CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (1st Batch)

1.) TECSON vs. COMELEC
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state
believes are deserving of the privilege.
FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
HELD:
He is a natural-born Filipino.
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to
refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition to disqualify FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of
the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.COMELEC
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish
regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church
records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the
Philippine Islands
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction
on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would
be determined by its Congress

the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish

subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they,

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however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were
thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time
in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of
the Congress of the United States on the Philippines
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was
an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-
born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines
from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship
law was extant in the Philippines. That the common law principle of
jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative
in the United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law
restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was
1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines
on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.
Whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by
adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of
the Philippines
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4),
Wich provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted
the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -
Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,
under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct
the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the
1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
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(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth. The earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father
of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to
be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan
The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only
remain in the sphere of civil law and should not unduly impinge on the
domain of political law.
Natural born citizen – citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo Pou’s
citizenship and father Allan F. Poe’s citizenship. Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino.
Conclusions with some degree of certainty to be drawn from the
documents presented:
The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley; FPJ was born
to them on August 20, 1939; Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on September 16, 1940; The father of Allan F.
Poe was Lorenzo Pou; At the time of his death on September 11,
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old; The public documents submitted
are deemed trustworthy.
It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s place of residence at the time
of death was the same as his residence before death in the absence
of evidence that would attest otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This citizenship would then extend to
his son Allan F. Poe, FPJ’s father.
Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during the Spanish colonization
period. Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during
the crucial period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existing record to
attest to that claim.Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the
country during that same time period. Lorenzo’s residence at the time
of death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory rules of civil law would
not apply in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, FPJ’s maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie,
proving the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the children in one house
as one family) would be accepted.
Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under civil rule should apply
because FPJ was an illegitimate son.In the FPJ case, there was no
signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ. Fornier argues
that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, Allan’s citizenship would not
have been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage
between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan
allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez.
The Court held that the veracity of this marriage between Paulita and
Allan is doubtful. Fornier also contended that even if Allan and
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Bessie’s marriage was not bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate
because his parents were married after he was born.
The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the
father’s citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates
the equal protection clause. For jurisprudence that regarded an
illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s citizenship, it was there to
ensure a Filipino nationality for the child with the assumption that the
mother would gain custody.
The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that
time period and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
2.) BENGSON VS HRET
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960,
of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision
of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed
of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a
Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive
pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine
territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time
of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so
only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to,
or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any
of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the
full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June
5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution. Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer
be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
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citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article
citizens are those who are from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING: Yes.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court
is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial
to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire
the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No.
(C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4
of C.A. 473
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
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Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
3.) REPUBLIC vs. NORA FE SAGUN
G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012
FACTS: Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a
Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was
born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City3 and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of
33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance4to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine
passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she
has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same
on her birth certificate. RTC granted the petition and declared Sagun
a Filipino citizen. OSG directly filed the case to SC via petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship is authorized by the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence; and
2.) Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
RULING:
1.) NO. It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the
court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach
of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific
declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such
pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.
2.) NO. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural
infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected
Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably
show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for
a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn
statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her
claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years
after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that
respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within
a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and
was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under
Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 27 Moreover, there
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was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay
and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to
comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the
exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court
must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by
respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
4.) MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his
citizenship upon his naturalization as a citizen of the USA.
Subsequently, he availed of the benefits of RA 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and ran as Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado, contending that Arnado is a foreigner. It turend
out that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines.
The COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of Arnado
and consequently directed that the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government of 1991 be followed. It ruled that Arnaldo’s
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes
in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the LGC is not applicable in this case.
Maquiling claims that due to the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy
and the nullification of the latter’s proclamation, he should be
proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office?
2. Whether the rule on succession in the LGC will apply.
HELD: 1. YES. The act of using a foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal presumption
does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continue possession of a foreign citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
and loss of PH citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who
is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
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The Court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using
a forein passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;
it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
Thus, by the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC, he was not qualified to
run for a local elective position.
2. NO. The rule on succession under the LGC will not apply.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate
ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election
offenses a provided for in the first sentence of Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.
5.) DAVID vs. AGBAY
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
Justice VIILLARAMA, JR.,
FACTS: In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned
to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house
is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application
(MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was pending,
petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of
R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07
issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and
that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property
from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property
was titled land and they have the right and authorityto convey the
same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
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On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s
MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had
been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under
R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been
lost on account of said naturalization
ISSUE/S:
Whether the petitioner can be considered a Filipino citizen.
Whether he can be indicted for falsification for representing himself as
a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225.
RULING: Yes. He is now a Filipino.
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they
shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may
be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away
with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also
provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine
citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took
the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his
Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
Yes, he can still be indicted for falsification.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the
time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss on the
retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost Philippine
citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other
words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
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Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned.
6.) POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC
(CITIZENSHIP; FOUNDLING)
FACTS: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace
Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding
to stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards,
she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was
born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally
adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as
American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe
is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however,
abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE: WON Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
citizen
HELD: (Yes! Foundlings are considered by the constitution as
natural born citizens. To think otherwise would result to
discrimination)
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
“To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render
them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance
that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the
child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any
sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in
the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There
is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire
class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and
the use of common sense are not separate disciplines”.
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked
to create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable
patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the
grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the
status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and
inflict this across the board marginalization."
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We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration
are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section
11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,"
Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly,
these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino
in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is
Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a
Filipino.
Lastly, It has been argued that the process to determine that the child
is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under
these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire
or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a
naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV,
Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is
done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object
of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute
that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling
Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on
13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora
Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his
wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively
affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention
nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article
15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the
Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we
ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally
accepted principle of international law."
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention
and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
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foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a
virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments
on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to
address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as
to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized
and a member of the community of nations.
7.) LEE vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS: In 1936, the family of Dinglasan sold a parcel of land to Lee
Liong, a Chinese Citizen, In Roxas City. However, in 1948, the former
owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against
the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The
plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agriculture
land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Lee and held that both parties were in pari
delicto
In 1968, another case was filed by the same former owners against
Lee and the SC ruled that the case was barred by res judicata. The
parcel of land has already passed to the heirs of Lee. A reconstitution
of the title was filed in favor of Lee but the OSG filed for an annulment
of the judgement. The CA ruled in favor of the OSG.
ISSUE: Whether the parcel of land belongs to the petitioner
HELD: Yes. Subsequent circumstances militate against escheat
proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The
original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been
inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein.
Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not
dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in
the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no
more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos
qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.33 Thus, the subsequent
transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. 34 The
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
8.) MULLER vs. MULLER
DOCTRINE: He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands.
FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22,
1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the
house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court
granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court
held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
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However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the
respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00
for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Elena Muller then
filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to
reimbursement.
Ruling: No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to
reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the
Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that
constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his
Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars
him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity
as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
9.) MATTHEWS vs. TAYLOR
FACTS: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor
(Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a
17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was
subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter
lot (Boracay property). The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a
vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All
required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were
obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran
away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA
in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with
respect to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as
lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the
Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental
of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and
executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession
of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort.1avvphi1
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered
into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that
his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay
property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband,
any transaction involving said property required his consent.
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RTC DECISION. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the Lease
Agreement null and void. The RTC considered the Boracay property
as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of
the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the
property. The same was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS VALID
RULING: In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an
Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife
without the consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter
before us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law
issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989.
Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the
vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under
her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he
was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used
in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into
a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations
of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code
provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable
constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.1avvphi1
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the
aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of
the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations
at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to
acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled
than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt
to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In
a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly
involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens
wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father’s
estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a
property titled in the name of another; that an implied trust be declared
in their (aliens’) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their
lack of consent. In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between
Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by
Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
10.) WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina,
married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros
Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the
former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership praying for the distribution of their properties claimed to
have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.
Respondent then averred that, with the exception of their two (2)
residential houses (Lots 1 and 2142), she and petitioner did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845
and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way
of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the
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improvements thereon using her own money. Accordingly, respondent
sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as payment
for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income
to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE/s: Whether or not the petitioner, a Dutch national, may
claim for reimbursement on the payment made to purchase the
subject properties.
RULING: NO. The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition
For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut
Muller the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner
Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section
7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject
properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed
his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis
of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply
the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall
not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court
of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the
funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable
refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under
Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had
spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on
the basis of unjust enrichment. Nor would the denial of his claim
amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is
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the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-
citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban
against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land
and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2)
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve
the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is
duty-bound to protect.
11.) REPUBLIC vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO
FACTS: Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance
and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title
against the Republic. In her complaint Mendoza essentially alleged
being the owner of the disputed Arlegui property which the Republic
forcibly dispossessed her of and over which the Register of Deeds of
Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic.
The Republic set up, among other affirmative defenses, the States
immunity from suit. the RTC of Manila dismissed Mendozas complaint.
In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and
reconveyance of the Arlegui property, Mendoza sought the declaration
of nullity of a supposed deed of sale which provided the
instrumentation toward the issuance of TCT No. 118911 in the name
of the Republic. And aside from the cancellation of TCT No. 118911,
Mendoza also asked for the reinstatement of her TCT No. 118527
The trial court rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and
against the Republic. To the trial court, the Republic had veritably
confiscated Mendozas property, and deprived her not only of the use
thereof but also denied her of the income she could have had
otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally dispossessed
of the same.
Petitioner urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial courts
order declaring it in default and the judgment by default that followed.
Sought to be nullified, too, also on the ground that they were issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
