RULE 130
wraps was found in a jute sack located beside her, approximately one foot away from her feet
1. OBJECT EVIDENCE
[G.R. No. 108722. December 9, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDA CARREON y trial on the merits, the trial court found herein appellant guilty as charged while Armina de
PRECIA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant Erlinda P. Carreon was charged with and convicted of violating Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, by the Regional Trial Court[1] and meted
the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos, and to [pay] the cost.[2] Dissatisfied,
appellant interposed the present appeal anchored on an interrelated assignment of errors, jointly
discussed in her brief, which dwell on the alleged (1) insufficiency of evidence to prove her guilt; (2)
erroneous admission in evidence of the bundles of marijuana, and (3) failure of the trial court to give any
probative value on the supposed affidavit of desistance of the apprehending officers and on her defense of
denial.[3]
The facts of the case, aptly narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General and which we have verified
to be duly supported by the record, are as follows:
At around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 30, 1990, a passenger jeepney in which herein appellant
was riding was flagged down at a checkpoint manned by elements of the Philippine Constabulary in Lamut,
Ifugao Province. In accordance with orders from their headquarters, a search was made on the jeepney as
well as its passenger. The search was conducted by C2C Melchor Rivera and C2C Samuel Bulahao, who
was himself a passenger of the same jeepney (TSN, supra, pp. 3-4).
At the time the search was being conducted, herein appellant and her companion Armina de Monteverde
were seated side by side immediately behind the driver. The bags and personal belongings of the
passengers were individually searched by the constables.As a result of said search, a small wrap of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
marijuana was found in the handbag of herein appellant, while a larger bundle consisting of four
(TSN, supra, pp. 4-7).
As a result thereof, appellant and her companion were arrested and their bags containing the
marijuana were confiscated. The seized items were all later turned over to the Provincial
Command (TSN, supra, pp. 14-15). The accused were later taken to the PC Headquarters in
Lagawe where they were investigated and subsequently detained (TSN, March 12, 1992, p. 12).
Upon investigation by the forensic chemist assigned at the Crime Laboratory at Camp Dangwa,
the items seized from appellant were confirmed to be marijuana (TSN, May 22, 1991, p. 4).
The appellant, together with her companion Armina de Monteverde, were subsequently charged
with violation of R.A. 6425, as amended. On arraignment, both entered pleas of not guilty. After
Monterverde was acquitted [on the ground that the prosecution failed to convincingly prove the
existence of conspiracy between the two accused]. [4]
The appeal is not impressed with merit; hence we affirm the conviction.
Appellant harps on the failure of the prosecution to present as evidence her handbag from
where the marijuana leaves were taken and assails C2C Riveras inconsistent testimony where on
one part he declared that the bag was turned over to Provincial Headquarters while on another
portion he said that appellant took it. The argument is unpersuasive. Appellant seems to have lost
sight of the fact that her conviction was not premised on the presence or absence of the bag, but
on her apprehension in flagante delicto, i.e., while in the possession of and transporting the
prohibited drugs. The non-presentation of the bag does not debilitate the case for the
prosecution. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of C2C Rivera, on the other hand, is
inconsequential. The testimony, we note, is unmistakably clear that the bag was forwarded to the
Provincial Headquarters from where appellant took the same. In addition, minor inconsistencies
do not discredit but rather strengthen the testimony of a witness as they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.[5] The alleged insufficiency of evidence, therefore, is more imagined than
real.
Anent appellants averment that the bundles of marijuana were erroneously admitted in
evidence as C2C Rivera failed to immediately submit the marijuana leaves for laboratory
examination and, in fact, it was not he who actually brought the specimen to the Crime Laboratory,
suffice it to say that there is no rule requiring the apprehending officer to personally deliver the
prohibited drug to the Crime Laboratory for testing. What is important is that the transmittal of the
specimen, as in this case, was not vitiated by irregularity or fraud to cast doubt on the authenticity
and source of the subject specimen. Moreover, the subject marijuana leaves taken from the
appellant were duly identified by C2C Rivera, the apprehending officer and Lt. Ong, the chemist
assigned at Dangwa Crime Laboratory where the specimen was brought for testing. In the
absence of evidence to indicate that these witnesses were moved by improper motive, their
Page 1
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[6] Besides, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of their
duties accorded by law[7] was not at all overthrown by contrary evidence.
In an apparent attempt to discredit the prosecutions witnesses, appellant invites the courts attention
to an affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by C2C Rivera and C2C Bulahao. We are not persuaded
as the said affidavit appears to be an afterthought. Apart from the fact that retractions are exceedingly
unreliable[8] and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts,[9] the trial court rightly observed that
the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries. Thus:
"First, comparison on the real evidence or autoptic proference on record consisting of signatures of the
affiant witness Melchor E. Rivera, appearing in the joint affidavit in support of the criminal complaint found
on page 2 of the records, and the signature of said witness marked as Exhibit 3-C appearing in Exhibit 3,
Joint Affidavit of Desistance found on page 5 of the records visibly show to the naked eye that the said two
signatures are entirely different, revealing the fact that the alleged signature of the alleged affiant Melchor
Rivera appearing in the contested document Exhibit 3 and 3-A was written by a person other than the true
and real Melchor E. Rivera, the witness for the prosecution in the instant case. In other words, the
signature marked as Exhibit 3-C appearing in Exhibit 3 is a forgery.
Second, it is quite surprising and lamentable to say the least, that an L.L.B. Graduate, like the defense
witness Revelino Antonio, professing himself to be a Notary public since 1979 up to the present to have
been allegedly satisfied as to his identity of the alleged affiants by the mere presentation of military IDs of
the alleged affiants, for normally a Notary public should satisfy himself as to the true identity of any person
or party to a document that he notarized. His allegation that he did not require them to present their
Residence Certificate because the alleged affiant told him that they do not have, has to be taken with a
grain of salt considering that a person like the witness who is capable of prevaricating on a vital and
delicate matter by testifying that the witness Melchor Rivera appeared before him as Notary Public,
claiming to be personally present when the alleged affiant affixed his signature in Exhibit 3, when in truth
and in fact, the said signature is found out to be a forgery is not trustworthy, thereby rendering his entire
testimony unworthy of credence. A witness who is capable of testifying falsely on a forged signature of a
person is likewise capable of committing falsehood on less important details. Consequently, the principle
of law Falsus in unos-falsus in omnibussquarely jibes with the testimony of the defense witness, Revelino
Antonio.
xxxxxxxxx
Thirdly, it would be unnatural for the alleged affiants in Exhibit 3 to have voluntarily goant to the residence
of Notary Public Evelino Antonio and requested for the preparation and final execution of the document,
and later categorically denied to have executed any when confronted by the Court during the preliminary
investigation, which only goes to show that it was fraudulently prepared, a fact reinforced by the act of
policeman Daniel Dominong who according to witness Revelino Antonio was the one who paid later the
Notarial Fee for no apparent reason at all, a circumstance showing that there was something fishy in the
preparation of the document Exhibit 3, which confirmed the version of the alleged affiants that they did not
in truth and in fact appear before any notary public.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
More importantly, the veracity of the affidavit in question is now academic since C2C Rivera
himself appeared as a witness for the prosecution; hence, reliance on his alleged affidavit of
desistance which he disowned is wanting in merit.
Further, appellants argument that her defense of denial and her witnesses testimony should
be given credence deserve scant consideration. Findings of fact of the trial court, especially its
assessment on the credibility of witnesses, are not disturbed on appeal except when the trial court
has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which
if considered would have altered the result,[10] an instance absent in this case.Besides, appellants
denial does not inspire belief. With approval, we quote the following disquisition of the trial court:
In summation, the Court is of the considered view, that the defense of denial interposed by the
accused is flimsy and preposterous which finding and conclusion of the Court finds its source and
strength from the very purpose advanced by accused Erlinda Carreon in going to Hapao,
Hungduan and later to O-ong, Banaue, two places in the province of Ifugao noted and taken
judicial notice of by this Court to be great source of marijuana leaves. The accused Erlina Carreon
as stated earlier, a total stranger allegedly went to Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao a far flunged place to
see one Fidel, her alleged companion who applied in going abroad. Such an allegation is highly
unbelievable for the accused does not even know and cannot tell the Court the family name of that
Fidel.All the more, that belies her alleged purpose in going to those places is the fact that it runs
counter to the ordinary course of things or event for normally, it would be this Fidel who would
have taken interest in going to Metro Manila and verify for himself the status of his alleged
application for abroad, if there was indeed any, not the accused going to Hapao, Hungduan,
Ifugao to look for Fidel whose relationship to the accused was not even shown by evidence, as a
matter of fact, he does not even know the family name of this Fidel, neither is there a showing that
the accused is a legal recruiter of any recruitment agency to create an apparent semblace of truth
of her alleged purpose in going to see the person Fidel.
Anent the purpose of the accused Erlinda Carreon in going to O-ong Banaue, Ifugao as elsewhere
stated herein earlier, is highly incredible. A scrutiny of the testimony of the testimony of accused
Erlinda Carreon would seem to suggest that these Liza Antonio and Rosa Kindipan are intimately
related to her. Assuming the relationship to be such, it is strange that said persons would address
and course their letter to the accused at O-ong, Banaue, Ifugao, a far away place from her alleged
residence at Miguilin, Sampaloc, Manila. At most, the logical and reasonable course of action to
have been taken by the said accused is for her to have given her city address to them, which for
purposes of convenience and expediency, could be at the ideal place where to address and
course their alleged intended and espected letter from the two informing the accused Carreon of a
possible job placement or employment abroad. All the moren (sic) nugatory to accused Carreons
alleged purpose in going to Hapao and O-ong is the fact that to a reasonable mind, the prudent
course of action for her to have done is to write this Rita Antonio and Rosa Kindapan and /or go to
the placement agency concerned, or to the Office of the POEA, to verify the status of her alleged
application for abroad, if any, instead of going to two places.
Page 2
The foregoing facts and circumstances indubitably show that the version of the accused Erlinda Carreoin
(sic) is self-serving being the product of a concoction so flimsy to deserve the slightest consideration of this
Court, and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight that the positive testimony of the witness C2C
Melchor Rivera.[11]
Denial constitutes self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declarations of the prosecution witnesses testifying on affirmative matters. [12]
Appellant in this case was convicted and meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of twenty
thousand pesos under Rep. Act No. 6425 for transporting more or less six (6) kilos of marijuana on July
1990. Rep. Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, amended the provisions of Rep. Act.
No. 6425, increasing the imposable penalty for the sale or transport of 750 grams or more of marijuana
to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos. Such penalty is not favorable to the appellant as it carries the accessory penalties provided under
the Revised Penal Code and has a higher amount of fine which in accordance with Article 22 of the same
Code should not be given retroactive effect. The Court, therefore, finds and so holds that the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine in the amount of twenty thousand pesos correctly imposed by the trial court should
be retained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986
EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon
C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by
"Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity
between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the
murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons
identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No.
86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No.
86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal
Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538
against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y
Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano
and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of
Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution
presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo,
and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their
testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper
accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta
by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was
denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar
Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the
leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them
ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty.
Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty.
Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas
and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back
and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the
situation later stabilized.1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos,
jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie
Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging
Page 3
around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos,
Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was
arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued
and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the
"Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by
a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and
his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him.
Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with
fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician
at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo
from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody
gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while
and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind
Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. 3Salcedo tried to stand but
accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo
on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at
the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more
fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand,
Sison repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice
what he did.7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on
some cement steps8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal
Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis,
pulis. Wala bang pulis?"9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer,
brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the
Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions,
lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region,
left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear,
pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right temporal region; occipital
region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and
foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the
following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to
order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A
reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then
Police Chief, for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers.11Several
persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the
basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and
investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and
offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the
photographs presented by the prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in
Quezon City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta
waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia
impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos
admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that
he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the
photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a
member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed
the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo.
The maulers however ignored him. 21
Page 4
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their
defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by
treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The
court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged
and hereby acquits them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused
Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of
Murder, defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790, the Court finds the Accused
Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Murder defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS
and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion
Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10)
MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby acquits him of said charge;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court finds the said Accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of
NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and
Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the
total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los
Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency of these cases shall
be credited to them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul
Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained for another
cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot and academic. The
Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of
merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega are hereby
cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court
by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito
Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against
him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Page 5
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los
Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in the instant consolidated
cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as Joselito
Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED
FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO
WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD
AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE
DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION
OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND
EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF
THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P",
"V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE
INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in
prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable,
Page 6
doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are
suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo even
submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved version of the
incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused
Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to
reprimand him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General Lim,
much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the
evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement
immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the
police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible.
The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the
investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for
being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did
not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was correctly
given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling
reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual
view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the
verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not
inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect
senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but
disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other
on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all
petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and
documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim
had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard
object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks and blows from
rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull
which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt
wooden instrument. 37
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified
that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G,"
and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to
"W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police
intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores
properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the
contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution
witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to
impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the
Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas
Boulevard, 41 — as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling
published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms.
Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these
photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or
persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can
identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the
person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. 52Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer
or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of
proper identification. 54 However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove
Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48"
to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in
the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and
accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas
represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty.
Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to
cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel
Page 7
for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing
objection to their admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person
who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some
of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and
accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed
when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave
reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants,
namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent
poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he,
although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two
appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and
Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the principal
accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous
affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When, while several persons, not composing groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault
each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty ofprision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used
violence upon the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3)
these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4)
someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence
can be identified.62
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage
in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and
the author thereof cannot be ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and
one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but
this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while
later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him.
There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at
this stage of the incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in
number65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their
superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free
himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters
away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time
when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from
his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself
nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they
continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they
ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior
strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no
proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the
assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was
sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow
t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into
mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper
of the rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the
part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against
Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack
against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the
so-called "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted
effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing
as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a
Page 8
conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and
character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo
was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The
reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three small
children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of
P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence,
he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the
following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 105830. January 15, 2002]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 23, 2001, this Court rendered a Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of
G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, maximum, with all the accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as
funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages,
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Eladio C. Tangan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking the rule that factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. Thus, he argues that
this Court erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstances which were appreciated by the lower
courts and in raising the indeterminate penalty imposed on him from a maximum of two years and
four months of prision correccional to a maximum of fourteen years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal. This, he claims, exposed him to the horrifying reality of being
re-incarcerated after having been preventively confined for more than four years.[1]
It bears stressing that at no time during the trial of the case did petitioner raise
self-defense. Nevertheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the attendance of the
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense, sufficient provocation, and passion and
obfuscation.
When petitioner appealed the decision, he threw open the whole case for review. It became
the duty of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it
was made the subject of assignment of errors or not.[2]
Thus, this Court reviewed the records of the case and found that the evidence fails to
support or substantiate the lower courts findings and conclusions. Clearly, therefore, this case
falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule that an appellate court will generally not disturb
the assessment of the trial court on factual matters considering that the latter, as a trier of fact, is
in a better position to appreciate the same.[3]
Page 9
 First of all, the physical evidence belies petitioners version of the incident. As we clearly explained in
our assailed Decision:
The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2
inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point of exit and trajectory transit of the wound,
the victim and the alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of
the gun was almost perpendicular when fired. These findings disprove Tangans claim of accidental
shooting. A revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it were
uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. [4]
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of
our trustworthy evidence.[5] For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[6]
The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of Rosalia dela Cruz and
Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and suddenly fired it at the
deceased.[7]
Likewise, this Court found that the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the trial court are not
present. Petitioner refutes this and insists on his version of the facts. However, the testimony of his witness,
on which he heavily relies, suffers from material inconsistencies which render it unworthy of belief.
It was shown that defense witness Nelson Pante was 10 meters away when he saw the incident,
and his line of vision was blocked by petitioners car.[8] From that distance and vantage point, he could not
have heard anything or have had an unobstructed view of the events. Sure enough, the details of his
statement betray the falsity thereof. He testified that petitioner was hit on the eyebrow, while petitioner said
he was hit on the jaw.[9] Pante was also unable to identify Manuel Miranda, the person whom he
supposedly saw punch petitioner.[10]
All of these, and the incredibility of petitioners account when compared with the physical evidence,
belie self-defense. From the established facts, it can be plainly gleaned that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased. What merely transpired before petitioners gun went off was a
heated exchange of words between the protagonists. This does not qualify as unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof. The person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with
actual use of weapon.[11]
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.[12]
By the same token, the evidence does not show the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party. As stated, the provocation must be sufficient to
excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In this case, all that
the deceased did immediately before he was shot was shout expletives and slap petitioners hand when
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the latter pointed it to his face. These acts, while offensive, were grossly disproportionate to
petitioners act of drawing and firing of a gun.
Furthermore, there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence that could have naturally
produced a powerful excitement in petitioners mind causing him to lose his reason and
self-control. As shown by the facts, no passion and obfuscation could have clouded his mind.
On the whole, therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper penalty for
Homicide, without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, maximum.
While his Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed with the Court an
Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse. He alleged, among others, that
the ponente of the assailed Decision is biased in favor of respondents and, therefore, must recuse
herself from this case. Petitioners accusation, however, is based on nothing more than this Courts
own evaluation of the evidence and departure from the rule that findings of facts of lower court are
not to be disturbed.
Petitioner should bear in mind that the Decision, although penned by a member of the Court,
is a decision of the whole Court. Hence, any attack on the integrity of the ponente, or any member
of the Court for that matter, is an attack on the entire Court. More importantly, petitioner fails to
establish with concrete proof his imputations of bias. Such irresponsible and unfounded
statements will not be taken lightly by this Court. Hence, petitioner and his counsel should be
admonished for making such baseless and unsubstantiated accusations of bias against the
Court. Moreover, the Omnibus Motion should be denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner faults the Court for increasing the penalty five times such that, despite having
served the penalty imposed by the trial court, he now faces the intolerable specter of
reincarceration.[13] It should be recalled that petitioner, by consciously and deliberately firing his
gun, snuffed the life out of a 29-year old optometrist. Suffice it to state that petitioner should bear
the consequences of his felonious act.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse is likewise DENIED. This
denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 104383*. July 12, 2001]
Page 10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIAS, FEDERICO
AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN and DIASCORO VIAS y
ODAL, accused,
ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
One of the cardinal rules of criminal law is that the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.[1] In the present case, there being a doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant, the constitutional
presumption of innocence stands and he must be acquitted.
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 36930 finding accused-appellant Albino Bagas guilty of the
complex crime of robbery in band with double rape and sentencing him accordingly.
At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22, 1991, a group of eight armed men wearing masks
entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos Lacsamana at Sacred Heart Village, Kalookan City
and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery,
two members of the gang raped Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago, niece and employee,
respectively of complainant Lacsamana.
On February 27, 1991, accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin,
Dioscoro Vias and four other accused, whose identities are unknown and who are still at large up to the
present, were charged with the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape under the following
information:
That on or about the 22nd day of February 1991, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
all armed with guns, with intent of gain, and by means of violence, threats and intimidation upon the person
of Perlita delos Santos de Lacsamana, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
carry away the following, to wit:
Cash money in the amount of -----------P128,000.00
Jewelries worth ------------------------- 600,000.00
Total ------------------------------- P728,000.00
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
all belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the aforesaid
amount of P728,000.00; and on the occasion thereof, said accused conspiring together and
mutually helping one another likewise by means of force and violence and with the use of their
weapons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Fe Catanyag y
Cabaero and Estrella Rolago y Madrid both residents of said house, against their will and without
their consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
On arraignment, all the accused including accused-appellant Albino Bagas pleaded Not
Guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court and as presented in the Solicitor Generals Brief are as
follows:
The incident happened at the compound of Block 5, Road 32, Phase II of the Sacred Heart Village
in Kalookan City (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 2, 1991). In the compound are the main house where Mrs.
Perlita Lacsamana resides and another house which serves as the office and quarters for
Lacsamanas employees. In between of these two houses is about three (3) meter-wide area
where the dirty kitchen and the garage are found. In the first floor of the main house is the masters
bedroom, and on the second floor is the guestroom (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 2, 1991).
While at the masters bedroom on that particular evening at about 9:30 p.m., Lacsamana
overheard her maid, cried aray, aray, aray. She immediately went out but as soon as she opened
the door of her room, two (2) men (one of them is accused Amestuzo while the other one remains
unarrested) poked their guns on her. At gun point, Lacsamana, Lea, Edwin, and Belen were
forcibly brought to the second floor of the main house. Thereat, Lacsamana saw four (4) other
male persons ransacking her premises. The said male persons, armed with guns and knives, tied
her including all her employees and members of her household with the use of torn electric fan
wire and television wire. After that they were told to lie down with face against the floor but a
minute later she was asked where the masters bedroom is and when she answered that it is on
the ground floor, she was again forcefully brought down. On her way down, she saw, aside from
the six (6) male persons who were inside her house, two (2) other male persons (later identified as
accused Ampatin and Vias) outside the main house but within the compound (pp. 8-10, TSN, July
2, 1991).
Once they were already inside the masters bedroom, the six (6 ) armed male persons (two (2) of
them were Amestuzo and Bagas) ransacked the same and took all her monies, jewelries, shoes,
jackets, colored television and imported wine. Likewise, aforesaid accused ate the foods found by
them in their kitchen. (pp.10-11, 13, TSN, July 2, 1991).
After ransacking the room, two (2) of the accused, one (1) of them is Amestuzo, brought Estrella
Rolago inside her room and afterwhich she was in turn brought to the guest room. Thereat she
Page 11
heard Rolago pleading Maawa kayo, maawa kayo then after ten (10) minutes, Rolago, with bloodstain on
her shorts, was brought in back to the guest room (pp. 13-14, TSN, July 2, 1991). Rolago was raped by
Amestuzo (pp. 17-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).
Almost simultaneously, Bagas likewise sexually assaulted and ravished Fe Catanyag (pp. 38-40, TSN,
July 3, 1991; pp. 2-5, TSN, July 4, 1991). Thereafter, Bagas shouted at her to stand up and although she
was experiencing pain on her private part which was bleeding at that time, she stood up, dressed up and
proceeded to the servants quarter (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 4, 1991).
Thereafter, Mrs, Lacsamana shouted for help. Sensing that the accused had already left, they locked the
door. With the help of her employer and co-employees, more particularly Nanding, she and Rolago were
brought the nearby Neopolitan Clinic and from there they proceeded to the St. Lukes Hospital where Dr.
Brion treated Catanyag and Rolago (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 4, 1991; pp. 19-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).[3]
On November 28, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused. The dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment CONVICTING accused VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIAS,
FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN, DIOSCORO VINAS y ODAL of the
complex crime of ROBBERY IN BAND WITH DOUBLE RAPE and sentences each of them to suffer
imprisonment of DOUBLE RECLUSION PERPETUA and orders them to jointly and severally indemnify to
complainant Perlita delos Santos de Lacsamana the amount of P800,000.00 representing the value of
monies and properties taken forcibly away by the accused and to indemnify, jointly and severally, Ma. Fe
Catanyag and Estrella Rolago the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each.
SO ORDERED.[4]
From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-appellant Bagas appealed to
this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be
represented by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due weight to the open
court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3)
the trial courts improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
Accused-appellant maintains that from the time he was arrested until he was presented to the
complainants for identification, he was deprived of the benefit of counsel. He narrates the circumstances
surrounding his arrest and investigation as follows:
On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together with
accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay
City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain Mario
and searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at
the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito and Magturo ka ng tao
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
kahit sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the
first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused
Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused Ampatin told him that he (Ampatin) committed an error
in pointing him out to the police, namumukaan lang niya ako, napagkamalian lang niya ako. They
were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together
with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived,
accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he was
asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and
Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that
accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy,
kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen intervened.[5]
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived
him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular
presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel,
accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by
counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on
detention. He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was
as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation.[6] Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements.[7] Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. [8] This was settled
in the case of People vs. Lamsing[9] and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra.[10] The
right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory[11] and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.[12]
Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was
presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the
investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the
complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from
accused-appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant
when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional
rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in
which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of
his conviction.[13] In the present case, there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission.
Page 12
 Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was presented to the
complainants for identification. It is alleged that the identification was irregular as he was not placed in a
police line-up and instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.
Again, the contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification.[14] The fact that he was brought out of the
detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any
other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process.
However, we agree that complainants out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was seriously
flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court
identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs.
Teehankee[15] which lists the following factors:
xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.
The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station
appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view
accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the detention cell to be presented to them for
identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he
was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits. According to accused-appellant -
Q: When the complaining witnesses arrived at the Urduja precinct at that time you mentioned, were
you immediately kicked by them?
A: No, sir.
Q: How long a time from the time they arrived at the Urduja precinct to the time that you were kicked
by them?
A: Around 10 minutes, sir.
Q: And how were you identified or recognized by the complaining witnesses?
A: Because upon arrival at the Urduja police station, the policemen announced that I am one of the
suspects in this case and thereafter, the complainants started kicking me, sir.
Q: So that the announcement of the policemen that you were one of the suspects came first then they
started kicking you?
A: Yes, sir.[16]
It is, thus, clear that the identification was practically suggested by the police themselves when they
announced to the complainants that accused-appellant was the person pointed to by Ampatin. The fact
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
that this information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior to their identification based
on their own recall of the incident detracts from the spontaneity of their subsequent identification
and therefore, its objectivity.
In a similar case, People vs. Cruz,[17] accused Cruz, a suspected co-conspirator in a case of
robbery with homicide, was presented to the witnesses alone and made to walk and turn around in
their presence. Then the police pointed out to the accused and several others as the persons
suspected by the police as the perpetrators of the robbery committed in Goso-on. The Court, in
rejecting the subsequent identification made by the witnesses, reasoned that:
The manner by which (witnesses) were made to identify the accused at the police station was
pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination,
and all told, subverted their reliability as eyewitnesses.
In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,[18] an NBI agent first pointed the accused to the witnesses
after which the latter identified the accused. The Court held that such identification was doubtful
as the same was not spontaneous and independent as there was improper suggestion coming
from the NBI agent. We ruled that a show-up or the presentation of a single suspect to a witness
for purposes of identification is seriously flawed as it constitutes the most grossly suggestive
identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
Likewise in People vs. Meneses,[19] where the accused was presented to the lone witness
as the suspect in the crime inside the police investigators office, the Court pronounced that
although the police officer did not literally point to the accused as in the Tuason case, the
confrontation and the identification proceeding therefrom was objectionable.
The Court also finds that the trial court erroneously rejected accused-appellants alibi.
Accused-appellant clearly and positively testified that at the time of the crime, February 22,
1991, he was working as a shell cutter in a factory in Pasay City where he was a stay-in
employee. He rendered overtime work until ten oclock in the evening that night because they had
to rush work. After ten p.m., he, together with his stay-in co-workers, went to sleep. Four days
later, he was arrested when accused Ampatin randomly pointed him out to the police. [20]
This testimony of accused-appellant was materially corroborated by two of his
co-employees who were with him on the night of the incident. Rodolfo Rosales, his co-worker,
testified that he worked overtime until 10 p.m. in the Pasay City factory together with
accused-appellant. Upon finishing work, they went to sleep in their quarters on the second floor of
the building because they were stay-in employees of the factory.[21] Another co-worker of
accused-appellant, Clemente Gahelan, was similarly offered as a witness to corroborate Rosales
testimony and his testimony was duly admitted by the prosecution. [22]
The employer of accused-appellant Rolando Ocasla, likewise testified that on the night of
the incident, accused-appellant worked overtime in his factory until 10 p.m. After 10 p.m., he
personally locked the door of the premises which was the only means of ingress and engress, as
he always does because it was his means of preventing any pilferage of materials. He was the
Page 13
only one who had keys to said door. Around five a.m. of the following day, he woke up accused-appellant Q: And what did they do to you?
and told him to drink his coffee. He also declared that there was nothing unusual about accused-appellants
behavior either, before, during or after the date of the alleged crime.[23] A: Immediately I was instructed to follow the policemen who went upstairs, sir.

The defense of alibi or denial assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by a Q: Why did that policemen go upstairs?
credible witness.[24] And to be given weight, accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else A: He was looking for Mario, sir.
when the crime was committed but that he was so far away that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [25] xxx

In this case, we find accused-appellants alibi sufficiently corroborated by the testimonies of his Q: Upon reaching the second floor, what happened there?
co-workers and his employer who categorically stated that they were with accused-appellant on the night
of the crime. There was no evidence that these witnesses were related to accused-appellant; neither was it A: They did not see any person there, sir.
shown that they had any personal interest nor motive in the case. As impartial credible witnesses, their
Q: What followed next?
testimonies cannot be doubted absent a clear showing of undue bias or prejudice, or convincing proof of
the impropriety of their motives to testify for the accused.[26] A: P/O Melmida pistol-whipped me, sir.

Accused-appellant vehemently argues that it was physically impossible for him to have been present Q: Where were you hit?
at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. First, the crime was
committed around 9:30 in the evening of February 22, 1991. Accused-appellant, as well as two other A: On the left portion of my neck, sir.
witnesses, testified that he worked in the factory until 10 p.m. that night and went to sleep after. Second,
Q: Did Melmida utter any remark while hitting you?
there was only one door in the factory which was the only means of entrance and exit and this door was
kept locked by witness Ocasla after ten p.m. that night. Ocasla was the only person who had a key to this xxx
door. Third, the windows on the first floor of the building consisted of hollow blocks with small holes which
do not allow passage. The second and third floor windows were 14 and 21 feet high, respectively. There A: He told me to point to somebody else, sir, saying these words, Magturo ka ng tao kahit
was no possible means of exit through these windows without accused-appellant getting hurt or sino.
injured. Lastly, the crime took place in Kalookan City around 9:30 p.m. while accused-appellants place of
xxx
work was in Pasay City. Assuming for the sake of argument that he was able to leave the premises after
10 p.m. that night, by the time he reaches Kalookan, the crime would have already been completed. Q: So what did you do when you were ordered to point to anyone?
The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the courts should not be too A: Because at that time I cannot yet stand up he forced me to go downstairs, sir.
readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as found by the trial court and thereby rightly set the accused xxx
free.[27] Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the present case has been sufficiently established by
Q: Were you able to reached (sic) the ground floor?
corroborative testimonies of credible witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of
accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime. Alibi, therefore, should have been properly A: Yes, sir.
appreciated in accused-apellants favor.
Q: And what happened there?
Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is the voluntary confession of
accused Federico Ampatin absolving accused-appellant Bagas of the crime. Ampatins testimony was A: I pointed to Albino Bagas, sir, because he was the only first person I saw there at the
clear and categorical: ground floor while his companions were on the other side because I dont want to get
hurt anymore, Your Honor.
Q: When you reached that house where Bagas was working what happened?
Court: When you see (sic) Bagas was lying face down at the tme you pointed to him?
A: All the persons were ordered to lie down, sir.
A: Yes, your Honor.
xxx
Court: You did not bother to look at his face?

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 14

 A: No more Your Honor because I was in a hurry to point to somebody because I was afraid that I will A: We were the first group of persons seen by the policemen and Albino and I were beside
be hurt again, Your Honor. each other, sir.

xxx
Court: You mean to say at the time you pointed to Albino Bagas you did not know him?
A: No I dont know him, Your Honor.[28]
Ampatin and accused-appellant were charged as co-conspirators in the crime of robbery with
rape. As a co-accused, it would have been more consistent with human nature for Ampatin to implicate
accused-appellant if indeed he was one of the gang. In fact, the Court has recognized that as is usual with
human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime is likely to put the blame as far as possible on others rather
than himself.[29] The fact that he testified to the innocence of a co-accused, an act which resulted in no
advantage or benefit to him and which might in fact implicate him more, should have been received by the
trial court as an indicum of the truth of Ampatins testimony and the innocence of herein accused-appellant.
Ampatins testimony, therefore, should have been given weight by the trial court. More so, the same was
substantially corroborated by another witness, Rodolfo Rosales, accused-appellants co-worker and who
was present when accused-appellant was arrested. Rosales testified as follows:
Q: Now, do you know when was Albino Bagas arrested in connection with this case?
A: Last February 25, that was Monday, sir.
Q: And where were you when he was arrested?
A: I was there at that time.
xxx
Q: And you want to impressed (sic) upon this Honorable Court that at first at the ground floor,
Albino Bagas was not identified by this Ampatin before going to the second floor?
A: The guide was not able to identify the person of Albino Bagas and that was the reason why
they still made searches at the second floor, sir.
Q: How was Federico Ampatin able to identify Albino Bagas when he was accompanied by
the policemen went downstairs?
A: I noticed from the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid after hearing the shout of
the policemen, sir.
xxx[30]
The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatins declaration in court that he does
not know herein accused-appellant and merely pointed to him out of fear of the police. These
testimonies remain unrebutted by the prosecution as the arresting officers were not presented to
refute or deny the same. The foregoing testimonies exculpating accused-appellant have
sufficiently cast at least a shadow of doubt as to his guilt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Albino Bagas of
the crime of robbery with multiple rape is hereby REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. His immediate release is hereby ordered unless he is held for some other valid charges.
SO ORDERED.

Q: xxx what was the reaction of Albino Bagas when he was being pointed to and arrested by the
arresting officers? THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181545
Appellee,
A: The situation goes like this, sir, the policemen arrived there and they were holding the persons of Present:
Ampatin and they were looking for a person named Mario that was what I heard, sir, and then
the policemen forced us to be identified or to be seen by the guide. Ampatin at first at the ground QUISUMBING, J.,
floor but since there was nobody there by the name of Mario they proceeded to the second floor - versus - Chairperson,
and upon looking one of the policemen shouted, Wala rito, niloloko lang tayo ng taong ito. CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
Court: Then what happened next? VELASCO, JR., and
MARK DELA CRUZ, BRION, JJ.
Witness: And I noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid, so, because of fear he Appellant.
was able to point on the person of Albino Bagas but when asked he does not know the name of Promulgated:
Albino Bagas, Your Honor. October 8, 2008

Atty. Pacis: Before going to the second floor, because according to you the arresting officers and the x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
guide went to the second floor, was Albino Bagas at the ground floor seen by the guide and the
policemen? DECISION

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 15

TINGA, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the 12 September 2007 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02534, affirming the 24 August 2006 judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
120 of Caloocan City, finding appellant Mark Dela Cruz y Batac guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu in an Information dated 18 July 2003,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July 2003 in Caloocan City, M.M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, without having been authorized by law, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to one PO2 EUGENE C.
AMOYO, who posed as buyer, two (2) pcs. of small transparent plastic sachets
containing 0.08 gram, total weight of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) for
[t]wo (2) pcs of One Hundred Peso Bill with SN DF950395 and KY384741 knowing
the same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated that P/Insp. Ericson L. Calabocal conducted a qualitative examination on two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets evidenced by Physical Science Report No. D-845-03 dated 17 July 2003. It
was further stipulated that said witness had no personal knowledge as to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the arrest of appellant, as well as the source of the subject specimens. [4]
Trial ensued. Witnesses for the prosecution narrated that in the evening of 16 July 2003, a male informant
came to the office of the Northern Police District on Tanigue Street, Kaunlaran Village, Caloocan City. In
the presence of PO3 Gilbert Velasco (PO3 Velasco) and PO2 Eugene Amoyo (PO2 Amoyo), the informant
complained about the rampant selling of shabu by a certain Mac-Mac. Said information was relayed to
P/Chief Inspector Rafael Santiago who immediately instructed PO3 Velasco to form a buy-bust team. The
team was composed of PO3 Velasco, PO2 Amoyo, PO3 Joel Borda (PO3 Borda), PO2 Loreto Lagmay,
PO1 Renato Ameng, PO1 Allan Reyes and PO1 Joel Cosme. PO2 Amoyo was the designated
poseur-buyer. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills were prepared as boodle money. The initials ECA were
placed on the bills.
The buy-bust team underwent a briefing and then proceeded to the target area on board two (2)
separate vehicles. They arrived at a parking lot along Hipon Liit in Dagat-dagatan at 7:30 p.m. PO2 Amoyo,
PO3 Velasco and PO3 Borda, along with the informant, waited beside a coconut tree for Mac-Mac.
After two hours, appellant arrived with two male companions. The informant approached
appellant and introduced PO2 Amoyo to him as a buyer of P200.00 worth of shabu. Appellant left for a
while to get the shabufrom his companions, who were standing 7 meters away from the group. He
returned ten (10) minutes later and handed two (2) plastic sachets to PO2 Amoyo, who, in exchange,
handed over the boodle money.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
After the exchange, PO2 Amoyo raised his left hand to signal the other members of the
buy-bust team that the transaction had already been concluded. PO3 Velasco and PO3 Borda
immediately arrested appellant while PO2 Amoyo ran after appellants companions. There was an
exchange of gunfire between PO2 Amoyo and an unidentified companion but the latter was able
to escape unscathed. PO2 Amoyo kept the two (2) plastic sachets in his pocket.
A spot investigation was conducted on appellant. It was revealed that the two (2) male
companions were identified as Amay and Tabo. Appellant was then brought to the police
headquarters. PO2 Amoyo placed his markings ECA-BB-1 and ECA-BB-2 on the plastic sachets
before turning them over, together with the buy-bust money, to SPO4 Jorge Tabayag. PO2
Amoyo also prepared a request for laboratory examination addressed to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
The two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were found positive
for shabu. Said finding was indicated in Physical Science Report No. D-845-03[5] prepared by
Forensic Chemist and Police Inspector Erickson L. Calabocal of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Group.
Appellant presented a different version of the facts. He testified that at 8:30 p.m. on 16
July 2003, he was sitting in the plaza located on Hipon Liit St., Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City. He
was waiting for his brother to deliver his boots when the policemen arrived and were looking for an
alias Amay. Appellant then heard a gunshot and saw Amay firing the shot. Appellant ran towards
his house. Later, the policemen went to his house and handcuffed him. When appellant asked
why he was being arrested, the policemen claimed that appellant knew Amay. Appellant denied
selling shabu and asserted that the case was filed against him when he refused to give
information about Amay.
Appellants testimony was corroborated by his brother, Balweg Dela la Cruz, who stated
in court that appellant instructed him to get his boots and bring them to the plaza at around 8:30
p.m.[6] As he was about to leave the house, Balweg saw his brother being arrested by two
policemen. He heard from other people that the policemen were asking appellant if he knew of a
man named Amay.[7]
In finding appellant guilty, the trial court ruled that there was a meeting of minds
between the poseur-buyer and appellant as to the delivery of shabu in exchange for P200.00. The
dispositive portion of said judgment reads:
Premises considered, this Court finds accused MARK DELA
CRUZ Y BATAC GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 5,
Article II of [R.A. No.] 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
The two (2) plastic sachets containing 0.04 gram each of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of
the government to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PEDEA) [sic] for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Page 16

On 15 September 2006, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal.[9]
On 12 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the RTC's decision in
Criminal Case No. 68601.[10] The appellate court gave weight to the testimony of the poseur-buyer as well
as to the Physical Science Report in concluding that the illegal sale of shabu was perpetrated by
appellant. The appellate court rejected appellants defense of frame-up for failure to substantiate such
allegation and in light of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of
their official duties. Anent the alleged failure of the police officers to observe the procedure laid down under
Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165, the appellate court held that such failure is not fatal as the circumstances in
the instant case show that the integrity pertaining to the custody of the seized shabu was not compromised
notwithstanding that the same were marked only during the investigation held at the police station. [11]
After obtaining an unfavorable decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court. [12]
On 9 April 2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously file their supplemental
briefs.[13]
In two separate manifestations, both parties expressed their intention not to file any
supplemental brief since all the issues and arguments have already been raised in their respective
Briefs.[14]
Appellant maintains that the prosecution was not able to establish the moral certainty required
by law to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that his defenses of alibi and denial were
supported not only by his testimony but by that of other witnesses. He questions the identity of
the shabu allegedly confiscated from him as the marking was made only in the police station in front of the
investigating officer, contrary to the requirement laid down in Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165. He also
assails the forensic laboratory examination result in that it was not covered by a certification in violation of
Section 21 (3) of the same law. He stresses that the prosecution must not simply rely on the presumption
of regularity for it cannot by itself support a judgment of conviction.[15]
In its appellees brief,[16] the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) supports the conviction of
appellant. It argues that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu in a legitimate buy-bust
operation. It claims that the elements necessary in the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs were duly
established by the prosecution, namely: the appellant, as seller of the shabu, and the poseur-buyer were
identified; and the shabuconfiscated from appellant and the money used to buy it were also presented in
court. The OSG emphasizes that the sachets of shabu presented in court were the same sachets
confiscated from appellant and subjected to laboratory examination. It justifies the non-observance of
Section 21 (1) of R. A. No. 9165 since the corpus delicti of the illegal sale of drugs was duly established
during trial. It adds that after the confiscation of the sachets of shabu from appellant, they were
immediately submitted for laboratory examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory. [17]
The appeal is meritorious.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.[18]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The common issue that crops out of a buy-bust operation, like in this case, is whether
the drug submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. The Court is cognizant of the fact that an entrapment operation is open to possibilities
of abuse. It is by this same thrust that the chain of custody rule was adopted by the
Court. In Lopez v. People,[19] we had the occasion to expound on the chain of custody rule, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence
is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the
time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or
otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit
is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to
people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it
was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the
court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed
heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the
state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the
exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers
until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of
the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which
similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
Page 17
 identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody
of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.
Thus, the corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.[20]
This Court believes that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic
sachets containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until they were brought to the
police investigator.
PO2 Amoyo testified that he failed to place any marking on the sachets of shabu immediately
after the apprehension of appellant. In fact, PO3 Amoyo admitted that he only placed his markings upon
being ordered by SPO4 Tabayag.[21]
The defense however failed to corroborate PO2 Amoyos claim. While SPO4 Tabayag was
presented in court, he neglected to mention nor was he asked about the markings on the shabu. On the
contrary, the sworn statement of PO2 Amoyo, which was formally offered in evidence, seemed to suggest
that markings were made prior to the submission of the shabu to SPO4 Tabayag, to wit:
16 T: Maipapakita mo ba yong sinasabi mong pinaghihinalaang Shabu na nabili mo
dito kay Mark Dela Cruz, alyas Mac Mac?
S: Opo. Ito po. [Affiant presented two (2) pieces of small transparent plastic
sachets (heat-sealed) containing a crystalline substance believed
to be Shabu] at ang plastic po nito ay aking minarkahan ng aking
inisyal na ECA-BB1 at ECA-BB2].[22]
Verily, PO2 Amoyos testimony suggests that he already placed his markings prior to being
questioned by SPO4 Tabayag.
Moreover, no other witness was presented to testify or to fill the gap from the time SPO4
Tabayag received the sachets of shabu from PO2 Amoyo up to the time they were delivered to the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
Furthermore, nothing on record shows that the procedural requirements of Section 21,
Paragraph 1 of Article II of R. A. No. 9165[23] with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs
were complied with.There was no physical inventory and photograph of the items allegedly confiscated
from appellant. Neither did the police officers offer any explanation for their failure to observe the rule. The
prosecution merely sought refuge in its belief that a stringent application of the rule may be dispensed with
if the corpus delicti has been duly established.
In People v. Orteza,[24] the Court citing People v. Laxa,[25] People v. Kimura[26] and Zarraga v.
People,[27] reiterated the ruling that the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of
the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.[28]
In People v. Nazareno,[29] the poseur-buyer failed to immediately place his markings on the
seized drugs before turning them over to the police investigators. The police officer who placed his
markings was not presented to testify on what actually transpired after the drugs were turned over to
him. The Court equated these circumstances as failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the
existence of the corpus delicti.[30]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
As stated by the Court in People v. Santos, Jr.,[31] failure to observe the proper
procedure also negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police
officers.[32] As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the accused is
usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their
duties regularly.[33] However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities,
such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[34] The
presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and
which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. [35]
In fine, the failure to establish the corpus delicti is detrimental to the cause of the
prosecution. The Court is thus constrained to acquit appellant on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 September 2007
affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 120
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant MARK DELA CRUZ y BATAC is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is
being lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision
forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant
was actually released from confinement.
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director and the Director General of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper guidance and implementation. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROGELIO S. REYES, G. R. No. 180177
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J, Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 18, 2012
Page 18

FIRST DIVISION
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J:
The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the standard of moral
certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard demands that all the essential elements of
the offense are established as to leave no room for any doubt about the guilt of the accused. The courts
should unfailingly impose the standard in order to prevent injustice from being perpetrated against the
accused.
Under review is the decision promulgated on September 28, 2007 by the Court of Appeals
(CA),[1] whereby the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2,
in Manila[2] for violations of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Antecedents
On February 23, 2005, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed two informations charging
petitioner with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of shabu defined and punished, respectively, by
Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165,[3] to wit:
Criminal Case No. 05234564
That on or about January 20, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being been (sic) authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to
another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell
One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero two two
(0.022) gram, of white crystalline substance known as SHABU containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 05234565
That on or about January 20, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being then authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero
point zero two four (0.024) gram of white crystalline substance known as SHABU
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
After petitioner pled not guilty, trial ensued. The summary of the evidence of the parties adduced at trial
follows.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In the morning of January 20, 2005, a lady confidential informant went to the Police Station 8 of
the Western Police District to report on the drug-dealing activities of a certain alias Boy (later
identified as petitioner) on M. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.[6] A buy-bust team of ten
members,[7] including PO2 Erwin Payumo as designated poseur-buyer,[8] was formed. PO2
Payumo then prepared the necessary documents prior to the operation.[9]
From the police station, the lady confidential informant called petitioner by phone. The
latter instructed her to wait on M. Mapa Street.[10] Thus, the buy-bust team proceeded to that area
and arrived at around 4:20 p.m. of January 20, 2005.[11] PO2 Payumo and the lady confidential
informant arrived together to wait for petitioner. The rest of the buy-bust team, who had gone to
the area on board an L300 van,[12] took positions nearby. Petitioner came by five minutes
later,[13] and, after asking the lady confidential informant whether PO2 Payumo was the buyer,
instructed Payumo to follow him to his house where he told PO2 Payumo to wait. Two other
individuals, later identified as Conchita Carlos and Jeonilo Flores, were also waiting for
petitioner.[14]
Upon getting back, petitioner asked PO2 Payumo for the payment, [15] and the latter complied and
handed the marked money consisting of three P50.00 bills all bearing the initials TF.[16] Petitioner
then went into a room and returned with a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
that he gave to PO2 Payumo. Receiving the plastic sachet, PO2 Payumo placed a missed call to
PO1 Miguelito Gil, a member of the buy-bust team, thereby giving the pre-arranged signal
showing that the transaction was completed. PO2 Payumo then arrested petitioner after
identifying himself as an officer. PO2 Payumo recovered another sachet containing white
crystalline substance from petitioners right hand, and the marked money from petitioners right
front pocket.[17] The rest of the buy-bust team meanwhile came around and recovered two sachets
also containing white crystalline substance from the sofa where Conchita and Jeonilo were sitting.
The buy-bust team thus also arrested Conchita and Jeonilo.[18]
Back at the police station, PO2 Payumo placed on the plastic sachet that petitioner had handed
him the marking RRS-1 and on the other sachet recovered from petitioners right hand the marking
RRS-2.[19] The seized items were thereafter turned over to the Western Police District Crime
Laboratory for examination by P/Insp. Judycel Macapagal, who found the items positive for
methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu.[20]
On the other hand, petitioner denied that there had been a buy-bust operation, and claimed that
he had been framed up.
Petitioner testified that he was at his house entertaining his visitors Conchita and
Jeonilo in the afternoon of January 20, 2005;[21] that Conchita was selling to him a sofa bed
for P800.00, while Jeonilo was only contracted by Conchita to drive the jeepney carrying the sofa
bed;[22] that the three of them were surprised when a group of armed men in civilian clothes
barged into his house and conducted a search, and arrested them; that he was also surprised to
see a plastic sachet when the armed men emptied his pocket; that the plastic sachet did not
belong to him;[23] that PO2 Payumo was not among those who entered and searched his
house;[24] that the three of them were made to board a van where PO1 Rudolf Mijares
demanded P30,000.00 for his release;[25] and that because he told them he had no money to give
to them, one of the men remarked: Sige, tuluyan na yan; and that they were then brought to the
police station.[26]
Jeonilo corroborated petitioners story.[27]
Page 19

Ruling of the RTC
As stated, on May 23, 2006, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit.
However like alibi, we view the defense of frame up with disfavor as it can easily be
concocted and is commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecution
arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Acts.
Having established that a legitimate buy-bust operation occurred in the case at bar,
there can now be no question as to the guilt of the accused-appellant. Such operation
has been considered as an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried
out with due regard to the constitutional and legal safeguards, it deserves judicial
sanction. (People of the Philippines vs. Lowell Saludes, et al., G.R. No. 144157, June
10, 2003)
The accused failed to show any ill motive on the part of the policeman to testify falsely
against him. Indeed, the prosecution showed that the police were at the place of the
incident to do exactly what they are supposed to doto conduct an operation. The
portrayal put forward by accused and his lone witness remained uncorroborated.
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible witness but must in itself
be credible.
The entrapment operation paved the way for the valid warrantless arrest of accused,
Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
A police officer or private person, without warrant, may arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx
It has been held that the testimonies of police officers involved in a buy-bust
operation deserve full faith and credit, given the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly. This presumption can be overturned if clear and
convincing evidence is presented to prove either two things: (1) that they were not
properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive.
(People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Remarata et al., G.R. No. 147230, April 29,
2003)
The positive identification of appellants by the prosecution witness should
prevail over the formers denials of the commission of the crime for which they are
charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony of the
prosecution witness than the accuseds denial. Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak
defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution
witness that the accused committed the crime. (People of the Philippines vs. Edwin
Belibet, Manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero, G.R. No. 91260, July 25, 1991)[28]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 05-234564, finding accused,
Rogelio Reyes y Samson, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment
and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 05-234565, finding accused,
Rogelio Reyes y Samson, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 17
years and 4 months as maximum; to pay a fine of P300,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and the
Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn
over with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law
and rules.
SO ORDERED.[29]
With his motion for reconsideration being denied by the RTC, petitioner filed his notice
of appeal.[30]
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC thuswise:
A fortiori, viewed in the light of the foregoing, We are strongly convinced that
the prosecution has proven the guilt of the Appellant for the crimes charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The
challenged Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The CA gave more weight to the testimony of poseur buyer PO2 Payumo, and believed the
findings of the laboratory examination conducted by P/Insp. Macapagal. It recognized the validity
of the buy-bust operation.
Issue
Page 20
Petitioner is now before the Court seeking to reverse the decision of the CA upon the sole error that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT FINDING WORTHY OF CREDENCE PETITIONERS WITNESS TESTIMONY
CREATING DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
Petitioner wants the Court to give credence to his defense of frame-up, and to believe the testimony of
Jeonilo Flores who had no reason to testify falsely against the arresting officers.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In this jurisdiction, we convict the accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt. Conformably with this standard, we are mandated as an appellate court to sift the records and
search for every error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is warranted,
and to correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding guilt against the accused. [32]
Guided by the standard, we acquit petitioner.
The buy-bust operation mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an unnamed lady
confidential informant. Such an operation, according to People v. Garcia,[33] was susceptible to police
abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion, and the possibility of that abuse was
great.[34] The susceptibility to abuse of the operation led to the institution of several procedural safeguards
by R.A. No. 9165, mainly to guide the law enforcers. Thus, the State must show a faithful compliance with
such safeguards during the prosecution of every drug-related offense.[35]
The procedural safeguards start with the requirements prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 relating to the custody and disposition of the confiscated, seized, and surrendered dangerous drugs,
plant sources of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments and
paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. The provision relevantly states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. xxx:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
This appeal involves two distinct drug-related offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (b) the presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti, or the dangerous drugs themselves. On the other hand, the prosecution of illegal
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
possession of dangerous drugs necessitates the following facts to be proved, namely: (a) the
accused was in possession of dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not authorized by law,
and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous
drugs.[36] For both offenses, it is crucial that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized
dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of
seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court.
Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of all law enforcers arresting
drug pushers and drug possessors and confiscating and seizing the dangerous drugs and
substances from them.
This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is
discharged only when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken.
This has been the reason for defining chain of custody under Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, viz:
(b) Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer or custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final
disposition; (Emphasis supplied)
In Mallilin v. People,[37] the need to maintain an unbroken chain of custody is
emphasized:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence
is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the
time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or
Page 21
 otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule.
Cogently, Mallilin v. People is reiterated in Catuiran v. People,[38] People v.
[39]
Garcia, and People v. Villanueva,[40] among others.
Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting lawmen of the
rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous drugs were inventoried and
photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence of petitioner, a representative of the media,
a representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official, was not shown. As
such, the arresting lawmen did not at all comply with the further requirement to have the attending
representative of the media, representative of the DOJ, and elected public official sign the inventory and
be furnished a copy each of the inventory. Instead, the records show that PO2 Payumo placed the
markings of RRS-1 on the sachet allegedly received from petitioner and RRS-2 on the two sachets
allegedly seized from petitioners hand already at the police station with only petitioner present. Yet, the
Prosecution did not also present any witness to establish that an inventory of the seized articles at least
signed by petitioner at that point was prepared.
We clarified in People v. Sanchez[41] that in compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, supra,
the physical inventory and photographing of the seized articles should be conducted, if practicable, at the
place of seizure or confiscation in cases of warrantless seizure. But that was true only if there were
indications that petitioner tried to escape or resisted arrest, which might provide the reason why the
arresting team was not able to do the inventory or photographing at petitioners house; otherwise, the
physical inventory and photographing must always be immediately executed at the place of seizure or
confiscation.
In People v. Pringas,[42] the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21, supra, was
held not to be fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground for it, and for as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized articles were properly preserved by the apprehending officer
or team. The Court further pronounced therein that such non-compliance would not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible, for what was of utmost importance
was the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized or confiscated articles,
considering that they were to be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
However, the omissions noted herein indicated that the State did not establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude required for a finding of
guilt.
To be sure, the buy-bust operation was infected by lapses. Although PO2 Payumo declared that
he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu (RRS-1) from petitioner and who had confiscated
the two sachets of shabu (RRS-2) from petitioner, all of which he had then sealed, nothing more to support
the fact that the evidence thus seized had remained intact was adduced. In fact, the State did not anymore
establish to whom the seized articles had been endorsed after PO2 Payumo had placed the markings at
the station, and with whose custody or safekeeping the seized articles had remained until their
endorsement to P/Insp. Macapagal for the laboratory examination. Presently, we cannot justifiably
presume that the seized articles had remained in the possession of PO2 Payumo in view of the testimony
of P/Insp. Macapagal to the effect that the party requesting the laboratory examination had been a certain
Police Officer Alano,[43] whom the Prosecution did not at all particularly identify or present as its witness. In
this regard, Laboratory Report No. D-085-05,[44] the report prepared by P/Insp. Macapagal, also stated that
the party requesting the conduct of the laboratory examination was the OIC-SAID-SOTU, PS-8, Western
Police District. Also, the Prosecution did not show to whom the seized articles had been turned over
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
following the conduct of the laboratory examination, and how the seized articles had been kept in
a manner that preserved their integrity until their final presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti. Such lapses of the Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they
demonstrated that the chain of custody did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the
integrity and identity of the dangerous drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes
charged.
We are then not surprised to detect other grounds for skepticism about the evidence of
guilt.
Firstly, PO2 Payumo testified that the lady confidential informant had gone to Police
Station 8 to report the alleged drug-selling activities of petitioner for the first time in the morning
of January 20, 2005. That report led to the forming of the buy-bust team,[45] for purposes of which
he prepared the pre-operation documents. His veracity was suspect, however, considering that
his so-called Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet appeared to have been prepared on the day
before, as its date January 19, 2005 disclosed.[46] The date of January 19, 2005 also appeared in
the Certification of Coordination issued by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency in reference
to the buy-bust operation against petitioner.[47] Considering that the Prosecution did not explain
the discrepancy, the impression is unavoidable that the buy-bust operation was already set in
motion even before the lady informant actually made her report against petitioner. Thereby, his
defense of frame-up was bolstered.
Secondly, the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet indicated that there were ten members
and three (3) others that comprised the buy-bust team.[48] Yet, the Joint Affidavit submitted by the
members of the buy-bust team was executed and signed by only six officers (excluding even
poseur buyer PO2 Payumo himself), namely: PO1 Mijares, PO1 Mark Dave Vicente, PO1
Maurison Ablaza, PO1 Elmer Clemente and PO1 Gil.[49] The Prosecutions failure to explain why
only six members of the buy-bust team actually executed and signed the Joint Affidavit might
indicate that the incrimination of petitioner through the buy-bust operation was probably not
reliable.
And, thirdly, both the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet and the Certification of
Coordination revealed that the confidential information received involved two suspects of illegal
drug trade in Bacood, Sta. Mesa known as alias Boy and alias Totoy Tinga. PO2 Payumo recalled,
however, that the lady confidential informant had tipped the police off only about alias Boy. It
seems from such selectiveness that PO2 Payumo deliberately omitted the other target and zeroed
in only on alias Boy (petitioner), which might suggest that PO2 Payumo was not as reliable as a
poseur buyer-witness as he presented himself to be.
Conviction must stand on the strength of the Prosecutions evidence, not on the
weakness of the defense the accused put up. [50] Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must
always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls short of this requirement, the
Court will not allow the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should come as a matter
of course.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
September 28, 2007 by the Court of Appeals; and ACQUITS accused ROGELIO S. REYES of the
crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 05-234564 and Criminal Case No. 05-234565.
The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to
release ROGELIO S. REYES from custody unless he is
Page 22

detained thereat for another lawful cause; and to report on his compliance herewith within five days from
receipt.
No pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190749 April 25, 2012
VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and EROLL MARCELINO y REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31713 dated
30 October 2009,1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan, 2
which found petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa (Zafra) and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes (Marcelino) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of Dangerous Drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and imposing on each of
them the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the minimum term, to thirteen
(13) years as maximum, and of fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The Facts
3
The prosecution charged Zafra and Marcelino with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165 before
the RTC of Bulacan under the Information below:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 2003, in the municipality of Balagtas, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession and control dangerous drug consisting of two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 0.0614 gram, in conspiracy with one another.5
The prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Apolinario Mendoza (SPO4 Mendoza), Chief of the Investigation
6 drugs are inadmissible in evidence; third, Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not complied with; and,
and Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police of Balagtas, Bulacan, testified that on 12
January 2003, at around 4:30 in the afternoon, he conducted surveillance in front of a sari-sari store at the
corner of Miraflor Subdivision and P. Castro Street in Balagtas, Bulacan, due to reported drug trafficking in
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the area. SPO4 Mendoza found there the group of Zafra, Marcelino, and a certain Marlon Daluz
(Daluz) standing and facing each other.7 In that position, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding
shabu, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter. 8 Seeing this illegal
activity, SPO4 Mendoza single-handedly apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from the
hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz. Then, he
ordered the three to lie down; he frisked them. Boarding a tricycle, he brought them to the
Balagtas Police Station,9 where he personally marked the confiscated two (2) sachets of shabu,
one with VSD, the initials of Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and the other with EMR, the initials of Eroll
Marcelino y Reyes.10
On the following day, 13 June 2003, SPO4 Mendoza brought the accused and the items to the
crime laboratory for urine sampling and laboratory examination, respectively. 11 The test of the
items resulted to positive presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. 12
The RTC, Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan, in a decision dated 11 June 2008, convicted Zafra and
Marcelino for the crime of possession of shabu:
WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No.
2297-M-2003, accused VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and accused EROLL MARCELINO y
REYES are hereby CONVICTED for possession of sachets of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as shabu, with a weight of 0.31 gram and 0.30 gram, respectively, which are
classified as dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" and are each
SENTENCED to suffer the IMPRISONMENT of, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE DAY, AS THE MINIMUM TERM, TO THIRTEEN (13) YEARS,
AS THE MAXIMUM TERM, and to pay the FINE of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱300,000.00).13
Daluz, on the other hand, who was charged of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of
Section 12 of RA No. 9165 pleaded guilty to the charge and was released after serving his
sentence of eight (8) months.14
Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the assailed 11 June 2008 Decision of the Court a quo STANDS. 15
Hence, this appeal on the following grounds: first, the arrest was unlawful; second, the prohibited
finally, the prosecution failed to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
Page 23
We resolve to ACQUIT petitioners Zafra and Marcelino on the following grounds:
First, the prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Mendoza,16 testified that, from a distance, he saw Zafra and
Marcelino holding shabu by their bare hands, respectively, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a
disposable lighter.17Seeing this illegal activity, he single-handedly apprehended them.18 He grabbed the
shabu from the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz.
In his affidavit, however, SPO4 Mendoza stated, that:
Na, nitong nakaraang Hunyo 12, 2003 ng 4:30 ng hapon humigit kumulang, sa P.
Casto St., Barangay Borol-1, Balagtas Bulacan, habang ako ay nagsasagawa ng
surveillance sa Suspected Drug Pusher sa nasabing lugar ay aking nakita ang tatlo (3)
kalalakihan na nakatalikod sa isang corner ng tindahan sa P. Castro St., na nakilala
ko na sina Valentine D. Zafra @ Val, Eroll R. Marcelino @ Eroll, at Marlon B. Daluz @
Marlon na pawang mga residente ng Borol-1, Balagtas, Bulacan.
Na, ako ay lumapit na naglalakad kina Valentine Zafra, Errol Marcelino at Marlon
Daluz at sa aking paglapit sa kanilang tatlo ay aking nakita at naaktuhang inabot ni
Valentine Zafra kay Eroll Marcelino ang isang (1) plastic sachet ng shabu may
timbang na 0.30 grams, at isa pang plastic sachet ng shabu na si Marlon Daluz ay
hawak ang isang disposable lighter at 2 piraso ng aluminum foil na inaayos na
nilalagyan ng lupi at 7 piraso ng empty plastic sachet. (Emphasis supplied)19
xxxx
On cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza testified that it was Zafra and not Daluz, who was holding the
aluminum foil (contrary to his earlier testimony that Zafra was holding shabu); 20 that Daluz (whom he
claimed during the direct examination to be holding the aluminum foil) and Marcelino were holding
handkerchiefs and on top of them were shabu;21 When the defense confronted SPO4 Mendoza about the
inconsistency, he told the court that his version during his direct testimony was the correct one. 22
While, it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the witness and the
testimony is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal,23 such rule does not apply
when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance. 24 In
the instant case, these circumstances are present, that, when properly appreciated, would warrant the
acquittal of petitioners.
Certainly, SPO4 Mendoza’s credibility has to be thoroughly looked into, being the only witness in this case.
While in his affidavit, SPO4 Mendoza claimed that he saw the sachet of shabu (0.30 gram) because Zafra
was in the act of handing it to Marcelino, his testimony during the direct examination reveals another
version, that is, from a distance, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, respectively, hence, he
approached them from behind and confiscated the shabu from both of them and the paraphernalia from
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Daluz. How he saw a 0.30 gram of shabu from a distance in a busy street, baffles this Court.
Asked, however, on cross examination, who among the three were holding the shabu and drug
paraphernalia, SPO4 Mendoza failed to be consistent with his earlier testimony and pointed to
Daluz as the one holding shabu with a handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the one in
possession of drug paraphernalia. These inconsistencies are not minor ones, and, certainly, not
among those which strengthens the credibility of a witness. Possession of drug paraphernalia
vis-à-vis shabu, are two different offenses under RA No. 9165. That Zafra was holding drug
paraphernalia and not shabu is material to this case, to the accusation against him, and to his
defense.
Second, a reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at
upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of Mendoza’s official duty. 25
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. 26 Evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this
burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all
doubts as to his culpability.27
Third, SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to the police
station,28 who himself marked the confiscated pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs,
media, and in the absence of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere. 29 And, worse, he was
the same person who took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own
to the crime laboratory for testing.30 No inventory was ever done;31 no inventory was presented in
court.
The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the
offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself in
serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed
what at the time of the alleged apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt whether not
the two sachets of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners were the very same objects offered
in court as the corpus delicti.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. 32 The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond doubt.34 Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession
will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of
guilt.35 More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. 36 The chain of custody
Page 24
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.37
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a) Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.38 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain.39 These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.40
The records readily raise significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from
Zafra and Marcelino. SPO4 Mendoza’s claim that the two sachets of shabu presented in court were the
same ones confiscated from the petitioners, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of
regularity of one’s performance of duty. SPO4 Mendoza blatantly broke all the rules established by law to
safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. There was even no mention about the details of the laboratory
examination of the allegedly seized drugs. To allow this to happen is to abandon everything that has been
said about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of custody. SPO4 Mendoza cannot alone satisfy the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
requirements in RA No. 9165 which is anchored on, expressly, the participation of several
personalities and the execution of specified documents.
And, while jurisprudence has refined the enumerated duties of an apprehending officer in a drug
case and has thus described the equivalent requirements for a proper chain of custody of
the corpus delicti, still, the case at bar cannot pass the constitutional requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
We reiterate, that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the
handling of the seized drugs should be observed. In People v. Salonga, 41 we acquitted the
accused for the failure of the police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also
reversed a conviction in People v. Gutierrez,42 for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and
photograph the seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo 43 also resulted in an
acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Capuno, 44 People v. Lorena,45
and People v. Martinez.46
The present petition is the sum total of all the violations committed in the cases cited above.
Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we reiterate that non-compliance with the
prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the
items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable
ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
shown to have been properly preserved.47 These conditions, however, were not met in the
present case as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of
SPO4 Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized
items.1âwphi1 As we held in People v. De Guzman,48 the failure to follow the procedure
mandated under RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations must be adequately
explained. The justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. 49 The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation
of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.50 In
dubio pro reo.51 When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.52
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31713. Petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa
and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes are hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove
Page 25
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless
they are confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court the
action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190343 February 06, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAIBEN LANGCUAy DAIMLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review through this appeal 1 is the decision2 dated 16 October 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-1-I.C. No. 03462 which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant SAIBEN
LANGCUA y DAI MLA (Langcua) of illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article 11 3 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual rendition of the prosecution follows:
The first witness presented by the prosecution was PO1 Jonie Domingo (PO1 Domingo). He testified that
he has been a member of the Philippine National Police since 16 December 2003 and assigned at the
Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations (PAID-SO) at Camp Valentin Juan, Laoag City on the day
of the busy-bust operation on 4 October 2006.4
On the day of the buy-bust, at about 1:45 o’clock in the afternoon, one of their police informants came to
their office and reported to their team leader Police Inspector Teddy Rosqueta (P/I Rosqueta) the selling of
drugs by the accused Langcua. He was just beside P/I Rosqueta when the report was made.5 Thereupon,
P/I Rosqueta instructed the informant to contact Langcua and place an order for P11,000.00-worth
of shabu.
The informant did what he was told to do. Langcua agreed to deliver the ordered shabu at Barangay 7-B,
Laoag City near City Employment Center.6
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A team composed of P/I Rosqueta, PO3 Rousel Albano, PO3 Marlon Nicolas (PO3 Nicolas), PO2
Jonathan Pasamonte, PO1 Alizer Cabotage, PO1 Rona Gaoiran, PO1 Domingo and the informant
was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation with PO1 Domingo as the poseur-buyer, and the
other members of the team as back-up perimeter security. PO3 Nicolas recorded in the Police
Blotter the pre-operation activity, including the marking of the buy-bust money and the
circumstances leading to the report of the informant.7 The buy-bust money was eight (8) pieces of
P1,000.00 bills and six (6) pieces of P500.00 bills 8 all marked with letter "J" at the upper right
portion by PO1 Domingo.9
PO1 Domingo and the informant proceeded to the agreed place of the transaction on board a
motorcycle, while the rest of the team followed on board an unmarked vehicle. 10 PO1 Domingo
and the informant waited for Langcua11 at the agreed place. After a few minutes, Langcua arrived
on board a motorcycle and approached them. He then asked the informant "SINO NAMAN YONG
KASAMA MO?"12 The informant replied, "HUWAG KANG MAG-ALALA, KASAMA YAN." Langcua
then asked, "YONG BALANCE MO PA, KAILAN MO BABAYARAN?" to which the latter replied,
"SA SUSUNOD NALANG."13
Langcua initiated the sale by asking, "SAAN NA YONG PERA NYO?" PO1 Domingo replied,
"HETO," and handed the marked money to Langcua. Langcua put the money in his pocket and
thereafter handed out to PO1 Domingo one (1) light blue colored folded paper coming from the
right portion of his pants.14
Upon receipt, PO1 Domingo opened the folded paper and found one (1) big heat-sealed plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. He then secured the plastic sachet and called the
cellular phone of P/I Rosqueta. After the call, he then grabbed the right arm of Langcua who was
already starting to accelerate his motorcycle but was stopped by the other police officers acting as
back-up.15
He also testified that one of the members of the buy-bust team, PO3 Nicolas conducted a body
search and recovered the buy-bust money, cellular phone and wallet from Langcua.16
In open court, PO1 Domingo identified the money recovered from Langcua as the same marked
money used in the operation through the markings letter "J" on the upper right portion of the paper
bills as well as their serial numbers recorded in the police blotter. 17 He also identified the white
crystalline substance contained in the plastic sachet handed over by Langcua to him in the sale
and pointed out the marking "JD" on one side and "SL" on the other side. 18
Afterwards, PAID-SO made a letter request to the Provincial Crime Laboratory for the examination
of the confiscated white crystalline substance. 19
PO3 Nicolas and P/I Rosqueta corroborated the direct testimony of PO1 Domingo on materials
points constituting the buy-bust operation conducted by them.20
Page 26
The presentation of evidence on the authenticity, genuineness and due execution of the initial laboratory
report issued by Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Mary Ann Cayabyab, (PSI
Cayabyab), with regard to the specimen subjected for examination, was dispensed with following the
agreement of the prosecution and defense as evidenced by the Pre-Trial Order.21
On the other hand, the factual version of the defense follows:
Langcua in his defense testified that on the date of the alleged sale of illegal drug on 4 October 2006, he
just came from the mosque for his noon prayer.22 Upon returning home, he saw his wife already waiting for
him. At around 12:30-1:00 o’clock in the afternoon she instructed him to buy medicines for their child who
then had fever.23
While he was setting his motorcycle, he saw Ombawa Ali (Ali) whom he asked to go with him. 24 Upon
approaching Rizal corner Guerrero Streets, three male persons on board a car flagged them to stop. The
three men introduced themselves as police officers and asked both of them if they were Muslims. 25 When
Langcua answered in the affirmative, they asked him and Ali to move to the side of the street and go with
them. When he asked the police officers what was their fault, they replied "just come with us if you don’t
want to get hurt."26He eventually complied with the police officers after one of them kicked his motorcycle
and strangled him. Ali ran away when he saw this.27
The police officers pulled him towards the direction of Guerrero Street where several armed men were
already waiting for them. One of them boxed him and handcuffed his hands.28 Upon boarding the car of the
police officers, he saw a man he knew as Danny Domingo inside and both of them were brought to the
police station.29 He added that he was again physically maltreated inside the vehicle until they reached the
station.30
While inside the police station, the police officers frisked him and recovered his wallet containing money
worth P11,000.00. When asked why he had such amount, he explained that he and his wife owned a
carinderia and were saving to go home to Mindanao. A male person then showed a plastic sachet
of shabu and claimed that it came from his motorcycle. He denied the allegation. The police officers
maltreated him again.31 He also denied possession of the cellular phone recovered by the police officers.
His statements were corroborated by his wife Naimah Sultan and Ali.32
Eventually, an Information33 was filed by Laoag City Prosecutor Angel G. Rubio as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of October 2006, in the City of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the [above] herein accused[,] did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell and deliver to a police officer who acted as poseur buyer one (1) big plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug popularly known as "shabu[,]" with net weight of
1.7257 gram, without any license or authority, in violation of the aforecited law.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on 16 April 2007,34 the accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded NOT GUILTY to the offense charged.
On 7 March 2008, the trial court found the accused-appellant GUILTY of violation of Section 5,
Article II, of R.A. No. 9165 under Criminal Case No. 13295-13. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Saibern Langcua y Daimla
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of the offense of illegal sale of shabu and is
therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P2,000,
000.00.
The shabu subject of this case consisting of 1.7257 grams is ordered confiscated, the same to be
disposed of as the law prescribes.35
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that the
buy-bust operation was sufficiently established; in finding credible the testimonies of the police
officers; and in relying on the presumption of regularity of the performance of official duties. He
argued that the corpus delicti of the crime was not established.36
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal
Case No. 132925-13 dated 7 March 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.37
In this appeal, accused-appellant adopted his arguments before the appellate court:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INITIAL CONTACT ON THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
POLICE OFFICERS AND THE APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROPERLY ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION.
We do not agree.
Page 27
On the first assigned error, the focus is on the alleged inconsistency of recollection of events of PO1
Domingo and PO3 Nicolas as compared to the statement of P/I Rosqueta. PO1 Domingo and PO3 Nicolas
testified that the police informant relayed to them the telephone conversation regarding an illegal sale. On
the other hand, P/I Rosqueta recalled that he himself heard the telephone conversation because he placed
his ear on the cellular phone of the informant. This inconsistency, according to the defense, tainted the
initial contact of the buy-bust operation.
The argument is misplaced.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of the corpus delicti.38 The commission of illegal sale merely consummates the selling
transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police
officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by seller, followed by the delivery
of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. 39
In this case, the prosecution has adequately proven all the elements constituting sale of illegal drug. This is
evident from the testimony of PO1 Domingo, we quote:
xxxx
Q: And after that, what happened next?
A: And after that, Saiben Langcua asked: "SAN NA YUNG PERA NYO?" [(]Where is your money then[?")]
xxxx
Q: What was your reply, if any?
A: "HETO," I answered, "here[.]"
Q: And after that, what next transpired?
A: I showed to the subject person the money and I handed it to him, sir.
Q: You said money, what money are you referring to that you handed to the subject person?
A: The buy-bust money used in the buy-bust operation, sir.
Q: What is that money in relation to the one that you have recorded in the police blotter?
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A: It is the one to be used in the buy-bust operation, sir.
Q: And after handling the money, what next transpired?
A: Subject person Saiben Langcua accounted the peso bills and after he accounted the money,
he immediately pocketed it in his left front pocket of his short pants, sir.
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, what denominations are those money that were used in the buy-bust
operation?
A: Eight (8) pieces of P1,000,000.00 bills and Six (6) pieces of P500.00 bills, sir.
Q: After pocketing them, what did the accused do, if any?
A: The accused brought out one (1) folded paper colored light blue from the right front of
his short pants and he handed it to me, sir.
Q: And did you actually receive that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you with it after receiving the same?
A: I immediately opened the folded paper containing one (1) big heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance, sir.
Q: After determining that it is a big plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, what did
you do, if any?
A: I secured the plastic sachet containing alleged shabu and I immediately miss called the cell
phone of Police Inspector Teddy Rosqueta, sir.40 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
PO1 Domingo in open court identified the white crystalline substance contained in the plastic
sachet as the one handed by Langcua to him during the buy-bust operation. The substance
yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by
the Chemistry Report given by PSI Cayabyab.41
Page 28
Further, the defense cited several inconsistencies on the part of the police officers. One instance was the
disagreement on the name of the street where the accused-appellant came from when he approached the
Employment Center. Another inconsistency was whether he was riding a motorcycle when he was
arrested or was just standing near the same. A question on whether the cellular phone confiscated from
him was operational or not was also put in issue. Further, the defense doubted the lower court’s finding
that there is no significance in the non-indication of the marking "J" in the buy-bust money in the
pre-operation blotter and the absence of the confiscated cellular phone in the list of the Certificate of
Seized Items.
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.46
In the case of People v. Kamad,47 the Court had the opportunity to enumerate the different links
that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation,
namely:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
We cannot subscribe to the arguments of the defense. apprehending officer;

As held in the case of People v. Gonzaga,42 minor inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. 43 "[M]inor officer;
inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not detract from their essential credibility as long as their
testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the
witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not expected to remember Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall." 44"[T]he witnesses’ testimonies need only to laboratory examination; and
corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime." 45
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to
The inconsistencies in the recollection of facts of PO1 Domingo, PO3 Nicolas and P/I Rosqueta regarding the court.48
the street where the accused came from, the position of the motorcycle as well as the operational condition
of the cellular phone, are not material elements in establishing an illegal sale of dangerous drug. It is not The Court finds that the different links to establish the chain of custody are sufficiently established.
irregular for police officers to have inconsistent statements in the narration of details of the buy-bust
operation, as, indeed the inconsistency can indicate truthfulness. What is important is for them to recount PO1 Domingo in his testimony identified the confiscated white crystalline substance and its
the material facts constituting sale of dangerous drug such as the exchange of the illegal drug for buy-bust turnover to the crime laboratory for examination. We quote the portion of his testimony:
money and identification of the buyer, seller and illegal drug in court as the object of the sale. The three
witnesses corroborated each other on material points which added to the confidence placed on their
xxxx
testimonies.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, with respect to the white crystalline substance contained in the plastic
As last attempt to persuade this Court of his innocence, the accused-appellant relied on the allegation of
broken chain of custody of evidence. sachet that you claimed to have been handed to you by the accused Saiben Langcua, if shown to
you again, Mr. Witness, would you be able to identify it?

The contention of the defense suggests that the non-marking of the seized illegal drug at the place where
A: Yes, sir.
the same was confiscated is enough to exonerate the accused-appellant. The reason is that this allegedly
places in doubt the authenticity of the drug delivered to the crime laboratory for examination.
Q: What could make you identify it?
A review of the records and pleadings failed to convince us to overturn the ruling of conviction.
A: I put markings, sir, my initial "JD" and the other is the initial of the accused, I put "SL" on the
other side.
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 29

Q: I have here a plastic sachet with markings that corresponds to what you have just mentioned, Mr.
Witness, kindly look over the same and tell what is the relation of that to that which was handed to you by
the accused?
A: This is the plastic sachet handed to me by the accused, sir. (The witness identified the heat-sealed
plastic sachet sealed with masking tape with markings containing white crystalline substance. On one side
were the markings "JD." October 4, 2006 and the other side bearing the initial "SL[,]" October 4, 2006).
Q: After taking custody of that, after it was delivered to you by the accused, what did you do with it, if any?
A: We made a letter request to the crime laboratory and we delivered that heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing alleged shabu to the Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination, sir. 49
xxxx
The Request for Laboratory Examination50 dated 4 October 2006 also stated that PO1 Domingo delivered
the heat-sealed plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance with markings "JD" representing his
initials and "SL" at the other side of the plastic sachets representing the initials of the arrested suspect
Langcua, to PSI Cayabyab.
The laboratory examination yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, an illegal
drug.51 The testimony of PSI Cayabyab was dispensed with by both parties hence, the appreciation of the
report was left to the sound discretion of the court for evaluation.
In his cross testimony, P/I Rosqueta explained why the marking was not made at the place of the buy-bust
operation, we quote:
Q: And because there were other people in the area from the time that you were able to confiscate the
items from the accused, you immediately ordered the accused to be brought to your office because you
were afraid that the incident might invite commotion?
A: Yes, sir, because after the confiscation of the items, there were many people gathering near and they
were shouting.
Q: And it was because of this reason that you did not longer (sic) order the marking of the confiscated
items on the buybust?
A: Not anymore, sir, because after showing me the confiscated item. I told them to bring it to the camp and
when were already at the camp, the shabu that was bought from Saiben is the same that was sold and that
is also the same that was brought to the crime laboratory.52
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The prosecution has properly established the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least from
the time it came into possession of the police officers, during its testing in the laboratory to
determine its composition and up to the time it was offered in evidence.1âwphi1
Be it granted that there was no strict observance of the procedure; the substantial compliance
thereof is well sanctioned for in Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 9165 which reads:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given copy thereof. Provided, that the physical inventory and the photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at least the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team/officer, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence are removed.53 As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending police officers, substantial compliance with the procedure
to establish a chain of custody is sanctioned.
This Court in People v. Lorena54held that:
People v. Pringas teaches that non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section
21 is not necessarily fatal. Its non-compliance will not automatically render an accused’s arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. We recognize that the strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions;
Page 30
the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the
procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.55
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16
October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-II. C. No. 03462 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212196 January 12, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City
(RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused Ramil Doria Dahil
(Dahil) and Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate Informations before the RTC. In
Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to a poseur
buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT
THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug,
without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642 grams of
marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and custody and control Five (5) tea bags of
dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FORTY TWO TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (20.6642), which is a dangerous drug, without
authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of
marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and custody and control One (1) brick in form
wrapped in masking tape of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
GRAMS and EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A
GRAM (130.8286), which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand,
filed a motion for reinvestigation and his arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued and the
prosecution presented PO2 Arieltino Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz)and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as
witnesses.
On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned through
inadvertence.6 The RTC informed the parties of the situation and the defense counsel did not
interpose any objection to the reopening of the case and the arraignment of Dahil. The latter was
then arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he
was adopting all the evidence already adduced.
Version of the Prosecution
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing
operations relative to the information they received that a certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel"
were trafficking dried marijuana in TB Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino,
Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers, namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz
Page 31
(Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2
Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz
together with the informant went to the house of Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When
PO2 Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then
introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be
buying and the latter answered that he would buy ₱200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took
out from his pocket six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking
the items, PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills to Castro.
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest
of the buy-bust team then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil
and recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu
searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust team to the
PDEA office. There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1Licu. First, the six (6) plastic
sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-1" to "A-6" and with
letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were
marked with "B-1" to "B-5" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Finally, the marijuana brick
confiscated from Castro was marked "C-RDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the request for
laboratory examination, affidavits of arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized
items7 was also prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the
confiscated drugs to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, which
subsequently yielded positive results for marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential contents of the prospective
testimony of the forensic chemist, to wit:
1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3 Dela Cruz;
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory,Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga;
3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;
4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance subject of the letter request with
qualification that said request was not subscribedor under oath and that the forensic chemist has no
personal knowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002;
and
6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7, 2007. 9 After much delay,
the public prosecutor was finally able to orally submit his formal offer of exhibits after almost two
years, or on January 6, 2009.10 He offered the following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit
of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked money, (4) Brown
envelope containing the subject illegal drugs, (5) Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory
Examination Request, and (7) Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002.
Version of the Defense
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for him
after he had arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for him. He
was then asked by the unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He
answered that there were many persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the
vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into one of the vehicles. He was brought to
Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling and possession of marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of Marisol,
Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by
some men who asked if he knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that
he did not know the said person and then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him
to Clark Air Base where he was charged withillegal possession of marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for violating Sections 5
and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00 each for the crime of illegal sale of marijuana;Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of ₱300,000.00
each for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of selling and
possession of illegal drugs against the accused. All the elements of the crimes were established.
To the trial court, the evidence proved that PO2 Corpuz bought marijuana from Dahil. The latter
examined the marijuana purchased and then handed the marked money to Castro.
Page 32
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC ruled that the same was not
fatal considering that a photocopy of the marked money was presented and identified by the arresting
officers.12 It did not give credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could
easily be concocted with no supporting proof.
CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,13 they argued that there
were irregularities on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from
them. The prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which generated
clouds of doubts as tothe identity of the seized items presented in evidence. 14
In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements
of the crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana. As to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that
the prosecution witnesses were able to account for the series of events that transpired, from the time the
buy-bust operation was conducted until the time the items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its view, the prosecution was able
to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of
PO2 Corpuz, there was an actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) sachets containing
marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to transact
₱200.00 worth of the illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of marijuana, was also thus
established by the prosecution.17 Another five (5) plastic sachets of marijuana were recovered from Dahil’s
possession while one (1) brick of marijuana from Castro’s possession. 18
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused during the buy-bust operation
were the same drugs presented before the RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets
of marijuana, which were sold by Dahil toPO2 Corpuz were marked "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters "RDRC,"
"ADGC"and "EML," the five (5) plastic sachets recovered in the possession of Dahil were marked "B-1" to
"B-5" and with the initials "ADGC" and "EML," while the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was
marked "C-RDRC."19
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1
Licu testified that the said drugs were marked at the police station. An inventory of the seized items was
made as shown by the Inventory Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. The
Request for Laboratory Examination revealed that the confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to
the PNP crime laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002 showed
that the specimen gave positive results to the test of marijuana. The accused failed to show that the
confiscated marijuana items were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to the crime
laboratory for examination.20
Hence, this appeal.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially
complied with the chain of custody procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.
The Court’s Ruling
Let it be underscored that appeal incriminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it is
the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than
the liberty of the accused, this Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the
records of the case and finds that there is merit in the appeal. The Court holds that that there was
no unbroken chain of custody and that the prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven
to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in
secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the
framers of the law. It is susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool
for extortion.22
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in
every prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of
the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in
court were the same substances boughtduring the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement,
known under R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring
thatunnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.23 In People v.
Catalan,24 the Court said:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore,
the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On
the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving
the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also
when there are substantial gapsin the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise
doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section 1(b) of
Dangerous DrugsBoard Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165,
explains the said term as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
Page 33
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165
specifies that:
First,the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation
as it was only done at the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the
inventory to be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution
did not even claim that the PDEA Office Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where
the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give sufficient justification for the delayed
conduct of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photographthe same in the presence of the accused or the Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Q: And did he sign that?
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)of R.A. No. 9165
enumeratesthe procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers toconfirm the chain of custody, to A: Yes, sir.
wit:

Q: Where was he when he signed that?

xxx

A: In our office, sir.

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a Q: Already in your office?
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the A: Yes, sir.
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrantis served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
A: Our investigator, sir.
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?
xxx
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or equipment for the preparation of the
documents so, we invited him to our office.25
The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.

PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excusethat they failed to immediately conduct an inventory because
Although the prosecution offered inevidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting
they did not bring with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such
officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
explanation is unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a
observed. The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
couple of weeks.26 They should have been prepared with their equipment even before the
immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the
buy-bust operation took place.
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be
required tosign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 34

Second,there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized.
According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruzwho prepared the said document. 27 PO2 Cruz on
the other hand, testified that it was their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s
testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator. 28
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official. During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: Q: After you arrested Ramil
Dahil,did you conduct the inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, sir (sic).
Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: In our office, ma’am
Q: Were pictures takenon the alleged seized items together with Ramil Dahil?
A: No, ma’am.29
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this was:
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you conduct an inventory of the alleged seized
items?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the inventory?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized items?
A: Pictures were takenon the accused, ma’am.
[Emphasis supplied]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no
pictures of the seized items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the accused were
taken. From the vague statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the
alleged drugs were indeed taken. The records are bereft of any document showing the photos of
the seized items. The Court notes that SPO1 Licu could have misunderstood the question
because he answered that "pictures were taken on the accused" when the question referred to
photographs of the drugs and not of the accused.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous requirements of Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates that substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly
comply with the law does not necessarily render the arrestof the accused illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible.30 The issue of non-compliance with the said section
is not of admissibility, but of weight to be given on the evidence.31Moreover, Section 21 of the IRR
requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence," as long as it can be proven that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 32
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the proper
chain of custody of the seized items must be shown. The Court explained in People v.
Malillin33 how the chain of custody or movement of the seized evidence should be maintained and
why this must be shown by evidence, viz:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain
of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, ifpracticable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized bythe apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to
the court.
Page 35
First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the Apprehending Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately
marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markingsas reference. The marking of
the evidence serves to separate the markedevidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence. 35
It must be noted that marking isnot found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and
photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this
Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the seized
items. They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless,
that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at
the police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, to wit: Q: So, after recovering all those marijuana
bricks and plastic sachets of marijuana and the marked money from the accused, what else did you do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to our office, sir.
Q: So, in your office, what happened there?
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for crime lab examination, joint
affidavit of arrest, booking sheet, and all other documents necessary for the filing of the case against the
two (2), sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you confiscated from the accused,
what did you do with those?
A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items were not marked. It
could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must conduct
guesswork on how the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit.
Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent their immediate marking thereof.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Still, there are cases whenthe chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the
seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for
as long as it is done in the presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent
application of the requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused in
this case. Aside from the fact that the police officers did not immediately place their markings on
the seized marijuana upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no showing that the
markings were made in the presence of the accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs when they were about to
send them to Camp Olivas for forensic examination. This damaging testimony was corroborated
by the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution. The following documents were made at
the PDEA Office: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of
Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory
Examination Request cited the markings on the seized drugs. Thus, it could only mean that when
the other documents were being prepared, the seized drugs had not been marked and the police
officers did not have basis for identifying them. Considering that the seized drugs wereto be used
for different criminal charges, it was imperative for the police officers to properly mark them at the
earliest possible opportunity. Here, they failed in such a simple and critical task. The seized drugs
were prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office itself because of the delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC
RD,39 Exhibit A-5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not have the initials of the apprehending
officers on the back. Bearing in mind the importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in
the procedure are too conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They placed uncertainty as to the
identity of the corpus delicti from the moment of seizure until it was belatedly marked at the PDEA
Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of the seized drug by
the apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the case. The officer testified that he marked
the confiscated items only after he had returned tothe police station. Such admission showed that
the marking was not done immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse of a
significant intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to the Investigating
Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance
turns it over to a supervising officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory
for testing.42 This is a necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating
officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the
developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must have possession of the illegal
drugs to properly prepare the required documents.
Page 36
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from
the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an
investigator in a drug-related case toeffectively perform his work without having custody of the seized
items. Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2
Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they
had custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the
same items.
In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to establish the chain of custody as
the apprehending officer did not transfer the seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending
officer kept the alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred them to the
forensic chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of custody led to the acquittal of the accused in
the said case.
Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the Forensic Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs
arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance. In this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some
information on the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas, to wit:
Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought to the crime laboratory, who
brought the same to the crime lab?
A: Me and my back-up, ma’am.
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?
A: I think it was the following day, ma’am.45
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was offered on how the seized
marijuana was handled and transferred from the PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight
without giving detailson the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable deficiency of the testimony would
be the lack of information as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on the subject drugs, did not
appear in court despite the numerous subpoenas sent to her. 46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense
agreed to stipulate on the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony
of the forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the
stipulations was "that said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
letter-request with qualification that said request was not subscribed or under oath and that
forensic chemist has no personalknowledge as from whom and where said substance was
taken."47 This bolsters the fact that the forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received the
seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link. The police officer, who
both served as apprehending and investigating officer, claimed that he personally took the drug to
the laboratory for testing, but there was no showing who received the drug from him. The records
also showed that he submitted the sachet to the laboratory only on the next day, without
explaining how he preserved his exclusive custody thereof overnight. All those facts raised
serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item have not been fatally
compromised. Hence, the accused inthe said case was also acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic Chemist to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when
presented as evidence in the criminal case. No testimonial or documentary evidence was given
whatsoever as to how the drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was
transferred to the court. The forensic chemist should have personally testified on the safekeeping
of the drugs but the parties resorted to a general stipulation of her testimony. Although several
subpoenae were sent to the forensic chemist, only a brown envelope containing the seized drugs
arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links in the chain of custody, the
prosecutor propounded questions concerning the location of the misplaced marked money, which
was not even indispensable in the criminal case.
The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the
forensic chemist. No explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug in the interim
- from the time it was turned over to the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination.
The records of the said case did not show what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between
the turnover by the investigator to the chemist and its presentation in court. Thus, since there was
no showing that precautions were taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of
that object and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof, the
accused therein was likewise acquitted.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there was no compliance
with the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the inadequate
physical inventory and the lack of photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil
and Castro. No explanation was offered for the non-observance of the rule. The prosecution
cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it
miserably failed to prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. The four links required to establish the proper chain of custody were breached with
irregularity and lapses.
Page 37
The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving the presumption of regularity
of the performance of official duties could apply in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the
performance of duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records
were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The presumption stands when no reason exists in the
records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the ell-rooted is the principle that factual findings of trial courts, especially when
presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be
presumed innocent.52 affirmed by the appellate court, are generally binding on the Supreme
W
Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized marijuana that the
prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the Court. In convicting the accused in the present case, the Court not merely
elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. 53

relied on this doctrine, but also meticulously reviewed the evidence on record. It has come to the
For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by the accused. WHEREFORE,
the appeal is GRANTED. The September 27, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05707 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and Rommel Castro y
inevitable conclusion that petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them and ordered immediately RELEASED from
custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.

charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision and to inform this Court
of the date of the actual release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of copy.

SO ORDERED.
The Case
CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, G.R. No. 163217
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Chairman,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ aside the November 28, 2003 Decision[2] and the March 10, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. April 18, 2006 Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 25401. The CA affirmed, with modifications as to the award of
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

damages, the Decision[4] of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The RTC
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 38

had found Celestino Marturillas guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98. The assailed CA
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification thus indicated, the judgment
appealed from must be, as it hereby is, AFFIRMED. With the costs of this instance to
be assessed against the accused-appellant.[5]
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[6]
Petitioner was charged with homicide in an Information[7] dated November 5, 1998, worded as
follows:
[T]hat on or about November 4 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed
with a gun, and with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one Artemio
Pantinople, thereby inflicting fatal wound upon the latter which caused his death.[8]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the Peoples version of the facts:
4. The prosecution presented Lito Santos, Ernita Pantinople, PO2
Mariano Operario, Alicia Pantinople and Dr. Danilo Ledesma as its witnesses
from whose testimonies, the following facts were established.
Lito Santos, a forty-three-year old farmer and resident of Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City, testified that about 6:00 oclock in the
afternoon of November 4, 1998, he saw his neighbor and kumpare Artemio
Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney from Bunawan, Davao City. Artemio was
carrying a truck battery, some corn bran and rice. They talked for a while
concerning their livelihood afterwhich, Artemio proceeded to connect the
battery to the fluorescent lamps in his store. Artemios store was located about
five (5) meters away from Litos house.
After installing the battery to the fluorescent lamps, Artemio sat for a
while on a bench located in front of his store. Then, Cecilia Santos, Litos wife,
called him and Artemio for supper. Artemio obliged.Lito, opting to eat later,
served Artemio and Cecilia the food. After eating, Artemio returned to the
bench and sat on it again together with his tree (3) children, namely: Janice,
Saysay and Pitpit.
Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a
gunshot. From a distance of about ten (10) meters, he also noticed smoke and
fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio
clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of his (Litos)
kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan,
meaning Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.However, Lito did not
approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him
that he might also be shot.
Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention
was then focused on Artemio.
Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from
her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the
ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril
and aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help.
Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was
lying dead near a banana trunk more than five (5) meters from his
Page 39
 house. Some of their neighbors, namely: Antenero, Loloy Libre and Lapis answered
Ernitas call for help and approached them.
When the shooting incident happened about 7:30 in the evening of November
4, 1998, Litos house was illumined by a lamp. Their kitchen has no walls. It is an
open-type kitchen giving him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about five (5)
meters away from where he was positioned at that time. Although there was
a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the
same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana
plants growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view.
At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her
baby. Her baby was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put
the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed
by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the
window of their kitchen and saw appellant wearing a black jacket and camouflage
pants running towards the direction of the back portion of Litos house. From there,
appellant crossed the street and disappeared.
Ernita saw appellant carrying with him a long firearm which looked like an
M-14 rifle. Ernita also sensed that appellant had some companions with him because
she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place. Ernita had a clear
view of appellant at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon
that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store which were switched on at
the time of the incident.
Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio
tried to speak to her but he could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. Upon
seeing the pitiful sight of her husband, Ernita shouted several times, Kapitan, ngano
nimo gipatay and akong bana. She also repeatedly called her neighbors for help but
only Lito Santos, Eufemio Antenero, Norman Libre and some residents of Poblacion
Gatungan responded to her calls and approached them. She noted that no member of
the CFO and CAFGU came to help them. Also, no barangay tanod came to offer them
to help.
While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched
by anybody. After more than two (2) hours, the police arrived, together with a
photographer by the name of Fe Mendez of Bunawan District, Davao City who took
pictures of the crime scene.
PO2 Mariano Operario, Investigation Officer of the Investigation Section of the
Bunawan Police Station, Philippine National Police, Davao City, testified that
about 9:05 in the evening of November 4, 1998, he received a report of an alleged
shooting incident at Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District in Davao City. Together
with SPO1 Rodel C. Estrellan and a member of the mobile police patrol on board their
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
mobile car, PO2 Operario proceeded immediately to the crime scene. They
reached the crime scene about 10:00 oclock in the evening of the same
date. They found the lifeless body of Artemio sprawled on the ground. Ernita
and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed him that appellant was
the one responsible for the shooting.
PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about one (1) hour and
waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral
hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the
vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito
Santos.
Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for
the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of appellant
and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then
invited appellant to go with him to the police station and also to bring along
with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle
and went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole
night of November 4, 1998. Appellant did not also give any statement to
anybody about the incident. The following day, appellant was transferred by
the police to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained.
Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, testified that on
the night of November 4, 1998, she was at home watching television. She
heard a gunshot but did not mind it because she was already used to hearing
the sound of guns fired indiscriminately in their place.
After a few minutes, Junjun, a child and resident of Sitio Centro,
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City came knocking at their
door. Junjun informed them that: Yoyo, Uncle Titing was shot,referring to
Artemio.
Upon hearing the report, Alicia looked for some money thinking that it
might be needed for Artemios hospitalization because she expected Artemio
to be still alive. Artemios two (2) children, namely: Jonel and Genesis who
were staying with her hurriedly left. She then ran to the place where her
brother was shot and found Artemios dead body on the ground surrounded by
his four (4) children.
At the Bunawan Police Station, Alicia was informed by the police that
appellant was at Tibungco Police Station. She sent her male cousin to proceed
to Tibungco Police Station to find out if appellant was indeed in the said
place. However, her cousin immediately returned and informed her that
appellant was not in Tibungco Police Station. She then went around the
Page 40
 Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped through the hole
of the said door, she saw appellant reclining on a bench about two and a half (2 )
meters away from the door. Appellants left leg was on top of the bench while his right
leg was on the ground. Appellant was wearing a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of
camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet.
At the police station, Alicia confronted appellant: Nong Listing I know that you
can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he done
wrong to you?
Appellant did not answer her. Nevertheless, she was sure that appellant was
awake because he was tapping the floor with his right foot.
Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health
Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemios cadaver about 9:30 in the morning
of November 5, 1998 at the Rivera Funeral Homes located at Licanan, Lasang. His
findings are summarized in his Necropsy Report No. 76:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, marked generalized.
Body in rigor mortis.
Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9 x 0.8 cm. Ovaloid
located at the anterior chestwall, rightside, 1.0 cm; from the
anterior median line, at the level of the third (3rd) intercoastal
space and 131.0 cms. above the right heel, directed backwards,
upwards, medially crossing the midline from the right to left,
involving the soft tissues, perforating the body of the sternum,
into the pericardial cavity, perforating the heart into the left
thoracic cavity, perforating the heart into the left thoracic cavity,
perforating the upper lobe of the left lung, forming an irregular
EXIT, 1.5 x 1.1 cms. at the posterior chest wall left side, 13.0 cms.
from the posterior median line and 139.0 cms. above the left heel.
Hemopericadium, 300 ml.
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following statement of facts:
Hemothorax, left, 1,000 ml.
Stomach, filled with partially digested food particles.
Other visceral organs, pale.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the
chest.
Signed by: DANILO P. LEDESMA
Medico-Legal Officer IV
During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that Artemio died of a gunshot wound,
0.9 x 0.8 centimeters in size located about one (1) inch away from the
centerline of Artemios Adams apple down to his navel and about 1:00
oclock from his right nipple.
The trajectory of the bullet passing through Artemios body indicates that his
assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired. Dr.
Ledesma also found the wound of Artemio negative of powder burns
indicating that the assailant was at a distance of more than twenty-four (24)
inches when he fired his gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug
inside the body of Artemio indicating that the bullet went through Artemios
body. Artemios heart and lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained
partially digested food particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal
when he was shot.
In the certificate of death of Artemio, Dr. Ledesma indicated that the cause of
his death was a gunshot wound on the chest.
5. After the defense presented its evidence, the case was submitted for
decision.[9]
Version of the Defense
9. This is a criminal case for Homicide originally lodged before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Davao City against herein Petitioner
Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain of Gatungan, Bunawan
District[,] Davao City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 42,091-98. The
criminal charge against Petitioner was the result of a shooting incident in
Page 41
 Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, DavaoCity which resulted in the slaying of
Artemio Pantinople while the latter was on his way home in the evening of November
4, 1998.
10. On that same evening at around 8:30 p.m. herein Petitioner former
Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was roused from his sleep at his house in
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, DavaoCity by his wife since Kagawads Jimmy
Balugo and Norman Libre (Barangay Kagawads of Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City) wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen from bed,
Petitioner was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his house. He
was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been
shot. Petitioner at once ordered his Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA
(Special Civilian Armed [Auxiliary]) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene
some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAAs were contacted, they (Petitioner,
Kagawads Libre and Balugo including Wiliam Gabas, Eddie Loyahan and Junior
Marturillas - the last three being SCAA members) then proceeded to the crime scene
to determine what assistance they could render.
11. While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far
from where the deceased lay sprawled, Petitioner was met by Ernita Pantinople (wife of
the deceased-Artemio Pantinople) who was very mad and belligerent. She immediately
accused Petitioner of having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his
enemy. Petitioner was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. He
explained that he just came from his house where he was roused by his Kagawads
from his sleep. Not being able to talk sense with Ernita Pantinople, Petitioner and his
companions backed off to avoid a heated confrontation. Petitioner instead decided to
go back to his house along with his companions.
12. Upon reaching his house, Petitioner instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo
to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing
the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of
nearby Barangay San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police
assistance since someone was shot in their locality.
13. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived
at the house of Petitioner and when confronted by the latter, he was informed by PO2
Operario that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon
their invitation, Petitioner immediately went with the said police officers for questioning
at the Bunawan Police Station. He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle
and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which Petitioner turned over for safe
keeping with the Bunawan PNP. The police blotter showed that Petitioner surrendered
his M-14 rifle with live ammunition to SPO1 Estrellan and PO3 Sendrijas of the
Bunawan PNP at around 10:45 p.m. of November 4, 1998.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
14. When the shooting incident was first recorded in the Daily
Record of Events of the Bunawan PNP it was indicated therein that deceased
may have been shot by unidentified armed men viz:
Entry No. Date Time Incident/Events
2289 110498 2105H SHOOTING INCIDENT-
One Dominador Lopez 43 years old, married, farmer and
a resident of Puro[k] 5, Barangay Gatungan, Davao City
appeared at this Precinct and reported that shortly
before this writing, one ARTEMIO PANTINOPLE, former
barangay kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was allegedly
shot to death by an unidentified armed men at the
aforementioned Barangay. x x x.
15. The extract from the police blotter prepared by SPO2 Dario B.
Undo dated November 9, 1998 already had a little modification indicating
therein that deceased was shot by an unidentified armed man and the
following entry was made.
2105H: Shooting Incident: One Dominador
Lopez, 43 years old, married, farmer and a resident of
Purok 5, Barangay Gatungan Bunawan District, Davao
City appeared at this Police Precinct and reported that
prior to these writing, one Artemio Pantinople, former
Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was
allegedly shot to death by unidentified armed man at the
aforementioned barangay. x x x.
16. On November 5, 1998 at around 7:15 a.m. PO2 Mariano
Operario indorsed with the Bunawan PNP an empty shell fired from a carbine
rifle which was recovered by the said police officer from the crime scene in the
night of the incident. Owing to his pre-occupation in organizing and preparing
the affidavits of the Complainant and her witnesses the previous evening, he
was only able to indorse the same the following morning. At the same time,
P/Chief Insp. Julito M. Diray, Station Commander of the Bunawan PNP made
a written request addressed to the District Commander of the PNP Crime
Laboratory requesting that a paraffin test be conducted on Petitioner and that
a ballistics examination be made on the M-14 rifle which he surrendered to
Bunawan PNP.
17. At around 9:30 a.m. of November 5, 1998, Dr. Danilo P.
Ledesma, M.D., Medico-Legal Officer for Davao City conducted an autopsy on
the cadaver of deceased and made the following Post-Mortem Findings
contained in Necropsy Report No. 76 dated November 6, 1998, viz:
Page 42

Pallor, marked, generalized
Body in rigor mortis
Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9-0.8 cm. ovaloid
located at the anterior chest wall, right side, .0 cm. from the
anterior median line, at the level of the third (3rd) intercostal space
and 131.0 cms. above the right neck, directed backwards,
upwards, medially, crossing the midline from the right to left,
involving the soft tissues, perforating the body of the sternum into
the pericardial cavity, perforating the heart into the left thoracic
cavity, perforating the upper lobe of the left lung forming an
irregular EXIT, 1.5x1.1 cms. at the posterior chest wall, left side,
13.0 cms. from the posterior median line and 139.0 cms. above
the left neck.
19. After preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her
witnesses PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr., the police officer as[s]igned to
investigate the shooting of the deceased, prepared and transmitted, on
November 5, 1998, a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office recommending
that Petitioner be indicted for Murder, attaching therewith the Sworn Affidavits
of Ernita O. Pantinople (Complainant), Lito D. Santos (witness) and the Sworn
Joint Affidavit of SPO1 Rodel Estrellan and PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr. of the
PNP.
20. The following is the Affidavit-Complaint of Ernita Pantinople as
well as the supporting affidavits of her witnesses all of which are quoted in full
hereunder:
Ernita Pantinoples Affidavit-Complaint dated
November 5, 1998:

Hemopericadium, 300 ml. That last November 4,

1998 at about 7:30 in the evening, I
Hemothorax, left 1,000 ml. was attending and caring my baby
boy at that time to let him sleep and
Stomach filled with partially digested food particles. that moment I heard first one gun
shot burst after then somebody
Other visceral organs, pale shouting seeking for help in Visayan
words tabangi ko Pre gipusil ko ni
CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest. Kapitan I estimated a distance to
more or less ten (10) meters away
18. After the fatal shooting of deceased, Celestino Marturillas was subjected from my house;
to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City at 10:30 a.m. November
5, 1998. The next day, November 6, 1998, the PNP Crime Laboratory released That I immediately peep at
Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 regarding the paraffin test results which found the windows, wherein I very saw a
Petitioner NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates based on the following findings of the person of Brgy. Capt. Celestino
PNP Crime Laboratory: Marturillas of Brgy. Gatungan,
Bunawan District, Davao City,
FINDINGS: wearing black jacket and
camouflage pants carrying his M-14
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned rifle running to the direction to the
specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the test for the presence of left side portion of the house of Lito
gunpowder nitrates. x x x Santos who was my neighbor
respectively;
CONCLUSION:
That I hurriedly go down
Both hands of Celestino Marturillas do not contain gunpowder from my house and proceeded to
nitrates[.] the victims body, wherein when I

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 43

 came nearer I got surprised for the victim
was my beloved husband;
That I was always shouting in
visayan words kapitan nganong imo mang
gipatay and akong bana;
That I let my husband body still at
that placed until the police officers will
arrived and investigate the incident;
That I know personally Brgy. Capt.
Celestino Marturillas for he is my nearby
neighbor at that placed;
That I am executing this affidavit to
apprise the authorities concern of the
truthfulness of the foregoing and my desire
to file necessary charges against Celestino
Marturillas.
Witness-Affidavit of Lito Santos dated November 5,
1998 reads:
I, LITO D. SANTOS, 43 yrs. old,
married, farmer, a resident of Purok 5, Brgy.
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City
after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law do hereby depose and
say:
That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in
the evening I was taking my dinner at the
kitchen of my house and after finished eating
I stood up then got a glass of water and at
that time I heard one gun shot burst
estimated to more or less ten (10) meters
from my possession then followed
somebody shouting seeking for help in
Visayan words tabangi ko pre gipusil ko ni
Kapitan;
That I really saw the victim
moving backward to more or less five (5)
meters away from where he was shot then
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
and there the victim slumped at the
grassy area;
That I immediately go
out from my house and proceeded
to the victims body, wherein, when
I came nearer I found and
identified the victim one Artemio
Pantinople who was my nearby
neighbor sprawled on his own
blood at the grassy area;
That no other person
named by the victim other than
Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas of
Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City;
That I am executing this
affidavit to apprised the authorities
concern of the true facts and
circumstances that surrounds the
incident.
21. Based on the Affidavits executed by Ernita Pantinople and Lito
Santos, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution
on November 5, 1998 finding sufficient evidence to indict Appellant for the
crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in Private Complainants Affidavit
Complaint. The Information states:
Above-mentioned Accused, armed with a gun,
and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shot one Artemio Pantinople, thereby inflicting fatal
wound upon the latter which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxxxxxxxx
23. The theory of the Defense was anchored on the testimony of the
following individuals:
23.1 Jimmy Balugo, was one of the Barangay
Kagawads who went to the house of Petitioner after
Page 44
 receiving a radio message from Brgy. Kagawad Glenda Lascua
that a shooting incident took place in their barangay. He also
testified that together with Kagawad Norberto Libre, he
proceeded to the house of Petitioner to inform him of the shooting
incident involving a certain Artemio Titing Pantinople. After
informing Petitioner about what happened, the latter instructed
him and Norberto Libre to gather the SCAAs and to accompany
them to the crime scene. He also narrated to the court that
Petitioner and their group were not able to render any assistance
at the crime scene since the widow and the relatives of deceased
were already belligerent. As a result of which, the group of
Petitioner including himself, went back to the formers house
where he asked Petitioner if it would be alright to contact the
police and request for assistance. He claimed that he was able to
contact the Bunawan PNP with the help of the Barangay Police of
Barangay San Isidro.
23.2) Norberto Libre testified that in the evening of
November 4, 1998, he heard a gunburst which resembled a
firecracker and after a few minutes Barangay Kagawad Jimmy
Balugo went to his house and informed him that their neighbor
Titing Pantinople was shot. Kagawad Balugo requested him to
accompany the former to go to the house of then Barangay
Captain Celestino Marturillas; that he and Kagawad Balugo
proceeded to the house of Petitioner and shouted to awaken the
latter; that Barangay Captain Marturillas went out rubbing his
eyes awakened from his sleep and was informed of the killing of
Artemio Pantinople; that Petitioner immediately instructed them
to fetch the SCAA and thereafter their group went to the crime
scene.
23.3) Ronito Bedero testified that he was in his house
on the night Artemio Pantinop[l]e was shot. The material point
raised by this witness in his testimony was the fact that he saw an
unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later
joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from
where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards the
direction of the Purok Center in Barangay Gatungan. This
witness noticed that one of the three men was armed with a rifle
but could not make out their identities since the area where the
three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men
disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Petitioner,
Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo and three (3) SCAA members
going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
scene. A little later, he saw the group of Petitioner return
to where they came from.
23.4) Police C/Insp. Noemi Austero, Forensic
Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that she
conducted a paraffin test on both hands of Petitioner on
November 5, 1999 at around 10:30 a.m.She also
testified that Petitioner tested NEGATIVE for gunpowder
nitrates indicating that he never fired a weapon at any
time between 7:30 p.m. of November 4, 1999 until the
next day, November 5, 1999. She also testified that as a
matter of procedure at the PNP Crime Laboratory, they
do not conduct paraffin testing on a crime suspect
seventy two (72) hours after an alleged shooting
incident. She also testified that based on her experience
she is not aware of any chemical that could extract
gunpowder nitrates from the hands of a person who had
just fired his weapon.
23.5) Dominador Lapiz testified that he lived
on the land of the victim, Artemio Pantinople for ten (10)
years. He was one of the first persons who went to the
crime scene where he personally saw the body of
deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance
from the victims house and that those with him at that
time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they
could clearly see the deceased. He also testified that
there were many coconut and other trees and bananas
in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of
Lito Santos was only about four (4) meters from the
crime scene, while the house of victim-Artemio
Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He
testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store
of deceased at the time of the shooting. He was also the
one who informed Kagawad Glenda Lascuna about the
shooting of Artemio Pantinople. His testimony also
revealed that when the responding policemen arrived,
Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen,
volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that
he would testify that it was Petitioner who shot Artemio
Pantinople.
On cross-examination, this witness declared
that the crime scene was very dark and one cannot see
Page 45
 the body of the victim without light. On cross-examination, this
witness also testified that Lito Santos approached the service
vehicle of the responding policemen and volunteered to be a from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the
witness that Petitioner was the assailant of the victim, Artemio
Pantinople. This witness further testified that immediately after he
went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the children victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latters complicity in the
were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the
policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan
nganong gipatay mo and akong bana? crime.

23.6) Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain

of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City testified
that he learned of Pantinoples killing two hours later through
information personally relayed to him by Kagawads Jimmy
Balugo and Norberto Libre. He intimated to the Court that he did No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive,
try to extend some assistance to the family of the deceased but
was prevented from so doing since the wife of deceased herself
and her relatives were already hostile with him when he was credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner
about to approach the crime scene. He also testified that he
voluntarily went with the police officers who arrested him at his
residence on the same evening after the victim was shot. He also beyond reasonable doubt.
turned over to police custody the M-14 rifle issued to him and
voluntarily submitted himself to paraffin testing a few hours after
he was taken in for questioning by the Bunawan PNP. Petitioner,
during the trial consistently maintained that he is innocent of the
charge against him.[10]
On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that they were

Ruling of the Court of Appeals necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives, and should thus be

subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been established beyond testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more credible.

reasonable doubt. According to the appellate court, he was positively identified as the one running away

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 46

The appellate court upheld petitioners conviction, as well as the award of damages. In addition, it awarded
In sum, petitioner raises two main issues: 1) whether the prosecutions evidence is credible; and 2)

actual damages representing unearned income.

whether it is sufficient to convict him of homicide. Under the first main issue, he questions the

Hence, this Petition.[11]

positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; the alleged inconsistencies between

The Issues
their Affidavits and court testimonies; and the plausibility of the allegation that the victim had

uttered, Tabangi ko pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan (Help me pre, I was shot by the captain), which was

In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Courts consideration:
considered by the two lower courts either as his dying declaration or as part of res gestae.
I

The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave credence to the claim
of the solicitor general that the prosecutions witnesses positively identified petitioner
as the alleged triggerman
Under the second main issue, petitioner contends that the burden of proof was
II

The Court of Appeals was in serious error when it affirmed the trial courts blunder in erroneously shifted to him; that there should have been no finding of guilt because of the negative
literally passing the blame on petitioner for the lapses in the investigation conducted
by the police thereby shifting on him the burden of proving his innocence
results of the paraffin test; and that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of gun
III

The Court of Appeals committed a serious and palpable error when it failed to used in the commission of the crime.
consider that the deceased was cut off by death before he could convey a complete or
sensible communication to whoever heard such declaration assuming there was any

IV

Petit[i]oners alibi assumed significance considering that evidence and testimonies of

the prosecutions witnesses arrayed against petitioner failed to prove that he was
responsible for the commission of the crime.[12] The Courts Ruling

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 47

 unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to review whether the trial

The Petition is unmeritorious. courts conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws. [14] Indeed, the findings of

the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless it has overlooked or misinterpreted some
First Main Issue:

facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[15] Although there are recognized exceptions[16] to
Credibility of the Prosecution Evidence

the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not

convinced this Court of the existence of any.

According to petitioner, the charge of homicide should be dismissed, because the inherent weakness of the

prosecutions case against him was revealed by the evidence presented. He submits that any doubt as to who really

Having laid that basic premise, the Court disposes seriatim the arguments proffered by
perpetrated the crime should be resolved in his favor.

petitioner under the first main issue.

