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Presentation attack detection on visible

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 Presentation Attack Detection on Visible Spectrum Iris Recognition by
Exploring Inherent Characteristics of Light Field Camera
R. Raghavendra Christoph Busch
Norwegian Biometric Laboratory, Gjøvik University College, Norway
Email: raghavendra.ramachandra, christoph.busch @hig.no
Abstract
Presentation (or spoof) attacks on biometric system is
a growing concern that received substantial attention from
both academics and industry. In this paper, we present a
novel way of addressing a Presentation Attack Detection
(PAD) (or spoof detection) by exploiting the inherent char-
acteristics of the Light Field Camera (LFC) for visible spec-
trum iris biometric system. The proposed PAD algorithm
will capture the variation in the depth (or focus) between
multiple depth images rendered by the LFC that in turn can
be used to reveal the presentation attacks. To this extent, we
introduce a new presentation attack database comprised of
52 subjects with 104 unique eye samples. The database is
collected using LFC by simulating the attacks through visi-
ble spectrum iris biometric artefacts like printed photo and
electronic display (using both Apple iPad (4th generation)
and Samsung Galaxy Note 10.1 tablet). Extensive experi-
ments carried out on this database reveal the efficacy of the
proposed PAD algorithm with a lowest Average Classifica-
tion Error Rate = 0.5% when confronted with diverse set of
attacks on visible spectrum iris biometric system.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the adoptability of the biometric system
for several security applications has seen not only rapid de-
velopment but also large-scale deployment in real-life sce-
narios. Even though, the biometric system can provide a
reliable, user identification scheme, these systems are vul-
nerable, particularly at the sensor level due to different kind
of presentation attacks. The goal of the presentation attack
is to subvert a biometric system by presenting a biometric
artefact that is replicating the biometric characteristic of an
enrolled data subject. With the evolving technology in cre-
ating biometric artefacts (or spoofs), the vulnerability of the
This work is funded by the EU 7th Framework Program under grant
agreement no 284862 for the large-scale integrated project FIDELITY.
biometric system irrespective of the adopted modality is at
risk.
Among the available biometric modalities, the visible
spectrum iris biometric system is more vulnerable to the
presentation attack.The easiest way one can attack the vis-
ible spectrum iris biometric system especially at the sen-
sor level is by simply presenting the iris biometric arte-
fact generated using a photograph of the eye image (or
video) or by presenting an electronic screen display using
tablet or mobile phones. The feasibility of these attacks are
acknowledged by the number of available research works
[10, 5, 4, 18, 6, 14, 7] that strongly dictates the importance
of detecting these attacks. Further, various iris PAD detec-
tion competitions [1, 2] were organized recently, which also
shows the importance of this problem.
Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) (or counter mea-
sure or spoof detection or anti-spoofing) algorithms at the
sensor level can be broadly classified into two groups [4]:
(1) Hardware based (2) Software based. The idea of the
hardware based approach is to include additional hardware
component as a supporting device with the actual iris sensor
that can perform the PAD. In [14], the PAD is carried out by
employing a multiple light source to measure the variation
of reflectance between iris and sclera region. The attack
detection based on Oculomotor Plant Characteristics (OPC)
to capture the saccadic eye movements using eye tracker is
presented in [13]. A new hardware setup to capture a stereo
image of visible spectrum iris to detect the attack especially
by presenting a cosmetic contact lens is introduced in [7].
In case of software based approach, the presentation at-
tacks are detected after the data was captured by the sen-
sor. The majority of the available state-of-the-art schemes
are especially devoted to near infrared iris. Most of these
available software based PAD schemes are based on ana-
lyzing the statistical characteristics of the observed iris pat-
tern. These observed iris pattern are further quantified to
reflect the quality of the captured image with the intent to
possibly reveal the presence of the presentation attack. The
potential of the image quality assessment to reliably de-
tect the presentation attack is presented in [4], in which
25 well established image quality measures are success- Normal Accept/Reject
Proposed Iris Recognition
fully employed to detect the photo print attack. The use of Light Field
PAD
Camera Reject
the frequency spectrum [10], time-frequency analysis using Algorithm
Artefact
Attack Detection