are the orders and processes enumerated immediately above issued
after the rendition of the default judgment.
It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the Constitution
and the fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from
execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of
execution against the Republic
ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunity from suit?
HELD: It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it
does not there by necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution
against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does,
in effect,is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that
the state has a liability.T he functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law
Accordingly, granting private respondents basic plea for recovery of
the Arlegui property, which was legally hers all along, and the
reinstatement of her cancelled certificate of title are legally correct as
they are morally right. While not exactly convenient because the Office
of the President presently uses it for mix residence and office
purposes, restoring private respondent to her possession of the
Arlegui property is still legally and physically feasible. For what is
before us, after all, is a registered owner of a piece of land who, during
the early days of the martial law regime, lost possession thereof to the
Government which appropriated the same for some public use, but
without going through the legal process of expropriation, let alone
paying such owner just compensation.
The Court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be erroneous.
And the error relates to basic fundamentals of law as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.
But surely, the Arlegui property cannot possibly be assigned, even
perhaps at the present real estate business standards, a monthly
rental value of at least P500,000.00 or P6,000,000.00 a year, the
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amount private respondent particularly sought and attempted to prove.
This asking figure is clearly unconscionable, if not downright
ridiculous, attendant circumstances considered. To the Court, an
award of P20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui
property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and may be
granted pro hac vice
12.) SHELL PHILIPPINES vs. JALOS
FACTS: Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of
the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration
and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years later,
Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and
pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas
Project. This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline
from Shells production platform to its gas processing plant in
Batangas. The pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed
the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
On May 19, 2003, respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo
Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for
damages. against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Jalos, et al claimed that they were
all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the
construction and operation of Shells natural gas pipeline.
Jalos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the
construction of the pipeline. As a result, their average net income per
month fell from a high of P4,848.00 to only P573.00. They said that
the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities
such as coral reefs and led [to] stress to the marine life in
the Mindoro Sea. They now have to stay longer and farther out at sea
to catch fish, as the pipelines operation has driven the fish population
out of coastal waters.
Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the
complaint. It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
action, as it is a pollution case under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control
Law. Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related
damages.
Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the
doctrine of state immunity without the States consent. Shell said
that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of
the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya
gas reserves.
ISSUE: W/N Shell can be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state
immunity.
RULING: Yes. Shell is not an agent of the Republic of
the Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the exploration and
development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the
Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum
operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the States full
control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the
States agent within the meaning of the law.
An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to
do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter. The essence of an agency is the
agents ability to represent his principal and bring about business
relations between the latter and third persons. An agents ultimate
undertaking is to execute juridical acts that would create, modify or
extinguish relations between his principal and third persons. It is this
power to affect the principals contractual relations with third persons
that differentiates the agent from a service contractor.
Shells main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to perform all
petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and
finance as well as other connected services to the Philippine
government. As defined under the contract, petroleum operation
means the searching for and obtaining Petroleum within
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the Philippines, including the transportation, storage, handling and
sale of petroleum whether for export or domestic consumption. Shells
primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine
government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons.
Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage
petroleum operations on behalf of the State.
Consequently, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but
a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya
Natural Gas Project. It is not immune from suit and may be sued for
claims even without the States consent. Notably, the Philippine
government itself recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the
project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties
under Service Contract 38.
Article II, paragraph 8, Annex B of Service Contract 38 states that legal
expenses, including judgments obtained against the Parties or any of
them on account of the Petroleum Operations, can be recovered by
Shell as part of operating expenses to be deducted from gross
proceeds. Article II, paragraph 9B of the same document allows a
similar recovery for [a]ll actual expenditures incurred and paid by
CONTRACTOR [Shell] in settlement of any and all losses, claims,
damages, judgments, and any other expenses not covered by
insurance, including legal services. This signifies that the State itself
acknowledged the suability of Shell. Since payment of claims and
damages pursuant to a judgment against Shell can be deducted from
gross proceeds, the State will not be required to perform any additional
affirmative act to satisfy such a judgment.
In sum, while the complaint in this case sufficiently alleges a cause of
action, the same must be filed with the PAB, which is the government
agency tasked to adjudicate pollution-related cases. Shell is not an
agent of the State and may thus be sued before that body for any
damages caused by its operations. The parties may appeal the PABs
decision to the CA. But pending prior determination by the PAB, courts
cannot take cognizance of the complaint.
13.) UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIZON
DOCTRINE: When the State does waive its sovereign immunity, it is
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant
is liable.
FACTS: UP entered into an agreement with respondent Stern
Builders for the extension and renovation of the CAS Building in UPLB.
Stern submitted three progress billings and UP paid two of them, but
the third one was not paid. Thus, Stern filed a case against UP in RTC
QC wherein it decided in favor of Stern Builders. UP, however, failed
to file a timely notice of appeal. The motion for writ of execution of
Stern Builders was granted. RTC respondent Judge Dizon orders for
the release of garnished funds of UP. Hence, the sheriff served notices
of garnishment on UP’s depository banks.
ISSUE: Whether the funds of UP can be subject to garnishment.
HELD: NO. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public
in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of
its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could
not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment.
The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it
had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not
necessarily mean its liability. Suability depends on the consent of the
State to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it
does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the State does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
UP was correct in saying that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy
the judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including
attorney’s fees) was not validly made if there was no special
appropriation by Congress to cover the liability.
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14.) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) vs. SPS. ABECINA
G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016
FACTS: Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina
(respondents/spouses Abecina) are the registered owners of five
parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte. The properties are covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) Nos. T-25094, T-25095, T-25096, T-25097, and T-
25098.
In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation,
maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications
Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program,
Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1)
Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of
land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the
municipality. However, the municipality erroneously included portions
of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs,
Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which
encroached on the properties of the respondent spouses
On April 29, 2003, the respondent spouses sent a final demand letter
to both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to pay unpaid
rent/damages in the amount of one million two hundred thousand
pesos (P1,200,000.00). Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with
the demand.
The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the
respondent spouses enjoyed the right to use and to possess them -
rights that were violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry,
construction, and refusal to vacate. The RTC ordered the Department
- as a builder in bad faith -to forfeit the improvements and vacate the
properties; and (2) awarded the spouses with P1,200,000.00 as actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit, The Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the DOTC’s contention that instead of allowing
recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for
determination of just compensation has merit
RULING: The Philippines recognizes the vital role of information and
communication in nation building. As a consequence, we have
adopted a policy environment that aspires for the full development of
communications infrastructure to facilitate the flow of information into,
out of, and across the country. To this end, the DOTC has been
mandated with the promotion, development, and regulation of
dependable and coordinated networks of communication.
The DOTC encroached on the respondents' properties when it
constructed the local telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte.
The exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National
Telephone Program. We have no doubt that when the DOTC
constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered the
FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign
function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's contention that these
are acts jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity.
The Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome and near-
limitless powers of the State. Chief among these limitations are the
principles that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law and that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. These limitations are
enshrined in no less than the Bill of Rights that guarantees the citizen
protection from abuse by the State. Consequently, our laws require
that the State's power of eminent domain shall be exercised through
expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken
for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office
or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary
implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of
State immunity. If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular
procedure upon discovering that it had encroached on the
respondents' property, it would have initiated expropriation
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proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from suit. The
petitioners would not have had to resort to filing its complaint for
reconveyance.
The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take
the property for public use and the consequent payment of just
compensation. The property is evidently being used for a public
purpose. However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly
entered into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject
properties. If in the future, the factual circumstances should change
