THIRD DIVISION

FRANCISCO RAYOS, G.R. No. 169079

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA,* JJ.

ATTY. PONCIANO G. Promulgated:

HERNANDEZ,
Respondent. February 12, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review[1] of the Resolution dated 12 March 2005 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing petitioner Francisco Rayoss complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.

Respondent was the counsel of petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 entitled, Francisco
Rayos v. NAPOCOR, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan. The
complaint alleged, among other things, that the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) recklessly, imprudently and negligently opened the three floodgates of the
spillway of Angat Dam at midnight of 26 October 1978 until the early morning hours of 27
October 1978, during the occurrence of typhoon Kading causing the release of a great volume
of stored water, the resultant swelling and flooding of Angat River, and the consequent loss of
lives of some of petitioners relatives and destruction of his familys properties, for which he
sought damages. Of the 10 members of petitioners family who perished, only four bodies were
recovered and only petitioner and one of his sons, German Rayos, survived.

On 21 December 1979, the complaint was dismissed[2] on the ground that the State cannot
be sued without its consent as the operation and management of Angat Dam, Norzagaray, were
governmental functions. Said dismissal was questioned directly to this Court which set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the reinstatement of the complaint.[3]

On 30 April 1990, however, the complaint was dismissed again by the RTC for lack of
sufficient and credible evidence.[4]
 The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC
decision and awarded damages in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:

xxxx
2. In Civil Case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellant, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final
and executory, the following:

A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);

B. Moral Damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and

C. Litigation Expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

xxxx
In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiffs-appellants, attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total amount
awarded.[5]

The case was appealed to this Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals
Decision.[6] The Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory on 4 August 1993.

Thus, a Writ of Execution[7] was issued by the RTC on 10 December 1993, upon motion filed
by respondent. As a consequence, NAPOCOR issued Check No. 014710 dated 5 January 1994,
in the amount of P1,060,800.00 payable to petitioner. Thereafter, the check was turned over to
respondent as counsel of petitioner. Petitioner demanded the turn over of the check from
respondent, but the latter refused.

On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion[8] to direct respondent to
deliver to him the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the check in the amount of P1,060,800.00 from
respondent, claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the same as he was already
dismissed by petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993.[9] Respondent, on the other hand,
justifies his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorneys fees.

On 7 April 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing respondent to deliver the check to
the Sheriff of the court who will subsequently deliver it to petitioner. A Writ of Execution was
subsequently issued. Despite the Court Order, respondent refused to surrender the check.

However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited the amount of P502,838.79 with Farmers
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of petitioner which was
eventually received by the latter.

Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to
return the rest of the award in the amount of P557,961.21.

In his comment,[10] respondent alleged that he handled petitioners case, in Civil Case No.
SM-951, for 15 years, from the trial court up to the Supreme Court. On 21 November 1993, he
received a letter from petitioner dismissing him as counsel. Simultaneous thereto, respondent
received a letter dated 15 November 1993 from Atty. Jose G. Bruno asking him to comment on
the therein attached letter dated 19 November 1993 of petitioner addressed to NAPOCOR,
requesting that the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the
Supreme Court be paid to him.

Respondent also averred that petitioner had a verbal contract for attorneys fees on a
contingent basis and that the said contract was only reduced in writing on 6 October 1991, duly
signed by both of them. By virtue of the contract, petitioner and respondent supposedly agreed
on a 40%-60% sharing, respectively, of the court award. Respondent was entitled to receive
60% of the award because petitioner agreed to pay him 40% of the award as attorneys fees and
20% of the award as litigation expenses.

Respondent further asseverated that because petitioner dismissed the respondent and
refused to settle his obligation, he deposited the amount of P424,320.00 in a bank in petitioners
name under Account No. 381 (representing petitioners share of 40% of the total award) on 10
May 1994[11]; and the amount of P63,648.00 in petitioners name under Account No. 389
(representing petitioners share of 40% of the P159,120.00 awarded as attorneys fees by the
Court of Appeals) on 19 May 1994.[12]Petitioner already received the amount of P502,838.79 in
accordance with the RTC Order dated 7 April 1994.