wavelet packets [6], combining different quality factors like

contrast (both local and global), analysis of purkinje reflec-
tion [15], analyzing pupil dilation [3] and statistical texture Figure 1. Block diagram of the proposed attack resistant visible
features obtained using Gray-Level-Co-occurrence-Matrix spectrum iris recognition pipeline
[18] are well explored.
In this work, we address the presentation attacks on visi-
ble spectrum iris recognition by exploring the inherent char-
acteristics of the light field camera (LFC). Adopting the
LFC as a biometric capture device will permit one to ex-
plore its unique characteristics of rendering a multiple fo-
cus images that can be obtained in a single capture. This
property of the LFC was well explored in recent litera-
ture on both face [17] and iris recognition [20, 16, 12],
which have shown the increased biometric performance of
the LFC based systems over conventional biometric sen-
sors. In this work, we explore an intuitive way of exploiting
these multiple depth images rendered by the LFC to extract
the information about the presence of an artefact (or spoof).
To achieve this, we measure the variation of focus between
multiple depth images rendered by the LFC. At the outset
following are the main contribution of this work: (1) We
present a unique perspective by exploring the variation of
focus between multiple depth images rendered by the LFC
to detect the presentation attacks on visible spectrum iris
biometric system. This is the first work that explores this
unique inherent characteristic of the LFC for PAD in the
visible spectrum iris biometric systems. (2) We contribute
to the biometric community a new relatively large scale (a) (b) (c)
database comprised of both normal (or real) and artefact
(or spoof) samples of visible spectrum iris collected from Figure 2. Multiple depth (or focus) image rendered by the LFC on
52 subjects constituting 104 unique eye patterns. The arte- the normal (or real) image capture (a) normal (or real) eye image
facts are generated using both high resolution capture of eye (b) Iris segmentation (c) Iris normalization
image using Canon EOS 550D DSLR camera and also the
all-in-focus image obtained using LFC images. This is the
sists of two main components namely (1) Proposed PAD
unique artefact (or spoof) database collected using LFC so
algorithm (2) Visible spectrum iris recognition (or baseline
far. (3) Extensive experiments are carried out on our LFC
system).
database that demonstrates an outstanding performance of
the proposed PAD algorithm in mitigating the presentation 2.1. Proposed PAD algorithm
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 In this section, we present our proposed scheme for ro-
presents the proposed PAD using LFC, Section 3 describe bust presentation attack detection on visible spectrum iris
the details of our new visible spectrum iris artefact database recognition. We exploit the property of LFC to generate a
and companion protocols, Section 4 discuss the experimen- multiple depth (or focus) image in a single capture attempt.
tal results and Section 5 draws the conclusion. Thus, our idea is to capture this variation of focus or depth
exhibited between multiple depth images that can provide
2. Presentation attack resistant visible spec- possible information about the presence of the presentation
trum iris recognition attack. In this work, we are focusing not only on the cost
effective and easier attacks, but also on the well adopted
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of the presentation at- and accepted presentation attacks carried out using either a
tack resistant visible spectrum iris recognition system based photo (printed using a laser printer) or an electronic screen
on Light Field Camera (LFC). The proposed scheme con- (image displayed using a tablet). Hence, the artefacts that