and the respondents refuse to continue the lease, then the DOTC may
initiate expropriation proceedings.
15.) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. VINZON
G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of
Appeals in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be
sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of
Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and
Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
 Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its
Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon,
sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The
Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a
consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy
Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta,
the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.
 The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are
air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein
that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years
and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either
party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of
expiry.
 Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration
of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed
respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the
discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in
February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed
the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he
allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory
and not in compliance with the standards set in the
Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy
terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.
Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally
informed respondent of their decision to terminate the
agreement.
 The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was
arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the
petitioners which was opposed by invoking immunity from
suit.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of
sovereign immunity from suit.
2. Whether the petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private
capacities.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of
Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity
to suit. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test
of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such
act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
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establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The
state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain
the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign
activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent.
The maintenance agreement was entered into by the
Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental
functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
2. No. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
 a real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf
of the sending State for the purposes of the
mission;
 an action relating to succession in which the
diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private
person and not on behalf of the sending
State;
 an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions.
16.) DEUTSCHE GESSELSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE
ZUSAMMENARBEIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(STATE IMMUNITY; AGENT OF THE STATE)
FACTS: On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an
Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in
Bonn, capital of what was then West Germany. The Agreement
affirmed the countries common interest in promoting the technical
and economic development of their States, and recogni[zed] the
benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-
operation, and allowed for the conclusion of arrangements
concerning individual projects of technical co-operation.
On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then
Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German
government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971
Agreement. This Arrangement affirmed the common commitment of
both governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health
Insurance Networking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was
designed to enable Philippine families especially poor ones to
maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality. In
the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective
implementing organizations for SHINE. The Philippines designated
the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) with the implementation of SHINE. For their
part, the German government charge[d] the Deustche Gesellschaft
fur Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Eschborn, with the
implementation of its contributions. Private respondents were
engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE
on various dates between December of 1998 to September of
1999. Due to several disputes with their belgian project manager Anne
Nicolay, Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay
dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of their
contracts of employment on the grounds of serious and gross
insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and
trust.
On 21 August 2000, the private respondents filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
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On 25 October 2005, GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the
governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany.
On 27 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a
private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and
that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its
diplomatic status.
ISSUE: WON the complaint for illegal dismissal should have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on account of GTZs insistence that it
enjoys immunity from suit.
HELD: NO! (GTZ FAILED TO ESTABLISH EVIDENCE THAT THEY
ARE IMMUNE FROM A SUIT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE RULES IN PIL AND FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE)
The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a
foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the
Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without
its consent.
If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal
Republic of Germany, there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought
against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said State
had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought
against GTZ. It is necessary for us to understand what precisely are
the parameters of the legal personality of GTZ.
Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as the implementing agency
of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. However,
it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to invoke
State immunity from suit. The distinction lies in whether the
agency is incorporated or unincorporated. The following lucid
discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:
“An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it
with a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security
System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By
contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has
no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general
machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in
its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says
so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing.”
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special
law. The special law can take the form of the original charter of
the incorporated government agency.
Now, Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government or a
private corporation engaged in the implementation of development
projects?
GTZs own website elicits that petitioner is federally owned, a federal
enterprise, and founded in 1975 as a company under private law. GTZ
clearly has a very meaningful relationship with the Federal
Republic of Germany, which apparently owns it. At the same
time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a
legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way
that Philippine corporations can be organized under the
Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine
government.
This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives
further cause for pause in adopting petitioners argument that
GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is an
implementing agency. The above-quoted statement does not
dispute the characterization of GTZ as an implementing agency of the
Federal Republic of Germany, yet it bolsters the notion that as a
company organized under private law, it has a legal personality
independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany.
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Taking this description on face value, the apparent equivalent
under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the
Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a
government-owned or controlled corporation without original
charter.
**GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not
consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal
Republic of Germany. We adhere to the rule that in the absence
of evidence to the contrary,
Ruling in Holy See v. Del Rosario provided a template on how a
foreign entity desiring to invoke State immunity from suit could
duly prove such immunity before our local courts. The principles
enunciated in that case were derived from public international law.
“In Public International Law, when a state or international agency
wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign
court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement
of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts
varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter
directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter
that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity.”
It is to be recalled that the Labor Arbiter, in both of his rulings, noted
that it was imperative for petitioners to secure from the Department of
Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and
entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits.The
requirement might not necessarily be imperative. However, had
GTZ obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have
provided factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the
very least, establish a disputable evidentiary presumption that
the foreign party is indeed immune which the opposing party will
have to overcome with its own factual evidence. We do not see
why GTZ could not have secured such certification or endorsement
from the DFA for purposes of this case. Certainly, it would have been
highly prudential for GTZ to obtain the same after the Labor Arbiter
had denied the motion to dismiss. Still, even at this juncture, we do not
see any evidence that the DFA, the office of the executive branch in
charge of our diplomatic relations, has indeed endorsed GTZs claim
of immunity. It may be possible that GTZ tried, but failed to secure
such certification, due to the same concerns that we have discussed
herein.
The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has
been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the
immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the
Federal Republic of Germany.
17.) ARIGO vs. SWIFT
FACTS: In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran
aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of
which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded
protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the
petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from
the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were
impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit between
US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from
damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil,
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administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident. They also prayed for the annulment of some VFA provisions
for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the US Government can be sued in this case
HELD: The general rule on state’s immunity from suit applies in this
case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners’ claim,
the US government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction
of any judgment against these officials would require remedial actions
and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State
Immunity – in correlation with the principle of States as sovereign
equals “par in parem non habet non imperium” – bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
However, The US government is liable for damages in relation to the
grounding incident under the customary laws of navigation.
The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of
the UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans”, which is
codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US’
refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has
nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary international
rules on navigation.
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US
will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
18.) IMBONG vs. OCHOA
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers
from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of
the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
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7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process 8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
clause of the Constitution.
PROCEDURAL:
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family
protected by the Constitution Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
PROCEDURAL:
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy. 2. Facial Challenge