Positive Identification
We do not agree. This Court has judiciously reviewed the findings and records of this case and

finds no reversible error in the CAs ruling affirming petitioners conviction for homicide.
Petitioner contends that it was inconceivable for Prosecution Witness Ernita Pantinople

-- the victims wife -- to have identified him as the assassin. According to him, her house was a

Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual
good fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene,[17] which was enveloped in pitch

findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present case.[13] Here, the RTC was
darkness.[18] Because of the alleged improbability, he insists that her testimony materially

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 48

 can be expected to know each others distinct and particular features and
characteristics.[20]
contradicted her Affidavit. The Affidavit supposedly proved that she had not recognized her husband from

where she was standing during the shooting. If she had failed to identify the victim, petitioner asks, how

This holding confirms the findings of fact of the RTC. Settled is the rule that on
was it possible for her to conclude that it was [p]etitioner whom she claims she saw fleeing from the

questions of the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
scene?[19]

court are given the highest degree of respect.[21] It was the trial court that had the opportunity to

observe the manner in which the witnesses had testified; as well as their furtive glances, calmness,
All these doubts raised by petitioner are sufficiently addressed by the clear, direct and

sighs, and scant or full realization of their oaths. [22] It had the better opportunity to observe them
convincing testimony of the witness. She positively identified him as the one running away immediately

firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.[23]
after the sound of a gunshot. Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the

firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running. She also clarified that she had

Petitioner doubts whether Ernita could have accurately identified him at the scene of the
heard the statement, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, uttered after the shooting incident. Accepting

crime, considering that it was dark at that time; that there were trees obstructing her view; and that
her testimony, the CA ruled thus:

Ernitas testimony that she saw [petitioner] at the crime scene is credible her house was fifty (50) meters away from where the crime was committed.
because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her
house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with [petitioner], who is her neighbor, and a
long-time barangay captain of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City when the incident took place. Ernita was also able to see his
face while he was running away from the crime scene. The identification of a person
can be established through familiarity with ones physical features. Once a person These assertions are easily belied by the findings of the courts below, as borne by the
has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task
even from a considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that
people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and records. Ernita testified on the crime scene conditions that had enabled her to make a positive

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 49

identification of petitioner. Her testimony was even corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, who

bolstered the truth and veracity of those declarations. Consequently, the CA ruled as follows: But even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the

x x x Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted

two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. x x x. In corroboration, Lito face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. [27] Since the
testified that the place where the shooting occurred was bright.
The trees and plants growing in between Ernitas house and the place
where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be circumstances in this case were reasonably sufficient for the identification of persons, this fact of
sure, the prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a clear picture of the place where
Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and plants growing in between her familiarity with him erases any doubt that she could have erred in identifying him. Those
the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot where Artemio was
shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree, some coconut trees and
young banana plants growing in the place where Artemio was shot. The trees and related to the victim of a crime have a natural tendency to remember the faces of those involved in
banana plants have slender trunks which could not have posed an obstacle to
Ernitas view of the crime scene from the kitchen window of her house especially so
that she was in an elevated position.[24] it. These relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim

and bringing the malefactor before the law.[28]

This Court has consistently held that -- given the proper conditions -- the illumination produced

by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow the

Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in positively
identification of persons.[25] In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a

identifying petitioner. The CA was correct in observing that it would be unnatural for a relative who
nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to

is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her
identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of

to do so is to let the guilty go free.[29] Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were
visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the

malefactor should normally be accepted.[26]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 50

actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath
deserve full faith and credence.[30]
Inconsistency Between
Affidavit and Testimony
Petitioner contends that the testimony of Ernita materially contradicted her Affidavit. According
to him, she said in her testimony that she had immediately recognized her husband as the victim of the
shooting; but in her Affidavit she stated that it was only when she had approached the body that she came
to know that he was the victim.
We find no inconsistency. Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the
victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not see
him.Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not really he. Thus, the
statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
To be sure, ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared
by administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have
said.[31] Almost always, the latter would simply sign the documents after being read to them. Basic
is the rule that, taken ex parte, affidavits are considered incomplete and often inaccurate. They
are products sometimes of partial suggestions and at other times of want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected circumstances
necessary for accurate recollection.[32]
Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the
presence of petitioner at the crime scene. Ruled the CA:
x x x. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita x x
x ascertained the identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate to
Ernitas identification of [petitioner] as the person running away from the
crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot.[33]
Statements Uttered
Contemporaneous with the Crime
Page 51
 Ernita positively testified that immediately after the shooting, she had heard her husband say, It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for

Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. This statement was corroborated by another witness, Lito Santos, help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea quoted earlier. A shift

who testified on the events immediately preceding and subsequent to the shooting. in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the

assailant. Petitioner then accuses this witness of harboring a deep-seated grudge,[35] which would

It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot the explain why the latter allegedly fabricated a serious accusation.

victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by

Ernita.He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those This contention obviously has no basis. No serious accusation against petitioner was

same words. ever made by Santos. What the latter did was merely to recount what he heard the victim utter

immediately after the shooting. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the

Petitioner insinuates that it was incredible for Santos to have seen the victim, but not the assailant. The CA crime. The statements of the former corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added

dismissed this argument thus: credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it

x x x. The natural reaction of a person who hears a loud or startling

command is to turn towards the speaker. Moreover, witnessing a crime is an would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim.
unusual experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses, for which no
clear-cut standard of behavior can be prescribed. Litos reaction is not unnatural. He
was more concerned about Artemios condition than the need to ascertain the
identity of Artemios assailant.[34]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 52


The two witnesses unequivocally declared and corroborated each other on the fact that the plea, Help
me pre, I was shot by the captain, had been uttered by the victim. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that it
The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness
of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.

was highly probable that the deceased died instantly and was consequently unable to shout for help. We

do not discount this possibility, which petitioner himself admits to be a probability. In the face of the positive Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own perception. A

declaration of two witnesses that the words were actually uttered, we need not concern ourselves with recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying persons declaration made under

speculations, probabilities or possibilities. Said the CA: the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.[37]

x x x. Thus, as between the positive and categorical declarations of the

prosecution witnesses and the mere opinion of the medical doctor, the former must
necessarily prevail.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the post-mortem examination of the
cadaver of Artemio was conducted by Dr. Ledesma only about 9:30 in the morning Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are
of November 5, 1998 or the day following the fatal shooting of Artemio. Evidently,
several hours had elapsed prior to the examination. Thus, Dr. Ledesma could not
have determined Artemios physical condition a few seconds after the man was entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect.[38] Persons aware of an impending death
shot.[36]

have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their

Dying Declaration accusations.[39] The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of

ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. [40] Hence, not infrequently,

Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the question to be resolved is whether they
pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased

can be considered as part of the dying declaration of the victim.

victim.[41]

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 53

 declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding impending death.[45] Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the

the declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be

voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full

the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to consciousness of being in a dying condition.[46]

testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.[42]

Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or suggestion,

The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case, the declarant was the

his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was victim who, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.

the only person referred to as kapitan in their place.[43] It was also established that the declarant, at the

time he had given the dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death. As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was a full

True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was]

The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of not merely fragmentary.[47] Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only

death.[44] The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 54

admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of to fabricate a false statement.[50] An important consideration is whether there intervened, between

evidence. the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus

restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. [51]
Res Gestae

The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an

as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.[48] exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res

gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its

Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling

occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect immediately attending circumstances.[52]
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a

startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to,

startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a
a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. [49] These statements are a spontaneous

reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 55

story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters never rely on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of its evidence, implying that there

statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae. was no sufficient evidence to convict him.

Aside from the victims statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of Ernita -- Kapitan, ngano We disagree. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to

nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) -- may be considered to be in sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to

the same category. Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and of the identity

right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to of the assailant.[53] This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the

the circumstances of the shooting. prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.

Second Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Evidence
The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt:

Having established the evidence for the prosecution, we now address the argument of petitioner that the

appellate court had effectively shifted the burden of proof to him. He asserts that the prosecution should First. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the

muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, Help me pre, I was

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 56

shot by the captain. This statement was duly established, and the testimony of Santos confirmed the and investigate the shooting. Instead, he avers that when he went to the situs of the crime, the

events that had occurred. It should be understandable that pre referred to Santos, considering that he and wife of the victim was already shouting and accusing him of being the assailant, so he just

the victim were conversing just before the shooting took place. It was also established that the two called left. This reaction was very unlikely of an innocent barangay captain, who would simply want to

each other pre, because Santos was the godfather of the victims child.[54] investigate a crime. Often have we ruled that the first impulse of innocent persons when accused

of wrongdoing is to express their innocence at the first opportune time. [55]

Second. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance, Help me pre,

I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The victims

the crime scene while carrying a firearm. wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate

transaction which petitioner tried to block. This showed petitioners antagonism towards the

Third. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was established as part of victim.[56]

the res gestae.

These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who

Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the shot and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held that, where an eyewitness saw the

incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the reasonable conclusion is

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 57

 (b) The facts from which the inferences are
that the accused had killed the victim.[57] Further establishing petitioners guilt was the definitive statement derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is

of the victim that he had been shot by the barangay captain. such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[62]

Clearly, petitioners guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. To be sure, conviction in a

Paraffin Test
criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute

certainty.[58] Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test done on him. While

unprejudiced mind.[59] they were negative, that fact alone did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and time

again, this Court has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person

That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the has not fired a gun.[63] In other words, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as

fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. [64] Besides,

toward the conviction of petitioner.[60] Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not necessarily the prosecution was able to establish the events during the shooting, including the presence of

weaker.[61] Moreover, the circumstantial evidence described above satisfies the requirements of the Rules petitioner at the scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative paraffin test

of Court, which we quote: result, are of lesser probative value.

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 58

 witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not
of the courts to dictate.
Corpus Delicti
Anent the failure of the investigators to conduct a paraffin test on
petitioner, this Court has time and again held that such failure is not fatal to
the case of the prosecution as scientific experts agree that the paraffin test is
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of gun used in the extremely unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an accuseds complicity in
the crime committed.[66]

shooting. Suffice it to say that this contention hardly dents the latters case. As correctly found by the

appellate court, the prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime

Finally, as regards petitioners alibi, we need not belabor the point. It was easily, and
had actually been committed. Ruled this Court in another case:

[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved
by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily
refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with
the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes.[65]
correctly, dismissed by the CA thus:
[Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must
be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus
criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any
event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the credible
and positive identification made by Ernita.[67]

To undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner depends heavily on its failure
Third Issue:
Damages
to present the gun used in the shooting and on the negative paraffin test result. These pieces of evidence

alone, according to him, should exculpate him from the crime. His reliance on them is definitely misplaced,

An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then
however. In a similar case, this Court has ruled as follows:

Petitioner likewise harps on the prosecutions failure to present the records becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether or not
from the Firearms and Explosives Department of the Philippine National Police
at Camp Crame of the .45 caliber Remington pistol owned by petitioner for
comparison with the specimen found at the crime scene with the hope that it would
exculpate him from the trouble he is in. Unfortunately for petitioner, we have
previously held that the choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 59

included in the assignment of error.[68] The CA upheld the RTC in the latters award of damages, with the loss of earning capacity[73] in the amount of P312,000; attorneys fees of P20,000; and payment of

modification that unearned income be added. the costs.

We uphold the award of P50,000 indemnity ex delicto[69] to the heirs of the victim. When death WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution

occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to this amount as indemnity for the are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification in the award of damages set forth here. Costs against

death, without need of any evidence or proof of damages.[70] As to actual damages, we note that the petitioner.

prosecution was able to establish sufficiently only P22,200 for funeral and burial costs. The rest of the

expenses, although presented, were not duly receipted. We cannot simply accept them as credible SO ORDERED.

evidence. This Court has already ruled, though, that when actual damages proven by receipts during the [G.R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000]

ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by its
trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of P25,000 for temperate damages is justified, in lieu of the
General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL
ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and
MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
actual damages of a lesser amount.[71] In effect, the award granted by the lower court is upheld.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: rny

As to the award of moral damages, the P500,000 given by the RTC and upheld by the This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering
petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons and damage to property as a result of a
CA should be reduced to P50,000, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[72] We also affirm the award of vehicular accident.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 60

The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus
(hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is
owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the Government Service Insurance
System.
On February 22, 1985, at around six oclock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando
Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was headed
towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left side of the Ford
Escorts hood was severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private
respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed
Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite
surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on
the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple
lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil Case No.
2206-V-85 for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
172, Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo,
filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86,
against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo,
registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the
"authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL
for the damage to her car. Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated and
later tried jointly. The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: Esmsc
In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the night
previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and
John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore, no sleep for them,
notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be totally
discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute
home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had
to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor
and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car
started to run only after five oclock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a
party still on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the
car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible accident. The accident
happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the driver John
Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore control
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have
prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle.
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1,2 and 3) will clearly
show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking
position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal
manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an
overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time, the car would
have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact.
The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their
drivers, and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is
committed by its employees, drivers especially, from the unrebutted
testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the
point of the impact. From these damages as shown by the picture, it can be
clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was the car driven by John
Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct lane.[2]
Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989,
dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against
Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for
lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on December 21, 1994, rendered a decision reversing
the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel
Abrahams uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to the fault of the driver of Bus 203;
(2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which had been taken an hour
after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the vehicles could have been
changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another
vehicle when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4)
that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver Armando Jose. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Jksm
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the
defendants-appellees MCL and Armando Jose are adjudged to pay jointly
and severally:
1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father
Felixberto Abraham:
Page 61
 (a) P37,576.47 as actual damages;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P15,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(e) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
2. The heirs of John Macarubo:
(a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against the appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues which
boil down to the question whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who was at fault
for the collision of the two vehicles.
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to
support the particular contention.[3] In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly
on photographs, identified in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of the
two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the
testimony of Rommel Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because Bus
203 invaded their lane.[4]
The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abrahams testimony
which was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an
eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. [5] In criminal
cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in
many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v.
Vasquez,[6] where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. [7] Esm
In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL
line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abrahams
self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort
and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to
Abrahams testimony, the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it
was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Escort positioned diagonally on the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203s lane.
As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the
collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right
from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the
center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was
overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the
Ford Escort.
Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It
was filled with passengers,[8] and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it
was overtaking another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and
its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision
would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a considerable distance from the point of
impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escorts smashed hood was only about one or two
meters from Bus 203s damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such as would be the
case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up far from
each other.
In discrediting the physical evidence, the appellate court made the following observations:
We cannot believe that it was the car which overtook another vehicle and
proceeded to the lane occupied by the bus. There was a traffic jam on the
"bus lane" while traffic was light on the "car lane." Indeed, we find it
inconceivable that the car, occupying the lane without any traffic, would
overtake and traverse a heavy traffic lane.[9] (Underscoring supplied.)
This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it
encroached on the opposite lane occupied by Bus 203.
Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the night before the accident,
he and John Macarubo went to a friends house in La Loma where they stayed until 11
p.m.[10] Abrahams explanation as to why they did not reach Valenzuela until six oclock in the
morning of the next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort careened and
slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect. Abraham told the court: [11] Esmmis
ATTY. RESPICIO:
Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnels place where did you go?
ROMMEL ABRAHAM
Page 62
 A: We proceeded in going home, sir. Q: House of Macarubo?

Q: You were on your way home? A: Yes, maam.

A: Yes, sir. Q: So you were able to repair the car?

Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You met the accident at about 6:00 A: Yes, maam.
oclock the next day, 6:00 oclock in the morning the next day, did it take you long to
reach BBB? Q: What time were you able to repair the car?

A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd Avenue, sir. A: Around 5:00 oclock in the morning, sir.

Q: What kind of trouble? Q: You were able to replace the cross-joint or what?

A: The cross-joint were detached, sir. A: Ginawaan ng paraan, maam.

Q: Are you familiar with cars? Q: How?

A: A little, sir. A: The cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go home, maam.

COURT: Q: No spare parts was replaced? Msesm

Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint problem? A: No, maam.

A: About 12:00 oclock perhaps, sir.
Q: What happened to the cross joint?
A: It was cut, maam.
Q: You were able to repair that cross-joint 12:00 oclock and you were able to run and
reached this place of accident at 6:00 oclock?
A: No, we were not able to get spare parts, maam.
Q: Why were you able to reach this place at 6:00 oclock?
A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their house, maam.
Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escorts rear cross-joint was cut/detached.
This mechanism controls the movement of the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a
cars maneuverability, the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem. In
this case, when asked if they were able to repair the cross-joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng
paraan, maam," by simply welding them just so they could reach home. His testimony indicates
that the rear cross-joint was hastily repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs made thereon
were merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. Given
such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another
vehicle, it actually strayed into the bus lane because of the defective cross-joint, causing its driver
to lose control of the vehicle.
The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the
photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could
have been moved because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident.
This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203s conductress, testified that, immediately after

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 63

the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the
Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital.[12] This fact is not disputed by private respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellants brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the
accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford
Escorts lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in
evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch
allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any
evidence unless formally offered by a party.
Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Armando
Jose.[13] Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not required.
The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Esmso
....
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
....
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees.
As held in Poblete v. Fabros:[14]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
[I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the
law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed
negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior,
where the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the
negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the last paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the responsibility therein
mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657;
Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.,
30 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited.
Therefore, before the presumption of the employers negligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established. While the
allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the
failure to prove the employees negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employers
vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence
against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising
from the same incident.[15]
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding petitioners liable to
private respondents. The next question then is whether, as the trial court held, private respondent
Juanita Macarubo is liable to petitioners.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the
quasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those
specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the deceased John
Macarubo. Exsm
In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the
Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. [16] Nowhere was it
alleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita
Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. The
allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to
an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the
"authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of
Juanita Macarubo.
Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John
Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubos negligence under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden, MCLs third-party complaint should be dismissed.
Page 64
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaints filed in Civil Cases OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Nos. 2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86 against Manila Central Bus Lines and Armando Jose, as well as the AUTHORITY, TAKENAKA CORPORATION, AND ASAHIKOSAN
third-party complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED. CORPORATION, Respondents.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

2. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE BRION, J.:

Before the Court are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assailing the Decision
dated August 22, 2013, and the Resolution dated October 29, 2013, of the Court of
A. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029; and the petition for certiorari assailing the May 3, 2007;
May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 117, in Civil Case No. 04-0876.1cralawrednad

G.R. No. 181892, September 08, 2015 In CA-G.R. CV No. 98029, the CA ordered petitioners Republic of the Philippines, Department of
Transportation and Communications, and Manila International Airport Authority (Government for
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. brevity) to pay the Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the amount of
ERMITA, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND MANILA $371,426,688.24 with interest at 6% per annum as just compensation for the expropriation of the
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioners, v. HON. JESUS M. MUPAS, IN HIS CAPACITY Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III).2cralawrednad
AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL
REGION, BRANCH 117, PASAY CITY, AND PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., In Civil Case No. 04-0876, the RTC appointed DG Jones and Partners as an independent
INC., Respondents. appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III, and ordered the Government to submit a Certificate of Availability of
Funds to cover DG Jones and Partners’ appraisal fee of $1,900,000.00.
[G.R. No. 209917]
For ease of presentation, the Court’s discussion shall be under the following
structure:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR 1. The Factual Antecedents
TERMINALS COMPANY, INC., TAKENAKA CORPORATION AND ASAHIKOSAN
CORPORATION,Respondents.
1. The NAIA-IPT IIII Contract and PIATCO
[G.R. No. 209696]
1. The NAIA-IPT III Contract
TAKENAKA CORPORATION AND ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
2. PIATCO
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, 3. PIATCO and the Services of Takenaka and Asahikosan
AND PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS COMPANY, INC.Respondents.

[G.R. No. 209731]

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC. PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE 2. The Agan v. PIATCO Case, G.R. No. 155001
PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
1. The Case and the Decision dated May 5, 2003

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 65

 2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution dated January 21, 2004 1. CA-G.R. CV No. 98029

3. The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876 2. CA-G.R. SP. No. 123221

4. The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429

1. The Case and the Decision dated December 19, 2005

4. The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case No. 06-171
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution dated February 1, 2006
5. The Parties’ Positions
5. Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876 after the Finality of the Gingoyon Case

1. The Appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an Independent Appraiser

1. The Government’s Position
2. The BOC’s Expenses
2. PIATCO’s Position
6. The Parties and the BOC’s Appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III
3. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s Position
1. The Government’s Appraisal
2. PIATCO’s Appraisal
3. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s Appraisal
4. The BOC’s Appraisal
6. The Issues

7. The Court’s Rulings

2. The RTC Rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876
1. G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696, and 209731
1. The Main Decision
1. The parties were afforded procedural due process despite their
non-receipt of the BOC Final Report prior to the promulgation of the
2. The RTC’s Interlocutory Order on the Validity of the Escrow Account
May 23, 2011 Decision in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
1. The Government and the Creation of an Escrow Account for the Payment of Just
Compensation 2. Framework: Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State
2. The Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011
2.a. The power of eminent domain is a fundamental state power
that is inseparable from sovereignty

2.b. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
3. The CA Rulings taken from the owner by the condemnor

2.b.1. Fair market value is the general standard of value in

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 66

 determining just compensation 7. Interests, Fruits, and Income

2.b.2 Replacement cost is a different standard of value from fair market 7.a. Computation of Interests
value 7.b. PIATCO is not entitled to the fruits and income of the NAIA-
IPT III
2.b.3. Replacement cost is only one of the standards that the Court should
consider in appraising the NAIA-IPT III
8. The BOC’s Expenses
2.b.4. The use of depreciated replacement cost method is consistent with
the principle that the property owner should be compensated for his actual 8.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan should not share in the BOC’s
loss expenses

3. Construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III 9. PIATCO as the Proper Recipient of Just Compensation

3.a. The base valuation of the NAIA-IPT III 9.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s intervention in the case as unpaid
3.b. Structural defects on the NAIA-IPT III subcontractors is proper
9.b. The property owner is entitled to just compensation
3.b.1. The Court cannot consider the additional evidence submitted by 9.c. A final disposition in the eminent domain case with respect to
Takenaka and Asahikosan before the Court of Appeals the order of payment to a particular person shall be final and
executory
3.b.2. Equiponderance of evidence on the alleged structural defects of the 9.d. The determination of whether the NAIA-IPT III shall be
NAIA-IPT III favors PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan burdened by liens and mortgages even after the full payment of just
compensation is premature
3.c. The unnecessary areas
10. The exercise of eminent domain from the perspective of “taking.”
4. Attendant cost of the NAIA-IPT III
10.a. The Government may take the property for public purpose or
4.a. PIATCO’s attendant cost public use upon the issuance and effectivity of the writ of
4.b. The BOC and the RTC’s attendant cost possession
4.c. The Government’s attendant cost

5. Deductions to the Replacement Cost of the NAIA-IPT III

2. G.R. No. 181892
5.a. Depreciation should be deducted from the replacement cost

5.b. Rectification for contract compliance should not be deducted from the 1. The issue on the appointment of an independent appraiser is
replacement cost already moot and academic

6. Adjustments to the Replacement Cost

I. The Factual Antecedents

6.a. The replacement cost should be adjusted to December 2004 values

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 67

 A. The NAIA-IPT III Contract and PIATCO
1. The NAIA-IPT III Contract
On October 5, 1994, Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government – through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) – for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under
a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit
competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC’s unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT
Law3 and its implementing rules.4cralawrednad
2. PIATCO
On September 20, 1996, Paircargo Consortium – composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS), and Security Bank Corporation
(Security Bank) – submitted its competitive proposal to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC).5cralawrednad
Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium offered to build the NAIA-IPT III for at least $350 million at no cost
to the Government and to pay the Government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of
operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross
revenues for the last ten years of operation. However, Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the
Government a total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay the
Government a total of P135 million for the same period.6cralawrednad
After finding that Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid superior to the AEDC’s unsolicited proposal and
after the AEDC’s failure to match the competitive bid, the DOTC awarded, through a notice of award, the
NAIA-IPT III project to the Paircargo Consortium (that later organized itself as PIATCO). 7cralawrednad
On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the construction,
development, and operation of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme. On November 26,
1998, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) superseded the 1997 Concession
Agreement. The Government and PIATCO likewise entered into a series of supplemental agreements,
namely: the First Supplement signed on August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement signed on September 4,
2000; and the Third Supplement signed on June 22, 2001.8cralawrednad
Under the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplemental Agreement (for brevity, PIATCO
contracts), the Government authorized PIATCO to build, operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the
concession period of twenty-five (25) years.9cralawrednad
3. PIATCO and the Services of Takenaka and Asahikosan
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, a local branch of a foreign corporation
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
duly organized under the laws of Japan and doing business in the Philippines, for the construction
of the NAIA-IPT III under an Onshore Construction Contract.10cralawrednad
On the same date, PIATCO, through an Offshore Procurement Contract,11 likewise contracted the
services of Asahikosan, a foreign corporation duly organized under the laws of Japan, for the
design, manufacture, purchase, test and delivery of the Plant 12 in the NAIA-IPT III.
In May 2002, PIATCO defaulted on its obligation to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan pursuant to
their respective contracts. To settle the problem, Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer
PIATCO’s payments until June 2003, conditioned on their receipt of adequate security from
PIATCO as stipulated in the Fourth Supplemental Agreement (relating to the Onshore
Construction Contract)13 and the Fourth Supplement Agreement (relating to the Offshore
Procurement Contract), respectively.14cralawrednad
On November 29, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that
the Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day, Takenaka and
Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for
PIATCO’s failure to provide adequate security.15cralawrednad
B. The Agan v. PIATCO Case, G.R. No. 155001
The Case and the Decision dated May 5, 2003
On September 17, 2002, petitioners Demosthenes Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the
PIATCO contracts, and to prohibit the DOTC and the MIAA from implementing these contracts for
being contrary to law. The case, entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed as G.R. No.
155001.16cralawrednad
On May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding that Paircargo Consortium
(that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet the
minimum equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project, as required under the BOT Law and the
Bid Documents. The Court also ruled that Security Bank (member of the Paircargo Consortium)
invested its entire net worth in a single undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of Section 21-B
of the General Banking Act (which limits a commercial bank’s equity investment, whether allied or
non-allied, to fifteen percent (15%) of its net worth).17 The Court further found that the PIATCO
contracts contained provisions that substantially departed from the draft Concession Agreement.
These substantial modification of the PIATCO contracts violated the public policy for being
repugnant to the principle that all bidders must be on equal footing during the public
bidding.18cralawrednad
The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution dated January 21, 2004We denied
PIATCO, et al.’s motion for reconsideration in our January 21, 2004 resolution. 19 Significantly, we
stated in the resolution that the Government should first pay PIATCO as a prerequisite before
taking over the NAIA-IPT III, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Page 68
 This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the
NAIA-IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO
in their construction. For the Government to take over the said facility, it has to
compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The
compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the
Government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.20 (Underlines and emphases ours)
C. The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-087621cralawrednad
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before
the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117. The Government informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) the amount of P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT III’s
assessed value.22cralawrednad
On the same day, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. Citing City of Manila
v. Serrano,23 the RTC held that that it had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession upon: (1) the
filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the Government’s deposit
of the amount equivalent to the property’s assessed value, pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.24cralawrednad
On January 4, 2005, the RTC modified its December 21, 2004 order and directed: (1) the Land Bank to
immediately release to PIATCO the amount of US$62,343,175.7725cralawred that would be deducted from
the just compensation; (2) the Government to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds for
the payment of just compensation; and (3) the Government to maintain and preserve the NAIA-IPT III
pending the expropriation proceedings and the full payment of just compensation. The RTC likewise
prohibited the Government from performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III such as awarding
concessions or leasing any part of the NAIA-IPT III to other parties.26cralawrednad
The Government sought reconsideration of the January 4, 2005 Order, arguing that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, and not RA 8974, applied to the case since the NAIA-IPT III was not a national government
infrastructure project.27cralawrednad
RA 8974 is otherwise known as “An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location
For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes.”
The Government argued that under Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it shall have the right to a writ
of possession upon deposit with the authorized government depositary of an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, which amount shall be held by the depositary
subject to the orders of the court. In contrast, Section 4 of RA 8974, as a rule, requires the Government to
immediately pay the property owner the amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on
the BIR’s relevant zonal valuation and the value of the improvements/and or structures, upon the filing of
the complaint and after due notice to the defendant.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
On January 7, 2005, the RTC appointed three Commissioners28 to determine just
compensation without consulting the Government and PIATCO.29Due to these successive
adverse rulings, the Government sought to inhibit Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, the RTC’s
presiding judge, from hearing the case.30(The judge was ambushed and killed on December 31,
2005.)31cralawrednad
On January 10, 2005, the RTC denied the Government’s urgent motion for reconsideration and
motion for inhibition.32cralawrednad
On December 14, 2005, Asahikosan filed a motion for leave to intervene in Civil Case No.
04-0876 (the expropriation case).33 On the other hand, Takenaka filed a Manifestation dated
December 15, 2005,34 with the attached Manifestation and Motion dated December 14,
2005.35 Takenaka alleged that the Government impleaded it as an additional defendant in an
amended complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III, but was not served summons. Takenaka
thus manifested its voluntary appearance before the RTC.36cralawrednad
Takenaka and Asahikosan informed the RTC that they had previously filed two collection cases
against PIATCO, docketed as Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269, before the High Court of
Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Technology and Construction Court in London, England,
(London Court) on August 9, 2004.
In both instances, the London Court ruled in their favor. The dispositive part of the judgment
award in Claim No. HT-04-248 provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment be entered for the First Claimant37 in the sum of
6,602,971.00 United States dollars, together with interest in the
sum of 116,825,365.34 Philippine pesos up to and including 18
February 2005.
2. Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant38 in the sum of
8,224,236.00 United States dollars, together with interest in the
sum of 2,947,564.87 United States dollars up to and including 18
February 2005, being a total of 11,171,800.87 United States
dollars.
3. Save for the costs of and caused by the amendment of the
particulars of claim, which will be the subject of a separate Order,
the Defendant do pay the First Claimant’s and the Second
Claimant’s costs in the action, to be subject to detailed assessment
if not agreed.
Page 69
 DATED this 18th day of February 2005.39
On the other hand, the dispositive part of the judgment award in Claim No. HT-05-269
states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment be entered for the First Claimant in the sum of 21,688,012.18
United States dollars, together with interest in the sum of 6,052,805.83
United States dollars.
2. Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant in the sum of 30,319,284.36
United States dollars, together with interest in the sum of 5,442,628.26
United States dollars.
3. The defendant to pay the Claimants’ costs in the action, to be subject to
detailed assessment if not agreed.
DATED this 2 (sic) day of December 2005.40
Takenaka and Asahikosan asked the RTC to: (a) hold in abeyance the release of just compensation to
PIATCO until the London awards are recognized and enforced in the Philippines; and (b) order that the just
compensation be deposited with the RTC for the benefit of PIATCO’s creditors.41cralawrednad
During the hearing of the motions, the Government clarified that it neither filed an amended complaint for
expropriation nor impleaded Takenaka as a necessary party in the case. 42cralawrednad
The RTC initially denied Takenaka and Asahikosan’s respective motions 43 in the August 8, 2006 Order,
but subsequently reconsidered its ruling.44In a March 12, 2007 Order, the RTC treated Takenaka’s
Manifestation with the attached Manifestation and Motion as a motion to intervene and allowed
Takenaka and Asahikosan to intervene in the case as PIATCO’s creditors.45cralawrednad
Pending the RTC’s resolution of Takenaka and Asahikosan’s motions for leave to intervene in the
expropriation case, the Government went directly to the Court seeking Judge Gingoyon’s inhibition from
the case; the nullification of the order of release of the sum of $62.3 million to PIATCO; and the nullification
as well of the appointment of the commissioners.
D. The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
1. The Case and the Decision dated December 19, 2005
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
On January 12, 2005, the Government, et al., filed a petition for certiorari with the Court assailing
the validity of the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the RTC in the expropriation
case.46 The case, entitled Republic v. Gingoyon, was docketed as G.R. No. 166429.
The Government argued that the RTC should not have ordered the release of $62.3 Million since
the NAIA-IPT III’s assessed value was only P3 billion. Moreover, the RTC’s prohibition against the
Government to perform acts of ownership on the NAIA-IPT III was contrary to the essence of a
writ of possession. It47 asserted that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governed the expropriation of
the NAIA-IPT III since it was not a national government infrastructure project.
The Government likewise contended that the commissioners’ appointment was void. It claimed
that it had been deprived of due process since it was not given the opportunity to contest the
appointment of the commissioners. The Government likewise sought Judge Gingoyon’s inhibition
from the case due to his alleged manifest partiality to PIATCO.48cralawrednad
The Court partly granted the petition and rendered the following
rulings:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, under the 2004 Resolution in Agan: (a) PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation
determined in accordance with law and equity; and (b) the Government is barred from taking over
the NAIA-IPT III until just compensation is paid.
Second, RA 8974 applies in the expropriation case insofar as the law: (a) requires the
Government to immediately pay PIATCO at least the proffered value of the NAIA-IPT III; and (b)
provides valuation standards in determining the amount of just compensation.
RA 8974 is the governing law in cases where the national government expropriates property for
the purpose of commencing national government infrastructure projects such as the construction
of the NAIA-IPT III. However, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court applies in determining the assessed
value and the mode of deposit of just compensation if the national government initiates the
expropriation complaint for purposes other than national infrastructure projects.
Under both Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and RA 8974, the Government initiates the expropriation
by filing an expropriation complaint. However, the rules on the mode of deposit differ because
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court merely requires the Government to deposit the assessed value of
the property sought to be expropriated with an authorized government depositary before the
issuance of a writ of possession.
In contrast, RA 8974 commands the Government to make a direct payment to the property
owner prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. Under RA 8974, the payment shall be based
on: (a) the BIR’s zonal valuation in case of land; and (b) the value of the improvements or
structures under the replacement cost method. If the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance and if there is no existing
valuation of the property, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the proffered
Page 70
value of the property.49cralawrednad
We thus observed that Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is contrary to our January 21, 2004
Resolution which required the Government to make prior payment of just compensation to PIATCO before
it could take over the NAIA-IPT III.
The Court at the same time qualified the applicability of RA 8974 to the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III.
We held that the Congress may legislate on the valuation standards of just compensation and the manner
of its payment since these are substantive matters. We made clear, however, that the Congress cannot
legislate on the procedural aspects of expropriation since this power lies with the Court. In fact,
Section 14 of RA 8974 IRR provides that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall apply to “all matters regarding
defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims,
effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint.”
Third, we held in abeyance the implementation of the writ of possession until the Government directly pays
to PIATCO the proffered value of P3 billion. The zonal valuation method under Section 4 of RA 8974 shall
not apply since the Government owns the land on which the NAIA-IPT III stands. Consequently, PIATCO
should only be paid the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost
method.50 Pending the determination of just compensation, the Government shall pay the sum of P3
billion as the provisional amount of just compensation because there was no expedited means by which
the Government could immediately take possession of the NAIA-IPT III.
We also stated that the replacement cost method is only one of the factors to be considered in
determining just compensation. Equity should likewise be considered in determining just
compensation.
Fourth, we authorized the Government to perform acts essential to the operation of the NAIA-IPT III
as an international airport terminal once the writ of possession becomes effective. This authority
covers the repair, reconditioning, and improvement of the complex; maintenance of the existing facilities
and equipment; installation of new facilities and equipment; provision of services and facilities pertaining to
the facilitation of air traffic and transport; and other services that are integral to a modern-day international
airport. This is consistent with Section 4 of RA 8974 which provides that “the court shall immediately issue
to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the
project” upon fulfillment of certain conditions.
This ruling qualified the Court’s statement in its January 21, 2004 Resolution that “[f]or the Government to
take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.”
Nonetheless, we clarified that the title to the NAIA-IPT III shall pass to the Government only upon full
payment of the just compensation since the proffered value is merely a provisional determination of just
compensation.
Fifth, we ordered the RTC to complete its determination of just compensation within sixty (60) days from
finality of our decision since it was no longer possible for the RTC to determine just compensation within
sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint under Section 4 of RA 8974.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Sixth, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in appointing the commissioners. Neither Rule
67 of the Rules of Court nor RA 8974 requires the RTC to consult the parties in the expropriation
case prior to the appointment of commissioners. We also stated that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court shall apply insofar as it is consistent with RA 8974, the IRR, and the Court’s rulings
in Agan.
Considering that the expropriation proceedings were effectively suspended seven days after the
appointment of the commissioners, the parties may file their objections with the RTC within five
days from finality of the decision in accordance with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Seventh, there was no ground to order Judge Gingoyon’s inhibition since the Government failed to
show his alleged partiality.51cralawrednad
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders
dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:cralawlawlibrary
1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated
21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending
payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of
Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the
proffered value of the NAIA-IPT III facilities;
2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of
Possession, are authorized [to] start the implementation
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger
Terminal III project by performing the acts that are
essential to the operation of the said International Airport
Passenger Terminal project;
3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60)
days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just
compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the
qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this
Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the
commissioners decreed therein.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED.
Page 71

No pronouncement as to costs.52
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution dated February 1, 2006
On January 2, 2006, the Government, et al., filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Court’s
December 19, 2005 Decision.53 Asahikosan, Takenaka, and Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina also filed a motion
for leave to intervene and asked the Court’s reconsideration of its December 19, 2005
Decision.54cralawrednad
The Government raised the question of who — between PIATCO, on the one hand, and Takenaka and
Asahikosan, on the other — was the NAIA-IPT III’s builder. The Government informed the Court that
Takenaka and Asahikosan, as the unpaid contractors in the NAIA-IPT III project, claimed significant liens
on the NAIA-IPT III. The Government opined that it would end up expropriating the NAIA-IPT III with liens
and claims in excess of its actual value if the proffered value would be directly released to PIATCO.
As PIATCO’s unpaid creditors, Takenaka and Asahikosan intervened in the case. They relied on Mago v.
Court of Appeals55 as basis for their intervention. In that case, the Court took the extraordinary step of
allowing the motion for intervention even after the challenged order of the trial court had already become
final. On the other hand, Rep. Baterina invoked his prerogative as legislator and taxpayer to curtail the
payment of just compensation without any appropriation in PIATCO’s favor.
The Court denied the motions and held that the alleged liens over the NAIA-IPT III have not been judicially
established. Takenaka and Asahikosan were not parties to Gingoyon and did not present their claims
before the Court. The Court did not make any declaration regarding Takenaka and Asahikosan’s rights to
any form of compensation for the construction of the NAIA-IPT III.
Moreover, the Court did not recognize the London awards in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan. Under
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign judgment would not bind Philippine courts unless the
judgment is recognized and enforced in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts may annul a foreign judgment for
lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, clear mistake of law or fact, or when the
foreign judgment is contrary to public policy. Even assuming that PIATCO is indeed liable to other parties,
the creditors have other judicial avenues to ventilate and prove their claims against PIATCO.
The Court also categorically stated that PIATCO, as builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive just
compensation in accordance with law and equity before the Government may take over the NAIA-IPT III.
The Court likewise denied the motions for intervention for serious procedural errors. Under Section 2, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court, the motion to intervene should be filed before the court’s rendition of judgment,
and not after the resolution of the case. Moreover, Takenaka and Asahikosan failed to establish their legal
interest in the case since their claims against PIATCO have not been conclusively established in this
jurisdiction.56cralawrednad
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
E. Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876 after the Finality of the Gingoyon Case
1. The Appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an Independent Appraiser
On April 11, 2006, the RTC ordered the BOC to resume its duties. In compliance, the BOC
submitted its Inception Report and Inception Framework to the RTC. On April 24, 2007, the parties
and the BOC conferred to set the ground rules and procedure in determining the just
compensation due to the NAIA-IPT III.
On April 26, 2006, the Government asked the RTC to stop the payment of P3 billion proffered
value in view of an alleged supervening event – the collapse of the ceiling of the arrival lobby
section of the north side of the NAIA-IPT III on March 27, 2006. The Government claimed that the
collapse created a 100-square foot hole in the ceiling and caused heavy asbestos pipes to fall on
the floor of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government likewise informed the Court that the MIAA requested
the Association of Structural Engineers of the Philippines (ASEP) to investigate the cause of the
collapse.57 In its Final Report dated June 2006, the ASEP identified the following factors that
contributed to the collapse:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Incomplete design coordination as shown by the absence of detailed shop drawings
during the construction, an absence described as “unusual” for a BOT project of this
size
2. Wrong choice of ceiling and wall components and fixing materials, e.g., use of rivets
instead of clips, screws or wire; use of furring channels instead of stronger C channels;
use of wall angles thinner than required; and
3. Poor workmanship, e.g., uneven distribution and improper attachment of rivets, lack of
ceiling supports in the presence of mechanical fixtures.58
The ASEP concluded that the likely cause of the collapse was the “syncretic effect of all these
factors working over time since the construction of the ceiling.”59cralawrednad
Upon the BOC’s request,60 on May 5, 2006, the RTC ordered the engagement of the services of
an internationally accepted independent appraiser who shall conduct the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III.61cralawrednad
On May 23, 2006, the Government manifested that it engaged the services of: (a) TCGI Engineer
to determine the structural integrity of NAIA-IPT III; (b) Ove Arup & Partners Massachusetts, Inc.
(Ove Arup) to conduct a design and technical review of the NAIA-IPT III and to conduct a peer
review of TCGI Engineer’s methodology and test results; and (c) Gleeds International to
Page 72
determine the value of the NAIA-IPT III.62cralawrednad likewise shoulder the BOC’s expenses as intervenors in the case. 77cralawrednad

On June 20, 2006, the RTC ordered Land Bank to immediately release the amount of P3 billion to PIATCO.
The RTC ruled that the collapse of a portion of the NAIA-IPT III was not a supervening event that would
hinder the payment of the proffered value to PIATCO. In compliance with this order, the Government
tendered to PIATCO a P3 billion check on September 11, 2006. On the same day, the RTC reinstated
the writ of possession in favor of the Government.63cralawrednad
Thereafter, the Government and PIATCO submitted their list of nominees for the appointment of an
independent appraiser.64 On May 3, 2007, the RTC appointed DG Jones and Partners as independent
appraiser.65cralawrednad
On May 18, 2007, the RTC directed the Government to submit a Certificate of Availability of Funds to
cover DG Jones and Partners’ $1.9 Million appraisal fee. 66cralawrednad
The Government sought the reconsideration of the May 3 and 18, 2007 orders. The Government
complained that the appointment of an appraiser apart from those hired by the Government would result in
the unnecessary depletion of its funds since it would be compelled to pay two appraisers. 67cralawrednad
In response, PIATCO argued that the RTC has the inherent power to appoint an independent appraiser
pursuant to Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The RTC has wide discretion on how it shall
carry its mandate under RA 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.68cralawrednad
In an order dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained the appointment of DG Jones and
Partners. The RTC ruled that its power to appoint the members of the BOC under Section 5, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court includes the power to appoint an independent appraiser. 69cralawrednad
The Government directly challenged before the Court the May 3, May 18, and January 7, 2008 orders in a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 181892.70cralawrednad
On January 9, 2008, the Court issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the May
3 and 18, 2007 Orders as well as the January 7, 2008 Order. 71cralawrednad
2. The BOC’s Expenses
In an order dated March 11, 2011, the RTC ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the
BOC’s expenses. The RTC thus ordered each party to pay P1,750,000.00. PIATCO complied with
this order and paid the amount of P1,750,000.00 to the BOC.78cralawrednad
Takenaka and Asahikosan sought the partial reconsideration of this order. They argued that they
should not be made to pay the BOC’s expenses since “their prayer to defer the release of a
portion of the just compensation pending the conclusion of the enforcement proceedings was
addressed to the RTC [,] and not to the BOC.”79cralawrednad
F. The Parties and the BOC’s Appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III
After the Court issued the January 9, 2008 temporary restraining order, the parties and the
BOC conducted a preliminary conference on April 22, 2010, to adopt an alternative course of
action to avoid further delay in the determination of just compensation. 80cralawrednad
The Government manifested that it was ready to present its own valuation of the NAIA-IPT III and
other supporting evidence. PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan did not object to this
manifestation.81cralawrednad
On August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their appraisal reports of NAIA-IPT III
with supporting documents and affidavits.82 The Government appraised the NAIA-IPT III
at $149,448,037.00 while PIATCO concluded that its replacement cost was $905,867,549.47. On
the other hand, Takenaka and Asahikosan claimed that the NAIA-IPT III’s construction cost
amounted to $360,969,790.82.
1. The Government’s Appraisal
Based on the Gleeds Report dated November 15, 2010, the Government computed the valuation
of the NAIA-IPT III as follows: 83cralawrednad
December 2002 December 2004
CCV CCV

On June 15, 2006, the BOC filed a request for the release of a mobilization fund of P1,600,000.00 to Base valuation $USD @3Q01 $300,206,693 $300,206,693
support the discharge of its functions.72 The RTC approved the request and directed the Government and
PIATCO to equally share the BOC’s expenses.73The Government and PIATCO complied with this order Deterioration $USD @2Q09 $0 $1,738,318
and tendered the sum of P1,600,000.00 to the BOC.74cralawrednad
Depreciation $USD 3Q01 $0 $35,076,295
On November 24, 2009, the BOC requested additional funds in the amount of P5,250,000.00. 75 On
December 7, 2010, the RTC directed the Government and PIATCO to equally defray the BOC’s Total Base CCVs $USD $300,206,693 $263,392,081
expenses.76 The Government contested this order and insisted that Takenaka and Asahikosan should

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 73

Rectification for Contract Compliance $USD@2Q09 and accessible only through the multi-storey car park (20,465 m2), and
excess retail concession space (1,727 m 2);
Not compliant with bid documents -$30,670,894 -$30,670,894
4. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements
in the terminal buildings and multi-storey car park structures, as those
Inferior quality -$7,702,640 -$7,702,640
retrofits are described in Arup’s Drawings listed in Appendix ‘B’ Drawing List
2 and other rectification works required to bring the terminal to compliance
Additional areas to be built (63,490 m 2) -$75,570,510 -$75,570,510
with applicable building and airport codes (as indicated in the Appendices of
Arup’s Site Observation Report);
Total Contract Compliance -$113,944,044 -$113,944,044
5. The cost of completing the items listed in the JAC project status summary
Deductions $USD report of 28 February 2003;85 and
6. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements
Total CCVs $USD $186,262,649 $149,448,037
in the elevated roadway structures as those retrofits were described in Arup’s
Drawings listed in Appendix ‘B’ Drawing List 3, Arup Review on ‘TCGI Report
of Civil Design Review and Evaluation’ – Elevated Roadway, dated March
2009, and other rectification works required to bring the elevated roadways to
 $300,206,693.00 as base current cost valuation (CCV). Based on the Gleeds report, the compliance with applicable building and airport codes (as indicated in the
construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III as of December 2002 was $300,206,693.00, consisting of Appendices of Arup’s Site Observation Report).86
the cost of constructing the terminal building, aprons, car park, elevated roadways, and other
related items.

Gleeds appraised the NAIA-IPT III by “multiplying the structure’s dimensions (i.e., quantities) by
a price (i.e., rate) for constructing the works at a designated time and specific location, adding
the cost of works in, on, and around the structure, and then accounting for inferior and
nonperforming works, and rectification of those works.”84]
 Gleeds arrived at the CCV by considering the rates and prices for the third quarter of 2001,
which represented the midpoint of the construction period from June 2000 (the commencement
of construction) to December 2002 (the suspension of construction). It claimed that calculating
the cost of construction based on its midpoint was a recognized standard practice in the
construction industry. The base CCV excluded the following items:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Failed structural elements of the Terminal, as identified in the Arup Seismic
Evaluation Report and Gravity Loading and Element Capacity Assessment;
2. The inferior quality of material used and works, including floor tiling, plasterboard wall
finishes and ceilings, internal and external metal paneling;
3. Constructed areas that are unnecessary to the functioning of an international aiport
terminal and therefore of no benefit to the Republic. These areas identified in the Arup
Site Observation Report include areas where the requirements stated in the Bid
Documents have been grossly overprovided. They also include the multilevel retail
mall that, with its own internal circulation, is functionally separate from the Terminal
2. PIATCO’s Appraisal
 $263,392,081 as total base CCV as of December 2004. The Government asserted
that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from depreciation and deterioration in the sum of
US$36,814,612.00 from December 2002 until December 2004. The base value CCV at
the time of expropriation should be US$263,392,081.00 after deducting depreciation
and deterioration.
 $113,944,044 as total contract compliance deductions. The Government further
deducted items which were non-compliant with bid documents, including, among
others:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. FIDS monitors not flat screen
b. Moving walkways underprovision
c. Sun shading to external glazing
d. Lack of 400hz PC air to loading bridges
e. Completion of testing, commissioning, and operation of the facility
f. Provision of as-built documentation
The Government likewise deducted the replacement cost of inferior quality items and
additional areas that the Government had to build to finish the NAIA-IPT III project.87

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 74

PIATCO claimed that the total replacement value of the NAIA-IPT III as of December 31, 2010 amounted Interest from 21 Dec 2004 to 11 Sept 2006 104,014,531
to $905,867,550.00.

Interest from 12 Sept 2006 to 31 Dec 2010 331,402,193

Actual Costs @ Inflation
Base Valuation @ 2004
2002 Rate
Total Interests 435,416,724
I. Materials, Equipment and Labor
360,969,791 1.0971 396,019,958
Engineering & Procurement Total Replacement Value 905,867,550

II. Attendant Costs Less: Payment on 11 Sept 2006 59,438,604

Engineering and Architecture 19,372,539 1.0971 21,253,613

Amount Still Due 846,428,946
Quality Assurance 6,923,720 1.0971 7,596,013

Construction Supervision 4,302,227 1.0971 4,719,973

Computation of Interest in US Dollars
Construction Insurance 4,329,272 1.0971 4,749,644
Interest Amount in
Period No. of Days
Site Development 8,358,169 1.0971 9,169,747 Rates USD

Other Costs 308,985 1.0971 338,987 Replacement Cost (a) 470,450,825

Attendant Costs exclusive of

43,594,911 1.0971 47,827,977 Interests
Financing Costs

Financing Costs 26,602,890 26,602,890 From takeover of December 21 to

NAIA T3 on 21 Dec December 31, 12% 11 1,724,986
Total Attendant Costs 70,197,802 74,430,868 2004 2004

TOTAL 431,167,593 470,450,825 January 1 to

December 31, 12% 365 57,448,057
2005

In US Dollars January 1 to
September 11, 12% 254 44,881,488
REPLACEMENT COST 470,450,825 2006

Add: Total Interest from 21 December 2004 to 11

(1) 104,014,531
September 2006

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 75

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE AS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2006 (a) + (1)
Less: Amount Paid on 11 September 2006 (Php 3,002,125,000/50.508)
NET AMOUNT STILL DUE AS OF 11 SEPTEMBER
(b)
2006
574,465,356  $360,969,791 as base value. PIATCO adopted Takenaka and Asahikosan’s actual
construction cost of $360,969,791 which is supported by As-Built Drawings and Bills of
Quantities. PIATCO stated that the Japanese Airport Consultants (JAC), the quality
59,438,604
assurance inspector for the NAIA-IPT III project, validated the works of Takenaka and
Asahikosan. PIATCO alleged that the Government and PIATCO entered into a Quality
Assurance Agreement with JAC.88]
515,026,752

 Attendant costs. Under RA 6957 IRR, the replacement cost includes the “overhead
September 12 to and all other attendant costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place of
Additional Interests December 31, 12% 112 19,227,665 the affected improvements/structures.” The items under the attendant costs correspond
2006 to these “overhead and other attendant costs” which are necessary to construct an
airport project.89cralawrednad
January 1 to
December 31, 12% 365 65,000,954 It is necessary to hire quality assurance surveyors to check and monitor the work of
2007 Takenaka. PIATCO hired Pacific Consultants, Inc. as construction supervisor in the
NAIA-IPT III project. PIATCO claimed that the planning and design consultancy fees
are even below the international norms which are in the range of 8.5% to 11.5% of the
January 1 to
Construction Contract cost.90 Financing costs are also “attendant costs” because loans
December 31, 12% 366 73,109,155
and guarantees were obtained to finance the NAIA-IPT III project.91]
2008

 Conversion to 2004 values. Since the NAIA-IPT III shall be appraised at the time of
January 1 to
taking, the total construction cost shall be converted to December 21, 2004 values by
December 31, 12% 366 82,028,472
considering the inflation rate of 1.0971.92 Inflation was computed using the Consumer
2009
Price Index (CPI) from 2002 to 2005. The reckoning period was from November 29,
2002, when Takenaka and Asahikosan suspended their works in the NAIA-IPT III
January 1 to project, until December 21, 2004, when the Government filed a complaint for
December 31, 12% 366 92,035,946 expropriation.93]
2010
 Interests on replacement cost. The twelve (12%) interest rate shall be added to the
Additional Interests up to 31 December 2010 (2) 331,402,193 replacement cost pursuant to the principles of law and equity. 94 In Benguet
Consolidated v. Republic of the Philippines,95 the Court ruled that the property owner is
AMOUNT STILL DUE AS REPLACEMENT VALUE (b) + (2) 846,428,946 entitled to the payment of interest where the payment of compensation does not
accompany the taking of property for public use but is postponed to a later date. The
interest shall compensate for the Government’s delay in the payment of just
Replacement Cost 470,450,825 compensation.96

Total Interests (1+2) 435,416,724

3. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s Appraisal
TOTAL AMOUNT OF
905,867,550
REPLACEMENT VALUE On the other hand, Takenaka and Asahikosan, computed the NAIA-IPT III’s replacement cost as
follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 76

 In US dollars
Total payments of PIATCO 275,119,807.88
Add: Awards by the London Court 84,035,974.44
Award by the Makati Court 1,814,008.50
Total Construction Cost 360,969,790.82
 $360,969,790.82 as total construction cost. Takenaka and Asahikosan claimed that the initial
contract price for the construction of the NAIA-IPT III was $323,753,238.11. Thereafter, changes
were made in the course of the construction that increased its construction contract price.
Pursuant to the Onshore Construction and Offshore Procurement Contracts, PIATCO paid
Takenaka and Asahikosan the amounts of $231,312,441.28 and P1,796,102,030.84 (a total of
$275,119,807.88).
After PIATCO defaulted on its payments, Takenaka and Asahikosan instituted Claim Nos.
HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 in England. The London court ruled in their favor and awarded them
the amounts of $81,277,502.50, P116,825,365.34 and £65,000.00 or a total of $ 84,035,974.44.
Thereafter, they filed an action to enforce Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 before the RTC
of Makati which awarded them the sum of $1,814,008.50. 97
4. The BOC’s Appraisal
On March 31, 2011, the BOC submitted its Final Report recommending the payment of just compensation
of $376,149,742.56 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the time of the taking
of the property until the amount is fully paid, plus commissioner’s fees equivalent to 1% of the
amount fixed as part of the costs of the proceedings.
In arriving at the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III, the BOC proposed the following
computation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Formula In US Dollars
Amount paid by PIATCO to Takenaka and Asahikosan
275,119,807.88
Add:
Award in Claim No. HT-04-248 Relating to the Construction Cost of
14,827,207.0098cralawrednad
NAIA-IPT III
Award in Claim No. HT-05-269 Relating to the
52,007,296.5499
Construction Cost of NAIA-IPT III
341,954,311.42
Construction Cost of NAIA-IPT III
Add:
34,195,431.14
Attendant Cost (10% of the Construction Cost)
376,149,742.56
Replacement Cost of NAIA-IPT III
 $341,954,311.42. In computing the construction cost, all actual, relevant and attendant
costs for the construction of the NAIA-IPT III, including its market price, shall be
considered. The BOC divided the construction cost into: (a) the amount paid by
PIATCO to Takenaka and Asahikosan for the construction of NAIA-IPT III; and (b) the
awards by the London Court in Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 relating solely to
construction cost, excluding interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit. The BOC
relied on Takenaka and Asahikosan’s construction cost since these corporations
shouldered the actual cost of constructing the NAIA-IPT III.
 $34,195,431.14. According to the BOC, PIATCO failed to substantiate its attendant
costs. In pegging the attendant cost at 10% of the construction cost, the BOC relied on
the Scott Wilson Report, which states that the accepted industry range for architecture,
civil and structural, electrical and mechanical, quantity surveyor and project
management cost is 8.5% to 11.5% of the construction cost.
 Depreciation shall not be deducted from the construction cost. The BOC explained
that the inventory of materials comprising the NAIA-IPT III does not reflect its
replacement cost. Rather, it is the actual cost of replacing an existing structure with an
identical structure that is considered in the replacement cost method. For this reason,
depreciation shall not be deducted from the construction cost; otherwise, the NAIA-IPT
III would have been fully depreciated since the Government estimated that the
NAIA-IPT III’s useful life was only ten years.
 The replacement cost shall earn interest at 12% per annum from December 21,
2004, until full payment. The BOC stated that legal interests shall accrue from the time
of taking of the property until actual payment of just compensation. The delay in the
payment of just compensation is equivalent to a forbearance of money.
Page 77
  The commissioner’s fees shall be equivalent to 1% of just compensation. According to the The RTC rejected PIATCO, Takenaka, Asahikosan, and the BOC’s computation for lack of factual
BOC, the commissioner’s fees shall be equivalent to 1% of just compensation, similar to the and legal basis. The court criticized the BOC’s computation of construction cost and stated that
arbitrators’ fees. Commissioners and arbitrators perform similar responsibilities since both act as the BOC erroneously relied on the amounts allegedly paid by PIATCO to Takenaka and
independent and uninterested third parties in resolving difficult factual issues.100 Asahikosan. The RTC pointed out that PIATCO failed to present proof that it had indeed paid
Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of $275,119,807.88. The RTC further posited that the BOC
did not take into account the actual cost of the NAIA-IPT III at the time of taking which was in a
state of collapse and deterioration.
II. The RTC Rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876
The RTC stated that just compensation is limited to the value of the improvement at the time of the
filing of the expropriation complaint. The payment of just compensation does not include the right
to be compensated of the franchise to operate the airport, and the increased value of
A. The Main Decision
improvements due to inflation rate.
In a decision dated May 23, 2011, the RTC directed the Government, Takenaka, and Asahikosan to pay
the commissioners’ fees in the amount of P1,750,000.00 each; and ordered the Government to pay  $26,339,208.10. Similar to the BOC, the RTC pegged the attendant cost at 10% of the
PIATCO just compensation in the amount of $116,348,641.10. In determining the amount of just CCV at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint. The RTC agreed with the
compensation, the RTC adopted the following computation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary BOC that the computation of the attendant cost based on the 10% of the CCV was an
accepted industry practice.
Formula In US Dollars
 $59,438,604.00. After deducting the proffered value of $59,438,604.00, the RTC fixed
Just compensation as determined by the Republic the net compensation at $116,348,641.10, without interest. The RTC stated that no
149,448,037.00
Add: Attendant cost (10% of $263,992,081.00, CCV as of December 21, interest shall accrue on the net just compensation since the Concession Agreement
26,339,208.10
2004) was nullified by the Court in Agan.
175,787,245.10
Just Compensation
(59,438,604.00)
Less: Proffered value paid to PIATCO
116,348,641.10 The dispositive portion of the decision states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Net Just Compensation

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay

 $149,448,037.00. The RTC adopted the Government’s computed just compensation of
$149,448,037.00, and ruled that the Government should not pay for the portions of the NAIA-IPT
III that were defective. The RTC thus excluded the following from the computation of the
CCV:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) failed structural elements in the NAIA-IPT III;
(b) inferior quality of material works;
(c) constructed areas that are unnecessary to the use of an international airport terminal;
(d) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements;
(e) cost of completing the items listed in the JAC project status summary report of February 28,
2003; and
(f) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements in the elevated
roadway structures.
respondent PIATCO the amount of US$175,787,245.10 less the proffered
value (P3,002,125,000.00) actually paid to and received by defendant, as the
just compensation for the improvements of NAIA-IPT III.
Moreover, both plaintiff Republic and intervenors Takenaka and Asahikosan
Corporations are directed to pay their proportionate shares of the
Commissioners’ Fees in the amount of P1,750,000.00 each with dispatch.
Finally, insofar as both intervenors Takenaka and Asahikosan Corporations
are concerned, resolution of their claim before this Court is held in abeyance
owing to the pendency of the outcome of the appeal on certiorari before the
CA, and in any of their claims, as contractors are solely as against defendant
PIATCO.
SO ORDERED. 101

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 78


PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan immediately appealed the RTC’s decision before the CA while the
Government opted to seek partial reconsideration of the attendant costs awarded to
PIATCO.102cralawrednad
PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan sought to nullify the RTC decision for alleged violation of their right to
due process. They complained that they were only furnished copies of the BOC Final Report only after the
promulgation of the May 23, 2011 decision.103 They averred that the RTC violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court which provide that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the commissioners’
report on all interested parties, with notice that they be allowed ten days within which to file objections to
the findings of the report, if they so desire.104cralawrednad
The Government subsequently partially appealed the case to the CA after the RTC denied its motion for
partial reconsideration.105cralawrednad
B. The RTC’s Interlocutory Order on the Validity of the Escrow Accounts
The Government and the Creation of an Escrow Account for the Payment of Just CompensationOn
July 8, 2011, the Government filed a Manifestation and Motion106 with the RTC stating that it was ready
and willing to pay PIATCO, through an escrow account, the amount of $175,787,245.10 less the proffered
value of P3 billion.
The Government expressed its desire to exercise full ownership rights over the NAIA-IPT III. However, it
could not directly pay PIATCO who had various creditors – Takenaka, Asahikosan, and Fraport, among
them. The Government asserted that just compensation should only be paid to claimants who are legally
entitled to receive just compensation.
The Government thus asked the RTC’s leave to deposit the just compensation due in an escrow account
that shall be subject to the following conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The claimant(s) shall have been held to be entitled to receive the sum claimed from the “Just
8.1.Compensation (NAIA Terminal 3) Fund” in accordance with Philippine law and regulation, by a final,
binding and executory order or award of the expropriation court;
The claimant(s) shall have been held to have accepted or otherwise become subject to the
jurisdiction of the expropriation court and other relevant courts of the Republic of the Philippines, by
8.2.
reason of or in connection with the expropriation of NAIA Terminal 3 by the ROP, directly or
indirectly;
The claimant(s) shall have executed a valid and effective quitclaim in favor of the Republic of the
8.3.
Philippines acknowledging that claimant(s) against the ROP or any agency or instrumentality or
corporation of the ROP, by reason of, or in connection with, the expropriation of NAIA Terminal 3 by
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the ROP, directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever;
The claimant(s) has complied with in good faith any condition or undertaking required from
8.4.it/him/her by the expropriation court by reason of or in connection with the expropriation of NAIA
Terminal 3 by the ROP, directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever.107
The Government thus prayed:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Pending determination of the entitled claimants, to allow the
Government to deposit just compensation less the proffered value
in an escrow account with a reputable bank whose senior
unsecured obligations are rated at least ‘BBB’ by Standard and
Poor’s Investors Service, Inc. or ‘Baa2’ by Moody’s Service
Investors Service, Inc. to be designated by the RTC;
2. After depositing the amount in an escrow account, to confirm the
Government’s right to fully exercise any and all acts of ownership
over the NAIA-IPT III; and
3. To order the release of just compensation, or of any portion thereof
from the escrow account to the entitled claimants provided that the
entitled claimants have fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements set forth under paragraphs 8.1 to 8.4 of the
Manifestation and Motion.108
PIATCO opposed the Manifestation and Motion and argued that the Government could not vary
the terms of the May 23, 2011 Decision as well as the Court’s rulings
in Agan and Gingoyon commanding the Government to make a direct payment of just
compensation to PIATCO. It insisted that the offer to pay through an escrow account is not
equivalent to direct payment. PIATCO further denied the Government’s allegations that there
were several claimants on the just compensation.109cralawrednad
On the other hand, Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed with the Government that just
compensation should only be paid to entitled claimants. They posited that the Court’s directive in
Agan (with respect to the direct payment to PIATCO) was premised on the erroneous assumption
that PIATCO was the builder of the NAIA-IPT III. Takenaka and Asahikosan insisted that they
were the actual builders of the NAIA-IPT III. Nonetheless, they contended that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the Manifestation and Motion because the parties already filed their respective
Notices of Appeal before the CA.110cralawrednad
Page 79
The Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011In an Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011, the RTC IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, plaintiffs’ Manifestation and Motion is
granted the Manifestation and Motion. GRANTED in part:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC ruled that it has residual jurisdiction to adjudicate the Government’s Manifestation and Motion
considering that the motion was filed prior to the parties’ filing of the Notice of Appeal. The RTC opined that 1. Plaintiffs’ prayer for the court to determine who is/are legally
the Manifestation and Motion was akin to a motion for execution pending appeal. The Manifestation and entitled to receive just compensation is DENIED for lack of merit.
Motion showed the Government’s intent to voluntarily comply with the May 23, 2011 decision which was
pending appeal before the CA. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the RTC has the residual 2. Plaintiffs’ prayer that they be allowed to deposit the payment of just
power to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the parties’ rights, and to order the execution compensation (less the proffered value) to an escrow account is
of a decision pending appeal. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court provides that courts hereby GRANTED, provided that only the following conditions may
have incidental power to issue orders that are necessary to effectuate their judgments. be imposed for the release of the money
deposited:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC held that the creation of an escrow account conforms with the Court’s rulings in Gingoyon that
just compensation shall be paid in accordance with law and equity. Since the Government had no legal
obligation to create an escrow account, it could impose conditions for the release of just compensation in 1. PIATCO must submit a Warranty that the structures and
the escrow account, including: (a) PIATCO’s submission of a warranty that the NAIA-IPT III shall not be facilities of NAIA IPT III are free from all liens and
burdened by liens and encumbrances and an undertaking that PIATCO shall be solely liable for any claims encumbrances;
from third persons involving the NAIA-IPT III; and (b) PIATCO’s execution of a Deed of Conveyance of the
NAIA-IPT III in favor of the Government. Equity dictated that the Government’s payment of just 2. PIATCO must submit an Undertaking that it is assuming
compensation should free the NAIA-IPT III from liens and encumbrances. The Deed of Conveyance sole responsibility for any claims from third persons
should be without prejudice to the appellate court’s determination of just compensation. arising from or relating to the design or construction of
any structure or facility of NAIA IPT III structures, if any;
Conversely, PIATCO had likewise no legal obligation to accept or reject the Government’s offer of and
payment.

The RTC clarified that PIATCO is the sole entity entitled to receive the payment from the 3. PIATCO must submit a duly executed Deed transferring
Government. The RTC pointed out that the Court has remanded the Gingoyon case for the sole the title of the NAIA IPT III structures and facilities to the
purpose of determining the amount of just compensation to be paid to PIATCO. Republic of the Philippines, without however, prejudice
to the amount which will finally be awarded to PIATCO
Moreover, the Government did not raise the alleged dispute in the ownership of the NAIA-IPT III during the by the appellate court;
expropriation proceedings. The RTC stated that it could not take judicial notice of the allegation that
PIATCO was indebted to various creditors, apart from Takenaka and Asahikosan, since these alleged
creditors were not impleaded in the expropriation complaint. The Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the
Philippines are hereby jointly appointed [a]s the Escrow Agents for
The RTC likewise observed that compliance with the Government’s conditions under 8.1 and 8.3 for the the above purpose.
release of just compensation from the escrow account pending appeal was legally impossible. For this
reason, the payment through an escrow account was not the payment that would transfer the title of the Upon payment of the plaintiffs of the said just compensation in an
NAIA-IPT III to the Government. escrow account, this court recognizes the Republic of the
Philippines’ right to exercise full rights of ownership over the NAIA
The RTC lastly ruled that the payment of just compensation through an escrow account shall be payment IPT III structures and facilities in accordance [with] 2 (c).
of just compensation within a reasonable time. Consequently, the Government may exercise full rights of
ownership over the NAIA-IPT III upon the creation of an escrow account.111cralawrednad
3. Plaintiffs’ Formal Offer of Evidence and defendant PIATCO’s
The dispositive portion of this order provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Comment and Opposition thereto are NOTED.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 80

 4. Defendant PIATCO’s motion for reconsideration with plaintiffs’ In US dollars
comment/opposition of the order of this court denying the motion for
inhibition is hereby denied. Replacement Cost 300,206,693.00
Less: Proffered value paid to PIATCO (59,438,604.00)
Just Compensation as of September 11, 2006 240,768,035.00
SO ORDERED.112
Add: Interest Due as of July 31, 2013 130,658,653.24
Just Compensation as of July 31, 2013 371,426,742.24
The RTC subsequently denied PIATCO’s as well as Takenaka and Asahikosan’s respective motions for
partial reconsideration of the above-quoted order,113opening the way for PIATCO’s petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed with the CA.114 This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 123221. The CA justified its computation as follows:

III. The CA Rulings  $300,206,693.00 as Replacement Cost. Under Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR,
replacement cost shall consist of the construction and attendant costs.

A. CA-G.R. CV No. 98029 $300,206,693.00 as construction cost. The CA relied on the Gleeds Report which it
characterized as more “particularized, calculable and precise.”116 The Government’s
In a decision dated August 7, 2013,115 the CA upheld the validity of the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision. The construction cost did not vastly differ from the BOC and PIATCO’s computed
CA ruled that the parties did not need to be furnished the BOC Final Report since RA 8974 is silent on the construction costs of $341,954,311.42 and $360,969,791.00, respectively. But the BOC
appointment of the BOC, as held in Gingoyon. and PIATCO’s computed construction costs were unreliable since they lacked detailed
proof that the quoted amounts were directly related to the construction of NAIA-IPT III.
However, the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own formula of the NAIA-IPT III’s replacement
cost, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary $0 as attendant cost. The CA stated that there was no need to award additional
attendant costs since these costs had already been included in the Government’s
Construction Cost computations under the heading “General Requirements and Conditions.” The inclusion
of attendant cost in the construction cost was justified since the attendant cost becomes
Add: Attendant Cost part of the total construction cost once the construction of a project is completed. Based
on the Bills of Quantities, the Government provided the following detailed list of
= Replacement Cost attendant costs in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III:

Add: Equity
Attendant Cost In US Dollars
Just Compensation
Design 6,439,680
Substituting:
Staff and labour 10,491,139.54
$300,206,693.00 + 0 (because attendant cost already imputed in
Replacement Cost =
construction cost)
Insurance 925,210.78
$300,206,693.00 + 6% interest from December 21, 2004 to September 11,
=2006 less $59,438,604.00 + 6% interest from September 12, 2006 until PI Insurance 2,200,000.00
finality of judgment

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 81

 Consequential Loss 800,000.00 NAIA-IPT III in 2002 was $300,206,693.00, its replacement cost in 2004 should be
equal to or higher than $300,206,693.00.
Setting out 364,647.00
 Interest. The CA further held that interest shall be added to just compensation as of
Health and safety 403,224.00 September 11, 2006. Citing Gingoyon, the CA explained that law and equity dictated
that the Government shall be liable for legal interests as a result of the delay in the
payment of just compensation to PIATCO. Since there was no stipulation on interests,
Enviro Management 176,490.00
the CA fixed the interest rate at 6%. Upon finality of the judgment, the interest shall be
6% until fully paid. As of July 31, 2013, the CA computed the interest as follows:
Design 2,631,100.00

In US Dollars
Staff and labour 2,590,774.19

Insurance 71,109.77 Interest from December 21, 2004 to December 21, 2005
18,012,401.58
$300,206,693*6%
Total 25,293,376.28117
Interest from December 22, 2005 to September 11, 2006
13,225,544.17
$300,206,693*6%*268 days/365 days
The CA likewise observed that PIATCO’s summarized computation of attendant costs was self-serving
and unsubstantiated by relevant evidence. On the other hand, the BOC and the RTC’s computation of Interest from September 12, 2006 to September 12, 2012
attendant costs at 10% of the construction cost lacked factual and legal support. Pegging attendant costs 86,676,492.60
$240,768,035*6%*6 years
at 10% of the construction cost was only relevant during the pre-construction stage since the costs of the
construction at that time could only be estimated. This estimate carried no relevance at the
Interest from September 13, 2012 to July 31, 2013
post-construction stage since the total construction costs, including the attendant costs, could already be 12,744,214.89
$240,768,035*6%*322 days/365 days
determined.

Total Interest as of July 31, 2013 130,658,653.24

 Depreciation, costs for noncompliance with contract specifications, and unnecessary
areas of NAIA-IPT III shall not be deducted from the replacement cost. The CA reversed
the RTC’s finding that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from massive structural defect. The CA opined
The CA further ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the expenses of the BOC. Since
that the collapse of the portion of the NAIA-IPT III merely relates to “finishing” rather than to
Takenaka and Asahikosan’s inputs on the construction costs of the NAIA-IPT III were heard by the
“structural” defects. In construction lingo, “finishing” pertains to aesthetics, convenience, and
RTC, they should share in the expenses of the BOC.
functionality of a built structure while “structural” refers to the very integrity and stability of the
built structure.
The CA likewise denied Takenaka and Asahikosan’s prayer to set aside in an escrow account a
portion of the just compensation corresponding to the amounts owed them by PIATCO. RA 8974
The CA disagreed with the RTC’s conclusion that depreciation, costs for non-compliance with
expressly provides that the Government shall directly pay the property owner upon the filing of the
contract specifications, and unnecessary areas of the NAIA-IPT III, shall be excluded from the
complaint as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession.
computation of construction cost. Depreciation should not be deducted since it merely measures
the book value of the property or the extent of use of the property. Depreciation is inconsistent
The dispositive portion of the CA decision provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
with the replacement cost method since the replacement cost merely measures the cost of
replacing the structure at current market price at the time of taking.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Just
Furthermore, the market price of a building increases over time; thus, if the construction cost of compensation is fixed at US$300,206,639.00 less US $59,438,604.00 paid in
September 2006 or the net sum of US$240,768,035.00 with legal interest at

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 82

 6% computed as above. The Republic is thus ordered to pay PIATCO just
compensation as herein determined and which sum has reached the total of US
$371,426,688.24 as of 31 July 2014.
Upon finality of judgment, interest on the sum due by then shall be at 12% until fully
paid.
IT IS SO ORDERED.118
On August 22, 2013, the CA amended its decision in view of the BSP’s recent issuance, BSP Circular No.
799, series of 2013, which took effect on July 1, 2013. BSP Circular No. 799 lowered the legal interest rate
on loan or forbearance of money, goods or credit to 6% per annum.119 The CA amended decision
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Just compensation is fixed
at US $300,206,639.00 less US $ 59,438,604.00 paid in September 2006 or the net
sum of US$240,768,035.00 with legal interest at 6% computed as above. The
Republic is thus ordered to pay PIATCO just compensation as herein determined and
which sum has reached the total of $371,426,688.24 as of 31 July 2013.
Upon finality of judgment, interest on the sum due by then shall be at 6% per
annum until fully paid pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799, series of 2013 which
took effect on 01 July 2013, and which effectively modified the interest rate
rulings in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Eastern Shipping was
the basis of the Court’s earlier imposition of a 12% interest from finality of
judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.120 [Emphasis supplied]
The CA likewise denied the Government’s, PIATCO’s, Takenaka’s, and Asahikosan’s motions for partial
reconsideration in a resolution dated October 29, 2013.121cralawrednad
The CA’s denial of their motions cleared the way for the elevation of CA-G.R. CV No. 98029 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari. The Government, PIATCO, and Takenaka and Asahikosan’s
consolidated petitions are docketed as G.R. Nos. 209917, 209731, and 209696, respectively.
B. CA-G.R. SP No. 123221
In a decision dated October 18, 2014, the CA reversed the Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011, for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. Parenthetically, the Omnibus Order dated 11 October
2011 and Order dated 5 December 2011 of the Pasay City RTC, Branch 117,
in Civil Case No. 04-0876-CFM for Expropriation, are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.122
IV. The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case No. 06-171
On February 27, 2006, Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an action to enforce the London awards in
Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-171.123cralawrednad
In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC recognized the validity of the London
awards in Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and declared these awards as enforceable in
the Philippine jurisdiction. The RTC thus ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan the
sum of $85.7 million.124cralawrednad
PIATCO appealed the case to the CA125cralawred which affirmed the RTC rulings in a decision
dated March 13, 2012.126 The CA likewise denied PIATCO’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated May 31, 2012.127cralawrednad
PIATCO responded by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the CA’s
ruling. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 202166 and is still pending before the Court
separately from the present petitions.
To summarize, the cases pending before the Court are the consolidated cases: G.R. Nos. 209917,
209696, 209731, and 181892, and G.R. No. 202166 as a separate case.
G.R. No. 209917 is the Government’s petition for review on certiorari128 to partially reverse the
CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision129 and its October 29, 2013 Resolution130 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 98029.
G.R. No. 209696 is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Takenaka and Asahikosan to partially
reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and its October 29, 2013 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.131cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209731 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari to reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013
Amended Decision, and October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029.132cralawrednad
G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731 originally arose from the Government’s complaint for
Page 83
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III filed with the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876. The
main issue before the Court in these petitions is the valuation of the just compensation due for the
Government’s expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 181892 is the Government’s petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order,133 assailing the May 3, 2007, May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008 orders of the RTC of
Pasay City, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876.134cralawrednad
This petition likewise arose from the Government’s complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. The
main issue in this petition is the propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 202166 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari135 to assail the CA’s March 13, 2012
decision136 and May 31, 2012 Resolution137 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96502. The petition arose from Takenaka
and Asahikosan’s action to enforce the London awards before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 in Civil Case
No. 06-171. As previously mentioned, this case was not consolidated with the four (4) cases above and
shall thus be separately ruled upon by the Court.
V. The Parties’ Positions
A. The Government’s Position (G.R. Nos. 209917, 209731, and 209696)
G.R. No. 209917
In G.R. No. 209917, the Government asks the Court to partially reverse the CA rulings and to deduct
from the replacement cost of US$300,206,693.00 the following items: (a) depreciation in the amount of
US$36,814,612.00; and (b) PIATCO’s non-compliance with contract specifications in the amount of
US$113,944,044.00. The Government also refutes the CA’s imposition of a legal interest on just
compensation.
The Government asserts that the CA did not consider equity in computing the replacement cost of the
NAIA-IPT III. Contrary to the Court’s pronouncement in Gingoyon, the CA computed just compensation
based solely on RA 8974 and its IRR. The CCV of $300,206,639.00 only reflects the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III as of November 2002 when PIATCO stopped the construction of the terminal, and did not
take into account other factors that lowered its valuation as of December 2004.
The Government posits that there are two standards in measuring the replacement cost. The
implementing rules of RA 8974 failed to provide a complete formula to arrive at the replacement cost of an
expropriated property.
The first and common standard is the depreciated replacement cost method which measures the cost
of replacing an asset at current prices but in its actual condition, i.e., adjusted for age, wear and tear.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting defines depreciated replacement cost
as “a method of valuation which provides the current cost of replacing an asset with its modern
equivalent asset less deductions for all physical deterioration and all relevant forms of
obsolescence and optimization” and as “the replacement value of property minus physical
depreciation and obsolescence; insurance adjusters estimate the actual cash value of property
based on its depreciated replacement cost.”138cralawrednad
In other words, depreciated replacement cost adjusts the cost of replacing the actual asset in
accordance with the asset’s age in order to take into account the lower economic utility of an asset
that is not brand new. As an asset ages, higher economic cost is required to maintain that asset to
the level of utility of a brand new one.
The second and less common standard is the new replacement cost method which measures
the cost of replacing an asset at current prices with no adjustment for age, wear, and tear. It refers
to “the cost to replace damaged property with like property of the same functional utility without
regard to depreciation (physical wear and tear) and obsolescence.”139cralawrednad
The Government asks the Court to adopt the depreciated replacement cost method where
depreciation is deducted from the replacement cost. The Government asserts that it is an
internationally accepted practice to consider depreciation and other forms of obsolescence and
optimization in measuring the replacement cost of an asset.
The Government argues that the new replacement cost method usually applies in cases where
the property must be rebuilt. For example, an insurance policy for a house would usually use the
new replacement cost method because a house, which was destroyed by fire or other natural
disaster, must be rebuilt. On the other hand, an insurance policy for an automobile would use the
depreciated replacement cost because it presupposes that a new automobile must be purchased
to replace the old automobile that suffered from wear and tear.
The Government disputes the CA’s opinion that the replacement cost cannot be lower than the
actual construction because market prices tend to move upward over time. The Government
contends that the replacement cost may be lower than the construction cost if the price of the
materials such as steel, cement, and copper used during the construction stage decreases after
the construction of the improvement. Moreover, labor productivity and technological
advancements affect the replacement cost since these counter-balance inflation. The depreciated
replacement cost method is utilized “in setting user rates for public utilities precisely because this
standard of value will tend to result in lower prices over time, not higher prices.”140cralawrednad
The Government likewise disagrees with the CA that the depreciation adjustment “would
irrationally result in [a] book value which continues to be lower and lower over time.” Since an
asset must be maintained, the cost of performing maintenance and repairs increases the asset’s
replacement cost. Consequently, repairs and maintenance cost counter-balance depreciation.
The recognition that an asset depreciates impliedly acknowledges that the owner will spend more
costs in maintaining the asset’s utility than on a brand new asset.
Page 84

The Government agrees with the CA that depreciation is a cost allocation method and not a valuation
method. However, the Government stresses that depreciation is also an economic cost; depreciation thus
recognizes that an asset suffers from wear and tear and would require higher cost to maintain an asset’s
economic utility. Depreciation, as both economic and accounting concepts, represents cost adjustments to
reflect the fair value of the asset due to age, wear, and tear.
The Government adds that the premise of the replacement cost method is “to measure the cost of
replacing an asset at current prices with an asset that has the same economic utility.”141 Thus, the CA
erred when it held that the depreciation adjustment was inconsistent with the replacement cost method for
the reason that this method factors in the current market price to measure the cost of replacing an asset.
For instance, if the Government would expropriate a ten-year-old automobile, the new replacement cost
method would compensate the owner the amount of an asset that has more economic utility than the
ten-year-old automobile. On the other hand, if the Government would use the depreciated replacement
cost method, it would only pay the value of an asset that has economic utility of a ten-year-old automobile.
The Government likewise insists that the CA erred in not deducting from the replacement cost the
construction costs for deviations from the original contract, the inappropriate and defective structures, and
structures that were built in violation of international standards. It asserts that the NAIA-IPT III suffers from
structural defects, as evidenced by the following:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the August 2007 Site Observation Report, Ove Arup found that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from
(a)
structural defects.
(b)In its Scott Wilson Report, PIATCO admitted that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from structural defects.
The relevant portions of the Report provide:
Section 3.3.23. The cracking noted in the 2004 report at the upper storey beam/column interface
appears to have worsened particularly in the outer faces of a number of columns at high level
adjacent to the internal ramps.
Section 3.3.37. As far as the building structure is concerned the outstanding issues are the Taking
Over Inspection Defects List, outstanding Quality Observation Report issues and the
Non-Compliance Schedule x x x.142
(c)The ASEP made the following observation in its June 23, 2006 Report:
 Results of material tests carried out identified that the materials used were adequate and
meet or exceed the ER specification. However, the thickness of the wall angle used (0.4
mm) does not meet the minimum plate thickness for metals to be fastened by
power-actuated anchors, which requires a minimum of 0.6 mm (Hilti Catalogue). ASEP
recommended further tests.
 ASEP considered that the quality of workmanship of the installation is not considered to be
within minimum acceptable practice.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
 Structural design of the ceiling system provided by Takenaka and independently assessed
by ASEP concluded that the factor of safety of individual components is high. However,
ASEP stated that the overall factor of safety of the total ceiling system is expected to be
lower due to poor workmanship of the connections. The positioning of the air-conditioning
ducts, fire protection system pipes, and other systems above the ceiling has affected the
standard spacing of the ceiling hangers and may have contributed to the uneven
distribution of loads to the various ceiling components, although without some of the
riveted joints failing, the ceiling hangers are still adequate.
 ASEP concluded that a combination of poor workmanship and wrong choice of system in
some areas particularly if repeated access is required for inspection and maintenance.143
In its June 23, 2006 Report, the ASEP opined that the NAIA-IPT III may be partially opened provided
(d)that retrofitting works are done prior to its full operation. Thus, the MIAA initiated the structural
remediation program of the NAIA-IPT III.144
TCGI documented the “heaving of homogenous tiles and cracks underneath the slabs in the head
house airline lounges (Level 3, Sector 4),”145attributable to the 5.4 magnitude earthquake that hit
(e)
Lingayen, Pangasinan, on November 27, 2008. The earthquake was felt in Pasay with a 3.0
magnitude. PIATCO failed to refute TCGI’s findings.146
The Government insists that the operation of the NAIA-IPT III is not an implied admission of the
nonexistence of structural defects. The Government clarifies that the structurally defective sectors
of the NAIA-IPT III remain unoccupied. Out of the 10 Sectors of the NAIA-IPT III, the MIAA fully
occupies Sectors 1, 3, 5, and 6, and partially occupies Sectors 2 and 4. The MIAA did not occupy
Sections 7, 8, 9, and the car park due to structural issues.
That the Court declared the PIATCO contracts as null and void should not impede the deductibility
of construction costs for deviations from the original contract, the inappropriate and defective
structures, and structures that were built in violation of international standards. The Government
emphasizes that when the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts, the NAIA-IPT III was almost
complete. Consequently, the Government had every reason to expect that PIATCO would build
the NAIA-IPT III according to the agreed specifications. PIATCO, however, acted in bad faith in
not complying with the nullified PIATCO contracts. PIATCO should not benefit from its violation of
the concession agreements and the gross deviations from the original design of the NAIA-IPT III.
The Government maintains that the imposition of legal interest on just compensation is erroneous.
First, the present expropriation case is sui generis. The Government was forced to expropriate the
NAIA-IPT III due to PIATCO’s violation of the Constitution and the law. To award legal interest to
PIATCO is to condone its illegal acts. In Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,147 the Court held that the
illegality should not be rewarded. In Valderama v. Macalde,148 the Court deleted the payment of
interest on the ground that a person should not be allowed to profit from an illegal act. As between
two parties, he who, by his acts, caused the loss shall bear the same. He, who comes to court for
Page 85
equity must do so with clean hands.
Second, PIATCO itself caused the delay of the expropriation proceedings before the RTC. PIATCO did not
produce the vouchers, purchase orders, and as-built documents which were in its possession despite the
Government’s filing of a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents dated May 25, 2006, before
the RTC.149cralawrednad
Third, in Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA,150 the Court pronounced that unliquidated claims are not subject to
legal interest, such as the present case.
Fourth, the law and jurisprudence on the imposition of interest does not address the peculiar situation
where the NAIA-IPT III is being expropriated as a direct result of the nullification of the PIATCO contracts.
The application of the law and jurisprudence on the imposition of interest would not result in a fair and
equitable judgment for the Government. The Court must apply equity in the absence of a specific law
applicable in a particular case or when the remedy afforded by the law would be inadequate to address the
injury suffered by a party.
The Government additionally complains that, since November 2002, “long before the institution of the
expropriation [complaint] in December 2004,” Takenaka and Asahikosan prevented it from entering the
NAIA-IPT III.151cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209696
The Government alleges that it is willing to pay just compensation to the lawful claimant. However, just
compensation should not be set aside in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan since their claim against
PIATCO has not yet been resolved with finality.
The Government disputes the applicability of Calvo v. Zandueta152 in the present case. In that case, the
Court allowed Juana Ordoñez to be subrogated to Aquilino Calvo as defendant because Ordoñez obtained
a final judgment in her favor which entitled her to levy the land sought to be expropriated. Furthermore,
Ordoñez was not a party to the expropriation case.
The Government asserts that Takenaka and Asahikosan should share in the BOC’s expenses. Under
Section 12, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the rival claimants should shoulder their costs in litigating their
claim while the property owner should shoulder the costs of the appeal if he appeals the case and the
appellate court affirms the lower court’s judgment.
To divide the BOC’s expenses between the Government and PIATCO would result in unjust enrichment.
Under Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, the court shall have the power to divide the costs of an
action as may be equitable.
Furthermore, Takenaka and Asahikosan actively participated in and benefited from the proceedings before
the BOC, which included the London awards in the computation of just compensation. Takenaka and
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Asahikosan likewise relied on the Final Report in their Appellant’s Brief dated October 3, 2012,
and in their Reply Brief dated January 20, 2013.
The Government contends that Takenaka and Asahikosan’s computations of actual construction
cost of the NAIA-IPT III are conflicting.
In their Manifestation dated December 9, 2010, Takenaka and Asahikosan stated that the actual
construction cost amounted to $360,969,790.82. However, in his report, Mr. Gary Taylor
appraised the actual construction cost at US$323 million, “plus other costs that were incurred by
various parties during its conception and construction plus any property appreciation.”153 Mr. Gary
Taylor further stated that the “true value of the NAIA-IPT III facility is nearer to US$408 million,
given the fact that the Republic’s expert, Gleeds, failed to recognize or include any values for [the]
design and other consultants (10%) or property inflation based on GRP schedules
(15%).”154 However, Mr. Taylor did not explain how he arrived at the amount of $408 million.
The Government adds that Takenaka and Asahikosan’s actual construction cost of
$360,969,790.82 is erroneous as the London and Makati awards include interests, attorney’s fees
and costs of litigation. Furthermore, Takenaka and Asahikosan’s “as-built” drawings are not truly
“as-built.” The drawings do not reflect the quality and exact detail of the built portions of the
NAIA-IPT III.155cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209731
The Government disputes PIATCO’s claim that it was denied due process when it was not
furnished a copy of the Final Report. The Government points out that all the parties in the case
were not given a copy of the Final Report. Furthermore, PIATCO belatedly raised this issue; it was
brought for the first time on appeal before this Court.
The Government also emphasizes that PIATCO immediately filed a notice of appeal a day after its
receipt of the RTC decision. This is contrary to PIATCO’s claim that it wanted to secure a copy of
the Final Report and subject it to clarificatory hearing.
Even assuming that the RTC erred in not furnishing the parties copies of the Final Report, the
lapse is merely an “innocuous” technicality that should not nullify the RTC rulings.
The Government claims that PIATCO failed to substantiate the attendant costs. The documents
attached to the Compliance dated December 14, 2010, are mostly summary of payments that
PIATCO allegedly paid to the consultants. However, PIATCO failed to prove that the alleged
consultants rendered actual service related to the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. Reyes
Tacandong & Co. merely verified the mathematical accuracy of the schedules, including the
computation of the inflation rate. Furthermore, the receipts that PIATCO submitted are not enough
to cover its claimed just compensation.156cralawrednad
Page 86
 G.R. No. 181892
The Government disputes the RTC’s appointment of an independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III. It
claims that Section 11 of RA 8974 IRR solely authorizes the implementing agency to engage the
services of an appraiser in the valuation of the expropriated property, while under Section 10 of RA 8974
IRR, it is the implementing agency that shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or
structures on the land to be acquired using the replacement cost method. Pursuant to these provisions, the
Government engaged the services of Gleeds, Ove Arup and Gensler for purposes of appraising the
NAIA-IPT III.
The Government also argues that the appointment of an independent appraiser would only duplicate the
efforts of the existing appraisers. A court-appointed appraiser and the existing appraisers would perform
the same task of determining the just compensation for the NAIA-IPT III. Thus, the RTC should have relied
instead on the opinion of the internationally-renowned appraisers that the Government hired.
The Government likewise avers that the appointment of an independent appraiser would only render the
expropriation proceedings more costly. The Government would be forced to pay for the services of two
appraisers, which is not the intention of RA 8974. The court-appointed appraiser, too, would render the
BOC’s functions useless. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it is the BOC that is required to receive
evidence in the determination of just compensation. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court does not require the
appointment of an appraiser in eminent domain cases.
Lastly, the Government complains that the RTC order requiring it to submit a Certificate of Availability of
Funds is vague because the RTC did not specify the costs of the expropriation
proceeding.157cralawrednad
B. PIATCO’s Position
G.R. No. 209731
PIATCO argues that the RTC rulings are null and void for the failure of the RTC clerk of court to furnish
them copies of the BOC Final Report. Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court require that the
parties be given ten days within which to file their objections to the findings of the commissioners.
On its base value of $360,969,790.82, PIATCO insists that its valuation is supported by a preponderance
of evidence, particularly by the As-Built Drawings and the Bills of Quantities submitted by Takenaka and
Asahikosan. The CA should not have relied on the Government’s self-serving evidence in computing the
base value of the NAIA-IPT III.
PIATCO also cites the CA’s failure to include the attendant costs in the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III as an
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
omission; the CA merely recognized the construction cost valuation of the terminal pursuant to the
Gleeds Report. PIATCO alleges that it incurred attendant costs of $70,197,802.00 apart from the
construction cost of $360,969,790.82. It also emphasizes that its consultancy fees are even below
the international norms, as shown in the Scott Wilson Report. It also claims that site preparation
costs, legal costs in planning and constructing the development, and financing costs form part of
attendant costs since these costs are indispensable in completing a complex infrastructure project.
PIATCO further alleges that its attendant costs are supported by the attachments in its
Compliance dated December 14, 2010, including the summary of payments for incurred attendant
costs, official receipts, statements of account, sales invoices, endorsements, insurance policies
and other related documents, acknowledgement receipts, agreements, invoices, and bonds. It
claims that Reyes Tacandong & Co examined these documents and confirmed that the attendant
costs amount to $70,197,802.00 in its Report of Factual Findings dated December 14, 2010.
PIATCO asserts that its submission of the summary computation is justified under Section 3 (c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which allows the party to submit non-original copies if the original
consist of numerous accounts or other documents that the court cannot examine without great
loss of time; the fact sought to be established from these, after all, is only the general result of the
whole.
PIATCO likewise argues that the total construction cost of $431,167,593.00 – which is the sum of
$360,969,791.00 and $70,197,802.00 – should be converted to 2004 values since the reckoning
period of just compensation is the date of taking or the date when the complaint was filed,
whichever is earlier. It posits that the amount of $431,167,593.00 should thus be multiplied by
1.0971 – the prevailing inflation rate from November 29, 2002, to December 21, 2004 – for a total
amount of $470,450,825.00.
The sum of $470,450,825.00 should further earn an interest rate of 12% per annum beginning
December 21, 2004, until full payment. PIATCO maintains that the Government’s deposit in an
escrow account of a portion of just compensation is not equivalent to payment; hence, interest on
the full amount of just compensation shall continue to apply.
PIATCO contends that the CA’s reduction of interest rate to 6% is erroneous because the Court,
in numerous cases, has consistently imposed 12% interest per annum on just compensation.
PIATCO emphasizes that the imposition of interest on just compensation is not based on contract,
but on the owner’s right to be immediately paid just compensation.
Finally, PIATCO prays that it be paid all income generated from the operations of the NAIA-IPT III,
from the date of taking up to the present.158cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209917
PIATCO asserts that the NAIA-IPT III does not suffer from massive structural defects; that the
Page 87
Government’s reliance on the Ove Arup Report is self-serving. The Government would not have
expropriated the NAIA-IPT III if it truly believed that the terminal suffered from massive structural defects.
Furthermore, the MIAA’s Project Management Office oversaw the construction of the NAIA-IPT III to
ensure that the terminal complied with the agreed specifications under the relevant contracts between
PIATCO and the Government.
PIATCO contends that the depreciation, deterioration, and costs for non-compliance with contract
specifications should not be deducted from the base value of the NAIA-IPT III. The base value of
$300,206,693.00 should be the least amount that the Government should pay. The measure of just
compensation is the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained by the property owner, not the gain that
would accrue to the condemnor.
PIATCO also asks this Court to strike from the record the affidavit of Kaczmarek and other attachments in
the Government’s motion for partial reconsideration dated August 22, 2013. The Government should not
be allowed to present new evidence on the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III before the CA. PIATCO points out
that Kaczmarek was not cross-examined and his identity, knowledge, and credibility were not established
before the trial court. The Government is estopped from introducing new evidence before the appellate
court since it objected to Takenaka and Asahikosan’s introduction of new and additional evidence before
the CA.
As its last point, PIATCO posits that Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR does not allow the deduction of
depreciation, deterioration, and costs for non-compliance with contract specifications from the replacement
cost. Depreciation is merely an accounting concept that facilitates the standard of decreasing asset values
in the books of accounts. It is not a method of valuation, but of cost allocation; an asset may still be
valuable and yet appear fully depreciated in the financial statements. If at all, depreciation was only
relevant after the Government took possession and operated the NAIA-IPT III.159cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209696
PIATCO agrees with the CA that just compensation must be directly paid to it as the owner of the
NAIA-IPT III. It stresses that RA 8974 and its implementing rules clearly provide that the owner of the
expropriated property shall receive the entire amount of just compensation.
PIATCO insists that it would be erroneous to create an escrow account in favor of Takenaka and
Asahikosan since the enforceability of Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 in Philippine jurisdiction has
yet to be decided by the Court in G.R. No. 202166. It points out that the main issue in G.R. Nos. 209731,
209917, and 209696 is the amount of just compensation, not the determination of Takenaka and
Asahikosan’s money claims against PIATCO. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s insistence to enforce their
money claims against PIATCO in G.R. Nos. 209731, 209917 & 209696 constitutes forum shopping and is
still premature.
PIATCO contends that Takenaka and Asahikosan have no standing to demand the creation of an escrow
account in their favor. Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court does not apply in this case because there
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
are no conflicting claims regarding the ownership of the NAIA-IPT III. Furthermore, the Court
categorically stated in Gingoyon that PIATCO owns the NAIA-IPT III.
PIATCO further argues that the rules on preliminary attachment do not apply to this case. Mere
apprehension that PIATCO would abscond from its financial liabilities is not a ground for the
attachment of the creditor’s assets. Moreover, an artificial entity cannot abscond. PIATCO
likewise denies that it refuses to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan’s money claims. PIATCO posits
that the eminent domain case is not the proper venue for the adjudication of Takenaka and
Asahikosan’s money claims.160cralawrednad
G.R. No. 181892
PIATCO agrees with the RTC’s appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function. The trial
court’s power to appoint commissioners is broad enough to include the power to appoint an
appraiser who shall assist the commissioners in ascertaining the amount of just compensation.
The latter power is inherent in the court’s task to receive evidence and to arrive at a fair valuation
of the expropriated property. Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court allows the court to
amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them consistent with law and justice.
Furthermore, nothing in RA 8974 IRR that prohibits the trial court from appointing an independent
appraiser.
Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that all parties may introduce evidence on the
valuation of the property sought to be expropriated. The trial court is not bound by the report of the
commissioners and of the independent appraisers, much less of the findings of the
Government-hired appraisers.
PIATCO asserts that the Government is estopped from assailing the appointment of an
independent appraiser. The Government voluntarily participated in the nomination of an
independent appraiser, and in fact, submitted its own nominees before the trial court.
Contrary to the Government’s claim, the RTC did not arbitrarily appoint DG Jones and Partners as
an independent appraiser. The RTC in fact required the nominees to submit their written
proposals and invited them to personally appear before the commissioners and the trial court prior
to the issuance of the May 3, May 18, and January 7, 2008 orders.
PIATCO argues that the Government should solely bear the expenses of DG Jones and Partners.
Section 12, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that all costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the
property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the
owner.161cralawrednad
Page 88
 C. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s Positions
G.R. No. 209696 and G.R. No. 209731
Takenaka and Asahikosan argue that law and equity dictate that just compensation of at least
$85,700,000.00 should be set aside to answer for their money claims against PIATCO. RA 8974 does not
prohibit the creation of an escrow account pending the determination of the parties’ conflicting claims on
the property and on the just compensation.
Takenaka and Asahikosan allege that PIATCO is a shell corporation with no significant assets, that has
repeatedly defaulted on its monetary obligations. They emphasize that PIATCO did not pay Takenaka and
Asahikosan despite its receipt of the P3 billion proffered value from the Government. Takenaka and
Asahikosan seek the creation of an escrow account to preserve their property rights against PIATCO.
They posit that PIATCO may abscond after its receipt of the remaining just compensation from the
Government.
PIATCO would profit by at least $155,000,000.00 if it solely receives the entire amount of
$431,167,593,000.00 (PIATCO’s claimed just compensation as of December 2002). PIATCO has judicially
admitted that it has paid Takenaka and Asahikosan only $275,000,000.00.
Takenaka and Asahikosan assert that the interest of justice will be served if the Court allows the creation
of an escrow account in their favor. They point out that the lower courts already ruled on the enforceability
of Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269. Furthermore, the Court, in Gingoyon, merely ordered the direct
payment of just compensation to PIATCO in order to ensure that the builder of the NAIA-IPT III is
compensated by the Government as a matter of justice and equity. Takenaka and Asahikosan underscore
that they are the real builders of the NAIA-IPT III as PIATCO’s subcontractors.
Takenaka and Asahikosan maintain that Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court apply with respect to the
adjudication of the parties’ conflicting just compensation claims. The Court did not declare
in Gingoyon that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall not apply to the payment of final just compensation.
The Court merely applied RA 8974 in Gingoyon insofar as the law prescribes direct payment as a
prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession in eminent domain cases.
Under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if there are conflicting claims on the property, the court
may order the just compensation to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto. Takenaka and Asahikosan argue that they are the lawful recipients of
just compensation as the real builders of the NAIA-IPT III and as the prevailing parties in Claim Nos.
HT-04-248 and HT-05-269.
Even assuming that PIATCO is the owner of the NAIA-IPT III, the owner of the expropriated property is not
solely entitled to the full amount of just compensation.
In Republic v. Mangotara,162 citing de Knecht v. CA,163 the Court held that just compensation is not due to
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the property owner alone; the term “owner” likewise includes those who have lawful interest in the
property such as a mortgagee, a lessee, and a vendee in possession under an executory contract.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion Development Authority,164 the Court held that
just compensation may be deposited with the court when there are questions regarding the
ownership of the expropriated property. In Calvo v. Zandueta,165 the Court deferred the release of
just compensation pending the determination of the ownership of the expropriated property,
despite the finality of the order allowing the release of just compensation.
Takenaka and Asahikosan refuse to share in the expenses of the BOC. Under Section 12, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, the costs of the expropriation suit shall be shouldered by the Government.
The Government would be unjustly enriched if other parties are required to shoulder the costs of
the suit. It would also be unfair to require Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the expenses of
the BOC since they were not furnished copies of the BOC Final Report, in violation of their right to
due process. 166cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209917
Takenaka and Asahikosan argue that deductions for depreciation and deterioration are
inconsistent with the concept of replacement cost as a measure of appraising the actual value of
the NAIA-IPT III. In exercising the power of eminent domain, the Government takes the property
on “as is, where is” basis. Takenaka and Asahikosan point out that the Government has the option
not to expropriate the terminal. Consequently, the Government cannot base the value of the
building on whether or not the building caters to the Government’s needs.
Furthermore, RA 8974 IRR provides that only the costs necessary to replace the expropriated
property should be considered in appraising the terminal. Statutes authorizing the deprivation of
private property, as in expropriation cases, must be strictly complied with because these are in
derogation of private rights. The Court’s intent in Agan when it declared that equity should likewise
be considered in appraising the NAIA-IPT III is to prevent the Government from undervaluing the
property and enriching itself at the expense of private parties.
Takenaka and Asahikosan also insist that a multi-level retail mall is not an unnecessary area.
They point out that modern airports are subsidized by income from retail malls and cannot operate
profitably without this additional income.
Takenaka and Asahikosan agree with the CA’s finding that the NAIA-IPT III is structurally sound.
There is no clear evidence that the collapse of the ceiling of the NAIA-IPT III was caused by the
terminal’s structural defects. The CA correctly concluded that the ceiling’s collapse is merely a
finishing and aesthetic issue.
They emphasize that Mr. Gary Taylor, their hired appraiser, assailed the qualifications, the
methodology, and the findings of Ove Arup in its August 2007 Site Observation Report.
Furthermore, Ove Arup made several conflicting findings on the structural soundness of the
Page 89
NAIA-IPT III. Ove Arup concluded that the number of structural members failing the Demand Capacity
Rate (DCR) /m.1.10 criteria was more than those used for the retrofit design. The DCR measures the
capacity of a portion of the NAIA-NAIA-IPT III to carry the load it was designed to bear, with an optimal rate
being less than 1.0. It likewise opined that the distance of the gap between the NAIA-IPT III’s bridge and
building structure had a potential for seismic pounding.
Takenaka and Asahikosan posit that all the structural members of the NAIA-IPT III have a DCR of less
than 1.0 based on the 1992 National Structural Code of the Philippines (NSCP), the code applicable when
the NAIA-IPT III was designed and constructed. Takenaka and Asahikosan opine that Ove Arup did not
use the 1992 NSCP in the August 2007 Site Observation Report.
Ove Arup’s finding that the NAIA-IPT III has a potential for seismic pounding is baseless. The terminal is
designed and built to address the possibility of seismic pounding, taking into consideration that the
NAIA-IPT III is built on Type I soil. Takenaka and Asahikosan claim that Ove Arup’s finding was not based
on the AASHTO Standard Specification for Highway Bridges (16th Ed., 1996), the code applicable at the
time the NAIA-IPT III was designed and built.
Takenaka and Asahikosan likewise argue that Scott Wilson did not admit that the NAIA-IPT III suffered
from structural defects. They clarify that the statements in the Scott Wilson report “were merely intended to
accommodate [the] changes that the client wished to effect.”167 They also point out that the Government
stated in its petition (in G.R. No. 209917) that “additional work is required to complete the terminal
structure to make it compliant with the standards of Takenaka and Asahikosan.” 168cralawrednad
To lay the structural issue to rest, Takenaka and Asahikosan consulted Meinhardst (Singapore) Pte Ltd.,
their Structural Design Consultant, to rebut TCGI’s findings. They also hired disinterested American
experts in the construction industry – Mr. S.K. Ghosh of S.K. Ghosh Associates, Inc.; Mr. Robert F. Mast,
PE, SE of Berger/Abram Engineers, Inc.; and Mr. Mete A. Sozen – to validate Meinhardst’s conclusions.
These experts unanimously concluded that the NAIA-IPT III’s design is structurally sound because it
complied with the 1992 NSCP, thus, effectively negating the Government’s claim that the NAIA-IPT III
suffers from structural defects.
Takenaka and Asahikosan impugn the ASEP Report. They reiterate that they constructed the NAIA-IPT III
in accordance with the Onshore Construction and Offshore Procurement Contracts and the prevailing
building code at the time of the design and construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The statement in the ASEP
Report that “the NAIA-IPT III may be partially opened provided that retrofitting works are done prior to its
full operation” does not mean that the terminal is defective. The remediation works were solely to ensure
that the NAIA-IPT III structures are compliant with the current standards, which were not yet in effect
when the construction of the NAIA-IPT III took place.
Messrs. Meinhardt opined that the scope of the proposed retrofitting works shows that the structural
design of the NAIA-IPT III is not defectivebecause the proposed retrofitting works are not related to the
alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III vis-à-vis the 1992 NSCP. He also stated that the proposed
retrofitting works are meant to reinforce the NAIA-IPT III which is already compliant with the 1992 NSCP.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Takenaka and Asahikosan likewise engaged the services of AECOM Australia Pty. Ltd. to conduct
a technical review of the Review on TCGI Report of Civil Design Review and Evaluation (Elevated
Roadway prepared by Ove Arup & Partners HK Ltd. Philippines Branch). AECOM criticized the
Ove Arup’s review as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Ove Arup valuated the NAIA-IPT’s Elevated Roadway using the AASHTO Manual of
Bridge Evaluation and the FHA Bridge Inspectors Reference Manual, which are
irrelevant to any discussion of its design;
2. Ove Arup evaluated the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway using the Seismic Retrofitting
Manual for Highway Structures, which is irrelevant because there is no need for a
seismic retrofit of the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway;
3. Ove Arup’s suggestion that an in-situ measurement of the geometry data of key
structural components be undertaken is unnecessary and irrelevant to a peer review of
the design of the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway;
4. Ove Arup made an incorrect assessment of the type of foundation material with respect
to soil bearing capacity;
5. Ove Arup used inappropriate codes for the assessment of the bearings of the NAIA-IPT
III’s Elevated Roadway;
6. Ove Arup’s analysis suggests that 36 pier columns of the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated
Roadway are allegedly under strength, but fails to quantify the ratio of the column effect
to the corresponding capacity;
7. AECOM objects to Ove Arup’s criticism that the value of the soil-bearing capacity used
for the length of the bridge of the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway needs to be justified,
since the design of the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway must be judged on the
geotechnical information available to AECOM at the time the bridge was made. No
foundation could have been built without the foundation bearing capacity results having
been submitted to the relevant overseeing authority and approved thereby;
8. Ove Arup used an incorrect site coefficient for the site’s soil type, which resulted in
seriously erroneous input data, thus, any conclusions or recommendations derived from
these data are rendered invalid;
9. Ove Arup’s claim that there are “failures” in the elastomeric bearings/bearing pads is
based on an Australian design code which did not exist at the time the NAIA-IPT III’s
Elevated Roadway was designed;
10. Takenaka and Asahikosan were never provided a copy of the TCGI Report that was
used as basis for the ARUP Report;
11. There are serious discrepancies between the Ove Arup Report and the referenced, yet
unseen TCGI Report;
12. The NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway complies with the project design codes in force at
the time it was designed; and
Page 90
 13. AECOM refutes Ove Arup and TCGI’s suggestion that the NAIA-IPT III’s Elevated Roadway construction cost;
requires retrofitting or any remedial work.
(d)With respect to the computation of attendant costs, the issues are:

Takenaka and Asahikosan aver that the Government would be able to lessen its expenses, operate the
NAIA-IPT III, and earn revenues sooner as there is, in fact, no need to perform retrofitting works on the
terminal.
Takenaka and Asahikosan point out that the design of the NAIA-IPT III is bilaterally symmetrical which
means the structural system of one area is virtually identical to others. Since the Government opened
certain areas of the NAIA-IPT III to the public, it follows that the unused areas are also structurally sound
considering that majority of the terminal building share the same structural design.
They also deny that they employed armed guards to prevent the MIAA and DOTC officials from entering
the premises of the NAIA-IPT III. They point out that the Government did not raise this issue before the
lower courts. They also state that they have provided the parties all documentary evidence necessary in
appraising the NAIA-IPT III, such as the Bills of Quantities.169cralawrednad
VI. The Issues
1. Whether PIATCO’s claimed attendant cost is supported by a preponderance of
evidence;
a) Whether the Court may accord probative value to photocopied voluminous
documents allegedly proving PIATCO’s attendant costs;
b) Whether the Court may accord probative value to the summary report prepared by
Reyes Tacandong & Co., which validated PIATCO’s computation of attendant costs;
2. Whether attendant cost may be pegged at 10% of the construction cost;
3. Whether the Government included the attendant cost in its valuation of the NAIA-IPT
III;
(e)Whether depreciation may be deducted from the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III;
Whether rectification for contract compliance (for failure to comply with bid documents; for
(f) inferior quality; and for the additional areas to be built) may be deducted from the replacement
cost of the NAIA-IPT III;

In G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696, and 209731, we resolve the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Whether the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III shall be adjusted to December 2004 values
(g)
based on inflation;
Whether the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision in Civil Case No. 04-0876 is null and void for violation of
(1) Whether the CA erred in imposing an interest rate of 6% per annum on the replacement cost of
PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan’s right to procedural due process; (h)
the NAIA-IPT III;
Whether the CA legally erred in computing just compensation in the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT
(2) (i) Whether PIATCO shall be entitled to the fruits and income of the NAIA-IPT III;
III;

(3)Whether Takenaka and Asahikosan shall share in the expenses of the BOC;
Whether “fair market value” and “replacement cost” are similar eminent domain standards of
(a)
property valuation;
Whether the owner of the property sought to be expropriated shall solely receive the just
(4)
compensation due; and
Whether the depreciated replacement cost approach or the new replacement cost approach
(b)
shall be used in the appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III;
Whether the Government may take property for public purpose or public use upon the issuance
(5)
and the effectivity of the writ of possession;
(c) With respect to the computation of construction costs, the issues are:

In G.R. No. 181892, the following issues are relevant:

1. Whether the Government’s computation of construction cost is supported by a
preponderance of evidence Whether the appointment of an independent appraiser issue has been rendered moot and
(1)
2. Whether the NAIA-IPT III suffered/suffers from massive structural defects; academic by the RTC’s promulgation of its rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876; and
3. Whether the alleged unnecessary areas should be excluded from the computation of
(2)
Whether the issue of who shall pay the independent appraiser’s fees has been rendered moot and

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 91

 academic by the RTC’s promulgation of its rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
VII. Our Ruling
A. G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731
The parties were afforded procedural
due process despite their non-receipt
of the BOC Final Report prior to
the promulgation of the RTC’s
May 23, 2011 Decision.
Before ruling on the substantive issues posed, we first resolve the issue of whether the CA erred in ruling
that the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision is valid.
PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan challenge the validity of the RTC’s decision for alleged violation of
their right to due process. They point out that the RTC promulgated its decision in Civil Case No. 04-0876
on May 23, 2011, immediately after the release of the BOC’s Final Report on March 31, 2011. They
complain that since the RTC’s clerk of court did not furnish the parties copies of the Final Report, the trial
court violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court as they failed to object to the Final Report’s
contents.
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the commissioners’ final
report on all interested parties upon the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten days within which to
file their objections to the report’s findings.170cralawrednad
Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or after all the parties have filed their objections and after hearing,
the trial court may: (a) accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; (b) for cause shown,
recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; (c) set aside the report and appoint
new commissioners; (d) partially accept the report; and (e) make such order or render such judgment as
shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation; and to the
defendant, the just compensation for the property so taken.171cralawrednad
We rule that the parties’ failure to receive the Final Report did not render the May 23, 2011 Decision
null and void.
The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.172 The procedural due process
requirements in an eminent domain case are satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present
their evidence before the commissioners whose findings (together with the pleadings, evidence of the
parties, and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and considered by the expropriation court. It is the
parties’ total failure to present evidence on just compensation that renders the trial court’s ruling void. The
opportunity to present evidence during the trial remains to be the vital requirement in the observance of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
due process.173cralawrednad
The record will show that the parties exhaustively discussed their positions in this case before the
BOC, the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court. They had ample opportunity to refute and
respond to each other’s positions with the aid of their own appraisers and experts. Each party, in
fact, submitted countervailing evidence on the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. They also filed
numerous and voluminous pleadings and motions before the lower courts and before this Court.
The mere failure of the RTC’s clerk of court to send the parties copies of the BOC Final Report is
not substantial enough under the attendant circumstances to affect and nullify the whole
proceedings. Litigation is not a game of technicalities. Strong public interests require that this
Court judiciously and decisively settle the amount of just compensation in the expropriation of the
NAIA-IPT III. We cannot further delay this more-than-a-decade case and let interests accrue on
just compensation by remanding the case once more to the trial court.
Framework: Eminent domain is
an inherent power of the State
2.a. The power of eminent domain is
a fundamental state power that is
inseparable from sovereignty.Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is inseparable
from sovereignty. It is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property within its
territorial sovereignty to promote public welfare. The exercise of this power is based on the State’s
primary duty to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. 174 It is an inherent
power and is not conferred by the Constitution.175 It is inalienable and no legislative act or
agreement can serve to abrogate the power of eminent domain when public necessity and
convenience require its exercise.176cralawrednad
The decision to exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the legislature which has the
exclusive power to prescribe how and by whom the power of eminent domain is to be exercised.
Thus, the Executive Department cannot condemn properties for its own use without direct
authority from the Congress.177cralawrednad
The exercise of eminent domain necessarily derogates against private rights which must yield to
demand of the public good and the common welfare. 178However, it does not confer on the State
the authority to wantonly disregard and violate the individual’s fundamental rights.
2.b. Just compensation is the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from the
owner by the condemnor.
The 1987 Constitution embodies two constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of
eminent domain: first, private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation;179 and second, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
Page 92
process of law.180cralawrednad
Just compensation is defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.” The word “just” is used to qualify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey the
idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.181 On the other hand, the word “compensation” means “a full indemnity or remuneration for the loss
or damage sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for public use.” 182cralawrednad
Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to the monetary
equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred.183 To achieve this monetary
equivalent, we use the standard value of “fair market value” of the property at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property, whichever is earlier.
2.b.1. Fair market value is the
general standard of value in determining
just compensation.
Jurisprudence broadly defines “fair market value” as the sum of money that a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received for a property.184cralawrednad
Fair market value is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values
determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may serve as factors to
be considered in the judicial valuation of the property.185cralawrednad
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of
acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of
lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations. The measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss.186 To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the
taker.187cralawrednad
While jurisprudence requires the “fair market value” to be the measure of recovery in expropriation cases,
it is not an absolute and exclusive standard or method of valuation.188There are exceptional cases where
the property has no fair market value or where the fair market value of the property is difficult to
determine.
Examples of properties with no or with scant data of their fair market values are specialized properties or
buildings designed for unique purposes.189 These specialized properties bear these characteristics
because they are “rarely x x x sold in the market, except by way of sale of the business or entity of which it
is part, due to the uniqueness arising from its specialized nature and design, its configuration, size,
location, or otherwise.”190cralawrednad
Examples of specialized properties are churches, colleges, cemeteries, and clubhouses. 191 These also
include airport terminals that are specifically built as “a place where aircrafts land and take off and where
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
there are buildings for passengers to wait in and for aircraft to be sheltered.”192 They are all
specialized properties because they are not usually sold in the ordinary course of trade or
business.
In the Tengson Report dated December 1, 2010, Gary Taylor characterized the NAIA-IPT III as a
specialized asset.193 Tim Lunt also stated in the Reply to Tengson International Ltd. Report and
Response from Takenaka & Asahikosan dated December 7, 2010 that the market value of an
airport will not be the same as the market value of other commercial, industrial, and residential
buildings within the Metro Manila region.194cralawrednad
In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain, the court may
use other just and equitable market methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair
market value of a property.
In the United States, the methods employed include: (1) the cost of replacing the condemned
property, less depreciation; (2) capitalization of the income the property might reasonably have
produced; (3) the fair rental value of the property during a temporary taking; (4) the gross rental
value of an item over its depreciable lifetime; (5) the value which the owner’s equity could have
returned, had the owner invested in monetary instruments; (6) the cost of repair or the capitalized
cost of inconvenience, whichever is less; and (7) the loss of investment expenses actually
incurred.195 The primary consideration, however, remains the same – to determine the
compensation that is just, both to the owner whose property is taken and to the public that will
shoulder the cost of expropriation.
2.b.2. Replacement cost is a
different standard of value from fair
market value.
In Gingoyon, we held that the construction of the NAIA-IPT III involves the implementation of a
national infrastructure project. Thus, for purposes of determining the just compensation of the
NAIA-IPT III, RA 8974 and its implementing rules shall be the governing law.
Under Section 10 of the RA 8974 IRR, the improvements and/or structures on the land to be
acquired for the purpose of implementing national infrastructure projects shall be appraised using
the replacement cost method.
Replacement cost is a different standard of valuation from the fair market value. As we
previously stated, fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller who is
not compelled to sell and bought by a buyer who is not compelled to buy. In
contrast, replacement cost is “the amount necessary to replace the
improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor,
contractor’s profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs associated with the acquisition and
installation in place of the affected improvements/structures.”196 We use the replacement cost
method to determine just compensation if the expropriated property has no market-based
Page 93
evidence of its value.
2.b.3. Replacement cost is only one
of the standards that the Court shall
consider in appraising the NAIA-
IPT III.
In using the replacement cost method to ascertain the value of improvements that shall be expropriated for
purposes of implementing national infrastructure projects, Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR requires the
implementing agency to consider the kinds and quantities of materials/equipment used, the
location, configuration and other physical features of the properties, and the prevailing construction
prices, among other things.
Section 5 of RA 8974 in this regard provides that the court may consider the following relevant standards
in eminent domain cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a)The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b)The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c)The value declared by the owners;
(d)The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvement
(e)
on the land and for the value of improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence
(g)
presented; and
Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire
(h)similarly situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and
thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
The Court explained in Agan and Gingoyon that the replacement cost method is only one of the factors to
be considered in determining the just compensation of the NAIA-IPT III. The Court added that the
payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well.
In Agan, we stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures
comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have
been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over
the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the
said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with
law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of PIATCO and its investors. (Emphasis supplied)197
We also declared in Gingoyon that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under RA 8974, the Government is required to “immediately pay” the owner
of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent
(100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal
valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate
payment should be limited to “the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7,” with Section 7 referring to the
“implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the
improvements and/or structures on the land.” Under the present
implementing rules in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are
to be based using “the replacement cost method.” However, the
replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in
determining the just compensation.
In addition to RA 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that
the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity
as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation,
the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not
only to the law, such as RA 8974, but to principles of equity as
well. (Emphasis supplied)198
The Court’s pronouncements in Agan and Gingoyon are consistent with the principle that
“eminent domain is a concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole.
It is not the amount of the owner's investment, but the ‘value of the interest’ in land taken by
eminent domain, that is guaranteed to the owner.”199cralawrednad
In sum, in estimating the fair market value of the NAIA-IPT III, the Court shall use (1) the
replacement cost method and (2) the standards laid down in Section 5 of RA 8974 and
Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR. Furthermore, we shall likewise consider (3) equity in the appraisal
of NAIA-IPT III based on the Agan and Gingoyon cases.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 94

2.b.4. The use of depreciated
replacement cost method is consistent
with the principle that the property owner
shall be compensated for his actual loss.
The present case confronts us with the question of the specific replacement cost method that we should
use in appraising the NAIA-IPT III. The Government advocates the depreciated replacement cost method
formula while PIATCO argues for the new replacement cost method formula.
The replacement cost method is a cost approach in appraising real estate for purposes of expropriation.
This approach is premised on the principle of substitution which means that “all things being equal, a
rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than the cost of building an acceptable
substitute with like utility.”200cralawrednad
The cost approach considers the principles of substitution, supply and demand, contribution and
externalities.201 “The value of the land and the value of improvements are determined separately according
to their highest and best use.”202 “Buyers assess the value of a piece of property not only based on the
existing condition of the property, but also in terms of the cost to alter or improve the property to make
it functional specifically for the purposes of the buyer's use. This may include building new structures,
renovating existing structures, or changing the components of an existing structure to maximize its
utility.”203cralawrednad
There are various methods of appraising a property using the cost approach: among them are the
reproduction cost, the replacement cost new, and the depreciated replacement cost.
Reproduction cost is the “estimated current cost to construct an exact replica of the subject building,
using the same materials, construction standards, design, layout, and quality of workmanship; and
incorporating all the deficiencies, superadequacies, and obsolescence of the subject building.”204 It is
the cost of duplicating the subject property at current prices205 or the current cost of reproducing a
new replica of the property being appraised using the same, or closely similar, materials. 206cralawrednad
In the United States, the recognized and used method in eminent domain cases in appraising specialized
properties is the reproduction cost less depreciation approach.
According to AmJur, this valuation method requires the inclusion of all expenditures that reasonably and
necessarily are to be expected in the recreation of the structure, including not only the construction itself
but also collateral costs, such as the costs of financing the reproduction. “Historical associations and
architectural values may enhance the market worth of a property by rendering it a specialty property; if so,
the property may fairly be worth the market price for similar properties, plus a premium for its unique
aspects. The premium value in such a case may also be determined by the cost of reproduction, minus
depreciation. The value assigned has also been described as the total of the land value, plus the
specialized value of the improvements, minus depreciation.”207cralawrednad
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Alfred Jahr explains the procedure in appraising a specialized property using this
method:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the valuation of the improvement or plant, however, market value is no
criterion because they have no market value. It is specialty property. The
improvements are therefore valued on several properties. First, consideration
is given to the original book cost of the improvements, that is, the original
cash expenditure paid by the company for making the physical structures and
appurtenances. Its purpose is to act as some guide; it is not value, however,
and the courts recognize the fact that it is not a value of the physical
structures. Second, evidence of reproduction cost new is then considered, for
it is an element of value of specialty property. In figuring this cost, all
overhead expenses are included. These expenses include engineering,
construction, management fees, insurance, legal expenses, office overhead,
and interest during construction period. Third, from the reproduction cost new
an allowance for depreciation of the improvements must be made. This
depreciation is a matter of opinion, formed after a physical examination of the
improvements as a whole and is generally not based on a straight-line
depreciation according to age. Some authorities, however, have not accepted
such an item of depreciation and prefer the straight-line method, at so much
per year. Obsolescence and functional depreciation are sometimes deducted
in addition to physical depreciation depending on the type of utility
involved.208
Replacement cost new is “the estimated cost to construct a building with utility equivalent to the
appraised building using modern materials and current standards, design, and layout”209 or “the
current cost of a similar new property having the nearest equivalent utility as the property being
valued.”210 It is the cost of acquiring a modern, functional equivalent of the subject property and
“views the building as if reconstructed with modern methods, design and materials that would
most closely replace the use of the appraised building but provide the same
utility.”211 Replacement cost does not consider the most common forms of functional
obsolescence.212cralawrednad
Depreciated replacement cost approach is the “method of valuation which provides the current
cost of replacing an asset with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all physical
deterioration and all relevant forms of obsolescence and optimisation.”213 Depreciated
replacement cost is a method of appraising assets that are usually not exposed to the open
market.214 A general formula of this method is as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cost of constructing the building (s) (including fees)
Plus: Cost of the land (including fees)
= Total Costs
Page 95
 Less: Allowance for age and depreciation
= Depreciated Replacement Cost215
Under this method, the appraiser assesses the current gross replacement of the assets, usually comprised
of the land and the building. If the asset is an improvement, the appraiser assesses the cost of its
replacement with a modern equivalent and deducts depreciation to reflect the differences between the
hypothetical modern equivalent and the actual asset. The appraiser has to “establish the size and
specification that the hypothetical buyer ideally requires at the date of valuation in order to provide the
same level of productive output or an equivalent service.”216cralawrednad
In appraising the improvement using the cost approach, the appraiser considers the construction cost,
and attendant cost.
Construction costs are “the costs that are normally and directly incurred in the purchase and installation of
an asset, or group of assets, into functional use.” On the other hand, attendant costs are “the costs that are
normally required to purchase and install a property but that are not usually included in the vendor
invoice.”217cralawrednad
Under Section 10 of the RA 8974 IRR, construction cost is the current market price of materials, equipment,
labor, the contractor’s profit and overhead, while the attendant cost is the cost associated with the
acquisition and installation in place of the affected improvement.
Once the gross replacement cost or the sum of construction and attendant costs is derived, depreciation
shall be deducted.218 Depreciation is classified into three categories: physical depreciation, functional
obsolescence, and external obsolescence.
Physical obsolescence refers to the “wear and tear over the years, which might be combined with a lack of
maintenance.”219 Physical depreciation is curable if “capital investment can bring the building to a state in
which the degree of obsolescence is mitigated (e.g., standards of finishes and services).”220It is incurable if
“no amount of capital investment can rectify the [depreciation] (for example, building structural
flexibility).”221 Curable physical depreciation is measured by the cost to cure or retrofitting which could
extend the life of the building.222 Incurable depreciation or deterioration is estimated by a variety of age-life
or economic-age calculation methods.223cralawrednad
Functional obsolescence “reflects the advances in technology which allow for a more efficient delivery of
services and goods from a building of different designs and specifications.”224 “Functional obsolescence
arises where the design or specification of the asset no longer fulfills the function for which it was originally
designed.”225cralawredcralawrednad
It is “usually related to operational inefficiencies that typically involve either inadequacies or
superadequacies. An inadequacy occurs when the asset is not enough (e.g., the asset is too small) for it to
operate efficiently. A superadequacy occurs when there is too much of an asset (e.g., the asset is too large)
for it to operate efficiently.”226 “To be feasible, the cost of replacing the obsolete item or design fault must
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
be equal to or less than the anticipated increase in value due to its cure. Curable functional
obsolescence may require abatement by adding or remodelling or by removing a
superadequacy.”227cralawrednad
Economic obsolescence results from “the impact of changing external macro- and
micro-economic conditions on the property and should not include internal factors which affect the
profitability of the occupying business, the writing down of such factors to reflect the profitability of
the business being a matter for the occupier. Within economic obsolescence, the prospect of
extending the life of the building by capital investment should be considered, as well as the fact
that lack of maintenance can accelerate the rate of depreciation.”228cralawrednad
In these consolidated cases, we rule that the depreciated replacement cost method, rather
than the new replacement cost method, is the more appropriate method to use in
appraising NAIA-IPT III.
Injustice would result if we award PIATCO just compensation based on the new replacement cost
of the NAIA-IPT III, and disregard the fact that the Government expropriated a terminal that is not
brand new; the NAIA-IPT III simply does not have the full economic and functional utility of a brand
new airport.
Adjustments for depreciation should be made to reflect the differences between the modern
equivalent asset and the actual asset or the NAIA-IPT III. The reason is that depreciation involves
the loss of value caused by the property’s reduced utility as a result of damage, advancement of
technology, current trends and tastes, or environmental changes.229cralawrednad
This conclusion is consistent with Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR which allows us – and under the
NAIA-IPT-III’s circumstances effectively direct us – to consider the kinds and quantities of
materials/equipments used, configuration and other physical features of the properties, among
other things, in determining the replacement cost of a building. To quote Section
10:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 10. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures – Pursuant to
Section 7 of the Act, the Implementing Agency shall determine the valuation
of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be acquired using the
replacement cost method. The replacement cost of the
improvements/structures is defined as the amount necessary to replacement
improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials,
equipment, labor, contractor’s profit and overhead, and all other attendant
costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvements/structures. In the valuation of the affected
improvements/structures, the Implementing Agency shall
consider, among other things, the kinds and quantities of
materials/equipment used, the location, configuration and other
Page 96
 physical features of the properties, and prevailing construction in determining the just compensation in these cases. Valuation is not exclusively a technical
prices. (Emphasis supplied) matter used in arriving at a numerical measure of compensation. Rather, valuation in eminent
domain is a judicial question based on equitable principles. Thus, this Court shall likewise
endeavor to weigh the justness and fairness of compensation between the condemnor and the
Depreciation should be deducted because modern materials and design are assumed in the replacement condemnee, considering the factual circumstances of this case.234cralawrednad
cost method. In using the depreciated replacement cost method, “[t]he intent is to provide a functionally
similar improvement in order to apply a meaningful level of depreciation.”230cralawrednad Construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III

If we adopt the new replacement cost method, PIATCO would be compensated for more than what 3.a. The base valuation of the
it had actually lost. We must remember that the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to NAIA-IPT III
the property owner alone. In an eminent domain situation, compensation must likewise be just to the public
which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to compensation only The Government claims that the construction cost or the base valuation of the NAIA-IPT III
for what he actually loses; what he loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the amounts to $300,206,693.00, itemized as follows:235cralawrednad
taking.231cralawrednad
Total $USD in Manila @3Q01
Just compensation must not extend beyond the property owner’s loss or injury. This is the only way for the
compensation paid to be truly just, not only to the individual whose property is taken, but also to the public
who will shoulder the cost of expropriation. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his General Requirements and Conditions $ 36,279,033
property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the
public.232cralawrednad Site Development $ 3,293,967

In using the depreciated replacement cost method of valuation, we do not rely on Kaczmarek’s affidavit
Terminal North Concourse $ 6,847,663
and other documents not presented before the trial court, and which were belatedly attached to the
Government’s motion for partial reconsideration dated August 22, 2013.
Terminal South Concourse $ 11,169,979
This Court exercises its judicial function to fix just compensation in eminent domain cases on the
basis of the law, the rules, and the evidence – including the appraisal reports and the embedded Terminal Head House $ 60,763,798
formula on how the parties arrived at the amounts of just compensation – presented by the parties before
the trial court and the entire record of the consolidated cases.
Terminal Building Services $ 54,982,628
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is essentially and exclusively a judicial
function. Fixing the formula with definitiveness and particularity in just compensation is not the function of Multi Storey Car Park $ 8,791,857
the executive nor of the legislative branches, much less of the parties in this case. Any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may not replace the court’s own judgment as to what amount
Special Systems $ 69,321,503
should be awarded and how this amount should be arrived at. Legislative enactments, as well as executive
issuances, providing the method of computing just compensation are treated as mere guidelines in
ascertaining the amount of just compensation. Airside Infrastructure Works $ 31,065,288

When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, courts are not strictly bound to apply the Landside Infrastructure Works $ 11,496,552
formula to its minutest detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the
formula’s strict application. The courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s
Terminal Support Facilities $ 6,194,425
application to fit the factual situations before them.233cralawrednad

We clarify, however, that this Court is not confined to the use of the depreciated replacement cost method

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 97

Office Fit-out $0 works, and rectification of those works.