(c)
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Multiple depth (or focus) image rendered by the LFC on
the artefact image capture (a) Artefact eye image (b) Iris segmen-
tation (c) Iris normalization
have been used in our work appear to represent an in-plane
object when compared to the normal (or real) eye images.
Therefore, the use of LFC as a biometric sensor to capture
these visible spectrum eye artefacts will reflect less vari-
ation in depth when compared to that of normal (or real)
eye images. Thus, it is our assertion that, by accurately
capturing these variation in terms of focus along multiple
depth images rendered by the LFC should certainly reveal
the presence of an attack.
Figure 2 - 3 illustrates the multiple depth images ren-
dered by the LFC on both normal (or real) and artefact
(photo print) eye image respectively. The artefact image
shown in the Figure 3 is generated from the normal (or real)
image shown in the Figure 2 by printing it on a good qual-
ity paper using a laser printer which in turn is captured us-
ing LFC. Here, one can observe two interesting facts: (1)
a larger number of depth images can be obtained from the
normal (or live captured) biometric characteristic capture
process when compared with the artefact capture process.
(2) variation of the focus (or depth) information between
multiple depth images is noted more with normal (or real)
image when compared to that of the artefact image. These
observations further justifies our idea of capturing the vari-
ation of focus between multiple depth images to reliably
carryout the PAD.
Pre-processing
Depth image 1 and
Focus estimation
Pre-processing
Estimating
Depth image 2 and Classification
variation in focus
Focus estimation
Pre-processing
Depth image N and
Focus estimation
Figure 4. Block diagram of the proposed PAD algorithm
Figure 4 shows the block diagram of the proposed PAD
algorithm based on capturing the variation of focus between
multiple depth images. The proposed scheme can be struc-
tured in three important steps namely: (1) Pre-processing
and focus estimation (2) Estimating variation in focus (3)
Classification.
2.1.1 Pre-processing and focus estimation
Given the eye image I captured using LFC a series of pre-
processing steps are carried out to obtain the normalized iris
image on which the focus is determined. To this extent, we
employed the open source algorithm OSIRIS V 4.1 [19] to
carry out the iris segmentation and normalization. Figure 2
(b) & (c) shows the qualitative results of iris segmentation
and normalization obtained using OSIRIS V 4.1 on normal
(or real) eye image respectively. Similar results can also
be visualized for the artefact eye image in Figure 3 (b) &
(c). The use of LFC to capture an eye image I will re-
sult in multiple depth images such that I = I1 , I2 , . . . , Ik ,
where k corresponds to the number of depth images. We
then perform the pre-processing (segmentation and normal-
ization) on each of these depth images rendered by the
LFC to obtain the corresponding normalized iris image as:
IN or = {IN or1 , IN or2 , . . . , IN ork }.
In the next step, we measure the focus by computing the
energy using the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) with
a Haar mother wavelet [11]. We choose this approach by
considering its many advantages that include (1) Monotonic
quantitative value with respect to the focus. Thus a higher
degree of focus in the image will result in a greater value
of the energy. (2) This measure is robust to noise. (3) low
computational costs [17]. Given the normalized iris depth
image IN or1 , we first carry out the DWT to obtain the four
different sub-images namely: approximate (IaN or1 ), hori-
zontal (IhN or1 ), vertical (IvN or1 ) and diagonal (IdN or1 ).
We then compute the energy corresponding to three differ-
ent DWT sub-images IhN or1 , IvN or1 and IdN or1 as:
R X
X C
EhN or1 = (IhN or1 (x, y))2 (1)
x=1 y=1
R X
X C
EvN or1 = (IvN or1 (x, y))2 (2)
x=1 y=1
R X
X C
EdN or1 = (IdN or1 (x, y))2 (3)
Normal x=1 y=1
Artefact Finally compute the total energy that can measure the
focus of the normalized image IN or1 as : F EN or1 =
EhN or1 + EvN or1 + EdN or1 . We repeat this pro-
cedure on the remaining normalized depth images to
obtain their corresponding energy values as: F E =
{F EN or1 , F EN or2 , . . . , F EN ork }.
2.1.2 Estimating variation in focus
After computing the energy value corresponding to multi-
ple depth images rendered by the LFC, we proceed fur-
ther to compute the quantitative value that can reflect the
variation in focus between these depth images. In this
work, we first normalize the energy value corresponding
to each depth image in F E using the sigmoid normaliza-
tion [9] to obtain the corresponding normalized energy as:
