgoing relativism; the concern with being “one of the
crowd” rather than with standing up for principles. It is little surprise that the
notion of martyrdom was unknown to the orient until the advent of
Christianity, or that Japanese prefer to end sentences with “1 don’t really
know,” over more conclusive assertions.
The Tao-te Ching puts the issue even more starkly in its last words:

True words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not true. A good man does not
argue; he who argues is not a good man . . . . The Way of the Sage is to act but not to
compete. (84)

This rationale of ancient China is still evident in the modern oriental attitude
towards apologies and explanations. Even today, it is far preferable to lie or
equivocate than to directly refuse a request (Ueda, 1972). The Japanese
prefer indirect reference and suggestive intuition to strict oral explanations,
and dislike hearing explanations and excuses given by others (Horikawa,
1970). The important thing is not the reason why one is late, but the fact that
one is very sorry for all the worry and inconvenience he caused the waiting
80 Carl B. Becker

party. In awkward situations, orientals show “a tendency to make statements

as short as possible and omit explanation” (Miyamoto, 1974). While
Americans most often give practical and emotion-appealing reasons, when
the Japanese include reasons at all in their apologies, they tend to be based
on the demands of social roles rather than on individual decisions (Miya-
moto, 1974). Even the use of causal conjunctions is less frequent in Japanese
than in English. It has been proposed that this is because the speaker’s use of
causal conjuntions tends to impose upon others his own way of viewing
cause-and-effect and to demand agreement from the listener. The gist of
these varied observations is that the Chinese and Japanese place higher value
on not offending someone than on speaking clearly and accurately; that
self-debasing apology is preferable to logical explanations traditionally, and
even still today. These facts may all be grounded in the historical situation of
close-knit densely-populated village societies, where social harmony was
more essential than precision or scientific experimentation.

FEATURES OF LANGUAGE

Some of the reasons militating against public argumentation can be traced

to social and historical conditions, as we have seen, but other reasons must
be sought in the nature of the Chinese and Japanese languages themselves,
through which the Chinese and Japanese view and interpret their world.
(a) The Chinese (and thence Japanese) written language was pictographic
in origin, like the picture-writing on an American Indian tepee, but it was
written not on tepees but on tortoise-shell fragments. Now a person could fit
only a few intelligible pictures-or hieroglyphs derived from pictures-on
one tortoise-shell fragment. It became somewhat like composing a telegram:
One chose the bare minimum necessary to convey his message, and trusted
the other party to decipher it. The length of one line was generally about four
pictures; even when paper and other writing surfaces became available, the
four-character sentence remained the standard. Thus, a typical written
dialogue might run:

Confucius: 1no desire talk.

Disciple: If master no talk, what can disciple(s) learn?
Confucius: Does Heaven say anything? [=Heaven rules without language.]
(Analects, XVII, 9.)

This excerpt is translated in this literal way, not to mock, but to demonstrate
the cryptic and ambiguous style inherent in Chinese. Even the Chinese
philosophers were acutely aware of the shortcomings of their own language
to reflect anything like the richness of human experience (as we shall
examine in greater detail in Section 3).
To this day, the Chinese language remains an efficient but higly am-
biguous medium, which makes few distinctions necessary for in-depth
 Reasons 81