1. Power of Judicial Review 3. Locus Standi

2. Actual Case or Controversy 4. Declaratory Relief

3. Facial Challenge 5. One Subject/One Title Rule

4. Locus Standi Discussions:

5. Declaratory Relief PROCEDURAL

6. One Subject/One Title Rule Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must
Issue/s: be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is lis mota of the case.
unconstitutional for violating the: Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an
1. Right to life existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
2. Right to health court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
6. Due process clause
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
7. Equal protection clause individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been

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accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights
in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that
“the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question
of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration
of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause
in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question
of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should
not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
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In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to
refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of
the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion.
By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect
it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term
“primarily”, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966).
With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right
or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH
Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects
to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section
5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a
state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive
use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH
procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
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intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against
the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and
(b) the right of families or family associations to participate in
the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage
and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing
a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7
of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
“in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as
it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation
and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section
14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of
the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is
superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed
by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health
service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care
service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
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The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and
non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono
or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from
the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple.
For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
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are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion
and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by
the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would
diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only
when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus
standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation
of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence,
their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms,
the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
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Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
19.) LOZANO vs. NOGRALES
FACTS: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their
capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the
nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution
Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of
Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a
Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress,” convening the
Congress into a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987
Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable
controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court
of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution.
The petitioners contend that the House Resolution contradicts the
procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the
amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the
members of each House (the Senate and the House of
Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the “members of
Congress” without distinction as to which institution of Congress they
belong to).
ISSUE: Whether the court has the power to review the case of the
validity of House Resolution No. 1109.
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HELD: No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners’
supplications. While some may interpret petitioners’ moves as
vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their
petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability
set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving
constitutional disputes.
The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to
actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely
legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans
this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent
questions,” lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of
“ripeness.” In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another
approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to
the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual
injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken
would be to determine whether an action has already been
accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the
courts may step in.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of
judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future
time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of
procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has
yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109
involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future
event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at
all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant
an intervention from this Court.
As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed
amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what
it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be
instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction
A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that
(1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar,
petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would
endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal
stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It
assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the
illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.
The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case is no more evident
than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners
that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of
public funds in this case as of yet.
The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet
unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi
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The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a
constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only “actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.”
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach
to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of
“personal injury” to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine,
such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the
ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
20.) DUENAS vs. HRET
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is
to guard the guardians themselves?)
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito Jett
P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the
2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized
national and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner
was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed
to private respondents 27,107 votes.
Private respondent filed an election protest ad cautelam, in the HRET
and prayed for a revision/recount in 170 of the 732 precincts in the
2nd legislative district of Taguig City so that the true and real mandate
of the electorate may be ascertained. In support of his protest, he
alleged that he was cheated in the protested precincts through
insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which
resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding
increase in petitioner’s votes.
Petitioner filed his answer and counter-protested 560 precincts
claiming that massive fraud through deliberate misreading,
miscounting and misappreciation of ballots were also committed
against him in said precincts resulting in the reduction of his votes in
order to favor private respondent.
The HRET then ordered that all ballot boxes and other election
materials involved in the protest and counter-protest be collected and
retrieved, and brought to its offices for custody.
In the preliminary conference petitioner and private respondent
agreed that, since the total number of the protested precincts was less
than 50% of the total number of the precincts in the 2 nd legislative
district of Taguig City, all of the protested precincts would be revised
without need of designation of pilot precincts by private respondent
pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules.
The HRET thereafter directed the revision of ballots. Reception of
evidence of the contending parties followed after the revision of ballots
in 100% of the protested precincts and 25% pilot of the counter-
protested precincts. The case was then submitted for resolution upon
submission by the parties of their memoranda.
The HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation
of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to
Rule 88 of the HRET Rules, [i]t appearing that the [HRET] cannot
determine the true will of the electorate from the initial revision and
appreciation of the 100% protested precincts and 25% counter-
protested precincts and in view of the discovery of fake/spurious
ballots in some of the protested and counter-protested precincts.
In another order, HRET directed petitioner to augment his cash
deposit in the amount of P320, 000 to cover the expenses of the
revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts
within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice.
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Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
This was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 08-353 reiterating its
order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and recalling its order
requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead
ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts.
In issuing Resolution No. 08-353, the HRET invoked Rule 88 of the
HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion
either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the
revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting
the validity of the election. This was with the end in view of
ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the HRET’s
position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the
unrevised precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its
jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it ruled that its task of
determining the true will of the electorate was not confined to the
examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it
could motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved in a
protest or counter-protest and the same could not be frustrated by the
mere expedient of filing a motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining
counter-protested precincts. Convinced that it could not determine the
true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on
the basis alone of the initial revision of the 100% protested precincts
and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but
to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts.
Aggrieved by the HRETs Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27,
2008, petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases over election protests heard and decided by the
HRET.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
The base of the decision is not only on the constitutional authority of
the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its members but also on the limitation of
the Courts power of judicial review.
The Court itself has delineated the parameters of its power of review
in cases involving the HRET
... so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, any final action taken
by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall,
as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this
Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it
or even affect the same.
Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power
that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment
for that of the Tribunal.
The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRET’s exercise of
its discretion, an exercise which was well within the bounds of its
authority.
Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an
independent constitutional body require that any finding of grave
abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and
convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave
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abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established
by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court
finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.
In Co v. HRET, the Court held that:
The Court does not venture into the perilous area
of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It
comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due
process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or
glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for
remedial action.
The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
members. By employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic
that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests
involving its members is exclusive and exhaustive. Its exercise of
power is intended to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
21.) KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC vs.
JESSIE ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government.
FACTS: The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap, Inc. were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and
located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon. These LGUs
sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the
implementation and construction of infrastructure projects2 in the
areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order
when: (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways,
and other public places suchas sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities occupy areas where
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented.
Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, et al. To first secure an eviction and/or demolition order
from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279.
The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by
generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.4 They also posit that the
respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional.
The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend
their constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions
and demolitions without any court order. They point out that Section
6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment
of liberty of abode unless there is a court order.
The Mayor of Navotas argues that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987
Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to be conducted even
without a court order provided they are done in accordance with the
law and in a just and humane manner. The Mayor of San Juan
similarly argues petitioners’ premature invocation of the Court’s power
of judicial review and their violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts are fatal to their cause of action. Moreover, the petitioners failed
to substantiate the material allegations in the petition. He additionally
argues that his faithful implementation of RA 7279, which the
legislature enacted in the exercise of police power, does not amount
to grave abuse of discretion
The Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the National
Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager adopt the Mayor of
Navotas’ position that the petition is procedurally infirm. They further
argue that the liberty of abode is not illimitable and does not include
the right to encroach upon other person properties. They also reiterate
that Section 28 of RA 7279 provides sufficient safeguards in ensuring
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that evictions and demolitions are carried out in a just and humane
manner.
ISSUE: Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of
Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: NO. Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari
since it assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279, the petition must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential
requisites that would warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial review. It
is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the courts will not
determine the constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites
are present: (1) the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review
is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case
Save for the petition pertaining to the City of Quezon’s threat of
eviction and demolition, this case no longer presents a justiciable
controversy with respect to the Mayors of Navotas and San Juan. We
take note of the Comments of these Mayors who alleged that they had
already successfully evicted the concerned petitioners in their
respective cities at the time of the filing of the petition.
What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of
constitutionality is the fact that this issue is not the lis mota of this case.
Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in
the principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of
the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts
of our coequal branches of the government.
This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a
law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved
unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is
unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionality should be avoided.22 Thus, to justify the nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.23
We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to
compellingly show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6,
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution. We further stated that demolitions
and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order.
22.) ROMUALDEZ vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino
Apostol filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the COMELEC thru the Office
of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with
violation of Section 261(y)(2 and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus
Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal
ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000,
petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied
for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos.
42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications,
petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of
Section 10 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they
are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth
and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop,
Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and
registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration
Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing
fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank
spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time which
they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent
charged petitioners, to wit:
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Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes
Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in
violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful
statements relative to any data or information required in the
application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered
voter, registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of
his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to
apply for transfer of registration records due to change of residence to
another city or municipality."
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal,
COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending
to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution
Division), the filing of the appropriate Information against petitioners,
disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and
Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary
information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper
Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to
Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of
the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the
prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report after
every hearing of the case.
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart
from the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and
ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby
directed to file the appropriate information with the proper court
against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA
ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to
Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189.
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department
of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate
Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of
Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez for violation of Section
10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim.
Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate
Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.
ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
RULING: NO. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the
COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code. The task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense
charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of
the case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section
8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating
officer makes a determination of whether there is a reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed. In Baytan v.
COMELEC, this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of
probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound
discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with
such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except
as may otherwise be provided by law.
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It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of
probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the
case at bar, held that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal
charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom.
Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for
registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners’
registration records as registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The
directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution of 28
November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does
not appear to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably
prudent man would conclude that there exists probable cause to hold
petitioners for trial.
That the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to
prosecute cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C),
Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate
and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine
who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not
to prosecute. Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the
right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The
courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary
powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Its rationale cannot
be doubted. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial
tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the
prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may
err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of
the defense.
23.) DAVID vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
“The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP
1017. Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and
present danger.
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ISSUE: Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot
and academic
HELD: NO. The power of judicial review may be exercised only when
the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case
or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest;” a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case
or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered
“moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8)
days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal
acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present
petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law,
it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is
in legal contemplation, inoperative.”
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify the Supreme
Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners
alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect
the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and
the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the factual
bases of the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power
HELD: YES. In IBP v. Zamora, while the Court considered the
President’s “calling-out” power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on
Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial
power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” The
latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden
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territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government. It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms
of power but also of duty.
As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of
power, Lansang v. Garcia adopted the test that judicial inquiry can go
no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision
is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the
standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Court further ruled that it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his
assertion, then the Supreme Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the
calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.
A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing
the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
24.) ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 203775 August 5, 2014
FACTS: On 28 August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC
Resolution SPP 10-013, dated 11 October 2011, cancelling the
certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC)
Party-List which won in the party-list elections in the 2010 national
elections. The disqualification of the ABC Party-List resulted in the re-
computation of the party-list allocations in the House of
Representatives, in which the COMELEC followed the formula
outlined in the case of Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on
Elections.1
The COMELEC then issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, in which
it resolved: to grant the proclamation of (Alay Buhay) Party-List;
denied the motion of (Senior Citizens) Party-List; and confirmed the
re-computation of the allocations of seats which resulted in (Alay
Buhay) Party-List as a winning party-list group in the Party-List System
of Representation in the House of Representatives in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Election. It also declared the First
(1st) NOMINEE of Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation,
Inc. (Alay Buhay) Party-List, as the FIRST (1st) SITTING
REPRESENTATIVE in the Party-List System.
On 25 October 2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims and
Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court a special
civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
Furthermore, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-
0859.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, and
(2) Whether the COMELEC may be compelled through mandamus to
publish Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
RULING: NO. Petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue. Sections
1 and 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure it provides that,
only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
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parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated
association not endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An
unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no
juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the
association.5 Such unincorporated association is not a legal entity
distinct from its members. If an association, like petitioner Association
of Flood Victims, has no juridical personality, then all members of the
association must be made parties in the civil action.6 In this case, other
than his bare allegation that he is the lead convenor of the Association
of Flood Victims, petitioner Hernandez showed no proof that he was
authorized by said association. Aside from petitioner Hernandez, no
other member was made signatory to the petition. Only petitioner
Hernandez signed the Verification and Sworn Certification Against
Forum Shopping,7stating that he caused the preparation of the
petition. There was no accompanying document showing that the
other members of the Association of Flood Victims authorized
petitioner Hernandez to represent them and the association in the
petition.
In Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association,8 the Court
held that the Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association (SSHA),
which was an unincorporated association, lacks capacity to sue in its
own name, and that the members of the association cannot represent
the association without valid authority.
More so in this case where there is no showing that petitioner
Hernandez is validly authorized to represent petitioner Association of
Flood Victims. Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no
legal capacity to sue, petitioner Hernandez, who is filing this petition
as a representative of the Association of Flood Victims, is likewise
devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court. Neither can
petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because he failed to show that
there was illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation 10 or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.11
Besides, petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing. Locus
standi or legal standing is defined as: x x x a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an. interest
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.12
In this case, petitioners failed to allege personal or substantial interest
in the questioned governmental act which is the issuance of
COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, which confirmed the re-
computation of the allocation of seats of the Party-List System of
Representation in the House of Representatives in the 10 May 2010
Automated National and Local Elections. Petitioner Association of
Flood Victims is not even a party-list candidate in the 10 May 2010
elections, and thus, could not have been directly affected by
COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
In view of our holding that petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue
and have no standing to file the present petition, we shall no longer
discuss the issues raised in this petition. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS
the petition.
25.) RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs. REYES
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Justice LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
FACTS:
 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals bring their case in their
personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be
injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity
"as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible
stewards of God's Creations." They use Oposa v. Factoran,
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Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce
international and domestic environmental laws enacted for
their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui. As
the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the
human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to
build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon
Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in
light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to
do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.
 Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also
assert that through this case, this court will have the
opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an
exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."
 The human petitioners want the court to create substantive
and procedural rights for animals through their allegation that
they can speak for them. The Court is asked to accept the
premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine
Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a
representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine
Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and
(d) they received clear consent from their animal principals
that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue
their interests.
 In the alternative, they want the court to accept through
judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship
between them and all the resident mammals in the
affected ecology.
ISSUE/S: Whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have
legal standing to pursue the case;
RULING:
1. No. As to standing, the Court declined to extend the
principle of standing beyond natural and juridical
persons, even though it recognized that the current trend
in Philippine jurisprudence “moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access
in environmental cases.” Instead, the Court explained, “the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing
has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws.”
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical
persons or entities that may be authorized by statute to be parties in
a civil action.
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
(2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from
the judgment of a case is a real party in interest. When a case is
brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that
another party's act or omission has caused a direct injury,
making his or her interest both material and based on an
enforceable legal right.
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party
in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express rust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be
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sued without joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal.
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as
a party who is not bound to directly or actually benefit or suffer from
the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real
party in interest. The representative is an outsider to the cause of
action. Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as
"representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the
coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the
environment, which means that for the Petition of the human
petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine
Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human
petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a
representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting
Tañon Strait." While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue
of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the
subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and
environmental rights.
In the United States, animal rights advocates have managed
to establish a system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship
model for nonhuman animals":
“Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-
established system by which nonhuman animals may
obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights
and protections: guardianships. With court approval,
animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on
behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-
appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-
challenged humans who possess an enforceable
right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.”
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of
representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as
individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate
reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for
themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very
nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g.,
corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in
law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore,
may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same
cannot be said about animals.
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of
guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the
environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a
representative of a party who has enforceable rights under
environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section
5:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon
the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of
said order.
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There is no valid reason in law or the practical
requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on
behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very
anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no
way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone
present that they would wish to use our court system, which is
designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their
responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for
themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living
things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further
relaxed.
To revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran:
The use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should
be allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the
representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon
an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing
interests existing within the population represented or those that are
yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing
because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an
immediate protective measure is necessary.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing
of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino
citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on
behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a
representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in
interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest. It is
clear that jurisprudence only applies consistently to human petitioners
including the unborn as represented by their human guardians.
Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the
Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on
mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is
impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At
best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if
there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress
before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and
representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring
"reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded
arguments"on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome.
However, they should be considered carefully so that no unintended
or unwarranted consequences should follow. Resident Marine
Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any
kind of petition.
26.) PORMENTO vs. ESTRADA (Judicial Review)
FACTS: Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He
sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10,
2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents
candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.
However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). His motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010.
However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would
not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not
even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of
votes.
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
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ISSUE: WON Judicial review is applicable.
HELD: NO! (THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY IN THE CASE
AT BAR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW)
There is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No
live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No
specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this
case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies.[9] The Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue
in the case before it.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between
the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his
reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose.
27.) GARCIA vs. JUDGE DRILON
FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with
the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed
to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “exercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA
9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and
the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that
the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity
and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the
law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
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WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.
HELD: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated
the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while
executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive,
not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of
BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit
28.) SOCIAL JUSTIC SOCIETY (SJS) vs. LIM
(G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916)
25 November 2014
FACTS: On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was
entered into by oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and
Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to address and
minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without
affecting security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum
products.
On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta.
Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. Owners
and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were
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given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation
of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003. · On 4
December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the
Supreme Court (SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. Unknown to the
SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction. The same was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell.
Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No.
8119 entitled †œAn Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto. This
designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone.
On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and
directed Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
It declared that the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents
of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7
March 2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027
is constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance
No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them. SC later
on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor
Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance
No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone
where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of
Ordinance No. 8187.
Their contentions are as follows: It is an invalid exercise of police
power because it does not promote the general welfare of the people
It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
as well as health and environment related municipal laws and
international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act;
Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code
provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child · The title
of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. On the
other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil
companies contend that: The petitioners have no legal standing to sue
whether as citizens, taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to
show that they have suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result
of the act complained of· The petition should be dismissed outright for
failure to properly apply the related provisions of the Constitution, the
Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available.
The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only
exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution. It is the function of the SP to enact zoning
ordinance without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of zoning
ordinance sought to be modified. There is a valid exercise of police
power.
On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which
essentially amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area
where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the
Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES:
1. WON there are violations of environmental laws
2. WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
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3. WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue
4. WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals
RULING:
1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases is embodied in Section 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the
Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil
actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs, and the RTCs
involving the enforcement or violations of environmental and other
related laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No.
6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749,
Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141; and other existing laws that
relate to the conservation, development, preservation, protection and
utilization of the environment and natural resources. Notably, the
aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are
allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these
only serve as collateral attacks that would support the other position
of the petitioners, the protection of the right to life, security and safety.
2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been
filed with the RTC, it having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a
special civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. However, the petitions at bar are of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil.
375)
3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which
ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the
petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have
a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city. No
different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement
of the assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter
that concerns a public right. In like manner, the preservation of the life,
security and safety of the people is indisputably a right of utmost
importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of
Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief to protect
such right.
4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed
Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC
followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision,
to wit: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting
a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to
take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined
in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. The following facts
were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval
of the ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products which include petroleum gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and
fuel oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacanang
Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could
spread to the neighboring communities. The Ordinance was intended
to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
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means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in
their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore becomes
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have
been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade
the Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila
are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds
that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is
invalid and unconstitutional. For, given that the threat sought to be
prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how remote it
is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the right to life
be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories
of probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just
an individual but of residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with
respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and
desist from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the
relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five
(45) days, submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall
be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required
document is submitted.
29.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, HENRICO
UVERO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation
of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents. The latter
demand that the just compensation for the property should be based
on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76,
as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by
the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is
lower. The RTC ruled for the private respondents. The CA affirmed
said decision. Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority (“EPZA”) vs. Dulay, etc. et al., the
Court held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
to be a judicial function and it thereby declared Presidential Decree
No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No.
1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an
impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now
conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should
have prospective, not retroactive, application.
HELD: There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute:
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton
v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is
therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to
have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by
the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the
court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul
or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as
if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for
ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties
only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or
reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination
of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute
books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The
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parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is
bound.

The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing

that “when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . .

An otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it

is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when
it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive
application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of
contracts. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not
necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act
occurring prior to such a declaration.

The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in

this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling
was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties. The appellate
court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed
decision. The instant petition is dismissed.

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