2.2.2 I have arrived at the CCVs by carrying out the

Builder’s Work in Connection with Services Included following sequence of tasks:

Total $ USD $ 300,206,693 1) Understanding the project as bid and as eventually constructed.

2) Preparing measured quantities for the major elements of the completed

On the other hand, PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan argue that the construction cost amounts to works.
$360,969,791.00, viz:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3) Establishing appropriate rates and prices for carrying out the works at that
time in Manila, Philippines.
In US dollars
4) Adjusting the quantities and/or rates and prices to take into account the
Total payments of PIATCO 275,119,807.88 extent of non-performing and/or inferior quality works, the extent of
rectification and remediation of the Terminal to bring it to Code and making it
Add: Awards by the London Court 84,035,974.44
structurally safe, and 22,193 m2 of ‘Unnecessary Areas’ that was built in the
Terminal.
Award by the Makati Court 1,814,008.50
5) Making provision for the cost of remediation on items which deteriorated
Total Construction Cost 360,969,790.82
between December 2002 and December 2004.

6) Making provision for the value of depreciation of Terminal 3 between

As we had earlier explained, construction cost is the amount necessary to replace the
December 2002 and December 2004.
improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor’s
profit and overhead. Construction or direct costs is also defined as the costs that are “normally and directly
7) Deducting the cost of rectification to otherwise bring the Terminal to the
incurred in the purchase and installation of an asset or group of assets into functional use.” Construction
standards in the Bid Documents, including the cost of building some 63,490
costs generally take into account the labor used to construct buildings; materials, products, and equipment;
m2 of ‘Necessary Operational Areas’ that was not built in the
contractor's profit and overhead, including job supervision, workers' compensation, fire and liability
Terminal.237cralawrednad
insurance, and unemployment insurance; performance bonds, surveys, and permits; use of equipment;
watchmen; contractor's shack and temporary fencing; materials storage facilities; and power-line
2.3 Understanding the Project
installation and utility costs.236cralawrednad
2.3.1 I visited the Terminal 3 site between May 9, 2006 and May 12, 2006;
We find the Government’s computation of construction cost to be more realistic and
May 30, 2006 and June 2, 2006; and June 20 and June 25, 2006, when I held
appropriate. As the CA aptly observed, the Gleeds Report is more “particularized, calculable and
meetings with the Office of the Solicitor General, White & Case, MIAA, Arup,
precise.” Tim Lunt sufficiently explained how he arrived at the value of
TCGI, and Gensler. I based myself at the Terminal 3 complex during my visits
$300,206,693.00:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
in May and June 2006 and made a number of visits to various areas both
internal and external to Terminal 3 to gain a full understanding of the scope of
2.2 Methodology the works performed.

2.2.1 Stated simply, valuation of any given structure is derived by
multiplying the structure’s dimensions, i.e., quantities by a price
(i.e., rate) for constructing the works at a designated time and
specific location, adding the cost of works in, on, and around the
structure, and then accounting for inferior and non-performing
2.3.2 Members of my staff visited the Terminal 3 site between May 30, 2006
and June 25, 2006, and based themselves in the Terminal 3 complex to
prepare quantities from construction drawings made available by Takenaka,
which, as noted, are not properly designated ‘As-built’ drawings. To

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 98

 safeguard against error or outdated dimensional information in the drawings, my staff
checked certain major dimensions against the structures as constructed and found
the dimensions to be substantially accurate. We did not check the drawings for
detailed accuracy of the contents in the drawings (i.e., what is within the dimensions).
2.3.3 Members of my staff also visited the Terminal 3 site between February 26, 2008
and March 11, 2007. During that time, they gathered pricing information from local
construction contractors to assist with the pricing of the CCVs.
2.3.4 I have examined all of the documents listed in Appendix ‘B’ and had discussions
with each of the Republic’s airport architectural and engineering experts on the
content of their reports to gain a full understanding of the main issues affecting
Terminal 3 and the CCVs.238
2.4. Preparing the Quantities
Bills of Quantities
2.4.1 Construction projects are generally priced by construction
contractors for the purpose of competitive tendering using a Bill
(or Bills) of quantities. Bills of Quantities are defined
as:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A list of numbered items, each of which describes the work to be
done in a civil engineering or building contract. Each item shows
the quantity or work involved. When the procedure of tendering is
adopted (as is usual), the Bill is sent out to contractors. Those
contractors who wish to do the work return the bill, with an
extended price opposite each item. This priced bill constitutes the
contractors’ offer (or tender to bid) to do the work.239cralawrednad
2.4.5 As noted, it was apparent from commencement of
preparation of the CCVs that it was doubtful that the set of
drawings listed in Appendix “B” that Takenaka provided were
“As-built” or approved. Accordingly, because of uncertainty over
the accuracy of the “As-built” drawings, and to avoid preparing
Bills of Quantities based on potentially inaccurate information, I
opted not to produce full Bills of Quantities to form the basis of
the CCVs. Instead, I relied on a “Principle Quantities” type
approach.240
Principle Quantities
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
2.4.6 The “Principle Quantities” type approach is
common in the cost planning and cost estimating of
construction projects. CESMM3 describes Principle
Quantities as “a list of principle components of the works
with their approximated estimated quantities x x x given
solely to assist surveyors and estimators in making rapid
assessment of the general scale and character of the
proposed works prior to the examination of the
remainder of the bills of quantities and other contract
documents on which construction estimates or tenders
will be based.” This methodology involves the
preparation of quantities for the major elements of the
construction works where the costs cannot be estimated
accurately from historical data, or for those areas which
are known to vary in cost due to the quality or nature of
the works. The quantities produced by adopting this
approach are what I term “Principle
Quantities.”241cralawrednad
2.4.7 Given the serious concerns over the accuracy of
the so called “As-built” drawings, and in order to make
some assessment of the dimensional accuracy of the
Takenaka drawings, we carried out a number of checks
of the plan dimensions against our measurement of the
physical dimensions of the structures. Overall
dimensions (length and width) were checked for a single
floor plate in each of the Terminal North Concourse, the
Terminal South Concourse and the Terminal Head
House buildings. Our checks revealed no major
discrepancies in respect of the physical plan dimensions
of the drawings against the actual dimensions of the
overall building floor plans. We therefore decided to use
the drawings provided by Takenaka to produce the
“Principle Quantities” dimensions required for us to
prepare the CCVs.
2.4.8 The ‘Principle Quantities’ dimensions produced by
Gleeds from the drawings made available by Takenaka
(listed in Appendix ‘B’ Drawing List 1) are included in
Appendix “G.”
2.4.9 It is standard good practice for quantities produced
as part of the measurement process to be checked by
another member of the team who is not connected to the
Page 99
 particular project. The quantities we produced were technically
checked by another member of Gleeds for consistency among
inter-related items, e.g., consistency between floors and ceilings,
and to identify any major items not measured. Another member
of Gleeds also checked the accuracy of the gross floor area, or
“GFA,” calculations for each of the buildings and no significant
errors were identified.242
2.5. Arriving at the Rates and Prices
2.5.1 In order to derive the rates by which the quantities are produced to arrive at the
CCV figures for this project, it is necessary to establish:
 The period of construction;
 The geographical location of the works;
 Access to the site;
 Any physical restrictions that might impede construction of the works;
 The duration for carrying out construction;
 Database of costs;
 The specification of the works;
 The quality of the works as constructed; and
 The extent of works requiring remediation and rectification
2.5.2 All of the above factors have an effect on the CCVs and it is necessary to
consider the implications of each to arrive at the CCV figures. General guidance
including a number of the above items are referred to in the document titled “Guide to
Carrying Out Reinstatement Cost Assessments’ published by the Royal Institution of
Chartered Surveyors in September 1999.243cralawrednad
3. CCV CALCULATIONS
3.1 Calculation of Rates and Prices
3.1.1 The CCVs have been calculated in £UK costs converted to $USD in Manila. x x
x
3.1.2 The basic approach to producing the CCV figures entails the following
steps:cralawlawlibrary
1) Establish UK pricing levels at 2nd Quarter 2006 (£UK @ 2Q06)
(the date when the pricing exercise was initially carried out);
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
2) Convert the £UK @ 2Q06 prices into £UK at 3rd
Quarter 2001 prices (£UK @ 3Q01) (the mid point of
construction) using published and recognized indices;
3) Convert the £UK @3Q01 prices into US dollars at 3rd
Quarter ($USD @3Q01) (the currency of the Termianl 3
Concession Contract) using published currency
exchange rates;
4) Convert the $USD @3Q01 prices to reflect local levels
of pricing by applying a Location Adjustment using
various methods and sources of information to check the
accuracy of the conversion.
Each of these steps is described below.
3.1.3 First, the quantities produced for Terminal 3 were priced using a mixture
of current data in Gleeds’ Database of costs and published cost data,
including Spons, and are priced at 2Q06 prices. These costs are shown in the
CCVs as £UK @ 2Q06. The rates used are included in Appendix “D.” Support
in respect of the reference to the source derivation of each of the rates and
prices included in the CCVs are also included in Appendix ‘D’ in the column
headed “Rate Source.”244cralawrednad
3.1.4 Second, it was necessary to adjust the prices to the midpoint of
construction. As such the “£UK @ 3Q01” levels to align them with required
base costs for inclusion in both CCVs. This conversion is made by using the
BCIS All-in Tender Price Indices published by the Royal Institution of
Chartered surveyors. These costs are shown in the CCV as “£UK @ 3Q01.”
3.1.5 Third, the “£UK @ 3Q01” costs were converted from UK pounds to US
dollars using an exchange rate of UK£1 = ISD$1.4540. This exchange rate is
obtained by averaging the exchange rates recorded for October 1, November
1 and December 3, 2001 (i.e., 3Q01) using historical data from the
xrates.com website. These particular dates represent the midpoint of
construction which I refer to earlier in this report. The result of this conversion
is shown in the column marked “£UK @ 3Q01” in Appendix “D.”
3.1.6 Fourth, a “Location Adjustment” of the “$USD @ 3Q01” cost is
necessary to account for the local cost of constructing in Manila. Local cost
data gathered in Manila by members of my team in February and March 2007
was compared directly with UK prices to establish a ratio between the UK and
the Philippines. The cost data gathered in Manila was compared on a like for
like basis with 1st Quarter 2007 UK prices. The results of this comparison of
Page 100
 rates result in the “Location Adjustment.” The Location Adjustments resulting from this 2.1.5 The contract priceS under the EPC Contracts are as
calculation which are applied to the CCV are UK£1=$USD0.7576 for the mechanical, follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
electrical and plant elements. The average conversion rate across the CCVs is
UK£1=$USD0.5370 or 53.70%.245cralawrednad On-Shore Contract. US$133,715,911
Off-Shore Contract. US$190,037,328
3.1.7 I double-checked my calculations of the Philippine prices by considering what Total US$323,753,239 excluding VAT
the conditions in the Philippines construction market were at the time the project
would have been bid, and how these conditions changed through to the end of 2002
when works stopped on site. 2.1.6 The amounts certified for the costs of construction up to 23 June 2004
in payment certificate no 35 which is the last payment certificate that has
During the period of 1995 to 2002 the “Construction Materials Wholesale Price Index” been certified by PIATCO, are as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(“CMWPI”) published by the ‘Economic Indices and Indicators Division, Industry and
Trade Statistics Department, Philippine National Statistics Office, Manila, Philippines’ On-Shore US$133.64 Million
showed an average increase of 2.8% per annum. Off-Shore US$189.83 Million
VAT US$11.43 Million
During the periods 2000 to 2001 and 2001 to 2002 the increases where 2.1% and ER Changes US $3.93 Million
3.4% respectively. The increases are seen to be at similar levels both in the period TOTAL US$338.83 Million
during which the works were priced, contracts executed and during construction and
in my opinion this would have resulted in no material difference to the pricing level of
the onshore works submitted at tender stage when compared with the actual cost 2.2.13 Based on the certified IPC no. 35 for both Takenaka and Asahikosan,
incurred. the cost of the completed and certified works (as of IPC No. 35) are as
follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3.1.8 I also have gathered information from other Chartered Surveyors’ published
data which also indicate that the Location Adjustment for the Philippines is in the On-Shore US$133.64 Million
region of 45%. This percentage is in line with the more detailed results obtained as Off-Shore US$189.83 Million
part of my own calculations.246 VAT US$11.43 Million
ER Changes US $3.93 Million
TOTAL US$338.83 Million
We thus rule in favor of the Government’s position and reject PIATCO’s claimed construction cost. For one,
PIATCO made inconsistent statements with respect to the construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III. The Scott
Wilson report states that the construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III amounted to US$338.83 million, 2.2.14 The construction cost stated above x x x is at 2002 prices (no
exclusive of attorney’s fees, cost of the suit, interest rates, etc. This amount is inconsistent with PIATCO’s adjustments for inflation/escalation) and are exclusive for all other attendant
claimed construction cost of $360,969,790.82 in its pleadings. The relevant portion of the Scott Wilson costs, such as the engineering and architectural service fees, quality
report states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary assurance service fees, construction supervision service fees, construction
insurance, site development costs, financing costs and other associated
2.1.4 When Scott Wilson was providing Lenders Technical Advice to the Asian costs.
Development Bank in September 2002, the total value of the construction contracts,
estimated by PCI at that time, was as follows:cralawlawlibrary 2.2.15 We would conclude that the certified cost of construction of US$338
million and the other attendant costs are fair and reasonable. We note that
On-Shore Contract: US$132.35 million the Gleeds’ estimate is close to the figure in 2.2.13 above.
Off-Shore Contract: US$190.08 million
Total US$322.43 million, excluding VAT 2.2.16 It is noted that in the Gleeds Report entitled Construction Cost
Valuation for NAIA IPT3 dated 15th November 2010 the project Base Case

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 101

 CCV is valued at a gross amount of US$334.61 million (US$300.21 million + US$34.6
million deductions).247
Furthermore, PIATCO did not present detailed supporting information on how the certified
construction cost of US$338.83 million was arrived at.248cralawrednad
PIATCO’s statement that the total sum of $360,969,791.00 is evidenced by the As-Built Drawings is
misleading. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s computation of construction cost includes items which do not
pertain to the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan erroneously included
in the construction cost the costs of the action, interest rates on the judgment award of
$14,827,207.00 and $52,008,296.54, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
These items were not directly incurred in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. In Claim No. HT-04-248, only
$6,602,971.00 and $8,224,236.00 or the sum of $14,827,207.00 can possibly relate to the construction
cost of the NAIA-IPT III. On the other hand, in Claim No. HT-05-269, only the amounts of $21, 688,012.18
and $30,319,284.36 or the total sum of $52,008,296.54 can be possibly imputed to the construction cost of
the terminal.
In any case, we cannot consider the London awards as evidence of the construction cost of the NAIA-IPT
III. To do so in this case is to recognize Claim No. HT-04-248 and Claim No. HT-05-269 when their
recognition and enforcement have yet to be decided by this Court in G.R. No. 202166. It is a basic rule that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of a foreign judgment or order. 249cralawrednad
We can only recognize and/or enforce a foreign judgment or order after a conclusive and a final
finding by Philippine courts that: (1) the foreign court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the case, (2) the
parties were properly notified, and (3) there was no collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.250cralawrednad
PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan alleged that PIATCO paid Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of
$275,119,807.88 pursuant to the Onshore Construction and Offshore Procurement Contracts. According
to the RTC (whose ruling the CA did not reverse), these parties failed to prove the fact of payment of
$275,119,807.88.
We add that the alleged payment of $275,119,807.88 does not support their allegations that this amount
pertains to the construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s admission that the sum
of $275,119,807.88 were paid by PIATCO does not bind the Government who is not a party to the
Onshore Construction and Offshore Procurement Contracts. If at all, the Court can only recognize the sum
of $66,834,503.54 from PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan’s computation of construction cost, which
is much lower than the Government’s computed construction cost of $300,206,693.00.
Lastly, we note that Takenaka and Asahikosan’s claimed construction cost is different from the amount
reflected in the Tengson Report. In this Report, Gary Taylor stated the “true value of the NAIA-IPT III
facility is nearer to US$408 million, given the fact that Gleeds failed to recognize or include any values for
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
design & other consultants (10%) or property inflation based on GRP schedules
(15%).”251cralawrednad
3.b. Structural defects on
the NAIA-IPT III
The Government contends that that the NAIA-IPT III suffers from structural defects, as
follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Failed structural elements of the NAIA-IPT III, as identified in the Arup Seismic
Evaluation Report and Gravity Loading and Element Capacity Assessment;
2. The inferior quality of material used and works, including, for example, floor tiling,
plasterboard wall finishes and ceilings, and the internal and external metal paneling;
3. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements in the
terminal buildings and multi-storey car park structures, as described in Arup’s Drawings
listed in Appendix “B” Drawing List 2 and other rectification works required to bring the
Terminal to compliance with applicable building and airport codes as indicated in the
Appendices of Arup’s Site Observation Report; and
4. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements in the
elevated roadway structures, as described in Arup’s Drawings listed in Appendix “B”
Drawing List 3, Arup Review on “TCGI Report of Civil Design Review and Evaluation” –
Elevated Roadway, dated March 2009; and other rectification works required to bring
the elevated roadways to compliance with applicable building and airport codes, as
indicated in the Appendices of Arup’s Site Observation Report. 252
Scott Wilson argued that no structural elements of the NAIA-IPT III actually failed.253 He
emphasized that there were varying opinions regarding the integrity of the NAIA-IPT
III:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3.3.7 The adequacy of the structural frame, individual load bearing elements
and foundations under “normal” gravity loads should be able to be readily
evaluated. However, there are clearly differences of opinion between all 3
parties who have carried out design and assessments in this regard in terms
of the extent of ‘apparent failed elements’ under the design appraisal which
ranges from:
 Meinhardt – zero failures
Page 102
  Arup reports under gravity loading – 4% of superstructure elements and less
than 1% of all substructure elements
 Arup reports under seismic loading – less than 1% of all primary RC and
composite columns, around 3% of all primary RC beams, around 6% of all
shear walls, around 8% of piles (mostly at shear walls) and around 1% of
mat footing locations. Differential settlements are considered insignificant to
cause any additional distress in the buildings. Pounding between floors of
adjacent sectors is not an issue.
 TCGI – extent not readily identifiable from documents reviewed although
within Section 2.0 of the TCGI July 2008 report it states that the evaluation
did not yield results pointing to foundation instability as a cause for concern.
3.3.8 On the basis of discussion in 3.3.6 above it would be reasonable to follow the
assessment of the original designer (Meinhardt) who also provided a Letter of
Guarantee confirming the adequacy of their design, (ref para3.3.30).
He also disputed the Government’s allegations that some portions of the NAIA-IPT III would not be able to
sustain strong earthquakes and that some areas of the NAIA-IPT III were built using materials with inferior
quality:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
c. Seismic Activity (Terminal and Multi-Storey Carpark)
3.3.12 It is understood from press reports that, since substantial completion of the
airport in 2002, Manila has been subjected to a number of earthquakes. It has been
reported that on 25 March 2010 a strong earthquake measuring 6.2 on the Richter
scale hit Metro Manila according to the government seismology institute. It was further
reported that in July 2010 “intense seismic activity persists in the Philippines and
Manila continues to be struck by moderate to strong earthquakes of 6.5 to 7.6
magnitude.” We can find no record relating to any damage being reported in terms of
the structure, finishes or services associated with NAIA Terminal 3 as a result of these
occurrences.
xxxx
3.3.14 Inferior quality of materials used, for example internal finishes.
3.3.15 Gleeds do (sic) not define exactly what areas they mean by this. There is a
number of finished items where deductions in excess of US$800,000 have been
made but the rational for the quantification of the deduction is not explained. If the
works were inferior to that specified then this would be reflected in the payments
made to Takenaka under the EPC contract.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Scott Wilson likewise supported Takenaka and Asahikosan position that the Government’s
experts examined the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III using the recent building codes, which
were not yet in place at the time the NAIA-IPT III was designed and built.
3.3.18 Seismic and gravity load retrofit and other rectification works
required to bring the building to compliance with applicable building
and airport codes.
3.3.22 TCGI also provided an option titled “A Government Prerogative” which
states:cralawlawlibrary
Research in earthquake engineering has rapidly
progressed to the extent that seismic design provisions
for the design of new buildings and procedures for the
evaluation of existing ones have drastically evolved. The
current edition of the National Structural Code of the
Philippines (NSCP) is dated 2001, whereas Meinhardt
used the 1992 edition which was applicable at the time
the Terminal was designed.
There are new published guidelines for the structural
safety assessment of existing buildings from such
organizations as the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) which have evolved into published
documents for the structural rehabilitation of existing
buildings. TCGI have therefore suggested that MIAA and
the Philippine Government may wish to use the more
recent published documents to enhance/upgrade the
facility.
3.3.23 It would appear from the Arup documents reviewed that they have
taken this approach in their assessment of design i.e., consideration of
updated documents (NSCP 2001 and UBC 1997) whilst Meinhardt used the
relevant codes at the time of design which was NSCP 1992. Consequently
any results from assessments carried out to later published codes has no
direct bearing on the design of the facility which was carried out prior to the
issue of these later standards. As such any assessment and proposed
strengthening/retrofit works in this regard is considered to be an
enhancement of the design and has no relevance on the value of the NAIA
Terminal 3 facility as constructed under the original contract.
On the other hand, the relevant portions of the Tengson Report dated December
2010254 states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Page 103
 In addition, we should note herein that Takenaka’s structural designer, Messrs.
Meinhardt, concluded that its check on the structural ductility requirements (as
questioned by TCGI & Ove Arup) on elements which do not resist lateral forces, is in
full compliance of the Philippine Code NSCP 1992 and its originating design code
ACI-318 (1989), and this is supported by several members of the American Concrete
Institute (ACI). Both Takenaka and other parties (including Meinhardt and members of
the ACI), have concluded that TCGI & Ove Arup reports use several conflicting and
misunderstood mathematical models. These include but are not limited to the
following:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) TCGI used larger loadings than those specified in the “Design & Load Schedule Plan.”
Their modeling for “sector 3” uses incorrect storey elevations and the slab thickness did not match
(ii)
those on the “as built” plans.
(iii) Beam section sizes do not match those shown on the “as built” plans.
TCGI used “Dynamic Analysis” in their modeling, whereas there is no requirement for such an
(iv)
analysis in the Philippine Structural Code – NSCP 1992.
TCGI & Ove Arup used the updated NSCP 2001 (and UBC1997) Philipine Codes, yet Takenaka’s
(v) design was based upon the NSCP 1992 code because the 2001 updated was not available when
the NAIA 3 designs were completed in 2000.
TCGI & Ove Arup reports were based upon a system which incorporates frame beams and columns
(vi)as primary structural element, whereas the Takenaka design used a building frame system (Sheer
Wall System). Two differing design methods will lead to different results. 255
PIATCO also argued that it is not the sole entity responsible for the completion of and/or compliance with
the outstanding items in the JAC project status summary report dated February 28, 2003. The summary
report shows that some outstanding items should be performed by the Government. 256cralawrednad
While Scott Wilson stated that only retrofit works actually undertaken should be taken into consideration in
the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III,257 Takenaka and Asahikosan insisted that subsequent rectification works
in the NAIA-IPT III were only intended to ensure that the terminal would be compliant with the current
building laws and standards.258 They reiterated that the design of the NAIA-IPT III was compliant with the
NSCP 1992, the effective building code when the terminal was designed and built. 259cralawrednad
3.b.1. The Court cannot consider
the additional evidence submitted by Takenaka
and Asahikosan before the Court of Appeals
At the outset, we rule that we cannot consider Takenaka and Asahikosan’s attachments in their (1) Motion
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
for Submission of Additional Documents dated July 30, 2013; 260 (2) Supplemental Motion for
Submission of Additional Documents dated October 3, 2012;261 and (3) Second Supplemental
Motion for Submission of Additional Documents dated April 11, 2013 in CA G.R. No.
CV-98029.262 These attachments sought to refute the Government’s position that the NAIA-IPT III
suffered from massive structural defects.
Takenaka and Asahikosan posit that they could have submitted reports before the trial court to
show that the design of the NAIA-IPT III was structurally sound if the RTC had only furnished the
parties copies of the BOC Final Report and afforded them the opportunity to file a Comment on
the Final Report.
Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the
following cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, (2) annulment of judgment or final order, (3) quo
warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5) amparo, (6) habeas data, (7) anti-money
laundering, and (8) application for judicial authorization under the Human
Security Act of 2007;
(b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53 of
the Rules of Court;
(c) In appeals in criminal cases where the Court grants a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 124 of the
rules of Court; and
(d) In appeals involving claims for damages arising from provisional remedies.
(Emphasis supplied)
This provision qualifies the CA’s power to receive evidence in the exercise of its original and
appellate jurisdiction under Section 9 of BP 129, as amended:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall
exercise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence, and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
Page 104
 including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or
hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within
three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
Since Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the
Rules of Court, the CA could only have admitted newly discovered evidence. Contrary to Takenaka and
Asahikosan’s claim, the attachments to the motions are not newly discovered evidence. Newly discovered
evidence is evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the
trial, and which, if presented, would probably alter the result. 263cralawrednad
We find it hard to believe that Takenaka and Asahikosan could only have possibly secured the
attachments after the trial court had rendered its decision. With the exercise of reasonable diligence,
Takenaka and Asahikosan could have produced these documents before the BOC since they were fully
aware that the Government presented evidence on the alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III.
In fact, in their Manifestation/Submission dated November 3, 2009, Takenaka and Asahikosan attached
the “Report and Response from Takenaka & Asahikosan, Contactors for the NAIA 3 Facility and
Intervenors in the Expropriation case between the GRP and PIATCO – October 2009” to refute the
allegations of structural defects. Moreover, Takenaka and Asahikosan manifested that they were reserving
their right to submit additional reports, comments, and memoranda with respect to this issue. The relevant
portions of the Manifestation/Submission dated November 3, 2009 provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The record[s] of this case will show that to date, plaintiffs have submitted
various reports prepared by TCGI Engineers, Ove Arup & Partners
Massachusetts, Inc. and Gleeds (Bristol) Partnership to this Honorable
Court. The TCGI and Ove Arup Reports point out alleged defects on the IPT
3, while Gleeds made an attempt to establish the value of the IPT 3, taking
into account the findings of the TCGI and Ove Arup. Intervenors have not
given their comments on these reports since they have not been required to
do so by this Court.
2. With the RTC’s permission, intervenors respectfully submit the
attached “Report and Response from Takenaka & Asahikosan,
Contactors for the NAIA 3 Facility and Intervenors in the Expropriation
case between the GRP and PIATCO – October 2009” prepared by Mr.
Gary Taylor, in response to the above mentioned reports. Intervenors
respectfully manifest that they are reserving their right to submit
additional reports, comments and memoranda in support of this
submission and to aid this Honorable Court in determining the true
value of the IPT 3.264 (Emphasis supplied)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
3.b.2. Equiponderance of evidence on
the alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT
III favors PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan.
Nonetheless, even without considering and/or giving probative value to the additional evidence
presented by Takenaka and Asahikosan before the CA, this Court finds that the Government
failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from
structural defects.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person is innocent of
wrong;265 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;266that private transactions have been
fair and regular;267 and that the ordinary course of business has been followed.268cralawrednad
Based on these presumptions, we presume that Takenaka and Asahikosan built the NAIA-IPT III
in accordance with the specifications required under the Onshore Construction Contract and
Offshore Procurement Contract. We also presume that the NAIA-IPT III is structurally sound and
compliant with the applicable building codes and other laws at the time it was designed and built.
However, these presumptions are merely disputable presumptions and may be overcome by
contradicting evidence. The burden of proof lies with the Government to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from structural defects. “Preponderance
of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater
weight of credible evidence.”269cralawrednad
In determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witness’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility in so far as the same may
legitimately appear during trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, although
preponderance does not necessarily lie with the greater number. 270cralawrednad
The Government’s burden of proof to show that the NAIA-IPT III is indeed defective does not shift
to its adverse parties. The burden of proof remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it
is imposed.
It is the burden of evidence that shifts from party to party during trial.271 This means that the
burden of going forward with the evidence is met by the countervailing evidence of PIATCO,
Takenaka and Asahikosan which, in turn, balances the evidence introduced by the Government.
Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts back to the Government.
In the present case, the experts and consultants of the Government, PIATCO, Takenaka and
Page 105
Asahikosa arrived at conflicting findings regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III. The Elevated road 2,443,276
Government’s experts detailed with particularity the alleged defects of the NAIA-IPT III, which allegations
the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan refuted with particularity.
Miscellaneous
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and nothing
in the evidence inclines a conclusion to one side or the other, the court will find for the Alarms 154,460
defendant. 272cralawrednad
Defective Ceiling 479,626
If the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with the defense of the defendant, the evidence does
not fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, CUTE not working 2,774,563
or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof
fails. 273cralawrednad Inferior FIDS 22,020

The reason for this rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
BHS Inferior Screening Software 957,881
weakness of the defendant's claim. Thus, even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of
the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side when this evidence is insufficient in itself
to establish his cause of action.274cralawrednad Fire Protection Inferior coverage 924,851

In the present case, PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan, met the Government’s allegations Civil and HV
regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III.

Apron Civil 829,619

A reading of the reports of the parties’ respective experts shows that each party presented an equally
persuasive case regarding the structural soundness or defect of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government’s case
on the alleged structural defect of the NAIA-IPT III has been met by equally persuasive refutations by the Taxiway Civil 439,280
experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan.
Storm Water 2,604,081
As a matter of law and evidence, the Government’s case regarding this matter must fail. Since PIATCO,
Takenaka and Asahikosan presented equally relevant and sufficient countervailing evidence on the
structural soundness of the NAIA-IPT III, the scales of justice tilt in their favor. Neither party successfully HV 252,084
established a case by preponderance of evidence in its favor; neither side was able to establish its cause
of action and prevail with the evidence it had. As a consequence, we can only leave them as they Total 20,713,901
are.275cralawrednad

We thus add to the construction cost the sum of $20,713,901, itemized below:276cralawrednad Admittedly, the Government did not open to the public certain areas of the NAIA-IPT III because of
uncertainties on their structural integrity.277 The Scott Wilson Report also recognized that some
Item In Dollars retrofit works should also be undertaken in some of the areas of the NAIA-IPT III. It stated that
only retrofit works actually undertaken in the building should be taken into consideration in
appraising the NAIA-IPT III.278cralawrednad
Surface demolition 1,971,500

On August 14, 2012, the DOTC invited construction firms to participate in the P212.3 million
Structural retrofit 6,860,660 NAIA-IPT III structural retrofit project. The structural retrofit of the NAIA-IPT III that was offered for
bidding had eleven components: shear wall thickening; slab thickening; application of FRPs to
columns, beams and slabs; thickening of flat slab drop; enlarging of column size; enlarging pile

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 106

cap and footings; steel jacketing; providing shear blocks to pier headstock (elevated access roadway);
enlarging of pier footings (elevated access roadway); application of FRP to piers (elevated access
roadway); and increasing seismic gap between the elevated access roadway and adjacent structures
(sector 1, 2, car park).279 The Official Gazette further stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Shear wall thickening is meant to fortify the reinforced concrete wall to increase its
capacity against horizontal structure movement. At the same time, thickened slabs will
increase their bending capacity and resistance against heavy superimposed loadings.
the NAIA-IPT III. To reiterate, the measure of just compensation is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss.282cralawrednad
Consequently, we include in the computation of construction costs the excess concession
space in the amount of $1,081,272.00, and the four-level retail complex in the sum
of $12,809,485.00.283cralawrednad
4. Attendant costs of the NAIA-IPT III

Applying fiber-reinforced polymer (FRP) to columns, beams, and slabs will increase
their strength and resistance against excess loads and combined forces of elements.
A thicker flat slab drop is meant to strengthen the slab-column connection.
Bigger -sized columns will also increase their capacity against combined stresses,
while enlarged pile cap and footings will increase foundation capacity under
compression. They also prevent movement of the foundation during earthquakes.
Scott Wilson criticized the Gleeds Report for excluding the attendant costs in the construction cost
valuation. He stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3.1.13 Gleeds do (sic) not show any costs for planning and design
consultancy fees preconstruction. In our experience the following percentage
ranges of the construction cost would typically be the international norms for
these fees.

Steel jacketing is meant to resist the additional loads. Shear blocks to pier headstock  Attendant Costs Percentage Range
will provide a bridge interlock is meant to distribute excess load along the carriage
way.
 Architecture 3.0 to 4.0 %
Enlarged pier footings will prevent foundation overturning during earthquake events.
 Civil and Structural 1.0 to 4.0 %
Application of FRP to piers will also increase the column capacity and ductility against
combined stresses due to earthquake forces.
 Electrical and Mechanical2.5 to 3.5 %
Increased seismic gap between the elevated access roadway and adjacent structures
will reduce the risk of pounding between the bridge and building structure. 280
 Quantity Surveyor 1.0 %

However, no documents regarding the retrofit project exist as part of the record of the case. The retrofit bid  Project Management 1.0 %
took place in 2012, or after the promulgation of the trial court’s ruling. Hence, we have to disregard
Government claims pertaining to the retrofit project.
Total 8.5 to 11.5 %
3.c. The unnecessary areas

Gleeds excluded “unnecessary areas” from the computation of the base value. These unnecessary areas
3.1.14 On the basis of a construction cost valuation of the order of US$322
are the multi-level retail mall that is accessible only through the multi-storey car park (20,465 m2), and
million we would expect planning and design consultancy fees
the excess retail concession space (1,727 m2).281cralawrednad
preconstruction to be a minimum of US$27 million, based on typical
international norms.
We find the exclusion of the unnecessary areas from the base value unjustified. Since the
Government would expropriate the entire NAIA-IPT III, the Government should pay for the replacement
3.1.15 Some preliminary design was carried out by Takenaka prior to the
cost of the retail mall and the excess retail concession space. The Government cannot avoid payment
EPC tender design so slight lower planning and design consultancy fees
simply because it deems the retail mall and the retail concession space as unnecessary in its operation of
could be expected. It is understood that PIATCO have paid US$19.3 million

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 107

 to the designers PCI, SOM, PACICON and JGC (architect of record) and this
therefore appears a fair and reasonable fee.
3.1.16. In addition there is also the cost of site supervision. In this case there was the
independent QA role undertaken by Japan Airport Consultants and construction
supervision by PCI. It is noted that the Bid Document suggested that up to 3% of the
construction cost should be allowed for the independent QA role. In our experience
we would expect QA and construction supervision to cost between 3% and 5% of the
construction cost.
3.1.17 On the basis of a construction cost valuation of the order of US$322 million we
would expect the cost of construction supervision to be a minimum of US$9.5 million.
It is understood that PIATCO have paid US$7.9 million to the QA Inspectors (JAC)
and US$4.2 million to PCI, SOM, PACICON and JGC and this therefore appears not
reasonable.
Overall Summary
3.1.21 PIATCO has incurred consultancy fees and site preparation costs
of US$41.7 million (US$31.4 plus US$10.3 million) not included by
Gleeds in the Base Case CCV.284
In response, Tim Lunt asserted that its CCV of US$300,206,693.00 already includes the attendant
costs of US$36,279,033 under the heading “General Requirements and Conditions.” The sum of
US$36,279,033 represents the General Requirements Section of the Takenaka Bill of Quantities.
The “General Requirements and Conditions” is composed of engineering and architectural
services fees, quality assurance services fees, construction supervision services fees,
construction insurance, and site. Tim Lunt, however, admitted that the “General Requirements
and Conditions” exclude financing costs, and other associated costs. He likewise stated that
PIATCO’s attendant costs have no evidentiary support.

3.1.18 In summary, PIATCO have paid the following consultancy On December 14, 2010, PIATCO attached to its Compliance documentary evidence of its claimed
fees:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary attendant costs of US$70,197,802.00. These include photocopies of summary of payments for
architecture & engineering, quality assurance, construction supervision, construction insurance,
site development, other costs and financing costs, official receipts, statements of account, sales
Planning and design consultancy fees preconstruction US$19.3 million
invoices, endorsements, insurance policies and other related documents, acknowledgement
receipts, agreements, invoices, and bonds.
QA Inspectors US$7.9 million
PIATCO claims that the following entities rendered services in the construction of the NAIA-IPT
Construction supervision US$4.2 million III:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Total US$31.4 million Services Rendered Entities that Rendered the Services

Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc.

3.1.19 In our opinion these fees are in reasonable range. Engineering and Pacicon Philippines, Inc.
Architecture Architect J. G. Cheng
Site Preparation Costs RMJM Philippines, Inc.

3.1.20 We understand that PIATCO has incurred costs of US$10.3 million for Japan Airport Consultants
relocation of PAF existing facilities, removal of subterranean structures and site Quality Assurance
I.A. Campbell & Associates
preparation which the Gleeds Base Case CCV has not included.

Legal Costs Construction

Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc.
Supervision
3.1.21 We assume that in addition to the above fees PIATCO has incurred legal costs
in planning and constructing the development and this is quite normal on BOT Construction
Gotuaco del Rosario
concession contracts where contract agreements and responsibilities have to be Insurance
agreed between a number of different parties.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 108

 Bases Conversion Development Corporation Construction
US$4,302,227
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill Supervision
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc.
Natural Resource Development Corporation Construction
Serclan Enterprises US$4,329,272
Insurance
Geodesy Services, Inc.
Site Development Geotechnics Philippines, Inc.
Revalu Constructions & Supply Site Development US$8,358,169
N.O. Mercado Construction, Inc.
Lopez Drilling Enterprises Other Costs US$ 308,985
Monark Constructions
Illustrious Security and Investigation Agency, Inc.
Financing Costs US$26,602,890
Core Watchmen, Security and Detective Agency Corp.

Total US$70,197,802
Laguna Lake Development Authority
National Telecommunications Commission

Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The BOC, the RTC, and the CA uniformly found that PIATCO failed to substantiate its
Other Services attendant costs. The CA observed that PIATCO’s summarized computation of attendant costs
Manila Electric Company, Inc.
Maynilad was self-serving and unsupported by relevant evidence.
Philippine Long Distance Telecommunications, Inc.
Myrtle Intergen Exchange Corp. Unlike the BOC and the RTC which pegged the attendant cost at 10% of the construction cost as
an accepted industry practice, the CA made a finding that the “General Requirements and
Conditions” in the Gleeds’ Appraisal Report constitutes the attendant costs. The CA stated that
Dresdner / Kfw / Helaba Banks there is no need to further recognize and award separate attendant costs because these were
Financing Services Fraport AG/FAG already included in the construction cost valuation of US$300,206,693.00. The CA explained that
Deutsche Bank the attendant cost becomes part of the total construction cost once the construction is
completed.285cralawrednad

4.a. PIATCO’s attendant costs

Reyes Tacandong & Co. checked the mathematical accuracy of the attendant costs. PIATCO asserts that
it engaged the services of various consultants in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III and incurred the Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document,
following attendant costs:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
Attendant Costs Amount
The best evidence rule ensures that the exact contents of a document are brought before the
court. In deeds, wills, and contracts, a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in the
Engineering and rights and obligations of the parties. A substantial hazard of inaccuracy exists in the human
US$19,372,539
Architecture process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting. Moreover, with respect to oral testimony
purporting to give the terms of a document from memory, a special risk of error is present, greater
Quality Assurance US$6,923,720 than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.286cralawrednad

The best evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against fraud. If a party is in the possession
of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 109

presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production
would expose and defeat. The rule likewise protects against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.287cralawrednad
As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
non-original documents may be produced in court in the following cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
(a)
part of the offeror;
When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
(b)
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
(c) court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(d)
(Emphasis supplied)
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the original cannot be
produced by the party who offers the evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.288cralawrednad
PIATCO argues that its non-submission of original documents before the trial court is justified under
Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It points out that a party need not submit the original when it
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole. PIATCO
insists that the lower courts erred in not giving probative value to the report prepared by Reyes Tacandong
& Co., an auditing firm, validating PIATCO’s computation of attendant costs. Significantly, Reyes
Tacandong & Co. failed to state that it examined the original documents in validating PIATCO’s
computation of attendant costs.
We agree with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and voluminous invoices, official receipts, and
other relevant documents before the trial court to prove the attendant costs that it incurred in the
construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The trial court may admit a summary of voluminous original
documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party has shown that the underlying writings are numerous
and that an in-court examination of these documents would be inconvenient. In other words, Section 3
(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with the item-by-item court identification and
authentication of voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome and tedious for the
parties and the court.
However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous documents, the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original documents on which the
summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source documents being summarized are
also admissible if presented in court.289cralawrednad
In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and not secondary.
Furthermore, the source documents must likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that the
correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may be tested on cross-examination
and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type proceedings, a proper foundation for the
introduction of a summary may be established through the “testimony of the person who is
responsible for the summary's preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the
summary.”290cralawrednad
The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary of numerous documents
is, in strict terms, hearsay evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a party to
present a summary of numerous documents and immediately admit and give probative value to
such summary without sufficiently laying these foundations. If the source documents of the
summary are non-original, the trial court would commit a grave error in admitting and/or giving
probative value to the summary of non-original documents; the evidence admitted would
be double hearsay.291cralawrednad
Furthermore, when a party invokes Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he does not
similarly invoke Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He does not likewise
claim that the original documents have been lost or destroyed. The party merely asserts that the
numerous documents cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and that the fact
sought to be established from these documents is only the general result of the whole.
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3 (c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary of
numerous documents, whose originals are available to the adverse party for inspection. He
does not ask permission from the trial court to present in evidence the numerous non-original
documents. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be
defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-original documents would be identified, authenticated,
and cross-examined, leading to a tedious and protracted litigation.
Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must first
establish that the presentation of photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He must establish the presence of all the elements under these
provisions.
In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-original documents must first prove
the following elements before secondary evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence
or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its
non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. To conclude otherwise is to allow the party to
Page 110
circumvent the best evidence rule and the requirements under Section 3 (a), (b), and (d), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court by merely invoking Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated December 14, 2010, the photocopies of
numerous documents, and the validation of PIATCO’s computation of attendant costs prepared by
Reyes Tacandong & Co., among others. PIATCO justifies the non-presentment of original documents
pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We affirm the lower courts’ uniform findings that PIATCO failed to establish its attendant
costs. PIATCO failed to establish that the photocopied documents fall under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These photocopied documents are hearsay evidence. They are mere
scraps of paper and have no weight as basis for the attendant costs of the NAIA-IPT III.
We likewise cannot give weight to the summary prepared by Reyes Tacandong & Co. for being
double hearsay. Reyes Tacandong & Co., whose letter was addressed to PIATCO and not to the trial
court, did not state in its report that it examined the original documents allegedly proving attendant costs.
Moreover, in a letter dated December 14, 2010, Reyes Tacandong & Co stated it does not “express any
assurance on the attendant costs:”
We have performed the procedures agreed with Philippine International Air Terminals,
Co., (“the Company”) with respect to the Company’s attendant costs incurred in
building NAIA Terminal 3 from 1997 to 2004. Our engagement was undertaken in
accordance with the Philippine Standard on Related Services applicable to
agreed-upon procedures engagements.
xxxx
The sufficiency of the procedures is solely the responsibility of the specified users of
the report. Consequently, we make no representation regarding the sufficiency of the
procedures either for the purpose for which this report has been requested or for any
other purpose.
Because the procedures do not constitute either an audit or a review of financial
statements made in accordance with Philippine Standards on Auditing, we do not
express any assurance on the attendant costs. (Emphasis supplied)
4.b. The BOC and the RTC’s attendant cost
The CA correctly disregarded the BOC and the RTC’s computation of attendant costs, which both pegged
the attendant cost at 10% of the construction cost. The BOC and the RTC relied on the mean percentage
range of attendant cost which appears in the Scott Wilson Report as follows: 292cralawrednad
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Attendant Costs Percentage Range
Architecture 3.0 to 4.0 %
Civil and Structural 1.0 to 4.0 %
Electrical and Mechanical 2.5 to 3.5 %
Quantity Surveyor 1.0 %
Project Management 1.0 %
Total 8.5 to 11.5 %
The BOC and the RTC computed the mean percentage range by adding 8.5% and 11.5% and
dividing the result by 2, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(8.5 + 11.5)/2 = 10%
The mean percentage range is highly speculative and devoid of any factual basis. As a court of
law, we should only measure just compensation using relevant and actual evidence as basis in
fixing the value of the condemned property. Just compensation must be duly proven by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. 293 Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.294cralawrednad
In a case for damages, we allow the party to receive temperate damages in the absence of
competent proof on the amount of actual damages. Temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.295cralawrednad
We cannot adopt the same liberal attitude in an eminent domain case and merely estimate
the attendant cost in the total absence of evidence of construction costs. The amount of just
compensation must be substantiated by a preponderance of evidence.
An eminent domain case is different from a complaint for damages. A complaint for damages is
based on tort and emanates from the transgression of a right. A complaint for damages seeks to
vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with Article 19 of
the Civil Code and other provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results
in the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held
responsible.296cralawrednad
In contrast, an eminent domain case arises from the State’s exercise of its power to expropriate
private property for public use. The Constitution mandates that the property owner shall only
Page 111
receive just compensation which, of course, should be based on preponderance of evidence. Moreover, xxxx
the determination of eminent domain being a judicial function, there is no constitutional or statutory
provision giving the courts unfettered discretion to determine just compensation based on estimates and
conjectures. 39. The cost associated with the Independent QA role referred to by
Scott Wilson is included in the General Requirements section of the
4.c. The Government’s attendant cost CCV. (Emphasis supplied)

We affirm the CA’s factual finding that the Government’s computation of construction cost
valuation already includes the attendant costs. In the Gleeds Report dated December 22, 2010, Tim The Government’s CCV already includes attendant costs which are incorporated in the “General
Lunt sufficiently explained:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Requirements and Conditions.” On the basis of the Bills of Quantities, Gleeds took into account
indirect costs in constructing the NAIA-IPT III, summarized below:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
9. I consider that Engineering and Architecture, Quality Assurance, Construction
Supervision, Construction Insurance and Site Development are clearly costs which Attendant Costs under General Requirements and Conditions
are included for in the CCV. The CCV includes costs associated with the General
Requirements (see Appendix D – Summary). The costs of Site Development are also
Design $6,439,680.00297
included (see CCV Appendix D – Part 2, page 5 of 38).
Staff and labour $10,491,139.54298
xxxx Insurance $925,210.78299
Professional Indemnity Insurance $2,200,000.00300
25. Scott Wilson states at paragraph 2.2.14 that the constructions costs “are exclusive Consequential Loss Insurance $800,000.00301
of all other attendant costs, such as the engineering and architectural services fees,
Setting out $364,647.00302
quality assurance services fees, construction supervision services fees, construction
insurance, site development costs, financing costs and other associated costs.” This Health and Safety $403,224.00303
statement is incorrect. It is clear on the inspection of the General Requirements
Environmental management $176,490.00304
sections of the Takenaka Bills of Quantities that some if not all of these items
are included in the assessment of the construction costs made by PIATCO with Design $2,631,100.00305
the exception of 1) financing costs and 2) other associated costs, for which Staff and labour $2,590,774.19306
there is no definition. Scott Wilson makes no reference to the Takenaka Bills of
Quantities nor do they use them as documents which they have reviewed in Insurance $71,109.77307
paragraph 1.4.1 of their report. I do not understand how Scott Wilson can ignore the Total $27,093,375.28
items which are included in the Bills of Quantities under the heading General
Requirements and make the suggestion that they are additional costs which should
be considered.
5. Deductions from the replacement
cost of the NAIA-IPT III
xxxx
5.a. Depreciation should be
deducted from the replacement
36. In respect of the Engineering Consultancy Fees set out by Scott Wilson, it is cost.
clear to me on inspection of the General Requirements section of the On shore
and Off shore Bills of Quantities that an element of design fees included as In eminent domain cases, it is acceptable that a “deduction should be made to the extent to which
Costs has also been included in the CCVs and should not therefore be included the improvement or fixture has depreciated. The cost of the buildings and fixtures, minus
as an addition. Scott Wilson has not provided any specific information on the actual depreciation, is a reasonable test of the amount by which they enhance the market value of the
cost or extent of service provided in respect of engineering consultancy. land even where the market value of the land itself is not readily quantifiable.”308cralawrednad

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 112


In order for this Court to arrive at a valid indication of the market value of the NAIA-IPT III, we must
consider accrued depreciation, which is the loss in value of the terminal.
Contrary to the CA’s position, “depreciation” is used in different contexts in valuation and financial
accounting. As earlier discussed, in appraisal, depreciation “refers to the reduction or writing down of the
cost of a modern equivalent asset to reflect the obsolescence and relative disabilities affecting the actual
asset”309 or “loss in value from any cause.”310 It is further defined as “the reduction or writing down of the
cost of a modern equivalent asset to reflect the obsolescence and relative disabilities affecting the actual
asset.”311cralawrednad
In contrast, depreciation in accounting refers to “a charge made against an entity’s income to reflect the
consumption of an asset over a particular accounting period.”312 It is the “process of allocating to expense
the cost of a plant asset over its useful (service) life in a rational and systematic manner.” 313 Accumulated
depreciation is reported as a deduction from plant assets and affects the income statement through
depreciation expenses. Thus, the cost allocation is designed to match expenses with revenues.
In financial accounting, “depreciation is a process of cost allocation, not a process of asset valuation. No
attempt is made to measure the change in an asset’s market value during ownership because” it is
assumed that plant assets are not held for resale.314 Book depreciation refers to “the amount of capital
recapture written off an owner’s books”; it is not market derived.315 Thus, the book value – original cost
less accumulated depreciation – of an asset may be different from the market value. Consequently, an
asset can have zero book value but still have a significant market value.316cralawrednad
Simply put, book depreciation is measured against the book value or original cost of the property and is
the amount of capital recapture written off an owner’s books. 317Accrued depreciation is measured
against the current market value of the property. 318cralawrednad
Under the depreciated replacement cost method, accrued depreciation is the difference between the
“replacement cost of the improvements on the effective date of the appraisal and the market value of the
improvements on the same date.”319cralawrednad
In the Gleeds Report, Tim Lunt stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Deterioration
3.2.7 The Arup Site Observation Report identifies a number of items which have
deteriorated since suspension of the construction of Terminal 3 in December 2002.
3.2.8 A provisional value has been assessed against the items identified in the Arup
report at $1,738,318.
The deterioration items have been costed with a base date of 2Q09. Calculation of
this amount is contained in Appendix ‘E.’ Further examination and costing of each of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the identified items are required and, therefore, the costs of these items will
require adjustment based on the actual date when the rectification works are
carried out.
Depreciation
3.2.0 An Assessment has been made of the depreciated value of the assets
from December 2002 when construction was suspended to December 2004
when Terminal 3 was expropriated by the Republic.
3.2.10 A depreciation value has been assessed at $USD35,076,294 in 3Q01
Manila prices. Calculation of this amount showing the various asset lives
assumed is included in Appendix “J.”
3.2.11 Based on the deductions for deterioration and depreciation between
December 2002 and December 2004, the Base Value CCV at the time of
expropriation is $USD263,392,081.320cralawrednad
In the Scott Wilson report, he stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3.7.1 We consider the question of depreciation in this instance to be a
financial and legal issue which has to be dealt with in accordance with
Philippine law.
3.7.2 We therefore do not feel qualified to comment on the legal issue except
that we do not understand how deterioration in section 3.6 and depreciation
can both be applied as surely this means that Gleeds (sic) have double
counted the effect of any deterioration. (Emphasis supplied)321
In response, Tim Lunt argued:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
14. With respect to PIATCO’s hypothetical inclusion of inflation, I do not
consider that inflation should be applied to the base value as the replacement
cost method establishes the cost of construction when completed in
December 2002.
15. The base values included in the CCVs are the same for the December
2002 and December 2004. The December 2004 base value is not adjusted to
account for inflation because the items which make up the construction of
NAIA3, i.e., the labour, plant, materials, systems and equipment installed
should not be paid for at a higher rate (that takes into account inflation) than
the rate which would have been paid when they were purchased at the earlier
date. Put simply, it makes no sense to apply December 2004 prices to items
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 bought and used in the construction of NAIA3 sometime between June 2000 and
December 2002.
16. PIATCO do (sic) not consider depreciation. Having explained above why inflation
should not be included, it is the application of a similar logic which demonstrates why
depreciation should be included. In the case of NAIA3 the materials, systems and
equipment installed are at least two years older as at December 2004 than at the time
they were incorporated into the construction of NAIA3. Their value should therefore be
less. The method used for assessing this reduced value is that of
depreciation.322cralawrednad
66. Scott Wilson provide a “Summary of Conclusions on deductions at section 3.11
and my responses to each of the items contained in their “comment” column are as
follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
 Deterioration – “Major deduction for baggage system not justified” – The
deterioration in the baggage systems is clearly set out in the Arup (and
Gensler) Site Observation Report dated August 2007, at section 9.2. The
cost deduction is set out in Appendix to the previous CCV report which
Scott Wilson do (sic) not appear to have reviewed.
 Depreciation – Scott Wilson states “This issue appears to be a legal issue and
should be commented on by legal expert” and offers no technical or cost
related comments relevant to the CCV.
On the other hand, Gary Taylor commented:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gleeds have (sic) assessed a depreciation value of US$35,076,294 (11.68%) to
conclude its 4Q04 value. This concept of depreciation is contrary to the GRP’s own
statistics which shows a Consumer Price Index for Manila (“CPI”) increase from 107.8
(Aug 01) to 125.1 (Nov. 04), a 16% increase over the period. The CPI is a
conglomerate of all consumer prices in the Manila region and includes property values
and is published by the GRP on a monthly basis. In assessing such a depreciation
value, Gleeds have (sic) taken an arbitrary life cycle of the building and assumed a
write off of asset over that period, then assessed the two (2) year depreciation over
the period 3Q01 to 4Q04. Whilst we acknowledge that an airport terminal building is
something of a specialized asset and appreciation of value is not always in line with
the area’s general value assessments, it is still a major structure and appreciation
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
before depreciation (which should be limited to equipment and fittings within
the building) should not be discounted. The concept of long term value of an
asset on a similar concept is proven out by NAIA Terminal 1, which since its
construction more than 30 years ago has maintained a value to this date.323
We uphold the Government’s computed extent of deterioration and depreciation. In
the Reply to Tengson International Ltd. Report and Response from Takenaka and Asahikosan
dated December 7, 2010, Tim Lunt explained that “[t]he asset lives are taken specifically from
experience in preparing Asset Revaluations for Airport properties which are used as an input for
annual published accounts, which are in turn audited by appointed Accountants.”324cralawrednad
Takenaka and Asahikosan should have provided for contrary assumptions with respect to the
useful lives of the subject assets if they did not agree with the Government’s assumptions. Instead,
Gary Taylor merely referred to the valuation of the NAIA Terminal I without any factual basis to
support his claim. Moreover, Scott Wilson did not question the assumed useful life of the
NAIA-IPT III, but agreed that the question of whether depreciation should be deducted is a legal
issue.
Since PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan failed to present contrary assumptions or estimates
with respect to the NAIA-IPT III’s useful life, we adopt Tim Lunt’s computations with respect to
deterioration and depreciation.
5.b. Rectification for contract
compliance should not be deducted from
the replacement cost.
However, we hold that the cost for “rectification for contract compliance” should not be
deducted from the base value, as the contract, being void, cannot be
ratified.325cralawredcralawrednad
In the present case, the Court already nullified the PIATCO contracts for being contrary to public
policy in Agan. A substantial amendment to a contract awarded through public bidding, when such
subsequent amendment was made without a new public bidding, is null and void. The PIATCO
contracts contain material and substantial amendments that substantially departed from the
bidded contract. If at all, the declaration of nullity of a contract only operates to restore things to
their state and condition before the contract’s execution.326cralawrednad
Moreover, Takenaka and Asahikosan, as subcontractors in the NAIA-IPT III project, were not
bound by the nullified PIATCO contracts. Takenaka and Asahikosan were only bound to perform
their contractual obligations under the Onshore Construction Contract and Offshore Procurement
Contract, respectively. They were not bound by the nullified PIATCO contracts.
If there had indeed been variations from the Onshore Construction Contract and Offshore
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Procurement Contract, the cause of action for breach of contract and damages lies with PIATCO. For
purposes of determining just compensation, the Government cannot rely on the specifications in the Bid
Documents precisely because the concession agreement between PIATCO and the Government had
already been nullified. The Government cannot complain of contract noncompliance in an eminent domain
case, whose cause of action is not based on a breach of contract, but on the peremptory power of the
State to take private property for public use.
Consequently, deductions from the base value of the cost of non-compliance with bid documents as well
as inferior quality items have no legal basis. Gleeds’ reliance on the NAIA-IPT III bid documents is
misplaced.
As Scott Wilson correctly pointed out, the decisive factor of the deductibility of items under “noncompliance
with bid documents” is whether they are functional. The Scott Wilson report shows that, except for the
nonprovision of moving walkway, the alleged noncompliant items are functional.327 Also, the nonprovision
of a moving walkway should not be deducted from the base value. The only consequence of the failure to
provide a moving walkway is the need to construct one, which would only increase the construction
cost.328 The increase in the construction cost, however, should not be included as part of just
compensation as this Court is only tasked to determine the construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III as of
December 21, 2004.
For these same reasons, we cannot allow the deduction in the amount of $75,570,510.00
“additional areas to be built.” These are “areas where the minimum requirements stated in the Bid
Documents have not been met and are necessary for the operation” of the NAIA-IPT III. These areas
include:
 Departure hall 22,462 m2
 Meeter/greeter hall 14,696 m2
 Ramp operations 13,640 m2
 Offices 4,370 m2
 Hold rooms 3,729 m2
 Public toilets 2,351 m2
 Hardstand hold rooms 1,442 m2
 Delayed flight restaurant 620 m2329
6. Adjustments to the Replacement Cost
6.a. The replacement cost should
be adjusted to December 2004 values.
Gleeds used the Principle Quantities approach in determining the gross replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT
III.330 Gleeds calculated the cost of construction based on the midpoint between June 2000 and December
2002 to arrive at the December 2002 CCV. According to Gleeds, the cost of construction based on its
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
midpoint or the third quarter of 2001 is a recognized standard practice in the construction
industry.331cralawrednad
Gleeds did not adjust the base valuation of $300,206,693.00 as of December 2002 to reflect
the current gross replacement cost as of December 2004. It merely assumed that the gross
replacement cost as of December 2002 is the same as the gross replacement cost as of
December 2004. It stated that it did not consider inflation in determining the base valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III as of December 2004:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
14. With respect to PIATCO’s hypothetical inclusion of inflation, I do not
consider that inflation should be applied to the base value as the
replacement cost method establishes the cost of construction when
completed in December 2002.
15. The base values included in the CCVs are the same for December
2002 and December 2004. The December 2004 is not adjusted to
account for inflation because the items which make up the construction
of NAIA3, i.e., the labour, plant, materials, systems and equipment
installed should not be paid for at a higher rate (that takes into account
inflation) than the rate which would have been paid when they were
purchased at the earlier date. Put simply, it makes no sense to apply
December 2004 prices to items bought and used in the construction of
NAIA3 sometime between June 2000 and December 2002.332 (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR provides that the replacement cost shall be based on
the current market prices of construction and attendant costs. Under the depreciated
replacement cost method, the replacement cost shall be based on the current gross replacement
cost of the asset.
In its pleadings, the Government itself explained that the cost of replacing an asset under both
depreciated replacement cost and new replacement cost methods should be measured at
its current prices.
In our jurisdiction, the word “current” should be equated with the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. In the present case, the word “current” should
necessarily refer to December 21, 2004, the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
In National Power Corporation v. Co,333 the Court suppletorily applied Section 4, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court in determining the value of the property sought to be expropriated for purposes of
implementing national infrastructure projects. Under the Rules of Court, just compensation shall
be determined from the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. Thus, where the filing of an action precedes the taking of the
Page 115
property, just compensation shall be computed as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.334cralawrednad
The relevant valuation date when we shall reckon the current gross replacement cost is December 21,
2004, or the date of filing of the complaint for expropriation.
The Government’s base valuation of $300,206,693.00 is only a measurement of the current gross
replacement cost as of December 2002. We agree with PIATCO that the gross replacement cost of the
NAIA-IPT III as of December 2002 should be adjusted to its cost as of December 2004 for the plain reason
that the Government’s computed gross replacement cost is not current, as required by the Rules of Court
and jurisprudence.
Equity dictates that we should adjust the replacement cost at December 2004 values using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).335 This Court should not be confined and restricted by the use of the
depreciated replacement cost method, especially in this case where the calculated base valuation as of
December 2004 appears to be not truly reflective of the current gross replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III
at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
In adjusting the gross replacement cost to December 2004 values, this Court takes cognizance of the fact
that the cost of goods and services in the Philippines increased from 2002 until 2004. This is shown by the
CPI which is used in calculating the inflation rate and the purchasing power of the peso. 336PIATCO
correctly arrived at the inflation rate of 1.0971 using the prevailing CPI from November 29, 2002, or the
date of the suspension of works in the NAIA-IPT III until December 21, 2004, or the date when the
Government filed the expropriation complaint.337cralawrednad
7. Interests, Fruits and Income
7.a. Computation of Interests
To avoid confusion in computing interests, we first distinguish three interrelated concepts in just
compensation: (1) the valuation period of just compensation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; (2) the
reckoning period of interest in eminent domain cases pursuant to Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the initial and final payments of just compensation under RA 8974.
Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the property sought to be expropriated shall be
appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the complaint for expropriation,
whichever is earlier, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed
by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to
dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court
deems just and equitable. (4a) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[n]o private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.” The 1987 Constitution thus commands
the condemnor to pay the property owner the full and fair equivalent of the property from the
date of taking. This provision likewise presupposes that the condemnor incurs delay if it does not
pay the property owner the full amount of just compensation on the date of taking.338cralawrednad
The reason is that just compensation would not be “just” if the State does not pay the property
owner interest on the just compensation from the date of the taking of the property. Without
prompt payment, the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its
fruits or income. The owner’s loss, of course, is not only his property but also its
income-generating potential.339cralawrednad
Ideally, just compensation should be immediately made available to the property owner so that he
may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived
income from his expropriated property.
However, if full compensation is not paid for the property taken, then the State must pay for the
shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of
replacement property from which income can be derived. Interest on the unpaid compensation
becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and as a basic
measure of fairness.340cralawrednad
Thus, interest in eminent domain cases “runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course
from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of
the date of taking.”341cralawrednad
Lastly, RA 8974 requires the Government to pay just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon
the filing of the complaint, when the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, and the value of the improvements and/or
structures sought to be expropriated (initial payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the
determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, in which case the implementing
agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court (final payment).
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In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and
there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the initial payment shall be the proffered value of the
property. Section 4 of RA 8974 also states that the initial payment of just compensation is a prerequisite
for the trial court’s issuance of a writ of possession, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. – Whenever it is necessary to
acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency
shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following
guidelines:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section
7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal
valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the
date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency
and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered
value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall
present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official
concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency’s
proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner
within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the
decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency
shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Government’s initial payment of just compensation does not excuse it from avoiding payment
of interest on the difference between the adjudged amount of just compensation and the initial
payment.
The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the issuance of the writ of possession under RA
8974 only provides the Government flexibility to immediately take the property for public
purpose or public use pending the court’s final determination of just compensation. Section 4 (a)
of RA 8974 only addresses the Government’s need to immediately enter the privately owned
property in order to avoid delay in the implementation of national infrastructure projects.
Otherwise, Section 4 of RA 8974 would be repugnant to Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution which mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. To reiterate, the Constitution commands the Government to pay the property
owner no less than the full and fair equivalent of the property from the date of taking.
In the present case, the Government avers that PIATCO is not entitled to recover interest.
According to the Government, PIATCO should not be allowed to profit from the void contracts.
This contention, however, stems from a mistaken understanding of interest in expropriation cases.
Contrary to the Government’s opinion, the interest award is not anchored either on the law of
contracts or damages; it is based on the owner’s constitutional right to just compensation.
The difference in the amount between the final payment and the initial payment – in the interim or
before the judgment on just compensation becomes final and executory – is not unliquidated
damages which do not earn interest until the amount of damages is established with reasonable
certainty. The difference between final and initial payments forms part of the just
compensation that the property owner is entitled from the date of taking of the property.
Thus, when the taking of the property precedes the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the
Court orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation from the date of taking
whose interest shall likewise commence on the same date. The Court does not rule that the
interest on just compensation shall commence the date when the amount of just compensation
becomes certain, e.g., from the promulgation of the Court’s decision or the finality of the eminent
domain case.
With respect to the amount of interest on just compensation, we decisively ruled in Republic v.
Court of Appeals342 that the just compensation due to the property owner is effectively a
forbearance of money, and not indemnity for damages.343 Citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,344 we awarded a legal interest of 12% per annum on just compensation. The
Court upheld the imposition of the 12% interest rate in just compensation cases, as ruled in
Republic, in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,345Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Wycoco,346Republic v. Court of Appeals,347Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,348Philippine
Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,349 and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.350The Court
reiterated the Republic ruling in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of
Page 117
the Philippines,351Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera,352Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Goduco,353 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr.354cralawrednad
On June 21, 2013, the BSP issued Circular No. 799,355 pursuant to MB Resolution No. 796 dated May 16,
2013, reducing the legal interest on loans and forbearance of money from 12% to 6% per annum. BSP
Circular No. 799 took effect on July 1, 2013.
In the present case, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III on December
21, 2004. On the same day, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government upon the
deposit of P3,002,125,000.00 with the Land Bank. In Gingoyon, the Court held in abeyance the
implementation of the writ of possession pending the direct payment of the proffered value of
P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO.
On September 11, 2006, the RTC reinstated the writ of possession after the Government tendered
PIATCO a check in this amount.
On April 11, 2012, the MIAA and the Land Bank entered into an escrow agreement in the amount of
$82,157,716.73. On the same date, the MIAA and the DBP likewise executed an escrow agreement in the
amount of $34,190,924.59.
Based on these factual circumstances, interest shall accrue as follows:
1. The principal amount of just compensation shall be appraised on the date of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or on December 21, 2004. The just compensation shall not earn
interest from December 21, 2004, until September 10, 2006, since the Government did not take
possession of the NAIA-IPT III during this period.
2. The difference between the principal amount of just compensation and the proffered value of
P3,002,125,000.00 shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of taking or
September 11, 2006 until June 30, 2013.
3. The difference between the principal amount of just compensation and the proffered value of
P3,002,125,000.00 shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013, until the finality
of the Court’s ruling.
4. The total amount of just compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality
of the Court’s ruling until full payment.
The execution of the escrow agreements shall not affect the accrual of interest in this case. In its
Manifestation and Motion dated July 8, 2011, the Government stated that the escrow accounts shall be
subject to the condition that “[t]he claimant(s) shall have been held to be entitled to receive the sum
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
claimed from the ‘Just Compensation (NAIA Terminal 3) Fund’ in accordance with Philippine law
and regulation, by a final, binding and executory order or award of the expropriation
court.”356cralawrednad
Clearly, the Government does not intend to pay the just compensation due to either
PIATCO or Takenaka and Asahikosan during the pendency of the expropriation case or
until the finality of the Court’s rulings in G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731.
7.b. PIATCO is not entitled to
the fruits and income of the
NAIA-IPT III.
PIATCO insists that aside from the interest on just compensation, it is also entitled to all income
generated from the operations of the NAIA-IPT III, from the date of taking up to the present.
PIATCO’s claim is unmeritorious. The State, by way of interest, makes up for the shortfall in the
owners’ earning potential and the absence of replacement property from which income can be
derived. This is because the interest awarded by the expropriation court is, in reality, the
equivalent of the fruits or income of the seized property.357 In fact, PIATCO itself admitted in its
petition in G.R. No. 209731 that the interest on just compensation already answers for the loss of
income that the owner suffered as a result of the State’s deprivation of the ordinary use of his
property.358cralawrednad
Thus, we cannot allow PIATCO to profit from the operation of the NAIA-IPT III whose funds are
sourced from the public coffers. Otherwise, PIATCO would be doubly compensated and unjustly
enriched to the detriment of the taxpayers.
8. The BOC’s Expenses
8.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan should
not share in the BOC’s expenses.
Takenaka and Asahikosan refuse to share in the expenses of the BOC. They argue that pursuant
to Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, the Government should solely shoulder the costs
incurred in the expropriation case.
The Government, on the other hand, asserts that Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the expropriation court to order the parties to equally share the costs of an
action. Hence, the court can require third-party intervenors, i.e., Takenaka and Asahikosan, to
share in the expenses of the BOC. It points out that PIATCO already shared in the expenses of
the BOC and tendered the sum of P2,550,000.00 to the RTC.
We find no merit in the Government’s assertion.
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The relevant rule is found in Section 12, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court which Deterioration $ 35,076,295.00
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

REPLACEMENT COST AS OF DECEMBER 2002 $ 297,996,738.00

SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a
part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by MULTIPLY:
the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs
of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. [Emphasis supplied] Inflation Rate of 1.0971

This provision specifically deals with the costs of eminent domain cases. Hence, we find that Section 1, REPLACEMENT COST AS OF DECEMBER 21, 2004 $ 326,932,221.26
Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, more specifically, the statement allowing the court to divide the costs of an
action to either party to the case, is inapplicable to the present case. ADD:

Based on the clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is the plaintiff – in this case, the Government – not the
Interests from September 11, 2006 to December 2014 $ 242,810,918.54
property owner or third-party intervenors, i.e.,Takenaka and Asahikosan, who shall shoulder the costs of
the expropriation before the court of origin. Since the expenses of the BOC form part of the costs of the
suit – as these are expenses necessary in prosecuting or defending an action or a distinct proceeding LESS:
within an action – the Government solely bears the expenses of the BOC. The property owner shall only
bear the costs of the appeal if he loses in his appeal. Proffered Value $ 59,438,604.00

PIATCO, in its pleading, has not questioned its share in the expenses of the BOC before the Court.
JUST COMPENSATION AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2014 $ 510,304,535.80
PIATCO’s voluntary sharing in the expenses of the BOC and its non-objection to its payment amount to a
waiver of its right not to share in the expenses of the BOC.

In sum, just compensation shall be computed as shown below:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Number Interest Principal Straight
Period Formula
Base Current Cost Valuation (Inclusive of Attendant Cost) $ 300,206,693.00 of Days Rate Amount Interest

ADD: September 11, 2006

to principal*rate*(113/365) 113 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $9,937,571.10
December 31, 2006
Excess Concession Space $ 1,081,272.00

January 1, 2007 to
Four-Level Retail Complex $ 12,809,485.00 principal*rate 365 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $32,099,234.07
December 31, 2007

Exclusions due to Structural Issues $ 20,713,901.00

January 1, 2008 to
principal*rate 365 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $32,099,234.07
December 31, 2008
LESS:
January 1, 2009 to
principal*rate 365 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $32,099,234.07
Depreciation $ 1,738,318.00 December 31, 2009

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 119

January 1, 2010 to
principal*rate 365 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $32,099,234.07 PIATCO, on the other hand, bases its claim for just compensation on its ownership of the
December 31, 2010
NAIA-IPT III and on the ruling in Agan and Gingoyon that PIATCO should be fully compensated
as the builder and owner of the NAIA-IPT III.
January 1, 2011 to
principal*rate 365 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $32,099,234.07
December 31, 2011 For its part, the Government refuses to make further payments to PIATCO. Instead, it created an
escrow account in favor of the “entitled claimants” of just compensation. The Government fears
January 1, 2012 to that the NAIA-IPT III would still be burdened with liens and mortgages – as a result of PIATCO’s
principal*rate 365 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $32,099,234.07
December 31, 2012 indebtedness to other entities – even after it pays PIATCO the full amount of just compensation.

January 1, 2013 to 9.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s

principal * rate *
181 days 12% $267,493,617.26 $15,917,702.38 intervention in the case as unpaid
June 30, 2013 (181/365)
subcontractors is proper.

July 1, 2013 to principal*rate* The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned.
189 days 6% $267,493,617.26 $8,310,623.62
December 31, 2013 (189/365) They include all other persons owning, occupying, or claiming to own the property. Under
Sections 8 and 14 of RA 8974 IRR, in relation with Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, all
January 1, 2014 to persons who claim to have lawful interest in the property to be condemned should be included as
principal*rate 365 days 6% $267,493,617.26 $16,049,617.04 defendants in the complaint for expropriation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
December 31, 2014

Total Section 8 of RA 8974 IRR. Expropriation. – If the owner of a private property

$242,810,918.54
needed by the government implementing agency does not agree to convey
his property to the government by any of the foregoing modes of acquiring
and/or transferring ownership of the property, then the government shall
exercise its right of eminent domain by filing a complaint with the proper Court
Total Interest from for the expropriation for the private property.
Just Compensation as of
Formula Principal Amount September 11, 2006
December 31, 2014
to December 31, 2014 The verified complaint shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be
expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own,
Principal
$510,304,535.80 or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing as far as
Amount + $267,493,617.26 $ 242,810,918.54
practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any
Interest
property sought to be condemned appears to be in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals,
or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot
with accuracy or certainty specify the real owners, averment to that
9. PIATCO as the Lawful Recipient of Just Compensation. effect may be made in the complaint.

After determining the amount of just compensation, we next resolve the question of who shall receive the
full amount of just compensation.
Takenaka and Asahikosan contend that as actual builders of the NAIA-IPT III, they are lawfully entitled to
receive just compensation. They pray that just compensation of at least $85,700,000.00 be set aside
through an escrow account or other means, in their favor, to answer for their pending money claims
against PIATCO in G.R. No. 202166.
Section 14 of RA 8974 IRR. Trial Proceedings. – Within sixty (60)-day period
prescribed by the Act, all matters regarding defences and objections to
the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims,
effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents
affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on
expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 120


Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. —
If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to
any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the
person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain
it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (9a) (Emphasis
supplied)
All persons who have lawful interest in the property sought to be expropriated should be impleaded in the
complaint for purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just compensation. If a known owner
is not joined as defendant, he may intervene in the proceeding. If the owner is joined but not served with
process and the proceeding is already closed before he came to know of the condemnation, he may
maintain an independent suit for damages.
Consequently, Takenaka and Asahikosan are correct in invoking Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
for purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just compensation in this case. This rule is likewise
their proper basis of intervention in the RTC’s March 12, 2007 order in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
Our ruling on this point does not contradict Section 4 (a) of RA 8974 which provides for a scheme of direct
and immediate initial payment to the property owner in cases involving national government
infrastructure projects.
Section 4 (a) of RA 8974 applies only to cases where the issue of ownership of the expropriated property is
not disputed. In cases where the ownership is contested; where conflicting claims or interests over the
expropriated property exist; or where there are other incidents affecting the complaint for expropriation, the
governing rule is Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. By creating a separate provision applicable only
to the latter cases, Section 14 of RA 8974 IRR359 necessarily acknowledged that the scheme of immediate
and direct initial payment is not an absolute and all-encompassing rule applicable in all circumstances.
We are aware of our pronouncement in the December 19, 2005 Gingoyon decision directing the
Government to directly and immediately pay PIATCO the proffered value of P3 billion. We rendered the
December 19, 2005 Decision based on the fact that Takenaka and Asahikosan were not yet parties to
G.R. No. 166429 and Civil Case No. 04-0876 at that time. The Court denied Takenaka and Asahikosan’s
motions for leave to intervene in our February 1, 2006 Resolution in Gingoyon for palpable violation of
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which only allows intervention before the rendition of judgment by
the court. Moreover, Takenaka and Asahikosan had not yet instituted Civil Case No. 06-171 (the
enforcement case) when we promulgated our rulings in Gingoyon.
The RTC’s issuance of the March 12, 2007 order, which is binding on the parties and which allows
Takenaka and Asahikosan to intervene in the case, changed the factual circumstances of this case. As an
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
incident in our determination of the just compensation, we necessarily should resolve the issue of
NAIA-IPT III’s ownership and the question of who the recipient of the just compensation should be.
9.b. The property owner is entitled
to just compensation.
Citing Agan, Takenaka and Asahikosan argue that the Court intended that the real builders of the
NAIA-IPT III should be paid just compensation. Takenaka and Asahikosan assert that they are the
entities who actually built the NAIA-IPT III pursuant to the Onshore Construction and Offshore
Procurement Contracts. In Agan, the Court declared that PIATCO is the builder of the NAIA-IPT III.
The Court stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures
comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have
been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over
the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the
said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law
and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
PIATCO and its investors.360
This finding is likewise affirmed in our February 1, 2006 Resolution in Gingoyon where we
declared:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court is not wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual
premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly,
whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against
PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established. Neither
Takenaka nor Asahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus have
not presented any claim which could be acted upon by this Court. The earlier
adjudications in Agan v. PIATCO made no mention of either Takenaka or
Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as to their rights to any form
of compensation. If there is indeed any right to remuneration due to these two
entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the courts
of the land.
It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution
dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that PIATCO,
as builder of the facilities, must first be justly compensated in
accordance with law and equity for the Government to take over the
facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated this case in its
19 December 2005 Decision.
While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court
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 in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82
Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet binding on
Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is
not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is
likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a
foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public
policy.
Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties
relating to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how such obligations, yet unproven,
could serve to overturn the Decision mandating that the Government first pay
PIATCO the amount of 3.02 Million Pesos before it may acquire physical
possession over the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the mechanism established
by the law the amount to be initially paid is that which is provisionally
determined as just compensation. The provisional character of this payment
means that it is not yet final, yet sufficient under the law to entitle the
Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.
There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for Reconsideration
wherein all other claims relating to the airport facilities may be ventilated,
proved and determined. Since such claims involve factual issues, they must
first be established by the appropriate trier of facts before they can be accorded
any respect by or binding force on this Court.361 [Emphasis supplied]
Contrary to Takenaka and Asahikosan’s position, in the Philippine jurisdiction, the person who is solely
entitled to just compensation is the owner of the property at the time of the taking.362As shown below,
the test of who shall receive just compensation is not who built the terminal, but rather who its true owner is.
From the express provision of Section 4 of RA 8974, just compensation shall only be paid to the property
owner. We implead persons with lawful interests in the property in order to determine the person who shall
receive just compensation. Note that the last paragraph, Section 4 of RA 8974 states: “When the decision
of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference
between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.” This provision
thus envisions a situation where the court determines with finality, for purposes of payment of just
compensation, the conflicting claims of the defendants and intervenors.
The cases cited by Takenaka and Asahikosan are inapplicable to justify their right to receive just
compensation. The Court did not award just compensation to a non-owner in De Knecht v. Court of
Appeals.363 The Court held in that case that a person who had no legal interest in the property at the time
of the filing of a complaint for expropriation had no right to intervene in the case. The Court ruled that only
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
persons who have lawful interests in the property may be impleaded as defendants or may
intervene in the expropriation case under Section 1, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. This case thus,
at most, support their right to intervene.
In Calvo v. Zandueta,364 the Court stayed the execution of the trial court’s judgment ordering the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan to pay Aquilino Calvo just compensation due to the pendency
of the interpleader that Juana Ordoñez brought based on her own claim of ownership of the
expropriated land. Ordoñez asserted that she acquired all rights and interests on the subject land
when she purchased it during the execution sale while the expropriation proceedings were still
pending.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion Development Authority365 further affirms the rule
that just compensation shall only be paid to the owner of the expropriated property at the time of
taking. In that case, the Court held that the trial court may order the payment of just compensation
to itself pending the adjudication of the issue of ownership in other proceedings pursuant to
Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
The Court likewise did not award just compensation to a non-owner in Republic v.
Mangotara.366 The Court held that the filing of a supplemental complaint for expropriation
impleading private parties does not necessarily amount to an admission that the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated are privately owned. The Republic merely acknowledged that there are
private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently
assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of
the public domain.
The record of the present case show that PIATCO has been the original contracting party
commissioned by the Government to construct the NAIA-IPT III based on a build-operate-transfer
arrangement and who, in this capacity, contracted out the actual construction to Takenaka and
Asahikosan. Thus, when the NAIA-IPT III was built, it was in PIATCO’s name and account,
although it subsequently owed sums to subcontractors, incurred in the course of the construction.
From this perspective, PIATCO has been the owner recognized as such by the Government
although the basis of its contractual relationship with the Government was later on nullified.
Takenaka and Asahikosan, on the other hand, had always been subcontractors with whom the
Government did not have any formal link. These facts indubitably show that PIATCO has been the
owner of the NAIA-IPT III entitled to receive the just compensation due. Takenaka and
Asahikosan for their part, have not shown that they possess legal title or colorable title to the
NAIA-IPT III that would defeat PIATCO’s ownership.
To recap and expound on the matter:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, Takenaka and Asahikosan were mere subcontractors in the nullified NAIA-IPT III project.
That Takenaka and Asahikosan actually built the NAIA-IPT III does not make them the owner of
the terminal building.
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We carefully point out that our finding in this case that Takenaka and Asahikosan are the actual builders of
the NAIA-IPT III does not contravene our rulings in Agan and Gingoyon that PIATCO is the builder of the
NAIA-IPT III. The word “builder” is broad enough to include the contractor, PIATCO, and the
subcontractors, Takenaka and Asahikosan, in the nullified NAIA-IPT III project. Republic Act No.
4566367 defines a “builder” as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 9 (b) of RA 4566. “Contractor” is deemed synonymous with the term “builder”
and, hence, any person who undertakes or offers to undertake or purports to have the
capacity to undertake or submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others,
construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any
building, highway, road, railroad, excavation or other structure, project, development
or improvement, or to do any part thereof, including the erection of scaffolding or other
structures or works in connection therewith. The term contractor includes
subcontractor and specialty contractor.
In Gingoyon, the Court loosely used the word “builder” and “owner” interchangeably. We clarify, however,
that a builder is different from the owner of the property. As we stated above, a builder includes the
contractor and the subcontractor. On the other hand, the “owner” who is constitutionally entitled to just
compensation is the person who has legal title to the property. Logically, a builder is not necessarily the
owner of the property and vice-versa.
Second, we cannot recognize Takenaka and Asahikosan’s claimed liens over the NAIA-IPT III in this just
compensation case. Since G.R. No. 202166 is still pending before the Court, we cannot conclusively rule
that Takenaka and Asahikosan are unpaid creditors of PIATCO without pre-empting the Court’s ruling in
the enforcement case.
Even assuming that Takenaka and Asahikosan – as unpaid contractors in the botched NAIA-IPT III
construction contract – indeed have liens over the NAIA-IPT III, PIATCO is still the property owner who, as
such, should directly receive just compensation from the Government.
We clarify that the expropriation court’s determination of the lawful property owner is merely provisional.
By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor merely serves notice that it is taking title to and
possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to
prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. The Court’s
disposition with respect to the ownership of the property is not conclusive, and it remains open to
challenge through proper actions. The court’s resolution of the title to the land at the time of taking has no
legal consequences beyond the eminent domain proceedings. The court’s decision cannot be pleaded as
a defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel in any action to determine title to the property.
As we explained in Republic of the Philippines v. Samson-Tatad:368cralawrednad
However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper
context. The discussion in Republic was anchored on the question of who
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
among the respondents claiming ownership of the property must be
indemnified by the Government:
Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of
Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court taking cognizance of the expropriation
must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan spouses by Antonio
Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid
by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else. x x
x
Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding
should not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an
action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves
notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that
the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to
prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.
If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is
temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine
who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains
open to challenge through proper actions. The consequences of Sec. 9,
Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate relationship
of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation
payment. (Emphasis supplied)
9.c. A final disposition in the eminent
domain case with respect to the order of
payment to a particular person shall be
final and executory.
To avoid future litigation, we emphasize that a final disposition in the eminent domain case
with respect to the order to pay a particular person shall be final and executory upon the
lapse of relevant periods under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The recourse of the person
claiming ownership over the expropriated property in any subsequent case is against the
adjudged property owner in the expropriation case.
The principle of res judicata applies in this particular matter because the issues on the amount
of just compensation and the person to be paid just compensation are the central issues in
the second phase of expropriation. Based on this principle, a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies
in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. 369cralawrednad
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There would be no end to litigation in an eminent domain case if we rule otherwise; we would only foment
mockery of the judicial proceedings as the order of payment in the eminent domain case would never be
truly final and executory. Furthermore, to the detriment of the public, interest would continue to accrue on
just compensation if we rule that the order of payment to a particular recipient can be reversed in the
subsequent judicial proceedings and is, indeed, reversed in the subsequent case. This would be unfair to
the State (and the public) that merely exercised its immutable right to exercise the power of eminent
domain.
Contrary to Takenaka and Asahikosan’s claim, in Calvo v. Zandueta,370 the Court did not stay the
execution of a final and executory ruling in the eminent domain case during the pendency of the
interpleader case.
A close reading of Calvo shows that the order of payment of just compensation in that case was
not yet final and executory.
In November 1924, the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan filed an action for expropriation of a
parcel of land owned by Aquilino Calvo and with a Certificate of Title No. 25100.
On November 25, 1925, the Court of First Instance (CFI) approved the commissioners’ valuation of the
subject land in the sum of P6,943.25. The municipality of San Quintin appealed the case but subsequently
withdrew the appeal on June 23, 1926. The CFI approved the withdrawal of appeal on July 20, 1926.
In the meantime, Juana Ordoñez levied on the subject land after she obtained a favorable judgment
against Calvo. The levy was recorded on the certificate of title on December 23, 1925. Thereafter, the
sheriff sold the subject land to Ordoñez in an execution sale. On January 23, 1926, the sale was duly
entered by memorandum on the certificate of title. On the same date, Ordoñez filed a motion for
substitution as a defendant in the expropriation case on the ground that she acquired all the rights and
interests of Calvo on the subject land.
On June 29, 1926, the CFI declared the November 25, 1925 decision final and ordered the provincial
treasurer of Pangasinan to pay Calvo a part of just compensation. The following day, Ordoñez filed a
motion praying for the revocation of the June 29, 1926 order and for the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan
to retain the award of just compensation.
On July 20, 1926, the CFI revoked the June 29, 1926 order and ordered the provincial treasurer of
Pangasinan to retain the money until further orders of the court. After the CFI denied Calvo et al.’s motion
for reconsideration, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court.
The Court denied the petition. The Court ruled that “assuming that the judgment of November 25, 1925,
constituted a final determination of the petitioners’ right to receive the award,” Ordoñez was not a party to
the expropriation case and, therefore, could not be bound by the judgment. Ordoñez’ claim that she stands
subrogated to Calvo’s right to just compensation has the appearance of validity. The judicial determination
of her claim may be adjudicated in an action for interpleader which was then pending when the motion for
substitution was filed. Consequently, the trial court correctly stayed the execution of the judgment in the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
expropriation case. “Whenever necessary to promote the ends of justice, courts have the power to
temporarily stay executions of judgments rendered by them.”
Clearly, the November 25, 1925 decision in Calvo was not yet final and executory when the Court
suspended the execution of that ruling. The July 29, 1926 order revoked the June 29, 1926 order
which in turn declared the finality of the November 25, 1925 decision of the CFI. Ordoñez filed a
motion for the reversal of the June 29, 1926 order prior to the CFI’s withdrawal of appeal on July
20, 1926. Significantly, the CFI approved the withdrawal of appeal on the same date that the CFI
revoked the June 29, 1926 order and ordered the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan to withhold
the just compensation. There is thus no basis to Takenaka and Asahikosan’s claim that the
execution of a final and executory judgment on just compensation may be suspended if
there is still a subsisting case regarding the disputed ownership of the expropriated
property.
9.d. The determination of whether the
NAIA-IPT III shall be burdened by liens and
mortgages even after the full payment of just
compensation is still premature.
The determination of whether the NAIA-IPT III shall be burdened by liens and mortgages even
after the full payment of just compensation is still premature. The enforceability of Claim Nos.
HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 in this jurisdiction has yet to be decided by the Court in G.R. No.
202166. Furthermore, the application of Article 2242 of the Civil Code371 presupposes that
PIATCO declared insolvency or has been declared insolvent. This, of course, should be litigated
in insolvency proceedings, not in the present eminent domain case.
The Court cannot pass upon the validity and enforceability of civil claims against PIATCO by
creditor/s in an expropriation case or the existence of liens on the NAIA-IPT III. Section 114 of
Republic Act No. 10142372 provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 114. Rights of Secured Creditors. – The Liquidation Order shall not
affect the right of a secured creditor to enforce his lien in accordance with the
applicable contract or law. A secured creditor
may:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) waive his right under the security or lien, prove his claim in the liquidation
proceedings and share in the distribution of the assets of the debtor; or
(b) maintain his rights under the security or lien:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If the secured creditor maintains his rights under the security or
lien:cralawlawlibrary
Page 124
 (1) the value of the property may be fixed in a manner agreed
upon by the creditor and the liquidator. When the value of the
property is less than the claim it secures, the liquidator may
convey the property to the secured creditor and the latter will be
admitted in the liquidation proceedings as a creditor for the
balance. If its value exceeds the claim secured, the liquidator
may convey the property to the creditor and waive the debtor's
right of redemption upon receiving the excess from the creditor;
(2) the liquidator may sell the property and satisfy the secured
creditor's entire claim from the proceeds of the sale; or
(3) the secure creditor may enforce the lien or foreclose on the
property pursuant to applicable laws.
10. The exercise of eminent domain from the perspective of “taking.”
10.a. The Government may take the property
for public purpose or public use upon the
issuance and effectivity of the writ of possession.
To clarify and to avoid confusion in the implementation of our judgment, the full payment of just
compensation is not a prerequisite for the Government’s effective taking of the property. As
discussed above, RA 8974 allows the Government to enter the property and implement national
infrastructure projects upon the issuance of the writ of possession. When the taking of the property
precedes the payment of just compensation, the Government shall indemnify the property owner by way of
interest.
“Taking” under the power of eminent domain means entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.373cralawrednad
“Taking” of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
(2) there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property; (3) the owner is
deprived of the ordinary use of the property, or (4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision and
control of his property.374cralawrednad
The taking of property is different from the transfer of the property title from the private owner to
the Government. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, there are two phases of expropriation: (a) the
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public
use; and (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made
by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The first phase is concerned with the determination of the Government’s authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. The court declares that the Government has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. 375cralawrednad
The second phase relates to the just amount that the Government shall compensate the property
owner. 376cralawrednad
Whenever the court affirms the condemnation of private property in the first phase of the
proceedings, it merely confirms the Government’s lawful right to take the private property
for public purpose or public use. The court does not necessarily rule that the title to the private
property likewise vests on the Government.
The transfer of property title from the property owner to the Government is not a condition
precedent to the taking of property. The State may take private property prior to the eventual
transfer of title of the expropriated property to the State.
In fact, there are instances when the State takes the property prior to the filing of the complaint for
expropriation or without involving the transfer of title.377 In People v. Fajardo,378 the Court ruled
that the municipal mayor’s refusal to give the property owner the permission to build a house on
his own land on the ground that the structure would destroy the beauty of the public plaza
amounts to the taking of the property requiring just compensation.
In National Power Corporation (NPC) v. Spouses Malit,379 the NPC’s transmission lines had to
pass the Spouses Malit’s property. The Court ruled that the NPC’s easement of right-of-way on
the land was equivalent to the taking of property. The limitation imposed by the NPC against the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprived the Spouses Malit of the lot’s ordinary use.
Consequently, the NPC shall give the Spouses Malit just compensation.
The reckoning period, however, of the valuation of just compensation is the date of taking or the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is earlier. In either case, it is only after the
finality of the second stage and after the payment of just compensation that the title shall pass to
the Government. As we have ruled in Gingoyon, the title to the property does not pass to the
condemnor until just compensation is paid.
Under Section 4 of RA 8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of possession upon initial
payment of just compensation to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of a certificate
of availability of funds.
A writ of possession does not transfer title to the Government; it is “a writ of execution employed to
enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land
and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.”380 Section 4 of RA 8974 further
states that the writ of possession is an order to take possession of the property and to start the
implementation of the project, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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 Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. – Whenever it is necessary to
acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency
shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following
guidelines:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
(a)percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7 hereof;
In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is
(b)hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come
up with a zonal valuation for said area; and
In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance,
and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately
(c)
pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in
Section 5 hereof.
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall
present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official
concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency’s
proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner
within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the
decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay
the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation
as determined by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
The Government is provisionally authorized to take the property for public purpose or public use whenever
the court issues a writ of possession in favor of the Government. It may take possession of the property or
effectively deprive the property owner of the ordinary use of the property. If the court, however, later on
determines that the State has no right of expropriation, then the State shall immediately restore the
defendant of the possession of the property and pay the property owner damages that he sustained.
Section 11, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. – The right of the
plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same
for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the
judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of
expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court
to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession of the
property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and
may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
The State’s taking of the property is not based on trust or contract, but is founded on its inherent
power to appropriate private property for public use. It is also for this reason – to compensate the
property owner for the deprivation of his right to enjoy the ordinary use of his property until the
naked title to the property passed to the State – that the State pays interest from the time of the
taking of the property until full payment of just compensation.
This conclusion is consistent with the dispositive portion of our ruling in Gingoyon where we
authorized the Government to perform acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA-IPT III
as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the writ of possession. The authority
granted to the Government encompasses “the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the
complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and
equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and
transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport.”
The present case involves the second stage of expropriation or the determination of replacement
cost of the NAIA-IPT III. The first stage has become final after the promulgation of the December
19, 2005 decision and the February 1, 2006 resolution in Gingoyon where we affirmed the
Government’s power to expropriate the NAIA-IPT III and where we ordered the issuance of a writ
of possession upon the Government’s direct payment of the proffered value of P3 billion to
PIATCO. Thus, the reinstatement of the writ of possession on September 11, 2006, empowered
the Government to take the property for public use, and to effectively deprive PIATCO of the
ordinary use of the NAIA-IPT III.
B. G.R. No. 181892
The issue on the appointment of
an independent appraiser is already moot
and academic.
In G.R. No. 181892, the RTC, in its order dated May 5, 2006, ordered the appointment of an
independent appraiser to conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III upon the BOC’s request.
Thereafter, the Government and PIATCO submitted their lists of nominees to this position. On
May 3, 2007, the RTC engaged the services of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
Page 126
appraiser. On May 18, 2007, the RTC directed the Government to submit a Certificate of Availability of
Funds to cover DG Jones and Partners’ $1.9 Million appraisal fee.
The Government disputed the May 3 and 18, 2007 orders and argued that the RTC had no power to
appoint an independent appraiser. The Government insisted that the RTC should exclusively choose
among its nominees pursuant to Section 7 of RA 8974 as well as Sections 10 and 11 of RA 8974 IRR.
The RTC sustained the appointment of DG Jones and Partners in an order dated January 7, 2008. The
RTC ruled that its power to appoint the members of the BOC under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court was broad enough as to include the appointment of an independent appraiser.
On February 6, 2008, the Government filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction before the Court assailing the May 3,
2007; May 18, 2007; and January 7, 2008 orders (G.R. No. 181892).
On January 9, 2008, the Court issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of
the May 3, May 18, and January 7, 2008 orders.
On August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their appraisal reports of the NAIA-IPT III. The
Government, PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan separately hired their own appraisers who came up with
their different valuations of the NAIA-IPT III.
On March 31, 2011, the BOC submitted its Final Report recommending the payment of just compensation
in the amount of $376,149,742.56. On May 23, 2011, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the
Government to pay PIATCO just compensation in the amount of $116,348,641.10. The CA modified the
RTC ruling and held that the just compensation as of July 31, 2013, amounts to $371,426,742.24.
These developments render the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III ineffective. An appraiser is a person selected or appointed by competent
authority to ascertain and state the true value of goods or real estate.381 The purpose of appointing DG
Jones and Partners as an independent appraiser was to assist the BOC in appraising the NAIA-IPT III. In
fact, the BOC requested the RTC to engage the services of an independent appraiser because the BOC
had no technical expertise to conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. In turn, the BOC was to
recommend to the RTC the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III. Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the BOC’s report which is
merely advisory and recommendatory in character.
We find, under the given circumstances, that the propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and
Partners and the corollary issue of who should shoulder the independent appraiser’s fees moot
and academic.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. 382 A justiciable controversy
must not be moot and academic or have no practical use or value. In other words, there must be a definite
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who have adverse legal
interests. Otherwise, the Court would simply render an advisory opinion on what the law would be
on a hypothetical state of facts. The disposition of the case would not have any practical use or
value as there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal or denial of the petition.383cralawrednad
After the BOC submitted its Final Report on the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III based on the
appraisal reports and other evidence submitted by the parties, the appointment of DG Jones and
Partners ceased to serve any purpose. Any subsequent findings of DG Jones and Partners
regarding the appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III would cease to have any practical materiality since the
RTC proceedings on the amount of just compensation had already been terminated.
As with the BOC, the independent appraiser’s valuation of the NAIA-IPT III was advisory and
recommendatory in character. DG Jones and Partners’ valuation was only preliminary and was
not by any means meant to be final and conclusive on the parties. In the exercise of its judicial
functions, it is the expropriation court who has the final say on the amount of just compensation.
Since the RTC has already made a factual finding on the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III, there is no
point in appointing DG Jones and Partners as an independent appraiser. To reiterate, valuation
involves a factual question that is within the province of the expropriation court, and not the BOC
or the independent appraiser. DG Jones and Partners’ rule has simply been overtaken by events.
As a final note, while we stated in Gingoyon that the RTC may validly appoint commissioners in
the appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III, the trial court should have appointed commission members who
possessed technical expertise in the appraisal of a complex terminal building. Under Section 5,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the BOC’s main functions are to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The appointment of technical experts
as commissioners would have avoided the DG Jones aspect of the controversy as there would
have been no need for the trial court to hire an independent appraiser. This would have avoided
the duplication of tasks and delay in the proceedings.
To summarize, we rule that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The May 23, 2011 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 04-0876 is valid. The parties were afforded
(1)procedural due process since their respective positions, counter-positions, and evidence were
considered by the trial court in rendering the decision.
Replacement cost is a different standard of valuation from fair market value. Fair market value is the
price at which a property may be sold by a seller who is not compelled to sell and bought by a buyer
who is not compelled to buy. In contrast, replacement cost is the amount necessary to replace the
(2)
improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor,
contractor’s profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs associated with the acquisition and
installation in place of the affected improvements/structures.
Page 127
 In computing just compensation, the Court shall use the replacement cost method and the standards
(3)laid down in Section 5 of RA 8974 as well as Section 10 of RA 8974. The Court shall likewise
consider equity in the determination of the just compensation due for NAIA-IPT III.
The use of depreciated replacement cost method is consistent with the principle that the property
owner shall be compensated for his actual loss. It is consistent as well with Section 10 of RA 8974
IRR which provides that the courts shall consider the kinds and quantities of materials/equipment
(4)
used and the configuration and other physical features of the property, among other things, in the
valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government should not compensate PIATCO based on the value
of a modern equivalent asset that has the full functional utility of a brand new asset.
The amount of just compensation as of the filing of the complaint for expropriation on December 21,
2004, is $326,932,221.26. From this sum shall be deducted the proffered value of $59,438,604.00.
(5)The resulting difference of $267,493,617.26 shall earn a straight interest of 12% per annum from
September 11, 2006 until June 30, 2013, and a straight interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013,
until full payment.
PIATCO, as the owner of the NAIA-IPT III, shall solely receive the just compensation. Based on the
last paragraph, Section 4 of RA 8974 and the prevailing jurisprudence, it is the owner of the
(6)expropriated property who is constitutionally entitled to just compensation. Other claimants should be
impleaded or may intervene in the eminent domain case if the ownership of the property is uncertain
or there are conflicting claims on the property pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
The Government may deprive PIATCO of the ordinary use of the NAIA-IPT III upon the issuance and
(7)effectivity of the writ of possession on September 11, 2006. However, the Government shall only
have ownership of the NAIA-IPT III after it fully pays PIATCO the just compensation due.
The expenses of the BOC, which are part of the costs, shall be shouldered by the Government as the
condemnor of the property pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Consequently,
(8)Takenaka and Asahikosan shall not share in the expenses of the BOC. PIATCO is deemed to have
waived its right not to share in the expenses of the BOC since it voluntarily shared in the expenses of
the BOC.
The issues of the propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser in the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III and who should shoulder DG Jones and Partners’
appraisal fee are already moot and academic. The purpose of appointing DG Jones and Partners as
(9)an independent appraiser was to assist the BOC in the appraisal of NAIA-IPT III. As with the BOC,
the independent appraiser’s recommendation to the RTC was merely recommendatory and advisory
in character. Since the RTC has already ruled on the just compensation in Civil Case No. 04-0876,
the appointment of an independent appraiser no longer serves any practical purpose.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY REVERSE the August 22, 2013 amended Decision
and the October 19, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The principal amount of just compensation is fixed at $326,932,221.26 as of December 21, 2004.
Thereafter, the amount of $267,493,617.26, which is the difference between $326,932,221.26 and the
1)
proffered value of $59,438,604.00, shall earn a straight interest of 12% per annum from September 11,
2006 until June 30, 2013, and a straight interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment;
The Government is hereby ordered to make direct payment of the just compensation due to PIATCO;
2)
and
3)The Government is hereby ordered to defray the expenses of the BOC in the sum of P3,500,000.00.
We DECLARE the issue of the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an independent
appraiser of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III MOOT AND
ACADEMIC. The temporary restraining order issued on January 9, 2008, against the
implementation of the May 3, 2007; May 18, 2007; and January 7, 2008 orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., no part.
Reyes, J., on Leave.
Leonen, J., in the result see separate concurring opinion.
Endnotes:
1
In G.R. No. 209917, the Government filed a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to partially reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and
October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029. In G.R. No. 209696,
Takenaka and Asahikosan filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
partially reverse the same CA rulings. In G.R. No. 209731, PIATCO filed a
petition for review on certiorari filed seeking to reverse the same CA rulings.
In G.R. No. 181892, the Government filed a petition for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order assailing the January 7,
2008 order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 in Civil
Case No. 04-0876.
2
Rollo, pp. 10-40; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.,
and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and
Samuel J. Gaerlan.
Page 128
 (d) Third Supplement Agreement Relating to the Off-shore Procurement
3
Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718. Contract Re: Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated
April 11, 2002.
4
Agan v. PIATCO, 450 Phil. 789 (2003). (e) Fourth Supplement Agreement relating to the Offshore Procurement
Contract dated September 11, 2002.
5
Id. at 792-793.
See CA rollo, Volume XXXII-Q, pp. 183-201 and 238-398.
6
Id. at 794.
12
“Plant,” as defined in Part II (ii) of the Offshore Procurement Contract dated
7
Id. at 794-795. March 31, 2001, means machinery, apparatus, materials, articles, intellectual
property and things of all kinds to be provided under the Concession
8
Id. at 795-796. Agreement and as specified in the Employer’s Requirements and including,
but not limited to, those necessary to achieve the Tender Design but
9
Id. at 795. excluding any Contractor’s Equipment (as defined in the Construction
Contract). See CA rollo, Volume XXXII-Q, p. 258.
10
This agreement was further supplemented by the following
13
contracts:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary CA rollo, Volume XXXII-Q, pp. 214-237.

(a) First Supplement to the Agreement Re: the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III On-Shore Construction Contract dated January 26, 2001;
(b) Second Supplement Agreement Relating to the On-Shore Construction Contract
Re: the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III On-Shore
Construction Contract dated February 21, 2001;
(c) Agreement between Takenaka and Asahikosan and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport
Services Worldwide Relating to the Deeds of Guaranteed Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated February 21, 2001;
(d) Third Supplemental Agreement relating to the Onshore Construction Contract
dated April 11, 2002; and
(e) Fourth Supplemental Agreement relating to the Onshore Construction Contract
dated September 11, 2002.
See CA rollo, Volume XXXII-Q, pp. 10-155, 183-201 and 381-398.
14
Id. at 381-398.
15
Rollo in G.R. No. 209696, Volume II, p. 415.
16
Supra note 4, at 797.
17
The Court ruled in Agan that the maximum amount that Security Bank
could validly invest in the Paircargo Consortium is only P528,525,656.55,
representing 15% of its entire net worth. We concluded that the total net
worth of the Paircargo Consortium – after considering the maximum amounts
that may be validly invested by each of its members – is P558,384,871.55 or
only 6.08% of the project cost. This amount is substantially less than the
prescribed minimum equity investment required for the project in the amount
of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost.

11 18
The Offshore Procurement Contract was supplemented by the following Supra note 4, at 744-841.
agreements:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
19
Agan v. PIATCO, 465 Phil. 545-586 (2004).
(a) First Supplement to the Agreement Re: the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
20
Passenger Terminal III Off-Shore Procurement Contract dated January 26, 2001; Id. at 582.
(b) Second Supplement Agreement relating to the Offshore Procurement Contract Re:
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated February 21, 2001; 21
The case is entitled “Republic of the Philippines represented by Executive
and Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the Department of Transportation and
(c) Agreement between Takenaka and Asahikosan and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Communications, and the Manila International Airport
Services Worldwide Relating to the Deeds of Guaranteed Re: Ninoy Aquino Authority, Plaintiffs, -versus- Philippine Air Terminals Co.,
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated February 21, 2001; Inc., Defendant. See G.R. No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 363-383.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 129

 22 38
Republic v. Gingoyon, 514 Phil. 678 (2005). See also RTC rollo, Volume II, pp. The Second Claimant refers to Asahikosan Corporation.
1050-1066 and rollo in G.R. No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 363-374.
39
Rollo in G.R. No. 209696, Volume I, p. 245; RTC rollo, Volume IV, p. 4239.
23
411 Phil. 754-765 (2001).
40
Id. at 227; id. at 4241.
24
Supra note 22, at 678-679. See also RTC rollo, Volume II, p. 1072 and rollo in G.R.
41
No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 384-385. Rollo in G.R. No. 209696, Volume I, pp. 242-243 and 284.

25 42
cralawred The MIAA held guaranty deposits in the sum of $62,343,175.77 with Land Id. at 332-333.
Bank for purposes of expropriating the NAIA-IPT III. See rollo in G.R. No. 209731,
Volume I, pp. 380-382. In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC recognized the validity of
the London awards in Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and declared
26
Supra note 22, at 679–680. See also RTC rollo, Volume II, pp. 818-821 and rollo in these awards as enforceable in the Philippine jurisdiction. The RTC thus
G.R. No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 390-396. ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan the sum of $ 85.7 million.

27
Supra note 22, at 680–681. See also RTC rollo, Volume II, pp. 823-829.
28
The RTC appointed Dr. Fiorello R. Estuar, Atty. Sofronio B. Ursal, and Capt. Angelo
I. Panganiban. Dr. Estuar and Atty. Ursal were succeeded by Engr. Adam Abinales
and Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr., respectively.
PIATCO appealed the case to the CA42 which affirmed the RTC rulings in a
decision dated March 13, 2012.42 The CA likewise denied PIATCO’s motion
for reconsideration in a resolution dated May 31, 2012.
43
RTC rollo, Volume X, pp. 7548-7573.

