Isidro Cariño vs The Commission on Human Rights

204 SCRA 483 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Constitutional Commissions – Commission on
Human Rights – Adjudicatory Power of the CHR
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to
stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for
90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño
ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was
appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for
certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR
continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such
as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all
forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide
on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8
herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and
subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may
take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not,
like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power
to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits”
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do;
and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers
in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.
Lupangco vs CA Case Digest
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.

Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review
classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?

Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to
conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee
cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material,
or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without
any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore,
it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during
the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in
the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized
to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors

Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the case of
National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot
interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that the
Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law.
Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government
agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place
he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who
wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office
of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts
of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.

As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose which is to preserve
the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot
even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is
caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to
be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students.

The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations
will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were
contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at
the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors
to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon
ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon
then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain
possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since
Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to
comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds
or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of
reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of
distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when
the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual
either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within
its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously
may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent
authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal
Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual
to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a
public officer.