debates or discussions. Chinese has no copulas, no piurals, and no tenses,

unless they are deliberately and awkwardly inserted. Since its contact with
Chinese, Japanese language has moved in the same direction (Waley, 1958,
p, 63). Lacking singulars and plurals, capitalization and tenses, many
medieval philosophers got into arguments which Russell could show to be
mere pseudo-problems, because neither side was speaking about the same
subject. One school would write poems or treatises to show that principles
were discernible within temporal events, and the other that Principle was
eternal and not instantiated in physical objects. Since Principle and prin-
ciples are the same word, both schools carried on long and fruitless debates
ending only in frustration and embarrassment, unaware that both sides could
be right because each was using the same words in very different ways
(Ching, 1974).
The problem is complicated in Japanese by the fact that the Japanese who
originally imitated the Chinese hieroglyphic script and vocabulary were tone
deaf. All four Chinese tones of a given phoneme were condensed into the
same Japanese sound. Sixteen unique two-syllable Chinese words all came to
have the same pronunciation in Japanese. This extreme plethora of homo-
nyms in Japanese, handicaps Japanese speech communication further. The
more Chinese loan-words the speaker uses, the more he must pause to either
verbally or pictorially (on blackboard or palm of his hand) distinguish the
word he is using from numerous homonyms. This method, of course,
detracts from the elegance and flow of the spoken language. The only
alternative is to simply u~.rume that the listeners all imagine the same single
meaning of the homonym that the speaker intends. In either event, we have a
reinforcement of the idea that precision is cumbersome and inelegant, while
ordinary speech is necessarily vague and depends heavily on the cooperative
imagination and sympathy of the listener.
Like most other languages, Chinese vocabulary acquires new meanings
through a process of accretion and meaning-extension. In English, for
example, the word fire means combustion, then to ignite, then to shoot a
gun, then to release from employment. Through the centuries, the Chinese
superimposed on a few thousand hieroglyphs some tens of thousands of
extended meanings. Indeed, this was the only way to get hieroglyphs for
words like “idea” or “unified theory of relativity.” The problem with this
process is that the pictograph remains the same throughout the centuries, so
that in addition to new meanings, the old, more graphic and concrete
meanings are still largely preserved. These in turn overlay (or underlie) every
more abstract or theoretical expression (Waley, 1958, p. 60). Thus, Chinese
and Japanese develop homonyms in another way, using the same character
as well as the same pronunciation in two very different ways, and leaving the
interpretation totally open to the reader or listener. Some scholars conclude
that written Chinese, read aloud, “was almost too ambiguous to be
understood” (Scharfstein, 1974; cf. Graham, 1964, pp. 54-55).
82 Carl B. Becker

While these ambiguities enabled many subtle double-entendres and poetic

turns of phrase, they too reinforced the notion that language was a vehicle for
art and not for conveying information; for elegant play, but not for clarifying
problems. Nakamura enumerates many specific examples of the confusions in
hieroglyphics and syntax, concluding that Chinese has been “an awkward
medium for expressing abstract thought”(Nakamura, 1964, p. 188). The same
can certainly be said of Korean and Japanese. It is no coincidence that, unlike
Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, the Chinese language never produced scholars
either conscious enough or interested enough in their own grammar to
examine the way syntax and sentences function (Nakamura, 1964).
(b) The tremendous ambiguities and difficulties implicit in ancient hiero-
glyphic languages, reviewed in the previous section, have led over the
centuries to language taking on very different functions in the Orient than
those it has in the West. This area of scholarship has been all but ignored by
Western scholars, although it is painfully obvious to Anglo-American
expatriates functioning in Oriental languages.
In China and Japan, communication is less of a process of mutually
gathering and exchanging information (“How are you? What’s happening?“)
than an affirmation of inevitably shared human conditions (“Sure is hot
today. Makes you hot to work in the sun, doesn’t it?“). A large part of the
language activity of any oriental dinner or drinking party consists of the
parroting of each others’ sentiments in the same words; as the evening wears
on, singing and chanting take the place of speech. While the Westerner in
such situations tends to feel that such behavior indicates the lack of anything
further to talk about, the Oriental feels that in singing and chanting he has
achieved true togetherness with his fellows, which in his mind transcends the
importance of exchanging ideas. When the Oriental climbs staircases, hefts
burdens, reaches home, begins to eat, smashes a tennis ball-and in any
number of similar situations-he is expected to say or shout words. These
words are addressed to no one and communicate nothing; the Japanese will
say them even when he is alone or when no one is listening. Some of these
words may have psychological functions of demarcating the time of one
activity from another; others are little more than animal grunts and cries
given phonemic pronunciations. We have already seen that language
patterns for important occasions are fixed by custom, and that silence is
often preferred to verbal response. In many situations, then, oriental
language is used less to communicate than to commune, congratulate, emote,
and to begin and end activities.
One fascinating consequence of the extreme ambiguity and noncommuni-
cative roles of oriental languages is that Chinese and Japanese communica-
tion assumes a kind of telepathic intuition which has gone all but ignored in
Western studies of communication. Japanese and Chinese languages have
many words for their intuitive, non-verbal “stomach-to-stomach” or “heart-
to-heart” communication, which serves as the ground for all verbal com-
 Reasons 83