29 44
Supra note 22, at 680–681. See also RTC rollo, Volume II, pp.942-943 and rollo in Rollo in G.R. No. 209731, Volume II, p. 1788.
G.R. No. 181892, pp. 306-307.
45
Rollo in G.R. No. 209696, Volume I, pp. 332-333.
30
Rollo in G.R. No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 397-398; RTC rollo, Volume II, pp. 944-950.
46
Supra note 22, at 681.
31
On January 20, 2006, Judge Jesus M. Mupas of RTC-Pasay, Branch 119 was
designated by the Supreme Court to replace Judge Henrick Gingoyon in the 47
For simplicity and ease of reading, the Court shall use “it,” instead of “they.”
expropriation case. See RTC rollo, Volume XXVI-A, unpaged.
48
RTC rollo, Volume II, pp. 971-1036.
32
Supra note 22, at 681. See also RTC rollo, Volume II, pp. 958-965 and rollo in G.R.
49
No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 399-406. Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
33
Rollo in G.R. No. 209696, Volume I, pp. 266-286; RTC rollo, Volume IV, pp.
4244-4247. SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government
depository. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and
34
Id. at 229-231; id. at 4224-4226. after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with
35
RTC rollo, Volume IV, pp. 4248-4264. the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by
36
Rollo in G.R. No. 209696, Volume I, pp. 229-231; id. at 4224-4226. such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in
money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a
37
The First Claimant refers to Takenaka Corporation. certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 130

 Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to
acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the
proper court under the following guidelines:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section
7 hereof;
xxxx
c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency
and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered
value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately
issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and
start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall
present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official
concerned.
50
RA 8974 IRR, Section 7.
51
Supra note 22, at 657-719.
52
Id. at 718-719.
53
Republic v. Gingoyon, 517 Phil. 7-8 (2006). See also RTC rollo, Volume V, pp.
4446-4487.
54
Id. at 7-8; id. at 4547-4579 and 4665-4732.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
55
363 Phil. 225-338 (1999).
56
Another related case is Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. v. DOTC, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 169914 & 174166. In G.R. No. 169914, AEDC filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition before the Court: (a) seeking to compel the
Government to execute in its favor an approved Draft Concession Agreement
for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III; and (b) seeking to prohibit the DOTC
and the MIAA from awarding the NAIA-IPT III project to or negotiating into
any concession contract with third parties. The case, entitled AEDC v. DOTC,
was docketed as G.R. No. 169914
AEDC contended that it had the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to
the award of the NAIA-IPT III project on the ground that it remained the
unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA-IPT III project as a result of the
Court’s nullification of PIATCO contracts.
The Court denied the petition.
We noted that AEDC belatedly filed the petition twenty months after the
Court’s promulgation of Agan in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, the petition was barred by res judicata. The RTC already
dismissed Civil Case No. 66213 upon the execution of a compromise
agreement by AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC,
on the other hand.
Under Section 10.6 of the RA 6957 IRR, the Government’s “acceptance” of
the unsolicited proposal is limited to its commitment to pursue the project and
to the recognition of the proponent as the original proponent. Thus, the
Government’s commitment is limited to the pursuit of the project; it does
not award the project to the original proponent. The acceptance of the
unsolicited proposal only prevents the Government from entertaining other
similar proposals until the solicitation of comparative proposals.
Upon the submission of comparative proposals, the original proponent has
the right to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within thirty
working days from notice thereof. If the original proponent is able to match
the lowest or most advantageous proposal submitted, then the original
proponent has the right to the award of the project. The right to be awarded
the project, however, is contingent upon the original proponent’s actual
exercise of his right to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal. In
other words, if the original proposal failed to match the most advantageous
comparative proposal, then the original proponent has no right to be awarded
the project.
Page 131

AEDC failed to match PIATCO’s more advantageous proposal. Consequently, AEDC
had no enforceable right to be awarded the NAIA-IPT III project. Moreover, the
nullification of the award to PIATCO neither revived the proposal nor re-opened the
bidding.
The Court also stated that AEDC’s original proposal was to undertake the building,
operation, and transfer to the Government of the NAIA-IPT III. This proposal was no
longer feasible since the NAIA-IPT III was already substantially built. Furthermore,
AEDC was not financially qualified to undertake the NAIA-IPT III project since it then
had a paid-in capital of only P150,000,000.00 at the time of the submission of the bids.
In G.R. No. 174166, Congressman Baterina, et al., filed a petition
for certiorari opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the NAIA-IPT
III is a public property. They posited that PIATCO should not be paid just
compensation and was only entitled to recovery on quantum meruit as the builder of
the NAIA-IPT III.
The Court denied the petition. We held that PIATCO was entitled to just and equitable
consideration for its construction of the NAIA-IPT III. Furthermore, the propriety of the
expropriation proceedings was already recognized and upheld by the Court
in Agan and Gingoyon.
In a resolution dated April 7, 2009, the Court denied AEDC et al.’s motion for
reconsideration. The Court stated that the project would be awarded to the original
proponent if there was no other competitive bid submitted for the BOT project.
However, if other proponents submitted competitive bids, then the original proponent
must be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid to enjoy his preferential
right to the award of the project.
57
Rollo in G.R. No. 181892, pp. 68-69.
58
Id. at 74-80.
59
Id. at 68-69.
60
Id. at 16 and 61.
61
Id. at 16.
62
Id. at 150; RTC rollo, Volume VIII, p. 5591.
63
Rollo in G.R. No 209696, Volume I, p. 331.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
64
Rollo in G.R. No. 181892, p. 174. After the conduct of a Pre-Final
Evaluation of Prequalification of Consultant, the BOC shortlisted DG Jones
and Partners as well as Sallmans Far East Ltd. HK. (Sallmans) as
independent appraisers.
65
Prior to the appointment, Judge Mupas interviewed the representatives of
DG Jones and Partners, and Sallmans. The RTC concluded that DG Jones
and Partners was more qualified than Sallmans as independent appraiser
since the former submitted a lower appraisal fee of US$1,900,000.00 ($1.9
Million). Moreover, DG Jones and Partners has a wide experience and track
record in the appraisal of airport facilities. See Prior to the appointment,
Judge Mupas interviewed the representatives of DG Jones and Partners, and
Sallmans. The RTC concluded that DG Jones and Partners was more
qualified than Sallmans as independent appraiser since the former submitted
a lower appraisal fee of US$1,900,000.00 ($1.9 Million). Moreover, DG Jones
and Partners has a wide experience and track record in the appraisal of
airport facilities.
See rollo in G.R. No. 181892, pp. 64-66.
66
The appraisal fee is itemized as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Description Amount in US Dollars
1. Fixed lump sum fee for valuation of work-in-place
2. Fixed lump sum fee for valuation of remaining works 1,400,000.00
to complete 200,000.00
3. Provisional sum for joint survey/inventory 300,000.00
Total 1,900,000.00
See rollo in G.R. No. 181892, pp. 60 and 358.
67
The Government further argued that there were no laws or rules that
empowered the RTC and the BOC to appoint an independent appraiser. The
Government opined that the RTC should exclusively choose among its
nominees pursuant to Section 7 of RA 8974 as well as Sections 10 and 11 of
RA 8974 IRR. Furthermore, the appointment of an independent appraiser
would only result in the duplication of tasks since the BOC and the
independent appraiser essentially perform the same function. The BOC
Page 132
 would serve no purpose since the appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III would be derived from appraisal fee with the RTC who shall in turn pay DG Jones and Partners.
the findings of DG Jones and Partners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC order provides:cralawlawlibrary
It opined that the DG Jones and Partners’ appraisal fee was unjust and exorbitant.
The Government also pointed out that PIATCO manifested its willingness to share WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders dated
one-half of the expenses in the valuation of the NAIA IPT-III during the valuation May 3, 2007 and May 18, 2007 are Affirmed without
hearings. The Government further raised doubts on DG Jones and Partners’ modification. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion
qualifications since the RTC allegedly appointed the firm without disclosing DG Jones dated June 15, 2007 is denied. This expropriation having
and Partners’ qualifications and proposals. See rollo in G.R. No. 181892, pp. 170-182. been initiated in December 2004, the certificate of
availability of funds from Plaintiffs for the necessary full
68 compensation to PIATCO, the costs and the expenses
PIATCO contended that the Government was estopped from assailing the
appointment of DG Jones and Partners. The Government participated in the entailed in this expropriation is clearly justified and
appointment process by nominating other firms as an independent appraiser. should be submitted to this Court within 15 days from
Furthermore, it would be iniquitous for the Government to solely appraise the plaintiffs’ receipt of this order.
replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III. PIATCO asserted that the Government should
solely bear the cost of the appraisal. The Government should have anticipated the SO ORDERED.
appointment of an independent appraiser when it filed a complaint for expropriation.
See rollo in G.R. No. 181892, pp. 183-190.

69
The RTC stated that it would be grossly unfair to choose exclusively among the EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND G.R. No. 145842
Government’s nominees; otherwise, the independence of the appraiser would be RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO,
questionable. The Government pointed out that the government tax assessors’ RUFINO L. SAMANIEGO, KUOK
valuation of expropriated property was not even conclusive on trial courts. In fact, the KHOON CHEN, and KUOK
BOC itself requested the appointment of an independent appraiser since it had no KHOON TSEN, Present:
technical expertise to ascertain the just compensation due to PIATCO. Petitioners,
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
The RTC also held that the Government was estopped from objecting to the - versus - Acting Chairperson,
appointment of an independent appraiser since it did not previously object to the TINGA,
engagement of the services of an appraiser. The Government even nominated VELASCO, JR.,
several firms for the purpose of appointing an independent appraiser, particularly, BF CORPORATION, REYES,* and
Gleeds International, Ove Arup, and Gensler. Respondent. BRION, JJ.
x ------------------------------------------- x
The RTC likewise imposed on the Government the sole responsibility of paying the
appraisal fee of DG Jones and Partners. Under Section 12, Rule 67 of the Rules of CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, G.R. No. 145873
Court, the commissioners’ fees shall be taxed as part of the costs of the proceedings. Petitioner,
The plaintiff shall pay all costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims. If
the property owner appeals from the expropriation court’s judgment, he shall pay for - versus -
the costs of the appeal. According to the RTC, PIATCO should not shoulder the Promulgated:
appraisal fee since it is constitutionally entitled to just compensation. BF CORPORATION,
Respondent. June 27, 2008
The RTC also affirmed DG Jones and Partners’ independence. The RTC impartially x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
chose this firm upon a thorough review of its qualifications and upon the BOC’s
recommendation. The Government would likewise not directly communicate with and DECISION
pay the appraisal fee to DG Jones and Partners. The Government shall deposit the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 133

VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 to nullify certain issuances of
the Court of Appeals (CA).
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort,
Inc. (ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen assail the
Decision[1]dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, affirming the Decision[2] dated
September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 in Pasig City in Civil Case No. 63435
that ordered them to pay jointly and severally respondent BF Corporation (BF) a sum of money with
interests and damages. They also assail the CA Resolution dated October 25, 2000 which, apart
from setting aside an earlier Resolution[3]of August 13, 1999 granting ESHRIs application for restitution
and damages against bond, affirmed the aforesaid September 23, 1996 RTC Decision.
In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo also
assails the aforementioned CA Decision of November 12, 1999 insofar at it adjudged her jointly and
severally liable with ESHRI, et al. to pay the monetary award decreed in the RTC Decision.
Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the
Execution of Builders Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project[4] that ESHRI and BF executed for the
construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract
stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the
monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI
which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that
months progress billing.[5]
In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure
BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the progress billing to ESHRIs Engineering Department; (2)
following-up of the preparation of the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity
Surveying Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn San
Pascual. BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991 to
June 30, 1992, submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the monthly progress
billings, including an evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Managers Instructions (PMIs)
and the detailed valuations contained in the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for final re-measurement
under the PMIs. BF said that the values of the WVOs were contained in the progress billings under the
section Change Orders.[6]
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the
procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05. [7]
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the
work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive
periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by
ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the
RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and,
by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments.
ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.
The RTC found for BF
On September 23, 1996, the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is
entitled to the payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention
money corresponding to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances, rendered
judgment for BF. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, defendants [EHSRI], Ru[f]o B. Colayco, Rufino L.
Samaniego, Cynthia del Castillo, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen,
are jointly and severally hereby ordered to:
1. Pay plaintiff the sum of P24,780,490.00 representing unpaid
construction work accomplishments under plaintiffs Progress
Billings Nos. 14-19;
2. Return to plaintiff the retention sum of P5,810,000.00;
3. Pay legal interest on the amount of P24,780,490.80 representing
the construction work accomplishments under Progress Billings
Nos. 14-19 and on the amount of P5,810,000.00 representing the
retention sum from date of demand until their full Payment;
4. Pay plaintiff P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees, and cost of
the suit.[8]
According to the RTC, ESHRIs refusal to pay BFs valid claims constituted evident bad faith
entitling BF to moral damages and attorneys fees.
ESHRI subsequently moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC,
prompting ESHRI to appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399.
Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the following events and/or incidents transpired:
(1) The trial court, by Order dated January 21, 1997, granted BFs motion for execution
pending appeal. ESHRI assailed this order before the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 43187.[9]Meanwhile, the branch sheriff garnished from ESHRIs bank account
in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of PhP 35 million.
(2) On March 7, 1997, the CA issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187 a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the trial court from carrying out its January 21, 1997 Order upon ESHRIs
posting of a PhP 1 million bond. In a supplemental resolution issued on the same day, the CA
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing the trial court judge and/or his branch
sheriff acting under him (a) to lift all the garnishments and levy made under the enjoined order of
execution pending appeal; (b) to immediately return the garnished deposits to PNB instead of
delivering the same to ESHRI; and (c) if the garnished deposits have been delivered to BF, the
latter shall return the same to ESHRIs deposit account.
Page 134
 (3) By a Decision dated June 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187, the CA set aside the trial
courts January 21, 1997 Order. The CA would later deny BFs motion for reconsideration.
(4) Aggrieved, BF filed before this Court a petition for review of the CA Decision, docketed
as G.R. No. 132655.[10] On August 11, 1998, the Court affirmed the assailed decision of the CA with the
modification that the recovery of ESHRIs garnished deposits shall be against BFs bond. [11]
We denied the motions for reconsideration of ESHRI and BF.
(5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of August 13, 1999 granted, an application
for restitution or damages against BFs bond. Consequently, BF and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the
bonding company, filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On November 12, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the CA rendered a Decision resolving (1) the
aforesaid motions of BF and its surety and (2) herein petitioners appeal from the trial courts Decision
dated September 23, 1996. This November 12, 1999 Decision, finding for BF and now assailed in these
separate recourses, dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED in toto. This Courts Resolution dated 13 August 1999 is reconsidered
and set aside, and defendants-appellants application for restitution is denied for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of two main reasons. First, the issues the parties raised in
their respective briefs were, for the most part, factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no reason to disturb
the case disposition of the RTC, inclusive of its award of damages and attorneys fees and the reasons
underpinning the award. Second, BF had sufficiently established its case by preponderance of evidence.
Part of what it had sufficiently proven relates to ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to re-measure BFs
later work accomplishments and pay the same. On the other hand, ESHRI had failed to prove the basis of
its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the defective work accomplished by BF.
Apropos ESHRIs entitlement to the remedy of restitution or reparation arising from the execution
of the RTC Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such remedy may peremptorily be allowed only if
the executed judgment is reversed, a situation not obtaining in this case.
Following the denial by the CA, per its Resolution[13] dated October 25, 2000, of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners are now before the Court, petitioner del Castillo opting, however, to file a
separate recourse.
G.R. No. 145842
In G.R. No. 145842, petitioners ESHRI, et al. raise the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding issues of law raised by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting
in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
II. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in
not holding respondent guilty of delay in the performance of its obligations
and, hence, liable for liquidated damages [in view that respondent is guilty of
delay and that its works were defective].
III. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding petitioners guilty of malice and evidence bad faith, and in awarding
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to respondent.
IV. Whether or not the [CA] erred in setting aside its Resolution
dated August 13, 2000.[14]
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered relate to the
correctness of the CAs factual determinations, specifically on whether or not BF was in delay and
had come up with defective works, and whether or not petitioners were guilty of malice and bad
faith. It is basic that in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
presented by the parties and reviewed by the Court.[15] Just as basic is the rule that factual
findings of the CA, affirmatory of that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on the Court and
may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) such findings are contrary
to the admissions of both parties; and (7) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant evidence
and undisputed facts, that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [16]
In our review of this case, we find that none of the above exceptions obtains.
Accordingly, the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that there was delay on
the part of ESHRI, that there was no proof that BFs work was defective, and that petitioners were
guilty of malice and bad faith, ought to be affirmed.
Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19,
PMIs and WVOs
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in
evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and
the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the
photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis requirement.
Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the
documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of the documents
since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF despite
requests.
We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring
that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced [17] and secondary
Page 135
evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the
document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented
as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other
than the original instrument or document itself.[18] A party may present secondary evidence of the contents
of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party
can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in
question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed. The
stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and
ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:
ATTY. ANDRES:
During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that certain
exhibits namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the
originals of these documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the
possession of ESHRI since these are internal documents and I am referring
specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your Honor, that in
order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary original, that opposing
counsel first be given opportunity to present the originals which are in their
possession. May we know if they have brought the originals and whether they will
present the originals in court, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)
ATTY. AUTEA:
We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed by
plaintiff that some of the originals are in their possession and our client assured that,
they will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client, Your Honor.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of
the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to
produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI
was not inclined to produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b)
of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there
is proof of the original documents execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the
original documents unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith. [19] While perhaps not on all
fours because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt,
thus:
x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6
of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice,
that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers
satisfactory proof of its existence.
xxxx
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission
of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his
power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to
produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such
party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
admitted.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
On the Restitution of the Garnished Funds
We now come to the propriety of the restitution of the garnished funds. As petitioners
maintain, the CA effectively, but erroneously, prevented restitution of ESHRIs improperly
garnished funds when it nullified its own August 13, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187. In
this regard, petitioners invite attention to the fact that the restitution of the funds was in
accordance with this Courts final and already executory decision in G.R. No. 132655, implying
that ESHRI should be restored to its own funds without awaiting the final outcome of the main
case. For ease of reference, we reproduce what the appellate court pertinently wrote in its
Resolution of August 13, 1999:
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Application (for
Restitution/Damages against Bond for Execution Pending Appeal) dated May
12, 1999 filed by [ESHRI] is GRANTED. Accordingly, the surety of [BF],
Page 136
 STRONGHOLD Insurance Co., Inc., is ORDERED to PAY the sum of [PhP 35 million]
to [ESHRI] under its SICI Bond. x x x In the event that the bond shall turn out to be
insufficient or the surety (STRONGHOLD) cannot be made liable under its bond, [BF],
being jointly and severally liable under the bond is ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of [PhP 35 million] representing the garnished deposits of the bank account
maintained by [ESHRI] with the [PNB] Shangri-la Plaza Branch, Mandaluyong City.
Otherwise, this Court shall cause the implementation of the Writ of Execution
dated April 24, 1998 issued in Civil Case No. 63435 against both [BF], and/or its
surety, STRONGHOLD, in case they should fail to comply with these directives.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Petitioners contention on the restitution angle has no merit, for, as may be recalled, the CA,
simultaneously with the nullification and setting aside of its August 13, 1999 Resolution, affirmed, via its
assailed November 12, 1999 Decision, the RTC Decision of September 23, 1996, the execution pending
appeal of which spawned another dispute between the parties. And as may be recalled further, the
appellate court nullified its August 13, 1999Resolution on the basis of Sec. 5, Rule 39, which provides:
Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. Where the executed judgment is
reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on
motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice
may warrant under the circumstances.
On the strength of the aforequoted provision, the appellate court correctly dismissed ESHRIs claim for
restitution of its garnished deposits, the executed appealed RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 63435 having
in fact been upheld in toto.
It is true that the Courts Decision of August 11, 1998 in G.R. No. 132655 recognized the validity
of the issuance of the desired restitution order. It bears to emphasize, however, that the CA had since then
decided CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the main case, on the merits when it affirmed the underlying RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 63435. This CA Decision on the original and main case effectively rendered our
decision on the incidental procedural matter on restitution moot and academic. Allowing restitution at this
point would not serve any purpose, but only prolong an already protracted litigation.
G.R. No. 145873
Petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, in her separate petition, excepts from the CA Decision affirming, in
its entirety, the RTC Decision holding her, with the other individual petitioners in G.R. No. 145842, who
were members of the Board of Directors of ESHRI, jointly and severally liable with ESHRI for the judgment
award. She presently contends:
I. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT ADJUDGING PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE
TO RESPONDENT VOID FOR NOT STATING THE FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH AWARD.
II. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT AS FORMER DIRECTOR,
PETITIONER CANNOT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY
ALLEGED BREACH OF A CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE
CORPORATION.
III. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
IV. THE [CA] ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONER PERSONALLY
LIABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
V. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
NOT ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES.[22]
First off, Roxas-del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in question violated the
requirements of due process and of Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution that states, No decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
Roxas-del Castillos threshold posture is correct. Indeed, the RTC decision in question,
as couched, does not provide the factual or legal basis for holding her personally liable under the
premises. In fact, only in the dispositive portion of the decision did her solidary liability crop
up. And save for her inclusion as party defendant in the underlying complaint, no reference is
made in other pleadings thus filed as to her liability.
The Court notes that the appellate court, by its affirmatory ruling, effectively recognized
the applicability of the doctrine on piercing the veil of the separate corporate identity. Under the
circumstances of this case, we cannot allow such application. A corporation, upon coming to
existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders of nearly all of the capital
stock of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of separate
corporate personality.[23] Thus, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as corporate
agents, are not theirs but direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. Solidary liability
on the part of corporate officers may at times attach, but only under exceptional circumstances,
such as when they act with malice or in bad faith. [24] Also, in appropriate cases, the veil of
corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the separate juridical personality of a corporation is
abused or used to commit fraud and perpetrate a social injustice, or used as a vehicle to evade
obligations.[25] In this case, no act of malice or like dishonest purpose is ascribed on petitioner
Roxas-del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the corporate veil.
The above conclusion would still hold even if petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, at the time
ESHRI defaulted in paying BFs monthly progress bill, was still a director, for, before she could be
held personally liable as corporate director, it must be shown that she acted in a manner and
under the circumstances contemplated in Sec. 31 of the Corporation Code, which reads:
Section 31. Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote
for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or acquire any
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees
shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
(Emphasis ours.)
We do not find anything in the testimony of one Crispin Balingit to indicate that
Roxas-del Castillo made any misrepresentation respecting the payment of the bills in question.
Balingit, in fact, testified that the submitted but unpaid billings were still being evaluated. Further,
in the said testimony, in no instance was bad faith imputed on Roxas-del Castillo.
Page 137
 CONCEPCION CHUA GAW, G.R. No. 160855
Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the controversy between the principal Petitioner,
parties started in July 1992 when Roxas-del Castillo no longer sat in the ESHRI Board, a reality BF does Present:
not appear to dispute. In fine, she no longer had any participation in ESHRIs corporate affairs when what YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
basically is the ESHRI-BF dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that contracts are binding Chairperson,
only among parties to an agreement. Art. 1311 of the Civil Code is clear on this point: - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns REYES, JJ.
and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. SUY BEN CHUA and Promulgated:
FELISA CHUA, April 16, 2008
Respondents.
In the instant case, Roxas-del Castillo could not plausibly be held liable for breaches of contract
committed by ESHRI nor for the alleged wrongdoings of its governing board or corporate officers occurring
after she severed official ties with the hotel management. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Given the foregoing perspective, the other issues raised by Roxas-del Castillo as to her liability
for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees are now moot and academic. DECISION

And her other arguments insofar they indirectly impact on the liability of ESHRI need not detain
us any longer for we have sufficiently passed upon those concerns in our review of G.R. No. 145842.
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration. The
assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Complaint for Sum of
Money in favor of the plaintiff.

The antecedents are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 145842 is DISMISSED, while the petition in G.R. No.
145873 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57399 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioner in G.R. No. 145873, Cynthia
Roxas-del Castillo, is absolved from any liability decreed in the RTC Decision dated September 23, 1996
in Civil Case No. 63435, as affirmed by the CA.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business
enterprises[3] namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood
Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben
Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua
Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the time
of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.[4]

On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition

and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir[5] (Deed of Partition, for brevity),
wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will
pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other
half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in
equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each.[6] In said document, Chan Chi and the
six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber
in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked
respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of
their house in Marilao, Bulacan.The parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six (6)
months without interest.[7] On June 7, 1988, respondent issued in their favor China Banking

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 138

Corporation Check No. 240810[8] for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couples house in Marilao,
Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check.
On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and
interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.[9]
Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the
designated period. Respondent sent the couple a demand letter, [10] dated March 25, 1991, requesting
them to settle their obligation with the warning that he will be constrained to take the appropriate legal
action if they fail to do so.
Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses
Gaw with the RTC. The complaint alleged that on June 7, 1988, he extended a loan to the spouses Gaw
for P200,000.00, payable within six months without interest, but despite several demands, the couple failed
to pay their obligation.[11]
In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that
the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioners share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her familys
businesses. According to the spouses, when they transferred residence to Marilao, Bulacan, petitioner
asked respondent for an accounting, and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills
Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They claimed that respondent
persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to
remain in control of the family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly
gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber. [12]
In his Reply, respondent averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an accounting
of Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the
spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right whatsoever in these businesses that would entitle them to an
accounting thereof. Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted by them as a
loan and not as their share in Hagonoy Lumber.[13]
With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory Counterclaim)
wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of
Hagonoy Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself. They claimed that, despite repeated
demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to
deliver her share therein. They then prayed that respondent make an accounting of the operations of
Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver to petitioner her one-sixth (1/6) share thereof, which was estimated to be
worth not less than P500,000.00.[14]
In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the heirs executed the Deed of Partition on December 8,
1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.[15]
Defendants, in their reply,[16] countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his claim
of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and valid agreements and do not express the real
intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper arrangements which were
prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and binding
agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs. [17]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under
Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the
conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens. He
narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from
his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing
thereon. According to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who managed the
business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also
managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he got married and
found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating. [18]
On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of
Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders on January 1, 1991. He
further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition,
executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he
bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990. [19]
On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol
Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price
of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate
receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas,
Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and
China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the
amount in the house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public
market. [20]
On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to cardio vascular and respiratory
failure.[21]
On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
renders judgement ordering defendant Concepcion Chua Gaw to pay the
[respondent] the following:
1. P200,000.00 representing the principal
obligation with legal interest from judicial demand or the
institution of the complaint on November 19, 1991;
2. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
3. Costs of suit.
The defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed for being devoid
of merit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
The RTC held that respondent is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with
interest. It noted that respondent personally issued Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her
husband upon their request to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court concluded that
the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the respondent from his own funds and not
Page 139
remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor petitioners advance share in the profits of THE LOWER COURTS APPEALED DECISIONS
their parents businesses. OBJECTIVITY, ANNEX C.

The trial court further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the II. THAT ON THE IMPORTANT LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE
Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT AND
was never impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the originals of the documents, petitioner PETITIONER, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS
judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged her signature BEEN COMMITTED UNDER THE LOWER COURTS
thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the DECISION ANNEX C AND THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF
contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-presentation of the original document is not fatal so MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX A) AND THE RESOLUTION OF
as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its contents. Also, the parties to the documents DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX B) IN DEVIATING FROM AND
themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately, petitioner failed to establish her right to demand an DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT
accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the delivery of her 1/6 share therein. DECISIONS ENJOINING COURTS NOT TO OVERLOOK OR
MISINTERPRET IMPORTANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES,
As for petitioners claim that an accounting be done on Capitol Sawmill Corporation and SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON
Columbia Wood Industries, the trial court held that respondent is under no obligation to make such an RECORD, AND WHICH ARE OF GREAT WEIGHT AND VALUE,
accounting since he is not charged with operating these enterprises.[23] WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE RESULT OF THE CASE AND
ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND OBJECTIVE DECISION.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1) when it considered the (Citations omitted)
amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and not Concepcions share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the defendant, plaintiffs testimony when he was called to III. THAT FINALLY, AS TO THE OTHER LEGAL IMPORTANT
testify as an adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and (3) when it ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP OF
considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is THE HAGONOY LUMBER FAMILY BUSINESS, CLEAR AND
now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.[24] PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED ON THE
REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE BEST
On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. [25] The appellate court found EVIDENCE RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE
baseless the petitioners argument that the RTC should not have included respondents testimony as part of REVISED RULES OF COURT.[28]
petitioners evidence. The CA noted that the petitioner went on a fishing expedition, the taking of
respondents testimony having taken up a total of eleven hearings, and upon failing to obtain favorable
information from the respondent, she now disclaims the same. Moreover, the CA held that the petitioner The petition is without merit.
failed to show that the inclusion of respondents testimony in the statement of facts in the assailed decision
unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims. In fact, the CA noted that the facts testified to by Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the
respondent were deducible from the totality of the evidence presented. respondents testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part
of her evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited during
The CA likewise found untenable petitioners claim that Exhibits H (Deed of Sale) and Exhibit I cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. She contends that
(Deed of Partition) were merely temporary paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the the examination of respondent as adverse witness did not make him her witness and she is not
testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was uncorroborated she should have presented the other heirs bound by his testimony, particularly during cross-examination by his own counsel.[29] In particular,
to attest to the truth of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted the due execution of the said documents. the petitioner avers that the following testimony of the respondent as adverse witness should not
Since petitioner did not dispute the due execution and existence of Exhibits H and I, there was no need to be considered as her evidence:
produce the originals of the documents in accordance with the best evidence rule. [26]

On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [27] (11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became owner of the HAGONOY
LUMBER business when he bought the same from Chua Sioc
Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following errors: Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990 (EXH.H);

(11.b) That the HAGONOY LUMBER, on the other hand, was acquired by the
sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of Extrajudicial Partition and
I. THAT ON THE PRELIMINARY IMPORTANT RELATED ISSUE, Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a Co-Heir (EXH. I);
CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED IN
THE APPLICATION AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE ON (11.c) That the 3 lots on which the HAGONOY LUMBER business is located
EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE PARTY OR HOSTILE WITNESS UNDER were acquired by Lu Pieng from the Santos family under the Deed
SECTION 10 (d) AND (e) OF RULE 132, CAUSING SERIOUS DOUBT ON of Absolute Sale (EXH. J); that Lu Pieng sold the Lots to Chua Suy

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 140

 Lu in 1976 (EXHS. K, L, & M.); that Chua Siok Huan eventually became
owner of the 3 Lots; and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan sold them to
RESPONDENT-Appellee (EXHS. Q and P); that after he acquired the 3
Lots, he has not sold them to anyone and he is the owner of the lots.[30]
We do not agree that petitioners case was prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony during cross-examination as her evidence.
If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondents
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitute a harmless error
which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.
In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or
the other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof
was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases, that burden
devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants
evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to
consider the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then
determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[31]
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on
the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,[32] except by evidence of his bad
character.[33] Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party
does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or
remains unrebutted.[34]
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony
only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts
contrary to what the witness testifies on. [35] A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness
shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight,
but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching
him.[36] This, the petitioner failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondents
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the
Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary.
On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer of
the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died
in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in
the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.
Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented.[37] All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable
effects resulting from the evidence.[38] As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the
evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this
light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an
adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence
becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.
Significantly, the RTCs finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her
husband as a loan is supported by the evidence on record. Hence, we do not agree with the
petitioners contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight and value in
arriving at its decision. The RTC merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be
more credible than the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of fact of the
CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court. Only
errors of law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.[39] A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the
CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported
by the evidence on record.[40] There is no reason to apply the exception in the instant case
because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court.
These findings are buttressed by the evidence on record. Moreover, the issues and errors alleged
in this petition are substantially the very same questions of fact raised by petitioner in the
appellate court.
On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to remember that
a check may be evidence of indebtedness.[41] A check, the entries of which are in writing, could
prove a loan transaction.[42] It is pure naivet to insist that an entrepreneur who has several sources
of income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any reason to borrow any
amount.
The petitioners allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share in the profits
of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber was originally owned by the
parents of petitioner and respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs freely renounced
and waived in favor of their sister Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein,
as shown by the Deed of Partition which the petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua
Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor of Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when the
respondent delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua Sioc
Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and
respondent no longer had any interest in the business enterprise; neither had a right to demand a
share in the profits of the business. Respondent became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber only
after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on August 1, 1990. So, when the respondent delivered to the
petitioner the P200,000.00 check on June 7, 1988, it could not have been given as an advance on
petitioners share in the business, because at that moment in time both of them had no
participation, interest or share in Hagonoy Lumber. Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was
an advance on the petitioners share in the profits of the business, it was highly unlikely that the
respondent would deliver a check drawn against his personal, and not against the business
enterprises account.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were
acknowledged before a Notary Public. The notarization of a private document converts it into a
public document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. [43] It is
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.[44] A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as
to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given full force and effect absent a strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects
Page 141
recognized by law.[45] A public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public FELIXBERTO EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner. [46] HOMOBONO CUETO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
Petitioner, however, maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the
Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule. In addition, petitioner insists February 28, 2006
that the Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations between a true seller and buyer. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is DECISION
only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the
original.[48] Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.[49]
Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently prove conveyance
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there of title to a property? This is the issue presented to Us in the present petition.
was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies
of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the The factual antecedents of this case are narrated herein:
Deed of Partition.[50] As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due
execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules. [51] The petitioner A Complaint dated 04 January 1994, docketed as Civil Case No. 4132 for
merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and Damages, was filed by Gil Ebreo, represented by his
they were only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. [52] Apparently, the Attorney-in-Fact Felixberto Ebreo, Flaviano Ebreoand Homobono Cueto against
petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous petitioners Felino Ebreo, Spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn P. Beraa-Ebreo,
agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary. Ignacio Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City,
Branch 7.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights,
duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties.[53] The parties intention is to be From plaintiffs account in their complaint, Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926 leaving
deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of behind as heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio,
the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract. [54] Thus, when the terms of an agreement and Felipa.[1] Subsequently, Felipa died leaving behind her
have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between heirs, Genoveva, Homobono and Eleuteria all surnamed Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991 without
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the any issue. Defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraa are the son and daughter-in-law,
written agreement.[55] respectively, of defendant Felino, one of the five children of Felipe Ebreo.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Felipe Ebreo left to his children an untitled parcel of land situated
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated May 23, 2003 and Resolution dated December 2, in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, more particularly described as follows:
2003 are AFFIRMED.
Isang palagay na lupang palayanin o linangin ipinamumuwis sa ilalim ng Tax
Declaration No. 39949
SO ORDERED. S-1953, na ang mga karatig sa Ilaya ay Prudencia Coz, sa Silangan ay
Pablo Cantro at Santiago Banaag, sa ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa Kanluranay
FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES ANTONIO and G.R. No. 160065 Marcos at Fortunato Banaag may luwang na 31,781
EVELYN P. BERAA, IGNACIO EBREO and metros kuwadrados humigit kumulang at
ELEUTERIA CUETO, may balor amiliorada na halagang P950.00, lalong kilala sa Lote 9046 ng su
Petitioners, Present: kat katastro dito sa Batangas.[2]

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
- versus - Chairperson, Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe, Lot No. 9046 was subdivided
YNARES-SANTIAGO, into six lots identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.[3]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
GIL EBREO, represented by His Attorney-in-Fact, CALLEJO, SR., and

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 142

On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of Felipe Ebreo, through themselves and their representatives,
executed and signed a document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa[4] where
they extrajudicially partitioned the above-described property except the portion known as Lot No.
9046-F. As agreed upon by these heirs, Lot No. 9046-F, with an area of 13,799 square meters, shall
remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However,
plaintiffs were surprised to discover that Lot 9046-F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs recitals, they alleged that they never sold, ceded, conveyed
or transferred their rights, share and co-ownership over Lot 9046- F.
Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of
the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by and among the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was
sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration
was transferred in the name of Santiago Puyo as owner. However, the deed of sale evidencing this
transaction was never presented.
As narrated by the defendants, Tax Declaration No. 39241,[5] beginning in the year 1969
covering Lot 9046-F was under the names of the heirs of Felipe Ebreo. Thereafter, upon the sale of the lot
by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, Tax Declaration No. 39241 was cancelled and a new one,
Tax Declaration No. 48221[6] dated 15 January 1973, was issued in the name of Santiago Puyo. On this
tax declaration, the alleged sale of Lot 9046-F by the Heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was
annotated. Soon, Tax Declaration No. 48221 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4042 [7] for the year
1974, still in the name of Santiago Puyo. Upon the sale by Santiago Puyo of Lot 9046- F to
Antonio Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax Declaration No. 4042 was cancelled and a new one, Tax Declaration
No. 50669,[8] for the year 1977, was issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo. This Tax Declaration was later
on revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 075-534 upon the marriage of defendant
Antonio Ebreo to defendant Evelyn Beraa. From 1977 up to 1994, defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and
Evelyn Beraa religiously paid the taxes due on the land.[9]
Defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9046-F by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was executed and ratified sometime in 1968 before Attorney Doroteo M.
Chavez of BatangasCity. From 1968 to 1976, Mr. Santiago Puyo possessed said lot peacefully,
continuously, publicly and in the concept of owner. As stated earlier, on 23 July 1976, Lot No. 9046-F was
sold by Santiago Puyo by way of Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio Ebreo. The Deed of Absolute Sale
or Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa[10] was duly executed and ratified before one Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.
After due proceedings, a decision[11] dated 18 August 1997, was rendered by the RTC which disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered as follows:
(1) Ordering the parties-in-interest (heirs of Felipe Ebreo and/or their representatives)
to partition Lot No. 9046-F among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance
under Sec. 2, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and in default thereof, the
partition shall be conducted in accordance with Sec. 3, et. seq., of the same Rule.
(2) Ordering the dismissal of the Counterclaim of the defendants.
(3) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, for and as
attorneys fee.
(4) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.[12]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Defendants- appellants appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. In a
decision[13] dated 27 February 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held:
The main issue in this case is whether or not a valid transfer of Lot No.
9046-F was effected which conveyed ownership of the property to
Santiago Puyo. The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Sale
supposedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor of
Santiago Puyo. However, defendant-appellants failed to produce the alleged
Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
xxxx
The best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates as a rule
of exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary) evidence cannot
inceptively be introduced as the original writing itself must be produced in
court, except in the four instances mentioned in Section 3. (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, Seventh Revised Edition, p.
555). Defendant-appellants miserably failed to prove that their case is
included among the exceptions to the Rule.
The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the Deed of Sale
cannot be given credence. In fact, it was contradicted by his supposed
co-sellers and co-owners. His claim that it was borrowed
by Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to him was also refuted
by Eleuteria Cueto. Not only are the testimonies of Felino Ebreo and his son
Antonio Ebreo self-serving, they are also uncorroborated by independent
witnesses. Defendant-appellants did not even look for a copy of the deed of
sale on the notarial registry of Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly
notarized the deed of sale. Neither did they look for a copy in the archives of
the Court where it should have been submitted as required by
the notarial law. In the words of the trial court, the decisive documentary
evidence remains an elusive phantom and conspicuously unproven. The
controversial deed of sale not having been produced as required by the rules
of evidence, the trial court was correct in ruling that Santiago Puyo acquired
no rights whatsoever to Lot No. 9046-F.
Since there was no valid transfer of the ownership of the subject lot from the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, the subsequent transfer thereof to
Antonio Ebreo is ineffectual. It is essential that the seller is the owner of the
property he is selling (Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78). Moreover,
the fact that the tax declarations for said lot were issued in the name of
Antonio Ebreo is of no moment for they are not conclusive proof of
ownership. It must be remembered that a tax declaration may be issued to
any claimant even if it is not supported by any deed.
Neither can defendant-appellants open, adverse, notorious and continuous
possession of the land for several years amount to ownership for they are
co-owners of the land as evidenced by
the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi Ng Lupa. A co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of
Page 143
 co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. (Trinidad v. Court of
Appeals, 289 SCRA 188).[14]
The motion for reconsideration of the defendants-appellants was denied in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 22 September 2003.[15]
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The following issues are submitted for resolution in this petition:
1) Whether or not the annotation of the Deed of Sale appearing in Tax
Declaration No. 48221 is a sufficient proof of transfer in line with the doctrine of
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
2) Whether or not entries in official records are admissible in
evidence to establish the fact of valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F that effectively
conveyed ownership of the property from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo.[16]
After a painstaking review of the records, we find the petition bereft of merit. First, it is important to re-state
the general rule that the findings of the trial court which are factual in nature, especially when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals deserve to be respected and affirmed by this court provided they are supported by
substantial evidence on record, as in the case at bench.[17]
As recounted by defendants, now petitioners, Antonio and Evelyn Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo initially to Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 or 1968 as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed and ratified before Atty. Doroteo Chavez in Batangas City. Santiago Puyo caused the transfer of
the tax declaration in his name and caused the sale to be annotated therein. Only this annotation in the tax
declaration was offered as proof of the sale. Santiago Puyo took possession, cultivated the land, exercised
uninterrupted ownership and paid real estate taxes thereon for a period of eight years.
Petitioners went on further to state that the Deed of Sale from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo could not be presented because the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was
lost in the fire which occurred in 23 May 1979 that gutted the building housing their office. From then on,
petitioners advance that they have paid the real estate taxes on the land and were in open, continous and
uninterrupted possession until the Complaint for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages was filed by the
respondents.
On the basis of the above narrations, petitioners insist that there was a valid transfer of the lot from the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, and thereafter from Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress this claim
of sale by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, petitioners presented the testimony of Antonio Pajilan of the City
Assessors Office of Batangas City who testified on the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221. The
annotation reads:
Deed of sale
D.V. P2,500.00
Doc. on file
Doc. No. 312
Page No. 17
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Book No. VI
Series of 1967[18]
The testimony of Pajilan went on as follows:
Q I am showing to you a tax declaration No. 32941 in the name of
Gil Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, Genoveva, Eleuteria Cueto which is
already marked as Exhibit 10 for the defendants in this case and
Exhibit F for the plaintiff, will you please examine the same and
identify it?
A Witness is examining the document. I think this tax declaration is an
owners copy, Sir.
Q But this tax declaration was issued by your office, the City Assessor
of Batangas?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you inform before this Honorable Court, if this tax declaration was still
existing in your office or a copy thereof?
A This tax declaration could not be found because our office was burned
on May 29, 1979, it could not be found anymore, Sir.
Q You are also required by this Honorable Court to bring a copy of the tax
declaration No. 48221, do you have copy of the same?
A I have copy of that tax declaration, Sir.
Q Will you please produce the same?
Witness is producing a copy of tax declaration No. 32941 in the name of
Santiago Puyo.
A Can you explain how this tax declaration was placed in the name of
Santiago Puyo?
Q Previously this tax declaration was owned by Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio Ebreo and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono Cueto un
der PD 32941 this tax declaration is under 48221 in the name of
Santiago Puyo and this was transferred by a virtue of Deed of Sale
annotated in the tax declaration and in the Deed of Sale and
purchase value was there: 2,500.00 document docketed No. 312,
Page 17, Book No. 6, Series of 1967, Doroteo de Chavez, the
Notary Public, Sir.
Q Can you explain why this annotation was placed or written in this tax
declaration No. 48221?
Page 144
 A This was placed under Tax Declaration No. 48221 because the office of the City SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject
Assessor transferred the tax declaration and annotated the instrument of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
used in the transfer of the tax declaration, Sir. other than the original document itself except in the following cases:

Q Do you have copy of that document which is the basis of the transfer? (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
A We could not be located (sic) because as I have said earlier our office was burned of the offeror;
on May 23, 1979, Sir.
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
Q So what does this phrase Deed of Sale, what do you mean by that? control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
A I placed that, that is the title of the instrument used in the transfer of this tax
declaration, Sir.[19] (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan, an employee of the City Assessors Office without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
of Batangas City[20] who testified regarding Tax Declaration No. 48221 dated 15 January 1973 on which established from them is only the general result of the
was annotated the alleged sale between the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, was employed in the whole; and
said office only in the year 1978. Thus, he did not make nor did he witness the causing of the annotation as
he was not yet employed in the said office at that time. Likewise, he was neither present when the deed of (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of
sale was executed nor did he personally see the said deed of sale. For these reasons, the testimony a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
of Pajilan is inconclusive.

Petitioners next argue that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the name of Santiago Puyo enjoys the Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
presumption of regularity in its issuance. It is a good time as any to re-state that this rule is a mere prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite
presumption, not absolute nor inflexible and applies only in the absence of proof to the contrary. [21] Besides, quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of the
the mere fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the said deed or document. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran declared:
petitioners does not necessarily prove ownership. In the same manner, neither does the payment of taxes
conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for.[22] It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.[23] Where there are two or more originals, it must appear
that all of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot be
Petitioners also presented the testimony of Felino Ebreo, father of petitioner Antonio Ebreo, produced before secondary evidence can be given of
who testified that the heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot 9046 F to Santiago Puyo.[24] When queried on the any one. For example, a lease was executed in duplicate,
whereabouts of the document of sale, Felino alleged that it was borrowed by his one being retained by the lessor and the other by the
niece Eleuteria Cueto who is the daughter of one of the heirs, Felipa Ebreo.[25] According lessee. Either copy was, therefore, an original, and could
to Felino, Eleuteria refused to return the document and even got angry when he tried to demand its have been introduced as evidence of the contract without
return.[26] From Felinos account,[27] there are three copies of the missing deed of sale. Lamentably, the production of the other. One of these originals could
petitioners failed to present any one of them. not be found.The non-production of the other was not
accounted for it was held that under these circumstances,
Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion Aguado, step-daughter of Santiago Puyo, who testified the rule is that no secondary evidence of the contents of
that her stepfather Santiago Puyo bought the subject lot from the Ebreo heirs.[28] Similar either is admissible until it is shown that originals must be
to Pajilans testimony, Aguadostestimony cannot be given much weight in view of the fact that save for her accounted for before secondary evidence can be given
bare allegations that Lot 9046-F was purchased by her stepfather Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise of any one.
present when the deed was executed. In her testimony she merely stated that her stepfather paid taxes for
his real estate properties but could not state with specificity if the payment was made for Lot 9056-F.[29] Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are at most secondary following:
evidence; hence, they are inadmissible considering that the petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of Sale,
thereof failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to (a) the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and destruction of
establish conditions for their admissibility.[30] Even if they are admitted, they have no probative the original or its non-production in court; and (c) unavailability of the original
value.[31] This rule provides: is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.[32]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 145

On this score, the factual findings of the trial court are worth repeating. It held:
The pivotal document of sale allegedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor
of Santiago Puyo and chiefly relied upon by defendant Antonio Ebreo as the
derivative basis of his ownership is sadly missing and remains a phantom in the
dark. The testimonies of Felino Ebreo, Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo to prove
by way of recollection of witnesses that Lot 9046-F was sold to
Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 for P2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized before
deceased Atty. Doroteo Chavez merits scant consideration. They were the verbal
say-so of interested parties and attributed acts to a party whose lips had been sealed
by death. Quite evidently, their testimony should be taken cum grano salis with a
grain of salt.
Both the testimonies of Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the legal
underpinning needed to prove the deed of sale. Their testimonies were not
recollection of witnesses who saw the execution and delivery of the document.
According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the contents of the lost writing may be
proved, inter alia, by the recollection of witnesses. As matters stand,
however, Aguados testimony relates not to the execution of the document but to what
her father (Santiago Puyo) did with the property after it was already acquired. (t.s.n.
pp. 4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995) Similarly, Antonio Ebreos testimony does not refer to
the execution and delivery of the deed of sale but of having allegedly seen said
document when he purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo. He testified that when I
bought it from Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the Tax Declaration in the name of
Santiago Puyo as well as the deed of sale between my father and his brothers
and SantiagoPuyo. (t.s.n. pp. 13-14, Direct, Aug. 16, 1995). In fine, they were not
witnesses to the execution and delivery of the document of sale to qualify their
testimonies under the phrase recollection of witnesses.
Neither does the testimony of Felino Ebreo evoke faith and confidence. His salutary
recollection of the missing document failed to instill credulity. For one, it was
uncorroborated by any of the parties to the alleged deed of sale. In fact, such sale
was directly controverted by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners Gil
and Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp. 7-8, Direct, July 18, 1994; t.s.n. pp. 22-23, Cross, Sept.
29, 1994) Then too, it appears rather unusual for the heirs to retain Lot 9046-F in
co-ownership in their partition agreement of 1967 and sell the said Lot that very same
year (1967) if not on the same occasion. Felino Ebreo did not give the exact date of
the supposed sale to Santiago Puyo except to say that it was sold in 1967. The Court
got the impression, though, that it was on the same occasion as the partition
agreement. (t.s.n. pp. 6-7, 14-16, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) More important, his
humanistic bias to favor his son Antonio Ebreo and his natural interest to defend his
actuations leading to the issuance of the Tax Decl. 50669 (Exh. 2) which he signed
caution us to accept his testimony with great care. He does not have the cold
neutrality of a disinterested party. He was covetous of gain. The Tax Decl. No. 50669
that transferred in 1976 the property in the name of Antonio Ebreo was signed
by Felino Ebreo himself (Exh. 2). This illustrated a dialectical connection between him
and his favored son Antonio Ebreo. Finally, Felino Ebreos claim that he could not
produce it because it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto and never returned
to him was squarely refuted by said Eleuteria Cueto when she testified in rebuttal for
the plaintiffs. (t.s.n. pp. 9, 12-13, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) (See testimony
of Eleuteria Cueto in rebuttal on July 17, 1997)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
While many things have been said about the crucial deed of sale, the decisive
documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and conspicuously
unproven. The ownership of Santiago Puyo becomes moreover doubtful
because while the alleged sale was executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in
1967 yet the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago Puyo was
issued only in 1973 (Exh. 9) or 1974 (Exh. 4) as far as the record of this case
can reveal. The issuance of a new tax declaration in the name of the sunrise
owner (Puyo) which was late by six (6) or seven (7) years naturally cast a slur
on the veracity of the sale.
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. 48221 (Exhs. 9 and 9-A) detailing the
particulars of the alleged deed of sale in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently
suspicious and a very very poor ersatz for the primary document. While the
sale allegedly took place in 1967, said deed was annotated on Exh. 9 which
however only begins with the year 1973. Moreover, while the alleged sale
took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No. 32941 (Exh. 10) that was issued
on Feb. 7, 1968 still carried the names of Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio,
all EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono, all CUETO and not the
name of Santiago Puyo. There even appears thereon the annotation that the
1968 tax was paid on Jan. 29, 1968 with no mention of
Santiago Puyo despite his having allegedly acquired the property the year
before (1967).
Riveting further its attention to the typewritten entry on Exh. 9, the Court finds
it rather strange that such an entry appears on the Tax Declaration. Firstly, it
is not a widely accepted practice to make such annotation. Secondly, there is
more than meets the eye in the conspicuous presence of this annotation only
on this particular Tax Declaration (Exh. 9). All other tax declarations in this
case do not have similar entry to identify the documentary basis for the
issuance of the latest tax declaration. Thirdly, not even Tax Decl. Nos. 50669
and 075-534 (Exhs. 2 and 3) of Antonio Ebreo carry such annotation to
indicate that he acquired the property by virtue of Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15,
Book No. I, Series of 1976 of the NotarialRegister of
Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza. The pregnant suspicion lurks that the alleged
particulars of the document of sale from Santiago Puyo to
Antonio Ebreo were belatedly annotated.
As icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo categorically stated it was Felino Ebreo who
authored the transfer. He testified on cross-examination that it was his eldest
brother Felino Ebreo who was the caretaker of the lot and in-charge of the
payment of taxes. It was his brother Felino who sold the subject lot
known as Lot No. 9046-F in favor of his son Antonio Ebreo. (t.s.n. pp.
16-17, Cross, July 18, 1994) The evidence tended to show that indeed it
was Felino Ebreo who had the opportunity to cause the transfer as it was he
(Felino) who took possession of the lot and acted as its overseer. (t.s.n. pp.
3-4, Direct, Nov. 17, 1994)
The alleged document of sale executed between Santiago Puyo and
Antonio Ebreo denominated as Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Exh. 1), was
ineffectual for the purpose of transferring ownership of disputed Lot No.
Page 146
 9046-F to said Antonio Ebreobecause the alleged vendor Santiago Puyo has not, as
heretofore explained, acquired it from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo as the transaction has
no supporting document of sale. It is self-evident that the seller cannot transfer
more than what he has or as oftenly stated hyperbolically, the river cannot rise
above its source. Moreover, Clerk of Court Jose C. Corales certified that
the Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976)
despite diligent efforts could not be found in the old CFI vault located at
the Capitol Building, Batangas City. (Exh. E Rebuttal)
The fact that tax declarations for Lot [No.] 9046-F were issued in the name of
defendant Antonio Ebreo (Exhs. 2 and 3) and that he paid the taxes for the land (Exh.
8) provides no evidentiary value that he was the owner thereof. The existence of the
tax declarations and payment of taxes did not transmogrify his possession into
ownership. Tax declarations are not sufficient evidence to prove possession in the
concept of owners. (Martinez, D., Summary of 1990 Supreme Court Rulings, Part.
II, p. 734) Tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.[33]
In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient
proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was
incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations of
petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2003 affirming in toto the decision of the trial court dated 18
August 1997 is likewise AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST G.R. No. 143338
CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK),
P e t i t i o n e r,
Present:
PUNO,
- versus Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
G. MORALES,[1]AND SPOUSE,
R e s p o n d e n t s. Promulgated:
July 29, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 16886 entitled, The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte
Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the order dated 28 December 1987 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint [3] for recovery of sum of
money against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales
(respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic
banking and trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of
respondents a loan in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a
promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the promissory note,
respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five
monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. The note
was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the
full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note.
Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their
obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness
which, as of 09 March 1984, stood at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint as
Annexes A, B, and C, respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by
respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and
statement of account pertaining to respondents loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default
which was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that they were never served with copies of
the summons and of petitioners complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a manifestation
attaching thereto its answer to petitioners complaint which states the following:
2- That it denies generally and specifically the allegations contained in
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters therein alleged, the
truth being those alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses
hereinbelow contained;
3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first special and affirmative
defense, defendant herein states that the promissory note in question is void
for want of valid consideration and/or there was no valuable consideration
involved as defendant herein did not receive any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second special affirmative
defense, defendant herein alleges that no demand has ever been sent to nor
Page 147
 received by herein defendant and if ever demands were made, denies any liability as
averred therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third special and affirmative defense,
defendant herein avers that the complaint states no cause of action and has no basis
either in fact or in law;
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., one of the defendants in this
case.
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused the preparation of the
above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of my own knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO[4]
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together with his answer wherein he
likewise renounced any liability on the promissory note, thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with a qualification in
paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been separated from his wife and the system
governing their property relations is that of complete separation of property and not
that of conjugal partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs 4,
5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief
and as to the truth of the matter therein averred, the truth being those alleged in the
Special And Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow pleaded;
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his personal
and/or individual capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack of valid
consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and execution of the questioned
promissory note, still, defendant herein cannot be bound personally and individually to
the said obligations as banking procedures requires, it being a standard operating
procedure of all known banking institution, that to hold a borrower jointly and severally
liable in his official as well as personal capacity, the borrower must sign a Suretyship
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Agreement or at least, a continuing guarranty with that of the corporation he
represent(s) but which in this case is wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any way, redound/inure to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gain, as there is no conjugal
partnership of gain to speak with, defendant having long been separated from
his wife and their property relation is governed by the system of complete
separation of property, and more importantly, he has never signed the said
promissory note in his personal and individual capacity as such;
VERIFICATION
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby depose and declare that:
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-entitled case;
I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer upon facts and
figures supplied by me to my retained counsel; have read each and every
allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same are true and
correct of my own knowledge and information.
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
Affiant[5]
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default
and admitted their respective answers.[6]
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A.
Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated
that respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to respondents
failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was constrained to send a
demand letter to respondents; that as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette Tolentino
(Tolentino), respondent corporations controller, wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for some
consideration because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then buffeting their business
operation; that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be
discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial payment to their companys
obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents obligation again
became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter which,
unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for
petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as
Exhibit A;[7] petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit B;[8] Tolentinos letter to
petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement
of account sent to respondents marked as Exhibit D.[10]
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the
original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the
duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E.
Page 148
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted respondents motion that they be Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 December 1999 which was denied
allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence. [11] for lack of merit in a resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000. [21]

On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration [12] of Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now seeks redress from this Court imputing the
the trial courts order admitting into evidence petitioners Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that following errors on the Court of Appeals:
Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and
hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit E was not properly identified by Lavarino I
who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of
which was Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit A. Lastly, respondent corporation FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE MATERIAL
claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E was ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE
not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent THE PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY POINTING TO THE
corporation based its own answer. FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE
GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider order admitting as evidence NOTE.
Exhibit E[13] which, other than insisting that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note
were not established as far as he was concerned, essentially raised the same arguments contained in II
respondent corporations manifestation with motion for reconsideration referred to above.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents motions for reconsideration. [14] Petitioner UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF
moved for the reconsideration of this order which was denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.[15] THE PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF
EXHIBIT A (XEROX COPY OF THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF
with the exclusion of Exhibits A and E, petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF
indebtedness.[16] SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion[17] praying that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of III
the court a quo inhibit himself from this case maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December 1985 thereby depriving it the opportunity of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
presenting proof that the original of Exhibit A was delivered to respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF
haste on the part of the presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness. FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING
This motion to inhibit was denied by the trial court on 06 August 1987.[18] THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED AND MANIFEST
BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO
In an order dated 28 December 1987,[19] the case before the trial court was dismissed, the dispositive THE GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK.[22]
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. and
Narciso O. Morales and spouse, is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the
plaintiff.
The petition is meritorious.
In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that contrary to petitioners stance,
respondents were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory note, thus:

The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision now before us. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28, 1987 dismissing plaintiff-appellant['s]
complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the plaintiff-appellant.[20]
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer (Record,
p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied generally and specifically
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and by
way of special and affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES)
never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his
personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover, what appears in the record
(Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny
generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 149

 that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial.[23]
We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon
a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided
in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall
be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.[24]
[25]
In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde, this Court held that
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did
not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the
true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his denial
under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and
bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that
it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses
Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by
law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,[26] the Court expounded on how to deny
the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that
he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect
that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation
raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the
contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and
due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument
upon a ground not affecting either.[27]
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to
specifically deny the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In
effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the best evidence rule or primary
evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning the
alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants
(respondents herein).[28]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The best evidence rule, according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year
1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating that they
should take into consideration the usages of trade and that the best proof that the nature of the
thing will afford is only required.[29] Over the years, the phrase was used to describe rules which
were already existing such as the rule that the terms of a document must be proved by the
production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about the document; it was also
utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court and not
subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate the
group of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to that of
others.[30]
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, the only actual rule that
the best evidence phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original
writing[31] the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of
more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight
variation in words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a
substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to
give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.
In the light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of
written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by
presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing is
justified.[32]
Page 150

Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the best
evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that
respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude
that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and
leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on
the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that
he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the precise
wording[33] of the promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the best
evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on
this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As
quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is
in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given
the opportunity by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A was in
the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the
promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the
promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed
to present the original of said note.[34]
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness
of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by
the defendant.[35] In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.,[36] this Court held that
Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into
consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without
having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the answer of the
defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents.
Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and due execution
of these documents must, in that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to
relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence.
The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the
introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. [37]
Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of the court a quo should have inhibited himself from
this case, we resolve this issue against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice brought against a judge, there must be
convincing proof to show that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough.
Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be presumed particularly if weighed against a judges
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right
to the poor and the rich.[38] There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case.[39]
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of
bias and prejudice, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that there was no cogent reason for him
to disqualify himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states the rule on the effect of
judgment on demurrer to evidence. It reads:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action. Caution, however, must be exercised by the party seeking
the dismissal of a case upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for the dismissal
on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his
right to adduce evidence. If the defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is
granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the
adverse party because the movant loses his right to present evidence.[40] The reviewing court
cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis of
the evidence presented by the plaintiff.[41]
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are obligated to petitioner
in the amount of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982.
In addition, they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the loan; and a
penalty charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed
to pay attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00,
plus costs of suit with both these amounts bearing a 1% interest per month until paid. Costs
against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision dated 25 November 1999 as
well as its Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 27, dated 28 December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
ordered to pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum, penalty charge
of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of the amount due as attorneys fees together with a 1%
interest per month until fully paid. The sum of P220,020.00 which was the value of the postdated
check given
by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should be deducted from the amount due from
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National G.R. No. 156132
City Bank) and INVESTORS FINANCE
Page 151
CORPORATION, doing business under the name Present:
and style of FNCB Finance,
Petitioners, PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
MODESTA R. SABENIANO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 16, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and the
Resolution,[3] dated 20 November 2002, of the same court which, although modifying its earlier Decision,
still denied for the most part the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioners.
Petitioner Citibank, N.A. (formerly known as the First National City Bank) is a banking corporation duly
authorized and existing under the laws of the United States of America and licensed to do commercial
banking activities and perform trust functions in the Philippines.
Petitioner Investors Finance Corporation, which did business under the name and style of FNCB
Finance, was an affiliate company of petitioner Citibank, specifically handling money market placements
for its clients.It is now, by virtue of a merger, doing business as part of its successor-in-interest, BPI Card
Finance Corporation. However, so as to consistently establish its identity in the Petition at bar, the said
petitioner shall still be referred to herein as FNCB Finance.[4]
Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners Citibank and FNCB
Finance. Regrettably, the business relations among the parties subsequently went awry.
On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint[5] against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case
No. 11336, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Respondent claimed to have substantial
deposits and money market placements with the petitioners, as well as money market placements with the
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds of which were supposedly
deposited automatically and directly to respondents accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent alleged
that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements despite
her repeated demands, thus, compelling respondent to file Civil Case No. 11336 against petitioners for
Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages. Respondent eventually filed an Amended Complaint[6] on 9
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
October 1985 to include additional claims to deposits and money market placements inadvertently
left out from her original Complaint.
In their joint Answer[7] and Answer to Amended Complaint,[8] filed on 12 September
1985 and 6 November 1985, respectively, petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits and
money market placements with them, including dollar accounts in the Citibank branch in Geneva,
Switzerland (Citibank-Geneva). Petitioners further alleged that the respondent later obtained
several loans from petitioner Citibank, for which she executed Promissory Notes (PNs), and
secured by (a) a Declaration of Pledge of her dollar accounts in Citibank-Geneva, and (b) Deeds
of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. When respondent
failed to pay her loans despite repeated demands by petitioner Citibank, the latter exercised its
right to off-set or compensate respondents outstanding loans with her deposits and money market
placements, pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge and the Deeds of Assignment executed by
respondent in its favor. Petitioner Citibank supposedly informed respondent Sabeniano of the
foregoing compensation through letters, dated 28 September 1979 and 31 October
1979. Petitioners were therefore surprised when six years later, in 1985, respondent and her
counsel made repeated requests for the withdrawal of respondents deposits and money market
placements with petitioner Citibank, including her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and her
money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. Thus, petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint and for the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
When the parties failed to reach a compromise during the pre-trial hearing,[9] trial proper
ensued and the parties proceeded with the presentation of their respective evidence. Ten years
after the filing of the Complaint on 8 August 1985, a Decision[10] was finally rendered in Civil Case
No. 11336 on 24 August 1995 by the fourth Judge[11] who handled the said case, Judge Manuel D.
Victorio, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, decision is hereby
rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring as illegal, null and void the setoff effected by the
defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank] of plaintiffs [respondent Sabeniano]
dollar deposit with Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount of US$149,632.99,
and ordering the said defendant [petitioner Citibank] to refund the said
amount to the plaintiff with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, compounded yearly, from 31 October 1979 until fully paid, or its
peso equivalent at the time of payment;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] indebted to the
defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank] in the amount of P1,069,847.40 as of 5
September 1979 and ordering the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] to pay
said amount, however, there shall be no interest and penalty charges from
the time the illegal setoff was effected on 31 October 1979;
(3) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims interposed by the
parties against each other.
Costs against the defendant Bank.
Page 152
All the parties appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 51930. Respondent questioned the findings of the RTC that she was still indebted to petitioner
Citibank, as well as the failure of the RTC to order petitioners to render an accounting of respondents
deposits and money market placements with them. On the other hand, petitioners argued that petitioner
Citibank validly compensated respondents outstanding loans with her dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva, in accordance with the Declaration of Pledge she executed in its favor. Petitioners also
alleged that the RTC erred in not declaring respondent liable for damages and interest.
On 26 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[12] affirming with modification the RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 11336, dated 24 August 1995, and ruling entirely in favor of respondent in this
wise
Wherefore, premises considered, the assailed 24 August 1995 Decision of
the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. Declaring as illegal, null and void the set-off effected by the
defendant-appellant Bank of the plaintiff-appellants dollar deposit with Citibank,
Switzerland, in the amount of US$149,632.99, and ordering defendant-appellant
Citibank to refund the said amount to the plaintiff-appellant with legal interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded yearly, from 31 October 1979
until fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment;
2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish by competent
evidence the alleged indebtedness of plaintiff-appellant, the set-off of P1,069,847.40
in the account of Ms. Sabeniano is hereby declared as without legal and factual basis;
3. As defendants-appellants failed to account the following
plaintiff-appellants money market placements, savings account and current accounts,
the former is hereby ordered to return the same, in accordance with the terms and
conditions agreed upon by the contending parties as evidenced by the certificates of
investments, to wit:
(i) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 023356 (Cancels and
Supersedes NNPN No. 22526) issued on 17 March
1977, P318,897.34 with 14.50% interest p.a.;
(ii) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 23357 (Cancels and
Supersedes NNPN No. 22528) issued on 17 March
1977, P203,150.00 with 14.50 interest p.a.;
(iii) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05757 (Cancels and
Supersedes NNPN No. 04952), issued on 02 June
1977, P500,000.00 with 17% interest p.a.;
(iv) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05758 (Cancels and
Supersedes NNPN No. 04962), issued on 02 June
1977, P500,000.00 with 17% interest per annum;
(v) The Two Million (P2,000,000.00) money market
placements of Ms. Sabeniano with the Ayala Investment &
Development Corporation (AIDC) with legal interest at the rate of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded yearly,
from 30 September 1976 until fully paid;
4. Ordering defendants-appellants to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff-appellant the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) by way of moral damages, FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages, and ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as attorneys fees.
Apparently, the parties to the case, namely, the respondent, on one hand, and the petitioners, on
the other, made separate attempts to bring the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 26 March 2002, before this Court for review.
G.R. No. 152985
Respondent no longer sought a reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and instead, filed immediately with this Court on 3 May 2002
a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, [13] which, after payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 152985. In the said Motion,
respondent alleged that she received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision on 18 April
2002 and, thus, had 15 days therefrom or until 3 May 2002 within which to file her Petition for
Review. Since she informed her counsel of her desire to pursue an appeal of the Court of Appeals
Decision only on 29 April 2002, her counsel neither had enough time to file a motion for
reconsideration of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals, nor a Petition for Certiorari with
this Court. Yet, the Motion failed to state the exact extension period respondent was requesting
for.
Since this Court did not act upon respondents Motion for Extension of Time to file her
Petition for Review, then the period for appeal continued to run and still expired on 3 May
2002.[14] Respondent failed to file any Petition for Review within the prescribed period for appeal
and, hence, this Court issued a Resolution,[15] dated 13 November 2002, in which it pronounced
that
G.R. No. 152985 (Modesta R. Sabeniano vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.). It appearing that petitioner failed to file the intended petition for review
on certiorari within the period which expired on May 3, 2002, the Court
Resolves to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Division
Clerk of Court to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be
reviewed has become final and executory.
The said Resolution was duly recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 3 January 2003.
G.R. No. 156132
Meanwhile, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of
its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002. Acting upon the said Motion, the
Court of Appeals issued the Resolution,[16] dated 20 November 2002, modifying its Decision of 26
March 2002, as follows
Page 153
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED as Sub-paragraph (V) paragraph 3 of the
assailed Decisions dispositive portion is hereby ordered DELETED.
The challenged 26 March 2002 Decision of the Court
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated
26 March 2002 and 20 November 2002, respectively, petitioners filed the present Petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 156132. The Petition was initially denied[17] by this Court for failure of the petitioners to attach
thereto a Certification against Forum Shopping. However, upon petitioners Motion and compliance with
the requirements, this Court resolved[18] to reinstate the Petition.
The Petition presented fourteen (14) assignments of errors allegedly committed by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002, involving both questions of fact and questions of law which
this Court, for the sake of expediency, discusses jointly, whenever possible, in the succeeding paragraphs.
I
The Resolution of this Court, dated 13
November 2002, in G.R. No. 152985,
declaring the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, final and
executory, pertains to respondent
Sabeniano alone.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the merits of the instant Petition, this Court wishes to
address first the argument, persistently advanced by respondent in her pleadings on record, as well as her
numerous personal and unofficial letters to this Court which were no longer made part of the record, that
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, had already
become final and executory by virtue of the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 152985, dated 13
November 2002.
G.R. No. 152985 was the docket number assigned by this Court to respondents Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. Respondent, though, did not file her supposed
Petition. Thus, after the lapse of the prescribed period for the filing of the Petition, this Court issued the
Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, declaring the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March
2002, final and executory. It should be pointed out, however, that the Resolution, dated 13 November 2002,
referred only to G.R. No. 152985, respondents appeal, which she failed to perfect through the filing of a
Petition for Review within the prescribed period. The declaration of this Court in the same Resolution
would bind respondent solely, and not petitioners which filed their own separate appeal before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 156132, the Petition at bar. This would mean that respondent, on her part, should be
bound by the findings of fact and law of the Court of Appeals, including the monetary amounts
consequently awarded to her by the appellate court in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002; and she can no
longer refute or assail any part thereof. [19]
This Court already explained the matter to respondent when it issued a Resolution[20] in G.R. No.
156132, dated 2 February 2004, which addressed her Urgent Motion for the Release of the Decision with
the Implementation of the Entry of Judgment in the following manner
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
[A]cting on Citibanks and FNCB Finances Motion for Reconsideration, we
resolved to grant the motion, reinstate the petition and require Sabeniano to
file a comment thereto in our Resolution of June 23, 2003. Sabeniano filed
a Comment dated July 17, 2003 to which Citibank and FNCB Finance filed
a Reply dated August 20, 2003.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sabeniano had knowledge of, and in fact
participated in, the proceedings in G.R. No. 156132. She cannot feign
ignorance of the proceedings therein and claim that the Decision of the Court
of Appeals has become final and executory. More precisely,
the Decision became final and executory only with regard to Sabeniano in
view of her failure to file a petition for review within the extended period
granted by the Court, and not to Citibank and FNCB Finance whose Petition
for Review was duly reinstated and is now submitted for decision.
Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED. (Emphasis
supplied.)
To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and incongruous situation
wherein one party may frustrate the efforts of the opposing party to appeal the case by merely
filing with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, ahead of the
opposing party, then not actually filing the intended Petition.[21] The party who fails to file its
intended Petition within the reglementary or extended period should solely bear the
consequences of such failure.
Respondent Sabeniano did not
commit forum shopping.
Another issue that does not directly involve the merits of the present Petition, but raised by
petitioners, is whether respondent should be held liable for forum shopping.
Petitioners contend that respondent committed forum shopping on the basis of the following facts:
While petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930,
dated 26 March 2002, was still pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent already filed with
this Court on 3 May 2002 her Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review of the
same Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 152985. Thereafter, respondent continued
to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930 by filing
her Comment, dated 17 July 2002, to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration; and a Rejoinder,
dated 23 September 2002, to petitioners Reply. Thus, petitioners argue that by seeking relief
concurrently from this Court and the Court of Appeals, respondent is undeniably guilty of forum
shopping, if not indirect contempt.
This Court, however, finds no sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for forum shopping.
Forum shopping has been defined as the filing of two or more suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment.[22] The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more)
cases pending, there is an identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought. [23] To
Page 154
guard against this deplorable practice, Rule 7, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court imposes the
following requirement
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any
of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as cause for administrative sanctions.
Although it may seem at first glance that respondent was simultaneously seeking recourse from the Court
of Appeals and this Court, a careful and closer scrutiny of the details of the case at bar would reveal
otherwise.
It should be recalled that respondent did nothing more in G.R. No. 152985 than to file with this
Court a Motion for Extension of Time within which to file her Petition for Review. For unexplained reasons,
respondent failed to submit to this Court her intended Petition within the reglementary
period. Consequently, this Court was prompted to issue a Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, declaring
G.R. No. 152985 terminated, and the therein assailed Court of Appeals Decision final and executory. G.R.
No. 152985, therefore, did not progress and respondents appeal was unperfected.
The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory pleading before this Court, upon the timely
filing of which, the case before this Court commences; much in the same way a case is initiated by the
filing of a Complaint before the trial court. The Petition for Review establishes the identity of parties, rights
or causes of action, and relief sought from this Court, and without such a Petition, there is technically no
case before this Court. The Motion filed by respondent seeking extension of time within which to file her
Petition for Review does not serve the same purpose as the Petition for Review itself. Such a Motion
merely presents the important dates and the justification for the additional time requested for, but it does
not go into the details of the appealed case.
Without any particular idea as to the assignments of error or the relief respondent intended to
seek from this Court, in light of her failure to file her Petition for Review, there is actually no second case
involving the same parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought, as that in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930.
It should also be noted that the Certification against Forum Shopping is required to be attached
to the initiatory pleading, which, in G.R. No. 152985, should have been respondents Petition for Review. It
is in that Certification wherein respondent certifies, under oath, that: (a) she has not commenced any
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, that she is presenting a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to this Court. Without
her Petition for Review, respondent had no obligation to execute and submit the foregoing
Certification against Forum Shopping. Thus, respondent did not violate Rule 7, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Court; neither did she mislead this Court as to the pendency of another similar
case.
Lastly, the fact alone that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002,
essentially ruled in favor of respondent, does not necessarily preclude her from appealing the
same. Granted that such a move is ostensibly irrational, nonetheless, it does not amount to malice,
bad faith or abuse of the court processes in the absence of further proof. Again, it should be noted
that the respondent did not file her intended Petition for Review. The Petition for Review would
have presented before this Court the grounds for respondents appeal and her arguments in
support thereof. Without said Petition, any reason attributed to the respondent for appealing the
26 March 2002 Decision would be grounded on mere speculations, to which this Court cannot
give credence.
II
As an exception to the general
rule, this Court takes cognizance
of questions of fact raised in the
Petition at bar.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it
from the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing
errors of law. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the interference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.[24]
Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.
It is indubitable that the Court of Appeals made factual findings that are contrary to
those of the RTC,[25] thus, resulting in its substantial modification of the trial courts Decision, and a
ruling entirely in favor of the respondent. In addition, petitioners invoked in the instant Petition for
Review several exceptions that would justify this Courts review of the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals, i.e., the Court of Appeals made conflicting findings of fact; findings of fact which went
beyond the issues raised on appeal before it; as well as findings of fact premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court shall proceed to reviewing and re-evaluating
the evidence on record in order to settle questions of fact raised in the Petition at bar.
Page 155

The fact that the trial judge who rendered
the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 11336,
dated 24 August 1995, was not the same
judge who heard and tried the case, does
not, by itself, render the said Decision
erroneous.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 was rendered more than 10 years from the institution of the said
case. In the course of its trial, the case was presided over by four (4) different RTC judges.[26] It was Judge
Victorio, the fourth judge assigned to the case, who wrote the RTC Decision, dated 24 August 1995. In his
Decision,[27] Judge Victorio made the following findings
After carefully evaluating the mass of evidence adduced by the parties, this
Court is not inclined to believe the plaintiffs assertion that the promissory notes as well
as the deeds of assignments of her FNCB Finance money market placements were
simulated. The evidence is overwhelming that the plaintiff received the proceeds of
the loans evidenced by the various promissory notes she had signed. What is more,
there was not an iota of proof save the plaintiffs bare testimony that she had indeed
applied for loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were notarized, hence they
partake the nature of a public document. It makes more than preponderant proof to
overturn the effect of a notarial attestation. Copies of the deeds of assignments were
actually filed with the Records Management and Archives Office.
Finally, there were sufficient evidence wherein the plaintiff had admitted the
existence of her loans with the defendant Bank in the total amount of P1,920,000.00
exclusive of interests and penalty charges (Exhibits 28, 31, 32, and 33).
In fine, this Court hereby finds that the defendants had established the
genuineness and due execution of the various promissory notes heretofore identified
as well as the two deeds of assignments of the plaintiffs money market placements
with defendant FNCB Finance, on the strength of which the said money market
placements were applied to partially pay the plaintiffs past due obligation with the
defendant Bank. Thus, the total sum of P1,053,995.80 of the plaintiffs past due
obligation was partially offset by the said money market placement leaving a balance
of P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979 (Exhibit 34).
Disagreeing in the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals stressed, in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
51930, dated 26 March 2002, that the ponente of the herein assailed Decision is not the Presiding Judge
who heard and tried the case.[28] This brings us to the question of whether the fact alone that the RTC
Decision was rendered by a judge other than the judge who actually heard and tried the case is sufficient
justification for the appellate court to disregard or set aside the findings in the Decision of the court a quo?
This Court rules in the negative.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a disputable presumption that the RTC
Decision was rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his official duties. While the said
presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other
evidence.[29] Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption that the RTC judge, in
resolving the case and drafting his Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
record. That the said RTC judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the
evidence is of little consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)
are complete and available for consideration by the former.
In People v. Gazmen,[30] this Court already elucidated its position on such an issue
Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge who
penned the decision was not the judge who heard and tried the case and
concludes therefrom that the findings of the former are
erroneous. Accused-appellants argument does not merit a lengthy
discussion. It is well-settled that the decision of a judge who did not try the
case is not by that reason alone erroneous.
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not
heard the controversy at all, the trial having been conducted by then Judge
Emilio L. Polig, who was indefinitely suspended by this Court. Nonetheless,
the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were complete and
were presumably examined and studied by Judge Baguilat before he
rendered his decision. It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to
decide it on the basis of the record. The fact that he did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but
merely relied on the transcript of their testimonies does not for that reason
alone render the judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is
in a better position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine by
their demeanor whether they are telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it
does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial
cannot render a valid decision since he can rely on the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.
Accused-appellants contention that the trial judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses since he
was not the same judge who conducted the hearing is also untenable. While
it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better
position to ascertain the truth and falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it
does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial
cannot render a valid and just decision since the latter can also rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his
decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of the
witness is whether or not such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent
with the experience of mankind (People vs. Morre, 217 SCRA 219
[1993]). Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the
basis of the substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances
(People v. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992]). A critical evaluation of the
Page 156
 testimony of the prosecution witnesses reveals that their testimony accords with the
aforementioned tests, and carries with it the ring of truth end perforce, must be given
full weight and credit.
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC Decision was not the same judge who
heard the case and received the evidence therein would not render the findings in the said Decision
erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in
deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for the trial court
judges decision are the contents and substance of the witnesses testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs,
as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case.
Money market placements with petitioner Citibank
The history of respondents money market placements with petitioner Citibank began on
6 December 1976, when she made a placement of P500,000.00 as principal amount, which was
supposed to earn an interest of 16% p.a. and for which PN No. 20773 was issued. Respondent
did not yet claim the proceeds of her placement and, instead, rolled-over or re-invested the
principal and proceeds several times in the succeeding years for which new PNs were issued by
petitioner Citibank to replace the ones which matured. Petitioner Citibank accounted for
respondents original placement and the subsequent roll-overs thereof, as follows

This Court proceeds to making its own Maturity Date

findings of fact. Date PN No. Cancels PN (mm/dd/yyyy) Amount Interest
No. (P) (p.a.)
Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, has (mm/dd/yyyy)
become final and executory as to the respondent, due to her failure to interpose an appeal therefrom within 12/06/1976 20773 None 01/13/1977 500,000.00 16%
the reglementary period, she is already bound by the factual findings in the said Decision. Likewise, 01/14/1977 21686 20773 02/08/1977 508,444.44 15%
respondents failure to file, within the reglementary period, a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal of the 02/09/1977 22526 21686 03/16/1977 313,952.59 15-3/4%
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the same case, dated 20 November 2002, which modified its earlier 22528 21686 03/16/1977 200,000.00 15-3/4%
Decision by deleting paragraph 3(v) of its dispositive portion, ordering petitioners to return to respondent 03/17/1977 23356 22526 04/20/1977 318,897.34 14-1/2%
the proceeds of her money market placement with AIDC, shall already bar her from questioning such 23357 22528 04/20/1977 203,150.00 14-1/2%
modification before this Court. Thus, what is for review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, as modified by the Resolution of the same court, dated 20 November
Petitioner Citibank alleged that it had already paid to respondent the principal amounts
2002.
and proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, upon their maturity. Petitioner Citibank further
averred that respondent used the P500,000.00 from the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357,
Respondent alleged that she had several deposits and money market placements with
plus P600,000.00 sourced from her other funds, to open two time deposit (TD) accounts with
petitioners. These deposits and money market placements, as determined by the Court of Appeals in its
petitioner Citibank, namely, TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784.
Decision, dated 26 March 2002, and as modified by its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, are as
follows
Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor questioned the authenticity of PNs No.
23356 and 23357 it issued in favor of respondent for her money market placements. In fact, it
Deposit/Placement Amount admitted the genuineness and due execution of the said PNs, but qualified that they were no
Dollar deposit with Citibank-Geneva $ 149,632.99 longer outstanding.[31] In Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillian,[32] this Court delineated the
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by Promissory Note (PN) consequences of such an admission
No. 23356 (which cancels and supersedes PN No. 22526), earning 14.5%
interest per annum (p.a.) By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an
P 318,897.34 instrument, as provided in this section, is meant that the party whose
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by PN No. 23357 (which signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for
cancels and supersedes PN No. 22528), earning 14.5% interest p.a. him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
P 203,150.00 figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced by PN No. 5757 document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such
(which cancels and supersedes PN No. 4952), earning 17% interest p.a. as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived
P 500,000.00 by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery (Puritan Mfg.
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced by PN No. 5758 Co. vs. Toti & Gradi, 14 N. M., 425; Cox vs. Northwestern Stage Co., 1 Idaho,
(which cancels and supersedes PN No. 2962), earning 17% interest p.a. 376; Woollen vs. Whitacre, 73 Ind., 198; Smith vs. Ehnert, 47 Wis., 479;
P 500,000.00 Faelnar vs. Escao, 11 Phil. Rep., 92); or that it was unauthorized, as in the
This Court is tasked to determine whether petitioners are indeed liable to return the foregoing amounts, case of an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in behalf of a
together with the appropriate interests and penalties, to respondent. It shall trace respondents transactions partnership (Country Bank vs. Greenberg, 127 Cal., 26; Henshaw vs. Root,
with petitioners, from her money market placements with petitioner Citibank and petitioner FNCB Finance, 60 Inc., 220; Naftzker vs. Lantz, 137 Mich., 441) or of a corporation
to her savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, and to her dollar accounts with (Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation, 6 Phil Rep., 314;
Citibank-Geneva. Wanita vs. Rollins, 75 Miss., 253; Barnes vs. Spencer & Barnes Co., 162

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 157

 Mich., 509); or that, in the case of the latter, that the corporation was authorized under Atty. Mabasa:
its charter to sign the instrument (Merchant vs. International Banking
Corporation, supra); or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other Okey [sic]. Now Mr. Witness, you were asked to testify in this case and this
capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out (Payne vs. National Bank, 16 case is [sic] consist [sic] of several documents involving
Kan., 147); or that it was never delivered (Hunt vs. Weir, 29 Ill., 83; Elbring vs. Mullen, transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant. Now, were
4 Idaho, 199; Thorp vs. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N.Y., 253; Fire Association of you able to make your own memorandum regarding all these
Philadelphia vs. Ruby, 60 Neb., 216) are cut off by the admission of its genuineness transactions?
and due execution.
A Yes, based on my recollection of these facts, I did come up of [sic] the
The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory note a outline of the chronological sequence of events.
prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of
evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special Court:
defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant
(Papa vs. Martinez, 12 Phil. Rep., 613; Chinese Chamber of Commerce vs. Pua To Are you trying to say that you have personal knowledge or participation to
Ching, 14 Phil. Rep., 222; Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. McKay & Zoeller, 27 Phil. Rep., these transactions?
183). x x x
A Yes, your Honor, I was the officer-in charge of the unit that was processing
these transactions. Some of the documents bear my signature.
Since the genuineness and due execution of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are uncontested, respondent was
able to establish prima facie that petitioner Citibank is liable to her for the amounts stated therein. The Court:
assertion of petitioner Citibank of payment of the said PNs is an affirmative allegation of a new matter, the
burden of proof as to such resting on petitioner Citibank. Respondent having proved the existence of the And this resume or summary that you have prepared is based on purely your
obligation, the burden of proof was upon petitioner Citibank to show that it had been discharged.[33] It has recollection or documents?
already been established by this Court that
A Based on documents, your Honor.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the Court:
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the Are these documents still available now?
obligation has been discharged by payment.
A Yes, your honor.
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained
in the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment Court:
devolves upon the debtor who offers such defense to the claim of the creditor. Where
the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the Better present the documents.
evidence as distinct from the general burden of proof shifts to the creditor, who is then
under the duty of producing some evidence of non-payment.[34] Atty. Mabasa:

Yes, your Honor, that is why your Honor.

Reviewing the evidence on record, this Court finds that petitioner Citibank failed to satisfactorily
prove that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 had already been paid, and that the amount so paid was actually
used to open one of respondents TD accounts with petitioner Citibank.
Petitioner Citibank presented the testimonies of two witnesses to support its contention of
payment: (1) That of Mr. Herminio Pujeda,[35] the officer-in-charge of loans and placements at the time
when the questioned transactions took place; and (2) that of Mr. Francisco Tan,[36] the former Assistant
Vice-President of Citibank, who directly dealt with respondent with regard to her deposits and loans.
The relevant portion[37] of Mr. Pujedas testimony as to PNs No. 23356 and 23357 (referred to
therein as Exhibits No. 47 and 48, respectively) is reproduced below
Atty. Mabasa:
Q Now, basing on the notes that you prepared, Mr. Witness, and according to
you basing also on your personal recollection about all the
transactions involved between Modesta Sabeniano and defendant
City Bank [sic] in this case. Now, would you tell us what happened
to the money market placements of Modesta Sabeniano that you
have earlier identified in Exhs. 47 and 48?
A The transactions which I said earlier were terminated and booked to time
deposits.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 158

 Q And you are saying time deposits with what bank?
A With First National Citibank.
Q Is it the same bank as Citibank, N.A.?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how much was the amount booked as time deposit with defendant Citibank?
A In the amount of P500,000.00.
Q And outside this P500,000.00 which you said was booked out of the proceeds of
Exhs. 47 and 48, were there other time deposits opened by Mrs. Modesta
Sabeniano at that time.
A Yes, she also opened another time deposit for P600,000.00.
Q So all in all Mr. Witness, sometime in April of 1978 Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic]
had time deposit placements with Citibank in the amount of P500,000.00
which is the proceeds of Exh. 47 and 48 and another P600,000.00, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And would you know where did the other P600,000 placed by Mrs. Sabeneano [sic]
in a time deposit with Citibank, N.A. came [sic] from?
A She funded it directly.
Q What are you saying Mr. Witness is that the P600,000 is a [sic] fresh money coming
from Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic]?
A That is right.
In his deposition in Hong Kong, Mr. Tan recounted what happened to PNs No. 23356 and 23357
(referred to therein as Exhibits E and F, respectively), as follows
Atty. Mabasa : Now from the Exhibits that you have identified Mr. Tan from Exhibits A
to F, which are Exhibits of the plaintiff. Now, do I understand
from you that the original amount is Five Hundred Thousand
and thereafter renewed in the succeeding exhibits?
Mr. Tan : Yes, Sir.
Atty. Mabasa : Alright, after these Exhibits E and F matured, what happened
thereafter?
Mr. Tan : Split into two time deposits.
Atty. Mabasa : Exhibits E and F?
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Before anything else, it should be noted that when Mr. Pujedas testimony before the
RTC was made on 12 March 1990 and Mr. Tans deposition in Hong Kong was conducted on 3
September 1990, more than a decade had passed from the time the transactions they were
testifying on took place. This Court had previously recognized the frailty and unreliability of human
memory with regards to figures after the lapse of five years. [38]Taking into consideration the
substantial length of time between the transactions and the witnesses testimonies, as well as the
undeniable fact that bank officers deal with multiple clients and process numerous transactions
during their tenure, this Court is reluctant to give much weight to the testimonies of Mr. Pujeda and
Mr. Tan regarding the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and the use by respondent of the
proceeds thereof for opening TD accounts. This Court finds it implausible that they should
remember, after all these years, this particular transaction with respondent involving her PNs No.
23356 and 23357 and TD accounts. Both witnesses did not give any reason as to why, from
among all the clients they had dealt with and all the transactions they had processed as officers of
petitioner Citibank, they specially remembered respondent and her PNs No. 23356 and
23357.Their testimonies likewise lacked details on the circumstances surrounding the payment of
the two PNs and the opening of the time deposit accounts by respondent, such as the date of
payment of the two PNs, mode of payment, and the manner and context by which respondent
relayed her instructions to the officers of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of her two PNs in
opening the TD accounts.
Moreover, while there are documentary evidences to support and trace respondents
money market placements with petitioner Citibank, from the original PN No. 20773, rolled-over
several times to, finally, PNs No. 23356 and 23357, there is an evident absence of any
documentary evidence on the payment of these last two PNs and the use of the proceeds thereof
by respondent for opening TD accounts. The paper trail seems to have ended with the copies of
PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Although both Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan said that they based their
testimonies, not just on their memories but also on the documents on file, the supposed
documents on which they based those portions of their testimony on the payment of PNs No.
23356 and 23357 and the opening of the TD accounts from the proceeds thereof, were never
presented before the courts nor made part of the records of the case. Respondents money
market placements were of substantial amounts consisting of the principal amount of P500,000.00,
plus the interest it should have earned during the years of placement and it is difficult for this Court
to believe that petitioner Citibank would not have had documented the payment thereof.
When Mr. Pujeda testified before the RTC on 6 February 1990,[39] petitioners counsel
attempted to present in evidence a document that would supposedly support the claim of
petitioner Citibank that the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 were used by respondent to
open one of her two TD accounts in the amount of P500,000.00. Respondents counsel objected
to the presentation of the document since it was a mere xerox" copy, and was blurred and hardly
readable. Petitioners counsel then asked for a continuance of the hearing so that they can have
time to produce a better document, which was granted by the court. However, during the next
hearing and continuance of Mr. Pujedas testimony on 12 March 1990, petitioners counsel no
longer referred to the said document.
As respondent had established a prima facie case that petitioner Citibank is obligated to
her for the amounts stated in PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and as petitioner Citibank failed to
present sufficient proof of payment of the said PNs and the use by the respondent of the proceeds
thereof to open her TD accounts, this Court finds that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are still
outstanding and petitioner Citibank is still liable to respondent for the amounts stated
therein.
Page 159
The significance of this Courts declaration that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are still outstanding becomes
apparent in the light of petitioners next contentions that respondent used the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 Based on the foregoing records, the principal amounts of PNs No. 5757 and 5758, upon their
and 23357, together with additional money, to open TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784 with petitioner maturity, were rolled over to PNs No. 8167 and 8169, respectively. PN No. 8167[45] expressly
Citibank; and, subsequently, respondent pre-terminated these TD accounts and transferred the proceeds canceled and superseded PN No. 5757, while PN No. 8169 [46] also explicitly canceled and
thereof, amounting to P1,100,000.00, to petitioner FNCB Finance for money market placements. While superseded PN No. 5758. Thus, it is patently erroneous for the Court of Appeals to still award to
respondents money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance may be traced back with respondent the principal amounts and interests covered by PNs No. 5757 and 5758 when these
definiteness to TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, there is only flimsy and unsubstantiated connection were already canceled and superseded. It is now incumbent upon this Court to determine what
between the said TD accounts and the supposed proceeds paid from PNs No. 23356 and 23357. With subsequently happened to PNs No. 8167 and 8169.
PNs No. 23356 and 23357 still unpaid, then they represent an obligation of petitioner Citibank separate
and distinct from the obligation of petitioner FNCB Finance arising from respondents money market Petitioner FNCB Finance presented four checks as proof of payment of the principal amounts and
placements with the latter. interests of PNs No. 8167 and 8169 upon their maturity. All the checks were payable to
respondents savings account with petitioner Citibank, with the following details
Money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
Date of Issuance Amount
According to petitioners, respondents TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, in the total amount (mm/dd/yyyy) Check No. (P) Notation
of P1,100,000.00, were supposed to mature on 15 March 1978. However, respondent, through a letter 09/01/1978 76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08167
dated 28 April 1977,[40]pre-terminated the said TD accounts and transferred all the proceeds thereof to
petitioner FNCB Finance for money market placement. Pursuant to her instructions, TD Accounts No. 09/01/1978 76961 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08169
17783 and 17784 were pre-terminated and petitioner Citibank (then still named First National City Bank)
issued Managers Checks (MC) No. 199253[41] and 199251[42] for the amounts of P500,000.00 09/05/1978 77035 500,000.00 Full payment of principal on PN#08167
and P600,00.00, respectively. Both MCs were payable to Citifinance (which, according to Mr.
which is hereby cancelled
Pujeda,[43] was one with and the same as petitioner FNCB Finance), with the additional notation that A/C
09/05/ 1978 77034 500,000.00 Full payment of principal on PN#08169
MODESTA R. SABENIANO. Typewritten on MC No. 199253 is the phrase Ref. Proceeds of TD 17783,
which is hereby cancelled
and on MC No. 199251 is a similar phrase, Ref. Proceeds of TD 17784. These phrases purportedly
established that the MCs were paid from the proceeds of respondents pre-terminated TD accounts with
petitioner Citibank. Upon receipt of the MCs, petitioner FNCB Finance deposited the same to its account Then again, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were later returned to petitioner FNCB Finance
with Feati Bank and Trust Co., as evidenced by the rubber stamp mark of the latter found at the back of together with a memo,[47] dated 6 September 1978, from Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, to a Mr.
both MCs. In exchange, petitioner FNCB Finance booked the amounts received as money market Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance. According to the memo, the two checks, in the total
placements, and accordingly issued PNs No. 4952 and 4962, for the amounts of P500,000.00 amount of P1,000,000.00, were to be returned to respondents account with instructions to book
and P600,000.00, respectively, payable to respondents savings account with petitioner Citibank, S/A No. the said amount in money market placements for one more year. Pursuant to the said memo,
25-13703-4, upon their maturity on 1 June 1977. Once again, respondent rolled-over several times the Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were invested by petitioner FNCB Finance, on behalf of respondent,
principal amounts of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, as follows in money market placements for which it issued PNs No. 20138 and 20139. The PNs each
covered P500,000.00, to earn 11% interest per annum, and to mature on 3 September 1979.
Maturity Date
On 3 September 1979, petitioner FNCB Finance issued Check No. 100168, pay to the order of
Date PN No. Cancels PN (mm/dd/yyyy) Amount Interest
Citibank N.A. A/C Modesta Sabeniano, in the amount of P1,022,916.66, as full payment of the
No. (P) (p.a.)
(mm/dd/yyyy) principal amounts and interests of both PNs No. 20138 and 20139 and, resultantly, canceling the
04/29/1977 4952 None 06/01/1977 500,000.00 17% said PNs.[48] Respondent actually admitted the issuance and existence of Check No. 100168, but
4962 None 06/01/1977 600,000.00 17% with the qualification that the proceeds thereof were turned over to petitioner
06/02/1977 5757 4952 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17% Citibank.[49] Respondent did not clarify the circumstances attending the supposed turn over, but on
the basis of the allegations of petitioner Citibank itself, the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139,
5758 4962 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
amounting to P1,022,916.66, was used by it to liquidate respondents outstanding
08/31/1977 8167 5757 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14% loans. Therefore, the determination of whether or not respondent is still entitled to the return of the
8169 5752 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14% proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 shall be dependent on the resolution of the issues raised
as to the existence of the loans and the authority of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of the
As presented by the petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent rolled-over only the principal amounts of her said PNs, together with respondents other deposits and money market placements, to pay for the
money market placements as she chose to receive the interest income therefrom. Petitioner FNCB same.
Finance also pointed out that when PN No. 4962, with principal amount of P600,000.00, matured on 1
June 1977, respondent received a partial payment of the principal which, together with the interest, Savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank
amounted to P102,633.33;[44] thus, only the amount of P500,000.00 from PN No. 4962 was rolled-over to
PN No. 5758.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 160

 Respondent presented and submitted before the RTC deposit slips and bank statements to
prove deposits made to several of her accounts with petitioner Citibank, particularly, Accounts No. - US$ 149632.99 Transfer to Citibank Manila on 26.10.1979
00484202, 59091, and 472-751, which would have amounted to a total of P3,812,712.32, had there been (counter value of Pesos 1102944.78)
no withdrawals or debits from the said accounts from the time the said deposits were made.
US$ 7309.71 Balance in current accounts
Although the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not make any definitive findings as to the status of
respondents savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, the Decisions of both the trial and - US$ 6998.84 Transfer to Citibank Zuerich ac no. 121359 on March
appellate courts effectively recognized only the P31,079.14 coming from respondents savings account 13, 1980
which was used to off-set her alleged outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank.[50]
US$ 310.87 various charges including closing charges
Since both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had consistently recognized only the P31,079.14 of According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979, respondent had a total of
respondents savings account with petitioner Citibank, and that respondent failed to move for US$156,942.70, from which, US$149,632.99 was transferred by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner
reconsideration or to appeal this particular finding of fact by the trial and appellate courts, it is already Citibank in Manila, and was used by the latter to off-set respondents outstanding loans. The
binding upon this Court. Respondent is already precluded from claiming any greater amount in her savings balance of respondents accounts with Citibank-Geneva, after the remittance to petitioner Citibank
and current accounts with petitioner Citibank.Thus, this Court shall limit itself to determining whether or not in Manila, amounted to US$7,309.71, which was subsequently expended by a transfer to another
respondent is entitled to the return of the amount of P31,079.14 should the off-set thereof by petitioner account with Citibank-Zuerich, in the amount of US$6,998.84, and by payment of various bank
Citibank against her supposed loans be found invalid. charges, including closing charges, in the amount of US$310.87. Rightly so, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals gave more credence to the computation of Citibank-Geneva as to the status of
respondents accounts with the said bank, rather than the one prepared by respondent herself,
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva which was evidently self-serving. Once again, this Court shall limit itself to determining whether or
not respondent is entitled to the return of the amount of US$149,632.99 should the off-set thereof
Respondent made an effort of preparing and presenting before the RTC her own computations of her by petitioner Citibank against her alleged outstanding loans be found invalid. Respondent cannot
money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva, purportedly amounting to a total of claim any greater amount since she did not perfect an appeal of the Decision of the Court of
United States (US) $343,220.98, as of 23 June 1985.[51] In her Memorandum filed with the RTC, she Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, which found that she is entitled only to the return of the said
claimed a much bigger amount of deposits and money market placements with Citibank-Geneva, totaling amount, as far as her accounts with Citibank-Geneva is concerned.
US$1,336,638.65.[52]However, respondent herself also submitted as part of her formal offer of evidence
the computation of her money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva as III
determined by the latter.[53] Citibank-Geneva accounted for respondents money market placements and
dollar accounts as follows Petitioner Citibank was able to
establish by preponderance of
MODESTA SABENIANO &/OR evidence the existence of
================== respondents loans.

US$ 30000.-- Principal Fid. Placement

+ US$ 339.06 Interest at 3,875% p.a. from 12.07. 25.10.79 Petitioners version of events
- US$ 95.-- Commission (minimum)
In sum, the following amounts were used by petitioner Citibank to liquidate respondents purported
US$ 30244.06 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979 outstanding loans

Description Amount
US$ 114000.-- Principal Fid. Placement Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and 20139
+ US$ 1358.50 Interest at 4,125% p.a. from 12.07. 25.10.79
(money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) P 1,022,916.66
- US$ 41.17 Commission
Savings account with petitioner Citibank 31,079.14
Dollar remittance from Citibank-Geneva (peso equivalent
US$ 115317.33 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
Of US$149,632.99) 1,102,944.78

US$ 145561.39 Total proceeds of both placements on 25.10.1979 Total P 2,156,940.58

+ US$ 11381.31 total of both current accounts
According to petitioner Citibank, respondent incurred her loans under the circumstances narrated
US$ 156942.70 Total funds available below.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 161

 As early as 9 February 1978, respondent obtained her first loan from petitioner Citibank in the respondent executed in favor of petitioner Citibank a Deed of Assignment[57] of PN No. 8169,
principal amount of P200,000.00, for which she executed PN No. 31504.[54] Petitioner Citibank extended to which was issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, to secure payment of the credit and banking
her several other loans in the succeeding months. Some of these loans were paid, while others were facilities extended to her by petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate principal amount
rolled-over or renewed. Significant to the Petition at bar are the loans which respondent obtained from July of P500,000.00. On 9 March 1978, respondent executed in favor of petitioner Citibank another
1978 to January 1979, appropriately covered by PNs (first set).[55] The aggregate principal amount of these Deed of Assignment,[58] this time, of PN No. 8167, also issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, to
loans was P1,920,000.00, which could be broken down as follows secure payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her by petitioner Citibank, in the
aggregate amount of P500,000.00. When PNs No. 8167 and 8169, representing respondents
Date of Issuance Date of Maturity Date of Release money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, matured and were rolled-over to PNs
PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy) Principal (mm/dd/yyyy) No. No. and 20139, respondent executed new Deeds of Assignment,[59] in favor of petitioner
MC 20138
Amount Citibank, on 25 August 1978. According to the more recent Deeds, respondent assigned PNs No.
32935 07/20/1978 09/18/1978 P 400,000.00 07/20/1978 20138
220701 and 20139, representing her rolled-over money market placements with petitioner FNCB
33751 10/13/1978 12/12/1978 100,000.00 Unrecovered Finance, to petitioner Citibank as security for the banking and credit facilities it extended to her, in
33798 10/19/1978 11/03/1978 100,000.00 10/19/1978 the aggregate principal amount of P500,000.00 per Deed.
226285
In addition to the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB
34025 11/15/1978 01/15/1979 150,000.00 11/16/1978 226439
Finance, respondent also executed a Declaration of Pledge, [60] in which she supposedly pledged
34079 11/21/1978 01/19/1979 250,000.00 11/21/1978 226467
[a]ll present and future fiduciary placements held in my personal and/or joint name with Citibank,
34192 12/04/1978 01/18/1979 100,000.00 12/05/1978 228057
Switzerland, to secure all claims the petitioner Citibank may have or, in the future, acquire against
34402 12/26/1978 02/23/1979 300,000.00 12/26/1978 228203
respondent. The petitioners copy of the Declaration of Pledge is undated, while that of the
34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00 01/09/1979 228270
respondent, a copy certified by a Citibank-Geneva officer, bore the date 24 September 1979.[61]
34609 01/17/1979 03/19/1979 150,000.00 01/17/1979 228357
34740 01/30/1979 03/30/1979 220,000.00 01/30/1979 When
228400 respondent failed to pay the second set of PNs upon their maturity, an exchange of letters
ensued between respondent and/or her representatives, on one hand, and the representatives of
Total P1,920,000.00 petitioners, on the other.

