Kopp 1

Operation Barbarossa and Intelligence

Operation Barbarossa was the massive Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union. It

began on 22 June 1941, and opened up the eastern front of World War II. It was truly a huge

undertaking by the Germans, and intelligence and intelligence services played a huge role for

both sides. In this paper I will be discussing the intelligence used, and the intelligence errors of

both sides, starting with the Soviet Union, and then moving on to Germany.

Three months to the day after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which was a peace

agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, Adolf Hitler told a select group of high-

ranking Nazi officers that once they were finished with the conquest of Western Europe, he

would turn their attention to conquering the Soviet Union. This conquest of Western Europe

culminated when on June 17 1940, France, after being completely taken over by Germany, sued

for peace.1 Just over one year later, on June 22 1941, three million German troops began to

invade the U.S.S.R., in what was the largest theatre of war in human history. This surprised the

Soviet Union, and as a result of this they suffered many defeats in the early stages of the

invasion. However, this surprise definitely did not come from a lack of intelligence information

that they had.2 The Soviet Union had an astounding amount of evidence that pointed towards a

German invasion, but failed to do anything about it. They received many intelligence reports,

signals that the Germans were preparing to invade, and warning from third-party countries.

The Soviet Union did have some high quality intelligence agents, some of whom were

working in Germany in the months leading up to the invasion. One of these agents was named

Arvid Harnack, and his codename was “Corscian”. He was an agent who provided the Soviet

1
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg. 111
2
Ibid

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Union with detailed reports on the upcoming German invasion. The NKGB, which was the

current intelligence agency in the Soviet Union, received no fewer than 41 reports in the months

leading up to the attack from “Corscian” and its other most useful Berlin agent, codename

“Sergeant-Major”.3 An NKVD report which was dated no earlier than October 1940 stated that

“Corscian” had met up with a staff officer at the German high command, who said that war with

the Soviet Union would begin at the start of next year. Another separate source said that it would

begin within six months.4 “Corscian” was eventually caught and arrested by the Gestapo in 1942,

and was subsequently executed.

Another important intelligence agent the Soviets had was Richard Sorge, and agent

working in Japan. He gave detailed reports on Barbarossa, saying:

“Hitler is fully determined to make war upon and destroy the USSR in order to acquire

the European area of the USSR as a raw materials and grain base (…) the decision about

hostilities will be taken by Hitler in May.”

As well as this, he gave another report, saying in this one:

“Nine armies consisting of 150 divisions will be concentrated against the USSR.”5

The Soviet Union also received signals from the Nazis that they were planning for a large

scale invasion. In August of 1940, German troops were re-deployed on the eastern border facing

the Soviet Union. By the end of October the number of German divisions facing the Soviet

Union increased from 15 to 33.6 In February of the next year there were 70 divisions, and by

3
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
pg. 136
4
Ibid pg. 137
5
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg. 114
6
Erickson, John and David Dilks. Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies Edinburgh University Press, 1994. Pg. 45

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June 1 it had increased even more to 80. Finally, the day before the invasion, June 21 1941, there

were 123 German divisions facing down the Soviet Union. These were massive military

movements that definitely did not go unnoticed. They were detected Soviet, Japanese, Polish and

British intelligence organizations.7 These movements were noted by Soviet Military commander

Filip Golikov. He identified these movements in a report on 15 April 1941, saying:

“A major transfer of troops (…) by railway, roads, motor columns and organized marches

between 1 and 15 April, from the heart of Germany, from the western districts of east

Prussia and from the General Gubernia [German-occupied former Poland] towards the

Soviet borders.”8

By the end of April 1941, Golikov sought advice not from Stalin, but from General Tupikov,

who was the Soviet military attaché in Berlin. Tupikov had sent 150 telegrams that all mirrored

the reports that the NKGB had been getting about the German deployment.9

Warnings about the upcoming invasion also came from the United States of America and

from Great Britain. The United States had intercepted a Japanese telegram of March 19,

indicating a change in German-Soviet relations. As well as this, two telegrams from Berlin were

intercepted, which clearly outlined Germany’s preparation for war with the Soviet Union, as well

as an army signal intelligence service memorandum on March 22 that called for a German attack

would be coming within two months.10

7
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg. 112
8
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
Pg. 141
9
Ibid pg. 145
10
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg.
113

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So with all of this information, with all of these signals, intelligence reports and

warnings, why did the invasion still come as a shock to the Soviet Union? They definitely had

enough to go off of and could have done a much better job preparing for Barbarossa, but they did

not. This was due to many reasons. First, not all of the reports that the Soviet Union received

were credible. This created quite a bit of doubt on the ones that were credible, which made the

Soviet Union question whether or not they could trust them.11

Another reason that the Soviet Union was so ill-prepared for the German invasion was

because of the chief of Soviet military intelligence, Filipp Ivanovich Golikov. Golikov only sent

the intelligence reports that he received to Stalin. That means that several other high-ranking

officers in the Soviet Union were not able to see what intelligence reports were coming in, about

all of the signs that the invasions was on the horizon. Probably the main reason that Stalin hired