N F E = {N F EN or1 , N F EN or2 , . . . , N F EN ork }. In the
next step, we sort the normalized energy N F E in the de-
scending order as SN = {Sn1 , Sn2 , . . . , Snk }. We then
compute the variation in focus by obtaining the consecu-
tive difference of these normalized and sorted energy value
corresponding to the multiple depth images as follows:
V F = Sn1 − Sn2 − . . . − Snk (4)
Where, V F represents the qualitative value that can de-
scribe the variation in focus of the normalized iris image
IN or .
2.1.3 Classification
In this work we employed a simple yet accurate classifier
based on an empirically determined threshold. The value
of V F is compared against the threshold value to classify
IN or as either an artefact (or spoof) or a normal (or real)
(or live) image. The value of threshold is obtained on the
development database as explained in section 3.3.
2.2. Visible spectrum iris recognition system
The baseline visible spectrum iris recognition system
employed in this work is based on the Local Binary Patterns
(LBPu23×3 ) and Sparse Representation Classifier (SRC). We
employed this algorithm by considering its improved per-
formance over existing state-of-the-art algorithms on the
visible spectrum light field iris recognition [16]. Since, the
LFC will render multiple depth images and employing all
these images for recognition is not very useful from a com-
putation perspective. In recent literature two ways in which
the information from these depth images can be combined
have been proposed namely: (1) All-in-focus image con-
struction [16] (2) Selection of the best focus image based
on the highest energy [12]. Since the performance accu-
racy of these two schemes are quite similar, in this work,
we adopt the second scheme which is based on selecting
the best focus image corresponding to the highest energy.
As we already computed the energy on each of these focus
images rendered by the LFC (see Section 2.1) we can select
the best focus image without any additional computational
cost. Thus our final baseline visible spectrum iris recogni-
tion system is based on the best focus image on which the
combination of LBPu2 3×3 and SRC is carried out to obtain
the comparison score.
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Illustration of data collection set up (a) Normal (or real)
image acquisition setup (b) Artefact image acquisition setup
3. Database construction
Our visible spectrum iris artefact database consists of
both normal (or real) and artefact samples collected from
52 subjects resulting in 104 unique eye samples. In the fol-
lowing, we present the data collection protocols adopted to
collect both normal (or real) and artefact iris samples. Fur-
ther, we also present the evaluation protocols that can be
used to benchmark the effectiveness of the proposed PAD
algorithm on the visible spectrum iris recognition.
3.1. Normal (or real) visible spectrum iris data col-
lection
The normal (or real) visible spectrum iris data collection
is carried out at our laboratory in an indoor scenario that
has both natural (sun) and artificial (room) lighting. The
data collection is carried out over a period of 6 months in
a single session. Figure 5 (a) shows the normal (or real)
image acquisition setup. Each subject is asked to stand in
front of the capture device at a distance of 9-15 inches from
the camera. We then capture the samples using two differ-
ent cameras namely: (1) Lytro LFC with 1.2 Megapixel. (2)
Canon EOS 550D DSLR camera with 18.1 Megapixel. For
each subject, we collected 5 different samples using both
Lytro LFC and Canon DSLR camera independently. Our
idea of using Canon DSLR camera is only to generate the
high quality artefacts that will be explained in the next sec-
tion. The whole database consists of 520 (= 104 × 5) high
resolution DSLR eye images and 4327 normal (or real) light
field eye images (including multiple depth images).
3.2. Artefact visible spectrum iris data collection
The artefact visible spectrum iris database are captured
using only Lytro LFC by reflecting a similar acquisition
conditions that was followed while capturing the normal (or
real) iris image. Figure 5 (b) illustrates the collection of the
artefact image captured by the electronic screen attack. In
this work, we generate the artefacts on both high resolution
DSLR camera samples as well as the light field camera sam-
ples. We are motivated to include these attacks using high
resolution eye samples because: (1) an attacker can easily
obtain the high resolution eye images (at least cropped from
face image) that can be obtained from the wide spread so-
cial media or captured in a non-intrusive way without get-
ting notice of the legitimate user. (2) it is not only easy and
cost effective but can also successfully subvert the visible