When respondent was unable to pay the first set of PNs upon their maturity, these were rolled-over or The first letter[62] was dated 5 April 1979, addressed to respondent and signed by Mr. Tan, as the
renewed several times, necessitating the execution by respondent of new PNs in favor of petitioner manager of petitioner Citibank, which stated, in part, that
Citibank. As of 5 April 1979, respondent had the following outstanding PNs (second set), [56] the principal
amount of which remained at P1,920,000.00 Despite our repeated requests and follow-up, we regret you have not granted
us with any response or payment.
Date of Issuance Date of Maturity
PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy) Principal Amount We, therefore, have no alternative but to call your loan of P1,920,000.00 plus
interests and other charges due and demandable. If you still fail to settle this
34510 01/01/1979 03/02/1979 P 400,000.00
obligation by 4/27/79, we shall have no other alternative but to refer your
34509 01/02/1979 03/02/1979 100,000.00 account to our lawyers for legal action to protect the interest of the bank.
34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00
34612 01/19/1979 03/16/1979 150,000.00
34741 01/26/1979 03/12/1979 100,000.00 Respondent sent a reply letter[63] dated 26 April 1979, printed on paper bearing the letterhead of
35689 02/23/1979 05/29/1979 300,000.00 respondents company, MC Adore International Palace, the body of which reads
35694 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 150,000.00
35695 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 100,000.00 This is in reply to your letter dated April 5, 1979 inviting my attention to my
356946 03/20/1979 05/29/1979 250,000.00 loan which has become due. Pursuant to our representation with you over the
telephone through Mr. F. A. Tan, you allow us to pay the interests due for the
35697 03/30/1979 05/29/1979 220,000.00
meantime.
Total P 1,920,000.00 Please accept our Comtrust Check in the amount of P62,683.33.
All the PNs stated that the purpose of the loans covered thereby is To liquidate existing obligation, except Please bear with us for a little while, at most ninety days. As you know, we
for PN No. 34534, which stated for its purpose personal investment. have a pending loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines in the
amount of P11-M. This loan has already been recommended for approval
Respondent secured her foregoing loans with petitioner Citibank by executing Deeds of and would be submitted to the Board of Governors. In fact, to further facilitate
Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. On 2 March 1978,

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 162

 the early release of this loan, we have presented and furnished Gov. J. Tengco a
xerox copy of your letter.
You will be doing our corporation a very viable service, should you grant us our
request for a little more time.
A week later or on 3 May 1979, a certain C. N. Pugeda, designated as Executive Secretary, sent
a letter[64] to petitioner Citibank, on behalf of respondent. The letter was again printed on paper bearing the
letterhead of MC Adore International Palace. The pertinent paragraphs of the said letter are reproduced
below
Per instructions of Mrs. Modesta R. Sabeniano, we would like to request for a
re-computation of the interest and penalty charges on her loan in the aggregate
amount of P1,920,000.00 with maturity date of all promissory notes at June 30,
1979.As she has personally discussed with you yesterday, this date will more or less
assure you of early settlement.
In this regard, please entrust to bearer, our Comtrust check for P62,683.33 to be
replaced by another check with amount resulting from the new computation. Also, to
facilitate the processing of the same, may we request for another set of promissory
notes for the signature of Mrs. Sabeniano and to cancel the previous ones she has
signed and forwarded to you.
This was followed by a telegram,[65] dated 5 June 1979, and received by petitioner Citibank the following
day. The telegram was sent by a Dewey G. Soriano, Legal Counsel. The telegram acknowledged receipt
of the telegram sent by petitioner Citibank regarding the re-past due obligation of McAdore International
Palace. However, it reported that respondent, the President and Chairman of MC Adore International
Palace, was presently abroad negotiating for a big loan. Thus, he was requesting for an extension of the
due date of the obligation until respondents arrival on or before 31 July 1979.
The next letter,[66] dated 21 June 1979, was signed by respondent herself and addressed to Mr.
Bobby Mendoza, a Manager of petitioner FNCB Finance. Respondent wrote therein
Re: PN No. 20138 for P500,000.00 & PN No. 20139
for P500,000.00 totalling P1 Million, both
PNs will mature on 9/3/1979.
This is to authorize you to release the accrued quarterly interests payment
from my captioned placements and forward directly to Citibank, Manila Attention: Mr.
F. A. Tan, Manager, to apply to my interest payable on my outstanding loan with
Citibank.
Please note that the captioned two placements are continuously
pledged/hypothecated to Citibank, Manila to support my personal outstanding
loan. Therefore, please do not release the captioned placements upon maturity until
you have received the instruction from Citibank, Manila.
On even date, respondent sent another letter[67] to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, stating that
Re: S/A No. 25-225928
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
and C/A No. 484-946
This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the outstanding
balance from my captioned accounts and credit the amount to my
loan outstanding account with you.
Unlike respondents earlier letters, both letters, dated 21 June 1979, are printed on plain paper,
without the letterhead of her company, MC Adore International Palace.
By 5 September 1979, respondents outstanding and past due obligations to petitioner Citibank
totaled P2,123,843.20, representing the principal amounts plus interests. Relying on respondents
Deeds of Assignment, petitioner Citibank applied the proceeds of respondents money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, as well as her deposit account with petitioner Citibank,
to partly liquidate respondents outstanding loan balance,[68] as follows
Respondents outstanding obligation (principal and interest) P 2,123,843.20
Less: Proceeds from respondents money market placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance (principal and interest) (1,022,916.66)
Deposits in respondents bank accounts with petitioner
Citibank (31,079.14)
Balance of respondents obligation P 1,069,847.40
Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank subsequently sent a letter, [69] dated 28 September 1979, notifying
respondent of the status of her loans and the foregoing compensation which petitioner Citibank
effected. In the letter, Mr. Tan informed respondent that she still had a remaining past-due
obligation in the amount of P1,069,847.40, as of 5 September 1979, and should respondent fail to
pay the amount by 15 October 1979, then petitioner Citibank shall proceed to off-set the unpaid
amount with respondents other collateral, particularly, a money market placement in
Citibank-Hongkong.
On 5 October 1979, respondent wrote Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, on paper bearing the
letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, as regards the P1,920,000.00 loan account
supposedly of MC Adore Finance & Investment, Inc., and requested for a statement of account
covering the principal and interest of the loan as of 31 October 1979. She stated therein that the
loan obligation shall be paid within 60 days from receipt of the statement of account.
Almost three weeks later, or on 25 October 1979, a certain Atty. Moises Tolentino dropped by the
office of petitioner Citibank, with a letter, dated 9 October 1979, and printed on paper with the
letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, which authorized the bearer thereof to represent the
respondent in settling the overdue account, this time, purportedly, of MC Adore International
Palace Hotel. The letter was signed by respondent as the President and Chairman of the Board.
Eventually, Atty. Antonio Agcaoili of Agcaoili & Associates, as counsel of petitioner Citibank, sent
a letter to respondent, dated 31 October 1979, informing her that petitioner Citibank had effected
an off-set using her account with Citibank-Geneva, in the amount of US$149,632.99, against her
outstanding, overdue, demandable and unpaid obligation to petitioner Citibank. Atty. Agcaoili
claimed therein that the compensation or off-set was made pursuant to and in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 1278 through 1290 of the Civil Code. He further declared that respondents
obligation to petitioner Citibank was now fully paid and liquidated.
Page 163

Unfortunately, on 7 October 1987, a fire gutted the 7th floor of petitioner Citibanks building at Paseo de
Roxas St., Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioners submitted a Certification[70] to this effect, dated 17 January
1991, issued by the Chief of the Arson Investigation Section, Fire District III, Makati Fire Station,
Metropolitan Police Force. The 7th floor of petitioner Citibanks building housed its Control Division, which
was in charge of keeping the necessary documents for cases in which it was involved. After compiling the
documentary evidence for the present case, Atty. Renato J. Fernandez, internal legal counsel of petitioner
Citibank, forwarded them to the Control Division. The original copies of the MCs, which supposedly
represent the proceeds of the first set of PNs, as well as that of other documentary evidence related to the
case, were among those burned in the said fire.[71]
Respondents version of events
Respondent disputed petitioners narration of the circumstances surrounding her loans with petitioner
Citibank and the alleged authority she gave for the off-set or compensation of her money market
placements and deposit accounts with petitioners against her loan obligation.
Respondent denied outright executing the first set of PNs, except for one (PN No. 34534 in
particular). Although she admitted that she obtained several loans from petitioner Citibank, these only
amounted to P1,150,000.00, and she had already paid them. She secured from petitioner Citibank two
loans of P500,000.00 each. She executed in favor of petitioner Citibank the corresponding PNs for the
loans and the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance as
security.[72] To prove payment of these loans, respondent presented two provisional receipts of petitioner
Citibank No. 19471,[73] dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723,[74] dated 10 November 1978 both signed by
Mr. Tan, and acknowledging receipt from respondent of several checks in the total amount of P500,744.00
and P500,000.00, respectively, for liquidation of loan.
She borrowed another P150,000.00 from petitioner Citibank for personal investment, and for
which she executed PN No. 34534, on 9 January 1979. Thus, she admitted to receiving the proceeds of
this loan via MC No. 228270. She invested the loan amount in another money market placement with
petitioner FNCB Finance. In turn, she used the very same money market placement with petitioner FNCB
Finance as security for her P150,000.00 loan from petitioner Citibank. When she failed to pay the loan
when it became due, petitioner Citibank allegedly forfeited her money market placement with petitioner
FNCB Finance and, thus, the loan was already paid.[75]
Respondent likewise questioned the MCs presented by petitioners, except for one (MC No. 228270 in
particular), as proof that she received the proceeds of the loans covered by the first set of PNs. As
recounted in the preceding paragraph, respondent admitted to obtaining a loan of P150,000.00, covered
by PN No. 34534, and receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds thereof, but claimed that she
already paid the same. She denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 (for the loan of P400,000.00, covered
by PN No. 33935) and No. 226467 (for the loan of P250,000.00, covered by PN No. 34079), and pointed
out that the checks did not bear her indorsements. She did not deny receiving all other checks but she
interposed that she received these checks, not as proceeds of loans, but as payment of the principal
amounts and/or interests from her money market placements with petitioner Citibank. She also raised
doubts as to the notation on each of the checks that reads RE: Proceeds of PN#[corresponding PN No.],
saying that such notation did not appear on the MCs when she originally received them and that the
notation appears to have been written by a typewriter different from that used in writing all other
information on the checks (i.e., date, payee, and amount).[76] She even testified that MCs were not
supposed to bear notations indicating the purpose for which they were issued.
As to the second set of PNs, respondent acknowledged having signed them all. However, she asserted
that she only executed these PNs as part of the simulated loans she and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
concocted.Respondent explained that she had a pending loan application for a big amount with
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and when Mr. Tan found out about this, he
suggested that they could make it appear that the respondent had outstanding loans with
petitioner Citibank and the latter was already demanding payment thereof; this might persuade
DBP to approve respondents loan application. Mr. Tan made the respondent sign the second set
of PNs, so that he may have something to show the DBP investigator who might inquire with
petitioner Citibank as to respondents loans with the latter. On her own copies of the said PNs,
respondent wrote by hand the notation, This isa (sic) simulated non-negotiable note, signed copy
given to Mr. Tan., (sic) per agreement to be shown to DBP representative. itwill (sic) be returned
to me if the P11=M (sic) loan for MC Adore Palace Hotel is approved by DBP.[77]
Findings of this Court as to the existence of the loans
After going through the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by both sides to this
case, it is this Courts assessment that respondent did indeed have outstanding loans with
petitioner Citibank at the time it effected the off-set or compensation on 25 July 1979 (using
respondents savings deposit with petitioner Citibank), 5 September 1979 (using the proceeds of
respondents money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) and 26 October 1979
(using respondents dollar accounts remitted from Citibank-Geneva). The totality of petitioners
evidence as to the existence of the said loans preponderates over respondents. Preponderant
evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the
adverse party.[78]
Respondents outstanding obligation for P1,920,000.00 had been sufficiently documented by
petitioner Citibank.
The second set of PNs is a mere renewal of the prior loans originally covered by the first set of
PNs, except for PN No. 34534. The first set of PNs is supported, in turn, by the existence of the
MCs that represent the proceeds thereof received by the respondent.
It bears to emphasize that the proceeds of the loans were paid to respondent in MCs, with the
respondent specifically named as payee. MCs checks are drawn by the banks manager upon the
bank itself and regarded to be as good as the money it represents. [79] Moreover, the MCs were
crossed checks, with the words Payees Account Only.
In general, a crossed check cannot be presented to the drawee bank for payment in cash. Instead,
the check can only be deposited with the payees bank which, in turn, must present it for payment
against the drawee bank in the course of normal banking hours. The crossed check cannot be
presented for payment, but it can only be deposited and the drawee bank may only pay to another
bank in the payees or indorsers account.[80] The effect of crossing a check was described by this
Court in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals[81]
[T]he crossing of a check with the phrase Payees Account Only is a warning
that the check should be deposited in the account of the payee. Thus, it is the
duty of the collecting bank PCI Bank to ascertain that the check be deposited
in payees account only. It is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its
depositors before it can make the clearing indorsement all prior indorsements
and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed.
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The crossed MCs presented by petitioner Bank were indeed deposited in several different bank accounts
and cleared by the Clearing Office of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as evidenced by the stamp
marks and notations on the said checks. The crossed MCs are already in the possession of petitioner
Citibank, the drawee bank, which was ultimately responsible for the payment of the amount stated in the
checks. Given that a check is more than just an instrument of credit used in commercial transactions for it
also serves as a receipt or evidence for the drawee bank of the cancellation of the said check due to
payment,[82] then, the possession by petitioner Citibank of the said MCs, duly stamped Paid gives rise to
the presumption that the said MCs were already paid out to the intended payee, who was in this case, the
respondent.
This Court finds applicable herein the presumptions that private transactions have been fair and
regular,[83] and that the ordinary course of business has been followed.[84] There is no question that the
loan transaction between petitioner Citibank and the respondent is a private transaction. The transactions
revolving around the crossed MCs from their issuance by petitioner Citibank to respondent as payment of
the proceeds of her loans; to its deposit in respondents accounts with several different banks; to the
clearing of the MCs by an independent clearing house; and finally, to the payment of the MCs by petitioner
Citibank as the drawee bank of the said checks are all private transactions which shall be presumed to
have been fair and regular to all the parties concerned. In addition, the banks involved in the foregoing
transactions are also presumed to have followed the ordinary course of business in the acceptance of the
crossed MCs for deposit in respondents accounts, submitting them for clearing, and their eventual
payment and cancellation.
The afore-stated presumptions are disputable, meaning, they are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.[85] Respondent, however, was unable to present
sufficient and credible evidence to dispute these presumptions.
It should be recalled that out of the nine MCs presented by petitioner Citibank, respondent admitted to
receiving one as proceeds of a loan (MC No. 228270), denied receiving two (MCs No. 220701 and
226467), and admitted to receiving all the rest, but not as proceeds of her loans, but as return on the
principal amounts and interests from her money market placements.
Respondent admitted receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds of her loan covered by PN No.
34534. Although the principal amount of the loan is P150,000.00, respondent only received P146,312.50,
because the interest and handling fee on the loan transaction were already deducted therefrom.[86] Stamps
and notations at the back of MC No. 228270 reveal that it was deposited at the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), Cubao Branch, in Account No. 0123-0572-28.[87] The check also bore the signature of
respondent at the back.[88] And, although respondent would later admit that she did sign PN No. 34534 and
received MC No. 228270 as proceeds of the loan extended to her by petitioner Citibank, she contradicted
herself when, in an earlier testimony, she claimed that PN No. 34534 was among the PNs she executed as
simulated loans with petitioner Citibank.[89]
Respondent denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 and 226467. However, considering that the said
checks were crossed for payees account only, and that they were actually deposited, cleared, and paid,
then the presumption would be that the said checks were properly deposited to the account of respondent,
who was clearly named the payee in the checks. Respondents bare allegations that she did not receive
the two checks fail to convince this Court, for to sustain her, would be for this Court to conclude that an
irregularity had occurred somewhere from the time of the issuance of the said checks, to their deposit,
clearance, and payment, and which would have involved not only petitioner Citibank, but also BPI, which
accepted the checks for deposit, and the Central Bank of the Philippines, which cleared the checks. It falls
upon the respondent to overcome or dispute the presumption that the crossed checks were issued,
accepted for deposit, cleared, and paid for by the banks involved following the ordinary course of their
business.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The mere fact that MCs No. 220701 and 226467 do not bear respondents signature at the back
does not negate deposit thereof in her account. The liability for the lack of indorsement on the
MCs no longer fall on petitioner Citibank, but on the bank who received the same for deposit, in
this case, BPI Cubao Branch. Once again, it must be noted that the MCs were crossed, for
payees account only, and the payee named in both checks was none other than respondent. The
crossing of the MCs was already a warning to BPI to receive said checks for deposit only in
respondents account. It was up to BPI to verify whether it was receiving the crossed MCs in
accordance with the instructions on the face thereof. If, indeed, the MCs were deposited in
accounts other than respondents, then the respondent would have a cause of action against
BPI.[90]
BPI further stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks to the effect that, All prior
endorsement and/or Lack of endorsement guaranteed. Thus, BPI became the indorser of the MCs,
and assumed all the warranties of an indorser,[91] specifically, that the checks were genuine and in
all respects what they purported to be; that it had a good title to the checks; that all prior parties
had capacity to contract; and that the checks were, at the time of their indorsement, valid and
subsisting.[92] So even if the MCs deposited by BPI's client, whether it be by respondent herself or
some other person, lacked the necessary indorsement, BPI, as the collecting bank, is bound by its
warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the defense of lack of indorsement as against
petitioner Citibank, the drawee bank.[93]
Furthermore, respondents bare and unsubstantiated denial of receipt of the MCs in question and
their deposit in her account is rendered suspect when MC No. 220701 was actually deposited in
Account No. 0123-0572-28 of BPI Cubao Branch, the very same account in which MC No. 228270
(which respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds of her loan from petitioner Citibank), and
MCs No. 228203, 228357, and 228400 (which respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds from
her money market placements) were deposited. Likewise, MC No. 226467 was deposited in
Account No. 0121-002-43 of BPI Cubao Branch, to which MCs No. 226285 and 226439 (which
respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were
deposited. It is an apparent contradiction for respondent to claim having received the proceeds of
checks deposited in an account, and then deny receiving the proceeds of another check
deposited in the very same account.
Another inconsistency in respondents denial of receipt of MC No. 226467 and her deposit of the
same in her account, is her presentation of Exhibit HHH, a provisional receipt which was
supposed to prove that respondent turned over P500,000.00 to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, that
the said amount was split into three money market placements, and that MC No. 226467
represented the return on her investment from one of these placements.[94] Because of her Exhibit
HHH, respondent effectively admitted receipt of MC No. 226467, although for reasons other than
as proceeds of a loan.
Neither can this Court give credence to respondents contention that the notations on the MCs,
stating that they were the proceeds of particular PNs, were not there when she received the
checks and that the notations appeared to be written by a typewriter different from that used to
write the other information on the checks. Once more, respondents allegations were
uncorroborated by any other evidence. Her and her counsels observation that the notations on the
MCs appear to be written by a typewriter different from that used to write the other information on
the checks hardly convinces this Court considering that it constitutes a mere opinion on the
appearance of the notation by a witness who does not possess the necessary expertise on the
matter. In addition, the notations on the MCs were written using both capital and small letters,
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while the other information on the checks were written using capital letters only, such difference could
easily confuse an untrained eye and lead to a hasty conclusion that they were written by different
typewriters.
Respondents testimony, that based on her experience transacting with banks, the MCs were not supposed
to include notations on the purpose for which the checks were issued, also deserves scant
consideration. While respondent may have extensive experience dealing with banks, it still does not qualify
her as a competent witness on banking procedures and practices. Her testimony on this matter is even
belied by the fact that the other MCs issued by petitioner Citibank (when it was still named First National
City Bank) and by petitioner FNCB Finance, the existence and validity of which were not disputed by
respondent, also bear similar notations that state the reason for which they were issued.
Respondent presented several more pieces of evidence to substantiate her claim that she received MCs
No. 226285, 226439, 226467, 226057, 228357, and 228400, not as proceeds of her loans from petitioner
Citibank, but as the return of the principal amounts and payment of interests from her money market
placements with petitioners. Part of respondents exhibits were personal checks[95] drawn by respondent on
her account with Feati Bank & Trust Co., which she allegedly invested in separate money market
placements with both petitioners, the returns from which were paid to her via MCs No. 226285 and
228400. Yet, to this Court, the personal checks only managed to establish respondents issuance thereof,
but there was nothing on the face of the checks that would reveal the purpose for which they were issued
and that they were actually invested in money market placements as respondent claimed.
Respondent further submitted handwritten notes that purportedly computed and presented the
returns on her money market placements, corresponding to the amount stated in the MCs she received
from petitioner Citibank. Exhibit HHH-1[96] was a handwritten note, which respondent attributed to Mr. Tan
of petitioner Citibank, showing the breakdown of her BPI Check for P500,000.00 into three different money
market placements with petitioner Citibank. This Court, however, noticed several factors which render the
note highly suspect. One, it was written on the reversed side of Provisional Receipt No. 12724 of petitioner
Citibank which bore the initials of Mr. Tan acknowledging receipt of respondents BPI Check No. 120989
for P500,000.00; but the initials on the handwritten note appeared to be that of Mr. Bobby Mendoza of
petitioner FNCB Finance.[97] Second, according to Provisional Receipt No. 12724, BPI Check No. 120989
for P500,000.00 was supposed to be invested in three money market placements with petitioner Citibank
for the period of 60 days. Since all these money market placements were made through one check
deposited on the same day, 10 November 1978, it made no sense that the handwritten note at the back of
Provisional Receipt No. 12724 provided for different dates of maturity for each of the money market
placements (i.e., 16 November 1978, 17 January 1979, and 21 November 1978), and such dates did not
correspond to the 60 day placement period stated on the face of the provisional receipt. And third, the
principal amounts of the money market placements as stated in the handwritten
note P145,000.00, P145,000.00 and P242,000.00 totaled P532,000.00, and was obviously in excess of
the P500,000.00 acknowledged on the face of Provisional Receipt No. 12724.
Exhibits III and III-1, the front and bank pages of a handwritten note of Mr. Bobby Mendoza of
petitioner FNCB Finance,[98] also did not deserve much evidentiary weight, and this Court cannot rely on
the truth and accuracy of the computations presented therein. Mr. Mendoza was not presented as a
witness during the trial before the RTC, so that the document was not properly authenticated nor its
contents sufficiently explained. No one was able to competently identify whether the initials as appearing
on the note were actually Mr. Mendozas.
Also, going by the information on the front page of the note, this Court observes that payment of
respondents alleged money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance were made using Citytrust
Checks; the MCs in question, including MC No. 228057, were issued by petitioner Citibank. Although
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Citytrust (formerly Feati Bank & Trust Co.), petitioner FNCB Finance, and petitioner Citibank may
be affiliates of one another, they each remained separate and distinct corporations, each having
its own financial system and records. Thus, this Court cannot simply assume that one corporation,
such as petitioner Citibank or Citytrust, can issue a check to discharge an obligation of petitioner
FNCB Finance. It should be recalled that when petitioner FNCB Finance paid for respondents
money market placements, covered by its PNs No. 8167 and 8169, as well as PNs No. 20138 and
20139, petitioner FNCB Finance issued its own checks.
As a last point on this matter, if respondent truly had money market placements with
petitioners, then these would have been evidenced by PNs issued by either petitioner Citibank or
petitioner FNCB Finance, acknowledging the principal amounts of the investments, and stating
the applicable interest rates, as well as the dates of their of issuance and maturity. After
respondent had so meticulously reconstructed her other money market placements with
petitioners and consolidated the documentary evidence thereon, she came surprisingly short of
offering similar details and substantiation for these particular money market placements.
Since this Court is satisfied that respondent indeed received the proceeds of the first set of PNs,
then it proceeds to analyze her evidence of payment thereof.
In support of respondents assertion that she had already paid whatever loans she may
have had with petitioner Citibank, she presented as evidence Provisional Receipts No. 19471,
dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723, dated 10 November 1978, both of petitioner Citibank and
signed by Mr. Tan, for the amounts of P500,744.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. While these
provisional receipts did state that Mr. Tan, on behalf of petitioner Citibank, received respondents
checks as payment for her loans, they failed to specifically identify which loans were actually
paid. Petitioner Citibank was able to present evidence that respondent had executed several PNs
in the years 1978 and 1979 to cover the loans she secured from the said bank. Petitioner Citibank
did admit that respondent was able to pay for some of these PNs, and what it identified as the first
and second sets of PNs were only those which remained unpaid. It thus became incumbent upon
respondent to prove that the checks received by Mr. Tan were actually applied to the PNs in either
the first or second set; a fact that, unfortunately, cannot be determined from the provisional
receipts submitted by respondent since they only generally stated that the checks received by Mr.
Tan were payment for respondents loans.
Mr. Tan, in his deposition, further explained that provisional receipts were issued when
payment to the bank was made using checks, since the checks would still be subject to
clearing. The purpose for the provisional receipts was merely to acknowledge the delivery of the
checks to the possession of the bank, but not yet of payment. [99] This bank practice finds
legitimacy in the pronouncement of this Court that a check, whether an MC or an ordinary check,
is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute valid tender of payment. In Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [100] this Court elucidated that:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and
not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as
payment (Sec. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan
Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco, v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44;
21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, is
not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid
tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment.
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 The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by
commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).
In the case at bar, the issuance of an official receipt by petitioner Citibank would have been dependent on
whether the checks delivered by respondent were actually cleared and paid for by the drawee banks.
As for PN No. 34534, respondent asserted payment thereof at two separate instances by two different
means. In her formal offer of exhibits, respondent submitted a deposit slip of petitioner Citibank, dated 11
August 1978, evidencing the deposit of BPI Check No. 5785 for P150,000.00.[101] In her Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits, dated 7 July 1989, respondent stated that the purpose for the presentation of the
said deposit slip was to prove that she already paid her loan covered by PN No. 34534. [102] In her
testimony before the RTC three years later, on 28 November 1991, she changed her story. This time she
narrated that the loan covered by PN No. 34534 was secured by her money market placement with
petitioner FNCB Finance, and when she failed to pay the said PN when it became due, the security was
applied to the loan, therefore, the loan was considered paid. [103] Given the foregoing, respondents
assertion of payment of PN No. 34534 is extremely dubious.
According to petitioner Citibank, the PNs in the second set, except for PN No. 34534, were mere
renewals of the unpaid PNs in the first set, which was why the PNs stated that they were for the purpose of
liquidating existing obligations. PN No. 34534, however, which was part of the first set, was still valid and
subsisting and so it was included in the second set without need for its renewal, and it still being the
original PN for that particular loan, its stated purpose was for personal investment. [104] Respondent
essentially admitted executing the second set of PNs, but they were only meant to cover simulated
loans. Mr. Tan supposedly convinced her that her pending loan application with DBP would have a greater
chance of being approved if they made it appear that respondent urgently needed the money because
petitioner Citibank was already demanding payment for her simulated loans.
Respondents defense of simulated loans to escape liability for the second set of PNs is truly a novel one. It
is regrettable, however, that she was unable to substantiate the same. Yet again, respondents version of
events is totally based on her own uncorroborated testimony. The notations on the second set of PNs, that
they were non-negotiable simulated notes, were admittedly made by respondent herself and were, thus,
self-serving. Equally self-serving was respondents letter, written on 7 October 1985, or more than six
years after the execution of the second set of PNs, in which she demanded return of the simulated or
fictitious PNs, together with the letters relating thereto, which Mr. Tan purportedly asked her to
execute. Respondent further failed to present any proof of her alleged loan application with the DBP, and
of any circumstance or correspondence wherein the simulated or fictitious PNs were indeed used for their
supposed purpose.
In contrast, petitioner Citibank, as supported by the testimonies of its officers and available documentation,
consistently treated the said PNs as regular loans accepted, approved, and paid in the ordinary course of
its business.
The PNs executed by the respondent in favor of petitioner Citibank to cover her loans were duly-filled out
and signed, including the disclosure statement found at the back of the said PNs, in adherence to the
Central Bank requirement to disclose the full finance charges to a loan granted to borrowers.
Mr. Tan, then an account officer with the Marketing Department of petitioner Citibank, testified
that he dealt directly with respondent; he facilitated the loans; and the PNs, at least in the second set, were
signed by respondent in his presence.[105]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Mr. Pujeda, the officer who was previously in charge of loans and placements,
confirmed that the signatures on the PNs were verified against respondents specimen signature
with the bank.[106]
Ms. Cristina Dondoyano, who worked at petitioner Citibank as a loan processor, was
responsible for booking respondents loans. Booking the loans means recording it in the General
Ledger. She explained the procedure for booking loans, as follows: The account officer, in the
Marketing Department, deals directly with the clients who wish to borrow money from petitioner
Citibank. The Marketing Department will forward a loan booking checklist, together with the
borrowing clients PNs and other supporting documents, to the loan pre-processor, who will check
whether the details in the loan booking checklist are the same as those in the PNs. The
documents are then sent to Signature Control for verification of the clients signature in the PNs,
after which, they are returned to the loan pre-processor, to be forwarded finally to the loan
processor. The loan processor shall book the loan in the General Ledger, indicating therein the
client name, loan amount, interest rate, maturity date, and the corresponding PN number. Since
she booked respondents loans personally, Ms. Dondoyano testified that she saw the original
PNs. In 1986, Atty. Fernandez of petitioner Citibank requested her to prepare an accounting of
respondents loans, which she did, and which was presented as Exhibit 120 for the
petitioners. The figures from the said exhibit were culled from the bookings in the General Ledger,
a fact which respondents counsel was even willing to stipulate.[107]
Ms. Teresita Glorioso was an Investigation and Reconcilement Clerk at the Control Department of
petitioner Citibank. She was presented by petitioner Citibank to expound on the microfilming
procedure at the bank, since most of the copies of the PNs were retrieved from microfilm.
Microfilming of the documents are actually done by people at the Operations Department. At the
end of the day or during the day, the original copies of all bank documents, not just those
pertaining to loans, are microfilmed. She refuted the possibility that insertions could be made in
the microfilm because the microfilm is inserted in a cassette; the cassette is placed in the
microfilm machine for use; at the end of the day, the cassette is taken out of the microfilm machine
and put in a safe vault; and the cassette is returned to the machine only the following day for use,
until the spool is full. This is the microfilming procedure followed everyday. When the microfilm
spool is already full, the microfilm is developed, then sent to the Control Department, which double
checks the contents of the microfilms against the entries in the General Ledger. The Control
Department also conducts a random comparison of the contents of the microfilms with the original
documents; a random review of the contents is done on every role of microfilm.[108]
Ms. Renee Rubio worked for petitioner Citibank for 20 years. She rose from the ranks, initially
working as a secretary in the Personnel Group; then as a secretary to the Personnel Group Head;
a Service Assistant with the Marketing Group, in 1972 to 1974, dealing directly with corporate and
individual clients who, among other things, secured loans from petitioner Citibank; the Head of the
Collection Group of the Foreign Department in 1974 to 1976; the Head of the Money Transfer Unit
in 1976 to 1978; the Head of the Loans and Placements Unit up to the early 1980s; and, thereafter,
she established operations training for petitioner Citibank in the Asia-Pacific Region responsible
for the training of the officers of the bank. She testified on the standard loan application process at
petitioner Citibank. According to Ms. Rubio, the account officer or marketing person submits a
proposal to grant a loan to an individual or corporation. Petitioner Citibank has a worldwide policy
that requires a credit committee, composed of a minimum of three people, which would approve
the loan and amount thereof. There can be no instance when only one officer has the power to
approve the loan application. When the loan is approved, the account officer in charge will obtain
the corresponding PNs from the client. The PNs are sent to the signature verifier who would
validate the signatures therein against those appearing in the signature cards previously
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submitted by the client to the bank. The Operations Unit will check and review the documents, including
the PNs, if it is a clean loan, and securities and deposits, if it is collateralized. The loan is then recorded in
the General Ledger. The Loans and Placements Department will not book the loans without the PNs.When
the PNs are liquidated, whether they are paid or rolled-over, they are returned to the client.[109] Ms. Rubio
further explained that she was familiar with respondents accounts since, while she was still the Head of the
Loan and Placements Unit, she was asked by Mr. Tan to prepare a list of respondents outstanding
obligations.[110] She thus calculated respondents outstanding loans, which was sent as an attachment to
Mr. Tans letter to respondent, dated 28 September 1979, and presented before the RTC as Exhibits 34-B
and 34-C.[111]
Lastly, the exchange of letters between petitioner Citibank and respondent, as well as the letters sent by
other people working for respondent, had consistently recognized that respondent owed petitioner Citibank
money.
In consideration of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the preponderance of evidence
supports the existence of the respondents loans, in the principal sum of P1,920,000.00, as of 5 September
1979. While it is well-settled that the term preponderance of evidence should not be wholly dependent on
the number of witnesses, there are certain instances when the number of witnesses become the
determining factor
The preponderance of evidence may be determined, under certain
conditions, by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts.
For instance, one or two witnesses may testify to a given state of facts, and six or
seven witnesses of equal candor, fairness, intelligence, and truthfulness, and equally
well corroborated by all the remaining evidence, who have no greater interest in the
result of the suit, testify against such state of facts. Then the preponderance of
evidence is determined by the number of witnesses. (Wilcox vs. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524,
66 Am. St. Rep., 761.)[112]
Best evidence rule
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily dismissing
the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of
the best evidence rule.
In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be
produced. Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the
production of the document itself,[113] to the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence.[114]
The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3,
which reads
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence
rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other
substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting
for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or
condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol
evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al.
vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil 565). x x x [115]
In Estrada v. Desierto,[116] this Court had occasion to rule that
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of
the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6,
2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule.
Wigmore,in his book on evidence, states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.24
xxxx
In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has
been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute
arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may
be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to
inspect it. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in
evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the
petitioners to establish the existence of respondents loans. The terms or contents of these
documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondents position
that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in
Page 168
the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan
transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt
of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted
the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of
the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or
when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are,
undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence
presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondents loans, it should be borne in mind that the
rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was established through the
testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents were personally executed
by respondent.The original PNs also went through the whole loan booking system of petitioner Citibank
from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the pre-processor, to the signature verifier, back to
the pre-processor, then to the processor for booking.[117] The original PNs were seen by Ms. Dondoyano,
the processor, who recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda personally saw the original MCs,
proving respondents receipt of the proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys.
Cleofe and Fernandez, the banks legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of respondents loans. The
original MCs were presented to Atty. Cleofe who used the same during the preliminary investigation of the
case, sometime in years 1986-1987. The original MCs were subsequently turned over to the Control and
Investigation Division of petitioner Citibank.[118]
It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the PNs
when it moved to a new office. Citibank did not make a similar contention; instead, it explained that the
original copies of the PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation of the loan, either through
payment or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that they were still looking for the documents
in their storage or warehouse to explain the delay and difficulty in the retrieval thereof, but not their
absence or loss. The original documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and,
thus, unavailable for presentation before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a fire broke out on the
7th floor of the office building of petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the fire was intentionally
set. The fire destroyed relevant documents, not just of the present case, but also of other cases, since the
7th floor housed the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of keeping the necessary documents for
cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved.
The foregoing would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of photocopies or microfilm
copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners as secondary evidence to establish the existence of
respondents loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule.
The impact of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dy case
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals made the following pronouncement
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Besides, We find the declaration and conclusions of this Court
in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 entitled Sps. Dr. Ricardo L. Dy and Rosalind O. Dy
vs. City Bank, N.A., et al, promulgated on 15 January 1990,
as disturbing taking into consideration the similarities of the fraud,
machinations, and deceits employed by the defendant-appellant Citibank and
its Account Manager Francisco Tan.
Worthy of note is the fact that Our declarations and conclusions
against Citibank and the person of Francisco Tan in CA-G.R. CV No.
15934 were affirmed in toto by the Highest Magistrate in a Minute
Resolution dated 22 August 1990 entitled Citibank, N.A., vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 93350.
As the factual milieu of the present appeal created reasonable
doubts as to whether the nine (9) Promissory Notes were indeed executed
with considerations, the doubts, coupled by the findings and conclusions of
this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
93350. should be construed against herein defendants-appellants Citibank
and FNCB Finance.
What this Court truly finds disturbing is the significance given by the Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision to the Decision[119] of its Third Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 (or the Dy
case), when there is an absolute lack of legal basis for doing such.
Although petitioner Citibank and its officer, Mr. Tan, were also involved in the Dy case, that is
about the only connection between the Dy case and the one at bar. Not only did the Dy case
tackle transactions between parties other than the parties presently before this Court, but the
transactions are absolutely independent and unrelated to those in the instant Petition.
In the Dy case, Severino Chua Caedo managed to obtain loans from herein petitioner Citibank
amounting to P7,000,000.00, secured to the extent of P5,000,000.00 by a Third Party Real Estate
Mortgage of the properties of Caedos aunt, Rosalind Dy. It turned out that Rosalind Dy and her
husband were unaware of the said loans and the mortgage of their properties. The transactions
were carried out exclusively between Caedo and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank. The RTC found
Mr. Tan guilty of fraud for his participation in the questionable transactions, essentially because he
allowed Caedo to take out the signature cards, when these should have been signed by the Dy
spouses personally before him. Although the Dy spouses signatures in the PNs and Third Party
Real Estate Mortgage were forged, they were approved by the signature verifier since the
signature cards against which they were compared to were also forged. Neither the RTC nor the
Court of Appeals, however, categorically declared Mr. Tan personally responsible for the forgeries,
which, in the narration of the facts, were more likely committed by Caedo.
In the Petition at bar, respondent dealt with Mr. Tan directly, there was no third party involved who
could have perpetrated any fraud or forgery in her loan transactions. Although respondent
attempted to raise suspicion as to the authenticity of her signatures on certain documents, these
were nothing more than naked allegations with no corroborating evidence; worse, even her own
allegations were replete with inconsistencies. She could not even establish in what manner or
under what circumstances the fraud or forgery was committed, or how Mr. Tan could have been
directly responsible for the same.
Page 169
While the Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the Decision of its Third Division in the Dy case, it
should not have given the said case much weight when it rendered the assailed Decision, since the former
does not constitute a precedent. The Court of Appeals, in the challenged Decision, did not apply any legal
argument or principle established in the Dy case but, rather, adopted the findings therein of wrongdoing or
misconduct on the part of herein petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. Any finding of wrongdoing or misconduct
as against herein petitioners should be made based on the factual background and pieces of evidence
submitted in this case, not those in another case.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the Dy case not as a legal precedent for the
present case, but rather as evidence of similar acts committed by petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. A basic
rule of evidence, however, states that, Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like.[120] The rationale for the rule is explained thus
The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial
convenience. The fact that a person has committed the same or similar acts at some
prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical guaranty that he committed the act in
question. This is so because, subjectively, a mans mind and even his modes of life
may change; and, objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at a
given time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way.Besides,
if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to a
multiplicity of collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well as
confuse the court and prolong the trial.[121]
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are so different and unrelated that the Dy case cannot be used
to prove specific intent, knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage on the part of
petitioner Citibank or its officer, Mr. Tan, to defraud respondent in the present case.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is
necessary;
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he
be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due
are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to
the debtor.
There is little controversy when it comes to the right of petitioner Citibank to
compensate respondents outstanding loans with her deposit account. As already found by this
Court, petitioner Citibank was the creditor of respondent for her outstanding loans. At the same
time, respondent was the creditor of petitioner Citibank, as far as her deposit account was
concerned, since bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current, should be considered as
simple loan or mutuum by the depositor to the banking institution.[122] Both debts consist in sums
of money. By June 1979, all of respondents PNs in the second set had matured and became
demandable, while respondents savings account was demandable anytime. Neither was there
any retention or controversy over the PNs and the deposit account commenced by a third person
and communicated in due time to the debtor concerned. Compensation takes place by operation
of law,[123] therefore, even in the absence of an expressed authority from respondent, petitioner
Citibank had the right to effect, on 25 June 1979, the partial compensation or off-set of
respondents outstanding loans with her deposit account, amounting to P31,079.14.
Money market placements with FNCB Finance

IV Things though are not as simple and as straightforward as regards to the money market
placements and bank account used by petitioner Citibank to complete the compensation or off-set
The liquidation of respondents of respondents outstanding loans, which came from persons other than petitioner Citibank.
outstanding loans were valid in so far as
petitioner Citibank used respondents Respondents money market placements were with petitioner FNCB Finance, and after
savings account with the bank and her several roll-overs, they were ultimately covered by PNs No. 20138 and 20139, which, by 3
money market placements with petitioner September 1979, the date the check for the proceeds of the said PNs were issued, amounted
FNCB Finance; but illegal and void in so to P1,022,916.66, inclusive of the principal amounts and interests. As to these money market
far as petitioner Citibank used placements, respondent was the creditor and petitioner FNCB Finance the debtor; while, as to the
respondents dollar accounts with outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and respondent the debtor. Consequently,
Citibank-Geneva. legal compensation, under Article 1278 of the Civil Code, would not apply since the first
requirement for a valid compensation, that each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that
he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other, was not met.
Savings Account with petitioner Citibank
What petitioner Citibank actually did was to exercise its rights to the proceeds of
Compensation is a recognized mode of extinguishing obligations. Relevant provisions of the Civil Code respondents money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of the Deeds of
provides Assignment executed by respondent in its favor.

Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own The Court of Appeals did not consider these Deeds of Assignment because of
right, are creditors and debtors of each other. petitioners failure to produce the original copies thereof in violation of the best evidence rule. This

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 170

Court again finds itself in disagreement in the application of the best evidence rule by the appellate court.
To recall, the best evidence rule, in so far as documentary evidence is concerned, requires the
presentation of the original copy of the document only when the context thereof is the subject of inquiry in
the case.Respondent does not question the contents of the Deeds of Assignment. While she admitted the
existence and execution of the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March 1978, covering
PNs No. 8169 and 8167 issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, she claimed, as defense, that the loans for
which the said Deeds were executed as security, were already paid. She denied ever executing both
Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, covering PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These are again issues
collateral to the contents of the documents involved, which could be proven by evidence other than the
original copies of the said documents.
Moreover, the Deeds of Assignment of the money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance were notarized documents, thus, admissible in evidence. Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of
Court provides that
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged
or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved.
Significant herein is this Courts elucidation in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,[124] which reads
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that the
notarization of a private document converts it into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194
SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document duly executed and entered
in the proper registry is presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown
by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 57 Phil. 652 [1918]; U.S. vs.
Enriquez, 1 Phil 241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As
such, the party challenging the recital of the document must prove his claim with clear
and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986]).
The rule on the evidentiary weight that must be accorded a notarized document is clear and
unambiguous. The certificate of acknowledgement in the notarized Deeds of Assignment
constituted prima facie evidence of the execution thereof. Thus, the burden of refuting this presumption fell
on respondent. She could have presented evidence of any defect or irregularity in the execution of the said
documents[125] or raised questions as to the verity of the notary publics acknowledgment and certificate in
the Deeds.[126] But again, respondent admitted executing the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978
and 9 March 1978, although claiming that the loans for which they were executed as security were already
paid. And, she assailed the Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, with nothing more than her bare
denial of execution thereof, hardly the clear and convincing evidence required to trounce the presumption
of due execution of a notarized document.
Petitioners not only presented the notarized Deeds of Assignment, but even secured certified literal copies
thereof from the National Archives.[127] Mr. Renato Medua, an archivist, working at the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Library, testified that the copies of the Deeds presented
before the RTC were certified literal copies of those contained in the Notarial Registries of the notary
publics concerned, which were already in the possession of the National Archives. He also explained that
he could not bring to the RTC the Notarial Registries containing the original copies of the Deeds of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Assignment, because the Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 97, dated 8 November 1968,
prohibits the bringing of original documents to the courts to prevent the loss of irreplaceable and
priceless documents.[128]
Accordingly, this Court gives the Deeds of Assignment grave importance in establishing the
authority given by the respondent to petitioner Citibank to use as security for her loans her money
her market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, represented by PNs No. 8167 and 8169,
later to be rolled-over as PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These Deeds of Assignment constitute the
law between the parties, and the obligations arising therefrom shall have the force of law between
the parties and should be complied with in good faith.[129] Standard clauses in all of the Deeds
provide that
The ASSIGNOR and the ASSIGNEE hereby further agree as
follows:
xxxx
2. In the event the OBLIGATIONS are not paid at maturity or upon
demand, as the case may be, the ASSIGNEE is fully authorized and
empowered to collect and receive the PLACEMENT (or so much thereof as
may be necessary) and apply the same in payment of the
OBLIGATIONS. Furthermore, the ASSIGNOR agrees that at any time, and
from time to time, upon request by the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR will
promptly execute and deliver any and all such further instruments and
documents as may be necessary to effectuate this Assignment.
xxxx
5. This Assignment shall be considered as sufficient authority to
FNCB Finance to pay and deliver the PLACEMENT or so much thereof as
may be necessary to liquidate the OBLIGATIONS, to the ASSIGNEE in
accordance with terms and provisions hereof.[130]
Petitioner Citibank was only acting upon the authority granted to it under the foregoing Deeds
when it finally used the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, paid by petitioner FNCB Finance,
to partly pay for respondents outstanding loans. Strictly speaking, it did not effect a legal
compensation or off-set under Article 1278 of the Civil Code, but rather, it partly extinguished
respondents obligations through the application of the security given by the respondent for her
loans. Although the pertinent documents were entitled Deeds of Assignment, they were, in reality,
more of a pledge by respondent to petitioner Citibank of her credit due from petitioner FNCB
Finance by virtue of her money market placements with the latter. According to Article 2118 of the
Civil Code
ART. 2118. If a credit has been pledged becomes due before it is
redeemed, the pledgee may collect and receive the amount due. He shall
apply the same to the payment of his claim, and deliver the surplus, should
there be any, to the pledgor.
Page 171
PNs No. 20138 and 20139 matured on 3 September 1979, without them being redeemed by respondent,
so that petitioner Citibank collected from petitioner FNCB Finance the proceeds thereof, which included
the principal amounts and interests earned by the money market placements, amounting to P1,022,916.66,
and applied the same against respondents outstanding loans, leaving no surplus to be delivered to
respondent.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Despite the legal compensation of respondents savings account and the total application of the proceeds
of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 to respondents outstanding loans, there still remained a balance
of P1,069,847.40.Petitioner Citibank then proceeded to applying respondents dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva against her remaining loan balance, pursuant to a Declaration of Pledge supposedly
executed by respondent in its favor.
Certain principles of private international law should be considered herein because the property pledged
was in the possession of an entity in a foreign country, namely, Citibank-Geneva. In the absence of any
allegation and evidence presented by petitioners of the specific rules and laws governing the constitution
of a pledge in Geneva, Switzerland, they will be presumed to be the same as Philippine local or domestic
laws; this is known as processual presumption.[131]
Upon closer scrutiny of the Declaration of Pledge, this Court finds the same exceedingly suspicious and
irregular.
First of all, it escapes this Court why petitioner Citibank took care to have the Deeds of Assignment of the
PNs notarized, yet left the Declaration of Pledge unnotarized. This Court would think that petitioner
Citibank would take greater cautionary measures with the preparation and execution of the Declaration of
Pledge because it involved respondents all present and future fiduciary placements with a Citibank branch
in another country, specifically, in Geneva, Switzerland. While there is no express legal requirement that
the Declaration of Pledge had to be notarized to be effective, even so, it could not enjoy the same prima
facie presumption of due execution that is extended to notarized documents, and petitioner Citibank must
discharge the burden of proving due execution and authenticity of the Declaration of Pledge.
Second, petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when the Declaration of Pledge was actually
executed. The photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank before the RTC
was undated.[132] It presented only a photocopy of the pledge because it already forwarded the original
copy thereof to Citibank-Geneva when it requested for the remittance of respondents dollar accounts
pursuant thereto. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge,
certified by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September 1979.[133] Respondent,
however, presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of the country on the said
date and could not have signed the pledge. Petitioner Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before
24 September 1979, but could not provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written on
the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified that the Declaration of Pledge was signed by respondent personally
before him, he could not give the exact date when the said signing took place. It is important to note that
the copy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certified by an officer of
Citibank-Geneva, which had possession of the original copy of the pledge. It is dated 24 September 1979,
and this Court shall abide by the presumption that the written document is truly dated.[134] Since it is
undeniable that respondent was out of the country on 24 September 1979, then she could not have
executed the pledge on the said date.
Third, the Declaration of Pledge was irregularly filled-out. The pledge was in a standard printed form. It
was constituted in favor of Citibank, N.A., otherwise referred to therein as the Bank. It should be noted,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
however, that in the space which should have named the pledgor, the name of petitioner Citibank
was typewritten, to wit
The pledge right herewith constituted shall secure all claims which the Bank
now has or in the future acquires against Citibank, N.A., Manila (full name
and address of the Debtor), regardless of the legal cause or the transaction
(for example current account, securities transactions, collections, credits,
payments, documentary credits and collections) which gives rise thereto, and
including principal, all contractual and penalty interest, commissions, charges,
and costs.
The pledge, therefore, made no sense, the pledgor and pledgee being the same entity. Was a
mistake made by whoever filled-out the form? Yes, it could be a possibility. Nonetheless,
considering the value of such a document, the mistake as to a significant detail in the pledge could
only be committed with gross carelessness on the part of petitioner Citibank, and raised serious
doubts as to the authenticity and due execution of the same.The Declaration of Pledge had
passed through the hands of several bank officers in the country and abroad, yet, surprisingly and
implausibly, no one noticed such a glaring mistake.
Lastly, respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that
the signature was a forgery. When a document is assailed on the basis of forgery, the best
evidence rule applies
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original
document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible
pursuant to the best evidence rule. This is especially true when the issue
is that of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the
party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The
fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person
whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original
document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a
definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on
a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot
produce reliable results.[135]
Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the pledge produced
before the RTC so as to have it examined by experts. Yet, despite several Orders by the
RTC,[136] petitioner Citibank failed to comply with the production of the original Declaration of
Pledge. It is admitted that Citibank-Geneva had possession of the original copy of the
pledge. While petitioner Citibank in Manila and its branch in Geneva may be separate and distinct
entities, they are still incontestably related, and between petitioner Citibank and respondent, the
former had more influence and resources to convince Citibank-Geneva to return, albeit
temporarily, the original Declaration of Pledge. Petitioner Citibank did not present any evidence to
Page 172
convince this Court that it had exerted diligent efforts to secure the original copy of the pledge, nor did it
proffer the reason why Citibank-Geneva obstinately refused to give it back, when such document would
have been very vital to the case of petitioner Citibank. There is thus no justification to allow the
presentation of a mere photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge in lieu of the original, and the photocopy of
the pledge presented by petitioner Citibank has nil probative value.[137] In addition, even if this Court cannot
make a categorical finding that respondents signature on the original copy of the pledge was forged, it is
persuaded that petitioner Citibank willfully suppressed the presentation of the original document, and takes
into consideration the presumption that the evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse to petitioner
Citibank if produced.[138]
Without the Declaration of Pledge, petitioner Citibank had no authority to demand the remittance
of respondents dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and to apply them to her outstanding loans. It cannot
effect legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code since, petitioner Citibank itself admitted that
Citibank-Geneva is a distinct and separate entity. As for the dollar accounts, respondent was the creditor
and Citibank-Geneva is the debtor; and as for the outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor
and respondent was the debtor. The parties in these transactions were evidently not the principal creditor
of each other.
Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondents dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva
and the application thereof to her outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank was illegal, and null and
void. Resultantly, petitioner Citibank is obligated to return to respondent the amount of US$149,632,99
from her Citibank-Geneva accounts, or its present equivalent value in Philippine currency; and, at the
same time, respondent continues to be obligated to petitioner Citibank for the balance of her outstanding
loans which, as of 5 September 1979, amounted to P1,069,847.40.
V fiduciary character requires high standards of integrity and performance. [141] A bank is under the
The parties shall be liable for interests on
their monetary obligations to each other,
as determined herein.
In summary, petitioner Citibank is ordered by this Court to pay respondent the proceeds of her
money market placements, represented by PNs No. 23356 and 23357, amounting to P318,897.34
and P203,150.00, respectively, earning an interest of 14.5% per annum as stipulated in the
PNs,[139] beginning 17 March 1977, the date of the placements.
Petitioner Citibank is also ordered to refund to respondent the amount of US$149,632.99, or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, which had been remitted from her Citibank-Geneva accounts. These
dollar accounts, consisting of two fiduciary placements and current accounts with Citibank-Geneva shall
continue earning their respective stipulated interests from 26 October 1979, the date of their remittance by
Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila and applied against respondents outstanding loans.
As for respondent, she is ordered to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her outstanding loans,
which amounted to P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979. These loans continue to earn interest, as
stipulated in the corresponding PNs, from the time of their respective maturity dates, since the supposed
payment thereof using respondents dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva is deemed illegal, null and void,
and, thus, ineffective.
VI
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Petitioner Citibank shall be liable
for damages to respondent.
Petitioners protest the award by the Court of Appeals of moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees in favor of respondent. They argued that the RTC did not award any damages,
and respondent, in her appeal before the Court of Appeals, did not raise in issue the absence of
such.
While it is true that the general rule is that only errors which have been stated in the assignment of
errors and properly argued in the brief shall be considered, this Court has also recognized
exceptions to the general rule, wherein it authorized the review of matters, even those not
assigned as errors in the appeal, if the consideration thereof is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case, and there is a close inter-relation between the omitted assignment of error
and those actually assigned and discussed by the appellant.[140] Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err in awarding the damages when it already made findings that would justify and support the
said award.
Although this Court appreciates the right of petitioner Citibank to effect legal compensation of
respondents local deposits, as well as its right to the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 by
virtue of the notarized Deeds of Assignment, to partly extinguish respondents outstanding loans, it
finds that petitioner Citibank did commit wrong when it failed to pay and properly account for the
proceeds of respondents money market placements, evidenced by PNs No. 23356 and 23357,
and when it sought the remittance of respondents dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva by virtue
of a highly-suspect Declaration of Pledge to be applied to the remaining balance of respondents
outstanding loans. It bears to emphasize that banking is impressed with public interest and its
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts
consist only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos.[142] The bank must record every single
transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. [143] Petitioner
Citibank evidently failed to exercise the required degree of care and transparency in its
transactions with respondent, thus, resulting in the wrongful deprivation of her property.
Respondent had been deprived of substantial amounts of her investments and deposits
for more than two decades. During this span of years, respondent had found herself in desperate
need of the amounts wrongfully withheld from her. In her testimony[144] before the RTC,
respondent narrated
Q By the way Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell us again, you said before that
you are a businesswoman, will you tell us again what are the
businesses you are engaged into [sic]?
A I am engaged in real estate. I am the owner of the Modesta Village 1 and 2
in San Mateo, Rizal. I am also the President and Chairman of the
Board of Macador [sic] Co. and Business Inc. which operates the
Macador [sic] International Palace Hotel. I am also the President of
the Macador [sic] International Palace Hotel, and also the
Treasures Home Industries, Inc. which I am the Chairman and
president of the Board and also operating affiliated company in the
name of Treasures Motor Sales engaged in car dealers [sic] like
Delta Motors, we are the dealers of the whole Northern Luzon and I
am the president of the Disto Company, Ltd., based in Hongkong
Page 173
 licensed in Honkong [sic] and now operating in Los Angeles, California.
Q What is the business of that Disto Company Ltd.?
A Disto Company, Ltd., is engaged in real estate and construction.
Q Aside from those businesses are you a member of any national or community
organization for social and civil activities?
A Yes sir.
Q What are those?
A I am the Vice-President of thes [sic] Subdivision Association of the Philippines in
1976, I am also an officer of the Chamber of Real Estate Business
Association; I am also an officer of the Chatholic [sic] Womens League and
I am also a member of the CMLI, I forgot the definition.
Q How about any political affiliation or government position held if any?
A I was also a candidate for Mayo last January 30, 1980.
Q Where?
A In Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
Q What else?
A I also ran as an Assemblywoman last May, 1984, Independent party in Regional I,
Pangasinan.
Q What happened to your businesses you mentioned as a result of your failure to
recover you [sic] investments and bank deposits from the defendants?
A They are not all operating, in short, I was hampered to push through the businesses
that I have.
A [sic] Of all the businesses and enterprises that you mentioned what are those that
are paralyzed and what remain inactive?
A Of all the company [sic] that I have, only the Disto Company that is now operating in
California.
Q How about your candidacy as Mayor of Dagupan, [sic] City, and later as
Assemblywoman of Region I, what happened to this?
A I won by voting but when election comes on [sic] the counting I lost and I protested
this, it is still pending and because I dont have financial resources I was not
able to push through the case. I just have it pending in the Comelec.
Q Now, do these things also affect your social and civic activities?
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A Yes sir, definitely.
Q How?
A I was embarrassed because being a businesswoman I would like to inform
the Honorable Court that I was awarded as the most outstanding
businesswoman of the year in 1976 but when this money was not
given back to me I was not able to comply with the commitments
that I have promised to these associations that I am engaged into
[sic], sir.
For the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation suffered by the respondent, the award of moral damages is but proper. However, this
Court reduces the amount thereof to P300,000.00, for the award of moral damages is meant to
compensate for the actual injury suffered by the respondent, not to enrich her.[145]
Having failed to exercise more care and prudence than a private individual in its
dealings with respondent, petitioner Citibank should be liable for exemplary damages, in the
amount of P250,000.00, in accordance with Article 2229[146] and 2234[147] of the Civil Code.
With the award of exemplary damages, then respondent shall also be entitled to an award of
attorneys fees.[148] Additionally, attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
party.[149] In this case, an award of P200,000.00 attorneys fees shall be satisfactory.
In contrast, this Court finds no sufficient basis to award damages to petitioners. Respondent was
compelled to institute the present case in the exercise of her rights and in the protection of her
interests. In fact, although her Complaint before the RTC was not sustained in its entirety, it did
raise meritorious points and on which this Court rules in her favor. Any injury resulting from the
exercise of ones rights is damnum absque injuria.[150]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, as already
modified by its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, as follows
1. PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are DECLARED subsisting and outstanding. Petitioner
Citibank is ORDERED to return to respondent the principal amounts of the said PNs, amounting
to Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and Thirty-Four
Centavos (P318,897.34) and Two Hundred Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P203,150.00), respectively, plus the stipulated interest of Fourteen and a half percent (14.5%)
per annum, beginning 17 March 1977;
2. The remittance of One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Two US
Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents (US$149,632.99) from respondents Citibank-Geneva accounts to
petitioner Citibank in Manila, and the application of the same against respondents outstanding
loans with the latter, is DECLARED illegal, null and void. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to
refund to respondent the said amount, or its equivalent in Philippine currency using the exchange
Page 174
rate at the time of payment, plus the stipulated interest for each of the fiduciary placements and current
accounts involved, beginning 26 October 1979;
3. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to pay respondent moral damages in the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00); and attorneys fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00); and
4. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her outstanding loans,
which, from the respective dates of their maturity to 5 September 1979, was computed to be in the sum of
One Million Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty Centavos (P1,069,847.40),
inclusive of interest. These outstanding loans shall continue to earn interest, at the rates stipulated in the
corresponding PNs, from 5 September 1979 until payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right
kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is
non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in
September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as
complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence
before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful
kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr.
Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or
incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of
the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the
left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, G.R. No. 177407 The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson
Petitioner, presented his evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as
Present: complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached
NACHURA, to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits A to D, which
Acting Chairperson, she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their
PERALTA, proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,* exhibits, as follows:
VILLARAMA, JR.,** and
MENDOZA, JJ. EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request
form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as
Promulgated: Annex 2 as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City
Respondents. February 9, 2011 Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or
DECISION identical to the certified photocopy of the document
marked as Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated March
NACHURA, J.: 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4,
2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this
complaint;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision[1] dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as
assailed the Orders[2] issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. Annex 3 as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to
1882. x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow. with the criminal complaint filed by the herein
complainant with the said office, on which are
handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical happens to be also the same as or identical to the
Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex 3

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 175

 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as
such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed
by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this complaint.
EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form
dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.
EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form
dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which
are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results
of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the
draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination which
is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to
the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr.
dela Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex 4 is
not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the
document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the
same as that which are written on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons]
formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the
same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended
to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to
prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of
Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was
admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson],
the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein
respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of
[therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the
[BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of
this case.
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the
reception of the evidence of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the
same reasons stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order
dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence
being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the
case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is
relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x
x.[3]
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas)
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY
WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06
DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF
RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH
CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL
LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.[4]
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
completely or finally disposes of the case.[5] At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to
petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding
that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of
whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are
inadmissible.
Page 176
 Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4)
are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible
evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM.[6] Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason
that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn
out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.[8]
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative
weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court
of Appeals[9] teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20,
Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance
with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy
or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical
errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of
either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.[10]
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights
of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were
in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12,
1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Edithas
medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the
examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter
affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the
criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC)
who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits
in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of
her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation, need not be proved as
it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.[11]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth
respecting a matter of fact.[12] Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established
and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
discretionary.[13] Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,[14] include the
structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may
take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most
human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left
non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously
Page 177
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may
be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys,
and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her
abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.[15] Witness Dr.
Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because
[it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building.[16] Ultimately, since the originals cannot
be produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall
determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),[3] a banking entity duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services [4] with HI, a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial
services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after
year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,[5] Leonilo Dayday,[6] Modesto Aguirre,[7] Alejandro
Ardimer,[8] Eleuterio Sacil,[9] Wilfredo Juegos,[10] Petronilo Carcedo,[11] and Cesar
Peciencia[12] were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch
along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.[13]
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City
separate complaints[14] against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation
pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorneys fees and costs. Their
complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor Arbiter
Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper disposition. Subsequently, on 22
August 2001, the petitioners[15] amended their complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay.

SO ORDERED. Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties
still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, G.R. No. 176240 they submit their respective position papers.
MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO ARDIMER,
ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, Present: In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of
PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank
Chairperson, had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do
AZCUNA,* so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION CHICO-NAZARIO, and
4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and NACHURA, JJ. For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an
HELPMATE, INC., independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial
Respondents. and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners wages, monitored petitioners
daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and supervision over the
Promulgated: petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank
could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees.

October 17, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision[1] dated 24 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912, which affirmed the
Decision dated 22 January 2003of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No.
V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a legitimate independent job contractor and that the
petitioners were not illegally dismissed from work; and the Resolution[2] dated 31 October 2006 of the
same court denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the
business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank
was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers
assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July
2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial
requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to
new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not
dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners complaints before the NLRC
were without basis.
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were
regular employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment;
and (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their money claims.
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties position papers and documentary
evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 178

contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually a) Backwages
perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor (same as Paciencia)
Code.[16] HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is = P25,840.00
held liable to petitioners. According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez: b) Separation Pay
March 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not = P190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
only as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an Total = P7,410.00
electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of the = P33,250.00
principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent
Equitable-PCI Banks principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare IV Petronillo Carcedo
that the [petitioners] are employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having
worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1) year, they are a) Backwages
deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment (same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00
without cause and without due process, which is wanting in this case.Hence, the
severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal.[17] b) Separation Pay
Sept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2 = P41,990.00
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez awarded to c) 13th Month Pay
petitioners the following amounts: = P190.00 x 26 days
Total = P4,940.00
I. CESAR PACIENCIA = P72,770.00

a) Backwages V Rolando Sasan, Sr.

July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
= P190.00 per day a) Backwages
= 5 months and 6 days (same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00
= 136 days x P190.00 = P25,840.00
b) Separation Pay
b) Separation Pay October 1989 to July 15, 2001
June 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001 = P190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2 = P29,640.00
= 5 years
=P190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2 =P12,350.00 c) 13th Month Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00
c) 13th Month Pay Total = P60,420.00
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00
Total P43,130.00 VI Leonilo Dayday

II Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended Complaint) a) Backwages

(same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00
a) Backwages
July 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002 b) Separation Pay
same as Paciencia Feb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001
= P25,840.00 = P190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2 = P44,460.00
b) Separation Pay
Feb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001 c) 13th Month Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2 = P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00
Total = P6,175.00 Total = P75,240.00
= P32,015.00
VII Eleuterio Sacil
III Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended Complaint)
a) Backwages

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 179

 (same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00 a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00
b) Separation Pay
June 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001 b) Separation Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2 = P22,230.00 = Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2 = P28,405.00
c) 13th Month Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00 c) 13th Month Pay
Total = P53,010.00 = P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00
Total = P59,185.00
VIII Mario Juntilla
xxxx
a) Backwages
(same as Pacencia) = P25,840.00 WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered directing the respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate,
b) Separation Pay Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants as follows:
October 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2 = P34,580.00 1. Cesar Paciencia - P43,130.00
2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00
c) 13th Month Pay 3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00 4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00
Total = P65,360.00 5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00
IX Wilfredo Juegos 7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00
8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00
a) Backwages 9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00
(same as Pacencia) = P25,840.00 10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00
11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00
b) Separation Pay TOTAL - P606,575.00[18]
July 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2 = P27,170.00
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI
c) 13th Month Pay appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,840.00docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate
Total = P57,950.00
job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not present before
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
X Modesto Aguirre
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of
a) Backwages Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet
(same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00 Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its authorized
capital stock from P1,500,000.00 to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999
b) Separation Pay with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2 = P23,465.00 2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets
of P20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000;
c) 13th Month Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00 3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No.
Total = P54,245.00 GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under the name of HI showing that it
has a parcel of land with Market Value of P1,168,860.00 located along
XI Alejandro Ardimer Rizal Avenue (now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 180

 4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing
that it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot located
along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of P2,515,170.00.[19]
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time
on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient
capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in labor-only contracting.
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows
that barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed on a
temporary off-detail, they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended their
complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their
services were already terminated. Temporary off-detail is not equivalent to
dismissal. x x x.[20]
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrezs award of backwages and separation pay, but
affirmed his award for 13th month pay and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month
pay, to thepetitioners.[21] Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the
following reduced amounts to petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G.
Gutierrez dated 7 January 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and
severally[22] pay the complainants of their 13th month pay and attorneys fees in the
aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two and 00/100
(P43,472.00), broken down as follows:
1. Aguirre, Modesto - P5,434.00
2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.00
3. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.00
4. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.00
5. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.00
6. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.00
7. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.00
8. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00
TOTAL P43,472.00[23]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003.[24]
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a
Petition for Certiorari[25] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79912.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI
was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:
As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent
job contractor, respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. We rule in
the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client
E-PCIBank expired on July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said
expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners new work assignments to
various establishments which are HIs clients. The petitioners, therefore, were
not even placed on floating status. They simply refused, without justifiable
reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal was tantamount
to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are not entitled
to backwages or separation pay.[26]
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003
promulgated on June 22, 2003.[27]
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN
EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISIONS DECISION
AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING
DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS
HONORABLE COURTS PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING
OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY
CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE PREMATURELY FILED.[28]
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues
raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our
jurisprudence is already replete with cases[29] allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented
Page 181
before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of
evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process.[30]
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of
Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor
cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the
interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider
evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit
counter-evidence.[31]
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] we again
emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal,
because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal
as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are
mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v.
NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that
even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious
in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said
evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action
would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the documentary
evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the
best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true
copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court[33] were furnished to the petitioners. Even
assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the
NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and
other documents.[34]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to
refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence presented by HI. Having
failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about these documentary
evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that
HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial of
the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due
process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and to seek
reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen
their positions by presenting their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by
E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case
by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties
evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for
our consideration, particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be
deemed petitioners principal employer; and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their
employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a
principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or
completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless
of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the
premises of the principal.[35] A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or
subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent
business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own
account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and
method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters
connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor
assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational
safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization,
security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.[36]
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the
contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal.[37] In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial
capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its
own account and responsibility; and
Page 182
 (b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or
subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business
of the principal.[38]
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only
contracting,[39] we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,[40] that it is not enough to
show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be
considered include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the
nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to
assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the
employers power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractors workers; the control of
the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and
manner or terms of payment.[41] Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of
the case are to be considered.[42] Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the
relationship are to be considered.[43]
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Certificate of Registration[44] Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate states among other things:
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as
amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number 9042769,
dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended,
and its Implementing Rules specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I
have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on this 23rd day of December
1997.[45]
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was
issued in the regular performance of official duty.[46] In the absence of proof, petitioners bare assertion
cannot prevail over this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for
regulating the business of independent job contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the
contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of
the Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent business
from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform janitorial and messengerial
services, clearly distinguishable from the banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job
contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited labor-only
contracting because it did not possess substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job,
work or service under its own account or responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
Substantial capital or investment refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in
the case of corporations, tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually
and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job,
work or service contracted out.[47] An independent contractor must have either substantial capital
or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The law
does not require both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, etc.[48] It is enough that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven
both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI
has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that it does
not fall within the purview of labor-only contracting.[49] There is even no need for HI to refute the
contention of petitioners that some of the activities they performed such as those of messengerial
services are directly related to the principal business of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the
petitioners as janitors, messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the principal
business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct
of its (E-PCIBANKs) principal business.[50]
HI has substantial capital in the amount of P20,939,935.72. It has its own building
where it holds office and it has been engaged in business for more than a decade now. [51] As
observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established business entity cannot be
considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of
the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power
of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employees conduct. Most
determinative among these factors is the so-called control test.[52]
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee
relationship to wit, the selection and engagement of the employee is shown by the fact that it was
HI which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by the
provision in the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive
discretion in the selection, engagement, investigation, discipline and
discharge of its employees.[53]
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid
petitioners their wages and who provided their daily time records and uniforms and other materials
necessary for the work they performed.Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for petitioners claims
Page 183
for wages and other employees benefits. Precisely, the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank SO ORDERED.
reveals the following:

Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the
salaries, allowances, overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel
including withholding taxes.[54]
[G.R. No. 146586. January 26, 2005]

As to the third requisite on the power to control the employees conduct, and the fourth requisite
regarding the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to control petitioners with
respect to the means and methods by which their work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no power
of dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS, petitioner, vs. JULIA DEL
negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of ROSARIO, MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL ROSARIO, and HEIRS OF
services between E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states: SANTOS DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its
employees who may be fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a DECISION
regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which regular
supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined CARPIO, J.:
in Section 1 hereof. x x x.[55]

All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own The Case
responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of
E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is limited only to the result of the work, independent job
contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of
permissible job contracting. This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the Decision[2] dated 25 September 2000 and the
Resolution dated 29 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43929. The Court
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as of Appeals reversed the Decision[3] dated 7 July 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
in government institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special Branch 8, Malolos (trial court) in Civil Case No. 70-M-92.
services,[56] ranging from janitorial, security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a
legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an employer-employee
relationship between HI and petitioners[57] which renders HI liable for the latters claims.

In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of The Facts
E-PCIBank regardless of how long they were working for the latter.[58]

We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the
Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the
latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not
employees of E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to the non-renewal
of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints with the Labor
Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only off-detail pending their re-assignment by
HI to another client. And when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other
clients,[59] petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners complaint for illegal
dismissal is apparently premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 24 April
2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del
Rosario and the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario (respondents) filed before the trial court a complaint
for Recovery of Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS). Respondents alleged that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters
(Property) situated in Kaypombo,[4] Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in
the name of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register
of Deeds. Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) under DECS
was occupying a portion of the Property through respondents tolerance and that of their
predecessors-in-interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS refused to vacate the premises
despite their valid demands to do so.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 184

 In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPSs occupation of a portion of the Property was with the
express consent and approval of respondents father, the late Isaias Del Rosario (Isaias). DECS claimed
that some time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion (Donated Site) of the Property to the Municipality of Sta.
Maria (Municipality) for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court judge (Judge
Natividad), prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance. KPPS started occupying the Donated Site
in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary educational needs of approximately 60 children between
the ages of 6 and 8. Because of the donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter
Donated Site. In fact, DECS renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.
During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted the existence and
execution of TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit A), Tax Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit B), and the tax receipts in
respondents names for the years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits B-1 and B-2). On the other hand, respondents
admitted the existence of Judge Natividads affidavit that he prepared the deed of donation (Exhibit 1) and
the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipalitys name (Exhibit 2). Since there was no dispute that the
Property was registered in respondents names, the parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS presenting
its evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to the Municipality.
DECS presented three witnesses: Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal De Jesus and Judge Natividad, all
residents of Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The trial court summarized the witnesses testimonies, thus:
Defendant, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, proceeded to present as its first witness,
Ricardo Nicolas, 78 years old, widower, housekeeper and residing at [K]aypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
since 1953 up to the present. He testified that during the duration of his residency in [K]aypombo, he came
across a public elementary school (KPPS); that as far as he knows, the land occupied by the primary
school was formerly owned by Isaias del Rosario who donated said land to the people of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan in 1959; that the act of donating said land was made during a political meeting in his residence by
Isaias del Rosario and in the presence of the then incumbent mayor; he actually saw Isaias del Rosario
and Mayor Ramos sign a document which is a deed of donation in favor of the Municipality of Sta. Maria;
that the signing was made in the presence of Judge Natividad who was then a municipal councilor; that
Isaias del Rosario is now dead but his death occurred long after the construction of the KPPS and that
Isaias del Rosario even witnessed the construction of the primary school.
Vidal de Jesus, the second witness for the defense, 65 years old, married, a barangay councilman of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and presently residing at No. 437 Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
testified that as barangay councilman, he was aware of the land problem of KPPS; that in 1991, the
barangay council and the children of Isaias del Rosario had a meeting in the presence of Judge Natividad,
during which, the latter told the children of Isaias del Rosario that the land had been donated by their father.
The children agreed but requested that the school be renamed after their fathers name; that the barangay
council tried to secure a copy of the deed of donation from the Municipality of Sta. Maria, but according to
the people at the municipal hall, when they transferred to the new municipal building, the deed got lost,
only they were able to get a copy of the tax declaration in the name of the municipality of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan (Exh. 2), a certification to that effect was issued by the municipal mayor (Exh. 3). They went to the
DECS office in Malolos, but could not likewise find a copy of the deed.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The last witness for the defense was Judge Eli Natividad, 63 years old, widower, resident of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He testified that KPPS is very near his house; that the land
occupied by said school is formerly owned by Isaias del Rosario, a close relative; that as far as he
knows, the municipality of Sta. Maria is now the owner of the land; that when he was still one of
the incumbent municipal councilors of Sta. Maria in 1961, his relative Isaias del Rosario went to
his house and told him that he wanted to have a primary school in their place as he saw the plight
of small pupils in their place; that the elementary school then existing was very far from their place
and Isaias del Rosario wanted to have a primary school to help these pupils; that Isaias del
Rosario was willing to donate a portion of the questioned lot for school site, so that said matter
was relayed to the municipal council; he also testified that he prepared the deed of donation which
was signed by Isaias del Rosario in his residence which was accepted by the municipality of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan through a resolution signed in the office of the secretary and the municipal mayor;
that a copy of said resolution could not be found due to the transfer of the municipal hall from the
old to the new building.[5]
Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R. Ignacio and Maria Del Rosario-Esteban,
daughters of the late Isaias. The trial court summarized their testimonies, as follows:
For the plaintiffs, Eugenia R. Ignacio, 59, residing at Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan testified that
she knows the plaintiffs as they are her brothers/sisters; that their father Isaias del Rosario died on
April 18, 1966 long after the construction of the school and that she does not know everything
about the donation because her father never informed them of his dealings and she did not inquire
from him about the occupancy of the lot by the school.
Maria del Rosario-Esteban, 66, residing at Pulang-lupa, Pandi, one of the plaintiffs herein, testified
that she knows the property in question and that they own it by virtue of succession and that she
cannot recall how the school was constructed on the land; that her parents never donated any
property because that is their only property. Also, she stated that their father told them that he just
lent the property temporarily to the municipality and she never found any document conveying the
lot in question to the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[6]
On 7 July 1993, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing respondents complaint for
recovery of possession as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, and for a much greater cause, the instituted
complaint, for recovery of possession of 1,181 square meters of land in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, covered by TCT No. T-222432 against the defendant is hereby DISMISSED without
costs.[7]
The trial court explained its decision in this wise:
Page 185
After a careful consideration of the facts at hand, taking into account the credibility and reasonableness of
the testimonies of the witnesses, the court is of the opinion that the defense was able to prove the due
execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of the same, in accordance with
Rule 130[,] Sec. 4. It is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria, testified
that he was the person who prepared the deed of donation and later notarized the same, and that said
deed was duly executed and signed before him and in his presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the
municipal board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, passed a resolution accepting the deed of donation in favor of the
said municipality. Noteworthy is the rule that a recantation/recollection of witness is a form of secondary
evidence to prove the existence/content of a document. Since the loss of the deed subject matter of this
case was likewise duly proved by the defense, exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy
of the same and without bad faith on its part, this Court is bent to give a greater weight to the secondary
evidence adduced by the defense vis--vis the title in the name of the plaintiff[s], most particularly in this
case, where the plaintiffs failed to make it appear that other and more secondary evidence is known to the
defendant and can be produced by them.
Further judging on the consistency, credibility and personality of the witnesses of the defense, notably
Judge Eli Natividad who was then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria at the time of the execution of the
deed of donation and who is thus in a best position to testify on the matter, not to mention the fact that their
testimonies were all under oath, the Court cannot avoid but give weight to their statements and
declarations. The defense witnesses were not induced by ill motive to testify in favor of the DECS,
considering that they will not derive any personal benefit, material or otherwise, from such an act. On the
contrary, such act may be considered heroic, as it is a manifestation of a moral compulsion to help shed
light to the truth.
On the part of the plaintiffs, it was testified to by Eugenia Ignacio that their father (donor) died on April 18,
1966, long after the school was constructed on the subject land with the occupation of the land by the
school which continued up to the present, and even after the land was allegedly transferred by succession
to the plaintiffs in 1976, it was only now that it comes to the mind of the plaintiffs to seek recovery of the
possession of the same. This, among other things, may be taken to favor the stand of the defense that the
land occupied by the school was in truth, donated to the municipality of Sta. Maria. [8]
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 25 September 2000, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED and another one entered
ordering the defendant to vacate the subject premises.[9]
The appellate court denied DECS motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated 29 December
2000. Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Court of Appeals held that DECS failed to prove the existence and due execution of the
deed of donation as well as the Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The
Court of Appeals was not fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search
of the alleged lost deed of donation. Pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals Decision read:
It is unfortunate that the Deed of Donation and the Resolution were not produced during the trial.
The defendant alleged that these were lost when the Municipality transferred to a new building.
The defendant resorted to proving the documents existence through Sec. 5 of Rule 130 (B) of the
Revised Rules on Evidence by relying on the testimony of the witnesses who were present during
the execution of the lost documents. xxx.
xxx
The Court disagrees with the ruling of the lower court to the effect that the defendant was able to
satisfy the foregoing requisites. The defense was not able to prove the due execution or existence
of the deed of donation and the resolution, as well as the loss of these documents as the cause of
their unavailability.
The Rule requires that the defendant must prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of the witnesses in the order stated.
However, the defendant proceeded with the last resort-testimony of the witnesses, without even
showing any diligent effort to secure a copy of the deed of donation and the resolution. Note that
Atty. Eli Natividad, then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the person who
prepared the deed of donation and later notarized the same. He also affirmed that the municipal
board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan passed a Resolution as he was a municipal councilor at that time
such resolution was passed. He testified that he furnished the municipal government, the Division
Office of Education in Bulacan, the court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed. However, the defendant
only submitted an affidavit showing that the deed can no longer be located in the municipal
government. There was no evidence to show that the defendant looked for a copy from the Clerk
of Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. If it is true that Atty. Natividad notarized the deed, he should have
a copy of it. In fact, such act of notarizing the deed should have been in his notarial register. This
notarial register was supposed to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance
of the province and later, to the Chief of the National Library.
Before secondary evidence of a writing may be introduced on the ground that the instrument has
been lost there must be proof that a diligent search has been made in the place where it is most
likely to be found and that the search has not been successful.
In the case at bar, this Court is not fully satisfied that a search was made or that there was
diligence in the search. The lower court erred in hastily concluding that the loss of the document
was sufficiently established when in fact, the defendant did not look for it in the office of the Clerk
of Court and the National Library. Since there was no diligent search, this Court finds it hard to
Page 186
believe the defendants theory that such documents existed because, for sure, if there really was a
notarized deed or a resolution, there must be a copy.
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted upon the theory that the original cannot be
produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered within a reasonable time by the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Until, however, the non-production of the primary evidence has been sufficiently
accounted for, secondary evidence is not ordinarily admissible.
For this Court to affirm the ruling of the lower court based on testimonies alone will work injustice to the
plaintiffs.[10]
The Issue
In its memorandum, DECS raises the sole issue of
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE OF THE DEED OF DONATION AND
THE RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ACCEPTING THE DONATION, AS WELL AS
THE LOSS OF THE DOCUMENTS AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR UNAVAILABILITY.[11]
The Solicitor General contends that DECS had satisfactorily proven by secondary evidence the fact
of donation, the existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well as the municipal council
Resolution accepting the donation. DECS had also adequately proven the loss of these documents.
According to the Solicitor General, based on the evidence presented in the trial court, DECS established
that Isaias donated a parcel of land to the Municipality as the site of a school. Isaias executed a deed of
donation, which then Atty. Eli Natividad notarized. There was a municipal council Resolution accepting the
donation and expressing gratitude to Isaias. There was notice of this acceptance as DECS constructed the
school on the Donated Site during the lifetime of the donor, without objection on his part. Since all the
essential formalities had been followed, the donation made by Isaias long after the death of his wife Nieves
Gumatay is valid and proven by secondary evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Formal Requisites of Donations of Real Property
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the formalities
stated in Article 749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code). Article 749 of the Civil Code
reads:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but
it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in a
public instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document.[12] The notary public shall certify that he knows the person
acknowledging the instrument and that such person is the same person who executed the
instrument, acknowledging that the instrument is his free act and deed. The acceptance may be
made in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. An acceptance made in a
separate instrument must also be in a public document. If the acceptance is in a separate public
instrument, the donor shall be notified in writing of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact
of such notification.[13]
Best and Secondary Evidence
The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed
of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce
the original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in
which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself.
Simply put, when a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the
original writing itself.
A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the
exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
Page 187
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) xxx;
(c) xxx;
(d) xxx.
In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original
document itself.[14] A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not
only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is
no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best
or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court
proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may
change this order if necessary.[15]
The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the deed of
donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and
that he witnessed the signing of the document. However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during
cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the
document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.[16]
In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus testimony does not help to establish the deed of
donations existence, execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On
cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to the
Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself.[17] If at all, DECS offered Vidal De Jesus
testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the barangay council
tried to get a copy of the deed but the Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was lost
when the municipal office was transferred to a new building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office
in Malolos but this proved futile too.
This leaves us with Judge Natividads testimony. Judge Natividad testified that he prepared and
notarized the deed of donation. He further testified that there was a municipal council Resolution, signed in
the Office of the Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing gratitude to the donor.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
He furnished the municipal government, the DECS Division Office of Bulacan and the clerk of
court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation.
DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the
donation. There is also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the
donor aside from the circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias lifetime
without objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both
instruments.
Sufficiency of Proof of Loss
What mainly militates against DECS claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate
proof that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in the places where the deed of
donation may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful. Prior to the introduction of
secondary evidence, a party must establish the existence and due execution of the instrument.
After a party establishes the existence and due execution of the document, he must prove that the
document was lost or destroyed.[18] The destruction of the instrument
may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, on the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place [or] places where the document or papers of similar character are usually
kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or
who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is
indeed lost.[19]
Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division
Office in Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly lost
when these offices transferred to new locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account
for other copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other
designated government offices.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The law requires
him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary public. The law
specifies the information that the notary public must enter in the notarial register. Failure to
perform this duty results in the revocation of his commission as notary public. We quote the
provisions of the Notarial Law pertinent to the case:
SECTION 245. Notarial register. - Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply
Page 188
a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees
therefor.
Such register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) to any
notary public upon request and upon payment of the actual cost thereof, but officers exercising the
functions of notaries public ex officio shall be supplied with the register at government expense. The
register shall be duly paged, and on the first page, the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) shall certify the
number of pages of which the book consist[s].
SECTION 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the
date of the execution, oath, or acknowledgment or the instrument, the fees collected by him for his
services as notary in connection therewith, and; when the instrument is contract, he shall keep a
correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of
the substance thereof, and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in
each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx
At the end of each week the notary shall certify in his register the number of instruments executed, sworn
to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none, such certificate shall show this fact.
A certified copy of each months entries as described in this section and a certified copy of any
instrument acknowledged before them shall within the first ten days of the month next following be
forwarded by the notaries public to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the province and shall
be filed under the responsibility of such officer; Provided, that if there is no entry to certify for the month,
the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of the certified copies herein required. (As
amended by C.A. 72, Sec. 1.)
SECTION 247. Disposition of notarial register. - Immediately upon his notarial register being filled,
and also within fifteen days after the expiration of his commission, unless reappointed, the notary
public shall forward his notarial register to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the province
or of the City of Manila, as the case may be, wherein he exercises his office, who shall examine the
same and report thereon to the judge of the Court of First Instance. If the judge finds that no irregularity
has been committed in the keeping of the register, he shall forward the same to the chief of the
division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-marks. In case the judge finds that irregularities
have been committed in the keeping of the register, he shall refer the matter to the fiscal of the province -
and in the City of Manila, to the fiscal of the city - for action and the sending of the register to the chief of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-marks shall be deferred until the
termination of the case against the notary public. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Notarial Law mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary
information regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also mandates
the notary public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him when it is a
contract.[20] The notarial register is a record of the notary publics official acts. Acknowledged
instruments recorded in the notarial register are public documents.[21] If the instrument is not
recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the notarial records, the presumption
arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public document.[22]
DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the
notary public should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have
explained the unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also explained
why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals
correctly observed, there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of
Court concerned or from the National Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a finding
that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, preponderance of evidence
means the greater weight of the evidence - or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the
adverse party. This Court is not satisfied that the evidence on the side of the party carrying the
burden of proof is of preponderating weight.
Finally, DECS raises for the first time before this Court the issue on whether respondents
claim is barred by the equitable defense of laches. DECS did not raise this matter in the complaint
or during the trial in the court below. DECS did not also raise this matter in its appeal to the Court
of Appeals. This Court cannot entertain this issue at this late stage, for to do so would plainly
violate the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process. [23]
Much as we sympathize with the plight of the schoolchildren, we do not find reversible error
in the Decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot grant the relief DECS is seeking and disregard
existing laws and jurisprudence. DECS, however, is not without remedy. The government can
expropriate at any time the Donated Site, paying just compensation to respondents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 25 September 2000 and the
Resolution dated 29 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43929 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
B. PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE
Page 189

G.R. No. 182424 September 22, 2014
NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the decision1 and the resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita Carganillo (petitioner). The CA
affirmed, with modification as to penalty, the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
THE CASE
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the
amount of ₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged tobe an "ahente"
or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or
before November 28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed that
for every kilo of palaybought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no
palayis purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner must return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita
within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palayor the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week thereafter,
respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the ₱132,000.00
but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner
before the Fiscal’s Office. Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime of estafawas filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty tothe crime and denied that she entered into a "principal-agent"
agreement with, and received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owedTeresita a
balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996,5 and
that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date and
amount.6 She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita. 7
In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of estafaand
sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment ranging from four (4)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.8 Also, the RTC ordered the petitioner to indemnify Teresita the sum of
₱132,000.00 representing the amount embezzled and to pay the costs of suit.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.10 The CA held that the prosecution properly
established the elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioner’s claim that her agreement
with Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA stated that:
In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998, which-accusedappellant admittedly
signed, is clear inits tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa.
Accused-appellant’s insistence that she signed the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her
admission of "the existence or authenticity of the documentary exhibits x x x" during the
prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and her own testimony x x x.
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioner’s defense that she did not personally receive a
writtenletter of demand from Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as tothe whereabouts
of the money suspected to be misappropriated isalready tantamount to a demand, and that the
petitioner failed to refute Teresita’s claim that she went to the petitioner’s house to ask for the
palayand/or the return of the ₱132,000.00.11
The CA, however, found error inthe RTC’s computation of the penalty and imposed upon the
petitioner an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00 (in excess of ₱22,000.00), equivalent to eleven (11) years, or a total of nineteen (19)
years.12
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raisesthe sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming (with
modification)the judgment of conviction against her, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her
guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she isnot engaged in the business of buying and selling palayand
that the "Kasunduan" between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a simple
money loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because
she never received the ₱132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that "the
offender receives the money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same."
Page 190
 THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision of September 10,
2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of
estafacommitted with abuse of confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission,
orfor administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.13
We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust the
amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palayand misappropriated it when she
failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by
the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement
between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of
₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palaywith the corresponding obligationsto (1) deliver
the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the
₱132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November 28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make palay
purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’
rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention.Thus, when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.14However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of
exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the
following:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
xxxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real
agreement between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not
that of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation with
Teresitawere vague, undated and unsigned.15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who
testified that they saw the petitioner sign the "Kasunduan" were not even certain of the real
transaction between the petitioner and Teresita.16 These findings of fact and evidence, which were
affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this Court. Where the factual findings of
the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb
these findings and to regard them not reviewable by this Court.17
Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she had been the victim of a fraud
becauseTeresita deceived her into signing a blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan,"
even if it had no date and amount written on it, because Teresita led her to believe that the
document would be used merely for show purposes with the bank. 18
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo causante)
inducement to the making of the contract,19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be
sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the
circumstances of each case.21
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her Memorandum 22 to this
Court, she narrated that after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made her
execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she refused to sign. 23 This statement
negates the petitioner’s self-serving allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a
blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible implications of the act of signing a
document.
Page 191
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in accordance with the Chairperson,
law.1âwphi1 We explained in People v. Temporada24 that: - versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
"The prescribed penalty for estafaunder Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded VELASCO, JR., and
exceeds ₱22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is EDITHA C. COQUIA, DOING BRION, JJ.
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from BUSINESS IN THE NAME OF
6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). xxx E. CARDOZO COQUIA ENTERPRISE,
Respondent. Promulgated:

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional July 14, 2008
maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every
₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. xxx To x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions oftime each of which portion shall be deemed to form DECISION
one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure,the maximum period of
prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. TINGA, J.:
The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc.[1] is engaged in the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which is
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by ₱22,000.00, and the
used in both commercial and industrial equipment for thermal and acoustic insulation. In 1993, it
difference shall be divided by ₱10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting
with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed ceased from using silica sand in the manufacture of fiberglass and started using instead recycled
liberally in favor of the accused. xxx"25
broken glass or flint cullets to save on manufacturing costs. [2]
In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, 26 we recognized the "perceived injustice"
brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property,
such as estafa, committed today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eight Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C. Coquia for the purchase of one (1) lot of flint
years ago in 1932. This Court, however, cannot modify these range of penalties in our decisions, as such
action would be an impermissible encroachment upon the power of the legislative branch of government cullets, consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons, at a price of P4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order
and would constitute proscribed judicial legislation.
No. 106211[3] dated 6 October 1994. Several deliveries made by respondent were accepted and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision paid for by petitioner at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo as indicated in Purchase Order No.
dated September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
106211.[4]
CR No. 29371, finding petitioner Nenita Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa penalized
under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

However, on 28 October 1994, petitioner demanded the reduction of the purchase price
SO ORDERED.
from P4.20 per kilo to P3.65 per kilo to which respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under duress.
ACI PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 174466
Petitioner, Petitioner accordingly issued Purchase Order No. 106373[5] explicitly superseding Purchase
Present:
Order No. 106211. Deliveries were again made by respondent on 5, 8 and 12 November

QUISUMBING, J., 1994 under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735,[6] respectively.Petitioner accepted the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 192

deliveries but refused to pay for them even at the reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that The appellate court denied petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration, [10] as well as

the unit price be further reduced to P3.10 per kilo.[7] respondents Urgent Ex Parte Application for Attachment,[11] in its Resolution[12] dated 30

August 2006.
[8]
Respondent then filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner seeking Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Purchase Order No. 106211 is a

payment for the deliveries made under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735, amounting to 46,390 kilos contract of adhesion despite the fact that respondent is an established businesswoman who has

at the renegotiated price of P3.65 per kilo. Respondent further demanded that petitioner be directed to the freedom to negotiate the terms and conditions of any contract she enters into. It stresses that

accept and pay for the remaining deliveries to complete the one (1) lot of flint cullets originally contracted Purchase Order No. 106211 was superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 and that in both

for. contracts, it was made clear to respondent that her assurance of prompt delivery of the flint cullets

motivated the transaction.

On 26 November 1994, three (3) days after the complaint against it was filed, petitioner paid for the flint

cullets under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735 at the unit price of P3.65 per kilo. Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts decision which

compelled it to accept and pay for the deliveries at the price of P4.20 per kilo and at the same

Ruling in favor of the respondent, the trial court ordered petitioner to accept deliveries of the flint cullets required it to pay damages representing respondents alleged unrealized profits. It also alleges

contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said deliveries within ten (10) days that the appellate court erroneously applied Article 21 of the Civil Code despite the existence of

from each delivery at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo. It further directed petitioner to pay P2,540,300.00 in purchase orders which should govern the contractual obligations of the parties.

damages plus interest at the legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint on 23

November 1994 until fully paid. The trial court also awarded respondent attorneys fees in the amount Apart from stating that petitioner appears to have shut down its operations, respondents

of P200,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00 and costs of suit. Comment[13] dated 12 January 2007 merely reiterates her position that Purchase Order No.

106373 was a product of intimidation practiced upon her by petitioner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees,

litigation expenses and costs of suit. In its Decision[9] dated 15 September 2005, the appellate court held
In its Reply[14] dated 22 April 2007, petitioner asserts that its juridical personality continues to
that Purchase Order No. 106211 is a contract of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against
subsist despite the change of its corporate name from ACI Philippines, Inc. to Asia Pacific
petitioner. It also deemed as contrary to the original agreement, which pegged the unit price of flint cullets
Insulation Corporation. It emphasizes that Purchase Order No. 106211 is not a contract of
at P4.20 per kilo, petitioners willful refusal to pay for the deliveries unless the price is reduced, for which
adhesion and should be considered valid and binding considering that the parties voluntarily
petitioner should be held liable.
executed the same and that, furthermore, Purchase Order No. 106211 had already been

superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 193


Petitioner maintains that it did not exercise any intimidation on respondent to force the latter to acquiesce
to the new purchase order and that assuming that it did, the resultant voidable contract was ratified by
respondents delivery of the flint cullets and the fact that the Statement of Account dated 28 October and 16
November 1994 sent by respondent to petitioner already reflected the reduced unit price of P3.65 per kilo.
Petitioner also maintains that it entered into a contract with respondent upon the latters assurance that she
could promptly deliver the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint cullets required by petitioner. However, it
believes that the trial court and the appellate court erroneously refused to receive evidence aliunde to
prove that time was an important element of the agreement.
The Court of Appeals identified the three issues for resolution: (1) whether petitioner may be bound to
accept the deliveries of washed cullets from respondent; (2) what is the unit price applicable; and (3) who
is entitled to damages. Central to these issues is the soundness of the appellate courts pronouncement
that the purchase orders in question are contracts of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed
against petitioner.
A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the
contract, and the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. Through the years, the
courts have held that in this type of contract, the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's
participation being reduced to the alternative to take it or leave it. Thus, adhesion contracts are viewed as
traps for the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect. However, we have also been steadfast
in reminding courts to be careful in their evaluation of allegations of blind adherence to contracts. [15]
There is every indication in this case that respondent, a presumably astute businesswoman who has
dealings with big corporations such as La Tondea as the latters sole buyer of cullets and has the financial
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
savvy to obtain a loan from a bank,[16] gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with full
knowledge. She was, in fact, the one who sought a contract with petitioner upon learning of the
latters need for a supply of flint cullets.Respondent testified:
Q: Could you tell the Court how you were able to get this PO?
A: I went to ACI, sir.
Q: You went to ACI because you have knowledge that they were in need of
flint cullets?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And who told you that ACI is in need of flint cullets?
A: With information, I learned that ACI is in need of cullets, so I went to ACI.
Q: You went to ACI to see a person, who is that person?
A: I went to see ACI that I will deliver cullets, and then I was ordered to go to
the purchasing department, sir.
Q: When you went to ACI, you said to deliver cullets?
A: To sell cullets, sir.[17]
We cannot, therefore, apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in construing the provisions of the
purchase orders in this case. Even the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse side of
the purchase orders, which uniformly provide
1. Acknowledgement by the Vendor to the Purchaser or any delivery
made by the Vendor pursuant to this order shall constitute
acceptance by the Vendor of this order and a contract between the
Vendor and the Purchaser in terms of this order to the exclusion of
all other terms and conditions between them.
2. The Vendor guarantees the goods ordered to be of merchantable
quality and condition and this condition shall apply notwithstanding
any examination of the goods by or on behalf of the Purchaser. Any
stipulation as to the quality of goods is also a condition of any
contract arising from this order. If a sample of the goods has been
Page 194
 made available to the Purchaser then contract arising from this order shall
have contract for sale by sample as well as a contract for sale by
descriptions.
3. The prices stated in this order are firm prices save that any reduction in
price resulting from a reduction in customs duties or sales tax from those in
force at the date hereof is to be allowed to the Purchase in reduction of the
price agreed hereunder.
4. Delivery of the goods must be made at the Purchasers address shown on
the face of this order or as otherwise directed, on a working day between the
hours of 8:00 and 3:30 p.m. Until delivery the goods shall be at the Vendors
risk. Any delivery date shown on this order shall be of the essence of any
contract arising. Delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or
delivery schedule and any quantities delivered in excess of that specified on
the order may be returned by the Purchaser at the Vendors risk and
expense.
5. All goods must be suitably packed or otherwise prepared for delivery to the
satisfaction of the carrier. No charges are to be made for wrapping packing
cartons boxes or crating unless authorized by this order.
6. The Purchaser may without prejudice to any other rights at any time after
delivery of the good reject them if on inspection the Purchaser considers
them not to be in conformity with any contract arising from this order. Goods
rejected will be held at the vendors risk and are returnable at the Vendors
risk and expense.
7. All drawings, blueprints, tools or patterns furnished in connection with this
order at any time, are confidential to the Vendor and Purchaser and shall be
used solely to complete this contract or any other contract relating to the
products between the Vendor and the Purchaser, and for no other purpose,
except with the prior consent in writing of the Purchaser, and shall remain
the property of the Purchaser and be returned to the Purchaser on demand.
The Vendor shall not without the written prior approval of the Purchaser
furnish to any third party any goods for the manufacture of which drawings,
blueprints, tools, patterns, specifications or samples have been supplied to
the Vendor by the Purchaser, or manufacture such articles except for the
Purchaser. This restriction shall continue notwithstanding termination of this
order.
8. The Purchaser reserves the right to cancel or suspend this order or any part
thereof, if the goods are not delivered according to deliveries as specified, or
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
if the Purchaser is unable to accept delivery for any cause beyond
the Purchasers control.
The Purchaser further reserves the right to cancel this order if the goods
are not in accordance with drawings, blueprints, approved samples
or specifications, or are defective in workmanship or material or are
not otherwise satisfactory to the Purchaser.
9. Vendor warrants that the sale to the Purchaser and the use by the
Purchaser of the goods in any way will not infringe any patent,
[trademark], [copyright], industrial design or process of manufacture,
and covenants that Vendor will, at Vendors own expense, upon
demand of Purchaser, investigate and deal with every claim and/or
suit or action, which may be brought against Purchaser or against
those selling or using any goods or products of Purchaser for any
alleged infringement or claim of infringement of any patent,
[trademark], [copyright], industrial design, or process of manufacture
by reason of the sale or use of the goods by the Purchaser and will
pay all costs[,] damages and expenses which Purchaser may
sustain by reason of any such claim and/or suit [or] action.
10. Invoices quoting this Order number and Vendors packing slip
numbers are required for each individual order and shipment, and
shall be mailed to the Purchaser not later than the day of despatch
of the goods. All products shall be accompanied by original packing
slips. Overseas Vendors must render an additional certified invoice
for Philippines Customs purposes. Negotiable bills of lading or
consignment notes properly signed by the Carrier must be attached
to the Vendors invoices.
11. Waiver by the Purchaser of any specific defaults by the Vendor, or
failure of the Purchaser to cancel this order or any part thereof when
such a right arises shall not constitute a waiver by the Purchaser of
any of the conditions of this order except such defaults as are
specifically waived and then only in respect of the actual defaults.[18]
do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in favor of petitioner.
If anything, in fact, Condition 4 above seems to have worked to petitioners disadvantage as it
underpins the refusal of the trial court to accept evidence aliunde to show that time was of the
essence in the transaction. The said condition specifically mentions that the delivery date shown on
Page 195
(the purchase order) shall be of the essence of any contract arising and that delivery must be made in strict reasoned resolution of the issues, without over-reliance on the tenuous application of the rule on

accordance with the order or delivery schedulePurchase Order No. 106211, however, is unusually silent as contracts of adhesion.

to the date the flint cullets are needed.

Coming now to the second purchase order, we find that Purchase Order No. 106211 had indeed

Petitioner remedied this seeming inadvertence by squarely raising the failure of the purchase order to been superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 as the latter plainly states. Respondent testified

express the true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner entered into a contract with respondent conditioned that the deliveries of flint cullets on 28 October 1994 and on subsequent dates were already

upon the latters prompt delivery of flint cullets, as an issue in its Answer with covered by the new purchase order which did indicate the reduced unit price but did not mention
[19]
Counterclaims. Unfortunately, the trial court sustained respondents objection based on the parol the quantity to be delivered. She said:

evidence rule.
Q: And of course you were told by Mrs. Batalon that the PO that will be
issued to you is an open PO?

It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the
Atty. Tanopo:
best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written What do you mean by open PO?

contract is established as the repository of the parties stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the Atty. Buyco:
[20]
It does not indicate the quantity that will deliver.
same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them. This rule,

however, is not without exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may Q: There is no quantity mentioned as to how much you are going to
deliver, you deliver as they come. [I]n other words at P3.65?
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading A: Yes, sir.

the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an Q: So much so that your subsequent deliveries after October 28 is
already on the basis of this PO?
exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should not
A: Yes, sir.
have been so inflexible as to completely disregard petitioners evidence.
Q: Exhibit D?
A: Yes, sir.

Sifting through the testimony of respondent, we find that although she was not given definite days during
Q: Now, your counsel earlier manifested that he filed this complaint on
which she should deliver the flint cullets, she was indeed apprised of petitioners urgent need for large November 24, 1994, it was after November 23, 1994 Mrs.
Coquia [sic] that there were developments that substantially
quantities thereof.[21] Furthermore, petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its affected the allegations in this complaint, like substantial
payments made by you by ACI, Philippines?
materials control manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because

respondent assured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for petitioners production requirements. [22] These Atty. Tanopo:
Counsel may show us, your Honor.
testimonies give us a more complete picture of the transaction between the parties and allow for a more

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 196

 Court:
Counsel may stipulate.
Q: Did the deliveries of invoices no. [901, 719] and 735[,] Exhibits F, F1 and F2
has already been paid by the plaintiff?
Atty. Tanopo:
Admitted, paid at the rate of P3.65.[23]
Clearly, respondent knew, at the time she made the deliveries on 28 October 1994 and thereafter,
that Purchase Order No. 106373 would already govern the transaction. Significantly, payments on these
deliveries were made by petitioner on 26 November and 8 December 1994, after the complaint for specific
performance was filed and without respondent making as much as a whimper of protest against the terms
of the new purchase order or the reduced purchase price indicated therein.
By acquiescing to the new purchase order which no longer indicated a specific quantity of flint
cullets to be delivered, respondent knew or should be presumed to have known that deliveries made
thereafter were no longer meant to complete the original quantity contracted for under Purchase Order No.
106211.
The foregoing leads us to resolve the first and second issues framed by the Court of Appeals in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner accepted deliveries under Purchase Order No. 106211 on 8, 12, 15, 18, 20 and 22
October 1994and paid for these deliveries in accordance with the terms of the purchase order, i.e., at the
contract price of P4.20 per kilo. However, the original contract between the parties evidenced by Purchase
Order No. 106211 was unequivocally novated by Purchase Order No. 106373, thereby extinguishing the
original obligation of petitioner to accept deliveries from respondent until the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint
cullets originally contracted for is filled.[24] Petitioner, therefore, cannot be compelled to accept more
deliveries of flint cullets from respondent to complete the quantity originally contracted for.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
By the same token, petitioner cannot be tied down to the P4.20 per kilo unit price under Purchase
Order No. 106211, nor even to the P3.65 per kilo indicated in Purchase Order No. 106373, the
latter contract not having stated the quantity petitioner is willing to accept delivery of and pay for
under that price.
As regards damages, we find the award thereof to respondent to be without factual
basis. Respondent sought to prove the actual damages she incurred merely through her own
testimony, without adducing any documentary evidence to substantiate her alleged losses. While
she claims that she obtained a bank loan at an interest rate of 21%, respondent did not present any
document to prove the said loan or the use thereof to purchase flint cullets for delivery to
petitioner. Neither did respondent present documents to prove her alleged stock of 1,000 metric
tons of flint cullets for which she allegedly invested P2,500,000.00.
The claim for actual damages in this case should be admitted with extreme caution since
it is based only on bare assertions without support from independent evidence. In determining
actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork
but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual
amount of loss.[25]
Finally, we find the appellate courts citation of Article 21 of the Civil Code misplaced not
only because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the parties which bars the application
of this provision, but more importantly because we do not deem petitioner to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57678 dated 15
September 2005, and its Resolution dated 30 August 2006 are REVERSED. The complaint
Page 197
dated 23 November 1994 filed by Editha C. Coquia against ACI Philippines, Inc. is hereby DISMISSED. No

pronouncement as to costs.

The factual antecedents, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

SO ORDERED.
On September 24, 1994, defendant-appellant Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation (Seaoil, for brevity) purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC
Excavator, Model 1994 from plaintiff-appellee Autocorp Group (Autocorp for
SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 164326 short). The original cost of the unit was P2,500,000.00 but was increased
Petitioner, to P3,112,519.94 because it was paid in 12 monthly installments up
Present: to September 30, 1995. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle
Sales Invoice No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Both
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., documents were signed by Francis Yu (Yu for short), president of Seaoil, on
- versus - Chairperson, behalf of said corporation. Furthermore, it was agreed that despite delivery of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, the excavator, ownership thereof was to remain with Autocorp until the
AZCUNA,* obligation is fully settled. In this light, Seaoils contractor, Romeo Valera,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and issued 12 postdated checks. However, Autocorp refused to accept the
NACHURA, JJ. checks because they were not under Seaoils name. Hence, Yu, on behalf of
AUTOCORP GROUP and PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ, Seaoil, signed and issued 12 postdated checks for P259,376.62 each with
Respondents. Promulgated: Autocorp as payee.

October 17, 2008 The excavator was subsequently delivered on September 26,
1994 by Autocorp and was received by Seaoil in its depot in Batangas.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
The relationship started to turn sour when the first check bounced.
However, it was remedied when Seaoil replaced it with a good check. The
DECISION second check likewise was also good when presented for payment. However,
the remaining 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil
NACHURA, J.: requested that payment be stopped. It was downhill from thereon.

Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining

balance of P2,593,766.20. Hence, on January 24, 1995, Autocorp filed a
complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The trial court ruled for Autocorp. Hence, this
appeal.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72193, which
had affirmed in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, dated
September 10, 2001 in Civil Case No. 64943.
Seaoil, on the other hand, alleges that the transaction is not as
simple as described above. It claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only
utilized as conduits to settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline
Asia (herein referred to as Uniline), in favor of another foreign entity, Focus
Point International, Incorporated (Focus for short). Paul Rodriguez
(Rodriguez for brevity) is a stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 198

 the owner of Uniline. On the other hand, Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil
and is at the same time owner of Focus. Allegedly, Uniline chartered MV Asia
Property (sic) in the amount of $315,711.71 from its owner Focus. Uniline was not
able to settle the said amount. Hence, Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed to settle
the obligation through conveyance of vehicles and heavy equipment. Consequently,
four units of Tatamobile pick-up trucks procured from Autocorp were conveyed to
Focus as partial payment. The excavator in controversy was allegedly one part of the
vehicles conveyed to Focus. Seaoil claims that Rodriguez initially issued 12 postdated
checks in favor of Autocorp as payment for the excavator. However, due to the fact
that it was company policy for Autocorp not to honor postdated checks issued by its
own directors, Rodriguez requested Yu to issue 12 PBCOM postdated checks in favor
of Autocorp. In turn, said checks would be funded by the corresponding 12 Monte de
Piedad postdated checks issued by Rodriguez. These Monte de Piedad checks were
postdated three days prior to the maturity of the PBCOM checks.
Seaoil claims that Rodriguez issued a stop payment order on the ten
checks thus constraining the former to also order a stop payment order on the
PBCOM checks.
In short, Seaoil claims that the real transaction is that Uniline, through
Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to
convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks issued by Seaoil but
which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline. x x x[3]
As narrated above, respondent Autocorp filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property
with Damages and Replevin[4] against Seaoil before the RTC of Pasig City. In its September 10,
2001 Decision, the RTC ruled that the transaction between Autocorp and Seaoil was a simple contract of
sale payable in installments.[5] It also held that the obligation to pay plaintiff the remainder of the purchase
price of the excavator solely devolves on Seaoil. Paul Rodriguez, not being a party to the sale of the
excavator, could not be held liable therefor. The decretal portion of the trial courts Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Autocorp
Group and against defendant Seaoil Petroleum Corporation which is hereby directed
to pay plaintiff:
- P2,389,179.23 plus 3% interest from the time of
judicial demand until full payment; and
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
- 25% of the total amount due as attorneys
fees and cost of litigation.
The third-party complaint filed by defendant Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation against third-party defendant Paul Rodriguez is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Seaoil filed a Petition for Review before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTCs Decision in toto.[6] It held that the transaction
between Yu and Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot alter the sales contract between
Seaoil and Autocorp as this will run counter to the parol evidence rule which prohibits the
introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls
under the exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been sufficiently proven. Moreover, it held
that Autocorps separate corporate personality cannot be disregarded and the veil of corporate
fiction pierced. Seaoil was not able to show that Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline or
that both corporations were utilized to perpetrate a fraud. Lastly, it held that the RTC was correct
in dismissing the third-party complaint since it did not arise out of the same transaction on which
the plaintiffs claim is based, or that the third partys claim, although arising out of another
transaction, is connected to the plaintiffs claim. Besides, the CA said, such claim may be enforced
in a separate action.
Seaoil now comes before this Court in a Petition for Review raising the following issues:
I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in partially applying the parol
evidence rule to prove only some terms contained in one portion of the
document but disregarded the rule with respect to another but substantial
portion or entry also contained in the same document which should have
proven the true nature of the transaction involved.
Page 199
 II Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary

the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.[8]
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in its judgment based on
misapprehension of facts when it declared absence of facts which are contradicted by
presence of evidence on record.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol evidence
III
rule and states:
Whether or not the dismissal of the third-party complaint would have the legal effect of
res judicata as would unjustly preclude petitioner from enforcing its claim against SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement
respondent Rodriguez (third-party defendant) in a separate action. have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
IV successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
Whether or not, given the facts in evidence, the lower courts should have pierced the
corporate veil. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

The Petition lacks merit. We sustain the ruling of the CA.
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
We find no fault in the trial courts appreciation of the facts of this case. The findings of fact of the
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
trial court are conclusive upon this Court, especially when affirmed by the CA. None of the exceptions to
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
this well-settled rule has been shown to exist in this case.
successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills.

Petitioner does not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice but merely argues that the

same does not reflect the true agreement of the parties. However, petitioner only had its bare testimony to
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
back up the alleged arrangement with Rodriguez.
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed

upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.[9]

The Monte de Piedad checks the supposedly clear and obvious link [7] between the documentary
This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule that this case falls
evidence and the true transaction between the parties are equivocal at best. There is nothing in those
within the exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and
checks to establish such link. Rodriguez denies that there is such an agreement.
agreement of the parties. This argument is untenable.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 200

 Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the Hence, petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol

purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous

at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.[10] Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere

verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract,

contract.[11] of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them

when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper

The Vehicle Sales Invoice[12] is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a interpretation of the instrument.[18]

commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to

promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.[13] Business forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice Even assuming there is a shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot be

and the like, are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties made a basis for holding respondents liable therefor.

and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact

transpired.[14] These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of As pointed out by the CA, Rodriguez is a person separate and independent from

evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of Autocorp. Whatever obligations Rodriguez contracted cannot be attributed to Autocorp[19] and vice

contracts.[15] versa. In fact, the obligation that petitioner proffers as its defense under the Lease Purchase

Agreement was not even incurred by Rodriguez or by Autocorp but by Uniline.

The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit

Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not, however, The Lease Purchase Agreement[20] clearly shows that the parties thereto are two

change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The corporations not parties to this case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this Lease Purchase

moment a party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not Rodriguez, that incurred the debt to Focus
[16]
and is subject to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach. Point. The obligation of Uniline to Focus Point arose out of a transaction completely different from

the subject of the instant case.

Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the

outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or It is settled that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its individual
[17]
documentary evidence. stockholders or members, and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions

of the latter.[21] The corporation may not be held liable for the obligations of the persons

composing it, and neither can its stockholders be held liable for its obligation.[22]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 201

 Of course, this Court has recognized instances when the corporations separate personality may
be disregarded. However, we have also held that the same may only be done in cases where the
corporate vehicle is being used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime.[23] Moreover, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
[24]
presumed.
To reiterate, the transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and distinct from that
under the Lease Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil that owes Autocorp, while in the latter,
Uniline incurred obligations to Focus. There was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that
Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations separate personalities were
being used as a means to perpetrate fraud or wrongdoing.
Moreover, Rodriguez, as stockholder and director of Uniline, cannot be held personally liable for
the debts of the corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own. While Section 31 of the
Corporation Code[25] lays down the exceptions to the rule, the same does not apply in this case. Section 31
makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for or assents to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of
[26]
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation. The bad faith or wrongdoing of
the director must be established clearly and convincingly. Bad faith is never presumed.[27]
The burden of proving bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on petitioner, a
burden which it failed to discharge. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to have dismissed the third-party
complaint against Rodriguez on the ground that he was not a party to the sale of the excavator.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Rule 6, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure defines a third-party
complaint as a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
The purpose of the rule is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against
a third party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of
suits.[28] Had it not been for the rule, the claim could have been filed separately from the original
complaint.[29]
Petitioners claim against Rodriguez was fully ventilated in the proceedings before the
trial court, tried and decided on its merits. The trial courts ruling operates as res judicata against
another suit involving the same parties and same cause of action. This is rightly so because the
trial court found that Rodriguez was not a party to the sale of the excavator. On the other hand,
petitioner Seaoils liability has been successfully established by respondent.
A last point. We reject Seaoils claim that the ownership of the subject excavator, having
been legally and completely transferred to Focus Point International, Inc., cannot be subject of
replevin and plaintiff [herein respondent Autocorp] is not legally entitled to any writ of
replevin.[30] The claim is negated by the sales invoice which clearly states that [u]ntil after the
vehicle is fully paid inclusive of bank clearing time, it remains the property of Autocorp Group
which reserves the right to take possession of said vehicle at any time and place without prior
notice.[31]
Page 202
 Considering, first, that Focus Point was not a party to the sale of the excavator and, second, that
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Seaoil indeed failed to pay for the excavator in full, the same still rightfully belongs to Autocorp.

Additionally, as the trial court found, Seaoil had already assigned the same to its contractor for the
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents
construction of its depot in Batangas.[32] Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the transaction
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look
even as it has not complied with its obligation. It cannot be permitted to unjustly enrich itself at the expense
beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
of another.
determine such intent.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the
Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72193 is AFFIRMED.
intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To

hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very
SO ORDERED.
purpose of agreements.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as the May 11, 2005

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 168387 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate

Petitioners, courts Decision reads:

Present: WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed
- versus - Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya,
dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA VELASCO, JR.,
ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
SO ORDERED.[4]
ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, DEL CASTILLO, and
ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, PEREZ, J.
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Bayombong,
Promulgated:
Respondents. August 25, 2010 Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following dispositive portion:

x--------------------------------------------------------x
Accordingly, judgment is rendered:

DECISION

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 203

 1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong
property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of
Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are disqualified to become
tenants of the Lantap property;
3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary,
herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and conditions;
4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering
the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents]
plus such accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly accounted for
with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya
who is also hereby instructed to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts and;
5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until
otherwise modified or dissolved by the appellate body.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two
hectares each. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other is
located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties
that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the husband[7] of respondent
Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor
Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain
loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of
RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the
following description:
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or
less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the
southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public Land,
properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination
0131 E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292. Surveyed under authority of
sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau
of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March
1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No.
159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.[9]
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and contained the
following description:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W., 1150.21 m. from
BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of
2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land;
and on the northwest by Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31E.,
points referred to are marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of Section
12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of
Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and
approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag
Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.[10]
Page 204
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any reference to
either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale[11] described
the property sold as follows:
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x that
certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and
more particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x x Containing an area of
2.000 hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by
Public Land; and on the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by
Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearing true.Declination 013
B. Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292.
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple in
accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto being evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located
but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property. There is no
evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the
petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the
Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other
respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid
rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on
[12]
July 1, 1994.
[13] [14] [15]
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20 and 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, executed
separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located
in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the
Lantap property).[16]
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on
September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated
in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on
September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and almost
seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of
petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution
of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on
respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by
virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their
Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries
thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it
became the owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief that they were
buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the Murong
property. Petitioners also argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was
actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap
property through respondent Nemi.
Page 205

[22]
RBBI answered that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents
Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its
acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.
[23]
OIC-RARAD Decision
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No.
T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD
concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs
referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs
necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof
is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD
declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their
CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong property is to remain as the
tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision[24]
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity of
the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There
being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued
the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the
Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that
they failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs claim that
respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the
Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi,
who is the actual tenant of the Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs
issued to appellants as they are by operation of law qualified beneficiaries over the
landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with
the CARP program implementation; and finally, the Board declares that all
controverted claims to or against the subject landholding must be completely and
finally laid to rest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed
decision is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:
1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona
fide tenant-tillers over the Murong property and therefore they are the qualified
beneficiaries thereof;
2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396
issued in the name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz
respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong
property as valid and legal;
3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold
contract with bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the
latter] being the subject matter of the buy back arrangement entered into between
[respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Incorporated, and other incidental
matters are deemed resolved.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Page 206

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap
property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers indicated
in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents Deed of
Sale expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to them was the Murong
property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus
it should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property. Respondents added that since petitioners are not
the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to their lack of qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that
the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of
the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong
property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the
subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located
in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description
contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly describes the
properties metes and bounds.
Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were separately denied.[28]
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this
Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean hands
because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
they be declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones expense. RBBIs
petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review
on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient showing that
the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this
case.[30]
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.[31] Entry of judgment was made in that case
on December 15, 2004.[32]
On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari, which assailed the
same CA Decision
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition
Page 207
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond the province of Rule for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the appellate courts
[34]
45. decision in favor of the respondents.[37]

The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of their evidence (as We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to

to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies
[35]
evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts authority to review. and errors in the appellate courts decision but simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the

respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule that a petition for
the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.
review should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are (1) when the findings are grounded

entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It is the
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts;
appellants responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of
raises equitable considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
arguments to support his claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact
mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants inadequate
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]
discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.

In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who were not
misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed
parties to RBBIs appeal, especially because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to
below.Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its
articulately and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an
jurisdiction under Rule 45.
adverse decision just because another party had already appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other

First Issue partys separate appeal had already been dismissed.[39]

Dismissal of RBBIs appeal

There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI executed the

Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for

cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 208

involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the parties and their
[40]
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the vendor (in this case
RBBI) has already transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment
[41]
which may be rendered against the vendor.
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between respondents and
RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated
that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the property repurchased
by the respondents was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and RBBI
refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap
property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the subject of the Deed of
Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of the
contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue
that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other
evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred
because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute
regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale
referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to
TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT
No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap
property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was a
typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects their
true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic
ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true
intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other
evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best
Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.[43]
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add
to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually
applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol
Page 209
Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties

and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms. respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in

case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would

are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties and their

successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of

party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a contracts:

right originating in the instrument.[44]

Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall
of Rule 130, Section 9: prevail over the former.

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement; Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening:

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of
agreement of the parties thereto;
an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of
the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.

Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as covered by TCT
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap
No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being located in Barangay Murong. Even
property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the
the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096
petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
(Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put

in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties. Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 210

 land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong property, undisturbed by

We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property, anyone for several long years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997.

and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of

ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position that the

not take possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession of subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been

the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners no contrary evidence of the parties actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap

paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents. property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to

their honest but mistaken belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched

Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property, there is one other considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does

circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi not indicate the particular barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by

(husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap property, without turning over the supposed a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties

landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the are very similar.

owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically ambiguous and

retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants failed to express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their

of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory propounded by the contract.[46] A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the contracting parties

respondents. manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly

We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was obvious that petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners)

the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already the never had any dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to

tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the cover the Murong property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the

Murong property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution of the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that the issue became relevant for the first time.

VLTs.Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying

and tilling it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their payment of the All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI covers

total purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials conducted their the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos.

investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, did not CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In

reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong property and were the qualified consequence, the CAs ruling against RBBI should not be executed as such execution would be inconsistent

beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the with our ruling herein. Although the CAs decision had already become final and executory as against

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 211

RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening This is an appeal under Rule 45 from the Decision[1] dated July 20, 2006 of the Court of

cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83595, which declared the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng

Lupa[2] (Kasulatan) valid as between the parties, but required respondents to return the amount of

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as PhP 50,000 to petitioners. Also assailed is the March 30, 2007 CA Resolution[3] denying

the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The petitioners motion for reconsideration.

January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985

between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while

the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
The Facts
property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary

corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against respondents.
Petitioner Ramon Lequin, husband of petitioner Virginia Lequin, is the brother of
SO ORDERED.
respondent Salome L. Vizconde and brother-in-law of respondent Raymundo Vizconde. With this

consanguine and affinity relation, the instant case developed as follows:

SPS. RAMON LEQUIN and VIRGINIA LEQUIN, G.R. No. 177710
Petitioners,
Present:
In 1995, petitioners, residents of Diamond Court, Brixton Ville Subdivision,
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Camarin, Caloocan City, bought the subject lot consisting of 10,115 square meters from one
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., Carlito de Leon (de Leon). The sale was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. The
NACHURA, and
SPS. RAYMUNDO VIZCONDE and SALOME LEQUIN PERALTA, JJ. subject lot is located near the Sto. Rosario to Magsaysay road in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. Adjacent
VIZCONDE, thereto and located in between the subject lot and the road is a dried up canal (or sapang
Respondents. Promulgated:
patay in the native language).
October 12, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

In 1997, respondents represented to petitioners that they had also bought from Carlito
DECISION
de Leon a 1,012-square meter lot adjacent to petitioners property and built a house thereon. As
VELASCO, JR., J.:
later confirmed by de Leon, however, the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents is part of

The Case the 10,115-square meter lot petitioners bought from him. Petitioners believed the story of

respondents, since it was Raymundo who negotiated the sale of their lot with de Leon. With the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 212

consent of respondents, petitioners then constructed their house on the 500-square meter half-portion of and void ab initio, the return of PhP 50,000 they paid to respondents, and various damages. The

the 1,012 square-meter lot claimed by respondents, as this was near the road.Respondents residence is case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4063.

on the remaining 512 square meters of the lot.

The Ruling of the RTC

Given this situation where petitioners house stood on a portion of the lot allegedly owned by

respondents, petitioners consulted a lawyer, who advised them that the 1,012-square meter lot be On July 5, 2004, after due trial on the merits with petitioners presenting three witnesses

segregated from the subject lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to and respondents only one witness, the trial court rendered a Decision[5] in favor of petitioners. The

respondents 512 square meters thereof. This sale was embodied in the February 12, decretal portion reads:

2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear that respondents paid PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby
512-square meter portion of the subject lot. In reality, the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
petitioners. Actually, it was petitioners who paid respondents PhP 50,000 for the 500-square meter portion
1. Declaring the KASULATAN NG TULUYANG BILIHAN
where petitioners built their house on, believing respondents representation that the latter own the dated February 12, 2000 as NULL and VOID; and

1,012-square meter lot. 2. Ordering the defendants:

(a) to return to the plaintiffs the amount of

In July 2000, petitioners tried to develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS which they have paid in the
simulated deed of sale plus an interest of 12% per
meter lot and the public road. Respondents objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or sapang annum to commence from the date of the filing of this
case;
patay.

(b) To pay the plaintiffs moral damages in the

amount of Php50,000.00;
This prompted petitioners to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the 1,012
(c) To pay exemplary damages of
square-meter lot claimed by respondents. Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to
Php50,000.00;
respondents was the dried up canal or sapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by
(d) To pay attorneys fees in the amount of
respondents really belongs to petitioners. Php10,000.00; and

(e) To pay the costs of suit.

Thus, on July 13, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint[4] for Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Sum
SO ORDERED.[6]
of Money and Damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 in

Cabanatuan City, praying, among others, for the declaration of the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan as null

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 213

 The RTC found the Kasulatan allegedly conveying 512 square meters to respondents to be null
and void due to: (1) the vitiated consent of petitioners in the execution of the simulated contract of sale;
and (2) lack of consideration, since it was shown that while petitioners were ostensibly conveying to
respondents 512 square meters of their property, yet the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to
them and, in fact, they were the ones who paid respondents PhP 50,000. The RTC held that respondents
were guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the above RTC Decision to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The appellate court viewed the case otherwise. On July 20, 2006, it rendered the assailed
Decision granting respondents appeal and declaring as valid the Kasulatan. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED. The
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan dated February 12, 2000 is declared valid. However,
Spouses Raymundo Vizconde and Salome Lequin Vizconde are hereby ordered to
return to the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 without interest.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In reversing and vacating the RTC Decision, the CA found no simulation in the contract of
sale, i.e., Kasulatan. Relying on Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio,[8] the appellate court pointed out
that an absolutely simulated contract takes place when the parties do not intend at all to be bound by it,
and that it is characterized by the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to
produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. It read the sale contract
(Kasulatan) as clear and unambiguous, for respondents (spouses Vizconde) were the buyers and
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
petitioners (spouses Lequin) were the sellers. Such being the case, petitioners are, to the CA, the
owners of the 1,012-square meter lot, and as owners they conveyed the 512-square meter portion
to respondents.
The CA viewed petitioners claim that they executed the sale contract to make it appear
that respondents bought the property as mere gratuitous allegation. Besides, the sale contract
was duly notarized with respondents claiming the 512-square meter portion they bought from
petitioners and not the whole 1,012-square meter lot as alleged by petitioners.
Moreover, the CA dismissed allegations of fraud and machinations against respondents
to induce petitioners to execute the sale contract, there being no evidence to show how petitioners
were defrauded and much less the machinations used by respondents. It ratiocinated that the
allegation of respondents telling petitioners that they own the 1,012-square meter lot and for which
petitioners sold them 512 square meters thereof does not fall in the concept of fraud. Anent the
PhP 50,000 petitioners paid to respondents for the 500-square meter portion of the 1,012-square
meter lot claimed by respondents, the CA ruled that the receipt spoke for itself and, thus, required
respondents to return the amount to petitioners.
On March 30, 2007, the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the above
decision through the assailed resolution. Hence, petitioners went to this Court.
The Issues
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
ERRED IN NOT CLEARLY STATING IN THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION THE FACTS AND LAW ON WHICH THE SAME WERE
BASED;
Page 214
 The trial court found, inter alia, lack of consideration in the contract of sale while the
II
appellate court, in reversing the decision of the trial court, merely ruled that the contract of sale is
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
not simulated. With the contrary rulings of the courts a quo, the Court is impelled to review the
NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND HOW THE LATTER APPRECIATED THE TESTIMONIES GIVEN BY records to judiciously resolve the petition.
THE WITNESSES;

III It is true that this Court is not a trier of facts, but there are recognized exceptions to this
general rule, such as when the appellate court had ignored, misunderstood, or misinterpreted
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case; or
FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE
RESPONDENT-VIZCONDES; when its findings were totally devoid of support; or when its judgment was based on a
misapprehension of facts.[10]
IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN As may be noted, the CA, without going into details, ruled that the contract of sale was
CONSIDERING THAT THE KASULATAN NG BILIHANG TULUYAN IS A VALID
not simulated, as it was duly notarized, and it clearly showed petitioners as sellers, and
CONTRACT OF SALE;
respondents as buyers, of the 512-square meter lot, subject matter of the sale. But the CA
V
misappreciated the evidence duly adduced during the trial on the merits.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT HAVE THE FINANCIAL
CAPACITY TO PURCHASE THE SUBJECT LAND FROM THE PETITIONERS.[9]

As established during the trial, petitioners bought the entire subject property consisting
of 10,115 square meters from Carlito de Leon. The title of the subject property was duly
transferred to petitioners names.Respondents, on the other hand, bought the dried up canal
consisting of 1,012 square meters from de Leon. This dried up canal is adjacent to the subject

The Courts Ruling property of petitioners and is the lot or area between the subject property and the public road
(Sto. Rosario to Magsaysay).

The petition is meritorious.

The affidavit or Sinumpaang Salaysay[11] of de Leon attests to the foregoing
facts. Moreover, de Leons testimony in court confirmed and established such facts. These were
The issues boil down to two core questions: whether or not the Kasulatan covering the 512
neither controverted nor assailed by respondents who did not present any countervailing
square-meter lot is a valid contract of sale; and who is the legal owner of the other 500 square-meter lot.
evidence.

We find for petitioners.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 215

 Before this factual clarification was had, respondents, however, made a claim against petitioners
in 1997when subject lot was re-surveyed by petitionersthat respondents also bought a 1,012 square-meter
lot from de Leon. Undeniably, the 1,012 square meters was a portion of the 10,115 square meters which
de Leon sold to petitioners.
Obviously, petitioners respected respondents claimif not, to maintain peace and harmonious
relationsand segregated the claimed portion. Whether bad faith or ill-will was involved or an honest
erroneous belief by respondents on their claim, the records do not show. The situation was further
complicated by the fact that both parties built their respective houses on the 1,012 square-meter portion
claimed by respondents, it being situated near the public road.
To resolve the impasse on respondents claim over 1,012 square meters of petitioners property
and the latters house built thereon, and to iron out their supposed respective rights, petitioners consulted a
notary public, who advised and proposed the solution of a contract of sale which both parties consented to
and is now the object of the instant action. Thus, the contract of sale was executed on February 12, 2000
with petitioners, being the title holders of the subject property who were ostensibly selling to respondents
512 square meters of the subject property while at the same time paying PhP 50,000 to respondents for
the other 500 square-meter portion.
From the above considerations, we conclude that the appellate courts finding that there was no
fraud or fraudulent machinations employed by respondents on petitioners is bereft of factual evidentiary
support. We sustain petitioners contention that respondents employed fraud and machinations to induce
them to enter into the contract of sale. As such, the CAs finding of fact must give way to the finding of the
trial court that the Kasulatan has to be annulled for vitiated consent.
Anent the first main issue as to whether the Kasulatan over the 512-square meter lot is voidable
for vitiated consent, the answer is in the affirmative.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other,
to give something or to render some service.[12] For a contract to be valid, it must have three
essential elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.
The requisites of consent are (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. In De Jesus v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[13] it was explained that intelligence in consent is vitiated by error,
freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence, and spontaneity by fraud.
Article (Art.) 1330 of the Civil Code provides that when consent is given through fraud,
the contract is voidable.
Tolentino defines fraud as every kind of deception whether in the form of insidious
machinations, manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of leading
another party into error and thus execute a particular act.[14] Fraud has a determining influence on
the consent of the prejudiced party, as he is misled by a false appearance of facts, thereby
producing error on his part in deciding whether or not to agree to the offer.
One form of fraud is misrepresentation through insidious words or machinations. Under
Art. 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of
the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which without them he would
not have agreed to. Insidious words or machinations constituting deceit are those that ensnare,
entrap, trick, or mislead the other party who was induced to give consent which he or she would
not otherwise have given.
Deceit is also present when one party, by means of concealing or omitting to state
material facts, with intent to deceive, obtains consent of the other party without which, consent
could not have been given. Art. 1339 of the Civil Code is explicit that failure to disclose facts when
there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes
fraud.
Page 216
 Na kaming magasawang Ramon Lequin at Virginia R. Lequin,
nawang may sapat na gulang, pilipino at nakatira sa 9 Diamond Court,
Brixton Ville Subdivision, Camarin, Kalookan City, alang-alang sa halagang
LABINGLIMANG LIBONG PISO (P 15,000.00) salaping pilipino
na binayaran sa amin ng buong kasiyahang loob namin ng
From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud is present in this case. The sale between magasawang Raymundo Vizconde at Salome Lequin, nawang may sapat
petitioners and de Leon over the 10,115 square-meter lot was negotiated by respondent Raymundo na gulang, pilipino at nakatira sa Sto. Rosario, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, ay amin
naman ngayon inilipat, ibinigay at ipinagbili ng bilihang tuluyan sa naulit na
Vizconde. As such, Raymundo was fully aware that what petitioners bought was the entire 10,115 square magasawang Raymundo Vizconde at Salome Lequin, at sa kanilang mga
meters and that the 1,012-square meter lot which he claims he tagapagmana ang x x x.[15]
also bought from de Leon actually forms part of petitioners lot. It cannot be denied by respondents that the
lot which they actually bought, based on the unrebutted testimony and statement of de Leon, is the dried
On its face, the above contract of sale appears to be supported by a valuable
up canal which is adjacent to petitioners 10,115-square meter lot. Considering these factors, it is clear as
consideration. We, however, agree with the trial courts finding that this is a simulated sale and
day that there was deception on the part of Raymundo when he misrepresented to petitioners that the
unsupported by any consideration, for respondents never paid the PhP 15,000 purported
1,012-square meter lot he bought from de Leon is a separate and distinct lot from the 10,115-square meter
purchase price.
lot the petitioners bought from de Leon. Raymundo concealed such material fact from petitioners, who
were convinced to sign the sale instrument in question and, worse, even pay PhP 50,000 for the 500
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence gives both the general rule and
square-meter lot which petitioners actually own in the first place.
exception as regards written agreements, thus:

There was vitiated consent on the part of petitioners. There was fraud in the execution of the
contract used on petitioners which affected their consent. Petitioners reliance and belief on the wrongful
claim by respondents operated as a concealment of a material fact in their agreeing to and in readily
executing the contract of sale, as advised and proposed by a notary public. Believing that Carlito de Leon
indeed sold a 1,012-square meter portion of the subject property to respondents, petitioners signed the
contract of sale based on respondents representations. Had petitioners known, as they eventually would
sometime in late 2000 or early 2001 when they made the necessary inquiry from Carlito de Leon, they
would not have entered or signed the contract of sale, much less pay PhP 50,000 for a portion of the
subject lot which they fully own. Thus, petitioners consent was vitiated by fraud or fraudulent machinations
of Raymundo. In the eyes of the law, petitioners are the rightful and legal owners of the subject 512
square-meter lot anchored on their purchase thereof from de Leon. This right must be upheld and
protected.
On the issue of lack of consideration, the contract of sale or Kasulatan states that respondents
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills.

paid petitioners PhP 15,000 for the 512-square meter portion, thus: The second exception provided for the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the
instant case. Lack of consideration was proved by petitioners evidence aliunde showing that

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 217

the Kasulatan did not express the true intent and agreement of the parties. As explained above, said sale
contract was fraudulently entered into through the misrepresentations of respondents causing petitioners
vitiated consent.
Moreover, the evidence of petitioners was uncontroverted as respondents failed to adduce any
proof that they indeed paid PhP 15,000 to petitioners. Indeed, having asserted their purchase of the
512-square meter portion of petitioners based on the Kasulatan, it behooves upon respondents to prove
such affirmative defense of purchase. Unless the party asserting the affirmative defense of an issue
sustains the burden of proof, his or her cause will not succeed. If he or she fails to establish the facts of
which the matter asserted is predicated, the complainant is entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her
favor.[16]
In the instant case, the record is bereft of any proof of payment by respondents and, thus, their
affirmative defense of the purported purchase of the 512-square meter portion fails. Thus, the clear finding
of the trial court:
Anent the second issue, the PhP 50,000 paid by petitioners to respondents as
consideration for the transfer of the 500-square meter lot to petitioners must be restored to the
latter. Otherwise, an unjust enrichment situation ensues. The facts clearly show that the
500-square meter lot is legally owned by petitioners as shown by the testimony of de Leon;
therefore, they have no legal obligation to pay PhP 50,000 therefor. Art. 22 of the Civil Code
provides that every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him. Considering that the 512 square-meter lot on which
respondents house is located is clearly owned by petitioners, then the Court declares petitioners
legal ownership over said 512 square-meter lot. The amount of PhP 50,000 should only earn
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of complaint up to finality of
judgment and not 12% since such payment is neither a loan nor a forbearance of credit.[20] After
finality of decision, the amount of PhP 50,000 shall earn interest of 12% per annum until fully paid.