Respondent contended that the petitioners complaint was without basis and was meant
only to harass and put him to shame before the residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.

In a Resolution dated 9 August 1995,[13] the Court referred the case to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

A series of hearings were conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, from March to September 2001.

On 1 February 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro B. Funa submitted

her Report and Recommendation,[14] recommending the dismissal of the case.

Thereafter, the IBP issued its Resolution dated 12 March 2005, approving and adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case lacks merit,
the same is hereby DISMISSED.[15]

We do not agree in the recommendation of the IBP.

The threshold issue in this petition is: whether respondent is justified in retaining the amount
awarded to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure payment of his attorneys fees.
 Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute
trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. [16] Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides as follows:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

In the case at bar, when respondent withheld and refused to deliver the NAPOCOR
check representing the amount awarded by the court in Civil Case No. SM-951, which he
received on behalf of his client (petitioner herein), he breached the trust reposed on him. It is
only after an Order was issued by the RTC ordering the delivery of the check to petitioner that
the respondent partially delivered the amount of P502,838.79 to the former, but still retaining
for himself the amount of P557,961.21 as payment for his attorneys fees. The claim of the
respondent that petitioner failed to pay his attorneys fees is not an excuse for respondents failure
to deliver the amount to the petitioner. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his
clients money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorneys fees. [17] The
failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general
morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyers unjustified withholding of money
belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.[18]

It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney
has the following rights;

Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphases
supplied.)

But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for
his client, as above-stated, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys
received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.[19] Thus, what respondent
should have properly done in the case at bar was to provide the petitioner with an accounting
before deducting his attorneys fees and then to turn over the remaining balance of the award
collected to petitioner. The Court notes that respondent represented petitioner from the time of
filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. SM-951 before what is now the RTC and of the appeal
of the same case to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. But respondent was not justified
to hold on the entire amount of award collected by him until his fees had been paid and received
by him.

The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special
trust and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his
relationship vis--vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he failed to render
an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf of his client and when he
refused to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorneys
fees had not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest
above that of his client.

We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants.[20] Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike
mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.[21]

A lawyer is not merely the defender of his clients cause and a trustee of his clients cause
of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in
the fundamental function of administering justice in society.[22] It follows that a lawyers
compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not
just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate
with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession
to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorneys oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits
himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.[23]

There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot just gloss over. Respondent
claimed that he charged petitioner, his client, a contingent fee comprising of forty percent
(40%) as attorneys fees and twenty percent (20%) as litigation expenses. The agreement
provides:

UNAWAIN NG LAHAT SA PAMAMAGITAN NITO:

Ako, si Francisco Rayos, Sr., Pilipino, may sapat na gulang at ngayon ay naninirahan sa
Pinagbarilan, Baliwag, Bulacan, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, ay nagpapatunay sa mga
sumusunod:

Na, kaugnay sa aking usapin laban sa NPC at Benjamin Chavez (Rayos vs. NPC, et al.)
na ngayon ay nakabinbin sa Court of Appeals, ako ay nakipagkasundo sa aking abogado, Atty.
Ponciano G. Hernandez, gaya ng sumusunod:

1 Sakaling ipanalo ang aking usapin, ang ano mang aking makukuha ay hahatiin gaya ng
sumusunod: 40% ang para sa akin; 40% ang para kay Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez; 20% ay
ilalabas bilang gastos sa kaso.

2. Kung matalo ako sa kaso ay wala akong sagutin sa aking abogado.

Sa katunayan ng lahat, ako ay lumagda sa kasunduang ito dito sa Norzagaray, Bulacan

ngayong ika-6 ng Oktubre 1991.

(SGD)PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ (SGD)FRANCISCO RAYOS

Abogado May Usapin[24]

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction[25] and is generally recognized as

valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. [26] The amount of contingent fee
agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit
fails.[27] Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor
client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no
means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the
contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress
for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.[28]
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in
order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.[29] Section 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics states that a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness. Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled

to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied.)