munication, and can exist independently of words and phrases altogether

(Ryu, 1974). In addition to leaving off subjects and pronouns, it is not
uncommon for the grammatical objects of sentences (be they ideas or
physical things) to be indicated by unreferenced pronouns (like the English
“that”). A professor may enter a classroom and ask, “Make it?” Only the
person whom the professor has in mind is expected to respond, and he is
expected to know exactly what the object of the professor’s inquiry is. That
oriental languages function in this way is further illustrated by the difficulties
that orientals have in learning English-in their omission of subjects, objects,
and specific referents until trained to include them. That their cultures
function as efficiently as they do is testimony to the well-nigh telepathic
sensitivity of each person to the unvoiced intentions of each speaker.
This sensitivity may be due in part to the fact that these cultures have been
relatively homogeneous and have possessed single languages for thousands
of years. It may be due to the pressures of close-knit families and densely-
packed societies to preserve harmony through concern with others’ feelings.
It may be partly due to the fact that hieroglyphic language-users sort
language into the right hemispheres of their brains (Westerners generally put
language in the left, linear-logical hemispheres)-and right hemispheres have
been linked to intuition, art, and telepathy (cf. Sasanuma, 1980; Sibatani,
1980; Tsunoda, 1975; Tzeng, 1978; Walker, 1981). The intuitive/telepathic
abilities of some Orientals in communication may strike some Westerners as
almost incredible, but are taken for granted as a necessary part of their
successful communication process.
(c) Still another problem inherent in Chinese and Japanese is their lack,
not only of formal logical systems, but indeed of a principle of noncontradic-
tion. One can add characters to a sentence in order to negate it, but adding
two of them does not make a double-negation, as a Western observer might
wish, nor return the sentence to its unnegated meaning. Tung-sun Chang, for
example, holds that Chinese thought

is not based upon the law of identity, but takes as its starting point a relative
orientation or rather the relation of opposites. This type of thought evidently
constitutes a different system. [Different from what? How? A system of what? Typical
of Chinese English, Chang does not say.] This system is probably related to the
nature of Chinese characters. (Chang. 1939.)

This quotation is an excellent example to illustrate that even Chinese

scholars (a) recognize that their language system violates the logical expecta-
tions of the West, and (b) continue to violate those logical expectations
themselves in their own English writing styles. In fact, it was not until recent
centuries that the Chinese even seriously encountered the notions of double
negation, or laws of syllogisms, and Chinese and Japanese languages
continue to function outside of such constraints.
84 Carl B. Becker

Historians of logic might challenge such assertions by pointing out that

Sanskrit (Indian) Buddhism had a highly developed mathematical logic by
the time of Christ, when Buddhism was just beginning to be introduced to
the Chinese. Since China and Japan adopted Buddhism, should we not also
expect them to have adopted many of its logical rules? In fact, however, the
Chinese butchering of Indian logical texts almost defies imagination. The
dean of Japanese Buddhist historians observes:

In the history of Buddhist logic in China, we can observe several striking phenomena.
First, very few logical works were ever translated.. Interest in Buddhist logic was
very slight among the Chinese. Secondly, only logical works of the simplest.kind were
translated. . . . Indian works on epistemology of logical theory were not translated..
Indian logic was accepted only in part, and even the part that was accepted was not
understood in the sense of the Indian originals, Hsuan-tsang, who introduced Indian
logic, seems not to have fully understood it.. . In developing his arguments, he
violated the rules of Indian logic.. . .
Ts’u-en’s work, which was regarded as the highest authority in China and Japan,
contains many fallacies in philosophical and logical analysis. He apparently did not
understand the Indian rule that the middle term should be distributed by the major
term. . . He confused ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi.. . in doing this, he simply
made a mechanical classification, and his explanation is self-contradictory as well as
at odds with the original meaning. (Nakamura, 1964, p. 192.)

The account could go on and on, but the point should be clear by now.
Even the highest authorities on logic in China literally did not know what
they were talking about, and frequently contradicted themselves without
being bothered by it! However, this failure is less to be blamed on the
stupidity and mechanical translation methods of the scholars than on the
intractable opacity and ambiguity of the Chinese language itself. In
Chinese, the fine distinctions and mathematical rules of Sanskrit simply
were untranslatable, did not apply, and seemed to make no difference.
From all these features of Chinese and Japanese language: Their tele-
graphic terseness and consequent ambiguities; their many homonyms; their
inabilities to make fine distinctions and abstractions; the use of language in
noncommunicative ways and of intuition for communication; and in their
lack of logical rules and constraints; we gain further insights as to why
public discussion and debate were considered inconclusive if not futile.
Unlike Indian and Western traditions, the Chinese had no internal
standards for determining when one set of arguments were better than
another, so even if debates had occurred, they could neither be governed
nor judged by a consistent logic. Thus, these whole languages and cultures
tend to frustrate the Western assumptions that reasonable men in free
communication can arrive at truer conclusions, either about the natural
world or the desirability of a given policy, than can a single man without
discussion.
 Reasons 85

3. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

We have already alluded to reasons for oriental respect for age and hence
antiquity. Few cultures have so valued the study of classical philosophical
and religious texts as have China, Korea, and Japan. In fact, for centuries,
examinations on the classical texts constituted the major screening-method
and stepping-stone to political offices in China and Korea. Although there
were several antagonistic schools of thought in ancient China, which have
dominated the cultural and philosophical scene in the orient ever since, they
each held similarly negative views of speech and language. Let us turn our
attention respectively to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and finally
to an opposition school which favored logic and language, to examine their
ideas on speech communication.
(a) Confucius is often known as the father of Chinese philosophy and
culture, although he in turn relied heavily upon odes and classics composed
centuries before the 6th century B.C. in which he lived. From Confucius’
reliance on ancient sources to vindicate his own teachings, we may again
observe the recurring theme that it is preferable to copy old solutions to
problems rather than inventing and discussing new ones. Confucius’empha-
sis is continually on being humble and respectful, rather than bold, assertive,
or innovative. He sets up a trilemma which virtually precludes the use of
persuasive speech:

To be importunate with one’s lord will mean humiliation; to be importunate with

friends will mean estrangement (IV, 24).
To speak to a man incapable of benefitting is wasting words (XV, 8). (Analecfs-Lau
translation, 1959; standard verse numbering.)

Even from the format of Confucius’ Analects themselves, we may observe

that Confucius’ remarks never run to a paragraph, but usually only to a
fleeting fortune-cookie response to a disciple’s inquiry. Of course Confucius
was aware that there were times when appropriate speech was indispensible,
but for the most part, the above verses manifest his reticence to speak (cf.
Analecrs, XVI, 8). As Confucian biographer Herlee Creel puts it, “Confucius
was always markedly contemptuous of eloquence and of ornate language”
(Creel, 1953, p. 27). This contempt is so often seen that some scholars
speculate that Confucius was in fact a poor, tongue-tied speaker, jealous and
therefore critical of those with rhetorical eloquence.
Confucius established for China the ideal of the gentleman, or “superior
man”-not necessarily someone from the upper classes, but one who has
properly cultivated himself in virtue and righteousness. Then how does
Confucius envisage the ideal man speaking? Confucius says:

The superior man is diligent in duty but slow to speak (1, 14).
The superior man is slow to speak but quick to act (IV, 24).
In antiquity [the ideal time], men were loath to speak (IV, 22).
86 Carl 8. Becker

We need not belabor the point. The phrase “slow to speak” can also be
translated, “slow of speech, halting, hesitant, reticent, taciturn.” The danger
which Confucius feared was that speech would outstrip one’s knowledge or
abilities.
Central to Confucius’ philosophy was the principle of hsin ( d-i”, )-that
one’s words should always be in accordance with that which one does, lives,
and practices. It is not that the Confucian cannot speak at all, but that he
must always speak with discretion only of that which he is prepared to act
upon or commit himself to (cf. Lau, “Introduction,~ Analects, 1979, p. 25).
Naturally, this principle put a damper on bold or persuasive speech.

The superior man acts before speaking and speaks according to his action (II, 13).
Immodest statements are hard to live up to. . . . A superior man is ashamed of his
words outstripping his deeds (XIV, 20.27).