2. x x x [I]t was established by the plaintiffs [petitioners] that they were the
ones who paid the defendants the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php50,000.00) and execute a deed of sale also in favor of the defendants. In a
simple logic, where can you find a contract that a VENDOR will convey his real
property and at the same time pay the VENDEE a certain amount of money without
receiving anything in return?[17]
The award of moral and exemplary damages must be reinstated in view of the fraud or
fraudulent machinations employed by respondents on petitioners. The grant of damages in the
concept of attorneys fees in the amount of PhP 10,000 must be maintained considering that
petitioners have to incur litigation expenses to protect their interest in conformity to Art.
2208(2)[21] of the Civil Code.

There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element of
Considering that respondents have built their house over the 512-square meter portion
consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has
legally owned by petitioners, we leave it to the latter what course of action they intend to pursue in
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab
relation thereto. Such is not an issue in this petition.
initio for lack of consideration.[18] Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the price is
simulated, the sale is void, also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision
the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made. [19]
dated July 20, 2006 and Resolution dated March 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83595 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC, Branch 28 in Cabanatuan City in
Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of sale. Where a partys consent
Civil Case No. 4063 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fifty thousand
to a contract of sale is vitiated or where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price, the contract
pesos (PhP 50,000) which respondents must return to petitioners shall earn an interest of 6% per
is null and void ab initio.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 218

 4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way
annum from the date of filing of the complaint up to the finality of this Decision, and 12% from the date of
1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m.
wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision.1
No pronouncement as to costs.

Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots.
SO ORDERED. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition
an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that
continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this
easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
G.R. No. 185240 January 20, 2010

Roughly, the lots including the easement of right of way would take the following
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON, Petitioners,
configurations,2 not drawn here to accurate size and proportion but illustrative of their relative
vs.
locations:
SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the admissibility of testimony that tends to modify a written agreement among the
parties and the extinction of the easement of right of way upon consolidation in one person of the
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates.

The Facts and the Case

Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion, Mandaue City.
Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos
executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among
themselves as follows:

1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m.
wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;

2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide
along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified
their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its
place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the
southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street. 3 Thus:

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 219


Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that
Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her
husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. One
garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of
right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this alley cemented and gated.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and
E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They
also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons
lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an
action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue against the Salimbangons in Civil Case MAN-3223
for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary
injunction.4 The Salimbangons filed their answer with counterclaims.
After hearing or on February 9, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, upholding the Salimbangons’ easement
of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The court pointed out that the
easement in this case was established by agreement of the parties for the benefit of Lots A, D, and E.
Consequently, only by mutual agreement of the parties could such easement be extinguished. The RTC
declined, however, to award damages to the Salimbangons.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 73468. On July 27, 2007 the
CA5 reversed the RTC decision, extinguished the easement of right of way established on the alley in Lot
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
B of the Tans, and denied the Salimbangons’ claim for damages. The court ruled that based on
the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of the parties was to
establish that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and E.
Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the easement
ceased to have any purpose and became extinct. The Salimbangons filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its resolution of October 14, 2008. This prompted
them to file the present petition.
Questions Presented
Two questions are presented:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule
Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement of
right of way as against what they stated in their written agreement; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the easement of right of way established by the
partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished.
The Court’s Ruling
One. The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony
that the heirs had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the
interior Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made
Lot A, now owned by the Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement. Thus:
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road
right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the
subdivision;6 (Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony
that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.
But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
Page 220
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5
meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E
to the street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that
they contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right
to use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to
give Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing
the street.1avvphi1
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of
right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.8 The existence of a dominant estate and
a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.

Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they Secondly, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5
alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the easement meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these lots were
was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. The complaint thus said: already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that
cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place
So that in the same partition instrument, the said heirs voluntarily agreed to establish the so-called imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B.
"perpetual and gratuitous easement of road right of way" along LOT A, with 1.50 meters wide and along
LOT B, with the same 1.50 meters wide. Although the "cancellation" document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of
the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the
Understandably, this servitude voluntarily constituted on LOTS A and B was had for the benefit and use by Salimbangons but also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B.
the owners of LOTS D (Guillermo Ceniza, Jr.) and E (defendant Victoria Ceniza Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist that their right as dominant estate under the original
Salimbagon).7 (Underscoring supplied) partition agreement remains, then that would be partly on a 1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and
partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley
established entirely on Lot B.
Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were entitled to introduce evidence to establish the true
intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the partition agreement literally
provided. The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to
abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the
street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the
At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo
ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the
Ceniza’s testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to have been extinguished by operation of law. 9
agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their
right to now question such testimony on appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS in all respects the decision dated
July 27, 2007 and resolution dated October 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
Two. The Salimbangons point out that the partition agreement among the heirs established in their favor, 73468.
as owners of Lot A, an easement of right of way on Lot B from the interior of their lot to the city street.
Since theirs was an easement established by agreement of the parties, only by mutual agreement could
the same be extinguished. SO ORDERED.

But, firstly, as Eduardo Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the establishment of an 3.TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct access to the street,
namely Lots D and E. His testimony made sense.1avvphi1 A. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 221


G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG", appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of June 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65
in Criminal Case No. 241, finding appellant Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and holding him civilly liable in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Information dated April 16, 1997 filed against appellant reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of August, 1996, at Barangay Bical, Municipality of Bulan, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, armed
with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Evelyn Canchela against her will and without her consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1997,3 appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo
Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care
and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant,
at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.4
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing,5 leaving Evelyn with
appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, 6 and soon
after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. 7 As he poked at her an object which to
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Evelyn felt like a knife,8 he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. 9 His lust satisfied,
appellant fell asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not
believe her and in fact she scolded her.10
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter
from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in
Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to
appellant’s home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as
she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General
Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed
pregnant.11 She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that
appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.12
In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a criminal
complaint against appellant. The police in Bulan, however, advised them to first have Evelyn
examined. Obliging, the two repaired on February 24, 1997 to the Municipal Health Office of Bulan,
Sorsogon where Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo.13 The Medico-legal Report
revealed the following findings, quoted verbatim:
FINDINGS: LMP [last menstrual period]: Aug. 96 ?
Abd [abdomen]: 7 months AOG [age of gestation]
FHT [fetal heart tone]: 148/min
Presentation: Cephalic
Hymen: old laceration at 3, 5, 7, & 11 o’clock position14
On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation Section of the Bulan Municipal Police
Station before which they executed their sworn statements.15
Page 222
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape 16 against appellant
before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.
In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a girl, Joana Canchela, at Guruyan, Juban,
Sorsogon.17
Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind is not
normal,"18 she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her."19
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision, convicted appellant as
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Salvador Golimlim having been found guilty of the crime of
RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as amended by RA 7659) beyond reasonable doubt is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the offended party Evelyn Canchela in the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damage[s], and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence, the present appeal, appellant assigning to the trial court the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
CONTRADICTORY AND IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY OF EVELYN CANCHELA, A MENTAL
RETARDATE, [AND]
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.21
Appellant argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus
engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.
In giving credence to Evelyn’s testimony and finding against appellant, the trial court made the following
observations, quoted verbatim:
1) Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was consistent in her claim that her Papay Badong
(accused Salvador Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and was the author of her pregnancy, and
nobody else (See: For comparison her Sworn Statement on p. 3/Record; her narration in the Psychiatric
Report on pp. 47 & 48/Record; the TSNs of her testimony in open court);
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
2) She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped her only once;
3) That the contradictory statements she made in open court relative to the details of how she was
raped, although would seem derogatory to her credibility and reliability as a witness under normal
conditions, were amply explained by the psychiatrist who examined her and supported by her
findings (See: Exhibits F to F-2);
4) Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her (which is still subject to question
considering that the victim could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact remains that she
never pointed to anybody else as the author of her pregnancy, but her Papay Badong. Which only
shows that the trauma that was created in her mind by the incident has remained printed in her
memory despite her weak mental state. Furthermore, granting for the sake of argument that other
men also laid on top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that her Papay Badong (the
accused) had sexual intercourse with her.22
The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is, as has repeatedly been
held by this Court, accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence
including the demeanor of the witnesses.23
In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings
of the trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony
bereft of truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they
are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
Page 223
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles,24 where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private
complainant’s testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and
ambiguity," this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental
condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no
matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter
can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. 25
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to
relate what he or she knows.26 If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.27
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a
witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person
available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence. 28
Thus, in a long line of cases,29 this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on
statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To
be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the
Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental
retardation with an IQ of 46,30 she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
Thus the doctor testified:
Q: So do you try to impress that although she answers in general terms it does not necessarily mean that
she might be inventing answers – only that she could not go to the specific details because of dullness?
A: I don’t think she was inventing her answer because I conducted mental status examination for three (3)
times and I tried to see the consistency in the narration but very poor (sic) in giving details.
xxx
Q: May we know what she related to you?
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A: She related to me that she was raped by her uncle ‘Tatay Badong’. What she mentioned was
that, and I quote: ‘hinila ang panty ko, pinasok ang pisot at bayag niya sa pipi ko’. She would
laugh inappropriately after telling me that particular incident. I also tried to ask her regarding the
dates, the time of the incident, but she could not really…. I tried to elicit those important things, but
the patient had a hard time remembering those dates.
Q: But considering that you have evaluated her mentally, gave her I.Q. test, in your honest opinion,
do you believe that this narration by the patient to you about the rape is reliable?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you consider that reliable?
A: Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of her answers during the
time of the testing. She was not even hesitating when she told me she was raped once at home by
her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me about how it was done on (sic) her.
So, although she may be inappropriate but (sic) she was spontaneous, she was consistent.
Q: Now, I would like to relate to you an incident that happened in this Court for you to give us your
expert opinion. I tried to present the victim in this case to testify. While she testified that she was
raped by her uncle Badong, when asked about the details, thereof, she would not make (sic) the
detail. She only answered ‘wala’ (no). I ask this question because somehow this seems related to
your previous evaluation that while she gave an answer, she gave no detail. Now, I was thinking
because I am a man and I was the one asking and the Judge is a man also. And while the mother
would say that she would relate to her and she related to you, can you explain to us why when she
was presented in court that occurrence, that event happened?
A: There are a lot of possible answers to that question; one, is the court’s atmosphere itself. This
may have brought a little anxiety on the part of the patient and this inhibits her from relating some
of the details relative to the incident-in-question. When I conducted my interview with the patient,
there were only two (2) of us in the room. I normally do not ask this question during the first
session with the patient because these are emotionally leading questions, and I do not expect the
patient to be very trusting. So, I usually ask this type of questions during the later part of my
examination to make her relax during my evaluation. So in this way, she will be more cooperative
with me. I don’t think that this kind of atmosphere within the courtroom with some people around,
this could have inhibited the patient from answering questions.
xxx
Q: What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else, will she be able to answer the
questions?
Page 224
A: Yes, she may be able to answer the questions, but you would notice the inconsistency of the answers A: Because then I was left at Mamay Bita’s house, although I am not there now.
because what we normally do is that we present the questions in different ways, and we expect the same
answer. This is how we try to evaluate the patient. If the person, especially a retarded, is being coached by Q: And that house where you were left is also the house of your Papay Badong?
somebody, the answers will no longer be consistent.

A: Yes ma’am.
Q: You also mentioned a while ago that the answers given by the patient, taken all in all, were consistent?

Q: What did Salvador Golimlim or your Papay Badong do to you that’s why you were able to say
A: Yes, sir.31 (Underscoring supplied) that he is the father of your child?

As noted in the above-quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent A: I was undressed by him.
answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions which do not inhibit her from
answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court, upon examination by a
female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the proceedings, on Dr. Belmonte’s xxx
suggestion,32 how, as quoted below, she was raped and that it was appellant who did it:
Q: What did you do after you were undressed?
Q: Lorna Hachero testified before this Court that you gave birth to a baby girl named Johanna, is this true?
A: I was scolded by the wife, Mamay Bita.
A: (The witness nods, yes.)
Q: I am referring to that very moment when you were undressed. Immediately after your Papay
xxx Badong undressed you, what did you do?

Q: Who is the father of Johanna? xxx

A: Papay Badong A: He laid on top of me.

Q: Who is this Papay Badong that you are referring to? Q: What was your position when he laid on top of you?

A: The husband of Mamay Bita. A: I was lying down.

Q: Is he here in court? Q: Then after he went on top of you, what did he do there?

A: He is here. A: He made (sic) sexual intercourse with me.

Q: Please look around and point him to us. Q: When you said he had a (sic) sexual intercourse with you, what did he do exactly?

A: (The witness pointing to the lone man sitting in the first row of the gallery wearing a regular prison A: He kissed me.
orange t-shirt who gave his name as Salvador Golimlim when asked.)
Q: Where?
Q: Why were you able to say that it is Papay Badong who is the father of your child Johanna?

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 225

A: On the cheeks (witness motioning indicating her cheeks). Q: Did you feel anything when he inserted into your vagina when your Papay Badong laid on top
of you?
Q: What else did he do? Please describe before this Honorable Court the sexual intercourse which you are
referring to which the accused did to you. A: His sexual organ/penis.

A: ‘Initoy’ and he slept after that. Q: How did you know that it was the penis of your Papay Badong that was entered into your
vagina?
(to Court)
A: It was put on top of me.
Nevertheless, may we request that the local term for sexual intercourse, the word ‘Initoy’ which was used
by the witness be put on the record, and we request judicial notice of the fact that ‘initoy’ is the local term Q: Did it enter your vagina?
for sexual intercourse.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
Q: What did you feel when your Papay Badong had sexual intercourse with you?
Q: Madam Witness, is it true that your Papay Badong inserted his penis into your vagina or sexual
A: I felt a knife; it was like a knife. organ during that time that he was on top of you?

Q: Where did you feel that knife? A: (The witness nods, yes.)33 (Underscoring supplied)

A: I forgot. Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who
Q: Why did you allow your Papay Badong to have sexual intercourse with you? convincingly identified him as her rapist.34

A: I will not consent to it. In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659 (the law in force when the crime was committed in 1996), the trial court did not specify under
which mode the crime was committed. Under the said article, rape is committed thus:
xxx

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
Q: Did you like what he did to you? a woman under any of the following circumstances.

A: I do not want it. 1. By using force or intimidation;

Q: But why did it happen? 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

A: I was forced to. 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

xxx The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 226

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua or death.
xxx
It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape
which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the
victim for conviction.35The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the Information
and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and intimidation
attended the commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the Information, was adequately
proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a retardate being different from those of a normal
person, the degree of force needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force which may
not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an
imbecile.36
Still under the above-quoted provision of Art. 335 of the Rev ised Penal Code, when the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the case
at bar, however, although there is adequate evidence showing that appellant indeed used force and
intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a deadly weapon.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65 in
Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant, Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong," GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, which this Court finds to have been committed under paragraph 1, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President.
It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among
others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the
process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of
the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses
the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public
interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate
a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of
government. In this task, this Court should neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the
co-equal and coordinate branches of government nor allow any of them to overstep the
boundaries set for it by our Constitution. The competing interests in the case at bar are the claim
of executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and the respondent Senate Committees’
assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other. The particular facts and
circumstances of the present case, stripped of the politically and emotionally charged rhetoric
from both sides and viewed in the light of settled constitutional and legal doctrines, plainly lead to
the conclusion that the claim of executive privilege must be upheld.
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"),
granting the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,1 Trade and Commerce,2 and
National Defense and Security (collectively the "respondent Committees"). 3
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for
about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN
Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC")
to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive
privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, 5 and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve it.6
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
Page 227
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense
with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. 7The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita
pertinently stated:
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege
(Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining
the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and
policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations
and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the
President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not
protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour
hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions
involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE /
NBN project be dispensed with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the
show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007,
in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters
to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request
for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008;
In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on
the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He insisted that
he had not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his
willingness to testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did not respond to his request
for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he previously filed
with this Court on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent
Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt and
directed his arrest and detention.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4,
2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated
January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege;
and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications as falling
under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential
and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the
President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that respondent
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) there
was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the
questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the
proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, anchored
on the following grounds:
I
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE
ASSAILED ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND NOT MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT
FUNCTIONS.
Page 228
 II
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE CAN BE NO PRESUMPTION THAT
THE INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS PRIVILEGED.
III
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL
BASIS TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE SUBJECT THREE (3)
QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED
CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.
B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE DECISION IS APPLIED,
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE ARE PRESENT.
C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A COMPELLING NEED TO JUSTIFY
THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE WOULD
SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE RESPONDENTS’ PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY FUNCTION TO
ENACT LAWS.
E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH
THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
IV
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, RESPONDENTS DID NOT COMMIT
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED CONTEMPT ORDER, CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN SENATE V.
ERMITA.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR
INTERNAL RULES.
D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE VI, SECTION
21 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE BE DULY
PUBLISHED, AND WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERED THE
OSG’S INTERVENTION ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT GIVING RESPONDENTS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.
E. RESPONDENTS’ ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY OR
PRECIPITATE.
In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees with exaggerating and distorting the
Decision of this Court. He avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees
from investigating the NBN Project or asking him additional questions. According to petitioner, the
Court merely applied the rule on executive privilege to the facts of the case. He further submits the
following contentions: first, the assailed Decision did not reverse the presumption against
executive secrecy laid down in Senate v. Ermita; second, respondent Committees failed to
overcome the presumption of executive privilege because it appears that they could legislate even
without the communications elicited by the three (3) questions, and they admitted that they could
dispense with petitioner’s testimony if certain NEDA documents would be given to them; third, the
requirement of specificity applies only to the privilege for State, military and diplomatic secrets, not
to the necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential communications privilege; fourth,
there is no right to pry into the President’s thought processes or exploratory exchanges; fifth,
petitioner is not covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the Court has the power and duty to
annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the
present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Rules)
has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, the requirement for a witness to be furnished advance copy
of questions comports with due process and the constitutional mandate that the rights of
witnesses be respected; and ninth, neither petitioner nor respondent has the final say on the
matter of executive privilege, only the Court.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical
pronouncement from the Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees
pursuant to their oversight function; hence, there is no reason for them "to make much" of the
distinction between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of the Constitution; (2) presidential
communications enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v.
Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3) the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all the elements of the
presidential communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad testificandum issued by
respondent Committees to petitioner is fatally defective under existing law and jurisprudence; (5)
the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6) respondent
Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order.
Page 229
Incidentally, respondent Committees’ objection to the Resolution dated March 18, 2008 (granting the
Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum) only
after the promulgation of the Decision in this case is foreclosed by its untimeliness.
The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective contentions of the opposing parties are as follows:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal
system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
I extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
Presidential Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are
presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court
erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential communications
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege
was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain
types of information which the government may withhold from the public, 16" that there is a "governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters";17 and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings."18
Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal
interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true
intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to,
but the decision must be considered in its entirety.19
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining
in Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464,
Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United
States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept,
a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the
duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the
"exemption" being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464,
solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive
official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt
from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege
given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise:
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that
a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only
to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official.
These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Page 230
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which
is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President
the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of
the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold
such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3,
in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by the
President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive
privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which
was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in
Senate v. Ermita.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the ruling
in Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit:
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has
been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and
high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted
the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he
has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those
values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communication," which was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage
in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Committees,
referring to the non-existence of a "presumptive authorization" of an executive official, to mean
that the "presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure" is to distort the ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and make the same
engage in self-contradiction.
Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the
Executive Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied
authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s
subordinate officials, as follows:
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked
by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption
dictates that the same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof
of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any
construction to the contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded by settled
jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence
citing "the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications." 23
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 II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered
by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not
present.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power."
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the
President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to
report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. 25 The power to enter
into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the
President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the
power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Congress
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact
that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the power to pass law
executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter into a contract to
secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the
Office of the President.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of
operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the
presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are ‘operationally
proximate’ to the President but who may have "no direct communications with her."
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed
Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court
was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully
cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies,
and then only to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential
decision-making, thus:
We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish the purposes
of the privilege, could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive branch
a privilege that is bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President. In order to limit
this risk, the presidential communications privilege should be construed as narrowly as is
consistent with ensuring that the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making process is
adequately protected. Not every person who plays a role in the development of presidential
advice, no matter how remote and removed from the President, can qualify for the privilege.
In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the White House in executive
branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should apply only to communications authored or
solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House advisor’s staff who have
broad and significant responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to be given the
President on the particular matter to which the communications relate. Only communications at
that level are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose
a risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational proximity"
to the President that matters in determining whether "[t]he President’s confidentiality
interests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch"
(a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter
ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official
involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid
down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational
proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining
which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to
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officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of
their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the
scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is
unfounded.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in
balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President’s invocation, through
the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees’ specific and
demonstrated need and the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information,
specifically, Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI,
Section 10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her
generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations
with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot
provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied)
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her
advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product
of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about
the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely
view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. We reiterate the importance
of secrecy in matters involving foreign negotiations as stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 38 thus:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on
secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands,
or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such
caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed
confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives
to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign
power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers
relating to a negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan
Citizens Action Party, et al. v. Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39upheld the privileged character of
diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan, the Court stated:
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
"information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even
earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v.
Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press
nor of the freedom of access to information." The Resolution went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision
which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.Although much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with
disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and
justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:
"A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through without many, many private talks
and discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from
other countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would
do under certain circumstances and would not do under other circumstances… If these
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reports… should become public… who would ever trust American Delegations in another
conference? (United States Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)
xxxx
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all
subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As
expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the
world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting
his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants, openly
arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment
that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one
of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides
would quickly lead to a widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been
drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is
approved. (The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the
President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries,viz:
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of
March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613…
(Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the
President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that
Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some
vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased
frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of
intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process,
which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the
right of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds
nothing in these arguments to support respondent Committees’ case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and
the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates
vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the
whims and caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to
information. And the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly
be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific
questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of
legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri
to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision
merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit
answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear
before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these
answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it
simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute
right to information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the
regulation of the law is unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show the
obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. (Emphasis supplied)
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In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may
be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1)
national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic
matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, they must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information
allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we
stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v.
Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does
the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials." As pointed
out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that
the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for
information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's
right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect
matters that are covered by executive privilege.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy discussion on the
purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight inquiry.
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’
inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a
constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative
investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported
by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have
relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority." In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees
argue that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of
their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b)
to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other
interests and it is necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve
the essential functions of each branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege
and the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled
that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the
primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said
Court further ratiocinated, through its ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice
Puno's dissenting opinion, as follows:
"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of
law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal
justice) is that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88,
55 S.Ct., at 633. We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the
parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the
adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice
would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation
of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To
ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense.
xxx xxx xxx
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions.
The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right 'to be
confronted with the witness against him' and 'to have compulsory process for obtaining
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witnesses in his favor.' Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate
those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be
produced.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a
privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial
would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of
the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office
is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a
criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in
the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally
frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communication will not be
vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some
bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a
criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This
leads us to consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent
Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to
intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to
said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon41 expounded on the nature of a
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether
the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear
difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution
engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its
task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past
events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its
hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit
specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the
content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the most precise evidence, the exact
text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is undeniable. We see no comparable
need in the legislative process, at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed,
whatever force there might once have been in the Committee's argument that the subpoenaed
materials are necessary to its legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by
subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be
lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2)
separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the
Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the
Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states:
A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified
presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous
discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al., v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals,
as well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of
Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a
presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent
Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable
them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is
pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to
pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined
without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the
Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion:
…If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive
officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from
recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily
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bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume ATTY. AGABIN
the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.
I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we look at this problem in its
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies factual setting as counsel for petitioner has observed, there are intimations of a bribery scandal
can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly, involving high government officials.
during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that
the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the lawmaking function of the Senate. For
instance, question Number 1 whether the President followed up the NBN project. According to the other
counsel this question has already been asked, is that correct?
Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize this ZTE, is that critical to the
lawmaking function of the Senate? Will it result to the failure of the Senate to cobble a Bill without
this question?
ATTY. AGABIN

I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed amendment to the Procurement
ATTY. AGABIN Law, Your Honor, because the petitioner had already testified that he was offered a P200 Million
bribe, so if he was offered a P200 Million bribe it is possible that other government officials who
Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your Honor. had something to do with the approval of the contract would be offered the same amount of
bribes.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function of the Senate?
Again, that is speculative.
ATTY. AGABIN
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe it is critical, Your Honor.
That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Why?
How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project
ATTY. AGABIN after being told about the alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function of the Senate?
And the question is may they craft a Bill a remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri to answer
this question?
For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam Santiago, she would like to indorse a Bill
to include Executive Agreements had been used as a device to the circumventing the Procurement Law.
ATTY. AGABIN

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound legislation requires
that a proposed Bill should have some basis in fact.42
But the question is just following it up.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 237

The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information
sought or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative
purpose is very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to
successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential
communication stands. The implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the
burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly impair the President’s performance of her
function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing that they would have to "speculate" regarding the questions
covered by the privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the information sought.
Indeed, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 43 held that while
fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally
depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political
acceptability than on a precise reconstruction of past events. It added that, normally, Congress legislates
on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. We cannot subscribe to the respondent
Committees’ self-defeating proposition that without the answers to the three (3) questions objected to as
privileged, the distinguished members of the respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for
information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the
inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function
of Congress.44 And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)
questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature
and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or
oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by
the Constitution.
In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases.46 (Emphasis supplied)
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not
really ‘in aid of legislation’ because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress,
since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the
Office of the President.48While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability
of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is
simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to
determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the
Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
adjudicate or prosecute.
Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a
"search for truth," which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search
for persons responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power
reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a
crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of
who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and
finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not
functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it
bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather
incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no
Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. 49 In this regard, the pronouncement
in Barenblatt v. United States50 is instructive, thus:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into
matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government.
Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively
the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to
the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)
At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already
been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the Ombudsman is the
body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not
the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts
upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the
rules of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure
that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are
protected and safeguarded.
Page 238
Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of their
investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of
government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot
be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive
privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the
information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.
Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege on the
ground that there is no privilege when the information sought might involve a crime or illegal
activity, despite the absence of an administrative or judicial determination to that effect. Significantly,
however, in Nixon v. Sirica,52 the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality
turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but,
instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the
material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment.
Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon does not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said case, no impeachment proceeding has
been initiated at present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is true that no impeachment proceeding has
been initiated, however, complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President
Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the
prosecutorial and judicial arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution
and our laws to determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so,
who should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct.
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence
essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the
Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for
a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest
public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in
proper proceedings by a competent court or body.
IV
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the
requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in accordance with their
internal Rules; (4) they did not violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary
or precipitate.
We reaffirm our earlier ruling.
The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding
pages, we see no reason to discuss it once again.
Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita,
requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry" along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an
obiter dictum.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these
requirements.
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its
own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or
has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times.53 Constant exposure to congressional
subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements set
forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power.
The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving
commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54 Likewise, witnesses have their
constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to be
covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents.
To our mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the part of
Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry. The logic of these
requirements is well articulated in the study conducted by William P. Marshall, 55 to wit:
A second concern that might be addressed is that the current system allows committees to
continually investigate the Executive without constraint. One process solution addressing this
concern is to require each investigation be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At present, the
charters of some congressional committees are so broad that virtually any matter involving the
Executive can be construed to fall within their province. Accordingly, investigations can proceed
without articulation of specific need or purpose. A requirement for a more precise charge in order
to begin an inquiry should immediately work to limit the initial scope of the investigation and
should also serve to contain the investigation once it is instituted. Additionally, to the extent
clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause and seriously consider the
constitutional implications of proposed courses of action in other areas, they would serve
that goal in the context of congressional investigations as well.
Page 239
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a standing committee to simply
articulate its reasons to investigate pro forma does no more than imposes minimal drafting
burdens. Rather, the system must be designed in a manner that imposes actual burdens on the
committee to articulate its need for investigation and allows for meaningful debate about the
merits of proceeding with the investigation.(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that
should have been granted by respondent Committees.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to
any pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the
subpoena merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to the subject matter under
inquiry."
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this
Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government,
however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’
compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of
courtesy. In this regard, the pronouncement in Arroyo v. De Venecia56 is enlightening, thus:
"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals.
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution empowers each House to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained."
In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears
to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the
Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it
who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions
by the Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order
because during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were
present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee on
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17)
Senators and respondent Committee on National Defense and Security which has a membership
of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which
has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were present. 57 These facts
prompted us to quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lack of the required majority to
deliberate and vote on the contempt order.
When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator
Francis Pangilinan stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because
two-thirds of the Senators effectively signed for the Senate in plenary session. 58
Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt
order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent
Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for
signing. As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful
representation of the proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of
those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when
the matter was taken up.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis
supplied)
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation.
If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could
there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such
majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority
vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater
measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully
articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion
to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the
contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More
than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of
the Rules.
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent Committees’ fourth
argument. Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules
because the same was published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a
Page 240
continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly,
there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but
may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by
the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even
with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same
status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of
its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure)
states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin
their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or
revision.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one
day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session
shall be required for its approval. (emphasis supplied)
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force
until they are amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the
Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid
from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation."59 The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In
view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until
they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even
in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and
effective.
Page 241
Respondent Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not precipitate or
arbitrary. Taking into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their argument.
As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of
respondent Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He
repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only
request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately
prepare as a resource person. He did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive
Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with his testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an executive official under the direct control and supervision of
the Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by his superior?
Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was very cooperative during the September 26, 2007
hearing.
On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their haste and impatience. Instead of ruling
on Executive Secretary Ermita’s claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as unsatisfactory and
ordered the arrest of petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to
decide whether to accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After all, he is not just an ordinary witness;
he is a high- ranking official in a co-equal branch of government. He is an alter ego of the President. The
same haste and impatience marked the issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of the
majority of the members of the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration alleging the pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political
branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash,
but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the
proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the
constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of government.
In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination on the validity of
executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion
that their internal procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in
accordance with the principle of respect between co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a
courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of executive privilege)
or this Court (on the matter of judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent Committees’
paradigm of checks and balances, what are the checks to the Legislature’s all-encompassing, awesome
power of investigation? It is a power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption,
even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to Congress
powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its
veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of
transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general
public, the religious community and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a
nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble
undertaking is not in the political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the
absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth
or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We
believe the people deserve a more exacting "search for truth" than the process here in question, if
that is its objective.
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131636. March 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION y SORIANO, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review[1] is the Decision[2] dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant
Artemio Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay Cynthia the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary
damages, as well as the costs of suit.
Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape
in separate complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October
1996. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of
not guilty in each case.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion,
Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal
witnesses were Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
Page 242
 Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac,
Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law
wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his
father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries.
Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes,
his father put on his short pants.[3]
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and
quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro.[4]
Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac,
Tarlac, testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was
passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then
peeped through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemios house. He saw
Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie
observed them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish. [5] He
reported what he had witnessed to Artemios stepfather, Celestino, later that morning. [6]
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and
Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemios mother died sometime in
1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located
in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.[7] On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia
was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter
confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia. [8]
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September
1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal
lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign
body inserted in her private part.[9]
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by
her mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by
her father Artemio. She then executed a written statement,[10] which she subscribed and sworn to before
Atty. Canlas.[11]
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo
Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the
same day when he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to
the house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked,
and its windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls
on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio
and his children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside. [12] Atty. Salamida
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared
having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in
the sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.
On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small
hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children
sometime in December 1995, there was a hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a
vacant lot where people passed by to fish in a nearby brook. [13] When she went to the place again
sometime in September 1996 after she was informed of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the
destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were not yet repaired.[14]
The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the
owner of the small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio
and his children, including Cynthia, were living in that house, the huts old sawali walls had some
small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on
the basis of Cynthias complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among
other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of
the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin occupied the house. [15]
In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No.
9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.
In his Appellants Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in
I
... BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS]
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven,
as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.[16] Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution
wanted him to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had
ill-motive in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio
points to the following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of
the crime, Elven testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while
Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the
second week of March 1996; (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the
former was living with her in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and
Page 243
Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr.,
Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was
impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply
Brief, he likewise urges us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and
Gloria. According to him, Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been
badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemios deceased
mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with
another man.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemios
conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in
addition to the awards of moral and exemplary damages.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because
the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness
or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of
the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.[17] This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where
there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the
court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts. [18] We do not find any of
these exceptions in the case at bar.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court,[19] otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant.[20] The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father;
he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he
was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth. [21]
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven.
Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[22] expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a
child of tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration.
Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender
age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive
other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified
because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly
pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
credence.[23]
We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was
committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the
testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the
crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has
been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the
elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.[24] In this case, we believe that
the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the
credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies,
which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not
destroy the witnesses credibility.[25] On the contrary, they may even be considered badges of
veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is
important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a
consistent and coherent whole.[26]
Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and
witnessed the crime because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by
rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG,
even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not have been mistaken in his identification of
Artemio because he had known the latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the time only
two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was
jostled out of his sleep by Cynthias loud cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his
father.[27]
The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently
proved. Nothing in the records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely
against Artemio, who is the father of her other children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that
no mother would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the
prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the person responsible
for her childs defilement incarcerated.[28] As for Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut
stands is owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by Artemios mother.[29] At any rate, even without
Celestinos testimony, Artemios conviction would stand.
The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death imposed by
the trial court. The death penalty was imposed because of the trial courts appreciation of the
special qualifying circumstances that Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less
than 18 years old at the time the crime was committed.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the
governing law in this case, pertinently reads:
Page 244
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the
minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances,
must be alleged in the complaint or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by
the quantum of proof required for conviction. The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No.
9375 reads as follows:
That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of
his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[30]
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly
established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly
proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,[31] we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of
the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age
shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented
and offered in evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement in the medical certificate showing
Cynthias age is not proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of
birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Glorias testimony regarding Cynthias age was
insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what
is sought to be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even
make a categorical finding on Cynthias minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthias age could not be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final
nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to
the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. [32] Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient
proof of Cynthias minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer
the death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Page 245
 As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape,[33] should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall not be less than P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case
No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003]
FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A.
MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the
Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision of May 31, 1996 and Resolution of December 9, 1996.
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as
creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on
January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00
and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.[1]
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed
separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00,
respectively.[2]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled,
appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate,
following which she was issued letters of administration. [3]
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola,
wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over
the objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
otherwise known as the Dead Mans Statute which reads:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind. (Emphasis supplied)
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction
with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks [4] issued by him before his death; before the
deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceaseds) son
Jerry who told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after the
death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were
dishonored[5] due to the closure of his account.[6]
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the
deceased issued five checks[7] to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the
deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the
closure of his account.[8]
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law
Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000
from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the
deceased,[9] two to Angeles and the other[10] to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died
or sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he
told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died on
January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were dishonored as the account against which
they were drawn was closed,[11] hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter[12] dated February
6, 1990 addressed to the deceaseds heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II
but the checks have remained unsettled.[13]
The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription. [14] And she
objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the
claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the
Dead Mans Statute.
Page 246
 Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that
they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant
Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.
At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and
that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank. [15]
After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations informing
the trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims.[16]
Finding that the Dead Mans Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the
subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993,[17] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in due course of
administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin,
in the amount of P315,000.00;[18] Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and Eduardo
Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the above-entitled
intestate estate.
On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FILING
FEES THEREON
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] BECAUSE [THEY ARE] ALREADY
BARRED BY THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S] EVIDENCE OF THE CLAIM IS
INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD MANS STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE
IV.
[19]
THE ALLEGED CHECKS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS PRIVATE DOCUMENTS,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by Decision of May
31, 1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of:
1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;
2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;[20]
3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and
4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the deceased JUAN
BON FING SY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)
The claimants Motion for Reconsideration[21] of the Court of Appeals decision having been
denied by Resolution of December 9, 1996,[22] they filed the present petition anchored on the
following assigned errors:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIMS OF
CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR..
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLAIMANT
FELICITO G. SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY [ON] THE CLAIM OF CELEDONIA
SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND VI[C]E VERSA. (Underscoring in the original)[23]
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not
deny the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny the
execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return
slips issued by the clearing bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the
Montinolas insufficient to prove their claims.
Page 247
 The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up and
signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had identical
and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of the Dead
Mans Statute.[24]
The administratrixs counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been
recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness orsubject only to well
recognized exceptions none of which is here presentthe admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness
of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a
witness testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the
credit otherwise accorded to it.[25]
Jades testimony on the genuineness of the deceaseds signature on the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas is clear:
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust Company Check
No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that this is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated July 6,
1989, in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola, are you referring
to this check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A: Mr. Sys signature.
Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)
The genuineness of the deceaseds signature having been shown, he is prima
facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:
Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature
appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the
original; emphasis supplied),
Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not
rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise
lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify
persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration
are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a
third person, if he took no active part therein.
x x x[27] (Underscoring supplied)
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case
is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those
involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the
parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any
event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the
Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and
Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead
Page 248
Mans Statute;[28] besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined
them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on
review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each
others favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between
testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his
co-parties. The law speaks of parties or assignors of parties to a case. Apparently, the testimonies of
Sanson and Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition.
(Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is
a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons
claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon
a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony.[29] Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by
checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on
the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonias account, she knows the signature of the
deceased.
xxx
Q: Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit A to E, please go over these
checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you know his signature?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[30]
Sanson testified too that he knows the signature of the deceased:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
xxx
Q: I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit A to G-1 Saquin,
please go over this if these are the checks that you said was issued by the late
Juan Bon Fing Sy in favor of your sister?
A: Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.
Q: Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[31]
While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the
quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison[32] with the naked eye
of the deceaseds signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of
the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account,
they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their
claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix
who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.
WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through
Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;[33]
3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.
Page 249
 representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001]
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled Lamberto T. Chua vs.
Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter
collectively referred to as petitioners).
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga
Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife,
respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding Up of Partnership Affairs,
Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent
and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto
while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the
profits would be equally divided between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager,
assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife of respondent, Erlinda Sy. As
compensation, Jacinto would receive a managers fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and
Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other remuneration from the
business.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business
operation went quite well and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to the
success of their business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled Shellane
cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished
respondent with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977
to 1989, respondent however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were
understated and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax
avoidance.
Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition
and management of Shellite without respondents consent.
Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory,
appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own
use and advantage its properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out of alibis and
reasons to evade respondents demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount
of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latters share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of
the properties of the business establishment.Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly
failed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of
Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in
Zambaonga del Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to
dismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance
denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims,
contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests,
damages and attorneys fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that
the claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership
affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets /properties should be dismissed
and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
Page 250
 On August 16, 1993, the trial court denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial
Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, as
petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court."[2]
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was
remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of the
case on January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to have
waived their right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of
evidence despite notice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under accounting procedures and
standards of the properties, assets, income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center since the time
of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued the business operations including all businesses
derived from the Shellite Gas Appliance Center; submit an inventory, and appraisal of all these properties,
assets, income, profits, etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for approval or disapproval;
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties, assets, income and
profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and advantage that legally pertain to the plaintiff
and account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of this petition as basis;
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff shares and interest of the plaintiff in the
partnership of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of the
petition;
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and profits from the partnership
from 1988 to may 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per
month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its business activities
pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the interest, shares, participation and equity in
the partnership, or the value thereof in money or moneys worth, if the properties are not physically
divisible;
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and
hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and,
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys (sic) and
P25,00.00 as litigation expenses.
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the
case to the Court of Appeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
respects.[4]
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a
partnership between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga
upon the latters invitation and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets
and business were taken over by petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or
prescription did not apply in the instant case.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was
competent and credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and
assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership, the finding of highly
exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets and profits.[5]
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the
Page 251
absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners
argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness,
Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this argument,
petitioners invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court that provides:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.-- Parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine,
should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now
represented by petitioners.
We are not persuaded.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights are
contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary.[6] Hence, based on the intention
of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal
contract of partnership may arise.[7] The essential points that must be proven to show that a partnership
was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the
profits.[8]Understandably so, in view of the absence of a written contract of partnership between
respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence
to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is whether or not the Dead Mans Statute applies
to this case so as to render inadmissible respondents testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. [9] But before this
rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.[10]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim[11] against respondent in their answer
before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively
removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute. [12] Well entrenched is the rule that
when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim.[13] Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent
is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased,
said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.[14]
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple
reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of
a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen. [15] Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that Josephines testimony lacks probative
value because she was allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor.
Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she
were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude
from this candid admission that Josephines testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine
is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since
relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.[16]
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot
prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was
established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the
documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence
for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of
judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between
respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review. [17] This Court can no
longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit
to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.[18] It must be also pointed out that
petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn
to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of
respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that
such evidence was offered.[19]
Page 252
 With regard to petitioners insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished
respondents claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting
filed by respondent three (3) years after Jacintos death was well within the prescribed period. The Civil
Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years [20] while the right to
demand an accounting for a partners interest as against the person continuing the business accrues at the
date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary agreement.[21] Considering that the death of a partner
results in the dissolution of the partnership[22], in this case, it was after Jacintos death that respondent as
the surviving partner had the right to an account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that
while Jacintos death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the
partnership. The Civil Code[23] expressly provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its
legal personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business, culminating in its termination.[24]
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had an initial capital of P200,000.00 should have
been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is mandated by
the Civil Code. True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or
more must register with the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not mandatory. Article 1768 of
the Civil Code[25] explicitly provides that the partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails to
register. The failure to register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the
partners, so long as the contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is
to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of
their contract.[26] In the case at bar, non-compliance with this directory provision of the law will not
invalidate the partnership considering that the totality of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto
indeed forged the partnership in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any
person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without
his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to
be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix,
Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of
respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged
that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross
misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against
Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
impressed with merit:2
Page 253
 On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request
for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as
malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned
annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission
as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and use
the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as
to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By
no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and
papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO
issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in
the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with
the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S.
SANSAET, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied
petitioners motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state
witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its
preceding disposition.[1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the
Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes
in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a
free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of
title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur.
Page 254
 However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action[2] for the cancellation of respondent Paredes
patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the
aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after
finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury[5] was
filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. [6] On November 27, 1985, the
Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the
case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.[7] In this criminal
case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce
the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a)
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of
record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution[8] recommending the criminal prosecution
of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for
reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that
motion:
x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same
evidence x x x but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of
this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x. [9] (Italics supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan[10] charging respondent Paredes
with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by
the defense was later granted in respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991 [11] and the case was
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. [12] He claimed that respondent Honrada, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents
purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.[13] These falsified documents
were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the
filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double
jeopardy.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said
perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended
pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.[14]
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded
and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have
the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by
making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned
therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the
house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he
claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was
intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as
in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of
falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal
position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As
counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory
and the evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession
of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his
client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution[17] and, ostensibly to forestall any
further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents
against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each of which named one
of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft
court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge
of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as
provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent
Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of
respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of
documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Page 255
 Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents
in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship
existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the
information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must
have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the
information is privileged.[19]
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, [20] the controversy was elevated to
this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1)
whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the
attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to
testify as a particeps criminis.
I concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which
existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts
surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as
client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty.
Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters
consent.[21]
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as
the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a
clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in
these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and
this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed,
the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and
Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this
point has always referred to any communication, without distinction or qualification. [22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular
mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not
confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.[23]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing
relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject
matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said
documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan.[24] Also,
the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were
necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed
him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the
criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be
committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a
past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate
basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the
past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client
seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is
given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality,
however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
that communications between attorney and client having to do with the clients contemplated
criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily
existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. [25] (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness
are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at
the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to
falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by
Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents,
Page 256
later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification
which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order
that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or
in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.[26] In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation
of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to
an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only
lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in
the interest of justice.[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the
so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which
was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client,
would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent
Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for
the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding
issue, did not pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now
submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some
ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not
respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that
issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this
Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of
justice and the expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it
to the trial court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three
separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents
herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information
was filed against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of
falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by
the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state witness, he can,
nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three
cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or
involving common questions of law and fact.Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes,
Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment
that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint
defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law,
persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having
been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and
became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes
of action involved had originally been joined in a single action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or more
persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense was too broad and indefinite; hence
the word joint was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all
together charged therewith substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The
word joint means common to two or more, as involving the united activity of two or more, or done
or produced by two or more working together, or shared by or affecting two or more.[30] Had it been
intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the
Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the
circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an
alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the
rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed
on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he does
not appear to be the most guilty.[31] not that he must be the least guilty[32] as is so often
erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held
guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the
others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of
the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of
the offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
Page 257
 However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., [34] two conspirators charged with five others in
three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their
confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators
was discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court
found that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his
two co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty
as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is
untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the
accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the
same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found expression in
People vs. Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a
co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not
to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is
equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash,
jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez
that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was
available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it
was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned
decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to
a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even
assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty.What the
law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to
jail. And by most guilty we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused
may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take
into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused
to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of
the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery
except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most
guilty.Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted. (Italics ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal
offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted
physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is
based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the
predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the
consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural
rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations,
such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the
judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a
guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying
criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge
of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the
falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is
faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who
steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct
evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has
indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the
substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable
witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows:
Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial
Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private
complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking
their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco
Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all
the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the
Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
Page 258
 This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may
propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the
proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion
should have been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein
discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second Division [37]and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely
anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its
resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof [39] declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second
Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted by the
Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable
Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant
the prosecutions motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned
resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and
given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998]
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA
EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S.
ABAD, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 19, 1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as
annulling petitioners extra-judicial partition of the decedents estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar
de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa
Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa
Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the
real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the
decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother,
Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as
administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the
above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482
in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real
estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel,
Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and
Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in
Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been
the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to
1971, and that during these period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado.Private respondents also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores
Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral
relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of
said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in
lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed
administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents motion to
remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to
establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos.
13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers
estate. Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the
Page 259
extra-judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the
Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages
constituted by the latter on said properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad,
and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo
M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased,
subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the
property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with
the deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedents collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M.
Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from
participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties,
monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his
appointment as administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked.[1]
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latters motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious
and accordingly
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all
registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of
Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT
No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house
situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the
late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de
Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
of the notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021
and issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de
Mesa Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of
Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the
corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate
mortgages executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa
Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b)
petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No.
XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doc.
No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of
Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the
Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from
the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola,
to surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482,
108483, and 108484 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the
trial court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed
out of time. Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorariand mandamus proceedings with
the Court of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the
appellate court granted petitioners petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the
latters appeal. The trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground that
their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19,
1974 ruling of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground
that it had been filed out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and
mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to
appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due
course to petitioners appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents
heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain
documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
Page 260
 The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19,
1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of
the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie,
all surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of
the deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land
described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that
the extra-judicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May
2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the beginning; the cancellation of the aforementioned
TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the
corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against petitioner-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S.
ABAD ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED
RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS
OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA,
THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the startling theory
that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the
birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The date of Jose Libunaos death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that
he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian
are not Ricardo Abads children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[4]
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at
Mapua Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Fathers Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: engineer (mining)
Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[5]
as well as Cesar Libunaos 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology,
which states:
Fathers Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: none
Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[6]
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications
were accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being
the case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro
Ramos[7] stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow,
Honoria Empaynado, and that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, [8] Ricardo Abads physician,
declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with
gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the
illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
Page 261
 At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial courts finding of
facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[9] Petitioners, however,
argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the
record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case. [10]
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the
least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not
necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose
Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latters death at that time, being merely secondary
evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter
died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that
said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunaos
death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao
was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynados first
husband, the latters name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose
Bautista Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria
Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [11] The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient
existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e)
the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.[12]
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that
the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone,
without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to
blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same
remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The
privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It
is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be
promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications
and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish
their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence
presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural
children of Ricardo Abad. We quote with approval the trial courts decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all
his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has
declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent
children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February
26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxxxxxxxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and
Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February
27, 1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund acount of P100,000.00 with the
Peoples Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them
in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund
of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4,
1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust
Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the
account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo
Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was
also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited
(money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian,
represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance
of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad,
petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Page 262
Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Italics supplied)

As to petitioners claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their DECISION
mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by
private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the TINGA, J.:
findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being
in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.),
while testifying in the case.[13] In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that
they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa. Rolando Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo Eddie Hermano alias
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals Bobby Reyes alias Eddie Reyes (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were charged with
affirmed the trial courts order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous,
for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the
dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court. kidnapping for ransom with homicide[1] and carnapping[2] in two separate informations.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
the MODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores
de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against was utilized as a state witness.[3] All appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignments.
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
B.ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181043
Appellee, at the latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho,

Present: Sr.), Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car with plate number

PSV-818. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., relative. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, visitor. Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his
TINGA,
family. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap
VELASCO, JR., and
MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO BRION, JJ. for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among
PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO
HERMANO ALIAS BOBBY them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came and they
REYES, ROLANDO DEQUILLO, Promulgated:
ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri. They had
FERRAER, October 8, 2008 dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for safekeeping a
Appellants.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 263

folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in a big paper bag, and a green After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of

backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package contained guns. Ferraer brought the package inside the Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together suddenly

his room; he inspected the contents before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton lay prostrate on the ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man standing near the

contained a shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also showed him three engineers. Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero. Two of them

their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists.[4] approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and

ordered him and Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground.[7] The assailants dragged the victim

towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero.

At one oclock in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., When the victim was already on board the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of them

and Hermano with a companion, seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their say, Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay.[8]

companion as Romeo. They informed Ferraer that the following day, they would proceed with their

plan. Romeo would be the informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate. Two

victim. The next day, at nine oclock in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraers house alone and more persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.[9]

asked Ferraer if he was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told

him to wait for the groups return. However, the group returned without the intended victim because the At 2:30 that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt.

latter did not show up at the construction site.[5] On 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Mission) received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was

Romeo informing them that the victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, ongoing and the kidnappers on board a Pajero with plate number UDL-746 were heading

Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the construction site at towards Lipa City. Supt. Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus

Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on board the Mitsubishi car as back-up. stop to put up a barricade. In the meantime, two teams were organized to intercept the Pajero.

At around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997, They proceeded to the barricade.[10]

Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero with plate number

UDL-746 carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site at Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted. When

Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two policemen

the Pajero and, along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site. Seraspetalked with Armand approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors and started firing
[6]
Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss. at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen present at the scene fired back. The cross-fire

lasted for around four minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and the front

passenger who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 264

escapees who turned out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero, at Barangay San Carlos, Batangas, about uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other
[11]
200 meters from the place of the shootout. hand, the defense presented appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.

On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997 he

their agreed meeting place but did not find Hermanos group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway was working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. His work starts at 8:00 in the

in front of the construction site. He thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the group, morning and ends at 5:00 in the afternoon. He stated that on 8 December 1997, he was arrested

so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer what happened to their by the CIDG at his house in Purok Sto. Domingo, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. At

operation. Worried that something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went back and the CIDG Detention Center, he was questioned about the guns used in the kidnapping of the

looked for the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone. victim. He was allegedly tortured when he denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was

forced to sign a statement without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he

At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. had already signed the statement. He denied any participation in the crimes charged against

watching the TV program Alas Singko y Medya. He joined them and saw on the news the Pajero riddled him.[13]

with bullets.Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraers house

at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car they used. That Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar.

night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales, He was first brought to the Calbayog City Police Station, and then transferred to Camp Crame.

Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs. He alleged that the police tortured him and forced him to sign the written confession of his

participation in the crimes. He denied having participated in the commission of the offenses

The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong, charged against him.[14]

Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy;

Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare[12] (Atty. Mallare), the lawyer who On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near

assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their respective sworn statements as witnesses. the place of the shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for

Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecutions documentary evidence such as the extra judicial his uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the crime.

confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He

Atty. Mallare. Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel

1997, in which he was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 during the custodial investigation.[15]

December 1997 in which he was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 265

 In a decision[16] dated 22 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 83 Before this Court, appellants opted not to file supplemental briefs, and instead adopted
[17]
of Tanauan City, Batangas found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty. Only the cases the assignment of errors in their respective original briefs.[21] Taken together, appellants claim

involving the charges of carnapping and kidnapping for ransom which resulted in the death of the victim that: (i) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against

were automatically appealed to this Court. them; (ii) the RTC erred in its finding that they acted in conspiracy in the commission of the

crimes charged against them; and (iii) the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial

The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in

declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. It found the prosecutions witnesses more credible than convicting them.[22]

appellants, whose self-serving statements were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal

liability. The RTC did not give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were The appeals are bereft of merit.

procured through torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention[23] are the following: (a) the

certificates which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements. And accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner

the RTC noted that even without appellants extra judicial confessions, there was still sufficient evidence on deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the

record to hold them guilty. commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled

In a resolution dated 17 January 2006, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.[24] The totality of the

intermediate review.[18] prosecutions evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with

homicide.
[19]
The Court of Appeals in a decision dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the

RTC.[20] The appellate court held that the RTC was correct in convicting appellants for kidnapping On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended,

and carnapping. The prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another

another in the planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by

extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping. using force upon things.[25] The crime was committed in this case when the victims Pajero was

As for Muit, other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified during the kidnapping forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.

by eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. Appellants filed their notices of appeal with the Court of Appeals.

The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the

direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 266

and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the secondary since the act of one is the act of all.[27] The degree of actual participation in the

crime in Ferraers house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at commission of the crime is immaterial.

the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the

victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The

construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muitand the other members of the group pointed group thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Ferraers house and patiently waited for the day

their guns at the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting when the victim would be at the construction site. Then on 2 December 1997, the group received

the keys to the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction site and carried out their plan.

immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by

the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different

engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two roles to consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played

persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the in the actual abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the

house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was

and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of the groups informant.

them were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial

After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the

and Dequillo who all took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to

investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and family members, produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution of the

crimes. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the

case against them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced

Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in

victim, they should still be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. the execution of appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts
[26]
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. Where conspiracy is which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the

established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their

lawyers when they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 267

and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them
[28]
alone and informed them of their constitutional rights. Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by
counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial confessions; his second statement
was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador. Muit cannot just conveniently
disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muits case, he
was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the
kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the ground.[29]
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical
examinations done on them.[30] These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for
the first time during trial; appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while they
were imprisoned about the alleged tortures.[31] Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to complain
[32]
of the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he was brought there. Claims of
torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and
independent corroborating evidence.[33]
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the
prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the
person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial
statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects
identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated
therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and may
likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as
interlocking confessions.[34] Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the
aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraers testimony that Romeo was introduced to
him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Neither actual
demand for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient
that the deprivation of liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.[35] The death of the victim
as a result of the kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for the rule is that
when more than one qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be considered as
generic aggravating circumstances.[36]
The imposition of death penalty is also proper in the carnapping of the victims Pajero because it
was committed by a band,
which serves as a generic aggravating circumstance, without any mitigating
circumstance.[37] There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of the offense.[38] As planned, Muit and three other armed men
kidnapped the victim and drove away with the latters Pajero while two more persons waiting near
the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalties imposed are commuted to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory
penalties and without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103.[39]
Page 268
 As to damages, the RTC erred in awarding compensation for loss of earning

capacity. Pursuant to jurisprudence, the Court precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without SO ORDERED.

adequate proof as it partakes of thenature of actual damages.[40] The bare testimony of the

father of the deceased that, at the time of his death, the victim was earning

P5,000.00 per month as an engineer is not sufficient proof.[41] But pursuant to the Courts ruling in People
[G.R. No. 133858. August 12, 2003]
v. Abrazaldo[42] wherein we deemed it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00

in cases where evidence confirms the heirs entitlement to actual damages but the amount of actual

damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting and duly presented receipts, the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE @ EMIANO
SATORRE, appellant.
Court awards P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the victim in the present case.

DECISION
The civil indemnity should be increased to P75,000.00.[43] The award of civil indemnity may be
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
granted without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. [44] In line with jurisprudence, the

moral damages should also be increased to P 500,000.00.[45] Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with Murder in an
information which reads:

Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide[46] and P25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping should be awarded. The law allows exemplary
damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is attended by
one or more aggravating circumstances.[47]
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1997 at 2:00 oclock dawn, more or less, in Sitio Kamari,
Barangay Calidngan, Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with the use
of .38 paltik revolver and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot ROMERO PANTILGAN, hitting the latter at
the head which caused his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02044 which

commuted the death penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607 On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued.

to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the
compensation for loss of earning capacity be deleted while the civil indemnity be increased
to P75,000.00 and the moral damages to P500,000.00, and that appellants shall also pay the heirs of
Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 for the
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at 2:00 a.m. of May 25,
1997, she and her two children were asleep inside the house of her parents at Tagaytay,
Calidngan, Carcar, Cebu. Her mother, Florida Saraum, was also in the house. Her husband,
Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she was awakened by a
gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she found her dead husband lying on
the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on his head.

crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and P25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping. Costs against Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997, his
fellow barangay kagawad, Pio Alvarado, fetched him from his house and, together, they went to
appellants. verify a report regarding a dead person on the porch of the Saraum residence. Upon confirming

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 269

the incident, they reported the matter to the Carcar Police. Rufino further narrated that appellants father,
Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan.They looked for appellant in the
house of his brother, Felix Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already
left. Nevertheless, appellants brothers, Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufinos house and
surrendered the gun which was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay
Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant
was detained.
Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu
testified that Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having
killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with
a piece of wood. That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where she
executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with
the use of a handgun which he wrestled from his possession.
Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of Pantilgans
death was gunshot wound.[2]
Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from Pantilgans head wound
was fired from the gun surrendered by appellants brothers to the Carcar Police. [3]
Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time
of the incident. He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he
tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied having confessed to the killing of
Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not even
remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having accompanied appellant to
Castaares house to surrender him.
Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant to Castaares
house to surrender. His other brother, Felix, also testified that he never surrendered any firearm to
anybody.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and rendered a decision
convicting appellant of Murder,[4] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, accused Herminiano Satorre is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of Romero
Pantilgan in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited in full during
the whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
SO ORDERED.
Appellant interposed this appeal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in giving full faith
and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the
instant case amounting to lack of due process provided by law due to its denial of accuseds
motion for preliminary investigation or reinvestigation; and (3) in rejecting the testimony of the
defenses witnesses.
The appeal has merit.
In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission, which was
concocted by the Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being
obtained without a competent and independent counsel of his choice. In effect, the quantum of
evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The bare allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero
Pantilgan is not proof of guilt.
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the
same Rule is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein. Both may be given in evidence against the person
admitting or confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a
declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement,
stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.[5]
Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay
Captain was a confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is
an oral extrajudicial confession.
The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral extrajudicial confession
given to Barangay Captain Cynthia Castaares and two barangay kagawads. According to the trial
court, their testimonies were positive and convincing. Appellants retraction of his oral extrajudicial
confession should not be given much credence in the assessment of evidence. However,
appellant disputes the admissibility and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the
alleged oral extrajudicial confession.
There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial
confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a
confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be
the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.[6]
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely
made. The term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord, without
Page 270
inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and consequences of the
confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time
the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. [7] Plainly, the admissibility
of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the
confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete
with details which could only be supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be
considered voluntary.[8] The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is an oral
extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the testimony of a
witness who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was
voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made
outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not only
the admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such confession was indeed made, but more
significantly whether it was made voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances
prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings
of the accused. This is the position taken by the courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating
statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into account. It must
be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act.[9]
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade. Granting
that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized
the full import of his confession and its consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making
the confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that
due to the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession
may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is
made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were
uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative
proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be
permitted to rest.[10]
Main prosecution witness Castaares testified that after appellants alleged oral confession, she
brought the latter to the office of the police at the Municipal Hall of Carcar, Cebu.[11] At the police station,
Castaares was investigated, after which she executed her sworn statement. [12] Also at the police station,
appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. [13] His statement was not taken nor
was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance alone casts some doubt on the prosecutions
account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan. It raises questions not only as to
the voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on whether appellant indeed made an oral
confession.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal
or informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape.[14] However,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise
recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds weight to
the confession and helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the
confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read by
defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses.[15]
The trial court gave credence to appellants oral extrajudicial confession relying on
jurisprudence which we find are not applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court,[16] the
convictions were based on circumstantial evidence in addition to the appellants confessions, or
the extrajudicial confessions were reduced to writing and were replete with details which only
appellants could have supplied. In the case at bar, however, there was no circumstantial evidence
to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of appellant. More importantly, the said confession
does not contain details which could have only been known to appellant.
Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical
evidence. According to Barangay Captain Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the
struggle between him and the deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter hit him on the head
with a piece of wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the
entrance wound on the deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that
the victim was probably lying down when he was shot.[17]
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is
uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection with
confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence
may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not necessary that the supplementary
evidence be entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place
of offense or the defendants identity or criminal agency. All facts and circumstances attending the
particular offense charged are admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession.[18]
Nonetheless, the fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be
considered as corroborative evidence. While the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from
the fatal gun, the prosecution was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun
other than the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the
gun to them. This was denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking
the gun to him.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the
testimonial evidence of prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the killing. We
cannot affirm appellants conviction on mere testimonial evidence, considering that the
voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established because of appellants
personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into
writing.The doubts surrounding the alleged oral confession, the conduct of the investigation as
well as the inapplicable jurisprudential precedents cited by the trial court do not lead to the same
moral certainty of appellants guilt.
Page 271
 To conclude, it must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt For review before this Court is the November 18, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of
as to their guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 which affirmed with modification the Decision [2] of
innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can
be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[19] In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, finding
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.[20] Larry Erguiza (appellant) guilty of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu of reclusion perpetua.
City, convicting appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre of Murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 as well as costs,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant The Information, dated April 10, 2000, in Criminal Case No. SCC 3282 reads as follows:
Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre is ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause. That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of January 5, 2000, at the back
of the Bical Norte Elementary School, municipality of Bayambang, province
SO ORDERED.
of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171348 the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife, by means of force and
Plaintiff-Appellee, intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
Present: sexual intercourse with AAA[3], a minor of 13 years old, against her will and
consent and to her damage and prejudice.[4]
PUNO,* C.J.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter trial ensued.
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant (AAA), her mother BBB
REYES, JJ.
and father CCC, and Dr. James Sison. The defense presented five witnesses, namely:
LARRY ERGUIZA, Promulgated:
Joy Agbuya, Juanito Macaraeg, Juanita Angeles, Albina Erguiza, and appellant.
Accused-Appellant. November 26, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------x On November 27, 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of rape,

DECISION the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old girl. And although the Court
may be moved by compassion and sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law.
In view whereof, the Court finds the accused LARRY C. ERGUIZA guilty of
RAPE under Article 266-a paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-b of R.A.
8353 and R.A. 7659 and sentences (sic) to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party, AAA P50,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, to
give support to AAA's offspring and to pay the costs.

Basic is the rule that for conviction of a crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt --
SO ORDERED.[6]
conviction with moral certainty.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 272

 her to YYY District Hospital[16] where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of
On appeal, the CA aptly summarized the respective versions of the parties, based on the evidence said hospital conducted the examination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made the
following findings:
presented before the trial court, thus:
Q. x x x No extragenital injuries noted. Complete
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
healed hymenal laceration 11:00 o'clock. x x x. In layman's term,
Dr. Sison found no physical injury from the breast, the body except the genital
On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year
area wherein he found a significant laceration complete (sic) healed
old first year high school student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and
over 11:00 o'clock.[17] Dr. Sison also testified that a single sexual intercourse
Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the back of ZZZElementary
could make a woman pregnant.
School to gather fallen mangoes.[7] When they were bound for home at around
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAAs short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after she was
asked Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.[8]
raped and that no amount of money could bring back the lost reputation of
her daughter.
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled
her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if she would make a
CCC (AAA's father), testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of
noise.[9]
accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered P50,000 and later
P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his house for the
Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree and other
wedding reception[18], Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down
on the grassy ground. Thereafter, he removed her short pants and panty, mounted
DEFENSE'S VERSION
himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts and made push and
pull movements. He likewise raised AAAs sando and mashed her breast. AAA felt
On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of CCC's[19] house
pain when accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her private
from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. When he
part after Larry made the push and pull movements.[10]
reached home at around 5:00 pm, his mother Albina Erguiza instructed him
to fetch a hilotas his wife Josie was already experiencing labor pains. He
Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise he would kill her and
proceeded to fetch the hilot Juanita Angeles and stayed in their house until
all the members of her family and then he ran away.[11]
his wife delivered a baby at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 6,
2000.[20]
AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having spent her tears, she
wore her panty and short pants and proceeded to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth
Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed fetched
who was asleep. After staying for some time at the store, AAA decided to come (sic)
her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his wife who was
home. Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed. Fearing Larry's threat, AAA
experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby at about 3:00 a.m. of
kept mum on the incident.[12]
January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his wife's side until the latter
On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother (BBB's mother),
gave birth.
a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the unusual palpitation on the
mid-portion of AAA's throat and the absence of her monthly period.[13]After examining
Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is the daughter of
AAA, her grandmother told BBB that her daughter was pregnant.
her balae Spouses CCC and BBB; that her son Larry, her husband and two
others left CCC and BBB's residence at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on
BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA refused to talk. After
January 5, 2000; that she went to Spouses CCC and BBB to talk about the
much prodding, and in the presence of her Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally
charge of rape against her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking
revealed that she was raped by accused-appellant.[14]
for P1,000,000.00 which was later reduced to P250,000.00 and that she
made a counter-offer of P5,000.00.[21]
On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle, went to the police
headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.[15] Then the police brought

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 273

 Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango orchard
of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5, 2000; that she never left AAA when her short The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution's evidence does not pass the test of moral
pants got hooked; that they went together to the store of Auntie Beth where
certainty.
they parted.[22]

Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that the house of Larry was
a walking distance of about three minutes from the mango orchard; that if one runs This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts:
fast, it would only take a minute to reach his house; and that he could not recall having
seen Larry in the orchard.[23] (Emphasis supplied) (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though

innocent, to disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution

In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, but modified
the amount of the award of exemplary damages and costs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing circumstances, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos (Pangasinan), Branch 57 dated November 27,
2000 in Criminal Case No. SCC-3282 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Larry Erguiza is held GUILTY of Rape and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim AAA P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to give support to AAAs offspring.
SO ORDERED.[24]
since, by the very nature of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the
complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime.[27]
In the case at bar, the CA upheld the conclusion of the RTC in finding the complainant credible, to
wit:
The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age, like AAA,
deserve full credence and should not be dismissed as mere fabrication
especially where they have absolutely no motive to testify against the
accused-appellant as in this case.Larry even admitted that AAA had no ill
motive for charging him with rape. The Supreme Court in several cases, ruled
that full credence is accorded the testimony of a rape victim who has shown
no ill motive to testify against the accused. This being so, the trial court did
not err in giving full credence to AAA's testimony.[28]

Hence, herein appeal.

This Court does not agree with the CA.

[25]
In his appeal Brief, appellant raises the following errors: The Court is not unmindful of the general rule that findings of the trial court regarding credibility of

witnesses are accorded great respect and even finality on appeal.[29] However, this principle does
1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVLEY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE, THUS UNBELIEVABLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE not preclude a reevaluation of the evidence to determine whether material facts or circumstances
COMPLAINANT AAA.
have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial court. [30] In the past, this Court has not
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
hesitated to reverse a judgment of conviction, where there were strong indications pointing to the
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECTUION EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND possibility that the rape charge was false.[31]
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Generally, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
3. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. And so long as her testimony meets
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI CORROBORATED BY THE
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.[26]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 274

the test of credibility and unless the same is controverted by competent physical and testimonial evidence, headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.[37] Afterwards, the police brought

the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[32] complainant to YYY District Hospital[38] where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said hospital,

conducted the examination on complainant. On cross-examination, BBB testified that the family of

After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds that there is testimonial evidence appellant offered her money to settle the case.[39]

that contradicts the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable

doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. The testimony of CCC, the father of AAA, was the lone rebuttal witness of the prosecution. In order to rebut the

Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of rape having taken place as narrated by allegation made by appellant's family that the present case was filed because appellant's family

complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles (Juanita) did a poor job in preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito,

corroborated the alibi of appellant. CCC testified that on the contrary, the wedding went smoothly.[40] CCC further claimed that the

family of appellant knelt before him crying and offered money to settle the case.[41] Moreover, CCC

Before dwelling on the testimonies of Juanita and Joy, the Court shall first scrutinize the testimonial testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000.

evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense.

On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses,

Aside from the testimony of complainant, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. namely: Juanito Macaraeg (Macaraeg), Albina Erguiza (Albina), Juanita and Joy.

James Sison, BBB, and CCC. The pertinent portions of their testimonies may be summarized as follows:

Macaraeg, the caretaker of the mango orchard, testified that he did not see appellant on any

Dr. James Sison testified that he conducted the medical examination of complainant. His diagnosis was occasion in the orchard.[42] More specifically, Macaraeg emphasized that he did not see appellant

that there was a significant laceration completely healed at the 11:00 o'clock position.[33] However, on January 5, 2000.[43]However, on cross-examination, he testified that the house of appellant is

Dr. Sison testified that his findings were not conclusive, but were rather suggestive that complainant was only a three-minute walk from the mango orchard and probably a minute if one walks fast. [44]

raped. Furthermore, as to the question of paternity of the child of complainant, Dr. Sison suggested doing

a DNA match.[34] Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she was with appellant at the

house of CCC and BBB preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and appellant's

BBB testified the she brought AAA to her grandmother, a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on brother Carlito. She said that they left the house of CCC at around 5:00 p.m.[45] Albina narrated

the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of complainant's throat and the absence of her monthly that when they arrived home, at around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as

period.[35] After examining complainant, the hilot told BBB that her daughter was pregnant. AAA later the wife of appellant was having some labor pains.[46] She said that appellant and the hilot arrived

revealed that she was raped by appellant.[36] BBB further testified that she accompanied AAA to the police at around 5:30 p.m.[47] According to Albina appellant never left their house.[48]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 275


On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she had an altercation with BBB regarding the bills
and that they never resolved their quarrel.[49] She spoke to BBB and CCC because she learned that they
were falsely accusing appellant of raping AAA.[50] After talking to BBB and CCC, she and her husband
confronted appellant and asked if he had raped complainant, which appellant denied. [51] Albina claimed
that CCC and BBB were demanding P1,000,000.00 and that they later reduced it
[52]
to P250,000.00. Albina said that she offered P5,000.00 to BBB and CCC only to preserve their
relationship as in-laws and for peace.[53]
In sum, with the exception of the claim of AAA that she was raped by appellant, other evidence presented
by the prosecution did not identify appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on certain
points, more notably the claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case. This,
however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and
jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.[54] In the case at bar, the offer of compromise was first testified to by BBB on
cross-examination, to wit:
Q. Is it not a fact that there was an offer by you to the mother of the accused that they
pay you 1 million and you have reduced it to P250,000.00?
A. No, sir, it was they who were the ones offering for settlement, but we never offer
them any settlement, sir.[55]
On rebuttal, CCC corroborated the testimony of BBB that the family of appellant offered to settle the case,
to wit:
Q. And according to Larry Erguiza as well as his witnesses they told the Honorable
Court that you and your wife are demanding from Larry Erguiza and his
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
parents the amount of one million pesos so that you will not file this
case against the accused, what can you say about that?
A. There is no truth about that, sir.
Q. And what is the truth about it?
A. It was they who went to my house, they even knelt before me crying and
they were offering money, sir.[56]
However, Albina, the mother of appellant, denied the foregoing allegations, to wit:
Q. What happened when you went to the house of BBB and CCC talking with
them about their problem of the alleged rape on AAA, their daughter?
A. They were asking for a settlement price for one million pesos but we have
no money, sir.
Q. What did you do when they were asking one million pesos from you?
A. We told them that we do not have that money until they reduced the price
to P250,000.00 but we have no money because we are poor, sir.
Q. Were you around when BBB testified to the witness stand?
A. I was here, sir.
Q. Did you hear what BBB said that you were the one offering money?
A. Yes, sir, I was here and I heard that.
Q. What can you say to that allegation of BBB?
A. That is not true, sir. She was saying that we were the ones offering money
for one million to them but she was telling a lie, it was they who were
asking for one million pesos, sir.
Q. What is your proof that is was they who are demanding the amount of one
million and reduced that to two hundred fifty thousand
(P250,000.00)?
A. We already left because we cannot afford to give that much, sir.
Q. Aside from the fact that you do not have money, was there any reason or
what was your other reason in going there?
A. Our reason in talking to them was that when Larry said that he did not
commit the alleged rape and so we went there to talk to them so that
we could preserve our relationship as in-laws even if it is for the sake
of peace we could try our best to cope up even P5,000.00 just for the
sake of peace because our intention in going to their house was to
extract the truth, sir.[57]
Page 276
 victim, respectively[63] Their testimonies relating to the offer of settlement simply contradict each

On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements: other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not consider the alleged offer of settlement in

Q. Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your parents and you were resolving the case.
pleading to the parents of AAA not to continue anymore the case, is it not?
A. Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship will not be destroyed,
sir. Thus, the Court now considers the testimonies of Juanita and Joy.

Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?

A. No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA, sir.
Testimony of Juanita Angeles
Q. But the family of AAA did not agree to the pleadings of your parents that the case
be not filed anymore, is it not? Juanita, a hilot, testified that appellant fetched her at around 5:10 in the afternoon of January 5,
A. They will agree if we will pay then 1 million, but we do not have 1 million, sir.
2000.[64] She asserted that they arrived at the house of appellant at 5:30 p.m. She said that
Q. Did you offer them 1 million?
A. No, sir. They were the ones who told that to us.[58] (Emphasis Supplied) appellant's wife gave birth at dawn at 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000.[65] Juanita said that appellant

was with her the entire time and never left the house.[66]

Testimony of Joy Agbuya

The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant as

evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover,
For a better perspective on the testimony of Joy, it is necessary to repeat the testimony of
appellant was not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
AAA. AAA testified that on January 5, 2000, she was accompanied by 12-year-old Joy and the

latter's brother Ricky Agbuya (Ricky) to the mango orchard at the back of the elementary school to
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party
pick fallen mangoes. Further, complainant claims that she was left behind by Joy and Ricky when
himself.[59] Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to
her shorts got hooked to the fence and that while she was unhooking her pants from the fence,
settle the case is an implied admission of guilt,[60] we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to
appellant grabbed her and raped her.[67]
amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the

proposed compromise.[61]Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not present at the time
This was however contradicted by Joy, to wit:
the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the
Q. How many times did you go to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg?
prosecution.[62] A. Three (3) times, sir.

Q. When you usually go to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg, where

In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to the testimonies did you met [sic] with AAA?
A. In their house, I dropped by her house, sir.
of Albina, on the one hand, and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 277

 Q. Was there an occasion wherein you brought your brother Ricky when you Q. After April, you did not talk to AAA anymore?
went with AAA to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg? A. No more, sir.
A. No, sir.
Q. Your friendship was severed?
Q. Are we made to understand that Ricky, your brother did not go even once to A. Yes, sir.
the mango orchard of Maning Macaraeg?
A. Yes, sir. Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court why your friendship became
severed?
Q. According to AAA in her sworn statement she stated that in [sic] January 5, A. Because she quarreled with me, sir.
2000 you were with your brother Ricky and AAA in going to the mango
orchard, what can you say about that? Q. And because you quarreled, that is the reason why you are now testifying
A. What she is saying is not true. I was not with my brother, sir. I did not tug him against her?
along with me. A. Yes, sir.[70]

Q. It is also said by AAA that you left her behind in the mango orchard when her
pants was hooked, what can you say about that?
On re-direct examination, Joy clarified, thus:
A. No, sir I waited for her.
Q. Madam Witness, you said that you have a quarrel with the private
Q. Are we made to understand Madam Witness, that there was no instance or
complainant, AAA, will you please tell this Honorable Court what
never that happened that you left her in the mango orchard alone?
is the reason or cause of your quarrel with AAA?
A. No, sir, I waited for her and both of us went home together, sir.
A. Because they wanted me to say another statement that I left AAA
behind, sir.[71] (Emphasis supplied)
Q. Going back to the occasion wherein you were with AAA, who were with you
in going back home? On re-cross examination, Joy gave the following answers to the questions of
A. Just the two (2) of us, sir.
Prosecutor Reintar:
Q. In your way home, where did you part or separate with each other?
A. In front of the store of auntie Beth, sir.[68] Q. You said that the reason for your quarrel is that they wanted you to change
your statement, that you left behind AAA, who are those they,
xxxx that you are referring to?

Q. Is AAA your bestfriend? INTERPRETER

A. Yes, sir. No answer.

Q. Since you said that AAA is your bestfriend was there an occasion wherein she told Witness
you that she was raped? I, sir.
A. None, sir.[69] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
PROS. REINTAR
Q. Who told you to change your statement that you left AAA behind?
A. Because they are saying that I will change my statement that I left
On cross-examination, Prosecutor Ely Reintar elicited the following statements from Joy: AAA but I did not sir.

Q. In the year 2000, when was the last time that you talked to AAA?
Q. Who are these who are telling that?
A. April, sir.
A. They, sir.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 278

 Q. Will you please mention them?
A. BBB, only her, sir.[72]
The testimony of 12-year-old Joy makes it impossible for the appellant to have raped AAA the way
complainant narrated it, to wit:
Q. You try to understand clearly the question, Madam Witness, and may I repeat that,
at the time of the rape when according to you, you were the one raped, where
were Joy and Ricky Agbuya?
A. They left ahead of me because my short pants was hooked at the fence so I was
left behind, sir.
Q. Were you able to remove the pants of yours at the fence?
A. I was removing it sir, when he suddenly grabbed me.
Q. And who is this person you are referring to as the one who grabbed you?
A. Larry Erguiza, sir.[73]
Put simply, complainant could not have been raped because Joy waited for complainant when the latters
shorts got hooked to the fence and thereafter both went home together. The Court finds no cogent reason
for Joy to lie and say that she had waited for complainant and that they both went home together. She had
nothing to gain for lying under oath. Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing or claim that Joy was
related to or was a close friend of appellant or his family. On the contrary, Joy considers herself the
[74]
best-friend and playmate of complainant.
When Prosecutor Reintar questioned her as to her understanding of the oath she took, Joy answered,
[75]
That I will swear to God, sir. x x x The truth, sir. Furthermore, Joy did not succumb to pressure even as
she was being conscientiously examined by Prosecutor Reintar. Joy boldly testified that BBB, the mother
of complainant, was forcing her to change her statement.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are damaging to the case of the
prosecution: first, that Joy did not leave behind AAA when the latters shorts got hooked to the
fence; and secondly, that Joy and AAA left the orchard, went home together and separated at
their Aunt Beth's house, indicating that no untoward incident, much less rape, was committed by
appellant at the time and place that complainant had testified on.
Necessarily, either Joy or AAA lied under oath. It was thus critical for the prosecution to show that
Joy gave false statements.
Unfortunately for AAA, the prosecution miserably failed to rebut Joys testimony. Neither
complainant nor Ricky, BBB or any other witness was called to the witness stand to refute Joys
testimony. True, it is up to the prosecution to determine who to present as witnesses.[76] However,
considering that the testimony of Joy critically damaged the case of the prosecution, it behooved
the prosecution to present evidence to rebut the defense evidence. Witnesses such as Ricky,
AAA and BBB should have been presented by the prosecution to demolish Joy's testimony. The
testimony of Ricky is particularly significant, especially since AAA claimed that he was with her
and his sister Joy at the mango orchard on the day of the alleged rape incident. The failure on the
part of the prosecution to present Ricky or AAA bolsters the defense evidence, that no rape
happened on the date and time claimed by AAA.
The prosecution presented CCC, the father of complainant, as it's lone rebuttal
witness.[77] However, the testimony of CCC covered facts and issues not related to the testimony
of Joy. The testimony of CCC merely rebutted the allegation made by appellant's family that the
present case was filed because appellant's family did a poor job of preparing for the wedding
of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito. To this, CCC testified that on the contrary,
the wedding went smoothly.[78] Furthermore, CCC claimed that the family of appellant knelt before
him crying and offered money to settle the case.[79] In addition, CCC testified that appellant left his
Page 279
house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000. Thus, the testimony of CCC did not in any way rebut the testimony

of Joy. Consequently, in view of the unrebutted testimony of Joy, appellants defense of alibi and denial

assumes considerable weight. It is at this point that the issue as to the time that the rape was

Further, Joy testified that during the three times she went with AAA to the mango orchard, the time was committed plays a significant factor in determining the guilt or innocence of appellant. This Court

1:00 p.m.[80] However, AAA testified that she went to the mango orchard with Joy at 4:00 p.m. [81] The must therefore address this issue for a thorough evaluation of the case.

variance in the testimonies of Joy and AAA as to the time they went to the mango orchard on the day of the The Court takes note that Macaraeg, the caretaker of the orchard, testified that appellant's house

alleged rape incident may be disregarded as they are de minimis in nature and do not relate to the was only a minute away from the orchard if one would run.

commission of the crime. There is a common point uniting the testimonies of both Joy and AAA; that is,

that both referred to the day when AAAs short got hooked to the fence. As earlier mentioned, CCC testified that appellant left CCC's house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5,

2000, contrary to the testimony of Albina that she and appellant left at 5:00 p.m. AAA declared

Moreover, assuming arguendo that the variance between the testimonies of AAA and Joy as to the time that the alleged rape took place after 5:00 p.m.

they were together at the mango orchard is an indicia that AAA may have been raped by appellant on a Q. So at 4:00 o'clock you were at the house and you left and proceeded at
the back of the school to pick mangoes?
different day, not on January 5, 2000, to still impute to appellant the crime of rape is not plausible.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was already around 5:00 o'clock?

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape is A. Yes, sir. I asked my companion Joy.

extraneous to and is not an element of the offense, such that any inconsistency or discrepancy as to the Q. What did you ask of her?
same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a ground for acquittal. [82]
Such, however, finds no application to A. She was wearing a wristwatch and I asked Joy what time is it and
when I looked at her wristwatch, it was already 5:00 o'clock,
the case at bar. AAA and Joy may differ in their testimonies as to the time they were at the mango orchard, sir.[83] (Emphasis Supplied)

but there could be no mistake as to the actual day when AAA was supposed to have been raped; it was the

day when AAA's shorts got hooked to the fence at the mango orchard. Moreover, on cross-examination, AAA gave the following statements, to wit:

The RTC and CA unwittingly brushed aside the testimonies of Juanita and Joy and gave full credence to Q. So it is almost 5:00 p.m. When you went to the mango orchard with
Joy Agbuya and Ricky Agbuya?
the testimony of AAA. As a matter of fact, their probative weight were not considered or evaluated in the
A. What I only know was that, it was already about 5:00 o'clock then, sir.
text of the lower courts' decision.
Q. How many minutes did you consume in getting mangoes?
A. When we went there, we were not able to get some mango and when I
asked sir what was the time then and when I looked at the
As mentioned earlier, the prosecution could have rebutted the testimony of Joy, but for some reason or
wristwatch, it was already 5:00 o'clock, sir.[84] (Emphasis
oversight, it chose not to do so. Supplied)

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 280

 provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional

The testimony of Joy makes it impossible for AAA to have been raped at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. or any time presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.[90]

thereafter since it was not rebutted that Joy never left complainant at the mango orchard even when AAA's

shorts got hooked to the fence, and both went home together without any other untoward incident. It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that

conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.[91] What is required of it is to justify

This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a defense, appellant must establish the conviction of the accused with moral certainty.[92] Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this

by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the
[85]
offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[93]

In the case at bar, although the orchard is just a minute away from the house of appellant, in WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in

view of the testimony of the hilot Juanita that appellant was with her from 5:10 p.m. and never left his CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Larry Erguiza is ACQUITTED and

house from that time until his wife gave birth at 3:00 a.m.; and the testimony of Joy that she never left AAA ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful

in the orchard and that they both went home together, the defense of alibi assumes significance or cause.
[86]
strength when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness. Thus, the Court finds that appellant's alibi

is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and

to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually

What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond released from confinement.
[87]
reasonable doubt -- moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The conflicting testimonies of Joy and

complainant, and the testimony of Juanita that corroborated appellants alibi preclude the Court from Costs de oficio.

convicting appellant of rape with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.
[88]
Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule. Thus, where

the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is HAROLD V. TAMARGO, G.R. No. 177727
Petitioner,
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
Present:
[89]
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 281

- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail
ANTIPORDA and LICERIO
ANTIPORDA, JR., Franzielle.[7] Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought
Respondents. Promulgated:
January 19, 2010 to Manila for detention and trial.[8]

x---------------------------------------------------x
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit

DECISION wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent
CORONA, J.:

Romulo Awingan (alias Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as
[1] [2]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the November 10, 2006 decision and May 18, 2007
masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. [9] The

resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610.

former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around
killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo

5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had
was acting as private prosecutor.

no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an

Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a
affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking

complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. [10]
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was

one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating

the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.[4] prosecutor[11] who subjected him to clarificatory questions.[12]

After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a
prosecutor[5] issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and
candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was
three John Does.[6] On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed against

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 282

instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal

Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.

by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were
dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements
dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the
against respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to
Sandiganbayan.[13]
his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center. [16]

During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department

handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the of Justice (DOJ).[17] On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,

letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.[18] He opined that the

tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent

in the killings.[14] Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein recantation and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of

the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. respondents.[19] Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and

assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.[20]

Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a

clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion for

letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. [21] This time, he declared

voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even

had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.[15] if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. [22] As a result, on August 22, 2005,

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 283

the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying

denied petitioners MR. out the conspiracy.

The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was consolidated with

Informations in an order dated October 26, 2005.[23] Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The CA denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a

inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge decision dated August 24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of respondents

Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, Antiporda.[24]

2005. She ruled that, based on Columnas March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed an
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the
amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision in
Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.

Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had
CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder
as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
against respondents.

In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the RTC
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there
judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was no
evidence but did not give credit to Columnas recantation.
probable cause against all the accused. It also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not

admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by

piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was limiting her evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 284

completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columnas extrajudicial confession
was inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of
lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial
court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.[25] It may either agree
or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[26] The court
must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused.[27]
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1) Columnas
affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of
this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the
May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutors recommendation to file the murder charges.[28]
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004
letter to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his participation
in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that neither
he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders and (3) his testimony during the October 22,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25,
2004 affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez[29] that
[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree
upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter
to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not
go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold.[30] (Emphasis
supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have
seen that, aside from the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on
them. We quote with approval the reflections of the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving
the motion to withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the guidelines
for an independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of the
case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of the
accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking
at everything made available to her at that point of the cases. No less than
that was expected and required of her as a judicial officer. According
to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent assessment
of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits,
documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the
public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the
court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at
the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.[31]
Page 285
 Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to

8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the

acta. conspiracy.[37] Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine

rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. [32] Consequently, an them.[38]

extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other
co-accused[33] and is considered as hearsay against them.[34] The reason for this rule is that:
piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding
upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore,
it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should
be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
evidence against him.[35]
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section

Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going
through a full blown court case.[39] When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary

investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared from
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is
the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. [40] The rule is all the more
shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.[36] Thus, in order that the

admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 286


significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant
to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna.[41]
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself
whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as
co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against respondents,
her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the petitions for certiorari
of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more
transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the
significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the
ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million
Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air
and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged
that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for
Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on
Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and
Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of
Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Page 287
 Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin
issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. [3] Two days later
or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of
the petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded
that the petitioner take the supreme self-sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also
joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department
of Social Welfare and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners resignation.[7] However, petitioner
strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of
Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister
Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar
Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. [9] On November 3, Senate President
Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from
the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in
both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker
Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as
prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo,
Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors
led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as
defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of
Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the
House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was
covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating.Its high and low points were
the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings
was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she
was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000. [15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On
January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took the witness
stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was
facing charges of insider trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of
11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose
Velarde. The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a
spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner
and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering
their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with
the impeachment tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of
the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A
10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity
in demanding petitioners resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro
Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all
masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people. [21]
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes,
together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. [22] In the presence of
former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators,
General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the
Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government. [23] A
little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a
similar stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of
the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations
for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the
Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel
Fernandez, head of the presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent
Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance
Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.[27] Outside the palace, there was a
brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in
stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news
Page 288
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the
EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace. [29] He issued
the following press statement:[30]
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: [31]
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January
20.[32] Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it
was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the
following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath
of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the
urgent request of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court,
dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court
Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a
proper party.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign governments swiftly
followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats
recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House
of Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of
the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the
House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations
goals under the Constitution.[39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. [40] A few
days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act. [41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
Page 289
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John
Osmea voted yes with reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of
respondent Arroyos presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert
Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingonas nomination in
Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later. [46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that
she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to
decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still
qualified to run for another elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked
up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the
ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted
President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in
Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very
poor class.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption;
(2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000
for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury,
serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000
for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No.
0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate
the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with
the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de
Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel,
petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken
her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day,
February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring
on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15
and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before
the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused
themselves on motion of petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked
the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they
have thrown their weight on one side but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties
were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit
their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and
press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the
office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement
justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of
being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of
the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news
reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will
make the cases at bar moot and academic.[53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
Page 290
 I x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I part of any branch or instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and
hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the
cases at bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President
of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by
foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the
Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts
in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and
on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law. [55] In the United States,
the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr.
Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the
impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is
inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground
of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of
political cases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for
a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.[57] Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when
it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. [60] With the
new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the
1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section
18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to x x x review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver
A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis
that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo,
they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are
inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the
result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the
Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a
successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
Page 291
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent
Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under
the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the
sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on
freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance
which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was
one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the
clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the
reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in
1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his
ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of
association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to
send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were preserved
when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and
the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of
assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and
fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining
the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the
progress of a society can take place without destroying the society. [70] In Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,[71] this function of free speech and assembly was
echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the
expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by
all.[72] In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly
stressed that "... it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is
the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal
issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine
has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in
the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a
political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable
from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President,
the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President,
the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then acts as President until President or Vice President shall have been
elected and qualified.
x x x.
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 The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as
of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14 th President of the Republic. Resignation is
not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.[78] The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before
he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow
the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit
as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary
of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal
refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of
January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their
grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside
like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that in morning
of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence,
they decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner
pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na
ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30,
p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At
3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the
petitioner and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge
of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option
of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky
was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the
urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that
petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a
graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. [84] At 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five
days to a week in the palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the
reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace
period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up
Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate
to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was
already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner
was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at
12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3)
points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of
the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to
vindicate the name of the petitioner.[87] Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was
not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to
Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following
entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
xxx
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately
stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second
envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na
ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too
painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]
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Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when
he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the
following happened:
Oppositions deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective
on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
president and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person
and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are
guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector
throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the
Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President
(Macapagal).
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will
authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject
savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the
Transition Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the
outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function
under Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the
necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and
observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor
provided for in Annex A heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has
resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of
the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were
the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the
resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was
ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her
oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the fateful events, viz:[90]
xxx
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 11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect
a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear
voices in the background.
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January
2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start
orientation activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority Vice President.
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B heretofore
attached to this agreement.
xxx
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What
about the agreement)? I asked.
Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?
And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter
is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the
documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General
Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the
other side, as it is important that the provision on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will
administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The president is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and
Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only
the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their
support for the President.
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal
possessions as they can.
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During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt,
he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which
he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of
absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said
letter, viz:
Sir
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law
and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its
preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value,
was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not
the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him
to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he
was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any
circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his
resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it
was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioners
resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the
people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners
letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues
that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it
was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill,
reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that
no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the period of
amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
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The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed.
Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision
mainly focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original
bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official
with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law
ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a
public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to
render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.[94] A public official has the right not to
serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official
is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not
cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his
resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit.Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction
to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates
of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and
the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As
aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the
same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of
Article VII.[95] This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on
leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses,
voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the
powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House;
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 (2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it

(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which
states:
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend
its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment
of the Nations goals under the Constitution.

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE Adopted,

ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION
AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE
Speaker
CONSTITUTION

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him; (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus
by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the
individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must
ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the
attainment thereof;
Secretary General
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
178[98] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of
such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation,
to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority
Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines;

WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 298

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the
Philippines - qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the
Senate signed the following:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change
and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes and overcome
the nations challenges.[99]
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members
of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority
Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Phillippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence,
and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship,
having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice. Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice
President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
Page 299
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any
recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to
govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses
of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.Following Taada v.
Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the
government. Or to use the language in Bakervs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question
is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo
is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from allkinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity
will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a
Page 300
case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a
Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E.
Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila,
respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition,
this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded
and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the
law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference
of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an
act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means,
simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may
not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of
his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and
the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly
as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This
remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property
rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not
do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official
duty, any more that it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public
policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority
was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not
protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such,
must answer for the consequences of his act.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief
executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials
of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a
distrust as to the integrity of government itself.[105]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on
executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of
the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie
for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of
this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All
The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners
learned counsel, former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive
privilege. To quote his disquisition:
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying
the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only from civil
claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it
would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we
broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they
government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said
that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept
of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of
Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency
immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public
trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism the king can do no
wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The
following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108]
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in
striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit
Page 301
under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the
first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the
President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument
that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a
better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and
yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President,
for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the
impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be
necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his
resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal
and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada
cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman
that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of
a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal
a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President
Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers.Seven advisers of President
Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate
Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted
co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that
the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and
removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was
rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme
Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official
acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case
of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is
that a public office is a public trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
Page 302
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. [121] It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman and
endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given
fiscal autonomy.[124] These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim
that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.[125] The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and
stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. [126] The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this
issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials
or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. [127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in
the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a
fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the
facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit
who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are
overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual
bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial
of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired
a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de
Leon, etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation
considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of
publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and
fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with
views not too many of which are sober and sublime.Indeed, even the principal actors in the case
the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media
blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials
cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
Page 303
 xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that the time this Nations organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or
partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a
shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys criminal process satisfy the
appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history,
supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine
v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the
First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees
of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which
had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of
assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the
draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media
have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity
and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right
to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the
DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of
proof.[131] He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the
office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner
that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with
its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to
the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with
bias. To quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the
barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him
by the mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent
Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy
of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this
Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be
reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be
compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding
of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the
proper court.
VI.
Page 304
 Epilogue
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the
majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized
as the most fundamental of all freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and
less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall
have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient
vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated
by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy,
the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has
proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be,
is the key to mans progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to
some peoples prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO, appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
There can be no greater violation of a persons right to feel safe and secure than the crime of
rape. When one commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that persons body; more
importantly, he defiles that persons mind. When the victim is a little child, the act and the perpetrator
himself assume a bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human beings. Yet, the law must apply
equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision[1] dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos,
Davao del Sur, finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia[2] guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the penalty
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
of death, and ordering him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will
to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia
testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)[3]and Kimberly
(1 year old)[4] at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At
the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon,
Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a
neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any
information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m.,
Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.[5] Amalia
rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters
from their house.[6] She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread
apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was
oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer
inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns private organ. [7]
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a
certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises
were the relatives and parents of the appellant.[8] The quack doctor found both dried blood and
fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being
(sic) raped.[9] At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had
seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.[10] At this point, the parents of appellant
told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the
amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.[11] Police officers came and brought
Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalias statement was taken.[12]
On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del
Sur. Dr. Patricio Hernane, the municipal health officer,[13] conducted a genital examination of
Remelyn, and made the following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Page 305
Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried blood are
(sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 oclock (sic) are noted
with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not extending to the perineum. No
lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.[14]
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object,
such as the penis of a man.[15]
On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.[16] Amalia stated therein that Remelyn
had told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos.[17] (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.)
Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy,
she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.[18]
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their
area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after
registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw
appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.[19] He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of
Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.[20]
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had
been raped. He proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for
examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant
committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud[21] and the other tanods of the
incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the police the information that
appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took appellant for investigation. [22]
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March
1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National
Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left
and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellants aunt, to ask for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish
composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina,
alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place
where Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried
Daylen.[23] They reached Catalinas place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of
appellant. Dodo Malon and appellants parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo
Malon left, after partaking of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997),
appellant and Dodo Malon went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of
his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated.[24] He
claimed that it was Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex Totong Loyola. Totong testified that on
24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering,
they went home to appellants house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano,
for their kinilaw. In Catalinas house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and
her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.[25] Catalinas daughter directed them to the place where she was
gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It was then
about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them appellant, Totong,
Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalinas house for the vinegar. Appellant and
Totong returned to appellants house where they spent the night. [26] Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m.
the following day, and left appellants house. Totong came to know of appellants arrest the
following day.[27]
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She relates that on 24 March 1997,
she was gathering tuba, at a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her
youngest child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her house.[28] At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and
Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish
gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the formers house, had a drinking
spree, and then parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to
Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At that time, appellant
was already at the house of Catalinas younger sister, which is located across the river, about 4
kilometers away.[29]
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
In his Brief[30] to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial
court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic)
GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH
CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.
Page 306
 We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[31]
The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon
Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of
the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house.[32] As a neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather,
Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in
identifying the victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn
emerged naked from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was
crying and walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyns private organ was bleeding and excreting a
white mucus-like substance.[33]
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to her mother that it was
appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove[34] and forced her to do something against her will.[35]
There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the
Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal
lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the
aforementioned circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant
contends, first, that Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the husband of
Amalia.[36] He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw
him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for
Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the
fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested her. Third, he
maintains that the accusation of flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by
his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him,[37] while the offer of compromise
he allegedly made to Amalias husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as
evidence for being hearsay.[38] Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and
Cabano should not be counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the strength
of the prosecutions evidence.
We reject appellants arguments.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik
is a relative by affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship
to one of the parties, without a showing of any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to
impair the credibility of the witness.[39] In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive for
Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also,
he assails Mik for failing to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the
inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying
home.[40] For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn
toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyns fate. But thereafter, he lost no time in
reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.[41] As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in the
pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay. [42] These subsequent actions strengthen
Miks credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Miks narration of the events over the testimonies
of Cabano and Loyola. It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of
the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but
also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could
alter the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the
assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Miks testimony. Given
the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position
to assess his demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not. [43] The trial court found
Miks testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have no reason to
reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that
he sexually molested her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, Crazy
Lendoy forced me.[44] Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she could
not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that children,
particularly very young children, make the perfect victims. They naturally follow the authority of
adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The childs
age and developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and
therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has happened to
her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because
they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences
from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover,
they have a limited vocabulary.[45] The fact that Remelyn called appellant Buang or crazy shows
that he did something which she knew was not right or proper. By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn
clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her limited comprehension, the
child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must
also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word rape in Visayan parlance.
Page 307
 Appellants charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not
pivotal to his guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither will it affect
the penalty or the award of damages rendered against him.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the
appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against
him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise
allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It
was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer,[46] and she was not a party to the conversation which
allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on
his personal knowledge or perception.[47] The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants
parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony[48] of Amalia. However, following the principle
of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,[49] the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant,
since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of
compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against
appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Appellants defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim
that it was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at
the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant
carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and
the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house,
raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m.,
he could then have returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC
office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The
discrepancies in the witnesses narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina
was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and appellant actually
parted ways, are not mere trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses because of the passage of
time. To make matters worse, the appellants testimony was, at times, contradicted by his own
witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellants statement that Totong had already left
his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and Catalinas own averments that Totong had stayed
the night at appellants house. These contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellants
tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information
states that appellant, by means of force and intimidationwillfully, unlawfully and feloniously (had) carnal
knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.[50] (emphasis
ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven years old when she was
violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659
introduced seven new attendant circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to qualified
rape, punishable by death. We again stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the information to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he must be
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
tried.[51] The main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the information
is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if
he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death,
although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment
was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.[52]
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that
when there is a finding that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory.[53] If the death penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be P75,000.00;
otherwise the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.[54] Thus, the appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.[55]
We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without
need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. [56]
We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of
complainant as proper because complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the
offense against her was committed with the aggravating circumstance[57] of age. However, the
amount awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[58]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos,
Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the
crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to
pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Page 308
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784, reversing the Order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Manila and dismissing the criminal case for slight physical
injuries against respondent on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one
hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement
was reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for
slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999
recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the
date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information
was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June
12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC denied said petition
and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision
wherein it held that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a
Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense
had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it
effectively terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP
Sulla, his designated alter ego, to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have
been taken as late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on
June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use once again the language of
Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much more than the prescriptive period of only two
(2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court on June 20,
2000. x x x3 (Emphasis supplied)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed Orders of both courts below
and Criminal Case No. 344030-CR, entitled: "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, -versus-
Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista, Accused," is ordered DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision. The
Court gives due course to the petition notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion
for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA before the filing of herein petition. It is not a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of
the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However,
the sole issue for resolution in this case is whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after
the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against
respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence
to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine
Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation for the filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription
began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. 6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of
the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
Page 309
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or
negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People
v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to
file the requisite complaint.8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in the present
petition considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court
but in the filing of the Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor to file the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of the
information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended
party to vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the
proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors’ apparent lack of a sense of urgency in fulfilling their mandate.
Under the circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative
disciplinary action against the erring public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72784 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 02-103990 is hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of herein Decision for appropriate
action against the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131040. October 5, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MICHAEL FRAMIO
SABAGALA, accused-appellant.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City,
Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. TCS-1822, finding the accused-appellant Michael Framio
Sabagala guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant Annie P. Cosip,[2] in the amount of P30,000.00.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 2, 1992, an Information for rape was filed against Michael Framio Sabagala by
Prosecutor Mamerta V. Paradiang, thus:
The undersigned upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party, accuses MICHAEL
FRAMIO SABAGALA, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1992 at 6:00 oclock in the afternoon, more or less, in
Barangay Punod, Municipality of Pinamungahan,[3] Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with Annie P. Cosip.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Annie P. Cosip, Marcelino Boro, [5] Dr. Alfredo
Soberano, and Dolores Cosip.
Private complainant Annie P. Cosip testified that she was 14 years old, single, student and
a resident of Punod, Pinamungajan, Cebu.[6] On February 14, 1992, at around 5:30 p.m., while
she was on her way home to Punod, she was accosted by appellant, a suitor whose suit she had
refused because they were third degree cousins. Immediately after her refusal, he dragged her
towards the banana plants. She shouted for help as appellant pushed her down. When she
struggled to free herself, appellant boxed her.
Despite her resistance by means of fistic blows, kicks and bites, appellant was able to tear
her dress and pull down her panty. Since he was physically stronger and because she was
already tired, appellant succeeded in having sex with her. At around this time a certain Marcelino
Boro came by and shouted at appellant who immediately stood up and walked away. Annie
headed home. When she reached her house, she did not immediately tell her mother of her ordeal
because she was threatened by appellant not to tell anyone. It was Marcelino Boro who informed
her mother about the incident.
Page 310
 Accompanied by her mother, Annie reported the matter to the Barangay Captain on February 17,
1992, and the next day they went to Dr. Alfredo Soberano, the municipal health officer, who examined her.
On February 22, 1992, they went to the police station to file a complaint. She presented her torn skirt
and panty that had already been washed. She learned that appellant had been telling his friends that he
had his way with her. Annie denied appellants claims. She denied meeting appellant on February 9, 1992,
and other prior occasions. She said that the place of the incident was quite far from their house. She
testified that she had no boyfriend and Angelito Boro, [7] said to be her boyfriend, was just a friend.Neither
was it true, she said, that she and appellant have had an amorous relationship since May 3, 1991. [8] She
denied attending a disco dance with appellant at the Pinamungajan fiesta. She also denied she had asked
the chief of polices consent to visit appellant while the latter was in jail.
Marcelino Boro corroborated parts of Annies story. He testified that in the afternoon of February 14,
1992, while he was grazing his carabao at around 6:00 p.m., he heard a womans shout so he immediately
proceeded to the place where the shout came from. He saw appellant and private complainant. When
appellant saw him, the latter ran away. He approached complainant who was crying so he brought her
home and informed her mother what had happened.
Dr. Alfredo Soberano, municipal health officer of Pinamungajan, Cebu, conducted the examination
of private complainant on February 18, 1992, four days after the alleged incident. He testified that the
hymen of private complainant was ruptured and the vaginal wall was inflamed. There were hematomas in
the vaginal canal.
Dolores Cosip, mother of the complainant, testified that on February 14, past 6:00 in the evening,
her daughter arrived with Marcelino Boro. She said Marcelino told her about the incident. He told her that
her daughter was raped by Michael Sabagala.[9]
The defense, for its part, presented Hilaria[10] Sabagala, SPO4 Loreto Gines,[11] Orlando Sabagala,
appellant Michael Sabagala, and Judge Esmeraldo Cantero.
Hilaria Sabagala, appellants aunt, testified that she knew Annie. On February 8, 1992, she went to
Annies house to ask for some papers. When she arrived at their house, the door was open and she saw
Annie at the sala necking with Angelito Boro. As she left, she saw Annie and her brother arguing and the
latter struck the wall of their house.
SPO4 Loreto Gines was the Chief of Police of Pinamungajan at the time private complainant filed
her case. He testified that he saw several persons visit appellant during his detention, among them Annie
and her classmates. Annie asked for his permission to talk to appellant in his office and he acceded. After
Annie and appellant had talked to each other, he instructed the guard to put appellant back in his cell.
Orlando Sabagala, appellants younger brother, testified that on February 14, 1992, at around 6:00
p.m., he was walking home from the basketball court with Nestor Sabagala. [12] On the bridge of Punod,
they met Marcelino on a carabao and the latter even greeted them. On their way home they met appellant
together with Annie. Appellant told them to wait for him as he was just going to take Annie
home.[13] Appellant returned after 15 minutes.[14] The following day, February 15, he saw appellant
accompanying Annie to a dance being held at Punod.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Appellant Michael Sabagala testified that he was 21 years old, single, and a resident of
Punod, Pinamungajan, Cebu.[15] He alleged that on February 14, 1992, at about 4:00 p.m., he was
at Pinamungajan Provincial High School to pick up Annie because they had previously agreed
that he would fetch her.[16] They made this agreement on February 9, 1992, at the basketball court.
According to him, he and Annie were sweethearts. On February 14, they met at 5:00 p.m.
because Annie had classes earlier that day.Later, they went home passing the public market and
they got a ride up to Hagakhakan. They arrived at Hagakhakan at around 6:00 p.m. and from
there they walked towards the house of Annie in Punod. They were supposed to go to a dance but
found out that none would be held on that day. On the way to Annies house, they met appellants
brother Orlando and some friends, namely Nestor Marcelo[17]and Artemio Tangaro at the
bridge.[18] At around 7:00 p.m. he parted with Annie. On his way home, he met Marcelino
Boro.[19] The following day, February 15, he met Annie at the dance. [20] Annie went home at 2:00
a.m. of February 16. He did not accompany her anymore as she was with Angel Boro and her
older brother, Jojit Cosip.[21] He was arrested on February 24, 1992 and while detained, Annie
visited him to ask for his forgiveness for filing the case. She allegedly explained to him that it was
her mother who insisted on filing the case.[22]
Appellant denied raping Annie. He pointed out that on February 14, 1992, Annie was
wearing a school uniform, a blue skirt and a white blouse. [23] He said that the blue skirt presented
by the prosecution belonged to Annies sister and was not the one Annie wore on February
14.[24] On cross-examination appellant stated that he and Annie were sweethearts. He did not
know whether or not they were related by blood.[25] He stated that he did not visit her in the house
because her parents were strict and her mother might get angry.[26] He admitted that he asked
Annie to marry him although he was not the one who raped her. Annies mother turned down his
offer.[27]
Judge Esmeraldo Cantero testified that he is the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Toledo City.[28] He alleged that after the appellant had been arrested, he saw him
conversing with private complainant behind the office of the Chief of Police. [29]
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented private complainant. She denied having any
amorous relations with appellant and agreeing to meet him on February 14, 1992. She belied
appellants claim that she asked him for forgiveness, saying that she was only prevailed upon by
Loreto Gines, the chief of police and appellants uncle, to talk to appellant in his office. [30] She also
stated that she did not want to marry appellant because he was a savage. [31]
The defense presented appellant as sur-rebuttal witness. He testified that he and Annie
became sweethearts on May 3, 1991. He also alleged that there was a letter written to him by
complainant after the incident but this was confiscated by Barangay Captain Lauriano
Bagahansol.[32]
On October 1, 1996, the trial court rendered the decision finding appellant guilty of rape. Its
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this Court finds accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE under Art. 335 and hereby sentence the accused to suffer
Page 311
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the complainant the sum of P30,000.00. The bail bond
of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and the accused is immediately committed to CPDRC, Cebu
City.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Accused interposed seasonably this appeal, raising the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION NOT BASED ON THE
FACTS AND THE LAW;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED [IN] SOLELY RELYING ON THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
ACCUSED; AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.[34]
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
improbabilities. According to him, Annies allegation that she kicked appellant while she was lying down is
unbelievable, for kicking while lying down is beyond human capability and experience. [35] Likewise
improbable is Annies assertion that appellant was able to continue his sexual advances although she
shouted for help eight times. Appellant maintains that no one of sound mind would pursue his passionate
advances if the would-be victim had the chance to summon help by shouting, especially in remote
areas.[36] Appellant also questions complainants allegation that she reported the incident because he kept
on telling everybody that he had sexual intercourse with her. He insists that it is unlikely for him to readily
admit committing a heinous crime and at the same time warn complainant not to tell anybody. [37]
Likewise, appellant asserts that he could not have committed the crime near the house of Marcelino
Boro as the latter would most likely discover it.[38]
Appellant points out inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of Annie Cosip and
Marcelino Boro. These show that they are perjured witnesses, according to appellant. First, Annie testified
that appellant tore off her dress and panty while she was already lying down after he pushed
her.[39] However, she also testified that he had removed her skirt before he pushed her. [40] Second, Annie
vehemently denied that her skirt was merely lifted up.[41] However, Marcelino specifically stated that he
saw Annies skirt merely lifted by appellant while he was raping her.[42] Third, Annie initially testified that she
did not tell anyone of the crime and that she would have remained silent had she not learned that appellant
had been spreading the story that he had his way with her.[43] Later however, she testified that she told her
mother about the rape right after the incident, and she admitted that she lied in court about the time when
she told her mother of the rape.[44]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) paid little attention to the alleged
inconsistencies and contradictions raised by appellant in his brief. Findings of the trial court with regard to
the credibility of witnesses, according to the OSG, are generally not disturbed by appellate courts unless
certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the case.[45] The OSG likewise focused on the offer of marriage made by appellant to the victim
which it claims is an admission of guilt.[46]
From the arguments raised by appellant and the OSG, it is clear that the sole issue to be
resolved in this case is the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses.
It is an entrenched jurisprudential rule that when the issue is on the credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court [47] on the ground that it had
the advantage of having observed closely the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. Aside from
this, we are also guided by the following principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility, but it is difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2)
considering that only two persons are usually involved in the crime, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[48] With these in mind and after thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, we
entertain no doubt that appellant committed the crime charged.
Appellant assails Annies testimony for being riddled with inconsistencies and
contradictions. True, her testimony was not flawless as pointed out by appellant in his brief and as
we discovered on our own reading of the records. For example, Annie testified that her dress was
torn off after appellant pushed her.[49] However, she also claimed that appellant had already
removed her skirt before she was pushed.[50] Also, Annie alleged that she would not have told
anyone about the rape had appellant not spread the news that he was able to have his way with
her.[51] But upon further questioning, she changed her statement and said that she immediately
informed her mother about the rape.[52] Also, when asked what day February 9, 1992 was, Annie
confidently answered that it was a Tuesday and that she was in school on that date. [53] When
confronted that said date was a Sunday, Annie retracted her statement and stated that she could
no longer recall said date.[54] Subsequently, Annie also testified that she met the appellant prior to
February 14, 1992 in a seminar for the youth at Punod Primary School.[55] However, she again
withdrew this statement and stated that the seminar was held after the alleged incident of
rape,[56] not before. When she was again confronted to affirm her earlier statement that she had
met appellant prior to February 14, she just meekly answered, I cannot remember anymore. [57]
However, and this we have to emphasize, these inconsistencies pertain to inconsequential
and trivial matters. They do not, in any way, relate to the gravamen of the crime, that is, the fact of
carnal knowledge under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented.[58] Annie had consistently held during her testimony that
appellant forced her to have sex with him and that he succeeded in doing so, notwithstanding the
tremendous resistance she exerted to repel his undesired advances.
Rather than weaken her testimony, said inconsistencies tend to strengthen complainants
credibility as these prove that she was being spontaneous during her narration of the ordeal she
suffered at the hands of appellant, an indication that she was not a rehearsed witness. [59] It is too
much for us to expect a victim of a heinous crime, such as rape, to narrate her unfortunate
experience free from any mistake or error.[60] A rape victim is not and cannot be expected to keep
Page 312
an accurate account of her traumatic experience.[61] A court cannot expect a rape victim to remember SO ORDERED.
every ugly detail of the appalling outrage, especially so since she might in fact have been trying not to
remember them.[62] Moreover, it must be remembered that the victim was only a 14-year old barrio lass, far
from being a sophisticated woman who could be expected to weigh her every word with care so as to be
free of inconsistency.
[A.M. No. RTJ-95-1326. July 8, 1998]
Even the alleged contradiction between Annies testimony and that of Marcelino Boro, however,
refers to an immaterial aspect of this case. Annie testified that appellant pulled down her skirt, it was not
lifted up.[63] However, Marcelino specifically stated that Annies skirt was merely raised up while appellant
was doing the coital act.[64] What should be stressed here is that notwithstanding the above contradiction, ANNABELLE R. GUTIERREZ, complainant, vs. HON. RODOLFO G.
Marcelino proved to be consistent throughout his testimony. He testified that he heard cries for help and PALATTAO, respondent.
when he went to the source of these shouts, he saw appellant, with his pants lowered down to his knees,
having sexual intercourse with Annie.[65] He even categorically stated in court that, he (appellant) sexually
DECISION
abused Annie.[66] The defense failed to present any valid reason for Marcelino to lie in court except for the
flimsy and nonsensical insinuation that his son was the boy friend of Annie. This, to our mind, is not QUISUMBING, J.:
sufficient to compel Marcelino to perjure himself. Absent any showing of ill-motive on his part, his
testimony deserves full faith and credit.
Complainant Annabelle R. Gutierrez was convicted by respondent Judge Rodolfo G.
Between the positive and categorical testimony of a rape victim, duly corroborated by a disinterested Pallatao of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Manila, for Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
witness on one hand, and the appellants bare denial on the other, it is a time honored principle that the (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) and for Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal
former generally prevails, especially if there is no sufficient motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses Code. Aggrieved by what she perceived as a wrongful conviction, she filed this administrative
to falsely testify against appellant.[67] case against respondent for Serious Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly Rendering an
Unjust Decision, Falsification of Public Document, and Gross Ignorance of the Law. She averred
Appellant offered to marry private complainant in his desperate attempt to free himself from any that, since the checks that were the bases of the informations against her were not presented in
liability. In a number of cases, we have held that an offer of marriage is considered an admission of guilt by evidence by the prosecution, her conviction was erroneous and the respondent should be held
the accused.[68] If it were true that he did not commit the crime, there is no reason why appellant would go administratively liable therefor.
to the extent of offering to marry the woman who supposedly fabricated false charges against him. This is
not in accord with ordinary human experience. He would have stood his ground and defended his The material facts, based on the pleadings, are as follows:
innocence.
Complainant borrowed the sum of Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000)
In sum, we find no error in the finding of guilt made by the trial court. However, we see the need to from one Ligaya V. Santos, for which she issued five (5) checks as guarantee for the loan, to wit:
modify the award for damages to conform to current jurisprudence. The trial court awarded P30,000.00 to
private complainant as civil indemnity. This is not enough. Recent jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil Drawee Bank Check No. Date Amount
indemnity to be awarded for simple rape at P50,000.00.[69] Aside from this, an additional amount
of P50,000.00 should be awarded as moral damages.[70] This is because it is recognized that the victims
UCPB SRD022496 April 7, 1993 P120,000.00
injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant the award of
UCPB SRD022513 April 15, 1993 P 60,000.00
moral damages.[71] Lastly, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the offender should also pay to the
UCPB PTU031796 June 6, 1993 P 60,000.00
victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
UCPB PTU031797 June 14, 1993 P 60,000.00
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, finding UCPB PTU031798 June 21, 1993 P 70,000.00
appellant Michael Framio Sabagala GUILTY of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award for civil indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 Santos deposited these checks in her account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Upon
and an additional award for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as well as P25,000.00 for presentment by PNB of said checks to the drawee United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), they
exemplary damages is granted in favor of the offended party. were dishonored, for the reason: closed account