Golikov is because they shared political views and stances. Both of them believed that it was all

a British plot to start a German-Soviet war. They believed that war with Germany was still

several years away and that all of the intelligence reports that they were getting were being

created by the British. They believed that the British were doing this because they were losing

the war, and if Germany also went to war with the Soviet Union, they would be fighting on two

fronts, which would allow them to have more of an advantage against their opponents. In a 21

March 1941 report from Golikov to Stalin, Golikov outlined his beliefs about all of the

intelligence reports that they had been receiving. He said to Stalin:

11
Ibid

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“Rumours and documents to the effect that war against the U.S.S.R. is inevitable this

spring should be regarded as misinformation coming from the English or perhaps even

the German intelligence service.”12

This shows of how suspicious and delusional Golikov was of not only the British, but the

Germans as well. But more suspicious and delusional than Golikov was Josef Stalin.

Stalin’s actions towards all of the reports that the Soviet Union were getting were most

likely the main reason that they were so ill-prepared for the invasion. Stalin desperately did not

want to provoke the Germans.13 This led him to into a strong state of denial, where he had an

overinflated idea of his own importance and ability, as a result of this slipped into a state where

he would ignore, disregard, dismiss and not even look at any information that contradicted his

formed view, this view being that war with Germany was not on the horizon, and was still

several years away at least.14 There were other officers who were in a position to talk Stalin out

of his denial, but all of those closest to him were scared to do so, as going against their leader

could result in an arrest, imprisonment, and even execution.

Stalin would consistently reject the raw intelligence that was coming in in favour of his

own beliefs on the war. For example, when receiving the detailed intelligence reports from

Richard Sorge, Stalin had a response that was more tailored to what he thought of Sorge as a

person, rather than the intelligence that he was providing. Stalin said:

12
Shelton, Kadon. "A Historiographic Survey of various Interpretations of Why the Soviet Military Fared so Poorly
during Operation Barbarossa."ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2007. Pg. 17
13
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
Pg. 136
14
Ibid pg. 145

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“Richard Sorge is a shit who has set himself up with some small factories and brothels in

Japan.”15

As well as this, the most serious that Stalin took Sorge’s warnings was that all the Germans were

doing in their deployment of troops was putting diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union. There

were some in the Soviet government who believed that it was just “sabre rattling”, and that its

purpose was to get the Soviet Union to make economic contributions to the war against

Germany.16

Intelligence and intelligence services were also vital to Germany in the lead up and

execution of Operation Barbarossa. Germany and intelligence in relation to the invasion was

successful, but also flawed.

Adolf Hitler was quite confident in Germany as they began preparation for Operation

Barbarossa. He assured the German high command that “We have only to kick in the front door

and the whole rotten edifice will come tumbling down.”17 This take on the weakness of the

Soviet Union was widely held by other Nazis. They believed that the citizens of the Soviet Union

belonged a group referred to by Hitler as the “Untermensch”, a Nazi term used to define non-

Aryan people who were strongly inferior to their Aryan purity.18 Based on this belief, the pre-

invasion spying of the Soviet Union began.

15
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg.
115
16
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
Pg. 144
17
"Operation Barbarossa And Germanys Failure In The Soviet Union." Imperial War Museums. Accessed March 29,
2018. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/operation-barbarossa-and-germanys-failure-in-the-soviet-union.
18
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
Pg. 152

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In September of 1940, Hitler instructed Abwehr, the German military intelligence

agency, to begin expanded coverage on the Soviet Union.19 They would be doing this with aerial

reconnaissance flights, as well as on the ground coverage. In October of 1940 Hitler began this

aerial reconnaissance over the Soviet Union. These flights were led and organized by German

pilot Theodor Rowehl. He led these deep penetration missions into the Soviet Union, with some

flights reaching as far as the Black Sea. These flights acquired many photographs, showing

Soviet industrial sites and keeping the Germans up to date on the newest in Soviet field

fortifications.20 The Soviets were aware of these flights. On 15 April 1941, a German plane had

to make an emergency landing in Rovno. When the plane was searched, it was found to be

holding topographical maps of the Soviet Union, as well as photographs of sensitive areas in the

country. The Soviet Union did respond to this, but the response was clearly made to placate, as

Stalin was still afraid of going to war with the Germans. The Soviets were even told not to fire at

German planes. This response had no effect, and the Germans continues to do their spy flights.21

By 22 April 1941, the Soviet Union charged that there had been more than 80 flights seen over

the country, and that these were most likely spy planes.22

After the invasion began, these German spy flights continued. Now that they knew it was

a blatant attack on their country, the Soviets did try to use ant-aircraft guns against the Germans.