In Confucius’ idea of hsin, we can again discern the Chinese idea of the
identity of the man and the ideas he voices. Words are not to be treated as
sounds, ideas, or propositions which exist independently of their utterers, to
be judged by criticai linguistic analysis. They are inextricably interrelated to
the person who utters them. Their truth depends on his character, and his
truth depends on the character of his words. Thus, it becomes impossible to
scrutinize or criticize an idea without casting aspersions on the character of
the person who voices it. Since one of our primary duties is to be respectful
to men (Am/em I, 13), then we should sooner allow their mistakes to pass
uncriticized than exhibit a lack of proper respect for their words and hence
their selves (Am/em, XIV, 29). Confucius taught that ordinary men were to
learn from the life and deeds of the superior man, and not from his logic or
language.
In overview, then, Confucius opposed eloquent and clever speech, advo-
cating hesitancy over brilliance, and he grounded this criticism of speech
deeply within his philosophy of the ideal man. This Confucian attitude still
persists widely in East Asia.
(b) The ancient Taoist school of Chinese philosophy is best represented by
the Tao-te Ching of Lao-tzu and by Chuang-tzu. In contrast to the
Confucian concerns with public behavior, etiquette, and politics, the Taoists
were more interested in man’s finding peace within himself and within
nature. The Taoists tended to be hermits and recluses whom, even sym-
pathetically, we should have to call quietistic. It is hardly surprising that we
find further opposition to speech and rhetoric within the Taoist philosophy.
The classic text of the Tao-te Ching advocates silence from the beginning:

The sage spreads doctrines without words (2).

Nature says few words, but the whirlwind [windbag] lasts less than a single morning
(23).

It revels in a juxtaposition of opposites:

 Reasons 87

The greatest skill seems clumsy and the greatest eloquence stutters (45).
He who knows does not talk; he who talks does not know.
Keep your mouth shut (56).

Such radical statements are not designed merely to shock the hearer nor to
take issue with all authority. Like Confucius’ opposition to speech, the
Taoists’ is also grounded in their philosophy, although their reasons are
different from Confucius’. The Taoists were acutely aware of the artificiality
of names and labels, the inability of their hieroglyphic language to capture
the fullness of experience, and the inappropriateness of most linguistic
distinctions to the real world. Thus we are told:

The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao (1).
As soon as there are names, know that it is time to stop (32).

The sage, however, remains at peace, because he does not distinguish good
and bad, desirable and undesirable, proper and improper:

Common folk make distinctions and are clear cut. 1 [the sage] alone make no
distinctions (20).

Thus, within Taoism, language and precision are thought to be the root of
contention and dissatisfaction, therefore a barrier to contentment and
sagehood.
Chuang-tzu takes the arguments of the Tao-te Ching a step further into a
total perspectival relativism, in which nothing can be judged true or false,
and no one can really know the mind of another person. Chuang-tzu
specifically alludes to debate, averring that it is always inconclusive,
inconsequential, unarbitrable, and opposed to the proper harmony of things
(Chuang-tzu, in Chan, 1963, pp. 189-190). He denies that we can even truly
know whether we ourselves are awake or dreaming, much less know such
things of others (Chan, 1963, p. 200).
In a classic dialogue with his friend Hui, as they walked along a dam
looking at the fish in the river, Chuang-tzu said, “The white fish swimming
easily in the river are so happy!” Answering with Chuang’s own relativistic
logic that no one can know another’s mind, Hui responded: “You are not a
fish. How do you know its happiness ?” To this, Chuang retorted again, “You
are not I. How do you know that I do not know?” (Chan, 1963, p. 210).
Indeed this is the logical conclusion of the argument from relativism, which
shows us the dilemma of any thoroughgoing relativism including the
Taoists’. On the one hand, no one can ever challenge any one else’s
assertions, because no one can know another’s mind and its insights. On the
other hand, since there are no criteria for meaning, no standards of
intersubjectivity, and no objective grounds for criticism, all assertions
ultimately become subjective, vacuous, nonreferential. Chuang-tzu says:
88 Carl 3. Becker

Vacuity, tranquillity, mellowness, quietness, and taking no action characterize the

things of the universe at peace and represent the ultimate Way [Tao] of virtue. (Chan,
1963, p. 208.)

The philosophy of Taoism may appear attractive to people tired of

competition, and to those resigned in the face of authoritarian administra-
tions. But Taoism provides no solutions to social problems, and is thorough-
going in its rejection of both speech and communication.
(c) Zen (Chinese: Ch’an) Buddhism first became known in America for its
curious tales about the sound of one hand, and of monks beating one
another instead of answering questions. in fact, Zen Buddhism was a
uniquely un-Indian Chinese creation, “in persistent and often violent opposi-
tion to words, and then to the intellect which deals exclusively in words”
(Suzuki, 1953, p. 36). Zen became the leading school of Chinese Buddhism
by the 1lth century, and the philosophy of the Japanese upper classes by the
14th century. Zen accepted the pervasive relativism of Chuang-tzu, as can be
seen in such statements as “he who drinks water alone knows if it is cold or
warm.” It agreed with the Taoist notions that fundamental principles are
inexpressible in language, and thus that many questions are also unanswer-
able (cf. Fung, 1948, pp. 257, 262). Zen proclaimed itself in China as a
“separate transmission of the dharma [true teachings] outside scriptures and
not dependent on words or phrases” (deBary, 1972, p. 208).
The Rinzai school of Zen particularly denounced eloquent speech:

Even though your eloquence be like a rushing torrent, it is nothing but hell-producing
karma [activity]. . . . Students become attached to words and phrases.. . and cannot
gain enlightenment. (deBary, 1972. p. 227.)