No pronouncement as to costs.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 313

 Thereafter, Santos made several verbal and written demands for Gutierrez to pay the amounts
covered by the checks, but the latter allegedly refused to make good her obligation to pay. Hence, Santos
filed five (5) criminal complaints for the Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and one complaint for Estafa
against Gutierrez. After preliminary investigation, the corresponding informations were filed in court and
the cases were raffled to respondent Judges sala.
On November 15, 1993, while the said informations were pending in court, Santos executed the
following letter in her own handwriting:
Nov. 15, 1993
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I am dropping my charges against Annabelle Rama and that she already
change (sic) the bouncing checks with a (sic) new ones.
I hope for your kind understanding on this case.
(Sgd.) Ligaya V. Santos
Lions Road Arroceros
On the same day, Gutierrez also executed the following document in her own handwriting:
I Annabelle Rama Gutierrez certify that I received all my old checks from Mrs. Ligaya Santos
in exchange to (sic) the new ones I gave her.
In agreement, Mrs. Santos agreed to dropped (sic) her case against me
(Sgd.) Annabelle Gutirrez
41 Derby, White Plains, Q.C.
The foregoing documents were executed by Santos and Gutierrez after the latter replaced the five (5)
checks subject of the informations. The replacement checks were subsequently honored except Check No.
SRD-043939 dated May 10, 1994, in the amount of P50,000.00, drawn against the UCPB. This check was
allegedly dishonored by the UCPB upon presentment by PNB, Santos depository bank, for the reason:
stop payment
The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by respondent Judge in his Decision as follows:
"To prove these cases against the accused, the Fiscal called to the witness stand Ligaya V.
Santos, the herein complainant who identified herself as a widow, businesswoman and who
resides at Lions Rd., Arroceros St., Ermita, Manila. In the course of her testimony, the
following exhibits were marked in evidence: Exhibit A- letter dated November 15, 1993, Exhibit
A-1 Signature of Ligaya V. Santos, Exhibits B Check No. SRD-043979 for P50,000.00 Exhibit
B-1 Notice of dishonor, Exhibit C letter of demand and Exhibit C-1 signature of complainant.
xxx.[1]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
On the basis of the above evidence proffered by the prosecution, respondent Judge
convicted the accused in the aforestated five criminal cases for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and in one
for Estafa. She was sentenced as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the
accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In Criminal Case No. 93-128841, accused
Annabelle R. Gutierrez is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year
and to pay a fine of P120,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. In Criminal Case No. 93-128842, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a fine of P60,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. For Criminal Case No. 93-128843, accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a fine
of P60,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For Criminal
Case No. 128844, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1)
year and to pay a fine of P60,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. And for Criminal case No. 93-128845, she is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a fine of P70,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. No pronouncement as to civil liability as the same
was already paid. Since the last check covered by Check No. SRD043939 in the
amount of P50,000.00 was dishonored by the drawee bank, accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify the offended party the said amount of P50,000.00.
For violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, accused is found guilty for the
crime of Estafa defined and punished under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
and in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
indeterminate sentence law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. No pronouncement as to civil liability as the same was already paid. The
bailbond posted by herein accused for her provisional liberty ordered cancelled.
Dissatisfied and aggrieved, she filed before us, this Administrative Complaint anchored on
the following grounds:
1. That respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases for Violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 because the imposable penalty therefor, which is imprisonment of not
more than one (1) year or a fine not exceeding P200,000.00 or both, is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) as provided for by
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691, otherwise known as the Law on the Expanded
Jurisdiction of the MTC.
2. That the venue and time of the commission of the offenses charged were not
established in violation of the petitioners right due process.
3. That the original checks in question were never offered in evidence, hence, the
decision is not supported by evidence of corpus delicti.
Page 314
 4. That the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal was arbitrarily and unjustly imposed.
5. That the decision was antedated and promulgated in a rush in violation of procedural rules.
6. That the cancellation of petitioners bail is whimsical and arbitrary, constitutive of grave
abuse of discretion.
To refute these grounds for the complaint, respondent Judge submitted specific arguments in his
Supplemental Comment dated July 7, 1995, which could be summarized as follows: [2]
(1) The alleged lack of jurisdiction is based on Section 2 of RA 7961 which was approved on March 25,
1994. This law, however, is inapplicable to complaints case because it did not provide for any retroactive
effect as to cover pending criminal cases. The retroactivity therein applies only to civil cases which did not
reach the pre-trial stage (Section 7, R.A. No. 7691).
The cases against complainant were filed on November 5, 1993, five (5) months before the approval of the
law on March 25, 1994. The law became effective 15 days after its complete publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation (Section 8, R.A. No. (7691).
(2) Concerning the alleged defect of the Informations in not specifying the exact place and time of the
commission of the crime, a perusal of the Informations filed by the City Prosecutor shows that
the situs (Manila) and date (first week of March, 1993) of the commission of the offenses charged were
sufficiently alleged. The specific place in Manila and the precise time need not be stated, because they are
not essential elements of the offense charged. If the stand of the complaint is that the charges in the
Informations did not constitute offenses, her remedy would have been the timely filing of a motion to quash
before the trial and not to raise the issue collaterally after the decision had been rendered.After the
decision, the complaints remedy is to appeal, which she availed of by filing a notice of appeal.
(3) Regarding the prosecutions failure to offer in evidence the original checks issued by Gutierrez,
respondent Judge commented that the same is of no moment because while the original checks were not
presented anymore, there is an admission that accused Gutierrez got back the bouncing checks from
Ligaya Santos. This document was presented as an exhibit by the prosecution and was not denied by the
accused.
(4) Anent the charge that the penalty of twelve (12) years of Reclusion Temporal was arbitrarily and
unjustly imposed, the respondent argued that the penalty is based on the amount subject of the fraud
which is P370,000.00. Under Art 315 (1st par.), the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00. If there is an excess, for every P10,000.00 excess, there is an additional penalty of
one year. If computed totally, the excess would amount to 34.8 years. But under the same Article, the
maximum shall only be 20 years. In imposing the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayoras minimum
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, respondent Judge merely exercised his discretion
as the penalty was within the range fixed by law.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
(5) On the charge that respondents decision was antedated and promulgated in a rush,
respondent that this charge is unfair, unjust and baseless because it was made to appear wrongly
that the respondent Judge falsified his own decision and promulgated it without notice at all.
Accordingly to respondent, the records will show that as early as October 25, 1994, he
already set the promulgation of the decision at 8:30 A.M. on November 24, 1994. During the
interim, the complainant filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the Court of Appeals (CA- G.R. SP No.
35373) questioning the Order denying her Demurrer to Evidence, resulting in the cancellation of
the promulgation set on November 24, 1994 which was reset to December 6, 1994. On said date,
the decision was not promulgated because of a Restraining Order issued by the Court of
Appeals. Consequently, the promulgation was reset to February 21, 1995, which was
intransferable in character. But since, the respondent was still waiting for developments in the
Court of Appeals, the promulgation was reset for the fourth time to March 23, 1995, and then for
the 5th time to April 18, 1995. Prior to April 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
on the certiorari case, dismissing the same but allowing Gutierrez to present her evidence.
Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the cases were set for reception of
accuseds evidence on three (3) dates: May 16, 23 and 25, 1995. On May 16, 1995, complainant
asked for postponement. On May 23, 1995, she asked for another postponement. On May 25,
1995, when the accused still failed to present evidence, so as not to frustrate the wheels of justice
and make a mockery of the solemn judicial system, the respondent was left without any recourse
but to exercise the coercive power of the court by promulgating the decision which was supposed
to have been promulgated way back December 6, 1994. To conform with the actual date of
promulgation, the respondent Judge, who found no justifiable basis to change his disposition of
the case, simply crossed out the previous date, December 2, 1994, on the last page and
superimposed the current date May 25, 1995.
Contrary therefore to the complainants charge, the promulgation of the Decision, in
respondents view was not precipitate. As a matter of fact, in obedience to the Court of Appeals,
the promulgation was deferred several times.
According to respondent there was no basis to change his mind, as the accused did not
present witnesses in her defense despite ample opportunities granted her. After her counsels
manifestation in court that if Fiscal Velasco were around, he would be presented to testify to the
effect that it was before him that the Affidavit of Desistance of Ligaya Santos was sworn to, and to
which the public prosecutor offered no objection and even admitted the tenor of the offer, there
was nothing more to be done. This was the only evidence offered by the accused. The public
prosecutor moved for the submission of the case, which was granted. Hence, according to the
respondent, there was no reason to re-write the whole decision where there was no reason for the
respondent Judge to change his disposition. He added, this was not antedating. There would be
antedating, if the decision were made on May 25, 1995 but backdated December 2, 1994. Neither
was it pre-judgment, he said. Rather, it was a judgment promulgated belatedly because of the
Court of Appeals restraining order, which order eventually self-destructed after the lapse of twenty
(20) days. The accused was fully aware of the developments in the cases, particularly the
deferred promulgation of the decision for several months, said the respondent.
Page 315
 (6) Lastly, respondent averred that the cancellation of complainants bail bond was not whimsical nor
arbitrary. After the promulgation of the Decision convicting the accused for a penalty higher than six (6)
years, under Circular No. 12-94, the accused must be ordered committed in jail. The respondent could not
question the wisdom of the Circular, he was under obligation to implement it.
Considering carefully the complainants charges and the respondent Judges Comments thereon, We
find that except for one issue, the aforementioned charges have been sufficiently and satisfactorily refuted
by respondent.However, with respect to the prosecutions failure to present in evidence the original checks
subject of the informations filed against the accused Gutierrez, We are not in accord with respondent
Judges conclusion that same is inconsequential for her conviction.
For, it is not disputed that the five (5) checks subject of the five (5) information for Violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and the information for Estafa, are UCPB checks with Nos. SRD022496, SRD022513, PTU031796,
PTU031797, and PTU031798. It is also not disputed that all these five (5) checks were not presented and
formally offered in evidence. Rather, the evidence of the prosecution consisted of the replacement check
drawn against UCPB, namely Check No. SRD043939, the return deposit slip issued by the PNB indicating
that this replacement check was dishonored by the UCPB for the reason, stop payment, and the testimony
of the PNB representative, one Hernando Balmores, Jr. to the effect that this replacement check was
indeed returned by the UCPB for the reason aforestated. This was very explicit from the Order of
respondent Judge[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration from the denial of her Demurrer to
Evidence to wit:
x x x. On the matter of the failure of the prosecution to mark in evidence the checks as alleged
in the information, the prosecuting fiscal that what was marked is a document executed by the
accused to the effect that said checks were in her possession and that the same were
replaced with other checks. Now, as to the matter of the representative of the bank not coming
from the drawee bank, the Court considers this testimony of the witness as only part of the
evidence for the prosecution.
Undoubtedly, respondent Judge based the judgment of conviction, not on the checks themselves, as
these were not proffered in evidence, but on petitioners written statement, dated November 15, 1995,
which respondent judge considered as admission on the part of the petitioner that, she had indeed, issued
the bouncing checks subject of the informations but that she had replaced them with new checks.
Evidently, respondent Judge misconstrued and misapplied the rule with regard to admission in
criminal cases.
The issue of whether or not an admission in criminal cases is adequate to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of the crime charged has been settled in the case of People vs. Solayao[4] where
this Court made the following pronouncements:
xxx xxx. By its very nature, an admission is the mere acknowledgement of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not
sufficient of itself to establish his guilt. In other words, it is a statement by defendant of fact or
facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to
prove guilt, but which is of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction. From the above principles,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged."[5]
By itself, herein complainants letter dated November 15, 1995, which respondent Judge
construed as an admission that she indeed issued the checks subject of the Informations filed
against her and that she was replacing them with new ones, does not prove beyond reasonable
doubt her culpability under B.P. 22 and Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. To establish
her guilt, it is indispensable that the checks she issued for which she was subsequently charged,
be offered in evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of knowingly
issuing a check with insufficient funds.[6] Clearly, it was error to convict complainant on the basis of
her letter alone.
Nevertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule on evidence, we do not find the
same as sufficiently constitutive of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of knowingly
rendering an unjust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in judgement, for which, as a general
rule, he cannot be held administratively liable. In this regard, we reiterate the prevailing rule in our
jurisdiction as established by current jurisprudence:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable
for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make
his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error
must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this
latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that
administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. xxx xxx.[7]
Moreover, it must be stressed that in the case of De la Cruz vs. Concepcion[8] this Court
declared that:
Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce
an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or of knowing rendition of an unjust decision,
are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. No one,
called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice, can
be infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules
prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that
emerge therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the
conclusions he finds established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law
to guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly.[9]
Page 316
 In this case, the record is bereft of any evidence to conclusively show that the respondent Judges
actuations were tainted with malice and bad faith, hence the administrative charges against him must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint for Serious Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Decision, Falsification of Public Document, and Gross Ignorance of the Law against
respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Palattao is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121982. September 10, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONILO CUI y BALADJAY, BEVERLY CUI y
CANTUBA, EDUARDO BASINGAN y SABELLO, WILFREDO GARCIA, alias TOTO,
JOSELITO GARCIA, alias TATA GARCIA, EMMANUEL GARCIA, alias MAWI, a certain
SADAM, BIENVENIDO NACARIO y PARDILLO, alias REY NACARIO, a certain EDGAR, a
certain BENJIE, LUIS OBESO, alias LEOS, HILARIA SARTE, alias LARING, and YUL
ALVAREZ, accused.
LEONILO CUI y BALADJAY, BEVERLY CUI y CANTUBA, LUIS OBESO, alias LEOS, and HILARIA
SARTE, alias LARING, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In the evening of December 5, 1990, some ten (10) armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny
and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims, their three (3) children, and the employees of
the family-owned business, Williams Educational Supply, were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo
alias Toto Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be
identified as they had flour sacks over their heads.
The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). They also
blindfolded and forcibly abducted seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the
Lims. They demanded a ransom of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) for her release.
Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the afternoon of the next day at an
arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father.
Initially, the Lims kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they reported the kidnapping to the
Philippine National Police Cebu Metropolitan District Command (Cebu Metrodiscom) at Camp Sotero,
Cabahug, Cebu City. The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST)[1] conducted an investigation
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
and Johnny Lim was shown photographs of criminal elements to identify the suspects. From
around ninety (90) photographs, Lim picked that of Toto Garcia.
The identification of Toto Garcia gave the MIST a valuable lead. Toto Garcia was known as
the leader of a group of armed robbers called the Baong Gang. The gangs base of operation was
pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu. When the police learned from Lim that his house guard,
Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, they decided to interrogate him.
Basingans interrogation broke the case wide open. He identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia
and Edgar as the three (3) who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two (2) who held him
and the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a
certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed outside the Lim compound. He named Toto Garcia as
the chief plotter of the crime at bar, and revealed that his neighbors and close family friends, the
spouses Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to join the
plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion because he would be placed at gun
point together with the other members of the Lim household when the crime is
committed. However, he refused to join the plot during the December 2, 1990 meeting of the
group at the residence of the Cuis in Quiot,. Pardo, Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even invoked their
close ties as godfathers of each others children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto
Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey, Sadam and the Cuis.
On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement [2] reiterating these
revelations in writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by executing a Joint
Affidavit.[3] The members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team also executed a Joint
Affidavit[4] relating their investigation. With these as bases, Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido N.
Mabanto, Jr. filed an Information[5] for Kidnapping with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and
the members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn statement.
On the same day, December 18, 1990, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested. [6] Beverly
Cui was also taken into custody on January 17, 1991.[7] The Cuis, however, were later granted bail
and their plea for preliminary investigation was given due course.[8]
On March 14, 1991, Joselito Tata Garcia, Hilaria Sarte and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso,
referred to by Basingan as Laring and Leos, respectively, were arrested in the neighboring Negros
Island. The next day, however, Tata Garcia died due to hemorrhage, severe, secondary to
gunshot wounds.[9] Upon presentation of his death certificate, the trial court ordered his name
deleted from the information.
On March 22, 1991, Obeso and Sarte filed their own motions for preliminary
investigation.[10] Their motions were granted in an Order dated April 2, 1991.[11]
On April 1, 1991, Basingan executed a second sworn statement [12] reiterating his first. In
addition, he detailed the role of the Cuis in the planning of the crime at bar.
After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Manuel J. Adlawan found that the participation of
the Cuis was only that of accomplices. Thus, on May 13, 1991, an Amended Information was filed
Page 317
downgrading the charge against the Cuis as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of
Stephanie Lim. It reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1990, at about 9:00 P.M. more or less and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, all private individuals, conniving and confederating together, and mutually helping with one
another, armed with unlicensed firearms, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, enter the dwelling
house of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and while inside therein with violence and intimidation, take and
carry away cash and jewelries in the amount of P20,000.00 from the possession of and belonging to
spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and that on the occasion thereof, and in connection therewith and for the
purpose of extorting ransom from said spouses Johnny and Rose Lim, herein accused, in pursuance of
their superior strength did then and there kidnap and detain Stephanie Lim 17 years old [sic] daughter of
spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and while Stephanie Lim was under detention in the place other than the
latters dwelling place, the said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 for the release of
Stephanie Lim to which demands and for fear of the latters life spouses Johnny and Rose Lim delivered
and caused to be delivered the amount of P1,000,000.00 to said accused; and accused-
(1) Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and
(2) Beverly Cui y Cantuba
who are hereby charged for the same offense as accomplices cooperate in its execution by previous acts
and subsequently profiting in the effects of the crime by receiving the amount of P10,000.00 from the
principal accused as their share of the loot, to the damage and prejudice of Johnny, Rose and Stephanie
Lim in the total amount of P1,020,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]
On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not
guilty.[14] On June 27, 1991, Basingan escaped from prison.[15]
Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia.
On February 13, 1992, Bienvenido Nacario, alias Rey Nacario, was arrested. On arraignment on
April 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1992, he, too, escaped from detention and
remains at large to this date.
On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested before the trial court that, per newspaper
report, Toto Garcia had been killed in Davao.
On December 6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and Nacario. [16] It
held:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In the light of the totality of the evidence adduced in the case at bar and the law and
aforementioned jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that a conspiracy was hatched by all the
accused in perpetrating the crime charged. For instance, as borne out by the testimony of Sgt.
Narciso Ouano, Jr., police investigator of the Cebu Metrodiscim [sic], accused Eduardo Basingan
declared during his investigation that the plan was indeed carried out and he knew all the persons
who participated in that robbery, naming Toto Garcia, Tata Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Rey, Edgar,
Sadam, Yul Alvarez, Benjie, Leo and Laring. When the named robbers entered the residence of
his master Johnny Lim, the robbers were wearing masks except Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia and
Edgar. The others, Rey, Sadam, Laring, Leo, Benjie and Yul Alvarez were wearing masks but
Basingan was still able to identify them in spite of the fact that they were wearing masks because
these persons were familiar to him already as they used to frequent the house of Leonilo and
Beverly Cui. At the time of the robbery, only Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey and Sadam
went inside the house of his master while Yul Alvarez, Benjie, Leos and Laring were guarding
outside the building. On December 7, 1990, two days after the robbery, he was called by his
Comadre Beverly Cui and the latter handed to him the amount of P40,000.00 in her house, saying
that Toto Garcia left the said amount to be given to him. During their talk, Basingan verbally told
them about the incident relative to the kidnapping and his having received P40,000.00 from Toto
Garcia as his share of the ransom. A formal investigation was conducted by Sgt. Armando Ballon
in the presence of Atty. Elias Espinosa who assisted Eduardo Basingan.
x x x The denial of accused Luis Obeso and Hilaria Sarte as to their participation in the
commission of the crime does not hold water for they were duly identified even during the initial
phase of the commission of the crime. They were the renters of the house where Stephanie, the
kidnapped victim, was placed. Stephanie had identified the house. The flight of these two accused
to Bacong, Dumaguete City is indicative of their guilt. x x x
The prosecution has indeed established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as
against accused Eduardo Basingan, Bienvenido Nacario y Pardillo, @ Rey Nacario, Luis Obeso,
@ Leos, Hilaria Sarte, @ Laring, Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and Beverly Cui y Cantuba, the latter two
are only as accomplices, to the crime of kidnapping with ransom. x x x.[17]
They were sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
convicting the accused Eduardo Basingan, Bienvenido Nacario y Pardillo @ Rey Nacario, Luis
Obeso, @ Leos, Hilaria Sarte, @ Laring, as principals for the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH
RANSOM and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accused Leonilo Cui and
Beverly Cui being accomplices, to suffer an imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to jointly restitute to the victim the ransom
money less the amount recovered. Accused Hilaria Sarte and Luis Obeso, being detention
prisoners are credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided that they signify in
writing that they will abide with the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
Page 318
xxx
SO ORDERED.[18]
Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appeal[19] on May 19, 1994. The Cuis filed theirs[20] on May 31,
1994.
In their Brief dated April 21, 1997, Obeso and Sarte prayed for their acquittal on the following
grounds:
I informal investigation he conducted on Basingan. Part of his testimony was the same
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS
OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT MADE BY EDUARDO BASINGAN AND THE TESTIMONY OF
SGT. NARCISO OUANO JR.THEREON, WHICH ARE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS PRINCIPALS BY
CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPETENT AND CONVINCING PROOF OF THEIR
CULPABILITY.[21]
On June 25, 1997, the Cuis also filed their Brief. They contended:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
APPELLANTS-SPOUSES LEONILO CUI AND BEVERLY CUI TO REMAIN SILENT, TO COUNSEL AND
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION HAD BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED DURING THEIR CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING HEARSAY EVIDENCE OFFERED TO PROVE
ALLEGED CONSPIRACY AND PARTICIPATION OF APPELLANTS-SPOUSES LEONILO CUI AND
BEVERLY CUI, AS ACCOMPLICES IN THE CRIME CHARGED.[22]
On August 13, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed, in lieu of an Appellees Brief, a
Manifestation[23] recommending the acquittal of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte on the ground that the
prosecution failed to present adequate proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was
postulated:
It is clear that the only piece of evidence that would link appellants directly to the kidnapping of Stephanie
Lim is the Sworn Statement executed by Eduardo Basingan (Exhibit C) implicating appellants and
describing their participation in detail. Basingans extra-judicial confession, however, is inadmissible for
being hearsay as he was not presented by the prosecution as its witness, he having escaped after
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
arraignment. Hence, appellants were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
him. Cross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and
meaning to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to
show that the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm x x x. It was intended
to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the
exercise of his right of cross-examination x x x.
Perhaps realizing the futility of relying solely on Basingans extra-juridical (sic) confession in order
to secure appellants conviction, the prosecution presented Sgt. [O]uano who testified on the
extra-judicial confession made by Basingan which was strongly objected to by appellants. It
cannot be overemphasized that Sgt. [O]uanos testimony is not based on his own personal
knowledge but on other evidence. He has no personal knowledge of the participation of the
appellants in the kidnapping of the victim. Hence, his testimony is purely hearsay evidence and
has no probative value, whether objected to or not x x x.[24]
There is no question that Basingan escaped and never testified in court to affirm his
accusation against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in
admitting and giving weight to the sworn statements of Basingan. In the same vein, the testimony
of Sgt. Ouano confirming the content of Basingans sworn statements is not proof of its truth and
by itself cannot justify the conviction of appellants. Both the extrajudicial sworn statements of
Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano are clear hearsay. Indeed, the records show that the
trial court itself admitted Basingans statements merely as part of the investigation of Sgt. Ouano,
thus:
Q What else did Mr. Basingan tell you?
A That it was the group of Toto Garcia who barged into the residence of Mr. Lim and that it
was that group of Toto Garcia who kidnapped the daughter of Mr. Lim and also it was
that group that gave him P40,000.00 out of the ransom money.
COURT:
xxx
Q Were you able to determine who composed that group?
A According to Basingan the group was composed of Wilfredo Garcia as the leader, Joselito
Tata Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, a certain Rey, a certain Leon and a certain Laring.
ATTY. GONZALEZ:
We move to strike out the answer of this witness. It is hearsey [sic]. The answer[s]
premise [is] according to.
FISCAL ADLAWAN:
Page 319
 That independence are relevant question which took action [sic]. In that case, your Honor may we make it of record that I am interposing a continuing
objection as to the series of questioning considering that we strongly belive [sic]
COURT: that what was given by this witness is hearsay.
Overruled. COURT:
xxx The objection is noted. The witness is only testifying regarding his investigation.[25]
FISCAL ADLAWAN: Despite its ruling, the trial court used the statements of Basingan, as testified to by Sgt.
Q Was there any inquiries [sic] made by you on Eduardo Basingan how did he happen to know this Ouano, as proofs of the guilt of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Undeniably, they are hearsay for any
group of Toto Garcia? oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never
ATTY. GONZALEZ: presented on the witness stand.[26]

We object. I understand there are two investigations. He conducted his own investigation. Conviction cannot be based on hearsay evidence. In the 1996 case of People v.
Raquel,[27] we squarely addressed the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial statements of
ATTY. GONZALEZ: (Cont) an escaped accused implicating his co-accused may be utilized against the latter.There we
ordered an acquittal and held:
Which investigation is he referring to.

COURT: A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of
As preliminary investigation.
accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated,
ATTY. GONZALEZ: the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large
since then.
Before the formal investigation he conducted his own investigation?

COURT:
Answer.
A Yes, I did inquire from him and that he told me Toto Garcia is frequently in the house of Leonilo
and Beverly Cui and that he was introduced by the couple to Toto Garcia in one of those visits of
Toto Garcia in the house and that subsequently thereafter he knew of the persons of [sic] Toto
Garcia is associationg [sic] with because Toto Garcia went to the house of Leonilo Cui.
ATTY. GONZALEZ:
May we move to strike out from the records for being that he has no personal knowledge as to
that information.
The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latters extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused
which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extra-judicial
and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to
cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.

COURT: The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extra-judicial confession is binding only upon the
Objection overruled.
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
ATTY. GONZALEZ: principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 320

unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their
acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.[28]
The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
a. That the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
"b. that the admission relates to the common objects; and
"c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. [29]
The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before the formation of the
conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence as against the other
co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross- examine them.[30]
In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by
independent evidence. Nor was it shown that the extra-judicial statements of Basingan were made while
they were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. In truth, the statements were made after the conspiracy
has ended and after the consummation of the crime. They were not acts or declarations made during the
conspiracys existence. Since the extra-judicial admissions were made after the supposed conspiracy, they
are binding only upon the confessant and are not admissible against his co-accused; as against the latter,
the confession is hearsay.[31] In fine, the extra-judicial statements of Basingan cannot be used against the
Cuis, Obeso and Sarte without doing violence against their constitutional right to confront Basingan and to
cross-examine him.[32]
Be that as it may, we hold that on the basis of other evidence on record, the Cuis are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of being accessories, not accomplices as held by the trial court, in the kidnapping of
Stephanie Lim.
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accomplices those persons who
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to the
consummation of the offense. Accomplices cooperate in the execution of the crime by previous or
simultaneous acts, by means of which they aid, facilitate or protect the execution of the crime, without,
however, taking any direct part in such execution, or forcing or inducing others to execute it, or contributing
to its accomplishment by any indispensable act.[33] Had Basingan been able to testify on his affidavit
detailing the role of the Cuis in the planning of the robbery of the Lim household, the trial court would have
had sufficient basis to convict them as accomplices therein. As discussed above, however, Basingan
escaped before taking the witness stand.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
This Court, however, holds that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and
are liable as accessories.
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accessories to the crime
those who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein by profiting themselves or assisting
the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime, without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the following
elements: (1) that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part in it
subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.[34] These twin elements are present in the case of the Cuis, and
indubitable proof thereof is extant in the records of the case.
The members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST), namely, Lt. John P.
Campos, Lt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, Sgt. Narciso L. Ouano, Jr., Sgt. Felipe Honoridez, Sgt.
Armando Ballon, Sgt. Oscar Dadula, Cpl. Jeremias Canares, and Sgt. Catalino Ybanez, executed
a Joint Affidavit dated December 18, 1990 stating, among other things, that the couple Leonilo
and Beverly Cui, although denying knowledge of the kidnapping revealed that Toto Garcia is their
Compadre and that they also turned over to us the amount of P10,000.00 representing that given
to them by Toto Garcia out of the ransom money".[35]
This statement charging the Cuis with having partaken of the ransom money was not denied
either in the Counter-Affidavit of Leonilo Cui dated February 15, 1991 or in the Counter-Affidavit of
Beverly Cui of the same date. In his Counter-Affidavit, Leonilo Cui even admitted that he knew
that Toto Garcia and Basingan had held secret meetings in his house and that he had already
become suspicious of their acts, but he did not confront them because they treated each other as
special friends, they being godfather of each others children.
In their defense, the Cuis submitted an Affidavit dated February 15, 1991 executed by
Myrna M. Limbagan, a niece of Beverly Cui who lived with them in their house in Pardo, Cebu
City. But instead of exonerating the Cuis, this Affidavit inculpates them as it states in paragraph 10
that on December 7, 1990, Toto Garcia, Eduardo Basingan and other persons visited the
residence of the Spouse[s] Cui[s] and handed some amounts of money to the
couple.[36] Significantly, it is Limbagan, a witness for the defense, who corroborates the
incriminating statements made by the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team in
their Joint Affidavit.
Realizing the aggravation caused them by the affidavits of Limbagan and the members of
the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team, the Cuis jointly executed a Supplement
Counter-Affidavit[37] dated April 24, 1991 this time denying that they profited in any way from the
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim. They explained that they turned over the sum of P10,000.00 to Lt.
Michael Ray Aquino not as their share in the ransom money but as a bribe to prevent the
members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team from further inflicting physical harm on
the person of Leonilo Cui. In her testimony in open court, Beverly Cui claimed that she and her
husband were arrested on December 14, 1990 at their residence in Pardo, Cebu City but that she
was later released by the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team so that she
could withdraw money from the bank to pay to them in exchange for her husbands freedom.
Page 321
 Two of the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team, Sgt. Narciso Ouano and Sgt. COURT: What did she tell Lt. Aquino?
Catalino Ybanez, testified rebutting the claim of Beverly Cui. Sgt. Ouano testified as follows:
A - She told Lt. Aquino that the money was for the ransom money which was given to him by
FISCAL ADLAWAN: Toto Garcia.

xxx COURT: Now, what was the remark of Lt. Aquino?

Q How about this P10,000.00 which according to you was recovered from the accused Cui couple?
xxx
Q How did you come into possession which according to you came from the Cui couple?
A The P10,000.00 was turned over to us by Beverly Cui.
Q Did Beverly Cui say anything when this P10,000.00 was handed to you?
A She told us that the P10,000.00 represents the money given to her and her husband by Toto Garcia.
A - He accepted the money, sir. He accepted the money and he told the couple if he could
execute an affidavit regarding their participation in the involvement of the kidnapping.
COURT: What was the answer?
A - Actually, the couple denied the involvement, sir, but he was given the money.
COURT: What was the answer of Beverly Cui to Lt. Aquino when it was mentioned that the
P10,000.00 was a part of the stolen money? The answer of Beverly Cui to Lt. Aquino,
what else did Beverly Cui say, did he tell Lt. Aquino?

Q And did you inquire from Beverly Cui why did Toto Garcia gave [sic] them P10,000.00? A - The money was given to her.

A They told us that Toto Garcia gave it to them sometime on December 7 and that was the share from Q - Was he made to execute an affidavit?
the loot in the kidnapping. A - Actually he denied the involvement.
COURT: COURT: But as you said, now, why did Lt. Aquino ask Beverly Cui to execute an affidavit that
Q Was it given to them? the P10,000.00 was a part of the ransom money?

A The couple told us it was given by Toto Garcia as their share of the ransom money as a result of the A - Lt. Aquino told the couple go execute an affidavit.
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim. COURT: What was the answer of Beverly Cui?
xxx A - They denied the[ir] involvement.
FISCAL ADLAWAN: xxx
Q Was Beverly Cui already under arrest when she gave you this information? COURT: What is the remark of Beverly Cui?
[38]
A No, Sir. It was her husband who was held then. She was free. A - According to Beverly Cui and Leonilo B. Cui, that they were not involved in the kidnapping,
For his part, Sgt. Catalino B. Ybanez testified in the following manner: sir.

COURT: Are you familiar with the P10,000.00? xxx

A - Yes, sir. FISCAL ADLAWAN:

COURT: You mean the money given? xxx

A - The money was turned over by Beverly Cui to Lt. Aquino, sir. Q - Now, Beverly Cui and Leonilo Cui testified in court that Beverly Cui was released on the
same evening that she was arrested by your team, what do you say to this?
COURT: In your presence?
COURT: Was she released?
A - Yes, sir.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 322

 A - She was released, your Honor. A - During the confrontation the couple admitted that they have that other passbook, the
P10,000.00, sir.
COURT: Beverly Cui?
COURT: Im referring of (sic) the admission that the P10,000.00 was a part of the ransom
A - On assurance that she will help in looking [for] the group of Toto Garcia, your Honor. money?
Q - What was the result, or was she able to locate the group? A - Yes, sir.
A - She pointed to us to the house of the wife of Toto Garcia, but during the raid, unfortunately, Toto COURT: When did you learn that it was a ransom-money? At the time the money was
Garcia was not in their house. returned or before the return?
Q - Who guided you to the house of Toto Garcia? A - At the time when there was a confrontation, sir.
A - Beverly Cui, sir. COURT: What do you mean by confrontation?
Q - Where is this house located? A - When we confronted the accused, sir.
A - Basak, sir. COURT: The Cuis?
Q - Was this the same house where those articles were raided and confiscated or recovered including A - Yes, and she admitted she has with her in the bank, the P10,000.00.
the firearm owned by the complaining witness Johnny Lim already marked as Exhbit A, a .22
caliber for the prosecution, is this the house? xxx

A - Yes, sir. COURT: You mean an interrogation not a confrontation by you?

Q - Had it not been for Beverly Cui, you would not be able to locate the house of Toto Garcia? A - Not by me, but by the investigator, sir.

A - No, sir. COURT: Who was doing the interrogation?

Q - Now, did Beverly Cui show to you any bank book? A - Ouano, sir.

A - Yes, sir. COURT: You mean Ouano interrogating the Cuis? Then you were listening?

Q - How many bank books were shown? A - Yes, sir.

A - At first about 5 bank books, sir. COURT: You heard the Cuis that they were given money by Toto Garcia and the money is in
the bank.
xxx
A - Yes, sir.[39]
COURT: You stated that this P10,000.00 received by Cui was a part of the ransom money lifted only
from the admission of the Cuis or the Cuis plus other parties? Significantly, it is again the Cuis themselves, in their Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 2, 1993, who corroborated Sgt. Ybanezs claim that Beverly Cui was temporarily
A - By the Cuis, sir. released for the particular purpose of accompanying the police to the hideout of Toto Garcia and
COURT: No proof that the Cuis are beneficiaries of Lt. Aquino? his men. Thus, in par. 5 of their Motion for Reconsideration, they allege that x x x Beverly Cui was
temporarily released from custody in order for her to lead the police to the hideouts of the other
A - Only the couple, your Honor. suspects of the crime.[40]

COURT: In other words, you learned the P10,000.00 only when the money was returned by Beverly As accessories to the consummated crime of kidnapping for ransom, the penalty imposable
Cui? upon Leonilo and Beverly Cui is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. [41] Under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty shall be death where the kidnapping

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 323

was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. However, when the crime was perpetrated in Q - And how long did you stay in that house where you were brought by those persons known
December 1990, the death penalty has been suspended by the 1987 Constitution and commuted as Toto Garcia and others?
to reclusion perpetua. Since no modifying circumstance is appreciated for or against the Cuis, the
imposable penalty should be in the medium period of the indeterminate sentence applicable under A - From dawn until afternoon.
Republic Act no. 4103, as amended.[42] xxx
Finally, while we affirm the conviction of the Cui spouses, we acquit Obeso and Sarte. COURT: What happened when you were brought back to your house?
The only evidence linking Obeso and Sarte to the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim is Basingans sworn A - Few days after I was asked to identify the house and the room where I stayed.
statements that a certain Leos and a certain Laring were among the lookouts who stood as guards outside
the house of the Lims while Toto Garcia and his group were inside. Basingans sworn statements are Q - You were brought to that place [a] few days after?
hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused because he escaped before he could
take the witness stand. A - Yes, sir.

Except for Basingan who could not even give the real names of Obeso and Sarte and just referred to Q - Who were with you when you were brought to that place?
them as Leos and Laring, respectively, no one really knew them. And significantly, no prosecution witness
A - Members of the Metro Discom, sir.
identified them, not even Stephanie Lim. She never saw any of them during the robbery or in the house
where she was detained. Her testimony runs, viz.: Q - When you were brought to the place again [a] few days after you were released, did you
come to know who occupied that room?
DIRECT EX. BY FISCAL ADLAWAN
ATTY. GONZALES: Hearsay, your Honor, she has no personal knowledge, whatever
xxx
information given to her thats not of her own, your Honor.
Q - What else took place?
COURT: Let us find out, if she knows.
A - They blindfolded me and handcuffed me and brought me out, sir.
A - Laring, sir.
Q - What do you mean when you said you were brought out, out of your residence?
xxx
A - That is correct, sir. They brought me to another place.
COURT: Cross?
Q - By what means?
CROSS BY ATTY. GONZALES
A - Our Fiera, sir.
xxx
Q - You owned the vehicle?
Q - And you mentioned of a certain Laring, you agree with me that this Laring was identified
A - Yes, sir. to you by people of the Metro Discom?

Q - While you were brought to (sic) outside, were you able to recognize one of them? A - Yes, sir.

A - No, sir, because I was blindfolded. Q - And the people at the Metro Discom meaning the police officers, told you that it was
Laring who occupied the place where you were allegedly brought, right?
Q - Was there an instance when your blindfold was taken off?
A - Yes, sir.
A - When I was placed in a room.
COURT: I can not hear.
xxx
WITNESS: Yes, sir, occupied by Laring.

Q - You have not seen Laring?

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 324

 A - Yes, sir. INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING
CORPORATION CHANNEL-13,
Q - You have not seen Laring, you mean no? Respondents. Promulgated:
A - Yes, sir. June 23, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
xxx
DECISION
Q - Now, you mention, no. Now, in your house where this incident allegedly took place, you only
saw Toto Garcia? YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

A - Yes, sir.
Assailed is the August 10, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81657
Q - You could not identify anybody there? which reversed the October 29, 2003 Decision and February 2, 2004 Resolution of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 finding petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva entitled to
A - No, sir. damages. Also assailed is the October 16, 2007 Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration.
x x x.[43]
On March 31, 1992, petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for
Obeso and Sarte interposed the defense of alibi. They asseverated that in late November, 1990, Operations of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation-Channel 13 (IBC-13) was dismissed from
they left the house they were renting in Linao, Minglanilla, Cebu and went to Banilad, Bacong, Dumaguete employment on the ground of loss of confidence for purportedly selling forged certificates of
City where the parents of Sarte reside. It was there, in March 1991, that they were arrested. performance. Contesting his termination, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission.
The prosecution never rebutted the claim of live-in partners Obeso and Sarte that they were in
Bacong, Dumaguete City as early as November, 1990. No direct evidence has been proffered by the During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in IBC-13 were
prosecution to place Obeso and Sarte at the scene of the crime. Their alibi has to be given credence. published in the July 18, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the Philippine Star, and in the July 19,
1992 issue of the Manila Bulletin.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated December 6,
1993, in Criminal Case No. CBU-20464, is MODIFIED. Appellants Leonilo and Beverly Cui are In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC-13, was quoted to
CONVICTED as ACCESSORIES and are ORDERED to serve the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his tenure which led to the
dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance.
four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum. Appellants LUIS OBESO, alias LEOS, and HILARIA SARTE, alias LARING are In the Manila Times, on July 18, 1992:[3]
ACQUITTED and if presently detained, they are ordered immediately released from detention unless other
legal reasons exists to detain them. The Director of Prisons is ordered to inform this Court within ten (10) Anomalies at IBC-13 uncovered
days from receipt of this Decision his compliance. No costs.
INSIDER pilferage, malversation, overpricing and other
SO ORDERED. irregularities have cost government-owned Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation (IBC) 13 more than P108 million in losses for the period
1986-1989.
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 180197
Petitioner, Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president, uncovered the anomalies after a
long and painstaking investigation when he took over the company in 1990.
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), The investigation uncovered irregularities ranging from selling
- versus - Chico-Nazario, forged certificates of performance (CPs) to non-remittance of sales
Velasco, Jr., collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie trailer advertisements
Nachura, and (MTAs), illegal leasing of electricity and machines to friendly clients, millions
Bersamin,* JJ. worth of undocumented transactions to movie suppliers, exorbitant fees
VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER and against in-house productions, abused overtime charges by certain
employees.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 325


The anomalies did not escape Balaguer when he came to IBC-13 backed
by hands-on experience in television management work.
IBC has had four presidents since 1986 after the EDSA
revolution. Balaguer is the fifth president.
A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the anomalies
in IBC. It led to the dismissal of an operations executive who sold forged
certificates of performance, a former supervisor who pocketed IBCs sales
collections, and station managers who did not remit payments on radio
advertisements.
Other anomalies committed against the government station include the
loose issuance of technical facilities orders (TFOs) which practically leased the
networks broadcast facilities to a friendly client for free.
Balaguer, sources said, succeeded in staying as president because of his
technical expertise in media and communications and his managerial will to cleanse
the ranks of the firm. (Emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine Star, on July 18, 1992:[4]
IBC president uncovers anomalies at tv network
The government-owned International Broadcasting Corp.-Channel 13 lost
more than P108 million due to insider pilferage, malversation, overpricing and other
irregularities from 1986 to 1989.
IBC president Gil P. Balaguer uncovered the anomalies after a long and
painstaking investigation when he took over the television station in 1990.
Balaguer, in a statement, said the irregularities uncovered included the sale
of forged certificates of performance, non-remittance of sales collections, illegal and
unauthorized airing of movie advertisements, illegal lease of equipment to friendly
clients, exorbitant fees on in-house productions and abused overtime charges by
some employees.
Balaguer, the fifth IBC president since 1986, easily detected the anomalies
as he has a vast experience in television management work.
A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the anomalies
at IBC, which has resulted in the dismissal of an operations executive who sold
forged certificates of performance, a former supervisor who pocketed sales
collections and a station manager who did not remit payments on radio
advertisements. (Emphasis supplied)
In the Manila Bulletin, on July 19, 1992:[5]
Sequestered firms losses bared
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC) 13, a sequestered
firm, lost more than P108 million for the period 1986-1989 due to pilferage,
malversation, over-pricing, and other irregularities perpetrated by a syndicate,
according to Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president, who took over the company in
1990.
He said the irregularities ranged from selling forged certificates of
performance to non-remittance of sales collections, illegal and unauthorized
airing of movie trailer advertisements, illegal leasing of electricity and
machines to friendly clients, millions worth of undocumented transactions to
movie suppliers, exorbitant fees against in-house productions, and abused
overtime charges by certain employees.
IBC has had four presidents since 1986, Balaguer being the fifth.
A special probe committee that helped Balaguer said one
dismissed executive sold forged certificates of performance, a former
supervisor pocketed IBC sales collections, and some station managers did
not remit payments on radio advertisements.
The loose issuance of technical facilities orders practically leased
the networks broadcast facilities to a friendly client for free.
Balaguer is credited with accelerating the networks rank from
number five in 1988 to number two or three under current ratings, despite the
efforts of some holdouts who tried to derail his administration. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a letter dated July 20, 1992, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or deny if he was
the person alluded to in the news article as the operations executive of IBC-13 who was dismissed
for selling forged certificates of performance.[6] None of the respondents replied to the letter.
On September 25, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
a complaint for damages against Balaguer,[7] which was later amended by impleading IBC-13 as
additional defendant.[8]
Petitioner claimed that respondents caused the publication of the subject news articles
which defamed him by falsely and maliciously referring to him as the IBC-13 operations executive
who sold forged certificates of performance.[9] He alleged that in causing these false and malicious
publications, respondents violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code. [10]
Balaguer denied that he had anything to do with the publications.[11] However, he
argued that the publications are not actionable because they are true and without malice;[12] are of
legitimate public concern and interest because IBC-13 is under sequestration; that petitioner is a
newsworthy and public figure;[13] and that they are privileged communication.[14] Balaguer filed a
counterclaim against petitioner for alleged malicious filing of the civil case.[15]
IBC-13 also denied participation in the publications. It claimed that assuming press
statements were issued during a press conference, the same was done solely by Balaguer
without its authority or sanction.[16] IBC-13 also filed a counterclaim against petitioner[17] and a
cross-claim against Balaguer.[18]
Page 326

On August 31, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[19] finding petitioners dismissal as
illegal, which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission, however,
declared respondents to be acting in good faith, hence, it deleted the award of moral and exemplary
damages. On December 6, 1994, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, [20] with IBC-13
proposing a scheme of payment for petitioners monetary claims, and with IBC-13 and petitioner waiving
any and all claims against each other arising out of the labor case.
On October 29, 2003, the Regional Trial Court[21] of Quezon City held that petitioner is entitled to
an award of damages,[22] thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of
plaintiff Francisco N. Villanueva and against defendants Balaguer and Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13).
Accordingly, defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally, as follows:
1) the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos by way of
moral damages;
2) the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as and by way
of exemplary damages;
3) the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of nominal
damages;
4) the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos by way of temperate or
moderate damages; and
5) the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as and by way
of attorneys fees.
With costs against defendants.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[24] Hence, they appealed to the Court
of Appeals which rendered the herein assailed Decision on August 10, 2007, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
October 29, 2003 Decision and the February 2, 2004 Resolution with Clarification
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 89, National Capital Judicial Region, Quezon
City, are hereby REVERSED. The Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Cross-claim
in Civil Case No. Q-92-13680 are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition raising the
following issues:[26]
a) Does the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter containing
statements attributing to him commission of acts constituting actionable
wrong, hence, adverse to his interest, and of such nature as would call for
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
his reaction, reply, or comment if untrue, constitute his admission
of said statements, consequently, may be used in evidence against
him?
b) Is the admission by a principal admissible against its agent? Is
the admission by a person jointly interested with a party admissible
against the latter?
c) Does the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him
by newspaper publications, as the source of defamatory
newspaper reports, when he is free and very able to do so,
constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said
defamatory news reports?
The petition lacks merit.
As early as 1905, this Court has declared that it is the duty of the party seeking to
enforce a right to prove that their right actually exists. In varying language, our Rules of Court, in
speaking of burden of proof in civil cases, states that each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations and that the burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
were given on either side.[27] Thus, in civil cases, the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff,
with respect to his complaint.[28]
In proving his claim, petitioner relied on the July 20, 1992 letter, the newspaper articles,
and the alleged admission of respondents. Based on the above pieces of evidence, the Court
finds that petitioner was unable to discharge his burden of proof. As such, the Court of Appeals
properly dismissed the complaint for damages.
The July 20, 1992 letter sent by petitioner to respondents reads as follows: [29]
20 July 1992
Mr. Virgilio Balaguer
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation
Broadcast City, Capitol Hills
Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Mr. Balaguer:
We write on behalf of our client, Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva.
You have caused to be published in the 18 July 1992 issue of The
Philippine Star and 19 July 1992 issue of Manila Bulletin, a news item
wherein you stated that you dismissed an Operations Executive because he
sold forged Certificate of Performance. Our immediate impression is, you are
referring to our client, Francisco N. Villanueva, because he is the only
Operations Executive in IBC, Channel 13 you have illegally and despotically
dismissed.
Page 327
 We urge you, therefore, to inform us, within forty-eight (48) hours from your
receipt of this letter that the Operations Executive you referred to in your press
statement is not our client, Francisco N. Villanueva. We shall construe your
failure/refusal to reply as your unequivocal admission that you are, in fact, actually
referring to our client, Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva, as the operations executive who
sold forged Certificate of Performance. Accordingly, we shall immediately proceed to
take appropriate criminal and civil court actions against you without further notice.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
REX G. RICO
cc: Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva
Board of Administrators, IBC-13
Petitioner argues that by not responding to the above letter which expressly urged them to reply
if the statements therein contained are untrue, respondents in effect admitted the matters stated therein,
pursuant to the rule on admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130, [30] and the disputable presumption that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact. [31]
Petitioners argument lacks merit. One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on
the other party. Indeed, (a) man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the
statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against
whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge
than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions
in the absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an
admission.[32]
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party
was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a
denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be
expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply. [33]
In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by
virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the source of
the articles. As explained above, the rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not
made orally in ones presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual
correspondence between the parties.
As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant
said are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third
[34]
persons. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, while the subject news items indicated that
Balaguer was the source of the columnists, proving that he truly made such statements is another
matter.[35] Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such statements.
Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff and the publisher of the alleged defamatory
articles.[36] Contrary to petitioners assertion, he should have at least presented the authors of the news
articles as witnesses to prove his case against respondents in the absence of an express admission by the
latter that the subject news articles have been caused by them.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Petitioner also claims that respondents have admitted that they held a press conference
and caused the publication of the news articles, based on the following testimony of Balaguer: [37]
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Okay, Let me ask another question. Now Mr. Balaguer this
publication referred to so called anomalies of 1986 to 1989 now how about
the termination.
A: 1991.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Yes.
WITNESS:
I think the termination of Mr. Villanueva has nothing to do with that
press statement release because the period that covers that report is from
specific date 1986 to 1989. (TSN, 07 November 2000, p. 19)
Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous[38] which can hardly be said of
Balaguers above testimony. If Balaguer intended to admit the allegation that he conducted a press
conference and caused the publication of the news articles, he could have done so. Instead,
Balaguer specifically denied these allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Answer.[39]
Petitioner next argues that IBC-13s Cross-Claim against Balaguer, in that:[40]
11. The acts complained of by the plaintiff were done solely by
co-defendant Balaguer.
Balaguer resorted to these things in his attempt to stave off his
impending removal from IBC.
is an admission by IBC-13, which is admissible against Balaguer pursuant to Sec. 29, Rule
130[41] as an admission by a co-partner or an agent.
Petitioner is mistaken. IBC-13s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively created an
adverse interest between them. Hence, the admission of one defendant is not admissible against
his co-defendant. Besides, as already discussed, the alleged acts imputed to Balaguer were
never proven to have been committed, much less maliciously, by Balaguer. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.[42]
In sum, we find that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof. No satisfactory
evidence was presented to prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents committed the
acts imputed against them. As such, there is no more need to discuss whether the assailed
statements are defamatory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81657 reversing the October 29, 2003 Decision and February 2, 2004
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, finding petitioner entitled to
damages, as well as the October 16, 2007 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
Page 328

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169431
Appellee, [Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891-92]
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
JERRY RAPEZA y FRANCISCO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Appellant.
Promulgated:
April 3, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In the complex but exquisite scheme laid down by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights occupies a
position of primacy, way above the articles on governmental power.[1] Once again, the Court extends fresh
vitality to the rights of a person under custodial investigation, which, beginning with the 1987 Constitution,
has been accorded equal but segregate weight as the traditional right against self-incrimination, to tip the
scales of justice in favor of the presumption of innocence and the lot of an unlettered confessant.
This treats of the appeal from the Decision[2] dated 1 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the Consolidated Judgment[3] dated 24 July 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 where Jerry Rapeza (appellant) was found guilty of
two (2) counts of murder and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus a total
of P100,000.00 as indemnity for the heirs of the two (2) victims.
In two (2) separate Informations, appellant, together with Mike Regino, was charged with the
murder of the Spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas,[4] with the following accusatory allegations:
Criminal Case No. 13064
That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less 4:00
oclock in the afternoon at Cawa-Cawa District, Municipality of Culion, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent
to kill and while armed with bladed weapons, did then and there wilfully [sic],
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with their bladed weapons, to wit:
knives, PRI[S]CILLA LIBAS, hitting her in the different vital parts of her body and
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds which causes (sic) hypovolemic
shock which were (sic) the direct and immediate cause of her instantaneous
death.[5]
Criminal Case No. 13202
st
That on or about the 21 day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less 4:00 oclock
in the afternoon at Cawa-Cawa District, Municipality of Culion, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, with intent to kill and while armed with bladed weapons, did
then and there wilfully, [sic] unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with their bladed weapons, to wit: knives, CESAR GANZON, hitting him
in the different vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him multiple stab
wounds which causes hypovolemic shock which were the direct and
immediate cause of his instantaneous death.[6]
As Mike Regino was at large, only appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty. Forthwith, joint trial ensued which resulted in the judgment of guilt against appellant as
co-principal for two (2) counts of murder, with conspiracy and evident premeditation attending the
commission of the felonies. Both cases were thereafter elevated to this Court on automatic review,
but later referred to the Court of Appeals per People v. Mateo.[7]The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of guilt.[8]
The prosecution had sought to establish the facts and events recited below.
In the afternoon of 21 October 1995, an unidentified woman went to the Culion
Municipal Station and reported a killing that had taken place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Barangay
Osmea, Culion, Palawan.[9] The officer-in-charge, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the victims house
which was the scene of the crime an investigating team led by SPO2 Crisanto Cuizon, Jr. and
PO2 Isidro Macatangay. There they saw two bloodied bodies, that of a woman lying on the floor of
the sala and that of a man inside the bedroom. The investigating team wrapped the bodies in
blankets and loaded them in a banca to be brought to the morgue. [10] The victims were later
identified as Priscilla Libas and Cesar Ganzon.
The Autopsy Reports[11] show that the common cause of death of both victims was
hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding secondary to multiple stab wounds and that
both bodies were in the early stages of decomposition. The medico-legal officer testified that
Ganzon sustained six (6) wounds on different parts of his body while Libas bore sixteen (16)
wounds.[12] All the wounds of the victims were fatal and possibly caused by a sharp instrument.
Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant had wanted to
confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for appellant. [13] He found appellant fishing
in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make
a confession in the presence of a lawyer.[14] Appellant was then brought to the police station after
which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel Alcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The
following day, appellant was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only available
Page 329
lawyer in the municipality.[15] The typewriter at the police station was out of order at that time and Atty. iyong matanda, dahil may galit daw si Mike
Reyes could not go to the police station as he was suffering from rheumatism.[16] At the house of Atty. sa dalawang matanda [Pris]cilla Libas at Cesar Ganzon)
Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two (2) officials of the Sangguniang na nakatira din sa Cawa-Cawa at
Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of ang layo ay humigit-kumulang isang daang metro
appellant who was assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being sa aming pinag-iinuman at kami ay nakaubos ng labing
investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon. dalawang bote ng
beer, mula umagahanggang alas kuatro ng hapon at ha
Per the Sinumpaang Salaysay[17] that appellant executed, he was informed of his constitutional bang kami ay nag-iinom aming pinag-uusapan [sic]
rights in the following manner: ang pagpatay sa dalawang matanda. Noong sinasabi sa
akin ni Mike, ako umayaw ngunit ako ay pinilit at sinabih
xxxx an ko rin siya (Mike) at pinag-tatapon [sic]
Tanong: Bago kita kunan ng isang salaysay, ikaw ay mayroong karapatan sa ating pa niya ang bote ng beer at may sinabi pa si Mike hindi
Saligang Batas na sumusunod: ka pala marunong tumulong sa akin, pamangkin mo
a) Na, ikaw ay maaaring hindi sumagot sa tanong na sa iyong pa naman ako. At ang sagot ko sa kanya,
akala ay makaka-apekto sa iyong pagkatao; ay maghintay ka, mamayang hapon natin[g] puntahan.
At noong humigit-kumulang [sa alas]
[sic] kuatro ng hapon, amin ng pinuntahan ang bahay ng
mag-asawa,
at pagdating namin sa bahay na dala naming [sic]
ang patalim, tuloy-tuloy na kaming umakyat,
at hinawakan ni Mike ang babae (Presing) at nilaslas na
ang leeg at sinaksak ng sinaksak niya sa ibat ibang part
b) Na, ikaw ay may karapatang pumili ng isang manananggol o e ng katawan at ako ay umakyat din
abogado na iyong sariling pili; sa bahay at nakita kong nakataob ang lalaki (Cesar)[,] a
king hinawakan [sic] ko sa kanyang balikat,
c) Na, kung ikaw ay walang kakayahan kumuha ng isang at siyaay nakaalam [sic] na
ab[u]gado ang Pulisya ang siyang magbibigay sa iyo. mayroong tao sa kanyang likuran,
akin nang sinaksak sa kaliwang tagiliran [sic]
d) Na, ang lahat na iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gawing ng kanyang katawan, at
ebidensya pabor o laban sa iyo. hindi ko na alam ang sumunod na pang-yayari
[sic] dahil ako[]y tuliro. At kami ay umalis at tumalon sa li
Sagot: Opo, sir. kod ng kusina, nang alam na naming [sic] na patay [na]
iyong dalawang matanda.
Tanong: Nakahanda ka na bang ipag-patuloy ang pagsisiyasat na ito, na ang ating
gagamiting salita ay salitang Tagalog, na siyang ginagamit nating x x x x[19]
[sic]?
An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in Tagalog being a
Sagot: Opo, sir. native of Samar. As he is illiterate, appellant affixed only his thumbmark on the statement above
his printed name. Bonifacio Abad, the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting counsel, also
x x x[18] signed the statement. Atty. Reyes signed again as the notary public who notarized the statement.

Thereupon, when asked about the subsequent events, appellant made the following narration:
xxx
Tanong: Maari mo bang isalaysay ang pang-yayari [sic]?
Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was filed against appellant, and Regino was
likewise arrested. Judge Jacinto Manalo of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Culion conducted a
preliminary investigation.Finding probable cause only as against appellant, Regino was ordered
released.[20] The Provincial Prosecutor, however, reversed the finding of the MTC by including
Regino in the Informations, but by then the latter had already left Culion. [21]

Sagot: Opo, [n]oong Sabado ng umaga alas 8:00[,] petsa 21 ng Oktobre, Testifying in his defense, appellant presented a different story during the trial. The
1995, kami ni Mike defense presented no other witness.
ay nagkaroon ng pag-iinuman sa kanilang bahay sa Cawa-Cawa
at sinabi sa akin [sic] puntahan naming

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 330

 Appellant testified that he did not know the victims and that he had nothing to do with their
deaths. He was a native of Samar and he did not know how to read or write as he never attended
school.[22] He arrived in Culion as a fisherman for the Parabal Fishing Boat.[23] As his contract had already
expired, he stayed in Culion to look for work. He lived with Regino as the latter was his only friend in
Cawa-Cawa.[24] Reginos house was about 40 meters away from the victims house.
Several days after appellants arrival, the killings took place. Appellant, along with Regino and
another man named Benny Macabili, was asked by a police officer to help load the bodies of the victims in
a banca.Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested and brought to the municipal hall where he was mauled
by PO2 Macatangay and placed in a small cell.[25] Regino, too, was arrested with him. While under
detention, appellant told the police that it was Regino who was responsible for the killing of the victims but
the police did not believe appellant. But appellant later testified that he implicated Regino only in retaliation
upon learning that the latter pointed to him as the perpetrator. [26] Appellant was then asked by SPO2
Gapas to sign a document so that he will be released. When appellant replied that he did not know how to
sign his name, SPO2 Gapas took appellants thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the
document. [27] Appellant claimed he did not resist because he was afraid of being mauled again.
Appellant further denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting Abad, the alleged
interpreter. He never left the jail from the time he was arrested except to attend the hearing before the
MTC.[28] When appellant was brought to the MTC, nobody talked to him during the hearing nor did counsel
assist him.[29] He was thereafter brought by a police officer to a hut in a mountain where he was told to go a
little bit farther. He refused for fear of being shot. The police officer then got angry and punched him in the
stomach.[30]
On the basis of appellants extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
Appellant submits for our resolution two issues, namely: (1) whether his guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was likewise
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant mainly contends that the extrajudicial confession upon which the trial court placed
heavy emphasis to find him guilty suffers from constitutional infirmity as it was extracted in violation of the
due process guidelines. Specifically, he claims that he affixed his thumbmark through violence and
intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed of his rights during the time of his detention when he
was already considered a suspect as the police had already received information of his alleged
involvement in the crimes. Neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him from the time he
was detained until trial began. Assuming Atty. Reyes was indeed designated as counsel to assist appellant
for purposes of the custodial investigation, said lawyer, however, was not appellants personal choice.
Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay states that his rights were
read to him, there was no showing that his rights were explained to him in a way that an uneducated
person like him could understand. On the assumption that the confession is admissible, appellant asserts
that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not amply proven as the trial court merely
relied on his alleged confession without presenting any other proof that the determination to commit the
crime was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the constitutional guidelines on custodial
investigation were observed. Hence, appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible. Even if appellant
was not informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his alleged detention, that would not be relevant,
the government counsel argues, since custodial investigation began only when the investigators started to
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
elicit information from him which took place at the time he was brought to the house of Atty.
Reyes. Moreover, appellant did not interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his
counsel. As to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the Solicitor General submits
that the same was sufficiently proven when accused proceeded to the victims house together with
Regino, armed with bladed weapons, in order to consummate their criminal design. He further
argues that appellants defense of denial and his lame excuse of being illiterate must be rejected in
the face of a valid voluntary extrajudicial confession.
The fundamental issue in this case is whether appellants extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt.
There is no direct evidence of appellants guilt except for the alleged confession and
the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the
witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded.
A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained
within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution.[31] Sec. 12, Art. III thereof states in part, to wit:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxxx
Republic Act No. 7438,[32] approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced the constitutional
mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. The pertinent provisions
read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order
or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and
Page 331
 understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to He must be warned prior to any questioning that
confer private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided by be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
with a competent and independent counsel. to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
xxxx questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers
is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
for any violation of law. evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it must further be tested The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of
for voluntariness, that is, if it was given freely by the confessant without any form of coercion or individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
inducement,[33] since, to repeat, Sec. 12(2), Art. III of the Constitution explicitly provides: statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; 3) the Court.
confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. [34]
x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins[,] a confrontation arises which at best
may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an
If all the foregoing requisites are met, the confession constitutes evidence of a high order army camp or police headquarters and there questioned
because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to a crime and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
unless prompted by truth and conscience.[35] Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold investigators as may be necessary to break down his
objectivity of the exclusionary rule.[36] The latter situation obtains in the instant case for several reasons. morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar
surroundings, and every person he meets he considers
Appellant was not informed of hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
his constitutional rights in seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
custodial investigation. means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee.
Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
A person under custodial investigation essentially has the right to remain silent and to have competent and constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the Constitution requires that he be informed of and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an
such rights.The raison d' etre for this requirement was amply explained in People v. Ayson[37] where this atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of
Court held, to wit: the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

xxxx x x x x[38]

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was invited by
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 oclock in the morning of 22
the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 332

allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was Q So you already considered Jerry Rapeza as a suspect?
already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional A When that person informed me that Jerry Rapeza would like to
guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October confess.
1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes.[39] In People v. Dueas, Jr.,[40] we ruled, to wit: x x x x [Emphasis ours.][42]

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the Already being held as a suspect as early as 21 October 1995, accused should have been
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to informed of his constitutional rights. SPO2 Gapas admitted that appellant was not so informed,
focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after thus:
appellants arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his
participation in the killing. As he testified on cross-examination: Q What was he doing?
A He was fishing, sir.
Q On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he actually told
[sic] you? Q And you told him that youre going to arrest him?
A Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told us that he has A He did not refuse to go with me, sir.
[sic] to reveal something about the death of Elvira Jacob.

Q So you already know [sic] that on December 18, 1996 that whatever
Catalino Duenas will reveal to you will give you lead in solving the
investigation in connection with the death of Elvira Jacob, isnt it?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that revelation, isnt it?
A Yes, sir. Thats all, your honor.[41] Q From the Island you brought him to the station?
A Yes, sir.
In the case at bar, SPO2 Gapas testified:
Q By the way, when you conducted the investigation in the house of Atty. Reyes in Q And there you arrived at the station at around 11:00 oclock in the morning?
Culion, why was Jerry Rapeza there? A Yes, sir.
A I invited Jerry Rapeza and upon my invitation he voluntarily came to me.
Q And then you started to conduct the investigation as Investigator of
Q In the first place, why did you invite him? the Police Station?
A To ask [a] question about the crime committed in the Island of Cawa-Cawa. A Yes, sir.

xxx xxxx

Q That was the only reason why you invited him, being a transient in that place you
made him a suspect?
A In the first place[,] Your Honor, he was not a suspect but 2 days after the
commission of the crime a certain person came to me and said that Jerry
Rapeza requested that he will give his confession but in front of a lawyer, so
he said: Puntahan nating [sic] ang isang taong nagngangalang Jerry
Rapeza.
xxx
Q And what was the[,] result of your investigation?
A According to him he would confess and he would give his confession
in the presence of a lawyer so I talked to Kgd. Arnel Alcantara.
x x x x[43]
Q On October 22, 1995[,] when you brought him to the Police Station, did you
start the investigation at that time?
A Not yet sir, I only talked to him.

Q And based on your experienced [sic], would it not be quite strange that a person Q When did you start the investigation?
who committed a crime would voluntarily give confession because ordinarily A I started the investigation when Jerry Rapeza was in front of his lawyer.
a criminals [sic] will find a way to escape?
A Yes, sir. [B]ut at that time the person who assisted me strongly believed that Jerry Q When was that?
Rapeza would confess so I did not make any tanong-tanong in order to A October 23, 1995[,] noon time, sir.
solve that crime so I proceeded to that place and talked to the suspect.
Q From the Island you just talked to him?

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 333

 A Yes, sir.
Q You did not consider that as part of the investigation?
A Yes sir, my purpose at that time was to certain (sic) the suspect of the said crime.
xxxx
Q Please answer my question[,] Mr. Witness, on October 22, 1995, did you
inform him of his constitutional rights?
A No sir, I did not.
x x x x(Emphasis ours.)[44]
Even supposing that the custodial investigation started only on 23 October 1995, a review of the records
reveals that the taking of appellants confession was flawed nonetheless.
It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2 Gapas had informed
appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used in evidence for
or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his own choice, and that if he cannot afford the services of
one, the police shall provide one for him.[45] However, there is no showing that appellant had actually
understood his rights. He was not even informed that he may waive such rights only in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful
communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital thereof.[46] Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances
of the person undergoing investigation.[47]
In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and
was not well versed in Tagalog.[48] This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining
whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged
confession.
The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its
claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an
interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the
signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged
confession.
For one thing, SPO2 Cuizon did not mention Abad as one of the persons present during the
interrogation. He testified:
Q Who were present during that investigation?
A Vice Mayor Marasigan and the two other SB members.
Q Can you identify who are these two SB members?
A SB Mabiran and SB Alcantara.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Q Who else?
A No more, sir.
Q So, there were two SB members, Vice Mayor Atty. Reyes, Gapas and you?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x[49]
For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the best
position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to
understand what was going on.This significant circumstance lends credence to appellants claim
that he had never met Abad.
According to the appellate court, appellant admitted in his Brief that the confession was made in
the presence of an interpreter. The passage in appellants Brief on which the admission imputed to
him was based reads, thus:
The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when
accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the
confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing
that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained
and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even
presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language
understood by accused-appellant. [50]
Clearly, the imputation is erroneous. Throughout his Brief, appellant disputes the
allegation that he ever met the interpreter much less made the confession with the latters
assistance. The evident import of the passage is that on the assumption that there was an
interpreter present still there was no indication that the rights of a person under investigation were
effectively imparted to appellant, as the interpreter could not translate that which was not even
said in the course of the proceeding.
Moreover, SPO2 Gapas testified on direct examination:
Q As a way of refreshing your mind[,] Mr. Witness, can you take a look at this
statement [referring to appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay] those
appearing on page 1 of the same up to the word Opo sir, kindly
take a look at this, do you remember that you were the one who
profounded (sic) this (sic) questions?
A Yes, sir, I was the one who profounded [sic] that [sic] questions.
Q And you are very definite that the answer is in [the] affirmative, in your
question and answer?
A I am not very sure, sir.
Q You are not very sure because he has a lawyer?
A Yes, sir.
Page 334

x x x x[51]
SPO2 Gapas could not say for certain if appellant had indeed understood his rights precisely
because he did not explain them to appellant. In any event, SPO2 Gapas would be incompetent to testify
thereon because appellants alleged confession was made through an interpreter as he did not understand
Tagalog. SPO2 Gapas testimony as regards the contents of appellants confession would in fact be
hearsay. In U.S. v. Chu Chio,[52] this Court rendered inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of the
accused therein because it was not made immediately to the officer who testified, but through an
interpreter. Thus, the officer as witness on the stand did not swear of his own knowledge as to what the
accused had said. Similarly in this case, SPO2 Gapass testimony as to what was translated to appellant
and the latters responses thereto were not of his personal knowledge.Therefore, without the testimony of
Abad, it cannot be said with certainty that appellant was informed of his rights and that he understood
them.
Not having been properly informed of his rights prior to questioning and not having waived them
either, the alleged confession of appellant is inadmissible.
Confession was not made with
the assistance of competent and
independent counsel of appellants
choice.
Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was arrested until
before he was arraigned. On the other hand, the prosecution admits that appellant was provided with
counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty. Reyes to which appellant was allegedly taken
from the police station.
SPO2 Gapas testified that he talked to appellant when they got to the police station at 11
oclock in the morning of 22 October 1995 and the result of their talk was that appellant would give his
confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then held in the police station overnight before he
was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes.
The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect,
the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.[53] Appellant did not make any such waiver.
Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his
competence and independence as appellants counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. The
meaning of competent counsel and the standards therefor were explained in People v. Deniega[54] as
follows:
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far
as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the
lawyer were one furnished in the accuseds behalf, it is important that he should be
competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would be
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
individuals constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed
that an accuseds right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing
custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged
by the accused (himself), or by the latters relative or person authorized by
him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their
probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many
areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.
x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be
present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the
interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to
give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)[55]
The standards of competent counsel were not met in this case given the deficiencies of
the evidence for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as appellants
counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how he assisted
appellant. The confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no
indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his constitutional rights.Atty. Reyes was not
even presented in court to testify thereon whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appears
that his participation in the proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellants
confession. Such participation is not the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to
appellant in legal contemplation.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellants counsel of choice but was picked out by
the police officers allegedly through the barangay officials. Appellants failure to interpose any
objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the prevailing
circumstances. As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including
the right to a counsel preferably of his own choice. SPO2 Gapas testified thus:
xxxx
Q Now Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the accused[,] when he
allegedly gave his voluntary confession[,] he [sic] did not read the
document when he made his thumbmark?
A He did not because according to him he is illiterate.
Page 335
 Q Illiterate because he only placed his thumbmark and you have all the freedom
to manipulate him and in fact he doesnt know that he is entitled to
have a lawyer of his own choice?
A He doesnt know.
x x x x[56]
Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the alleged confession that appellant was informed of
his right to a counsel of his own choice and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police shall
provide him with one, it was overlooked that it was not similarly made to appear in the same statement that
appellant was advised that he had the option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police
authorities.[57]
Set against the clear provisions of the Constitution and the elucidations thereof in jurisprudence,
the foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities preclude the admissibility of appellants alleged
confession.
Confession is not voluntary.
It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.[58] The trial court found that appellants bare denials
failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that the confession was
not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.
First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the
investigators themselves.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face,
the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being
replete with detailswhich could only be supplied by the accusedreflecting spontaneity and coherence, it
may be considered voluntary.[59] The trial court applied this rule but without basis. On closer examination of
the evidence, the key details in the alleged confession were provided not by appellant but by the police
officers themselves.
The prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. This is disturbing, to say the
least.
The trial court found that the killings were reported to the police at four oclock in the afternoon
of 21 October 1995. That when the investigating team arrived at the scene of the crime, the bodies of the
victims were already rank and decomposing,[60] and that two days after the crimes were committed, SPO2
Gapas had set out to look for appellant following information from a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant
would like to confess to the crimes.
Indeed, SPO2 Gapas testified that he received a report of the killings on 21 October 1995 and
sent a team to investigate the incident. On direct examination, he declared that two days after the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
commission of the crime, he received information that appellant would give his confession in front
of a lawyer.[61] However, on cross-examination, he stated that it was on the following day or on 22
October 1995 when he found appellant and invited him to the police station and that appellants
custodial investigation had taken place on 23 October 1995.
Likewise, SPO2 Cuizons testimony is far from enlightening. He testified, thus:
xxxx
Q Now, on October 24, 1995, where were you?
A I was in Culion Police Station.
Q While you were there in the Police Station, what happened?
A A woman reported to us regarding this incident.[62]
xxxx
Q When was the investigation conducted?
A October 24, 1995.
Q On the same day that you discover [sic] the cadavers?
A The investigation was conducted on October 25, 1995.
x x x x[63]
The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession.
While the prosecution insists through the recitals of the Informations and the testimony
of its witnesses that the killings took place on 21 October 1995, the totality of its evidence shows
otherwise, i.e. the killings took place earlier. When the bodies were discovered on 21 October
1995, they were already decomposing, a factor that indicates that the victims had been dead long
before then. How then could appellant have killed the victims at 4 oclock in the afternoon of 21
October 1995 as expressly stated in the confession, when that was the same date and time when
the bodies were discovered? Had appellant voluntarily confessed and had he really been the killer,
he would have given the correct date and time when he committed the horrid acts. The only
sensible way to sort out the puzzle is to conclude that the police officers themselves supplied 21
October 1995 and four oclock in the afternoon as the date and time of the killings in appellants
statement, a barefaced lie on which the prosecution based its allegations in the Informations and
which SPO2 Gapas repeated on the witness stand.
Moreover, the police officers went to the house of the victims on 21 October
1995 where they found the bodies. The autopsy on the victimss bodies was done the following
day or on 22 October 1995 while appellants statement was allegedly taken on 23 October
1995. By then, the investigators knew how and where the victims were killed, circumstances that
could have enabled them to fill up the details of the crime in the extrajudicial confession.[64]
Curiously, the autopsy report on Ganzons body shows that he sustained six (6) stab
wounds, four (4) on the right side of his body and two (2) on the left side. Yet, it is stated in
Page 336
appellants extrajudicial confession that he stabbed Ganzon on his left side. Quite oddly, The prosecutions evidence likewise fails to establish when the custodial investigation
SPO2 Cuizon testified that Ganzon was wounded on the left arm only. His full account on this aspect runs, had taken place and for how long appellant had been in detention. Strangely, the confession is
thus: undated and it cannot be ascertained from it when appellant made the confession or affixed his
thumbmark thereon. What emerges only is the bare fact that it was notarized by Atty. Reyes on 23
Q Where did you go? October 1995. One can only speculate as to the reason behind what seems to be a lack of
A I immediately proceeded to the house of the victim. forthrightness on the part of the police officers.

Q What did you find out when you went to the house of the victim? These unexplained inconsistencies cast doubt on the integrity and voluntariness of appellants
A I have seen blood on the ground floor of the house. alleged confession.

Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel.

xxxx
Q When you opened the house[,] you are [sic] with Macatangay?
A Yes, sir[.] I was with POII Macatangay but he was a little bit far from the victim and I
was the one who opened the door and went upstairs.
To reiterate, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation
is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make
self-incriminating statements.[67] And in the event the accused desires to give a confession, it is
the duty of his counsel to ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his act and that
it is a product of his own free choice.

Q What did you find out inside the house? It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station overnight before he was
A I have seen a woman lying down with her hands nakadipa on the ground and allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes. He was not informed of his rights and there is no
blooded (sic). evidence that he was assisted by counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant having been
subjected to trickery and intimidation at the hands of the police authorities, as he claims, cannot
xxxx be entirely discounted.

Q Where else did you go when you were already inside the house? Confession was not sufficiently
A I went to the other bedroom. corroborated.

Q And what did you find out?

A An old man with his face facing downward. Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently
disputed unless they are corroborated.[68] There must be such corroboration so that when
Q The woman already dead was in the sala? considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a
A Yes, sir. reasonable doubt.[69]

x x x x[65] As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness
who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made [70] or by
Q Do you know in what bedroom (sic) of her body she was wounded? any other evidence.[71]
A The neck was slashed and both arms and both foot (sic) were wounded.
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering
Q How about the man? doubt as to the credibility of appellants statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies
A Left arm, sir. of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However,
they were not presented in court.
Q Where else?
A No more, sir.

x x x x[66] (Emphasis ours.)

Abads testimony was likewise crucial in proving that appellant had understood every
part of his alleged confession. Confessions made in a language or dialect not known to the
confessant must also be corroborated by independent evidence. [72] As appellant is unschooled
and was not familiar with the Tagalog dialect, his confession which was in Tagalog necessarily
had to be read and translated to Waray allegedly by Abad. This Court has held that such a
multiple process of reading and translating the questions and translating and typing the answers

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 337

and reading and translating again the said answers is naturally pregnant with possibilities of human, if
unintentional, inadequacies and incompleteness which render the said confession unsafe as basis of
conviction for a capital offense, unless sufficiently corroborated.[73] A confession may be admissible if it is
shown to have been read and translated to the accused by the person taking down the statement and that
the accused fully understood every part of it.[74] To repeat, we cannot accept SPO2 Gapas testimony as
regards the contents of appellants alleged confession for being hearsay evidence thereon. Since appellant
allegedly made the confession to SPO2 Gapas through Abad, Abads testimony is thus indispensable in
order to make the confession admissible.
Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be
resolved in favor of appellant[75] and the confession should be disregarded as evidence.[76] Verily, we are
left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority the Constitution
protects the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay
evidence, we find the same insufficient bases to hold appellants extrajudicial confession admissible
against him.
The only other prosecution evidence under consideration are the autopsy reports with which the
alleged confession supposedly dovetails, as the trial court concluded. However, a perusal of the alleged
confession would reveal that does not fit the details in the autopsy report. As discussed earlier, Ganzon
was found to have sustained six (6) stab wounds on different parts of his body while appellant allegedly
admitted stabbing him on his left side only. The confession does not even state how many times appellant
stabbed the old man. SPO2 Cuizon testified that he saw only one stab wound on Ganzons body and it was
on the latters left arm. Thus, it is not with the autopsy reports that the alleged confession dovetails but
rather with what the police authorities would like us to believe as the truth.
Nevertheless, since the confession is inadmissible, it becomes irrelevant whether it dovetails with the
autopsy reports. The corroboration that medico-legal findings lend to an extrajudicial confession becomes
relevant only when the latter is considered admissible. In People v. De la Cruz,[77] we held, to wit:
It is significant that, with the exception of appellants putative extrajudicial
confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the
People. The proposition that the medical findings jibe with the narration of appellant
as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the fatal error of figuratively
putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the
supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied
and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a
finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which has still to be proved, a situation
of petitio principii or circulo en probando.[78]
No motive could be ascribed
to appellant.
For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is
essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator. [79] In view of the
inadmissibility of the confession, there is no other evidence that directly points to appellant as the
culprit. However, the prosecution failed to show any motive on appellants part to commit the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
felonies. Appellant consistently denied having known the victims. Although the confession states
that Regino allegedly sought appellants help in killing the victims as Regino was his nephew, the
fact of their relationship was denied by appellant and was never established by the
prosecution. In People v. Aguilar,[80] we held that the absence of apparent motive to commit the
offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create a presumption of the innocence of the
accused, since, in terms of logic, an action without a motive would be an effect without a cause.[81]
Furthermore, appellants conduct after the killings was not that of a guilty person. He
never attempted to flee even if he knew that the police authorities were already investigating the
incident as he was summoned to help load the bodies in a banca. Being a transient in the place,
he could have easily disappeared and left the island but he remained there to continue looking for
work.
Taken together, these circumstances generate serious doubts that must be resolved in appellants
favor, congruently with the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In view of the inadmissibility of appellants confession, which is the sole evidence of the
prosecution against him, the resolution of the issue of whether the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation had attended the commission of the crimes has become academic. Indeed,
there exists no other prosecution evidence on which appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt
may be based.
In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is not whether appellant is
completely innocent, but rather whether the quantum of evidence necessary to prove his guilt was
sufficiently met. With the exclusion of appellants alleged confession, we are left with no other
recourse but to acquit him of the offenses charged for the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In fact,
unless the prosecution discharges the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. [82]
WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Rapeza y Francisco is
hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable doubt. The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellant from confinement,
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance
herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
C. EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE
G.R. No. 201822, August 12, 2015
MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC.*, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondent.
Page 338
 DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the December
29, 2011 Decision2 and May 8, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR. CV No. 88321,
which granted the appeal filed therein by respondent American Home Assurance Corporation (AHAC) and
reversed and set aside the October 17, 2006 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City,
Branch 271 dismissing AHAC's Complaint5 for Damages against petitioner Marina Port Services, Inc.
(MPSI).
Factual Antecedents
On September 21, 1989, Countercorp Trading PTE., Ltd. shipped from Singapore to the Philippines 10
container vans of soft wheat flour with seals intact on board the vessel M/V Uni Fortune. The shipment was
insured against all risks by AHAC and consigned to MSC Distributor (MSC).
Upon arrival at the Manila South Harbor on September 25, 1989, the shipment was discharged in good
and complete order condition and with safety seals in place to the custody of the arrastre operator, MPSI.
After unloading and prior to hauling, agents of the Bureau of Customs officially broke the seals, opened the
container vans, and examined the shipment for tax evaluation in the presence of MSC's broker and
checker. Thereafter, the customs inspector closed the container vans and refastened them with safety wire
seals while MSC's broker padlocked the same. MPSI then placed the said container vans in a
back-to-back arrangement at the delivery area of the harbor's container yard where they were watched
over by the security guards of MPSI and of the Philippine Ports Authority.
On October 10, 1989, MSC's representative, AD's Customs Services (ACS), took out five container vans
for delivery to MSC. At the compound's exit, MPSI issued to ACS the corresponding gate passes for the
vans indicating its turnover of the subject shipment to MSC. However, upon receipt of the container vans at
its warehouse, MSC discovered substantial shortages in the number of bags of flour delivered. Hence, it
filed a formal claim for loss with MPSI.
From October 12 to 14, 1989 and pursuant to the gate passes issued by MPSI, ACS took out the
remaining five container vans from the container yard and delivered them to MSC. Upon receipt, MSC
once more discovered substantial shortages. Thus, MSC filed another claim with MPSI.
Per MSC, the total number of the missing bags of flour was 1,650 with a value of £257,083.00.
MPSI denied both claims of MSC. As a result, MSC sought insurance indemnity for the lost cargoes from
AHAC. AHAC paid MSC the value of the missing bags of flour after finding the tetter's claim in order. In
turn, MSC issued a subrogation receipt in favor of AHAC.
Thereafter, AHAC filed a Complaint6 for damages against MPSI before the RTC.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
AHAC averred in its Complaint that the partial loss of the bags of flour was due to the fault or
negligence of MPSI since the loss happened while the shipment was still in MPSI's custody.
MPSL, on the other hand, disclaimed any liability. It essentally maintained in its Answer 7 that the
bags of flour were inside sealed container vans when it received the same; that it handled the
subject shipment with the diligence required of it; and, mat the container vans were turned over by
it to MSC in the same condition that they were in at the time of their discharge from the vessel.
MPSI likewise countered that the failure of MSC to request for a bad order survey belied the
latter's claim for loss.
Trial then ensued.
On October 17, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing AHAC's Complaint. It held that
while there was indeed a shortage of 1,650 sacks of soft wheat flour, AHAC's evidence failed to
clearly show that the loss happened while the subject shipment was still under MPSI's
responsibility. Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, AHAC appealed to the CA.
In its Decision10 dated December 29, 2011, the CA stressed that in a claim for loss filed by a
consignee, the burden of proof to show due compliance with the obligation to deliver the goods to
the appropriate party devolves upon the arrastre operator. In consonance with this, a presumption
of fault or negligence for the loss of the goods arises against the arrastre operator pursuant to
Articles 126511 and 198112 of the Civil Code. In this case, the CA found that MPSI failed to
discharge such burden and to rebut the aforementioned presumption. Thus, it was held liable to
AHAC for the value of the missing bags of flour, viz.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We conclude that x x x MPSI was negligent in the handling and safekeeping
of the subject shipment. It did not create and implement a more defined,
concrete and effective measure to detect, curb and prevent the loss or
pilferage of cargoes in its custody. This is manifested by the fact that [MPSI]
never took any action to address such complaint even after it received the
formal claim of loss in the first five (5) vans. As a consequence, more bags of
flour were eventually lost or pilfered in the remaining container vans that were
still in [MPSI's] custody at that time. Case law tells us that negligence is that
Page 339
 conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance[s] justly demand,
whereby that other person suffers injury. Clearly, [MPSI] breached its arrastre
obligations to the consignee for it failed to deliver said bags in good and complete
condition.
In view of MPSI's failure to exercise that degree of diligence, precaution and care the
law [requires] of arrastre operators in the performance of their duties to the consignee,
[MPSI] is legally bound to reimburse [AHAC] for the value of the missing bags of flour
that it paid to MSC pursuant to the insurance policy.13
In view of the same, the said court disposed of the appeal in this wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 271 dated 17 October 2006 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellee Marina Port Services, Inc. is ORDERED to pay appellant,
American Home Assurance Corporation, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Seven
Thousand and Eighty Three Pesos (PhP257,083.00) with interest thereon at Six
percent (6%) [per annum] from the filing of this complaint on 24 September 1990 until
the decision becomes final and executory, and thereafter, at the rate of twelve (12)
percent [per annum] until fully paid, and additionally, to pay the x x x sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.14
MPSI moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution15 dated May 8, 2012.
Hence, the present recourse.
Issue
The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether MPSI is liable for the loss of the bags of flour.
Our Ruling
There is merit in the Petition.
Albeit involving factual questions, the
Court shall proceed to resolve this case
since it falls under several exceptions to
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the rule that only questions of law are
proper in a petition for review on
certiorari.
At the outset, it is evident that the resolution of the instant case requires the scrutiny of factual
issues which are, however, outside the scope of the present petition filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. However, the Court held in Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam Insurance Co.,
Inc.16 that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
But while it is not our duty to review, examine and evaluate or weigh all over
again the probative value of the evidence presented, the Court may
nonetheless resolve questions of fact when the case falls under any of the
following exceptions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.17
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the aforementioned second, fourth, fifth, and
seventh exceptions. Hence, it shall proceed to delve into factual matters essential to the proper
determination of the merits of this case.
Several well-entrenched legal principles
govern the relationship of an arrastre
operator and a consignee.
The relationship between an arrastre operator and a consignee is similar to that between a
warehouseman and a depositor, or to that between a common carrier and the consignee and/or
the owner of the shipped goods.18 Thus, an arrastre operator should adhere to the same degree of
diligence as that legally expected of a warehouseman or a common carrier 19 as set forth in
Page 340
Section 3[b] of the Warehouse Receipts [Act]20 and Article 1733 of the Civil Code.21 As custodian of the [A]fter receipt by the broker of the container van containing the cargo, do you require the
Q
shipment discharged from the vessel, the arrastre operator must take good care of the same and turn it broker to issue you a report or certification as to the appearance of the container van?
over to the party entitled to its possession.22redarclaw
A [W]e only rely on the gate pass.
In case of claim for loss filed by a consignee or the insurer as subrogee, 23 it is the arrastre operator that
carries the burden of proving compliance with the obligation to deliver the goods to the appropriate Q [A]nd you don't place there "the padlock is still intact or the wirings still intact"?
party.24 It must show that the losses were not due to its negligence or that of its employees. 25 It must
establish that it observed the required diligence in handling the shipment.26 Otherwise, it shall be A [I]t is stated in the gate pass, your Honor.
presumed that the loss was due to its fault. 27 In the same manner, an arrastre operator shall be liable for
damages if the seal and lock of the goods deposited and delivered to it as closed and sealed, be broken xxxx
through its fault.28 Such fault on the part of the arrastre operator is likewise presumed unless there is proof
to the contrary.29redarclaw [A]nd the findings [are counter-signed] by the representative of the broker also on the same
Q
date?
MPSI was able to prove delivery of the
shipment to MSC in good and complete A [Y]es, your honor.35
condition and with locks and seals intact.
xxxx
It is significant to note that MPSI, in order to prove that it properly delivered the subject shipment
consigned to MSC, presented 10 gate passes marked as Exhibits 4 to 13. 30 Each of these gate passes
bore the duly identified signature31 of MSC's representative which serves, among others, as an
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
acknowledgement that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Atty. Laino
Issuance of [the] Gate Pass constitutes delivery to and receipt by consignee of the goods as described
above in good order and condition, unless an accompanying B.O. certificate duly issued and noted on the
[B]ut did you not say that in the gate pass it is stated there as to the external appearance of
face of [the] Gate Pass appears.32 q
the container van?
As held in International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Co.,
Inc.,33 the signature of the consignee's representative on the gate pass is evidence of receipt of the [I]here was no indication of any inspection of the container van x x x
shipment in good order and condition.34redarclaw a
meaning the container vans were all in good condition, sir.

Also, that MPSI delivered the subject shipment to MSC's representative in good and complete condition q [Y]ou said a [while] ago that you did not receive any complaint for broken seals, is it not?
and with lock and seals intact is established by the testimonies of MPSFs employees who were directly
involved in the processing of the subject shipment. Mr. Ponciano De Leon testified that as MPSI's delivery a [Y]es, sir.
checker, he personally examined the subject container vans and issued the corresponding gate passes
that were, in turn, countersigned by the consignee's representative. MPSI's other witness, Chief Claims q [B]ut the complaint that you received indicates that there were losses,
Officer Sergio Icasiano (Icasiano), testified that the broker, as the consignee's representative, neither
registered any complaints nor requested for an inspection, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw a [W]e did not receive any complaint from the broker, sir.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION: [I]f the broker will complain they have to file a request for inspection of the cargo so that they
q
will know if there [are] shortages x x x.
Atty. Laurente
a [Y]es, sir.
xxxx
[C]ourt

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 341

 [A]nd if the broker would notice or detect [something] peculiar, the way the door of the
q
container van appears whether close[d] or not, they have to request for an inspection[?]
a [Y]es, your honor.
q [O]r in the absence of the padlock or wirings, the broker will request for an inspection[?]
a [Y]es,your honor[;] they can require for the examination of the cargo.
q [B]ut there was no request at all by the broker?
a [T]here was none, your Honor.36
Verily, the testimonies of the aforementioned employees of MPSI confirm that the container vans, together
with their padlocks and wirings, were in order at the time the gate passes were issued up to the time the
said container vans were turned over to ACS.
AHAC justifies the failure of ACS to immediately protest the alleged loss or pilferage upon initial pick-up of
the first batch of container vans. According to it, ACS could not have discovered the loss at that moment
since the stripping of container vans in the pier area is not allowed. The Court cannot, however, accept
such excuse. For one, AHAC's claim that stripping of the container vans is not allowed in the pier area is a
mere allegation without proof. It is settled that "[m]ere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof."37 For another, even assuming that stripping of the container
vans is indeed not allowed at the pier area, it is hard to believe that MSC or its representative ACS has no
precautionary measures to protect itself from any eventuality of loss or pilferage. To recall, ACS's
representative signed the gate passes without any qualifications. This is despite the fact that such
signature serves as an acknowledgment of ACS's receipt of the goods in good order and condition. If MSC
was keen enough in protecting its interest, it (through ACS) should have at least qualified the receipt of the
goods as subject to inspection, and thereafter arrange for such an inspection in an area where the same is
allowed to be done. However, no such action or other similar measure was shown to have been
undertaken by MSC. What is clear is that ACS accepted the container vans on its behalf without any
qualification. As aptly observed by the RTC:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
During [the] period of tum-over of goods from the arrastre to [ACS], there had been no protest on anything
on the part of consignee's representative x x x. Otherwise, the complaint would have been shown [on] the
gate passes. In fact, each gate pass showed the date of delivery, the location of delivery, the truck number
of the truck used in the delivery, the actual quantity of goods delivered, the numbers of the safety wires
and padlocks of the vans and the signatures of the receiver. More importantly, the gate passes bared the
fact that the shipments were turned-over by [MPSI] to [ACS] on the same dates of customs inspections
and turnovers.38
There being no exception as to bad order, the subject shipment, therefore, appears to have been accepted
by MSC, through ACS, in good order.39 "It logically follows [then] that the case at bar presents no occasion
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
for the necessity of discussing the diligence required of an [arrastre operator] or of the theory of
[its] prima facie liability x x x, for from all indications, the shipment did not suffer loss or damage
while it was under the care x x x of the arrastre operator x x x." 40redarclaw
Even in the light of Article 1981, no
presumption of fault on the part of MPSI
arises since it was not sufficiently shown
that the container vans were re-opened
or that their locks and seals were broken
for the second time.
Indeed, Article 1981 of the Civil Code also mandates a presumption of fault on the part of the
arrastre operator as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Article 1981. When the thing deposited is delivered closed and sealed, the depositary must return
it in the same condition, and he shall be liable for damages should the seal or lock be broken
through his fault.
Fault on the part of the depositary is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary.
As regards the value of the thing deposited, the statement of the depositor shall be accepted,
when the forcible opening is imputable to the depositary, should there be no proof to the contrary.
However, the courts may pass upon the credibility of the depositor with respect to the value
claimed by him.
When the seal or lock is broken, with or without the depositary's fault, he shall keep the secret of
the deposit.
However, no such presumption arises in this case considering that it was not sufficiently shown
that the container vans were re-opened or that their locks and seals were broken for the second
time. As may be recalled, the container vans were opened by a customs official for examination of
the subject shipment and were thereafter resealed with safety wires. While this fact is not disputed
by both parties, AHAC alleges that the container vans were re-opened and this gave way to the
alleged pilferage. The Court notes, however, that AHAC based such allegation solely on the
survey report of the Manila Adjuster & Surveyors Company (MASCO). As observed by the
RTC:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
AHAC x x x claim[s] that there were two instances when the seals were broken. [First], when the
customs officer examined the shipment and had it resealed with safety wires. [Second], when the
surveyor and consignee's broker visually inspected the shipment and allegedly found the safety
wires of the customs officer to have been detached and missing which they then replaced. This
second instance is only upon their say so as there is no x x x documentary or testimonial proof on
the matter [other] than the [MASCO] survey report.41
Page 342
However, the person who prepared the said report was not presented in court to testify on the same. Thus,
the said survey report has no probative value for being hearsay. "It is a basic rule that evidence, whether
oral or documentary, is hearsay, if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand." 42 Moreover, "an
unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value. It is precluded because
the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person
to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness
to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay
evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative
value."43redarclaw
There being no other competent evidence that the container vans were reopened or that their locks and
seals were broken for the second time, MPSI cannot be held liable for damages due to the alleged loss of
the bags of flour pursuant to Article 1981 of the Civil Code.
At any rate, the goods were shipped
under "Shipper's Load and Count"
arrangement. Thus, protection against
pilferage of the subject shipment was
the consignees lookout.
At any rate, MPSI cannot just the same be held liable for the missing bags of flour since the consigned
goods were shipped under "Shipper's Load and Count" arrangement. "This means that the shipper was
solely responsible for the loading of the container, while the carrier was oblivious to the contents of the
shipment. Protection against pilferage of the shipment was the consignee's lookout. The arrastre operator
was, like any ordinary depositary, duty-bound to take good care of the goods received from the vessel and
to turn the same over to the party entitled to their possession, subject to such qualifications as may have
validly been imposed in the contract between the parties. The arrastre operator was not required to verify
the contents of the container received and to compare them with those declared by the shipper because,
as earlier stated, the cargo was at the shipper's load and count. The arrastre operator was expected to
deliver to the consignee only the container received from the carrier."44redarclaw
All told, the Court holds that MPSI is not liable for the loss of the bags of flour.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 29, 2011 and Resolution dated
May 8, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 88321 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated October 17, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 271, Pasig City in Civil Case No.
90-54517 is REINSTATED and the Complaint in the said case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 202978
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appelee
vs.
VICTOR P. PADIT, Accused-Appelant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Victor P. Pad it (Padit) assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 19, 20 I l, in CA-GR. CEB-CR-H.C. No.
00888, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Comi (RTC) of Guiuan,
Eastern Sarnar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 2266, finding Padit guilty of the crime of rape. The
antecedents are as follows:
In the morning of May 5, 2006, the victim, AAA,3 a four-year-old girl, was playing inside their
house while her mother was looking after her younger brother. After a while, AAA went out of the
house to buy bread. On her way to the store, she was called by accused-appellant, who is their
neighbor and the uncle of her mother, and whom AAA calls as Lolo Victor. Accused-appellant
brought AAA inside his house and allowed her to play. He then brought her upstairs, caused her to
lie down and removed her short pants. Accused-appellant also removed his short pants and
proceeded to rub his penis against AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but was rendered helpless and
prevented from making any sound as accused-appellant covered her mouth with his hand.
Thereafter, accused-appellant threatened to hurt AAA with his knife if she tells anybody about the
incident.
Meanwhile, AAA's mother was about to serve lunch when she noticed that AAA was not yet
around. She then went out of their house and around their neighborhood calling for AAA. While
she was in accused-appellant's yard, the latter came out of his house and told her that AAA is
inside watching him weave baskets. Accused-appellant then went back inside the house and,
after a few minutes, brought AAA outside.
Back at their house, her mother asked AAA why she did not respond to her calls. AAA then told
her mother about what accused-appellant did to her. Upon hearing AAA's account of her sexual
molestation committed by accused-appellant, AAA's mother immediately went to
accused-appellant's house to confront him. Accused-appellant, however, denied having molested
AAA. Unable to elicit an admission from accused-appellant, AAA's mother went back to their
house and proceeded to give AAA a bath. While she was washing AAA's vagina, the latter cried
and asked her not to touch it because it was very painful.
The following morning, AAA's parents filed a complaint with their Barangay Chairman. They also
caused AAA to undergo physical/medical examination on May 8, 2006 wherein it was found that
the child's vulva
Page 343
showed a slight hymenal abrasion.
Subsequently, AAA's mother filed a criminal Complaint4 with the Prosecutor's Office of Guiuan, Eastern
Samar. In an Information5 dated August 2, 2006, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Eastern Samar
charged accused-appellant with the crime of rape, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
xxxx
The undersigned, Public Prosecutor of the Province of Eastern Samar, accuses Victor
Padit y Padual of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Art. 335, Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2006, at about 12:00 noon, Brgy. Naparaan,
Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously place and rub his penis into the
vagina of [AAA], 4-year-old girl minor, without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law.
xxx
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution contending that he could not
have raped AAA because his wife was with him at the time that the alleged molestation was committed.
Accused-appellant's wife corroborated his testimony on the witness stand.
During pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense entered into a stipulation of facts wherein it was admitted
that the victim was four (4) years old at the time of the alleged rape; accused-appellant is the same person
who has been charged and arraigned; and, accused-appellant and the victim and her parents are
neighbors.6
Thereafter, trial ensued
On March 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision7 finding accusedappellant guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds
accused VICTOR P. PADIT, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the
consummated offense of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby convicts him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim, [AAA], the sum of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity and seventy-five
thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages; with the accessory
penalties provided for by law. With costs de oficio.
March 3, 2008, Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of the victim as corroborated, in its material
points, by the medical findings of the physician who examined the victim.
Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Decision with the CA in Cebu City.9
On July 19, 2011, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision affirming with modification the
judgment of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated3 March
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Guiuan, EasternSamar in
Criminal Case No. 2266, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of consummated rape is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. In
addition to the award [of] P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA held that the prosecution was able to establish the elements ofrape through the victim's
testimony and that it found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC with respect to the
credibility of the victim.
On August 8, 2011, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal11 manifesting his
intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.
In its Resolution12 dated December 1, 2011, the CA gave due course to accused-appellant's
Notice of Appeal and directed its Judicial Records Division to elevate the records of the case to
this Court.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
Page 344
In a Resolution13 dated October 11, 2012, this Court, among others, notified the parties that they may file b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. otherwise unconscious;

In its Manifestation14 dated December 13, 2012, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
Court that it will no longer file a supplemental brief because it had already extensively discussed and authority; and
refuted all the arguments raised by the appellant in its brief filed before the CA, subject, however, to the
reservation that it will file a supplemental brief if appellant will raise new matters and issues. d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
In the same manner, accused-appellant filed a Manifestation15 dated January 2, 2013, indicating that he no circumstances mentioned above be present.
longer intends to file a supplemental brief and is adopting in toto and reiterates the contents and substance
of his brief which was filed with the CA. xxxx

Thus, the basic issue to be resolved by this Court, in the instant appeal, is whether the prosecution was ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant is guilty of rape. article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

The Court rules in the affirmative. xxxx

At the outset, the Court notes that the Information, dated August 2, 2006, specifically charged petitioner The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
with rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). However, upon the enactment of Republic any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
Act No. 8353 (RA 8353), otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which became effective on
October 22, 1997, rape was reclassified as a crime against persons, thus, repealing Article 335 of the RPC.
The new provisions on rape are now found in Articles 266-A to 266-D of the said Code. In the instant case, xxxx
the crime was committed on May 5, 2006. Hence, the applicable law is the RPC as amended by RA 8353
and that the prosecution as well as the RTC and the CA committed an error in specifying the provision of 5. When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.
law which was violated. Nonetheless, it is settled that the failure to designate the offense by statute or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does xxx
not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime
charged.16 The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor
Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate
all the elements of the crime charged and this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. 17 In the instant case, the body of the Information
findings, as will be discussed below.
contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner and describes acts
punishable under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC, as amended.
Accused-appellant's arguments in the instant appeal basically harp on the alleged loopholes,
The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provide: inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the victim and her mother which
supposedly cast doubt on their credibility as witnesses.