However these were largely unsuccessful, as the gun were no match for the height that the

German spy plane, the JU-88, could reach. On top of this, the Soviet Union had no response of

19
Erickson, John and David Dilks. Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies Edinburgh University Press, 1994. Pg. 46
20
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg.
164
21
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
Pg. 138
22
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg.
113

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aerial reconnaissance of their own. The German attack in June had ravaged Soviet airfields, and

as a result had made it impossible for the Soviets to monitor the movements of their attackers in

any sort of reliable way from the air.23

As well as spying from the air, once the preparation for the invasion began, so did German

spying on the ground. The same time that Hitler ordered for aerial intelligence to begin, Wilhelm

Canaris, the chief of Abwehr, expanded Abwehr’s coverage to inside the Soviet Union as well.

From April to June 1941, there were 25-35 time the number of spies in the Soviet Union that

were found between April and June of 1940.24

On top of all the spying and reconnaissance happening in and above the Soviet Union, the

Germans also practiced disinformation against the Soviets. A strong example of this

disinformation is how they justified the deployment of troops on the Soviet border. They claimed

that this was part of a German operation called SEA LION. The purpose of this fake operation

was that Soviet troops were training for a large scale invasion into the British Isles. The reason

that it was happening so far Britain, was for safety. They were out of reach of any British

bombers or spies, thy claimed. All of this was of course completely made up, and only used as a

justification for the massive amounts of troops on the border.25

All of these intelligence operations were highly successful for the Germans. On paper, it

appeared that the Germans were quite ready to obliterate the Soviet Union quite easily. But that

is where German intelligence failed, quite badly. Germany completely underestimated the

23
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg.
165
24
Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press, 1995. Pg.
114
25
Erickson, John and David Dilks. Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies Edinburgh University Press, 1994. Pg. 82

1
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strength of the Russian military reserves, especially the air force.26 The view that German

intelligence had of the Soviet Union was highly coloured by Hitler’s personal views of the

country, mainly his belief that they were inferior to the Nazis. The draft plan for the invasion,

published on 5 December 1940, stated:

“The Russian is inferior. The army is without leadership (…) the internal restructuring of the

Russian army will be no better in the spring (…) we will have a perceptibly better position in

leadership, material, troops, while the Russians will be at an unmistakable low point. Once

the Russian army is beaten, then disaster cannot be forestalled.”27

Based on this it is clear how confident the Germans were in the strength of the Russian army.

The main problems for the Soviets appeared to be ones that would take a fair amount of time to

put right. There was a prominent lack of army commanders, including the most senior of

officers, the training of the army was inadequate for modern combat, and they had a severe lack

of equipment for pretty much all units. This was a fair assessment by the Germans, if perhaps a

little biased, in the sense of how little they thought of the Russians as people. This assessment

was in large part a result of the OKH, who were responsible for the invasion. They thought they

knew the Red Army.28 However this draft plan is contrasted by a report by Major-General

Hoffman von Waldau, a German Luftwaffe general. He wrote, months into the invasion:

“The complete surprise struck at a gigantic Russian deployment (…) the military means of

the Soviet Union are considerably stronger than studies before the start of the war indicated.

26
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage Books, 2008.
Pg. 151
27
Ibid, pg. 144
28
Shelton, Kadon. "A Historiographic Survey of various Interpretations of Why the Soviet Military Fared so Poorly
during Operation Barbarossa."ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2007. Pg. 18

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We had regarded many statistics as propagandist exaggerations. The material quality is better

than expected (…) a large number of Soviet aircraft remains to be destroyed (…) the will to

resist and the toughness of the masses exceeds all expectations.”29

This was a clear analytical failure by the Germans, which was definitely, in part, a biased view

on what sort of people they thought the Soviets were. They thought they would just surrender

after Barbarossa began, however they were mistaken.

Operation Barbarossa marks an important chapter in intelligence history. Both sides

suffered in regards to intelligence, with both making clear analytical errors that cost many lives

for both side, and for the Germans, was the beginning of the end for them in World War II.

Barbarossa was a massive failure for the Germans, and even though the Soviet Union eventually

was victorious, it was at the cost of millions on lives.

29
Porch, Douglas. "Greatest Strategic Blunder: Operation Barbarossa." MHQ : The Quarterly Journal of Military
History 12, no. 2 (Winter, 2000): 12. http://ezproxy.lib.ryerson.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.lib.ryerson.ca/docview/223667135?accountid=13631.

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Bibliography

Erickson, John and David Dilks. Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies Edinburgh University

Press, 1994.

Shelton, Kadon. "A Historiographic Survey of various Interpretations of Why the Soviet Military

Fared so Poorly during Operation Barbarossa."ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2007.

Porch, Douglas. "Greatest Strategic Blunder: Operation Barbarossa." MHQ : The Quarterly

Journal of Military History 12, no. 2 (Winter, 2000): 12.

http://ezproxy.lib.ryerson.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-

com.ezproxy.lib.ryerson.ca/docview/223667135?accountid=13631.

"Operation Barbarossa And Germanys Failure In The Soviet Union." Imperial War Museums.

Accessed March 29, 2018. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/operation-barbarossa-and-germanys-

failure-in-the-soviet-union.

Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century Oxford University Press,

1995.

Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. 1st Vintage Books ed. Vintage

Books, 2008.

Erickson, John and David Dilks. Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies Edinburgh University Press, 1994.

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