Rinzai Zen inveighs against studying the words of the past classics; it calls
words “dreams and illusions,” and it specifically criticizes those who spend
their days “in idle talk” about rights and wrongs, landowners and thieves,
laws and politics (deBary, 1972, p. 230).
In Zen, truth is thought to be intuited only in silent meditation and
incommunicable through language. This is one reason that Zen masters
frequently beat their logically-minded disciples, or give them insoluble
language-tangles called kQa~s to contemplate until they realize the futility of
discursive reason. To their students’ logical inquiries, some masters respond
with cries, some with blows. Some lift tea trays or put their sandals on their
heads. Many simply remain silent to the most serious and important of
questions, or walk out of the room (Suzuki, 1961, pp. 294-296). Hundreds of
such examples have been compiled into the classic literature of Zen, which
itself disavows classic literature and scripture. Zen in turn became the model
for bushido, the martial code of the Japanese Samurai, which was drummed
into the heads and hearts of the educated classes for centuries in Japan.
While Westerners may be fascinated or bemused by Zen anecdotes of cries
 Reasons 89

and cat-cutting, we must not forget that such tales also represent the deep-
seated religious rejection of logic and denial of rational communication in
China and Japan.
(d) It is not true that there never existed logicians and debaters in China.
The Ming-chia (literally, “School of Names”) philosophers were a class of
lawyers analogous in role and history to the Sophists of Greece. They early
became known for their debates about whether white horses were horses and
whether criminals were men. In fact, these were very logical arguments
designed to demonstrate (1) that there are distinctions within classes of
objects, as among horses and among men; (2) that a man sets himself apart
from other men by committing criminal deeds; (3) that in so doing, he
sacrifices his human right to life and liberty, and therefore (4) capital
punishment is justifiable, for taking the life of a criminal is not the same as
taking the life of an ordinary man. To the average man, however, the state
had the power to kill or free criminals without needing such justifications,
and the debates of the Ming-chia seemed purest sophistry. As Chuang-tzu
criticized: “They can subdue others’ mouths but cannot win their hearts”
(Chan, 1953, p. 233).
Even in their own day, the Ming-chia were loathed by other scholars.
Historian Ssu-ma T’an wrote (around 110 B.C.):

The School of Names conducted minute examinations of trifling points in compli-

cated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute their
ideas. (Quoted in Fung, 1948, p. 8 I .)

Some Ming-chia lawyers were indeed highly successful in getting their own
suspects sentenced or acquitted, and were at the same time accused of
turning wrong into right. The typical reaction of both people and govern-
ment was summarized by philosopher Han Fei-tzu: “When discussion of
hardness and whiteness appear [the standard examples of Ming-chia logic],
then the governmental laws lose their effect”(Fung, 1948, p. 82). Popular as
well as official opinion militated against the Ming-chia; their school was
consequently short-lived, and their name remained more as an epithet for
vacuous language-manipulation than as a respectable title of a school of
logicians. Thus, the history of Chinese and Japanese thought is dominated
by three major philosophico-religious schools: Confucian, Taoist, and
Buddhist; and all of them opposed debate, public speech, and even
communication. The single small school famous for debate and logical
argumentation soon defeated its own purposes; by being too good at
argument, it lost the trust of the people and government forever.