spectrum iris biometric system.
For high resolution samples captured using the DSLR
camera, we generate the artefacts using three different
methods namely: (1) Photo print artefact: Here, every
high quality sample captured using DSLR camera is first
printed on a good quality A4 paper using RICOH ATICIO
MP C4502 laser printer and then recaptured using Lytro
LFC. This procedure resulted in a print artefact database
with 1122 light field samples (each consisting of multiple
depth images) corresponding to 520 high resolution DSLR
samples. (2) Screen artefact using iPad: Here, we record
the artefacts by displaying each DSLR captured image us-
ing iPad(4th generation) with retina display to the Lytro
LFC as shown in Figure 5 (b). This artefact database con-
sists of 1444 light field samples (each consisting of multiple
depth images) corresponding to 520 high resolution DSLR
camera samples. (3) Screen artefact using Samsung Galaxy
Note 10.1: In order to more effectively analyze the effect of
electronic screen attacks, we consider to collect the artefact
samples using Samsung Galaxy note 10.1. Here, we capture
the artefact samples by storing the high quality samples cap-
tured using DSLR in the Samsung tablet that in turn will be
presented to the LFC. This database is comprised of 1208
light field samples including multiple depth images. Figure
6 shows the examples of the artefact images captured us-
ing iPad (fig:Figure6 (b)), Samsung tablet (6 (c)) and photo
print (6 (d)). While Figure 6 (a) shows the corresponding
normal (or real) image.
Natural Image Artefact Images
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6. Illustration of artefacts generated from DSLR images (a)
Normal (or real) images (b) iPad (c) Samsung tablet (d) Photo print
In addition to the above mentioned artefact generation
using high quality print-outs of the enrolled iris samples, we
also consider to generate the artefacts using normal (or real)
samples collected using LFC. This will allow one to study
the impact of the presentation attack in which an attacker
will successfully get access to the enrolled sample of the le-
gitimate user and later the same sample will be used to gen-
erate the artefact to subvert the biometric sensor (i.e. LFC).
Since our baseline system will use only the best focus im-
Natural Image Artefact Image
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7. Illustration of artefacts generated from best focus images
obtained from the Lytro LFC (a) normal (or real) image (b) iPad
(c) Samsung tablet
age selected from the set of multiple focus image rendered
by the LFC, we used the best focus image corresponding to
each subject to generate the corresponding artefact sample.
For simplicity, here we generate the artefact sample by pre-
senting the best focus sample using both iPad and Samsung
tablet one at a time to the Lytro LFC. The artefact image
database collected using an iPad will result in a total of 1860
light field samples while the use of Samsung tablet resulted
in a total of 1973 light field samples. Figure 7 shows the
examples of the artefacts captured from LFC using iPad (7
(b)) and Samsung tablet (7 (c)).
3.3. Performance evaluation protocol
In this section, we describe the performance evaluation
protocol to effectively analyze the prominence of our gen-
erated visible spectrum iris artefacts and also to bench-
mark the performance of our proposed PAD algorithm. The
whole database of 104 unique iris is divided into three in-
dependent non-overlapping groups namely: training, devel-
opment and testing. The training set consists of 4 unique
eyes, development set consist of 20 unique eyes and test-
ing set consists of 80 unique eyes. In this work, we em-
ployed the development set to tune the proposed PAD al-
gorithm and also to fix the value of the threshold which is
further used for the PAD classification. The value of the
threshold adopted in this work corresponds to the Equal Er-
ror Rate (EER) calculated on the development dataset. The
test dataset should be solely used to report the performance
of the proposed PAD algorithm. Further, in order to evalu-
ate the vulnerability of the visible spectrum iris recognition
system for the artefacts collected in this work, we further
divide both development and testing dataset into reference
and probe samples. In this work, we have collected 5 sam-
ples for each subject, we choose the first four samples as
reference and the last sample as the probe. With this setting
of reference and probe, we report the baseline performance
with normal (or real) visible spectrum iris biometric sam-
ples. While, to study the vulnerability of the system for the
 0.25
Genuine Scores
Baseline
Imposter Scores
Artefact attack Scores Baseline under attack
60
0.2 Baseline with proposed PAD