The reduction of unreasonable attorneys fees is within the regulatory powers of the
courts.[30] When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is
unreasonable, or found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or suppression
of facts on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract be disregarded to
protect the client from unreasonable exaction.[31]

There is, therefore, now a corollary issue of whether the stipulated attorneys fees are
unreasonable and unconscionable under the circumstances of the case as to warrant a reduction
thereof.

Stipulated attorneys fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so

disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud
perpetrated upon the client. This means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for,
standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been
taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him.[32]

The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a

contingent fee contract, will not, however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by
the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyers services.

Generally, the amount of attorneys fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement
which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation. A stipulation on a lawyers
compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of
fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount
unreasonable or unconscionable.[33] In the absence thereof, the amount of attorneys fees is fixed
on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys services. Courts may
ascertain also if the attorneys fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances.[34] In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness

of a claim for attorneys fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered;
(2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business
in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or
the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the
skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character
and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or
contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it
is contingent than when it is not;[35] and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the
client have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee.[36]

Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following
factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

In the case at bar, respondent retained the amount of P557,961.21 out of

the P1,060,800.00 award for damages paid by NAPOCOR to petitioner. Under the said scheme,
respondent actually collected fifty-three percent (53%) or more than half of the total amount
due the petitioner; indeed, he appropriated for himself more than the amount which he had
already turned over to and actually received by his client.

As adverted to above, we note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and hopeless
with the tragic loss of his loved ones caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray,
Bulacan, on 26-27 October 1978 because of the negligent release by NAPOCOR of the water
through the spillways of the Angat Dam. Petitioner also had to face the loss and destruction of
his familys properties. Under such circumstances and given his understandable desire to recover
the damages for the loss of his loved ones and properties, petitioner would easily succumb and
readily agree to the demands of respondent lawyer regarding his attorneys fees.
 We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts
obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when
considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair
advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him. Lawyers
should not be permitted to get a lions share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless.
Contracts for legal services between the helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to
the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to
guard a client,[37] especially an aged and necessitous client,[38] against such a contract.

A survey of existing jurisprudence regarding attorneys fees would reveal the following:
in the case of Amalgamated Laborers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations,[39] the rate of
attorneys fees allowed was 25%; in Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of
Appeals,[40] the rate allowed was 20%; in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco,[41] 25%; in Santiago
v. Dimayuga,[42] 20%; in Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,[43] 15%; in Reyes v. Court
of Appeals,[44] 15%; and in Social Security Commission v. Almeda,[45] 15%.

In the present case, respondent Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a
favorable decision for his client, the petitioner. At first, respondent failed to obtain a favorable
judgment in the RTC as the case was dismissed. But on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
RTC Decision was reversed and petitioner was awarded the amount of P1,060,800.00 as
damages and P159,120.00 as attorneys fees. Said award was sustained by the Supreme
Court. We also take note respondents efforts in litigating petitioners case for a long period of 15
years. Lastly, the respondent took risk in representing petitioner on a contingent fee basis.

In consideration of the foregoing, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner

would be a fair compensation for respondents legal services.

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, renders him
unworthy to the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.[46]
The court should also exercise a sound discretion in determining whether a lawyer should
be disbarred or merely suspended. It should bear in mind that admission to the Bar is obtained
only after years of labor and study and the office acquired often becomes the source of great
honor and emolument to its possessor. To most members of the legal profession, it is a means of
support for themselves and their families. To deprive one of such an office is often to decree
poverty to the lawyer and destitution to his family. [47] Disbarment, therefore, should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired.[48]

In the case of Schulz v. Atty. Flores,[49] a lawyer was suspended for six months for not
returning his clients money despite demands, for unjustifiably refusing to return his clients
papers, and for collecting excessive and unreasonable fees. Also in the case of Tanhueco v. Atty.
De Dumo,[50] a lawyer was suspended for a period of six months for failure to return the money
received by him on behalf of his client and for collecting excessive and unconscionable fees.