4. CONCLUSIONS

There are tremendous barriers - socio-historical, linguistic, and philo-

sophical-to the acceptance of argumentation and debate as methods for
90 Car! B. 3ecker

the consideration of new proposals or as strategies for socio-political change

in East Asia. In addition to the many problems reviewed above, there are
also the practical problems of education, of martial law, of industrial as well
as international rivalries, and of the lack of speech and communication
courses in Asian schools and universities. All these factors militate against
the rapid rise of public argumentation and debate in the near future.
Many Westerners may be convinced of the importance of logic, and of its
superiority to emotive intuition. Yet we need to be careful not to discard
those areas of human life and communication in which intuition may be
extremely valuable, in our efforts to quantify and mathematize. We may
agree with Habermas that an ideal speech situation requires equality of
participants, freedom from social coercion, suspension of privilege, and free
expression of feeling [rather than self-censorship] (cf. Burleson & Kline,
1979, pp. 412-428). But we should realize that this is at best a very Western
ideal, both impractical and even theoretically inconceivable to traditionally-
educated Chinese and Japanese.
We desire to understand our powerful Fast Asian neighbors, and to do so,
we propose to communicate. It is true that they may have many ideas to
learn from our forms and modes of argumentation and debate. At the same
time, we should not forget the long and relatively peaceful histories they have
experienced, entirely without the benefit of our methods of discussion and
rhetoric. Before imposing our own models of communication upon them in
another gross display of insensitivity and cultural imperialism, let us remind
ourselves that our own presuppositions about ideal communications are also
culture-bound. In mutual respect, while we make our communications
methods and studies available to those in the Far East, let us seek to
understand the very different values and communication patterns which
regulate their own respective cultural contexts. It is hoped that this article
will have made a start in that direction.

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92 Carl B. Becker

ABSTRACT TRANSLATIONS

Cet essai examine les attitudes chinoises et japonaises envers la com-

munication orale, particuligrement dans les milieux publics. Des per-
spectives sociales, linguistiques et philosophiques sont utilisks
pour expliquer l'absence de dialogue et de dEbat. La pren&re section
soutient que des facteurs g'eo-dgmographiques ont influe& 1'Asi.e ori-
entale pour exalter les higrarchies humaines au-dessus d'une v'eritz
propositionnelle dans leurs syst&wes de pens&. La deuxi‘eme section
examine le caract'ere higroglyphique et les suppositions grammaticales
des langues chinoise et japonaise pour expliquer une attitude plus
or&n&e vers les images et la comprshension intktive plut"ot qu“a
la d'efinition et la distinction. La troisi&ne section trace les
points de vues des philosophies principales de 1'.4sie orientale -1e
confucianisme, le ta%isme, le bouddhisme et le Ming-chia (EcoTe des
Noms) - 'a l'geard de la communication orale. trouvant ainsi encore
plus de r&sons pour lesquelles 1'Asie orientale refuse la discussion.
Cet essai n'a pas l'intention d'impliquer une sup&rioritg de la
logique ou des normes de pens& occidentales 'i celles de 1'Asie ori-
entale. Son intention est plutzt d'avertir un public occidental que
son apprgciation pour la discussion et le dzbat est spzcifique 'a la
culture occidentale, et aussi, qu'il y a des p&jug& sino-japonais
tr'es forts contre ces genres de communication.

En este ensayo se examinan 1;~s wtitlldes chinas y japonesns hacin

la cumunicaci6n oral, particulnrmente en ;nnbientes pliblic<ls. se
refiere a perspectivas sociales, I injirlisticasy filo&fivas p,lrn
explicar la ausencia de dialogo y debate. En la primer3 sccci&n
se razona que fue por la influencia de factores gee-demogr,ificiJs
que Asia Oriental exalt6 jerarquias humanas sobre la verdad pro-
positional en sus sistemas de pensamiento. En la segunda secri&n
se examina el carkter jeroglifico y las suposiciones gramaticales
de 10s idiomas chino y japonhs para explicnr una actitud orientadn
hacia las i&genes y hacia la comprensihn intuitiva r&s que a la
definici& y la distinck. En 13 tercera secci6n se trazan 1;1s
posiciones de las filosofias principales de Asia Oriental - el
confucianismo, el taoismo, el budismo, y el Minxa (Escuela
de Nombres) - con respect0 a la comunicncik oral, encontrandc
asi m& razones por las cuales Asia Oriental rechazn la argument-
xi&l. La intencihn de este ensayo no es la de implicar alguna
superioridad de la 16gica o patrones de pensamiento occidentales
a 10s de la Asia Oriental. Mejor dicho, su intenci6n es de
advertir a un pGblico occidental que su apreciacibn de la dis-
cus& y el debate es especifica a la cultura occidental, y
tambi& que hay prejuicios sinojaponeses muy profundos contra
estos estilos de comunicaci6n. (author-supplied abstract)