40

False Non Match Rate (in %)

Number of Attempts

0.15

20
0.1

10

0.05 5

2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1
Score Bins
0.5
Figure 8. Overlapped comparison scores obtained on normal and
artefact (photo print) (best viewed in color) 0.2
0.1
0.050.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40 60
False Match Rate (in %)

presentation attacks we employ the artefact samples (gener- Figure 9. Verification performance of the proposed PAD on photo
ated as mentioned in Section 3.2) as the probe samples. print artefact corresponding to DSLR samples (best viewed in
color)
3.4. Availability of database
The database shall be distributed for the academic situation illustrated in Figure 8 the baseline system has ac-
and research purposes via: http:/www.nislab.no/ cepted 96.78% of artefact samples as the genuine samples.
biometrics_lab/guc_lf_viar_db. This illustrates not only the quality of the artefact employed
in this work but also the strong need of an efficient and ro-
4. Experiments and results bust PAD algorithm.
Experimental results presented in this work is carried out Figure 9 shows the verification performance of the base-
according to the protocol presented in the Section 3.3. The line visible spectrum iris system under attack (photo print).
performance of the proposed PAD algorithm is measured It can be observed here that, despite the good performance
using two kind of errors [8] namely: (1) Attack Presenta- of the baseline system (with EER = 2.26% shown in green
tion Classification Error Rate (APCER), which is reporting color) on normal (or real) samples, when exposed to the at-
the proportion of attack presentation (with a fake or arte- tack the performance is heavily deceived (as shown in red
fact) that are incorrectly classified as normal (real) presen- color). This fact can be attributed to the strong overlapping
tation. (2) Normal Presentation Classification Error Rate of genuine and artefact comparison scores as shown in Fig-
(NPCER), which is reporting the proportion of normal pre- ure 8. Further, it can also be observed from Figure 9 that,
sentation incorrectly classified as attacks. Finally, the per- the implication of the proposed PAD algorithm that can mit-
formance of the overall PAD algorithm is presented in terms igate the presentation attacks will bring back the baseline
of Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) such that, performance to the normal level (indicated by the overlap-
ping of green and blue lines in the Figure 9). Similar results
AP CER + N P CER can also be observed with the iPad attack that uses lytro
ACER = (5)
2 samples as shown in Figure 10. We illustrated these two
cases for simplicity, however similar observation can also
The lower the values of the ACER, the better is the
be made with all five kinds of attacks that are addressed in
performance. The value of APCER, NPCER and ACER
this work.
are computed with the classifier threshold. The classifier
threshold is calculated on the development dataset such that Table 1. Performance of the proposed PAD algorithm
the threshold value corresponds to the point where APCER Presentation attacks PAD Performance Measure (%)
and NPCER are equal (nothing but an EER as mentioned in APCER NPCER ACER
the Section 3.3) on the development dataset. Photo Print 0.25 0.75 0.50
Artefacts from DSLR samples iPad 1.50 0.50 1.00
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the comparison scores
Samsung Tablet 0.75 0.50 0.62
obtained using the baseline visible spectrum iris system on
Artefacts from Lytro samples iPad 1.20 3.70 2.45
both normal (or real) and artefact (photo print attack) sam-
Samsung Tablet 1.40 0.90 1.15
ples. Here, one can observe the strong overlapping of the
artefact comparison scores with the genuine comparison
scores obtained on the normal (or real) samples. With the Table 1 presents the quantitative performance of the pro-

60
40
False Non Match Rate (in %)
20
10
5 References
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1
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.050.1 0.2 0.5 1 2
False Match Rate (in %)
Figure 10. Verification performance of the proposed PAD on iPad
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posed PAD scheme on all five kinds of attacks discussed
in this work. Quantitative results shown in the Table 1 are
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the whole database into training, development and testing
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the print attack with ACER of 0.5%. In addition, similar
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In addition the proposed PAD algorithm can offer the
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schemes. (2) Overcomes the need of additional feature ex-
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is highly computationally efficient.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a novel PAD algorithm
that exploits the variation of the depth between multiple
depth images rendered by the LFC. This work explores the
inherent characteristics of the LFC that can reveal the pres-
ence of the presentation attacks. To this extent, we collected
a new artefact visible spectrum iris database by simulating
five different kind of attacks. The artefacts are generated us-
ing both high quality visible spectrum iris samples obtained
using DSLR camera in addition to the light field iris sam-
Baseline ples. The attacks are carried out by presenting these arte-
Baseline under attack facts using photo print and electronic screens (using iPad
Baseline with proposed PAD
and Samsung tablet) to the LFC that is used as the biomet-
ric sensor for the visible spectrum iris recognition system.
Extensive experiments carried out on our database has re-
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