Guided by our rulings in the abovestated cases, suspension of respondent for six months
is justified in the case at bar.
 WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys oath and of serious professional

misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely;

2. Respondent is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to THIRTY-FIVE

PERCENT (35%) of the total amount awarded[51] to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-
951; and

3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred
Nine Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (P290,109.21),[52] which he retained in excess of
what we herein declared as fair and reasonable attorneys fees, plus legal interest from
date of finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of the
Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Leave
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
On leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-24.
[2]
Records, Vol. III, p. 66.
[3]
Id. at 89.
[4]
Id. at 125.
[5]
Id. at 198-201.
[6]
Promulgated 21 May 1993.
[7]
Records, Vol. III, pp. 224-226.
[8]
Id. at 243-245.
[9]
Id. at 239.
[10]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 45-49.
[11]
Records, Vol. III, p. 233.
[12]
Id. at 234.
[13]
Records, Vol. I, p. 75.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 28-34.
[15]
Id. at 27.
[16]
Aya v. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11 (1932).
[17]
Cabigao v. Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20, 23 (1932).
[18]
Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores, 443 Phil. 490, 494 (2003); Reyes v. Maglaya, 313 Phil. 1, 7 (1995).
[19]
Tanhueco v. De Dumo, A.C. No. 1437, 25 April 1989, 172 SCRA 760, 767.
[20]
Canon 1, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
[21]
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 86100-03, 23 January 1990, 181 SCRA 367, 377,
citing Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 173-174.
[22]
Pineda v. Atty. De Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, 23 August 2006.
[23]
Sumaoang v. Judge, RTC, Br. XXXI, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 78173, 26 October 1992, 215 SCRA 136, 143.
[24]
Records, Vol. I, p. 53.
[25]
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90983, 27 September 1991, 202 SCRA 16, 24.
[26]
Corpus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40424, 30 June 1980, 98 SCRA 424, 441.
[27]
Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 884, 893 (1995).
[28]
Director of Lands v. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096, 27 February 1979, 88 SCRA 513, 524.
[29]
Licudan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91958, 24 January 1991, 193 SCRA 293, 300; Director of Lands v. Ababa, id. at 525.
[30]
Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. v. International Corporate Bank, G.R. Nos. 77042-43, 28 February 1990, 182 SCRA 862, 868.
[31]
Felices v. Madrilejos, 51 Phil. 24, 33 (1927); Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422, 424 (1933).
[32]
Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27 at 894.
[33]
Rule 138, Section 24, Revised Rules of Court; Francisco v. Matias, 119 Phil. 351, 358 (1964); Lopez v. Pan American World
Airways, 123 Phil. 256, 271 (1966).
[34]
Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27 at 894.
[35]
Research and Services Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 652, 668 (1997).
[36]
Taganas v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118746, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 133, 137.
[37]
Tanhueco v. De Dumo, supra note 19 at 772.
[38]
Article 24, Civil Code of the Philippines.
[39]
131 Phil. 374, 386 (1968).
[40]
Supra note 25 at 25.
[41]
G.R. No. L-27033, 31 October 1969, 30 SCRA 187, 193.
[42]
113 Phil. 902, 905 (1961).
[43]
122 Phil. 648, 651 (1965).
[44]
202 Phil. 172, 173 (1982).
[45]
G.R. No. L-75428, 14 December 1988, 168 SCRA 474, 481.
[46]
Po Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 1, 13.
[47]
Pineda, Ernesto, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1994 Edition), p. 280.
[48]
Lim v. Montano, A.C. No. 5653, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA 192, 202.
[49]
462 Phil. 601 (2003).
[50]
Supra note 19.
[51]
P1060,800.00 as damages and P159,120.00 (15% of P1,060,800.00) as attorneys fees or a total of P1,219,920.00.
[52]
35% of P1,219,920.00 is P426,972.00. Since respondent retained P557,961.21 and P159,120.00 and 35% of P1,219,920.00
is P 426,972.00, respondent will return the difference of P290,109.21 to petitioner. The amount of P557,961.21
and P159,120.00 retained by respondent is actually 59% of the amount due to petitioner in Civil Case No. 951.