Art. 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed - 1) By a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has, in fact, been committed.18 When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if
the matter to which she testified is not true. 19 Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 345

and sincerity.20 Considering that AAA was only four (4) years old when she was raped and was only five (5)
years old when she took the witness stand, she could not have invented a horrible story. For her to
fabricate the facts of rape and to charge the accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental
capacity.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove carnal
knowledge on the ground that AAA explicitly stated in her testimony that accused-appellant merely rubbed
his penis against her vagina. AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not
expected to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The fact that she claimed
that accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not mean that there was no penetration.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. 21 This
explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.22 As such, a mere
touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes
consummated rape.23 In the present case, AAA testified that she felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed
his penis [against her] vagina."24 This Court has held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that
she felt pain.25 In fact, AAA still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being given a bath by her
mother after her molestation.26 This kind of pain could not have been the result of mere superficial rubbing
of accusedappellant's sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result of penile
penetration sufficient to constitute rape.27
Besides, the testimony of AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who examined her
indicating the presence of slight hymenal abrasion upon examination of her vulva. 28 Thus, the RTC and the
CA are correct in concluding that both the victim's positive testimony and the findings of the medico-legal
officer complemented each other in the conclusion that there was penetration, however slight.
The Court is neither persuaded by accused-appellant's insistence that while there is no question that
children, like AAA, at such an age are incapable of lying, their credibility is not only limited to their capacity
to tell the truth but also their capacity to grasp things that have happened, to intelligently recall them and to
completely and accurately relate them. The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that she
is incapable of perceiving and of making her perception known. 30 In fact, AAA had consistently, positively,
and categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete
with details of the rape.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of AAA's mother that it was accused-appellant who
molested her child is nothing but hearsay, considering that she only came to know of the alleged
molestation when she found AAA inside accused-appellant's house and after the child told her about it
when they got back home.
The Court does not agree.
The term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the
personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value,
if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that
fact, and consequently, not subject to crossexamination.31If one therefore testifies to facts which
he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible
as hearsay evidence.
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay
testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom
the statements are attributed. Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of
hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them.
In the instant case, the declarant, AAA herself, was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by
her mother.1âwphi1Accused-appellant's counsel even crossexamined AAA. Moreover, the trial
court had the opportunity to observe AAA's manner of testifying. Hence, the testimony of AAA's
mother on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of AAA's mother is hearsay, its non-admission
would not save the day for accused-appellant.
Such testimony is not indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate AAA's testimony that
accused-appellant forced himself upon her. As discussed earlier, AAA's testimony, which was
found to be credible by the trial court, and was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal, is
sufficient basis for conviction.
At any rate, the testimony of AAA's mother is proof of the victim's conduct immediately after the
rape. It shows that AAA immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of
her defiler. Such conduct is one of the earmarks of the truth of the charge of rape.
The Court finds neither logic nor relevance in accused-appellant's argument that if he indeed
committed the offense charged, why is it that of all times that AAA went to his yard and play it was
only during the time alleged by the prosecution that accused-appellant decided to rape her. This
matter is inconsequential as it has no bearing with respect to the elements of rape. As aptly held
by the CA, the decisive factor in the prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime
has been sufficiently proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to
serve as a basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts indispensable to the guilt or
innocence of the accused for the crime charged. 32 As the inconsistencies alleged by
accused-appellant had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape, they cannot be used
as grounds for his acquittal.
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age, the crime committed is termed
statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. 33 What the law punishes is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age.34 In the instant case, there is no dispute
Page 346
that AAA was four years of age when the crime was committed.1âwphi1 Resultantly, accused-appellant
was charged and proven guilty of statutory rape.
As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed
if the victim is a child below seven years old. However, following Republic Act No. 9346,35 the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of
death, but it should be specified that it is without eligibility for parole, as the RTC did not state it in the
dispositive portion of its Decision. Likewise, the RTC correctly awarded in AAA's favor the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. The CA, in turn, correctly modified the
RTC ruling by awarding an additional amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. An award of civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages may be
automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental and physical suffering. 36 Exemplary
damages are also called for, by way of public example, and to protect the young from sexual abuse.37
The Cami additionally orders accused-appellant to pay interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until all the monetary awards for damages are fully paid, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.38
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision elated July 19, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (I)
accused-appellant VICTOR P. PADIT is sentenced to suffer the penalty or reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole; and (2) that said accusedappellant is additionally ordered to pay the victim interest of
six percent (6c%) per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146030. December 3, 2002]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA
ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III,
ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE
ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS
CITY, respondents.
DECISION
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public
Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired through such
means.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
44568. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE and RECALLED.[2]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA thus:
On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed with the District Land Office,
Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 1,
Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City
(Exh. A; Exh 9). It appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was executed under
oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and verification of the
land to the District Land Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District
Land Officer of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the
applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent was
forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and issuance of the
corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 Free Patent No.
(VI-2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by defendant Register of Deeds.
On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-complaint requested
the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the
Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore
land in favor of [respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division,
Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report dated April 17,
1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director
Page 347
of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the f) defendants, Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed.
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of [respondent].
Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr. [3]
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage Industry Guarantee and Loan
Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu City in
the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981.The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage in favor
of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was annotated at the back of the title. Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas City
respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and
and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel
misrepresentation.[4] The appellate court likewise held that, assuming there was
of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City.
misrepresentation or fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for reversion should have been
brought within one (1) year from the registration of the patent with the Registry of Deeds. [5]
On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent] died. He was substituted by his
wife Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga, Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land
Maria Dulla Alejaga. Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga III. Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of
Felipe Alejaga Sr.[6] The CA added that petitioner had failed to support its claim that the lot
covered by respondents free patent and title was foreshore land. [7]
xxxxxxxxx
Hence, this Petition.[8]
After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of Free Patent Application No. 3358 and Issues
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of fraud hence,
null and void ab initio and the court orders:
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
a) the cancellation of the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering Lot No. 1, Mli-06-000020-D
with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less, located at Dumulog, Roxas City; I

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case is already final and executory as
b) the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 in the name of
Felipe Alejaga; against respondent PNB.

c) the land covered thereby as above described is reverted to the mass of the public domain; II

d) the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine National Bank, Roxas City Branch, The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has proven the allegations to the
to surrender the owners duplicate copy of above described Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 to the Complaint.
Register of Deeds (now Registries of Land Titles and Deeds), Roxas City;
III
e) the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 and the
owners duplicate copy of said title surrendered by above stated defendants; The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action for reversion is unavailing.[9]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 348

 Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the grant of the free patent
and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent Alejagas free patent and
Certificate of Title.[10] It also avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested right over the parcel of
land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven open, actual, exclusive and undisputed possession
of the land for more than 30 years.[11]
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt by Respondent PNB of a
copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3, 1993 as alleged by petitioner. [12] Further, the bank
filed its Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the 15-day reglementary period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition -- the presence of fraud --
is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters. [13] However, the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions, because the findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the
evidence on record.[14]
We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake
in a transaction bears the burden of proof.[15] The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the
people who perpetrate it in each case.[16] It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed
in as many different ways.[17] Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear and convincing
evidence.[18]
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of evidence before the
trial court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the patent.[19] This Court agrees with the RTC that in
obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud,
signs of which were[20] ignored by the Court of Appeals.[21]
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. [22] Under Section 91 thereof, an
investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true.[23]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the municipality
and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to
present their claims.[24] Note that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of
land are to be conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of
Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent[25] was dated and filed
on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation & Verification Report[26] prepared by
Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City
was dated December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the necessary
investigation and verification in the presence of the applicant. Even if we accept this statement as
gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required notice
to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation allegedly
conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the Public Land Act. [27] As correctly
pointed out by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been done only after the
filing of the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own
investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the
Application for Free Patent.[28] It must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist that an
investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the
application.[29]
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not
sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature. [30] Their
reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty [31] is thus
misplaced. Since Recios signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can
be no presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually
conducted.Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the Verification &
Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will later on be
explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever existed -- is overcome by the
evidence presented by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully
rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an
investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged
admission may be considered as independently relevant. A witness may testify as to the state of
mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule.[32]
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination,
the Investigation Report[33] he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part
of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge,
perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.[34] On the other hand, the part referring to the
statement made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant. [35]
Page 349
 The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were
actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue[36] or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.[37]
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.[38]
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention that the free patent
granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.[39] Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate
of Title.[40] The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in
consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former.[41] Verily, we must uphold
petitioners claim that the issuance of the Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud. [42]
Second Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a piece of
property belonging to the public domain.[43] On the other hand, the Alejagas claim that, pursuant to Section
32 of PD 1529[44] -- otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree -- the one-year period for
reversion has already lapsed.[45] Thus, the States Complaint for reversion should be dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered
by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title
issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter.[46] However, this
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.[47] Well-settled is
the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely
confirms the registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode
of acquiring ownership.[48]
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[49] the State -- even after the lapse of
one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has been
fraudulently granted to private individuals.[50] Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation
by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine
whether fraud has in fact been committed in securing the title.[51]
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by the Alejagas,
whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud.[52] Public policy demands that those who have done
so should not be allowed to benefit from their misdeed.[53] Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions
filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud by private individuals.[54] This is settled
law.[55]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Prohibition Against Alienation
or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is another basis for the
cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141[56] proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a
free patent or homestead within five years from its grant.[57] The prohibition against any alienation
or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every application. [58]
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title to, or interest
in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or any improvements thereon. They
are forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have not secured the consent
of the grantee and the approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than education, charity, or
easement of way. [59]
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358[60] was approved and issued on March 14,
1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15[61] was issued on the same date. On
August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained
from Respondent PNB a loan[62] in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title
certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years
from the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land covered
by OCT No. P-15.[63] In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then Cashier III of respondent bank,
even admitted that the PNB was aware of such restriction.
COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you credit
investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have personally
examined this?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] patent?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979.
A Yes, your honor.
COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the government
or within five years from its issuance?
A Yes, your honor.
COURT Why did you recommend the loan?
A Because it is just a mortgage.[64]
Page 350
 Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely within the
term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.[65] A mortgage constitutes a legal
limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the
property.[66]
As early as Pascua v. Talens,[67] we have explained the rationale for the prohibition against the
encumbrance of a homestead -- its lease and mortgage included -- an encumbrance which, by analogy,
applies to a free patent. We ruled as follows:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the
State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the
State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of
the patent.
Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free patent constitutes sufficient
ground for the nullification of such grant, as provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, which we quote:
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one
hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall
be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling the
grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and
cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies the award and
constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the state, as we held in Republic v. Court of
Appeals:[68]
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free
patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance
results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain.[69]
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years from its issuance,
Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel land granted to him. The mortgage he made
over the land violated that condition.[70] Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain,
pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC., G.R. No. 132864
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
COURT OF APPEALS (12th Division) and
LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC., October 24, 2005
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Philippine
Free Press, Inc. seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated February 25, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52660, affirming, with modification, an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Makati, Branch 146, in an action for annulment of deeds of sale thereat
instituted by petitioner against the Presidential Commission for Good
Government (PCGG) and the herein private respondent, Liwayway Publishing, Inc.
As found by the appellate court in the decision under review, the facts are:
xxx [Petitioner] . . . is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of
Philippine Free Press Magazine, one of the . . . widely circulated political
magazines in the Philippines. Due to its wide circulation, the publication of the
Free Press magazine enabled [petitioner] to attain considerable prestige prior
to the declaration of Martial Law as well as to achieve a high profit margin. . . .
Sometime in . . . 1963, [petitioner] purchased a parcel of land situated at No.
2249, Pasong Tamo Street, Makati which had an area of 5,000 square
meters as evidenced by . . . (TCT) No. 109767 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati (Exh. Z). Upon taking possession of the subject land,
[petitioner] constructed an office building thereon to house its various
machineries, equipment, office furniture and fixture. [Petitioner] thereafter
made the subject building its main office . . . .
Page 351
 During the 1965 presidential elections, [petitioner] supported the late President
Diosdado Macapagal against then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the
election of the late President Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 and prior to the imposition of
Martial law on September 21, 1972, [petitioner] printed numerous articles highly
critical of the Marcos administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the
regime. The [petitioner] likewise ran a series of articles exposing the plan of the
Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the guise of Martial Law . . . .
In the evening of September 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press Building,
forced out its employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said establishment. The
soldier in charge of the military contingent then informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., the son
of Teodoro Locsin, Sr., the President of [petitioner], that Martial Law had been
declared and that they were instructed by the late President Marcos to take over the
building and to close the printing press. xxx.
On September 21, 1972 . . ., Teodoro Locsin, Sr. was arrested [and] . . . . was brought
to Camp Crame and was subsequently transferred to the maximum security bloc at
Fort Bonifacio.
Sometime in December, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was informed . . . that no charges were to
be filed against him and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the
following conditions, to wit: (1) he remained (sic) under city arrest; xxx (5) he was not
to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write anything critical of
the Marcos administration . . . .
Consequently, the publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased. The subject
building remained padlocked and under heavy military guard (TSB, 27 May 1993, pp.
51-52; stipulated). The cessation of the publication of the ... magazine led to the
financial ruin of [petitioner] . . . . [Petitioners] situation was further aggravated when its
employees demanded the payment of separation pay as a result of the cessation of its
operations. [Petitioners] minority stockholders, furthermore, made demands that
Locsin, Sr. buy out their shares. xxx.
On separate occasions in 1973, Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin
Baizas with offers from then President Marcos for the acquisition of the [petitioner].
However, Locsin, Sr. refused the offer stating that [petitioner] was not for sale (TSN, 2
May 1988, pp. 8-9, 40; 27 May 1993, pp. 66-67).
A few months later, the late Secretary Guillermo De Vega approached Locsin, Sr.
reiterating Marcoss offer to purchase the name and the assets of the [petitioner].xxx
Sometime during the middle of 1973, Locsin, Sr. was contacted by Brig. Gen. Hans
Menzi, the former aide-de-camp of then President Marcos concerning the sale of the
[petitioner]. Locsin, Sr. requested that the meeting be held inside the [petitioner]
Building and this was arranged by Menzi (TSN, 27 May 1993, pp. 69-70). During the
said meeting, Menzi once more reiterated Marcoss offer to purchase both the name
and the assets of [petitioner] adding that Marcos cannot be denied (TSN, 27 May
1993, p. 71). Locsin, Sr. refused but Menzi insisted that he had no choice but to sell.
Locsin, Sr. then made a counteroffer that he will sell the land, the building and all the
machineries and equipment therein but he will be allowed to keep the name of the
[petitioner]. Menzi promised to clear the matter with then President Marcos (TSN, 27
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
May 1993, p. 72). Menzi thereafter contacted Locsin, Sr. and informed him
that President Marcos was amenable to his counteroffer and is offering the
purchase price of Five Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand (P5,
750,000.00) Pesos for the land, the building, the machineries, the office
furnishing and the fixtures of the [petitioner] on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
(TSN, 2 May 1988, pp.42-43; 27 May 1993, p. 88).
On August 22, 1973, Menzi tendered to Locsin, Sr. a check for One Million
(P1, 000,000.00) Pesos downpayment for the sale, . . . Locsin, Sr. accepted
the check, subject to the condition that he will refund the same in case the
sale will not push through. (Exh. 7).
On August 23, 1973, the Board of Directors of [petitioner] held a meeting and
reluctantly passed a resolution authorizing Locsin, Sr. to sell the assets of the
[petitioner] to Menzi minus the name Philippine Free Press (Exhs. A-1 and 1;
TSN, 27 May 1993, pp. 73-76).
On October 23, 1973, the parties [petitioner, as vendor and private
respondent, represented by B/Gen. Menzi, as vendee] met . . . and executed
two (2) notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land, building and the
machineries of the [petitioner]. Menzi paid the balance of the purchase price
in the amount of . . . (P4,750,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. A and (; B and 10;TSN, 27
May 1993, pp. 81-82; 3 June 1993, p. 89).
Locsin, Sr. thereafter used the proceeds of the sale to pay the separation pay
of [petitioners] employees, buy out the shares of the minority stockholders as
well as to settle all its obligations.
On February 26, 1987, [petitioner] filed a complaint for Annulment of
Sale against [respondent] Liwayway and the PCGG before the Regional Trail
Court of Makati, Branch 146 on the grounds of vitiated consent and gross
inadequacy of purchase price. On motion of defendant PCGG, the complaint
against it was dismissed on October 22, 1987. (Words in bracket and
underscoring added)
In a decision dated October 31, 1995,[2] the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint and granted
private respondents counterclaim, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the herein complaint for
annulment of sales is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
On [respondent] counterclaim, the court finds for [respondent] and against
[petitioner] for the recovery of attorneys fees already paid for at
P1,945,395.98, plus a further P316,405.00 remaining due and payable.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added)
In time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat its appellate recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. C.V. No. 52660.
Page 352
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in a decision dated February 25, 1998, affirmed with
modification the appealed decision of the trial court, the modification consisting of the deletion of the award
of attorneys fees to private respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the award of attorneys fees in favor of
[respondent] be deleted, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, urging the setting aside of the decision under review which,
to petitioner, decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law and applicable jurisprudence
considering that the appellate court gravely erred:
I The petition lacks merit.
xxx IN ITS MISAPPLICATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
THAT RESULTED IN ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER'S
CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
II
xxx IN CONCLUDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
PRECEDING THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACTS OF SALE FOR THE
PETITIONER'S PROPERTIES DID NOT ESTABLISH THE FORCE, INTIMIDATION,
DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE WHICH VITIATED PETITIONER'S CONSENT.
A. xxx IN CONSIDERING AS HEARSAY THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
WHICH CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THE THREATS MADE UPON
PETITIONER AND THAT RESPONDENT LIWAYWAY WILL BE USED AS
THE CORPORATE VEHICLE FOR THE FORCED ACQUISITION OF
PETITIONER'S PROPERTIES.
B. xxx IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACTS OF THEN PRESIDENT MARCOS
DURING MARTIAL LAW DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE FORCE,
INTIMIDATION, DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE WHICH VITIATED
PETITIONER'S CONSENT.
C. xxx IN RESOLVING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE BASIS OF MERE
SURMISES AND SPECULATIONS INSTEAD OF THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III
xxx IN CONCLUDING THAT THE GROSSLY INADEQUATE PURCHASE PRICE
FOR PETITIONER'S PROPERTIES DOES NOT INDICATE THE VITIATION OF
PETITIONER'S CONSENT TO THE CONTRACTS OF SALE.
IV
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
xxx IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER'S USE OF THE PROCEEDS OF
THE SALE FOR ITS SURVIVAL CONSTITUTE AN IMPLIED RATIFICATION
[OF] THE CONTRACTS OF SALE.
V
xxx IN EXCLUDING PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS X-6 TO X-7 AND Y-3
(PROFFER) WHICH ARE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WHICH
COMPETENTLY PROVE THAT THEN PRESIDENT MARCOS OWNED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT LIWAYWAY, WHICH WAS USED AS THE
CORPORATE VEHICLE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PETITIONER'S
PROPERTIES.
Petitioner starts off with its quest for the allowance of the instant recourse on the submission that
the martial law regime tolled the prescriptive period under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, which
pertinently reads:
Article 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect
of the consent ceases.
xxx xxx xxx
It may be recalled that the separate deeds of sale[3] sought to be annulled under petitioners basic
complaint were both executed on October 23, 1973. Per the appellate court, citing Development
Bank of the Philippines [DBP] vs. Pundogar[4], the 4-year prescriptive period for the annulment of
the aforesaid deeds ended in late 1977, doubtless suggesting that petitioners right to seek such
annulment accrued four (4) years earlier, a starting time-point corresponding, more or less, to the
date of the conveying deed, i.e., October 23, 1973. Petitioner contends, however, that the 4-year
prescriptive period could not have commenced to run on October 23, 1973, martial law being then
in full swing. Plodding on, petitioner avers that the continuing threats on the life of Mr. Teodoro
Locsin, Sr. and his family and other menacing effects of martial law which should be considered
as force majeure - ceased only after the February 25, 1986 People Power uprising.
Petitioner instituted its complaint for annulment of contracts on February 26, 1987. The
question that now comes to the fore is: Did the 4-year prescriptive period start to run in late
October 1973, as postulated in the decision subject of review, or on February 25, 1986, as
petitioner argues, on the theory that martial law has the effects of a force majeure[5], which, in turn,
works to suspend the running of the prescriptive period for the main case filed with the trial court.
Petitioner presently faults the Court of Appeals for its misapplication of the doctrinal rule laid down
in DBP vs. Pundogar[6] where this Court, citing and quoting excerpts from the ruling in Tan vs.
Court of Appeals [7], as reiterated in National Development Company vs. Court of
Appeals, [8] wrote
Page 353
 We can not accept the petitioners contention that the period during which
authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that the same began to
run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino government took power. It is true that
under Article 1154 [of the Civil Code] xxx fortuitous events have the effect of tolling the
period of prescription. However, we can not say, as a universal rule, that the period
from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure. Plainly,
we can not box in the "dictatorial" period within the term without distinction, and
without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities, however demandable, incurred during
that period, including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid. While this Court
is cognizant of acts of the last regime, especially political acts, that might have indeed
precluded the enforcement of liability against that regime and/or its minions, the Court
is not inclined to make quite a sweeping pronouncement, . . . . It is our opinion that
claims should be taken on a case-to-case basis. This selective rule is compelled,
among others, by the fact that not all those imprisoned or detained by the past
dictatorship were true political oppositionists, or, for that matter, innocent of any crime
or wrongdoing. Indeed, not a few of them were manipulators and scoundrels.
[Italization in the original; Underscoring and words in bracket added]
According to petitioner, the appellate court misappreciated and thus misapplied the correct thrust of
the Tan case, as reiterated in DBP which, per petitioners own formulation, is the following:[9]
The prevailing rule, therefore, is that on a case-to-case basis, the Martial Law
regime may be treated as force majeure that suspends the running of the applicable
prescriptive period provided that it is established that the party invoking the imposition
of Martial Law as a force majeure are true oppositionists during the Martial Law
regime and that said party was so circumstanced that is was impossible for said
party to commence, continue or to even resist an action during the dictatorial
regime. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
We are not persuaded.
It strains credulity to believe that petitioner found it impossible to commence and succeed in an
annulment suit during the entire stretch of the dictatorial regime. The Court can grant that Mr. Locsin, Sr.
and petitioner were, in the context of DBP and Tan, true oppositionists during the period of material law.
Petitioner, however, has failed to convincingly prove that Mr. Locsin, Sr., as its then President, and/or its
governing board, were so circumstanced that it was well-nigh impossible for him/them to successfully
institute an action during the martial law years. Petitioner cannot plausibly feign ignorance of the fact that
shortly after his arrest in the evening of September 20, 1972, Mr. Locsin, Sr., together with several other
journalists[10], dared to file suits against powerful figures of the dictatorial regime and veritably challenged
the legality of the declaration of martial law. Docketed in this Court as GR No. L-35538, the case, after its
consolidation with eight (8) other petitions against the martial law regime, is now memorialized in books of
jurisprudence and cited in legal publications and case studies as Aquino vs. Enrile.[11]
Incidentally, Mr. Locsin Sr., as gathered from the ponencia of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal
in Aquino, was released from detention notwithstanding his refusal to withdraw from his petition in said
case. Judging from the actuations of Mr. Locsin, Sr. during the onset of martial law regime and
immediately thereafter, any suggestion that intimidation or duress forcibly stayed his hands during the dark
days of martial law to seek judicial assistance must be rejected.[12]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Given the foregoing perspective, the Court is not prepared to disturb the ensuing ruling
of the appellate court on the effects of martial law on petitioners right of action:
In their testimonies before the trial court, both Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr.
claimed that they had not filed suit to recover the properties until 1987 as they
could not expect justice to be done because according to them, Marcos
controlled every part of the government, including the courts, (TSN, 2 May
1988, pp. 23-24; 27 May 1993, p. 121). While that situation may have
obtained during the early years of the martial law administration, We could
not agree with the proposition that it remained consistently unchanged until
1986, a span of fourteen (14) years. The unfolding of subsequent events
would show that while dissent was momentarily stifled, it was not totally
silenced. On the contrary, it steadily simmered and smoldered beneath the
political surface and culminated in that groundswell of popular protest which
swept the dictatorship from power.[13]
The judiciary too, as an institution, was no ivory tower so detached from the
ever changing political climate. While it was not totally impervious to the
influence of the dictatorships political power, it was not hamstrung as to
render it inutile to perform its functions normally. To say that the Judiciary
was not able to render justice to the persons who sought redress before it . . .
during the Martial Law years is a sweeping and unwarranted generalization
as well as an unfounded indictment. The Judiciary, . . . did not lack in gallant
jurists and magistrates who refused to be cowed into silence by the Marcos
administration. Be that as it may, the Locsins mistrust of the courts and of
judicial processes is no excuse for their non-observance of the prescriptive
period set down by law.
Corollary to the presented issue of prescription of action for annulment of contract voidable on
account of defect of consent[14] is the question of whether or not duress, intimidation or undue
influence vitiated the petitioners consent to the subject contracts of sale. Petitioner delves at
length on the vitiation issue and, relative thereto, ascribes the following errors to the appellate
court: first, in considering as hearsay the testimonial evidence that may prove the element
of "threat" against petitioner or Mr. Locsin, Sr., and the dictatorial regime's use of private
respondent as a corporate vehicle for forcibly acquiring petitioners properties; second, in
concluding that the acts of then President Marcos during the martial law years did not have a
consent-vitiating effect on petitioner; and third, in resolving the case on the basis of mere
surmises and speculations.
The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and
Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins, collectively), which, in gist, established the following facts: 1) the
widely circulated Free Press magazine, which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the
strongest critical stand against the Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such
declaration, which closure eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos orders, Mr.
Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2 months without charges and, together with his
family, was threatened with execution; 3) Mr. Locsin, Sr. was provisionally released on the
condition that he refrains from reopening Free Press and writing anything critical of the Marcos
Page 354
administration; and 4) Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the
1986 EDSA Revolution.
Per the Locsins, it was amidst the foregoing circumstances that petitioners property in question
was sold to private respondent, represented by Gen. Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly applied the
squeeze on Mr. Locsin, Sr. thru the medium of the Marcos cannot be denied and [you] have no choice but
to sell line.
The appellate court, in rejecting petitioners above posture of vitiation of consent, observed:
It was under the above-enumerated circumstances that the late Hans Menzi, allegedly
acting on behalf of the late President Marcos, made his offer to purchase the Free
Press. It must be noted, however, that the testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr.
regarding Menzis alleged implied threat that Marcos cannot be denied and that
[respondent] was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press
is hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend
himself; the same can be said of the offers to purchase made by Atty. Crispin Baizas
and Secretary Guillermo de Vega who are also both dead. It is clear from the
provisions of Section 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence that any
evidence, . . . is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand.
Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value
unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule (Citations omitted)
The appellate courts disposition on the vitiation-of-consent angle and the ratio therefor commends itself for
concurrence.
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered
against a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded
precisely because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to
cross-examine the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed. [15] And there can be no
quibbling that because death has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos
subalterns, Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening
statements allegedly made by them for the late President.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of the exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section 38,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzis supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that
he was acting for the late President Marcos when he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free
Press property, we are loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us.
For, the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like
fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips
had been sealed by death.[16] Francisco explains why:
[I]t has been said that of all evidence, the narration of a witness of his
conversation with a dead person is esteemed in justice the weakest. One
reason for its unreliability is that the alleged declarant can not recall to the
witness the circumstances under which his statement were made. The
temptation and opportunity for fraud in such cases also operate against the
testimony. Testimony to statements of a deceased person, at least where
proof of them will prejudice his estate, is regarded as an unsafe foundation for
judicial action except in so far as such evidence is borne out by what is
natural and probable under the circumstances taken in connection with actual
known facts. And a court should be very slow to act upon the statement of
one of the parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other party;
such corroborative evidence should be adduced as to satisfy the court of the
truth of the story which is to benefit materially the person telling it. [17]
Excepting, petitioner insists that the testimonies of its witnesses the Locsins - are not hearsay
because:
In this regard, hearsay evidence has been defined as the evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. xxx
Thus, the mere fact that the other parties to the conversations testified to by
the witness are already deceased does [not] render such testimony
inadmissible for being hearsay. [18]
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonies of Teodoro Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. that the late
Atty. Baizas, Gen. Menzi and Secretary de Vega stated that they were
representing Marcos, that Marcos cannot be denied, and the fact that Gen.
Menzi stated that private respondent Liwayway was to be the corporate
vehicle for the then President Marcos' take-over of petitioner Free Press are
not hearsay. Teodoro Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. were in fact
testifying to matters of their own personal knowledge because they were
either parties to the said conversation or were present at the time the
said statements were made. [19]
Again, we disagree.
Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half purporting to
quote the words of a live witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live witness heard
from one already dead, the other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in
character.
The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge. [20] There can be no quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify respecting what
President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the acquisition of petitioners newspaper, if any there
Page 355
be, precisely because none of said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the
declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which
canconceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in
offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his own
interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act
for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.
Petitioner next assails the Court of Appeals on its conclusion that Martial Law is not per se a
consent-vitiating phenomenon. Wrote the appellate court: [21]
In other words, the act of the ruling power, in this case the martial law administration,
was not an act of mere trespass but a trespass in law - not a perturbacion de mero
hecho but a pertubacion de derecho - justified as it is by an act of government in
legitimate self-defense (IFC Leasing & Acceptance Corporation v. Sarmiento
Distributors Corporation, , citing Caltex (Phils.) v. Reyes, 84 Phil. 654 [1949].
Consequently, the act of the Philippine Government in declaring martial law can not
be considered as an act of intimidation of a third person who did not take part in the
contract (Article 1336, Civil Code). It is, therefore, incumbent on [petitioner] to present
clear and convincing evidence showing that the late President Marcos, acting through
the late Hans Menzi, abused his martial law powers by forcing plaintiff-appellant to
sell its assets. In view of the largely hearsay nature of appellants evidence on this
point, appellants cause must fall.
According to petitioner, the reasoning of the appellate court is "flawed" because:[22]
It is implicit from the foregoing reasoning of the Court of Appeals that it treated the
forced closure of the petitioner's printing press, the arrest and incarceration without
charges of Teodoro Locsin, Sr., the threats that he will be shot and the threats that
other members of his family will be arrested as legal acts done by a dictator under
the Martial Law regime. The same flawed reasoning led the Court of Appeals to the
erroneous conclusion that such acts do not constitute force, intimidation, duress and
undue influence that vitiated petitioner's consent to the Contracts of Sale.
The contention is a rehash of petitioners bid to impute on private respondent acts of force and intimidation
that were made to bear on petitioner or Mr. Locsin, Sr. during the early years of martial law. It failed to take
stock of a very plausible situation depicted in the appellate courts decision which supports its case
disposition on the issue respecting vitiation. Wrote that court:
Even assuming that the late president Marcos is indeed the owner of [respondent], it
does not necessarily follow that he, acting through the late Hans Menzi, abused his
power by resorting to intimidation and undue influence to coerce the Locsins into
selling the assets of Free Press to them (sic).
It is an equally plausible scenario that Menzi convinced the Locsins to sell the assets
of the Free Press without resorting to threats or moral coercion by simply pointing out
to them the hard fact that the Free Press was in dire financial straits after the
declaration of Martial Law and was being sued by its former employees, minority
stockholders and creditors. Given such a state of affairs, the Locsins had no choice
but to sell their assets.[23]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Petitioner laments that the scenario depicted in the immediately preceding quotation as a case of
a court resorting to mere surmises and speculations, [24] oblivious that petitioner itself can only
offer, as counterpoint, also mere surmises and speculations, such as its claim about
Eugenio Lopez Sr. and Imelda R. Marcos offering enticing amounts to buy Free Press.[25]
It bears stressing at this point that even after the imposition of martial law, petitioner, represented
by Mr. Locsin, Sr., appeared to have dared the ire of the powers-that-be. He did not succumb to,
but in fact spurned offers to buy, lock-stock-and-barrel, the Free Press magazine, dispatching
Marcos emissaries with what amounts to a curt Free Press is not for sale. This reality argues
against petitioners thesis about vitiation of its contracting mind, and, to be sure, belying the notion
that Martial Law worked as a Sword of Damocles that reduced petitioner or Mr. Locsin, Sr. into
being a mere automaton. The following excerpt from the Court of Appeals decision is
self-explanatory: [26]
Noteworthy is the fact that although the threat of arrest hung over his head
like the Sword of Damocles, Locsin Sr. was still able to reject the offers of Atty.
Baizas and Secretary De Vega, both of whom were supposedly acting on
behalf of the late President Marcos, without being subjected to reprisals. In
fact, the Locsins testified that the initial offer of Menzi was rejected even
though it was supposedly accompanied by the threat that Marcos cannot be
denied. Locsin, Sr. was, moreover, even able to secure a compromise that
only the assets of the Free Press will be sold. It is, therefore, quite possible
that plaintiff-appellants financial condition, albeit caused by the declaration of
Martial Law, was a major factor in influencing Locsin, Sr. to accept Menzis
offer. It is not farfetched to consider that Locsin, Sr. would have eventually
proceeded with the sale even in the absence of the alleged intimidation and
undue influence because of the absence of other buyers.
Petitioners third assigned error centers on the gross inadequacy of the purchase price, referring to
the amount of P5,775,000.00 private respondent paid for the property in question. To petitioner,
the amount thus paid does not even approximate the actual market value of the assets and
properties,[27] and is very much less than the P18 Million offered by Eugenio Lopez.[28] Accordingly,
petitioner urges the striking down, as erroneous, the ruling of the Court of Appeals on purchase
price inadequacy, stating in this regard as follows: [29]
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in determining the adequacy of the price
for the properties and assets of petitioner Free Press relied heavily on the
claim that the audited financial statements for the years 1971 and 1972
stated that the book value of the land is set at Two Hundred Thirty-Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P237,500.00). However, the Court of
Appeals' reliance on the book value of said assets is clearly misplaced. It
should be noted that the book value of fixed assets bears very little
correlation with the actual market value of an asset. (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original).
With the view we take of the matter, the book or actual market value of the property at the time of
sale is presently of little moment. For, petitioner is effectively precluded, by force of the principle
of estoppel ,[30] from cavalierly disregarding with impunity its own books of account in which the
Page 356
property in question is assigned a value less than what was paid therefor. And, in line with the rule on Inc. Said exhibits are of little relevance to the resolution of the main issue tendered in this case.
the quantum of evidence required in civil cases, neither can we cavalierly brush aside private respondents Whether or not the contracts of sale in question are voidable is the issue, not the ownership of
evidence, cited with approval by the appellate court, that tends to prove that-[31] Liwayway Publishing, Inc.

xxx the net book value of the Properties was actually only P994,723.66 as appearing WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
in Free Press's Balance Sheet as of November 30, 1972 (marked as Exh. 13 and Exh. Appeals AFFIRMED.
V), which was duly audited by SyCip, Gorres, and Velayo, thus clearly showing
that Free Press actually realized a hefty profit of P4,755,276.34 from the sale to Costs against petitioner.
Liwayway.
SO ORDERED.

Lest it be overlooked, gross inadequacy of the purchase price does not, as a matter of civil law, per
se affect a contract of sale. Article 1470 of the Civil Code says so. It reads:
Article 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it
may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188124
some other act or contract. Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

Following the aforequoted codal provision, it behooves petitioner to first prove a defect in the consent, CORONA, C.J.,
failing which its case for annulment contract of sale on ground gross inadequacy of price must fall. The Chairperson,
categorical conclusion of the Court of Appeals, confirmatory of that of the trial court, is that the price paid - versus - VELASCO, JR.,
for the Free Press office building, and other physical assets is not unreasonable to justify the nullification of LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
the sale. This factual determination, predicated as it were on offered evidence, notably petitioners Balance DEL CASTILLO, and
Sheet as of November 30, 1972 (Exh. 13), must be accorded great weight if not finality.[32] PEREZ, JJ.

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, the question of whether or not petitioners undisputed utilization of
the proceeds of the sale constitutes, within the purview of Article 1393 of the Civil Code, [33]implied
ratification of the contracts of sale need not detain us long. Suffice it to state in this regard that the ruling of
the Court of Appeals on the matter is well-taken. Wrote the appellate court: [34]
In the case at bench, Free Presss own witnesses admitted that the proceeds of the
1973 sale were used to settle the claims of its employees, redeem the shares of its
stockholders and finance the companys entry into money-market shareholdings and
fishpond business activities (TSN, 2 May 1988, pp. 16, 42-45). It need not be
overemphasized that by using the proceeds in this manner, Free Press only too
clearly confirmed the voluntaries of its consent and ratified the sale. Needless to state,
such ratification cleanses the assailed contract from any alleged defects from the
moment it was constituted (Art. 1396, Civil Code).
Petitioners posture that its use of the proceeds of the sale does not translate to tacit ratification
of what it viewed as voidable contracts of sale, such use being a matter of [its financial] survival, [35]is
untenable. As couched, Article 1393 of the Civil Code is concerned only with the act which passes for
ratification of contract, not the reason which actuated the ratifying person to act the way he did. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, neither should we. [36]
Finally, petitioner would fault the Court of Appeals for excluding Exhibits X-6 to X-7 and Y-3 (proffer).
These excluded documents which were apparently found in the presidential palace or turned over by the
US Government to the PCGG, consist of, among others, what appears to be private respondents
Certificate of Stock for 24,502 shares in the name of Gen. Menzi, but endorsed in blank. The proffer was
evidently intended to show that then President Marcos owned private respondent, Liwayway Publishing
JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL
LORICA LABAD, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellants.
June 29, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque in Criminal Case No. 02-01426
convicting appellants Jonel Falabrica Serenas alias Joe-An (Joe-An) and Joel Lorica Labad (Joel)
of the crime of murder.
Appellants were charged under the following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of December 2002 in the City of Paraaque,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one John Doe,
whose true name and present whereabouts is still unknown, and all of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 357

 attack, assault and stab one Nino Noel Ramos, thereby inflicting upon him serious
and mortal stab wound, which caused his death.[3]
The facts, as narrated by prosecution witnesses, follow
On 8 December 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Nio Noel Ramos (Nio) had just brought his
girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino (Dianne), home in Sto. Nio, Paraaque City. On his way back to La
Huerta, he passed by a bridge connecting the barangays of Sto. Nio and La Huerta. Thereat, Nio was
stabbed and mauled.[4]
Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Nios brother, was in the vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La Huerta when he heard a
commotion on the bridge. As he was about to proceed to the bridge, he met Nio and noticed that his
brother was soaked in his own blood. Nio relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar
immediately brought Nio to the hospital where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later. [5] At the police
station, Cesar claimed that appellants told him that they merely took fancy on Nio.[6]
Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station that her cousin informed her of a
commotion on the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge, she met a friend who told her that her boyfriend, Nio,
was stabbed and brought to the hospital. She added that one day before the incident, she and Nio were
walking along the bridge when they passed by the group of appellants and heard Joe-An utter the
words, Iyang mama na iyan, may araw din siya sa akin.[7] In her testimony during the trial however, she
narrated that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Nio.[8]
PO3 Ramoncito Lipana (PO3 Lipana) was at the police station in La Huerta on 8 December
2002 when a woman named Dianne came to report a stabbing incident involving her boyfriend. PO3
Lipana, together with PO2 Jesus Brigola (PO2 Brigola) and PO3 Marlon Golfo, immediately proceeded to
the crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, the police saw two men scampering away upon seeing them. They
chased the two men, later identified as Joe-An and Joel. The police managed to catch the appellants while
they were hiding near a bangka under the bridge. Appellants were brought to the police station where
Dianne identified them as the assailants of Nio.[9]
Dr. Valentin T. Bernales (Dr. Bernales), the medico-legal officer who issued the autopsy report, testified
that the victim was stabbed twice at the back and the assailant was situated within arms length. The victim
succumbed from the stab wounds, both of which, are fatal. Dr. Bernales also noted that there were
contuse abrasions on different parts of the victims body.[10]
Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense. Joe-An, a resident of Wawa, Sto. Nio, alleged that he
was at his house on 8 December 2002. While he was taking his dinner, he saw people running towards the
bridge.He went out of the house to check on what had happened. He approached a group of people talking
about the commotion. Thereafter, he saw the police and barangay tanods arrive. He was immediately
handcuffed and asked to go with the police. Joe-An alleged that he was physically forced by the police to
admit the killing of Nio.[11] Joe-An denied knowing the victim or his girlfriend, Dianne, but admitted that Joel
is an acquaintance.[12]
Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Nio. He stated that he was sleeping at around 11
p.m. on 8 December 2002 when he was awakened by an argument involving his mother and four (4) men
outside his room. He then got out of the room and saw PO3 Lipana, PO2 Brigola, and two other police
assets. The group invited him for questioning. When the two assets suddenly grabbed him, Joel resisted
but he was forcibly brought to the police station. He saw Dianne at the station but the latter did not identify
him as the culprit. Instead, Dianne even sought his help to identify the person who killed her boyfriend.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
This fact notwithstanding, the police refused to let him go. He testified that he did not know the
victim or Dianne personally.[13]
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
both accused beyond reasonable doubt, accused JONEL FALABRICA
SERENAS alias JOE-AN and JOEL LORICA LABAD are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to R.A. 9346
which repealed the death penalty law. However, pursuant to Sec. 3 thereof,
they are not eligible for parole.
Accused JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS alias JOE-AN and JOEL LORICA
LABAD are jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of NIO NOEL RAMOS,
the following amounts, to wit:
1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P23,000.00 as actual damages;
4. P20,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the cost of suit.[14]
Lending full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded
that the appellants conspired in assaulting and stabbing Nio. It gave full weight to the dying
declaration uttered by Nio to his brother, as well as the statement of Dianne, who allegedly
witnessed appellants threaten Nio the night before the incident. It also appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the trial court regarded the uncorroborated testimonies of appellants to be full of
inconsistencies and unworthy of weight and credence.[15]
On 13 September 2006, appellants filed a notice of appeal informing the RTC that they are
appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals.[16]
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC by awarding
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from,
being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is
awarded to the heirs of the victim. The Decision in all other respects
STANDS.[17]
On 13 August 2008, a notice of appeal was filed assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
before this Court.[18]
On 26 October 2009, the parties were required to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.[19] In two (2) separate manifestations, both parties opted to adopt their briefs
submitted before the Court of Appeals.[20]
Page 358
Summarizing the arguments of both parties, the issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the testimonies of
the witnesses are sufficient to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) whether the killing was
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation; (3) whether conspiracy has been adequately proven.
In convicting appellants, the lower courts relied heavily on the testimonies of witnesses Cesar and Dianne,
which they deemed to be credible. Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded
great respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception is
when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.[21]
We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica Serenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder not by
virtue of identification by Dianne but as established by the dying declaration of the victim. Upon the other
hand, we reverse the conviction of Joel Lorica Labad.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, accorded full weight to the testimony of the
prosecution witness, Dianne, who declared on the witness stand that she actually saw appellants maul and
stab the victim, thus:
Q Miss witness, do you know the person of Nio Noel Ramos?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A He was my boyfriend, sir.
Q And where is Nio Noel Ramos now?
A Hes dead already, sir.
Q Why do you know that he is dead?
A Because I saw that day when he was stabbed, sir.
Q You said that you know when he was stabbed. When was that?
A On December 8, 2002, sir.
Q What time was that?
A At around 10:00 in the evening, sir.
Q Where did it happen?
A It happened on a bridge between La Huerta and Sto. Nio, Paraaque City, sir.
Q Do you know the person who killed your boyfriend?
A Yes, sir.
Q If they are inside the courtroom, can you point to them?
COURT:
Witness pointing to the second and the third detention prisoners from among five (5)
who when asked by the Court, Anong pangalan mo, yong pangalawa? answered by
the name of Joel Labad. IKaw? Jonel Serenas po.[22] [emphasis supplied]
Appellants argue that Dianne gave conflicting statements regarding the identity of the
assailants. In her affidavit, she narrated that a friend informed her that Nio was stabbed and taken to the
hospital. During trial however, Dianne testified that she witnessed the actual stabbing incident.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the alleged inconsistencies in the statements
made by Dianne in the affidavit and during trial. It claims that Dianne was categorical in her testimony that
she saw appellants stab her boyfriend. Furthermore, her testimony in open court is superior to statements
made in her affidavit, which statements may have been made when she was not in her right mind. [23]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The Court of Appeals dismissed the alleged inconsistencies by giving greater weight to
the statement made in court by Dianne than that made in the affidavit she executed before the
police.
We do not agree.
Diannes testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the rule that if
there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be
given more weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained
and they dwell on material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit the veracity of the
witness' claim.[24] The second rule is apt to the case at bar.
Nowhere in her affidavit did Dianne point to appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. From the tenor of her affidavit, Diannes suspicion that appellants committed the crime
merely arose from the alleged threats made by appellants on the victim the day before the incident.
The pertinent portion of her affidavit is hereby reproduced:
T: Mayroon ka bang natatandaan pagbabanta kay Nio Noel bago ito nangyari
sa kanya?
S: Opo, naalala ko po kahapon ika 7 ng Disyembre 2002 humigit kumulang
na alas 9:45 ng gabi noong kami ay papauwi dahil hinatid niya ako sa bahay,
pagdaan naming sa Wawa Sto. Nio may apat na kalalakihan, naka upo sa
may daanan malapit sa laruan ng pool, ang isa ay narinig ko nagsalita ng
IYANG MAMA NA IYAN, MAY ARAW DIN SIYA SA AKIN, hindi ko naman ito
pinansin at tuloy tuloy po ang lakad namin.
T: Nakilala mo ba kong sino ang apat na kalalakihan?
S: Akin pong napag-alaman ang dalawang magkatabi na sina, Michael
Baluyot at @Joe-An.
T: Sino naman ang iyong narinig nagsalita ng pagbabanta sa kanila kong
natatandaan mo pa?
S: Opo, si @Joe-An po.
T: May ipapakita ako sa iyo, ano ang masasabi mo?
S: Opo, siya po ang nagsalita ng pagbabanta, affiant pointing to the person
when asked identified himself as JONEL SERENAS Y FALABRICA,
@Joe-An, 23 yrs. old, single, jobless, residing at 5058 Wawa Sto. Nio, Pque
City.
T: Mayroon akong ihaharap sa iyo, ano naman ang iyong masasabi sa
kanya?
S: Opo, siya po ang sumagot kay Joe-An ng Oo nga, Oo nga na umaayon sa
nasabing pagbabanta, affiant pointing to the person inside investigation when
Page 359
 asked voluntarily identified himself as MICHAEL BALUYOT Y ALIC, 17 yrs old single
of 117 Wawa, Sto. Nio, Pque City referred to this office by PO2 Ramoncito Lipana, et
al. for investigation.[25]
We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened
to do harm on the victim, she failed to identify who the perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the
Court, this omission in Diannes affidavit is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne altogether becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecutions case did not necessarily crumble. The victims dying declaration
is a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an.
Appellants question the alleged dying declaration of the victim in that they were not sufficiently
identified as the persons responsible for Nios death. Appellants anchor their argument on the utterance of
the word Joe-An when the victim was asked on who stabbed him. Appellants advance that the victim may
have been referring to some other person. Moreover, the victim did not even mention Joel or Joel Labad,
the other suspect.[26]
The OSG defends the victims dying declaration and insists that there was no mistake that the
victim was indeed referring to Joe-An, considering that the latter was familiar to him. [27]
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante
mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[28]
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at
the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death;
third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.[29]
Nios ante mortem statement was relayed to his brother Cesar, in this wise:
Q Cesar, will you please tell this Honorable court where were you on the night of
December 8, 2002 at about 9:30?
A I was near the crime scene, sir.
Q Where is this place?
A In N. Domingo, La Huerta, Paraaque City, sir.
Q At that time, what did you notice?
A There was a commotion on top of the bridge, sir.
Q So, what did you do?
A We verified it, sir.
Q After that, what did you do?
A I saw my brother coming, sir.
Q Who is this brother of yours that you saw?
A Nio Noel Ramos, sir.
Q When you saw Nio Noel approaching, what did you do?
A I asked him what the commotion was all about, sir.
Q What did he answer?
A He told me that he was stabbed, sir.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Q What else did he tell you?
A I asked him who stabbed him, sir.
Q What was his answer?
A He answered [to] me that it was Joe-an, sir.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He asked me to bring him to the hospital, sir.
Q What did you do when he asked you to bring him to the hospital?
A I held him up and brought him to the hospital, sir.
Q Why? What was the condition of your brother at that time?
A He was bloodied, sir.[30]
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement of the victim
communicated to Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Nio being stabbed, particularly
pin-pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator.Second, Nio must have been fully aware that he was on the
brink of death considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the bridge. Third, the
competence of Nio is unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Nios
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Note however that based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was no direct evidence
linking appellant Joel to the crime. Cesar testified, thus:
Q But you only knew that there was a stabbing incident when you were told
by the victim that he was stabbed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he told you that he was stabbed by a certain, who was that?
A Joe-an, sir.
Q Only Joe-an?
A Yes, sir.
Q And aside from this, he was not mentioning any other person?
A That is the only name he mentioned but there were three (3) or four (4)
persons who mauled him, sir.
Q The accused in this case, of course, you do not know them?
A I know them by their faces, sir.
Q Why did you say so?
A Because I often pass by that place, sir.
Q But you did not see these persons at that time of the incident?
A I saw them but I cannot see their faces because it was quite far, sir.
Q And you only came to know about these persons at the police precinct, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because Dianne and your brother told you so?
A Yes, sir.[31] [Emphasis supplied]
While the police officers caught Joel hiding under the bridge, this incident appears to be
circumstantial and cannot stand to prove Joels complicity without any corroborating
evidence. Admittedly, Joels defense of denial and alibi are inherently weak, however, it is doctrinal
that the weakness of the defense cannot be the basis for conviction. The primary burden still lies
Page 360
with the prosecution whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and who must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused before there can be conviction. [32] At this juncture, we
acquit appellant Joel.
With respect to Joe-An, the lower courts properly appreciated the presence of treachery in
qualifying the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[33]
The medical records support the finding of treachery. The nature and location of his wounds are
indicative of the positions of the victim and his assailant at the time the incident occurred. The trial court
drew a better picture of how the victim was stabbed, thus:
It is clear under the circumstances that the victim has no opportunity to
retaliate the aggression of the accused when he was stabbed because according to
Dr. Valentin Bernales, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
considering the locations of the wound which was sustained by the accused, the
assailant was about an arm [sic] length away and believed to be at the back of the
victim who was standing and almost in the same level when the first stab wound was
inflicted. As to the second wound, according to Dr. Bernales, the victim appears
already lying face down on the ground when stabbed by the accused which to some
extent is consistent with the testimony of Cesar that his brother/victim was mauled by
four (4) other persons. This may be the reason why the victim sustained contuse
abrasions on the different parts of his body.[34]
The victim was suddenly attacked by appellant on his way home from his girlfriends house. He
was stabbed twice from behind. The mode of attack on the victim was clearly executed without risk to the
attacker. We cannot discount the fact that there were other participants to the crime. Appellant could not
have acted alone based on the testimony of the witnesses and the medico-legal report. However, the
identity of the other assailants was not proven by the prosecution.
While affirming that treachery attended the commission of the crime, we however rule out the
presence of evident premeditation.
In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must be proven: (1)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution,
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. In the instant case, appellant uttered the words iyang mama na iyan, may araw din
siya sa akin. Even conceding that these utterances were in the form of a threat, it still cannot be presumed
that at the time they were made, there was indeed a determination to kill and that appellants had indeed
clung to that determination, planning and meditating on how to kill the victim.
Finally, appellants question the sufficiency of evidence to prove conspiracy. They aver that there
was no concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design between the appellants. Moreover, the
manner by which appellants conspired with one another in stabbing the victim was not discussed in the
trial courts decision.[35]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The OSG submits that conspiracy may be deduced from the manner by which the crime
was perpetrated. It recalled that appellants waited by the bridge where the victim passes by
whenever he visits his girlfriend.Upon seeing the victim, they grabbed and mauled him. Moments
later, Joe-Ann stabbed the victim. Thereafter, appellants escaped and hid under the bridge where
they were eventually apprehended. Clearly, they have performed overt acts in furtherance of the
common design of killing the victim.[36]
There is nothing on record that would prove that conspiracy existed. The circumstantial evidence
cited by the OSG are not sufficient to prove that appellant conspired with other individuals to
perpetrate the crime. Further lending doubt to this claim is the fact that the alleged co-conspirators
identity was not established.
In sum, we find that the prosecution has proven that appellant Joe-An is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. The acquittal of the other appellant, Joel, is in order on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
As to appellants pecuniary liability, we find it proper to increase the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00[37] each. The trial courts grant of P23,000.00 as
actual damages is increased to P25,000.00, but as temperate damages in line with the ruling
in People v. Villanueva.[38] We uphold the grant of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, with the victims
mother having hired a private prosecutor to prosecute the case. [39] We increase the award of
exemplary damages to P30,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED.
Appellant JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS is found GUILTY of the crime of murder and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim Nio Noel Ramos the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages
and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
For failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
appellant JOEL LORICA LABAD is ACQUITTED. The Director of Prisons is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to inform this Court of
such action within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 146556 April 19, 2006
DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioner,
vs.
SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Page 361
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Danilo Parel (petitioner) which seeks to set aside the
Decision1dated March 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Baguio, in Civil Case No. 2493-R, a case for recovery of possession and
damages. Also assailed is CA Resolution2 dated November 28, 2000.
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey residential
house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS)
compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said house in 1972 until its
completion three years later; when the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed
petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second
floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to
safeguard the materials; when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent
allowed petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of
sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house of their own and since respondent’s wife is the
older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for
them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which
petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s knowledge,
petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of respondent’s house;
petitioner’s refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the instant
action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from
April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and surrender possession
thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the said
residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s
parents; he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondent’s
full knowledge; his parents spent their own resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey
house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands
and as a co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the demand to vacate was
respondent’s attempt to deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that
respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject house
which were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and
attorney’s fees.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision3 dated December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares that the house erected at No. 61 DPS
Compound, Baguio City is owned in common by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon
Prudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel
from said property, nor to recover said premises from herein defendant.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to:
(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages;
(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney’s fees and P3,300.00 in appearance fees;
(c) pay the costs of this suit.4
The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that petitioner’s father was an allocatee of the
land on which the subject house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at
that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave them the chance to construct their own house on
said reservation; that respondent failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral, express or
implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere
lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house; and, that
the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the house and
paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between respondent and
petitioner’s father, Florentino.
The RTC concluded that respondent and petitioner’s father agreed to contribute their money to
complete the house; that since the land on which said house was erected has been allocated to
petitioner’s father, the parties had the understanding that once the house is completed,
petitioner’s father could keep the ground floor while respondent the second floor; the trial court
questioned the fact that it was only after 15 years that respondent asserted his claim of sole
ownership of the subject house; respondent failed to disprove that petitioner’s father contributed
his own funds to finance the construction of the house; that respondent did not question (1) the
fact that it was the deceased Florentino who administered the construction of the house as well as
the one who supplied the materials; and (2) the fact that the land was in Florentino’s possession
created the impression that the house indeed is jointly owned by respondent and Florentino.
The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing
the City Assessor’s assessment of the property all in respondent’s name since tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the
house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine
the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late
Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought
then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be
accepted for being hearsay.
Aggrieved by such decision, respondent appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated March 31, 2000,
the CA reversed the trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house
and ordered petitioner to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to respondent
immediately. It also ordered petitioner to pay respondent a monthly rental of P2,000.00 for use or
Page 362
occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same and the sum of P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
The CA found as meritorious respondent’s contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in
evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. It ruled
that the trial court’s statement that "defendants’ occupancy of the house is due to a special power of
attorney executed by his parents most specially the deceased Florentino Parel who is in fact a co-owner of
said building" is wanting of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of attorney was never offered,
hence, could not be referred to as petitioner’s evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare
testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house
and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated to petitioner’s
father, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the trial
court’s conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.
The CA found the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioner’s father, stating that he is not
the owner of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondent’s sole ownership of the
subject house as it is a declaration made by Florentino against his interest. It also found the tax
declarations and official receipts representing payments of real estate taxes of the questioned property
covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish respondent’s case which constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2000.1avvphil.net
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
RESPONDENT AS THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AT 61 FORBES PARK
NATIONAL RESERVATION, NEAR DPS COMPOUND, BAGUIO CITY,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CO-OWNERSHIP BETWEEN THE LATE FLORENTINO PAREL AND
RESPONDENT;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING
PETITIONER TO SURRENDER POSSESSION OF THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE
SUBJECT BUILDING TO RESPONDENT;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING
PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENT P2,000.00/MONTH FOR USE OR
OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES FROM APRIL 1988 UNTIL
PETITIONER ACTUALLY VACATES THE SAME;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY TO RESPONDENT P50,000.00
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT;
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 5
Petitioner concedes that while his former counsel failed to make a formal offer of his documentary
evidence before the trial court and that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered, he maintains that the said rule is not absolute, citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v.
Borja; 6 that his documentary evidence which were not formally offered in evidence were marked
during the presentation of the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses and were part of their
testimonies; that these evidence were part of the memorandum filed by him before the trial court
on July 12, 1993.
Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the documentary evidence, his testimony as well as
that of his witnesses substantiated his claim of co-ownership of the subject house between his late
father and respondent as found by the trial court.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring
respondent as owner of the subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is the true and only
owner of the house since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
which it was executed.
Petitioner further contends that since he had established his father’s co-ownership of the subject
house, respondent has no legal right to eject him from the property; that he could not be
compelled to pay rentals for residing in the ground floor of the subject house; that respondent
should bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for damages which petitioner sustained for
being constrained to litigate.
The principal issue for resolution is whether petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that his father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house.
The issue raised by petitioner is mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are
appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, considering that the findings of the RTC and CA
are contradictory, the review of the case is in order.7
We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for
recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.
Respondent presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn
to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
Page 363
I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after
having been sworn to according to law depose and say:
That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City
which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor,
Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55
Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.
Further, affiant say not.8 (Underscoring supplied)
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further
that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. 9
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect
to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is
the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who
is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he
believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs. 10 A
declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.11 Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989,
the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal
complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in
1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing
that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will and held that the remedy of respondent was to file
an action for ejectment;12 and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and
his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent’s action should be
an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.13
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of
respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross-examination that the existing
structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.14
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house
declared under his name since 1974.15 In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted
that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the
house in their name.16
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.17 The
house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father had been consistently declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances
above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the
house subject matter of the litigation.
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to contravene respondent’s claim. The burden of evidence shifted to
petitioner to prove that his father was a co-owner of the subject house.
We held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit:18
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of
evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered
in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.19
In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer
his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. 20 Thus, the CA did not
consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. 21 It is a settled rule
Page 364
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it
has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. 22
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same were
marked during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of
relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.23
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true
copy of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence. This
was due to the fact that the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove
petitioner’s minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of the
records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
and not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor,
the evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against petitioner which were
dismissed as well as the alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioner’s parents whereby they authorized
petitioner to stay in the ground floor of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino and
respondent of the subject house.
The testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-owned by
petitioner’s father and respondent.
Candelario Regua merely testified that he was hired by petitioner’s father, Florentino, to construct the
residential building in 1972;24 that he listed the materials to be used for the construction which was
purchased by Florentino;25that he and his men received their salaries every Saturday and Wednesday
from Florentino or his wife, respectively;26 that he had not met nor seen respondent during the whole time
the construction was on-going.27 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he cannot tell where
the money to buy the materials used in the construction came from.28
Corazon Garcia merely testified that Florentino started building the house when he was allocated a lot at
DPS compound, that she knew Florentino constructed the subject house29 and never knew
respondent. 30 The bare allegation that Florentino was allocated a lot is not sufficient to overcome
Florentino’s own affidavit naming respondent as the owner of the subject house.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and
purchased the materials to be used; 31 and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries
upon order of his father 32 and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one
of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that
petitioner’s father and respondent co-owned the house.
We also find that the CA did not err in ordering petitioner to pay respondent being the sole owner
of the subject house a monthly rental of P2,000.00 from April 1988, the date of the extra-judicial
demand, until petitioner actually vacates the subject house. Although the CA made no
ratiocination as to how it arrived at the amount of P2,000.00 for the monthly rental, we find the
same to be a reasonable compensation for the use of the ground floor of the subject house which
consists of a living room, a dining room, a kitchen and three bedrooms. The rental value refers to
the value as ascertained by proof of what the property would rent or by evidence of other facts
from which the fair rental value may be determined. 33
We likewise affirm the CA’s award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. Article 2208 of the
Civil Code allows the recovery of attorney’s fees in cases when the defendant’s act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest 34 and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered 35 which are both shown in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution
dated November 28, 2000 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138471. October 10, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or
ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Page 365
 A rosebud that had been snuffed out of its fragrance long before it could even blossom into a flower.
Such is the case of Lizette Arabelle Gonzales (hereafter LIZETTE), who had been defiled at a very tender
age. She was at the time voiding her body waste at their neighbors backyard, but that did not deter herein
appellant from imposing his lechery on her. Indeed, lust is no respecter of time and place.[1]
[2]
On 27 January 1995, an information for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y
Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which reads:
Boy, was not there. Jacqueline forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to the
police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital.[8]
Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old,
but at the time Jacqueline testified on 17 October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years old. LIZETTEs last
birthday was on 19 April 1995.[9]

That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party,
Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage
and prejudice.
Upon motion of PRUNAs counsel, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), the Information was amended
changing the name of the accused from Manuel Pruna y Ramirez to Erman Pruna y Ramirez, which was
the name reflected in his birth certificate.[3] However, when he testified in court, he stated that his name
was Manuel Pruna; and in the minutes of the court proceedings, he signed the name Manuel Pruna.
On 27 November 1995, upon the Motion to Put the Accused Under Psychiatric or Mental
Examination[4] filed by PRUNAs counsel on the ground that he could not secure from PRUNA a coherent
answer to even simple questions, the trial court ordered that the accused be brought to the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong City for psychiatric or mental examination.[5] Accordingly, the trial was suspended,
and PRUNA was sent to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong City.
LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called Boy. She pointed to him inside the
courtroom. According to her, PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area and inserted his penis into
her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she knew that it is a sin to tell a lie, she
answered in the affirmative.[10]
Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital,
testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and
took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The specimen was sent to the
laboratory for analysis by a medical technologist. Further, she requested a urinalysis for
LIZETTE.[11] The Medico-Legal Report[12] prepared by Dr. Quiroz reveals the following findings:
Essentially normal PE-Findings
Infantile areola & nipples
Flat breasts (-) hematoma

On 28 June 1996, the trial court received a telegram[6] from the NCMH stating that PRUNA was in (-) pubic hair
fair condition. The NCMH later submitted to the trial court a report [7] on the psychiatric evaluation of
PRUNA with a recommendation to put him back to jail for the resumption of court proceedings. The report
Labia minora and majora well coaptated
also stated that PRUNA narrated that while he and his friends were under the bridge sniffing rugby and
drinking alcohol, they saw a 3-year-old girl defecating in the river bank; that they called her; and, upon the
order of his friends he placed her on his lap and attempted to caress her sensitive parts. Said report was Hymenal ring intact (+) hyperemia (-) laceration
not, however, offered in evidence by the prosecution or the defense.
(Vaginal Opening)
The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as follows:

LABORATORY RESULT:
Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that on 3 January 1995, at 9:30 a.m., she was
fetching water from the artesian well located ten meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was
defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria Tolentino. Jacqueline then carried her pail of WET SMEAR: KOH - Negative for T-Vaginalis
water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not home yet, Jacqueline headed toward the place
where the former was moving her bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when NSS- Negative for fungi
Jacqueline was already returning to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and
appeared to be very frightened. When asked where she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was
SPERM ANALYSIS -POSITIVE for sperm cells
brought by a certain Boy to the grassy area at the back of Glorias house where she was sexually molested
(or kinantot in the Tagalog dialect). LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the house of PRUNA,
which was about eight meters away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their community as Gram staining-few, epithelial cells seen, no other microorganism

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 366

URINALYSIS: RBC-3-7-/hpf epithelial cells few.
WBC-0-2
Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis report[13] includes a
positive finding for sperm cells. Dr. Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal
signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the person of the patient. There was no
laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the vaginal
opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.[14]
Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations and
prepared the corresponding reports,[15] testified that sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen
and urine taken from LIZETTE.[16]
SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at the Pilar Municipal
Station, testified that on 3 January 1995 the parent of the minor rape victim filed a complaint against
PRUNA. He referred the matter to the desk officer to have it blottered. Upon his advise, the minor was
brought to the hospital for examination. When they returned from the hospital, he took their
statements. Later, he conducted an ocular inspection and investigation at the alleged place of the incident
and caused the place to be photographed, which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from
the people in the neighborhood, and one of them answered that he saw the minor being brought by
PRUNA to the place where the minor was found. When PRUNA was brought to their station by
four barangay tanods of Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to converse with him, but the former
did not give any reply.[17]
On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.
Carlito testified that on 3 January 1995, he fetched water at the public artesian well together with
Jacqueline. After having drawn water from the well, Jacqueline called her daughter, who was then
defecating on the road near the river; and they both went home. After a while, the parents of LIZETTE
shouted that their daughter was raped, and then they proceeded to the house of PRUNA and accused him
of having raped the child. Carlito asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he
(PRUNA) was in his house from the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her
mother went to the house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA was at home because the former was also
in the latters house to have coffee. Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter brought PRUNA to the barangay
hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they brought PRUNA to the municipal building to prove
that he was innocent.[18]
PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January 1995, he was in
his house preparing coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not
known to him. Carlito and the latters friend then brought him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTEs father
boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail. There, the mother of the child threw at
him the lid cover of a kettle. He was also asked by the police to take off his clothes and lie flat; then he was
mauled. Thereafter, he was told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to masturbate. Worse,
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
his testes were burned with cigarette butts. Every night, he was asked to kneel on a chair and was
hit with a 2x 2 piece of wood.[19]
After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified form
and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the victim in the sum of
P50,000, plus costs.[20] Hence, this automatic review.
In his Appellants Brief,[21] PRUNA attributed to the trial court the following errors:
I
IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES, THE MOTHER OF THE
CHILD, THAT THE LATTER WAS THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE
OCCURRED WHEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THEREFOR IS THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF THE
CHILD.
II
IN RELYING ON THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES AS TO THE
ALLEGED RAPE OF HER CHILD.
III
IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT[ ] CHILD WHO WAS
ONLY THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED EVEN AS SHE WAS
ONLY FIVE (5) YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED.
IV
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON DUBIOUS EVIDENCE.
The Office of the Solicitor General (hereafter OSG) seeks the affirmation of the trial courts
decision with the modification that an additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be granted
in favor of the offended party.
As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as
follows:
(1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she
was allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old
when she testified;
(2) Whether Jacquelines testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;
Page 367
 (3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is fatal; PROS. LUMABAS:

(4) Whether appellants guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt; I think that will be all for the witness.[22]

(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify the After which, the defense counsel manifested that he would not cross-examine her and that
imposition of the death penalty. he intended to file a motion for her disqualification as a witness.[23] The court then proceeded to
ask her a few questions, thus:
We shall resolve these issues in seriatim.
COURT :

Do you know what will happen to a child if she is not telling the truth?
I. LIZETTEs Competency and Credibility as a Witness
A Sa lupa.

Q Do you know that it is a sin to tell a lie?

Appellant disputes the competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender age. When
LIZETTE was called to testify, his counsel interposed a vigorous objection to the admission of her A Yes, sir.
testimony because of her tender age.The trial court noted the objection and allowed her to testify; thus:
Q The witness is excused considering the manifestation of Atty. Baluyot that he will
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY be filing a written motion for the striking out of the testimony of the witness
considering her tender age.[24]
PROS. LUMABAS:
No such motion is extant on the records. At the next hearing, the defense counsel
Do you know Manuel Pruna? cross-examined LIZETTE, as follows:
A Yes, sir. ATTY. BALUYOT:
Q How do you call Manuel Pruna? On January 3, 1995, in the morning where were you?
A Boy, sir. A I was in the grassy area, sir.
Q Where is he? Q In that grassy area there were other children with you playing?
A There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person wearing blue T-shirt, who when asked, gave his A None, sir.
name as Manuel Pruna)
Q You were then removing[sic] your bowel, is it not?
PROS. LUMABAS:
A Yes, sir.
What did Manuel Pruna or Boy do to you?
Q Then while removing your bowel you saw your mother pass[ ] by, is it not?
A Inihiga niya ako and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And in what place did he do this to you?
Q She was then carrying a pail to fetch some water, is it not?
A In the grassy area, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next?
Q The water from where she will fetch is [sic] a few meter[s] away from you, is it not?
ATTY. BALUYOT:
A Near, sir.
The witness for quite sometime could not answer the question.
ATTY. BALUYOT:

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 368

 Considering that the grassy place where you were then discharging your bowel is beside a
street?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you saw your mother bringing a pail of water towards your house after her pumping
from the well, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q When she passed by she likewise saw you, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Then how far were you from your house when you were discharging your bowel? Please
demonstrate the distance?
A Up to that door, sir.
Q From that position you were at the grass you could see your house, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell the Honorable Court how long did it take you to discharge your bowel?
A For a short period of time, sir.
(Sandali lang po.)[25]
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy,
presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his
incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the competency of a witness to
establish the ground of incompetency.[26]
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be
witnesses. Among those disqualified are [c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully.
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The
intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness.[27] It is settled that a
child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is
examined.[28]
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at the time
the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to
comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered
as a witness.[29] The examination should show that the child has some understanding of the punishment
which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
child states that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so,
or that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false
swearing.[30] A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him
incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating them
truthfully.[31]
The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the
trial court. This is so because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his manner
of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his understanding of the
obligation of an oath.[32] Since many of the witness manners cannot be photographed into the
record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved
it is clear that such finding was erroneous.[33]
In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the
ground of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the
above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication[34] and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. We,
therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great weight.
We are not persuaded by appellants assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify
two years after the alleged rape when the interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination
of earlier years. It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to
have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed and the identity of the
person responsible therefor.[35]
In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or
tender age is credible and deserves full credit,[36] especially where no motive is attributed to the
victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. [37] Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in
fact raped.[38]
II. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales
Contrary to appellants contention, Jacquelines testimony that LIZETTE told her that
appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina is not covered by the
hearsay evidence rule, which finds application when the declarant does not testify. This rule, as
enunciated under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, provides that a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided
in the Rules of Court.
The term hearsay as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded
upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does
Page 369
not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its
value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact,
and consequently not subject to cross-examination.[39] If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned
from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay
evidence.[40]
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay
testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statements are attributed.[41]Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay
statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them.[42]
In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by
Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the
opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacquelines testimony on the incident related to
her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its non-admission
would not save the day for the appellant. Such testimony is not indispensable, as it merely serves to
corroborate LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA laid her down in the grass and inserted his private organ into
hers. As discussed earlier, LIZETTEs testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is
sufficient basis for conviction.
At any rate, Jacquelines testimony is proof of the victims conduct immediately after the rape. It
shows that LIZETTE immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of her
defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is one of the earmarks of the truth of the charge of rape.
III Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness
Appellant harps on the prosecutions failure to put on the witness stand Gloria Tolentino, who was
listed as a witness and executed an affidavit on 4 January 1995 that she saw the appellant carrying and
bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house.
It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already moved out of her
residence in Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, and could not be found anymore. In any event, as opined by the OSG,
her intended testimony could be dispensed with, as it would only be corroborative of LIZETTEs testimony
that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.
IV. Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence Against Appellant
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she unhesitatingly identified PRUNA, their
neighbor, as the one who defiled her. A rape victim can easily identify her assailant especially if he
is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant that enables her
to have a good look at the latters physical features.[43]
LIZETTE testified that on 3 January 1995 PRUNA, whom she called Boy, laid her in a
grassy area and inserted his penis into her genitalia. When a girl or a woman says that she has
been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was truly committed. [44] She
is not expected to remember all the ugly details of the outrage committed against her. [45] And
when her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof, for in most cases it is the only evidence that can be offered to establish his guilt. [46]
Likewise, LIZETTEs mother testified that right after the incident LIZETTE disclosed what
happened to her and readily identified PRUNA as the culprit. She even led her mother to the
house of PRUNA.[47] Thereafter, the two went to the police authorities to report the incident, and
then to the hospital for LIZETTEs medical examination.
By and large, the medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA
inserted his penis into her vagina. The Medico-Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia or
reddening of the vaginal opening of LIZETTE.As opined by Dr. Quiroz, who was presented as an
expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and
finger.[48] The presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute
testimony of the sexual contact that further strengthens LIZETTEs claim of rape.
This Court is not oblivious of the finding that no laceration was found in LIZETTEs organ
despite the fact that she was examined immediately after she was raped. We have already ruled,
however, that the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding of rape,[49] especially
when the victim is of tender age.[50] Well- settled is the rule that rape is consummated by the
slightest penile penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female.[51] The presence of hyperemia
in LIZETTEs vaginal opening and the existence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine are
clear indications that PRUNAs organ indeed touched the labia or pudendum of LIZETTE.
In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a) the
spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her immediate revelation
to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c) her act of leading her mother to
appellants house right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the
authorities; (e) LIZETTEs submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in her private part;
and (g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine.
The trial court correctly disregarded the defense of alibi raised by the accused. We have
consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of the
crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense; and unless supported by clear
and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the
victim.[52] We have also held that when alibi is established only by the accused, his relatives, or
close friends, the same should be treated with strictest scrutiny.[53]
Page 370
 Carlito, who was admittedly a close friend of appellants parents, corroborated PRUNAs testimony
that he (PRUNA) was in his house during the time that LIZETTE was raped. It is, however, an established
fact that the place where the rape occurred was just a few meters away from the house of PRUNA. Thus,
there was no physical impossibility for PRUNA to be in the grassy area to consummate the crime of rape.
The defense, through Carlito, attempted to impute motive to Jacqueline in filing against PRUNA the
charge of rape. According to him, LIZETTEs grandparents, the Sulits, wanted to buy the place of the
PRUNA family, but the latter refused.[54] Aside from the fact that such testimony was not corroborated, said
motive, if at all, is too flimsy to be even considered. No mother in her right mind would use her offspring as
an engine of malice. She would not subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and even the stigma
attendant to a prosecution for rape unless she is motivated by the desire to bring to justice the person
responsible for her childs defilement.[55]
V. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTEs Minority and Propriety of the Imposition of the Death
Penalty
The commission of the crime of rape by PRUNA having been duly established by the prosecution,
we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child
below seven (7) years old. We have held that in such a case the minority of the victim must be proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the victims age is fatal
and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.[56]
A persons age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victims birth
certificate a sine qua non requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Recent jurisprudence has conflicting
pronouncements.
In the following cases, no birth certificate was presented and this Court ruled that the age of the
victim was not duly proved by the prosecution:
1. In People v. Vargas,[57] the testimonies of the victim and her aunt that the former was 10 years old at the
time of the rape were not considered proof of her age for being hearsay. This Court also observed that the
victim could easily be mistaken for a child below 12 years of age, and hence it was not correct to judge the
victims age by her appearance. We held: The difference of two or three years in age may not always be
readily apparent by mere physical manifestations or appearance.
[58]
2. In People v. Javier, the victim was alleged to be 16 years old, and the accused did not contest her
age. Ratiocinating that in this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year-old girl
and an 18-year-old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned, this Court held that an
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim is vital and essential so as to remove an iota
of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 7659.
3. In People v. Brigildo,[59] aside from the failure of the prosecution to present the offended partys
birth certificate or other equally acceptable official document concerning her age, the testimonies
on record were not clear as to her exact age. The victim declared that she was 11 years old when
she testified in court a year after the incident, while her mother claimed that she was around 15
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The informations even alleged a different
age. Hence, this Court refused to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of minority because of
the uncertainty regarding her age.
4. In People v. Tipay,[60] the offended party was alleged in the information to be under 16 years of
age. No independent evidence was presented to prove it. This Court recognized that the minority
of a victim who may be below the age of 10 is quite manifest and may be taken judicial notice of by
the court. But when the victim is between the crucial years of 15 and 17 where minority may seem
to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance, the prosecution should prove the fact of
minority with certainty. The lack of objection on the part of the accused concerning the victims age
does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden.
5. In People v. Cula,[61] the victim was alleged in the complaint to be 16 years old when the rape
was committed, but no evidence at all was presented to prove her age. We held that the failure of
the accused to deny such allegation cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to prove
with certainty the victims minority. Because of the lacuna in the prosecutions evidence, coupled
with the trial courts failure to make a categorical finding of minority of the victim, we declined to
consider the qualifying circumstance of minority.
6. In People v. Veloso,[62] the victim was alleged to be 9 years of age when she was
raped. Citing People v. Vargas,[63] this Court refused to consider the testimonies of the victim and
her father as sufficient proof of her age.
7. In People v. Pecayo,[64] the victim simply stated during the beginning of her direct examination
that she was 14 years old and that she was born on 13 January 1983. We held that the victims
casual testimony as to her age is not enough, and that the lack of denial on the part of the
accused does not excuse the prosecution from proving her age through competent evidence such
as a duly certified certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, or some other authentic document
showing her age.
8. In People v. Tundag,[65] the victim testified that she was 13 years of age when she was raped,
but she did not know exactly when she was born. Unable to secure a copy of her birth certificate,
the prosecution moved that judicial notice be taken of the fact that she was below 18 years old at
the time of the rape. Despite the admission by the defense of such fact, this Court held that the
Page 371
age of the victim is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory or discretionary. Under Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, a hearing is required before such fact can be taken judicial notice of by
courts.
9. In People v. Geraban,[66] the victims testimony was categorical in declaring that she was 15, but her
mothers testimony regarding her age was not clear. We thus declared that the prosecution failed to
discharge the burden of proving minority.
10. In People v. Liban[67] and People v. Llandelar,[68] the only evidence adduced to prove the minority of the
victims was the victims bare testimony that they were 10 and 16 years old, respectively. This Court held
that while the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would
be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is
another matter. The prosecution should present the victims birth certificate or, in lieu thereof, any other
documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, or
credible testimonial evidence that can help establish the age of the victim. Neither the obvious minority of
the victim nor the absence any contrary assertion from the defense can exonerate the prosecution from its
burden. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the
Rules on Evidence would not be sufficient compliance with the law.
11. In People v. Alvarado,[69] the victim testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape, and this
was confirmed by the accused, who was victims father. The victims mother, however, testified as to her
date of birth which showed that she was 13 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. For
this doubt as to the victims age, the accused was held guilty of simple rape only and meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
On the other hand, in the following cases, we ruled that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently
established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party to
prove her age:
1. In People v. Rafales,[70] the testimony of the victim and her mother that the former was only 10 years old
when she was raped, which was not denied by the accused, was deemed sufficient to prove her age for
the purpose of determining whether the accused could be held guilty of statutory rape, which is carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.
2. In People v. De la Cruz,[71] the testimony of the mother alone that her two daughters were both 14 years
old at the time of the rape incidents was deemed sufficient because there was no reason to doubt the
testimony of the mother, who had personal knowledge of the ages of her children. Moreover, said
testimony was never challenged by the accused and stood unrebutted by any other evidence.
3. In People v. Bali-balita,[72] the victims testimony as to her age, which was corroborated by her half-sister,
was deemed sufficient. We noted that the victim testified in court four months after the rape, and hence it
was not difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice that she was under 18 years of age.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
4. In People v. Velasco,[73] the minority of the victim was deemed established by (a) the
complainant herself, who was held to be competent to testify on her age, as it constituted family
tradition; (b) the open admission of the accused that the victim was a 12-year-old minor; and (c)
the categorical finding of the trial court that she was a minor of a little over twelve years.
5. In People v. Remudo,[74] the trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority on
the strength of (a) the offended partys testimony as to the date of her birth, which showed that she
was 13 years old at the time of the rape, and (b) the admission of said date of birth by the accused
who was the victims brother.
6. In People v. LLanita[75] the only evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that the
victim was below 7 years old at the time of the alleged rape was the victims own
testimony. Although hearsay because she could not have personal knowledge of the date of her
birth but could only acquire knowledge thereof from her parents or relatives, said testimony was
held admissible for being an assertion of family tradition regarding pedigree. Her testimony and
the accuseds admission that she was 5 years old during the commission of the crime were held
sufficient to establish her age.
7. In People v. Agustin,[76] the victims testimony that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape
incidents, coupled with the express admission of her age by the accused who was her father,
sufficiently proved her minority.
8. In People v. Esuela,[77] the testimony of the victims mother that the victim was 13 years of age
at the time of the rape was held sufficient to establish minority for the reason that as a mother she
was in the best position to know when she delivered her child.Also considered were the victims
own testimony regarding her age, as well as the observation of the trial court that she could not
have been more than 18 years old when she testified.
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
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a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.[78]
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal
certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court
ratiocinated in this wise:
In the instant case, the victim, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, was a 3-year-old minor girl as alleged in the
information and the defense did not contest her age and as a matter of fact was questioning her
qualification to testify because of her tender age when she testified two (2) years later in Court. The victims
Medico-Legal Certificate date[d] January 3, 1995 established the fact that at the time of the commission of
the rape on January 3, 1995, the child was only 3 years old.[79]
It thus appears that the trial courts finding that LIZETTE was 3 years old when she was raped was
based on the Medico-Legal Report prepared by Dr. Quiroz, as well as on the fact that the defense did not
contest her age and even questioned her qualification to testify because of her tender age.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age
of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was
presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified on 17 October 1995 as follows:
Q. Now, on January 3, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, do you still recall where you were?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that particular date and time?
A. I was fetching water from an artesian well beside the house of my neighbor, sir.
Q. Where was this daughter of yours then when you were fetching water?
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
A. My daughter was discharging her bowel who was then at the back of the house of
our neighbor, sir.
How old is your daughter Lizette Arabelle Gonzales?
A. Three years old, sir.
Q. At the time that she was discharging her bowel, how old [was] she?
A. Three years old, sir. She is four years old now.
Q. When was her last birthday?
A. April 19, 1995, sir.[80]
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident,
that she was 5 years old.[81] However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3
January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further
question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.[82]
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of
death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its
irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital
offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.[83]
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence[84] in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated
against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse
the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for
purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was
below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA
cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs
mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for
purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3
of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should
be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of P50,000 awarded by
the trial court is not sufficient. In accordance with recent jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also be
awarded moral damages in the amount ofP50,000 without need of pleading or proof because the
mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious. [85]
Page 373
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, in Criminal
Case No. 6044 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or
Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape, and not qualified rape,
and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the sum
of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the indemnity of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995 decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860[1] which reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 16373.[2] The latter dismissed the complaint of
private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner
Francisco Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error, which, in
this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a general rule, factual issues are not within
the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, this case falls under an exception to this rule.[3]
In her complaint[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had
been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's
daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood,
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and
that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education,
such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a
Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for
a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In his answer,[5] FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with
Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his
employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never
recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special
defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and
that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of
the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.
After MONINA filed her reply,[6] pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the
following issues:
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about the
end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the
latters own acts and those of his family?
3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by
estoppel, laches and/or prescription?
4. Damages.[7]
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself,
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez,
Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked for
FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence. Towards
the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCOs wife suffered a miscarriage or abortion,
thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCOs wife managed a
nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of
the following day, thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother, Esperanza
Amolar, who was nicknamed Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya (nanny) of
Lourdes from July 1946 up to February 1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two (2)
weeks before Adela started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in September 1946,
or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO for support. As a
result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living room, and in the course
thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her baby. To which, Lilia replied: I did
not tell you to make that baby so it is your fault. During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till
11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he worked
as FRANCISCOs houseboy at the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod
City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the bookkeeper at Nelly Garden,
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informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCOs daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of
introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of
MONINA,[8] and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6) telephone cards (Exhs. G to
L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as
FRANCISCOs daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCOs house, but when the latter and his wife would come
over, Arsenio would conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her
face. Once, Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in Silay
City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally,
Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having finished her
schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was FRANCISCO who
instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his wife were around; that although
FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the Bacolod house only once, they called each other
through long distance; and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as Daddy during their lone meeting at
the Bacolod house and were affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA stayed at
FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then for about a week the second time. On both
occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO
likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like his (FRANCISCOs) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City, initially
touched on how he and his wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. Zafiro
first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the Jison and Lopez families, which showed that
former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, then told the court that
the family of Vice-President Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is considered a relative xxx by
reputation, by actual perception. Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18, photographs taken at the
14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA with the former
Vice-President and other members of the Lopez family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for some of
MONINAs school needs and even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that
another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, a certain Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA
with her studies and problems, and even attended MONINAs graduation in 1978 when she obtained a
masteral degree in Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover,
upon Remedios recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant Financing
Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of
FRANCISCOs wife, and among whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and Dantheas husband. In
closing, Zafiro identified MONINAs Social Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as
employer and where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first cousin of her
husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the latter part of 1965 when
Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea
managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea as being reputedly the daughter of Mr.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Frank Jison; and on several occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latters
husband understand that MONINA was reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]. While MONINA
worked at Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the
latter part of 1966, as Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin
University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During MONINAs
6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board and lodging and was treated as a relative,
not a mere employee, all owing to what Remedios had said regarding MONINAs filiation. As
Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant Financing as she was called by Mrs.
Cuaycong, a first cousin of Dantheas husband who lived in Bacolod City.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO from
1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a procurement officer, hacienda
overseer and, later, as hacienda administrator.Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo saw and heard
MONINA ask her Daddy (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but
FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to give, then told MONINA to go see Mr.
Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo
to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office,
Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they came
out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would
be released to MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol
intended not to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave
MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she signed and ran
outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his motive for testifying, Romeo
stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as FRANCISCOS daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was employed
by FRANCISCOs wife at the Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at
FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda expenses, typing vouchers and office
papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his work, Rudy
knew the persons receiving money from FRANCISCOs office, and clearly remembered that in
1965, as part of his job, Rudy gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times,
upon instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise
recalled that he first met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever
FRANCISCOs wife was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would speak with and
address FRANCISCO as Daddy, without objection from FRANCISCO.In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw
FRANCISCO give MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCOs
office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of MONINAs mother. Finally, as
to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he simply wanted to help bring out the truth
and nothing but the truth, and that MONINAs filiation was common knowledge among the people
in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCOs office to MONINA
were not reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr. Lagarto
explained that FRANCISCOs wife and children should not know [of] this. Rudy further revealed
that as to the garden meetings between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss
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FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before leaving, and FRANCISCOs reaction upon seeing
her was to smile and say in the Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you, daughter?); and that
MONINA was free to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes,
MONINA would join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at
Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo
first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced
Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her P15.00 monthly
allowance given upon FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo further declared that MONINAs filiation was
pretty well-known in the office; that he had seen MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building to
the office, with FRANCISCOs arm on MONINAs shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial expenses
of Pansay, but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCOs wife. Alfredo also
disclosed that the disbursements for MONINAs allowance started in 1961 and were recorded in a separate
cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in
Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as FRANCISCOs accountant-auditor. Once, when
Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the
preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her
how she came to work there, she answered that her Daddy, FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact
confirmed by Mr. Atienza.Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., was the
most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at
Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954, MONINA and her
mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for about an hour, during which time,
Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of the
vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their
conversation. As FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask for
the sustenance of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head and asked: How are you
Hija?, to which MONINA answered: Good morning, Daddy. After FRANCISCO told Pansay and MONINA
to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and said to Pansay: I am giving this for the child.
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagartos office where Dominador was to get the days
expenses, while MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next month, Dominador saw
MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that MONINA was there to get her allowance from her
Daddy. In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father
of FRANCISCOs wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift and she was calling Don
Vicente, Lolo (grandfather). At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around. Then sometime in
1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagartos office to get the marketing expenses, Dominador saw
MONINA once more claiming her allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for FRANCISCO,
Dominador was at Mrs. Francos residence as she recommended him for employment with her sister, Mrs.
Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Francos
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who
MONINA was. Dominador answered that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter with Pansay, and
then Mrs. Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was
sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of Esperanza
Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to
November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to work at Elena
Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where
she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then confronted FRANCISCO,
who told Lope dont get hurt and dont cause any trouble, because I am willing to support
your Inday Pansay and my child. Three (3) days after this confrontation, Lope asked for and
received permission from FRANCISCO to resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40
years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she
was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who
passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO.[9] MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she
stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father,
FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses. She either received the money
from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr.
Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools,[10] but
FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped
due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of
the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the
University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition
fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by
FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was
enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After
finishing two (2) semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records
(Exh. Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1]), she transferred to
De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter,
MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors
degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea
Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and
took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein
FRANCISCO was likewise listed as Guardian (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to wit:
Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid
Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and
others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto,
Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and others), and identified them from a
Page 376
photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the prior testimony regarding her employment
at Merchant Financing Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence in
Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO at Elena
Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was going
for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Francos mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her
return from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter arranged for her
employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City.MONINA went to Bacolod City, was interviewed by Mr. Jose
Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start working first week of
September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at
her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and
asked him for money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and would
not be able find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA out of the
house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her hand, after which,
FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to Bacolod City and
promised that he would give her the money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket (Exh. M)
which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls
were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards (Exhs. G to L), with annotations at the back reading:
charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to
L-1). PLDT issued a certification as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise
introduced in evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on
MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo and sign a
certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by FRANCISCO. She went to Atty.
Tirols office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was
not FRANCISCOs daughter. She explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would
pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She
started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he was also a
father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could not be blamed for being brought into the
world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to the latters Forbes Park residence
(Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in
Bacolod City where they discussed the affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the
affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would keep her
peace.
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirols office, she was accompanied by
one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit (Exh. P) [11] would boomerang against
FRANCISCO as it is contrary to law. MONINA returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once
more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971,
she signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her
studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check for P15,000.00
(Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give. As Atty.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely
grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of
introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder sister
Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother), addressed to another cousin,
Beth Jison (Emilios daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh.
S-1) expressly recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter. Ultimately though,
MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check
for her CPA review, board exam and graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she
again planned to travel abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from former
Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh.
V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as
FRANCISCOs wife was going to arrive at the latters Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called
Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa
Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCOs wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice
President Fernando Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting to go to school.Thus,
MONINA asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible
employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit
U, Mrs. Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As additional proof of
her close relationship with the family of Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified photographs
taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April 1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife,
namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes and
Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two (2) occasions
when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when
she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented
Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores
Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that
while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his
residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his
household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male
workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again, neither did
he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual relations
with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied
having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew
that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would
pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise
Page 377
categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or
Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he fired Alfredo
Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position during the formers
absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the reasons
therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long distance calls from his Bacolod residence;
nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this, he fired certain people in his office for their failure to
report this anomaly. As regards the caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since
MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the caretaker thought that he could allow people who lived at
the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCOs) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys Garden from 1963 up to 1974, then from
1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not know MONINA; that
he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him;
and that he never saw MONINA at Nellys Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at
Nellys Garden to give money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCOs bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986, testified that
FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified discrepancies; and that he never saw
MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court,
however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCOs haciendas, and not
vouchers pertaining to the latters personal expenses.
Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nellys Garden from 1964 up to 1984 as
a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo
Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that
MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iigo never heard FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his
(FRANCISCOs) daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCOs daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know) MONINA at the
Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes first son, Mark. Over lunch one day,
Lourdes aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA to each other, but they were referred to only by
their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes house in Sta. Clara
Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting. However,
Lourdes did not comply with the request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz from 1968
up to 1971, however, he did not personally interview her before she was accepted for
employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening procedure before being hired. Jose
recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be
FRANCISCOs daughter. Jose then told Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza)
could stop her from spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him
that she planned to leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange,
she would sign a document disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienzas
report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCOs personal lawyer, about the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirols) office in Iloilo. Jose
then wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose relayed Atty.
Tirols message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with
a check for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirols office, Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol
and his secretary reading some documents. MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the
document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds,
subject to reimbursement from and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946, testified
that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes nanny; that Lourdes slept in her parents room; that she
had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay; that there was no unusual
relationship between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores would have easily
detected it since she slept in the same room as Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever
FRANCISCOs wife was out of town, Pansay would bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and
that Pansay would not sleep in the room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared
that Pansay stopped working for FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October
1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about half of MONINAs
testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard the rest of MONINA's
testimony and those of FRANCISCOs witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 1990[12] the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the
complaint with costs against MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof, it observed:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against
defendant Francisco Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at the time when plaintiff,
reckoned from her death of birth, was already thirty-nine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that
it was instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiffs mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the years
between plaintiffs birth and Esperanzas death, no action of any kind was instituted against
defendant either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latters parents. Neither had plaintiff
brought such an action against defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20, 1965,
considering that she was then already nineteen years old or, within a reasonable time
thereafter. Twenty years more had to supervene before this complaint was eventually instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without,
however, summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies of the
witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.
Page 378
 The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for witness Lope I
Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November
1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE
copulation did indeed take place between Francisco and Esperanza; and that MONINAs attempt to show THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT
opportunity on the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider that there was also the opportunity for copulation APPELLANTS DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER
between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also residing at Nellys Garden at CASE.
that time. The RTC also ruled that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA II
paled in light of jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein were considered.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINAs evidence APPELLANTS WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND
thereon may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or INCREDIBLE.
self-serving evidence." To the first category belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo
Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINAs filiation was based, as to the former, on utterances of defendants III
wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while as to the latter, Alfredo's
conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendants daughter, from his THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
personal observation of plaintiffs facial appearance which he compared with that of defendants and from THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY
the way the two (plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then APPELLANT AS PART OF HER EVIDENCE.
opportunity to closely observe them together. To the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz,
IV
as:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and allegedly on those occasions ACTUAL ACT OF COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND
when defendants wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard pieces of APPELLANTS MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID
conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to the paternity of the latters child. xxx EFFECT.

V
The RTC then placed MONINAs testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded her by
FRANCISCOs relatives under the third category, since the latter were never presented as witnesses, for THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
which reason the trial court excluded the letters from FRANCISCOs relatives (Exhs. S to V). DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE
APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for it was of the
perception that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended to VI
illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family Code has so provided; or by laches, which is [a]
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS AFFIDAVIT
creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results, and addressed to the sound discretion of the court
(EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION
[and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon the death
INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.[13]
of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, xxx there seems to be no inequitable
result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff. Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellees Brief. [14]

The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit
(Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed when she was already twenty-five years, a professional and under the
able guidance of counsel.
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the
complaint with malice, she having been propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause.
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and sought
reversal of the trial courts decision on the grounds that:
In its decision of 27 April 1995,[15] the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no vested or
acquired rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles
172 and 173, of the Family Code.[16]While the Court of Appeals rejected the certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them,
said court focused its discussion on the other means by which illegitimate filiation could be
proved, i.e., the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of
the child, a judicial admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 379

reputation respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses xxx. [17] To the Court of
Appeals, the bottom line issue was whether or not MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCOs
illegitimate daughter by preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is the illegitimate
daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts of
[FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena
and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish MONINAs filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolars testimony by saying that Lope could not
have detected Esperanzas pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point in time [sic] she was still
in the initial stage of pregnancy. Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by
Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import of his testimony. As xxx Lope xxx was asked about an incident
that transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that Lope
could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his sister. At any rate,
what is important is not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his sister pointed to
their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her pregnancy, and that upon being confronted,
[FRANCISCO] assured him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an
attempt to find fault with Lopes testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even
[FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope about what he had done to
Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity by assuring Lope of support for both
Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appelas further noted that Casabuena and Savariz testified on something that they
personally observed or witnessed, which matters FRANCISCO did not deny or refute. Finally, said court
aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies xxx let alone such circumstantial
evidence as [MONINAs] Birth Certificates xxx and Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear the name of
[FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go along with the trial courts theory that [MONINAs] illegitimate
filiation has not been satisfactorily established.
xxx
Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCOs] former employees,
Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. xxx
xxx
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter
of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof, We find more weight in the
former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her] witnesses xxx all bearing on
[FRANCISCOs] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged
[MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact,
[FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and
detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by [MONINAs] witnesses, he merely
explained that he had fired [them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCOs]
vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial
evidence.
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does not hold
sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit
which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who,
however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse xxx. Further,
the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx
could not have been true, for as pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit xxx almost five
months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. xxx
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not
absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the
contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO]
clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has been
conclusively established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena
and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had admitted his paternity of the
appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant, Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson
and Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending
appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the
Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing
her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother,
acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his
office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment
at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long
distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also
at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records
(Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5), appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his
illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of [FRANCISCOs] relatives acknowledging or
treating [MONINA] as [FRANCISCOs] daughter (Exh U) or as their relative (Exhs T & V). On this
point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez
clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has been considered by the Lopezes as a
relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 &
Page 380
X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellees first cousin,
testified that appellant was introduced to her by appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the
daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchants
Financing Corporation of which she was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family free
of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz declared that sometime in February, 1966
appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the daughter of appellee Francisco
Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINAs]
Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in evidence as part of [MONINAs]
testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to further reinforce [MONINAs] claim that she is
[FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar.
True it is that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on
appeal. But the rule admits of certain exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who rendered the
judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial
court had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted] In the
present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs] witnesses xxx whose testimonies were not given
credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment. xxx
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is
hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco
Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 29
March 1996,[18] FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of law:
I.
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE]
IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS SUPPOSED
TO HAVE OCCURRED.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
II.
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING CONSIDERING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND
FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING
THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE
PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN STATEMENT
(EXH. P/EXH. 2) IN A MANNER NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS
OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
V.
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE
FILING OF THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second
paragraph of MONINAs complaint wherein she claimed that he and Pansay had sexual relations
by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, it was physically impossible for him and Pansay to
have had sexual contact which resulted in MONINAs birth, considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private respondent in
her complaint that her mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO at the end of 1945 or the start of
1946, she would have been born sometime in late September or early October and not August 6,
1946 xxx. The instant case finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,[19] thus:
xxx
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him
at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during the
time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINAs testimonial evidence is shaky,
contradictory and unreliable, and proceeds to attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in
the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected Pansays pregnancy in November 1945
when they met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador
Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c)
Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which
was then under Central Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo;
and (d) Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment
Page 381
MONINA received from Danthea was due to the formers employment at Merchants Financing Company
and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides, Danthea admitted that she had no personal
knowledge as to the issue of paternity and filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and
40[20] of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of
the trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINAs testimony that he answered for her schooling was
self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary evidence; and assuming he did, such
should be interpreted as a manifestation of kindness shown towards the family of a former household
helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO points to the
fact that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the families of
Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of
Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong;
and MONINAs employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her educational
attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her employment
thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot,[21] the quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and
convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof, was not met.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals reliance on
the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as
circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons
who issued them did not testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[22] the contents of the
baptismal certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest who
solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the name of the father
appearing therein was Franque Jison, which was not FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F,
the names of the childs parents were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not
Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as legitimate, while
the fathers occupation as laborer. Most importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO signed
Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the childs birth to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar. As to MONINAs educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Baas v. Baas [23] which recognized
that school records are prepared by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove
paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of
Appeals,[24] and further asserts that MONINA did not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in
the pictures to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at best, mere second cousins of
FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as
they were not identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the telephone
cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his
residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals interpretation of
MONINAs affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran counter to Dequito v. Llamas,[25] and overlooked that at the
time of execution, MONINA was more than 25 years old and assisted by counsel.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals failure to consider
the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs arguments, leading
FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters
relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly,
the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco[26] served as a judicial confirmation of Article
256 of the Family Code[27] regarding its retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights, which does not hold true here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has
passed away and the former having actually resisted the latters claim below.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph,
which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first
paragraph, a high standard of proof[28] is required.Specifically, to prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such
Page 382
acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent
desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.[29]
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of
time.[30]
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on the principle that an
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the
family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.[31]
his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the
status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her
narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her
relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly
established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when her mother
was in the employ of the former;

The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of 2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct which
the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:
evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof,
and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books,
civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts
board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellants
to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give
weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of
appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller,
greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long
of truth.[32]
distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy. Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5)
FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant consideration. While it
has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years
such indulgence,[33] this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances,
publicly,[35] spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.[36]
the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity
suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or
mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error must
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long fail.
before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of
prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the
some of MONINAs documentary evidence.
testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical
and natural.[34] MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her
birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is
1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local
her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and
Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of
information of a third person.[37] Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth
FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact
certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or
between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the
doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the
overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as
father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latters part. [38] In like manner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D)

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 383

and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former
being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so
specified.[39] However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may
be admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her
education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local
Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs
filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, namely
Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to
MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue,[40] as MONINA witnessed the
authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable
to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than
the documents in question.[41] As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40,
however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may
not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the
second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase [e]ntries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light
of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or
those articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a
person.[42] These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family,[43] or
those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. [44] Other examples of
these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones,[45] monuments or coffin plates.[46]
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, [47] it having been
observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by
reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the
pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.[48]
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim
that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2),
subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her
father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no savings
and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P
upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived and that FRANCISCOs ploy
would boomerang upon him. On the other hand, FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be
afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years old at the time of its execution and was
advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its genuineness and due execution
could not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm
of Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading rumors
about her filiation within the firm, which might have had deleterious effects upon the relationship
between the firm and FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the Court of
Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does not hold
sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit
which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who,
however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse xxx.
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not
absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the
contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO]
clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would have been
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her
filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly appreciated by the Court of
Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the
Page 384
sworn statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating
within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the
credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that the standard to
contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and convincing evidence and more than merely
preponderant,[49] has been met by MONINA.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was
comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as That is not true, I do not
believe that, or None that I know. In declining then to lend credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we resort
to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid
down as early as 1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of
our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false
narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make
statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately
related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their
truthfulness could be tested, their answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions
as I dont know or I dont remember. xxx[50]
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified or
likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCOs attempt to prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in
MONINAs favor may not succeed. As may be gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as
to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that Baylosis allegedly took
advantage of his position while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from this bare claim,
FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias against
FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either. Nonito Jalandoni
avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in June 1988; [51] that during his employment at Nelly
Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever having seen MONINA there, neither did he know of
any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCOs office manager before passing away)
regarding the disbursement of MONINAs allowance.[52]Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandonis testimony
regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINAs allowance; declared that Alfredo
Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration,
however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCOs personal
expenses, merely those intended for one of FRANCISCOs haciendas. [53] Then, Iigo Superticioso
confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis was dismissed by Mr. Jison for
irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that MONINA received money from FRANCISCOs office,
neither was there a standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.[54]
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are likewise
insufficient to overcome MONINAs evidence. The former merely consist of denials as regards the
latters having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her allowance from FRANCISCOs office,
which, being in the form of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive
testimony;[55] bare assertions as regards the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCOs
personal expenses incapable of evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an
allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and
Tingson. But what then serves as the coup de grce is that despite Superticiosos claim that he did
not know MONINA,[56] when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on 18
May 1971, MONINA called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office, Superticioso admitted that his
nickname was Iing and that there was no other person named Iing in FRANCISCOs office.[57]
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of
an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open
and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;
moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential elements
of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct
as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held barred.[58] The last element is the origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply only
where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal
rights.[59]
As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to
prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs delay in
asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it must be
stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since
it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be
worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. [60] Since the instant case involves
paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted
her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be
inequitable and unjust.
Page 385
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged Merlita immediately went to her daughter who had not stopped crying and asked Elizabeth
decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED. what happened and why was she crying.[10] It was then that Elizabeth spoke and told her mother
that her uncle Baby, herein appellant, removed her panties, made her lie down and then inserted
Costs against petitioner. his penis inside her vagina.[11]
SO ORDERED. That same evening, the Tumulak family, including Rosendos father, who was a barangay
tanod, looked for appellant. They found him at a party in a neighbors house half a kilometer from
theirs. They apprehended appellant and delivered him, first, to the barangay captain and later on,
to the Merida Police.[12] Appellant allegedly admitted the commission of the crime and said that he
[G.R. No. 139211. February 12, 2003] only did it out of drunkenness.[13]

On November 4, 1996, Elizabeth was brought to Dr. Jane Grace Solaa, a physician at the
Rural Health Center of Merida, for examination. Dr. Solaa found the girl complaining of pain in her
vagina and detected contusions in her labia minora. The doctor wrote her findings in the following
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GORGONIO VILLARAMA alias Baby, appellant. medical report:

DECISION Reddish discoloration w/ tenderness (contusion), medial aspect (R) & (L) labia minora.
CORONA, J.:
CONCLUSIONS:

On November 2, 1996, the spouses Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak went to the cemetery to light
candles for the dead, leaving behind their three young children, Arthel (8 years old), Bernadeth (6 years 1. The above described physical injuries are found in the body of he subject, the age
old) and Elizabeth (4 years old), playing inside their house without adult supervision. That perhaps was the of which is compatible to the alleged date of infliction.
biggest mistake of their lives and one the couple will always regret. On that fateful day, their youngest child
2. Under normal circumstances, without subsequent complication and/or deeper
fell prey to the rapacious desires of a beast in the person of the childs own uncle, appellant Gorgonio
involvement present, but not clinically apparent at the time of the examination, the
Villarama.
above described physical injuries is expected to improve in 7 to 10 days. [14]
Approximately between five to six oclock in the afternoon, appellant, 35-year-old Gorgonio Villarama,
Appellant was charged with rape as then defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
elder brother of the victims mother Merlita, arrived at the Tumulaks house and found the three children by
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,[15] in the following information:
themselves.[1]

Thereupon, appellant ordered the two older children, Arthel and Bernadeth, to pasture the goats, That on or about the 2nd day of November 1996, at Sitio Capasanan, Barangay Casilda,
leaving the youngest, Elizabeth, with him.[2] Once alone, appellant undressed Elizabeth and made her lie Municipality of Merida, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
down while he pulled down his pants and briefs to his knees, and thereafter mounted his niece Elizabeth.[3] Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party ELIZABETH V.
This was the scene which greeted the prosecutions eyewitness, Ricardo Tumulak, younger brother
TUMULAK, who is 4 years old, against her will and without her consent, while inside their
of Elizabeths father Rosendo, when he arrived at his brothers house to return the bolo he borrowed from
residential house of the victim, the accused who is her uncle, held her hand, remove her short
the latter.[4] Ricardo peeped through the open window to check why his niece was crying and saw
pants and was made to lie down and was made to spread her legs, lay on top of her and insert his
appellant, with briefs and pants slipped down to the knees, on top of Elizabeth who was naked. [5] When
penis over (sic) the victims genital organ to accomplish his lewd design, to her damage and
appellant noticed Ricardos presence, he hurriedly stood up and scurried away through the
prejudice.
backdoor.[6] Ricardo immediately entered the house and dressed up the crying child. Ricardo then called
his mother, the victims paternal grandmother, who was in the house nearby.[7] The grandmother asked
Elizabeth what happened but the child did not answer and just continued crying. [8] CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]

Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak got home at about six oclock in the evening. They were met by Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the
Rosendos parents who told them what happened.[9] merits ensued.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 386

 The prosecution presented four witnesses: eyewitness Ricardo Tumulak, Dr. Jane Grace Solaa, the
physician who examined the victim, and the victims parents Merlita and Rosendo Tumulak.
The defense presented two witnesses: appellant Gorgonio Villarama and Bernaldo Claros, cousin of
appellant.
Appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that at about five oclock in the afternoon of
November 2, 1996, he was in the house of his aunt, Patricia Claros, butchering a pig. He, however,
admitted that at 6 oclock that same evening, he went to the victims house about a kilometer away from his
aunts house, after a 30-minute walk. Upon reaching the place, he discovered that his sister Merlita and her
husband were not home, but their three children were playing inside the house. Appellant then told the
children to tell their mother that he was going to spend the night in their house because it was already late
and he could not find any means of transportation to go to Ormoc City where he lived. [17]
Thereafter he smoked a cigarette in the balcony and admitted having cradled the victim because the
child allegedly clung to his shoulder. Appellant claims that it was that cradling which eyewitness Ricardo
Tumulak chanced upon when the latter arrived to borrow the bolo of his brother Rosendo. According to
appellant, they were not able to find the bolo so Ricardo left. Not long after, appellant also left, heeding the
invitation of a friend to attend the birthday party of the latters wife.[18] Upon arriving at the friends house,
appellant helped in grating coconut and joined the celebrations. It was then that he was arrested by the
victims paternal grandfather, a barangay tanod, and brought before the barangay captain who informed
him of the accusation against him. The Mayor of Merida thereafter arrived with police officers and brought
him to the Merida jail.[19]
On cross examination and in response to questions propounded by the trial court, appellant also
admitted ordering the victims two older siblings to pasture the goats, leaving him alone with the victim
Elizabeth.[20]
Appellants cousin, Bernaldo Claros, corroborated appellants testimony that they butchered a pig
together. However, Claros also testified that he left appellant at about 5:30 in the afternoon to go to the
house of his elder brother Oligario Claros, Jr. where he spent one hour before going back to his mothers
house, and, upon his return, he found appellant still there. Thereafter, they attended a friends birthday
party. They arrived at the party at 6:30 in the evening and stayed there until the barangay tanod arrested
appellant.
On April 30, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35, Eighth Judicial Region, in
Criminal Case No. 50630-0 rendered a decision[21] finding accused-appellant Gorgonio Villarama guilty as
charged and imposing the death sentence on him. The trial court disposed thus:
Wherefore, for all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the accused Gorgonio Villarama alias Baby
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and hereby sentences him, it being proven that the
crime of rape was committed under the attendant circumstance of the victim being under eighteen (18)
years of age and the accused, the offender being an uncle and therefore relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree, to the penalty of DEATH pursuant to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The accused is also penalized to pay the private offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Appellant now questions said conviction in this automatic review before us and anchors his
appeal on the general catch-all argument that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant makes much capital of the non-presentation of the victim Elizabeth on the witness
stand and invokes the doctrine of willful suppression of evidence which raises the presumption
that such evidence was adverse to the prosecution.
This argument is utterly without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that it is the prosecution which controls the presentation of
its witnesses.[23]
Unlike countless other rape cases perpetrated in relative isolation and secrecy, where only
the victim can testify on the forced coitus, the offense here was providentially witnessed by
another person, an adult, who was definitely more articulate in describing the sensitive details of
the crime.
Moreover, Dr. Jane Solaas testimony sealed the case for the prosecution when she testified
on the presence of a contusion on the victims genital organ, specifically the labia minora. Thus,
the prosecution deemed the evidence sufficient to overwhelm the constitutional presumption of
innocence of appellant.
While the victims testimony of the assault would have added support to appellants
conviction, the same was not indispensable. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
intent of the prosecution was to spare the victim from further trauma which could have resulted
from being placed on the witness stand. The prosecutions apprehension in presenting the victim
can be inferred from the records:
TESTIMONY OF ROSENDO TUMULAK
PROS. BELETA
/continuing
Q Now, since that incident up to this time, do you notice of (sic) any physical changes
in her?
A Yes, maam.
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court.
Page 387
 A Right after the incident, she was sick, she seemed to be, she cannot sleep and she seemed
to be scared.[24]
TESTIMONY OF MERLITA TUMULAK
Q Prior to that incident, could your child talk intelligently?
A Yes, she could talk intelligently.
Q After the incident, how did you observe her speech? Could she also talk intelligently the way
she talked prior to the incident?
A No longer.[25]
PROS. BELETA
Q After this incident of November 2, 1996, can you tell this court the behavior of your child
Elizabeth Tumulak. Did you find any unusual behavior?
A Yes, maam.
Q Can you tell this Court, what is that unusual behavior?
A We can no longer hear her speak, she used to have fever, and she was so sickly. If you talk
to her, it would seem nothing and she would easily cry.
Q Before the incident, do you find her to be jolly?
A Yes, maam.
Q Would you consider her very sick?
A Yes, maam.[26]
The Court is not convinced that the prosecution suppressed any evidence. The victim was present in
the court room a few times during the trial. The defense could have called Elizabeth to the stand as a
hostile witness but it did not.
Time and again, the Court has held that the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the
prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible defense.[27] There should thus be no unfavorable inferences from
the failure of the prosecution to present Elizabeth. If appellant believed that her testimony would have
exculpated him, then he should have presented Elizabeth. And the coercive processes of the court would
have been at his disposal had Elizabeth refused to testify. [28]
Appellant likewise asserts that the testimonies of the victims parents were hearsay since they did not
witness the actual rape and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.
This too fails to convince us.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.
To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a
startling occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the
circumstance of such occurrence.[29]
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence
when she pointed to appellant as her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement
was spontaneous because the time gap from the sexual assault to the time the victim recounted
her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there was neither
capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to fabricate her statement.
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim
could not have had the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made
her lie down, took off her panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a
four-year-old child. Such a brutal experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that
Elizabeth was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion that she was still in a
traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to appellant.
In People vs. Moreno,[30] the Court, sustaining the conviction of an accused for robbery with
rape, ruled that the affidavit of the accused who was not available for trial was properly admitted in
evidence as part of res gestae:
This exception is based on the belief that such Statements are trustworthy because made
instinctively, while the declarants mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the
shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex
products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action. Said natural
and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same
person on the witness stand.
Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the
threatening presence of the accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told
their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were raped. The latter later testified in court as to
these statements. These were thus part of the res gestae since they were spontaneously made
Page 388
after their harrowing experience, as soon as the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for
or threat to their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of its ruling in People vs. Contreras,[31] wherein the accused was
acquitted in one of the many statutory rape charges against him because, among other things, the
prosecution failed to present the child-victim.
At first blush, the facts of that case are deceptively similar to those of the case at bar. However, upon
careful scrutiny and analysis of the two cases, we rule that the instant case is not on all fours with
the Contreras case.
In Contreras, the main witness for the prosecution, Nelene Diaz, was not deemed by the Court to be
in a position to categorically state that the accuseds genitals had penetrated the victims vagina. In fact,
what she saw was merely the accused, with his zipper open and his penis exposed, facing the six-year-old
victim who was sitting on his lap with her legs apart. Although the victim had no underwear, it was,
nevertheless, established that the witness did not see any genital contact between the two as the genital
organs were visibly apart. However, in the case at bar, the eyewitness saw the appellant, without his briefs
and pants, on top of the naked victim - a position conclusively indicating sexual intercourse.
In Contreras, there was positive testimony of the victims companions that the rape was prevented by
the timely arrival of the witness. This circumstance is not present in this case.
Furthermore, in Contreras, the victims statement that she had been sexually molested by the
accused was not received under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did
not refer to the incident witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern of molestation of her and her
companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeths declaration to her mother regarding the then just
concluded assault were so full of details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she was
referring to the same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.
Finally, in the Contreras case, the mother of the victim did not testify in court for no explainable
reason. Here, Elizabeths mother actively pursued the prosecution of appellant who is her own brother. No
mother will falsely accuse a person of rape, specially if it involves her own sibling, unless she is convinced
it will vindicate the wrong done to her daughter.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on Ricardo Tumulaks testimony, branding the same as self-serving
and devoid of any evidentiary weight on the ground that Ricardo is the victims uncle.
This argument is flimsy.
First of all, a self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his favor. It
does not include the testimony he gives as a witness in court.[32]
Second, Ricardo Tumulaks testimony was credible. He harbored no ill-motive against appellant
which could have impelled him to fabricate a story so repulsive as to attach a stigma on his niece, the
victim, for the rest of her life.Appellant himself admitted that, prior to the rape incident, he had been a friend
of Ricardo.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se impair the
credibility of a witness. On the contrary, relationship itself can strengthen credibility in a particular
case, for it is unnatural for a relative of a victim to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit.[33]
The guilt of the appellant having been established, we now delve into the extent of his
culpability, the stage of consummation of the crime of rape.
Appellant insists that the medical report of the prosecution witness, Dr. Solaa, failed to
support the finding of consummated rape.
The Court, in People vs. Campuhan,[34] laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape
cases, thus:
In People v. De la Pea, we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attackers
penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to
achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the
victims vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victims
testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in
all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva,
or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when
applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs,
a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mans
pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched
the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an
accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be touched by
the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mans pubis or the vaginal surface, to
touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female
organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin or the outer convex
surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which
does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora are
the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Page 389
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted touching of the female
organ, but also progressed into being described as the introduction of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum, or the bombardment of the drawbridge. But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes
a shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency, or as earlier stated, a strafing of the citadel of passion.
As can be drawn from the above ruling, the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora
of the pudendum is sufficient to consummate rape.
The Court is convinced that the medical report and testimony of Dr. Solaa provided enough bases to
prove that appellants sexual assault on the victim had reached the gynecological threshold for rape. The
labia minora are directly beneath the labia majora, thus, the contusion in labia minora of the victims vagina
and the pain she felt as reported by Dr.Solaa were decisive indications that appellant was able to enter the
labia majora. Clearly, this is way beyond the mere shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency or the strafing
of the citadel of passion.
In most cases of rape committed against young girls where total penetration of the victims organ is
improbable due to the small vaginal opening, it has been held that actual penetration of the victims organ
nor rupture of the hymen is not required.[35]
We now come to the critical and crucial part as we discuss the propriety of the trial courts imposition
of the death penalty.
Article 335 as amended by R.A. 7659, provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation.
The Court is convinced with moral certainty that appellant Gorgonio Villarama raped
4-year-old Elizabeth Tumulak on November 2, 1996. We, however, hold that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty on him. Appellant can neither be convicted for incestuous rape under
the first paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, nor for rape of a child
below 7 years old under the fourth paragraph of the same provision.
Under paragraph 1, although Elizabeth was less than 18 years at the time she was raped
and the offender was her uncle, the information failed to categorically state that said offender was
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Jurisprudence dictates that if the offender
is merely a relative, not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of
the mother of the victim, the information must allege that he is a relative by consanguinity or
affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree. It is not enough for the information to
merely allege that appellant is the uncle of the victim even if the prosecution is able to prove the
same during trial.[36]
Under paragraph 4, it is true that the penalty for raping a child below 7 years old is death.
However, in the case at hand, even if Elizabeth was only 4 years old when the appellant
committed the dastardly crime, the prosecution did not present, other than the testimony of the
mother, independent evidence proving her age.
Court decisions on the rape of minors invariably state that, in order to justify the imposition
of the death penalty, there must be independent evidence showing the age of the victim.
Testimonies on the victims age given by the prosecution witnesses or the lack of denial of the
accused or even his admission thereof on the witness stand is not sufficient. This Court has held
that, to justify the imposition of the death penalty for rape committed against a child below 7, the
minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. The failure
to sufficiently establish the victims age with factual certainty and beyond reasonable doubt is fatal
and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form. [37]
In the case at bar, the victim was presented in open court during the testimony of the mother
to establish Elizabeths age:
Q How about the victim Elizabeth Tumulak, is she your daughter?
A: Yes, maam.
Q How old is she at the time of the incident?
A Four (4) years and eleven (11) months.
Q Will you please point her out
INTERPRETER
Page 390
 (The witness pointed to a child and when asked about her name, she answered, Elizabeth
Tumulak)[38]
The above-quoted testimony, however, is not sufficient for the court to take judicial notice of the
victims age. In People vs. Liban[39], citing People vs. Tundag[40], the Court declared that, in cases calling
for a conviction of rape in its qualified form, the age of the victim, without qualification, is not a matter of
judicial notice, whether mandatory[41] or discretionary[42]. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the
requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules on evidence would not be sufficient to establish
the age of the victim to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
The matter of appreciating the age of the victim, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, was settled when the Court, in the case of People vs. Pruna,[43] laid down the following
guidelines:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim [44].
It is clear then that even the admission of appellant as to the age of the victim could not be
taken against him in the case at bar because of the foregoing guidelines. Paragraph 4 which
allows the appreciation of the testimony of the complainant as to the victims age provided the
same is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused, must be applied in relation to paragraph
3(a) which dispenses with the presentation of independent proof of age only when the victim is
below 3 and the age sought to be proved is less than 7. In this case, the unfortunate victim was 4,
a year too old.
In view of the moral uncertainty of the victims exact age on account of the failure of the
prosecution to present the birth certificate or similar authentic document (such as her baptismal
certificate) and to make a positive and unequivocal manifestation that the victim was indeed 4
years old, not to mention the absence of a categorical finding by the trial court of the victims
minority, the Court hesitates to impose the penalty of death upon appellant.
As we affirm the appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant for the crime of
rape, we, however, make the following modifications: the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
pertpetua and P50,000 as moral damages is awarded to the offended party aside from the P
50,000 as civil indemnity already awarded to her by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Ormoc City is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Gorgonio Villarama is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party Elizabeth V. Tumulak the sum
of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150780 May 5, 2006
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
FY SONS, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57299 dated January 11, 2001 which in
turn affirmed with modification the decision of Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Page 391
Makati City in Civil Case No. 90-3169,2 as well as the CA’s resolution3 dated November 14, 2001 which
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts follow.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of all Nestle products nationwide.
Respondent, on the other hand, is a corporation engaged in trading, marketing, selling and distributing
food items to restaurants and food service outlets. On December 23, 1998, petitioner and respondent
entered into a distributorship agreement (agreement) whereby petitioner would supply its products for
respondent to distribute to its food service outlets. A deed of assignment was also executed by respondent
in favor of petitioner on December 13, 1988, assigning the time deposit of a certain Calixto Laureano in the
amount of P500,000 to secure respondent’s credit purchases from petitioner. A special power of attorney
was likewise executed by Laureano authorizing the respondent to use the time deposit as collateral.
The areas covered by the agreement were Baguio, Dagupan, Angeles, Bulacan, Pampanga, Urdaneta, La
Union, Tarlac and Olongapo. At the end of 1989, the agreement expired and the parties executed a
renewal agreement on January 22, 1990. A supplemental agreement was executed on June 27, 1990, to
take effect on July 1, 1990.
On July 2, 1990, petitioner fined respondent P20,000 for allegedly selling 50 cases of Krem-Top liquid
coffee creamer to Lu Hing Market, a retail outlet in Tarlac. This was purportedly proscribed by the
agreement. Respondent paid the fine. In September 1990, Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer was sold to
Augustus Bakery and Grocery, an act again allegedly in violation of the agreement. Petitioner imposed
a P40,000 fine which respondent refused to pay.
On October 19, 1990, respondent, through counsel, wrote petitioner to complain about the latter’s
breaches of their agreement and the various acts of bad faith committed by petitioner against respondent.
Respondent demanded the payment of damages. In turn, on November 5, 1990, petitioner sent
respondent a demand letter and notice of termination, alleging that the latter had outstanding accounts
of P995,319.81. When the alleged accounts were not settled, petitioner applied the P500,000 time deposit
as partial payment.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, alleging bad faith. 4 According to respondent:
… [petitioner] made representations and promises of rendering support, including marketing support,
assignment of representatives by way of assistance in its development efforts, and assurances of income
in a marketing area not previously developed. Thus, [respondent] was lured into executing a distributorship
agreement with the [petitioner]…. [Respondent] thereby invested huge sums of money, time and efforts to
abide by such distributorship agreement, and to develop market areas for [petitioner’s] products.
Thereafter, the [petitioner] breached the distributorship agreement by committing various acts of bad faith
such as: failing to provide promotional support; deliberately failing to promptly supply the [respondent] with
the stocks for its orders; intentionally diminishing the [respondent’s] sales by supporting a non-distributor;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
and concocting falsified charges to cause the termination of the distributorship agreement without
just cause. By such termination, [petitioner] would be able to obtain the market gains made by
[respondent] at the latter’s own efforts and expenses. When [respondent] complained to
[petitioner] about the latter’s acts of bad faith, the latter terminated the agreement on the allegation
that [respondent] did not pay its accounts. [Petitioner] also seized [respondent’s] time deposit
collateral without basis; penalized [respondent] with monetary penalty for the concocted charge;
and unilaterally suspended the supply of stocks to [respondent]. 5
Respondent sought actual damages of P1,000,000, moral damages of P200,000, exemplary
damages of P100,000, attorney’s fees of P100,000, plus the return of the P500,000 time deposit
and costs of suit. In its answer, petitioner interposed a counterclaim for P495,319.81 representing
the balance of respondent’s overdue accounts, with interest of 2% per month from the date of
default until fully paid, moral damages of P100,000, exemplary damages of P200,000, attorney’s
fees of P120,000 and costs of suit.
In a decision dated November 10, 1997, the Makati City RTC ruled in favor of the respondent:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of P1,000,000.00 as actual damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the
unwarranted and illegal acts of the defendant in terminating the distributorship agreement;
2. The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. The amount of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
The plaintiff however, is hereby ordered to pay the defendant the amount of P53,214,26 (sic)
which amount has been established as the amount the defendant is entitled from the plaintiff.
Three-fourths costs against the defendant.
.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. On January 11, 2001, the CA rendered a decision
affirming the RTC’s decision with modification:
Page 392
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
actual damages is INCREASED from P1,000,000.00 to P1,500,000.00;7 and (2) the amount of P53,214.26
payable by the appellee to the appellant is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.8
Both the CA and the RTC found, among others, that petitioner indeed failed to provide support to
respondent, its distributor; that petitioner unjustifiably refused to deliver stocks to respondent; that the
imposition of the P20,000 fine was void for having no basis; that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s
alleged outstanding obligation; that petitioner terminated the agreement without sufficient basis in law or
equity and in bad faith; and that petitioner should be held liable for damages.
Hence this petition raising the following grounds:
(1)
THE [CA] COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT: "THE
RATIOCINATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AS TO THE APPELLEE’S ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF THE CONTRACT ARE THUS WEAK AND UNCONVINCING" AND
"THE APPELLEE’S ALLEGED NON-PAYMENT AND OUTSTANDING BALANCE
OF P995,319.81 WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN" DESPITE THE FACT THAT
FLORENTINO YUE, JR., THE MANAGER OF THE RESPONDENT ADMITTED IN
OPEN COURT IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF THEN PRESIDING JUDGE
PHINNY C. ARAQUIL THAT THE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WAS
TERMINATED BY YOUR PETITIONER BECAUSE OF THE UNPAID BALANCE OF
THE RESPONDENT OF AROUND P900,000.00.
(2)
THE [CA] COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN LAW IN DISREGARDING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS FOR THE PETITIONER, CRISTINA RAYOS WHO
PREPARED THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT (EXHIBIT 11) ON THE GROUNDS
THAT SHE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DELIVERY AS SHE WAS ONLY IN
CHARGE OF THE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF ALL ACCOUNTS
RECEIVABLES AS PART OF HER DUTIES AS CREDIT AND COLLECTION
MANAGER CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE UNDER SECTION 45 (SIC), RULE 130, OF
THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE.
(3)
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
THE [CA] COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN LAW IN AWARDING TO THE
RESPONDENT ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P1,000,000.00
AND ORDERING THE REFUND OF THE AMOUNT OF P500,000.00
REPRESENTING THE TIME DEPOSIT OF THE RESPONDENT WHICH
WAS ASSIGNED AS SECURITY FOR THE RESPONDENT’S CREDIT LINE
BECAUSE THE PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE
DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT UNDER ART. 1191 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 22 OF THE DISTRIBUTORSHIP
AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO
SETTLE ITS ACCOUNT IN THE AMOUNT OF P995,319.81 AND THAT THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED
ACTUAL DAMAGES IT SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE TERMINATION
OF THE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT 5) AND COMPANION
EXHIBITS WERE MERELY SPECULATIVE AND DID NOT HAVE
PROBATIVE VALUE.
(4)
THE [CA] COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN LAW FOR NOT AWARDING
TO THE PETITIONER ITS COUNTERCLAIM.9
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that respondent’s witness, Florentino Yue, Jr., a director and
officer of respondent corporation, admitted in open court that the respondent had an unpaid
obligation to petitioner in the amount of "around P900,000."10
Respondent counters that this statement was merely in answer to the question of the presiding
judge on what ground petitioner supposedly terminated the agreement. The witness was not
being asked, nor was he addressing, the truth of such ground. In fact, this witness later testified
that "(petitioner) wrote us back saying that they (had) terminated my contract and that I owe(d)
them something like P900,000."11
Petitioner’s argument is palpably without merit and deserves scant consideration. It quoted Mr.
Yue’s statement in isolation from the rest of his testimony and took it out of context. Obviously,
Yue’s statement cannot be considered a judicial admission that respondent had an unpaid
obligation of P900,000 and that the agreement had been terminated for this reason.
On the second issue, petitioner argues that the CA should not have disregarded the testimony of
petitioner’s witness, Cristina Rayos, who prepared the statement of account on the basis of the
invoices and delivery orders corresponding to the alleged overdue accounts of respondent. 12 The
CA ruled that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent indeed had unpaid accounts, saying,
among others, that the testimony of Rayos constituted incompetent evidence:
Page 393
xxx the appellee’s alleged non-payment and outstanding balance of P995,319.81 was not sufficiently
proven.
xxx xxx xxx
Anyway, the appellant’s Statement of Account showing such alleged unpaid balance is undated, and it
does not show receipt thereof by the appellee, and when, if such indeed was received. Moreover, there are
no supporting documents to sustain such unpaid accounts. The witness for the appellant who prepared the
Statement, Cristina Rayos, in fact admitted that the Invoices corresponding to the alleged overdue
accounts are not signed. Her explanation was that there were DO’s or Delivery Orders covering the
transactions. However, she did not identify the signatures appearing on the Delivery Orders marked as
Exhibits "13-A", "14-A", "15-A" and "16-A" as the persons who received the goods for the appellant. In any
case, she could not have identified the same, for she was not involved in the delivery, as she is only in
charge of the records and documents on all accounts receivables as part of her duties as Credit and
Collection Manager.13
Petitioner contends that the testimony of Rayos was an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:14
Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.1avvphil.net
Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
The provision does not apply to this case because it does not involve entries made in the course of
business. Rayos testified on a statement of account she prepared on the basis of invoices and delivery
orders which she, however, knew nothing about. She had no personal knowledge of the facts on which the
accounts were based since, admittedly, she was not involved in the delivery of goods and was merely in
charge of the records and documents of all accounts receivable as part of her duties as credit and
collection manager.15 She thus knew nothing of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the invoices and
delivery orders, i.e., whether such deliveries were in fact made in the amounts and on the dates stated, or
whether they were actually received by respondent. She was not even the credit and collection manager
during the period the agreement was in effect.16 This can only mean that she merely obtained these
documents from another without any personal knowledge of their contents.
The foregoing shows that Rayos was incompetent to testify on whether or not the invoices and delivery
orders turned over to her correctly reflected the details of the deliveries made. Thus, the CA correctly
disregarded her testimony.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Furthermore, the invoices and delivery orders presented by petitioner were self-serving. Having
generated these documents, petitioner could have easily fabricated them. Petitioner’s failure to
present any competent witness to identify the signatures and other information in those invoices
and delivery orders cast doubt on their veracity.
Petitioner next argues that respondent did not deny during the trial that it received the goods
covered by the invoices and was therefore deemed to have admitted the same. 17 This argument
cannot be taken seriously. From the very beginning, respondent’s position was that petitioner
concocted falsified charges of non-payment to justify the termination of their agreement. 18 In no
way could respondent be deemed to have admitted those deliveries.
On the third issue, petitioner questions the award of actual damages in the amount of P1,000,000
and the refund of the P500,000 time deposit, contending that it validly terminated the agreement
because of respondent’s failure to pay its overdue accounts.
As discussed above, the CA declared that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent had
unpaid accounts, thus debunking the claim of a valid termination. The CA also held petitioner
guilty of various acts which violated the provisions of the agreement. 19 Consequently, for
petitioner’s breach of the agreement, the CA awarded actual damages to respondent in the
amount of P1,000,000. Petitioner, other than claiming that it validly terminated the agreement, did
not challenge the findings of the CA that it committed various violations of the agreement. Hence,
there was legal basis for the grant of actual damages.
Petitioner asserts that the documentary evidence presented by respondent to prove actual
damages in the amount of P4,246,015.60 should not have been considered because
respondent’s complaint only prayed for an award of P1,000,000. It further contends that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the claim only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. 20
Indeed, a court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of damages upon payment of the correct
docket fees.21 In this case, it is not disputed that respondent paid docket fees based on the
amounts prayed for in its complaint. Respondent adduced evidence to prove its losses. It was
proper for the CA and the RTC to consider this evidence and award the sum of P1,000,000. Had
the courts below awarded a sum more than P1,000,000, which was the amount prayed for, an
additional filing fee would have been assessed and imposed as a lien on the judgment.22However,
the courts limited their award to the amount prayed for.
Both the RTC and CA found that respondent had satisfactorily proven the factual bases for the
damages adjudged against the petitioner. This is a factual matter binding and conclusive upon this
Court.23 It is well-settled that –
. . . findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the
Supreme Court. This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of
Page 394
Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence
on record. But there is no ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all
over again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the findings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.24
Likewise, the determination of the amount of damages commensurate with the factual findings upon which
it is based is primarily the task of the trial court. 25 Considering that the amount adjudged is not excessive,
we affirm its correctness.
Moreover, given that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent had unpaid accounts in the amount
of P995,319.81, the seizure of the P500,000 time deposit was improper. As a result, the refund of this
amount with interest is also called for.
Finally, petitioner’s counterclaims are necessarily without merit. It failed to prove the alleged outstanding
accounts of respondent. Accordingly, it is not entitled to the supposed unpaid balance of P495,319.81 with
interest.
Petitioner, being at fault and in bad faith, and there being no proof that respondent was guilty of any
wrongdoing, cannot claim moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees from respondent.
In fine, we find no error in the assailed decision and resolution of the CA. We therefore affirm them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 11, 2001 and resolution dated November 14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 57299 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998]
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
ROMERO, J.:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered
and duly proved.[1] Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount
thereof.[2] The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory damages are borne.[3] A court cannot merely rely on speculations,
conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages [4] as well as hearsay[5] or
uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.[6]Such are the jurisprudential precepts that the
Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the
waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it
collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on
this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,[7] private respondent sued
the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of
Caloocan City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos
(P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00).[8] In particular, private respondent
prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat
equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof
as attorneys fees. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired
ownership of the Petroparcel.[9]
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground
that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV.[10] Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent averred that M/V Maria
Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment
of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed.The amended complaint
also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the
replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there
should be a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the
vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities
that would thereafter be proven.[11]
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a
defendant[12] which the lower court granted in its order of September 16, 1985.[13] After petitioner
had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on February 5, 1987, the lower court
issued a pre-trial order[14] containing, among other things, a stipulations of facts, to wit:
Page 395
 1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat `M/V MARIA EFIGENIA owned by plaintiff
was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, on its way to Navotas,
Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker Petroparcel causing the former to
sink.
2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine accident and on 21
November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, the Honorable Simeon N.
Alejandro, rendered a decision finding the cause of the accident to be the reckless and
imprudent manner in which Edgardo Doruelo navigated the LSCO Petroparcel and declared
the latter vessel at fault.
3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), executed in
favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer involving several
tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which was the LSCO Petroparcel.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again entered into an
Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business properties and
other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil departments including the motor tanker
LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to PNOC STC.
5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC assumes, without
qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it obtained over the LSCO
`Petroparcel.
6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOC-STC was
executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the sea accident of 21
September 1977) was specifically identified and assumed by the latter.
7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the Ministry of
National Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt. Edgardo Doruelo and Chief
mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO `Petroparcel.
8. LSCO `Petroparcel is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt.
Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.
9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and imprudent
manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo, plaintiff suffered
actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat equipments (sic) and cargoes, which went
down with the ship when it sank the replacement value of which should be left to the sound
discretion of this Honorable Court.
After trial, the lower court[15] rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil Case No.
C-9457 as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the
plaintiff:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case against
defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private
respondent consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del
Rosario. Private respondents witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned by private
respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard showing
that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross
tonnage. According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs (baeras) of
assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with the vessel were two cummins
engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and compass. He further added that with the loss of
his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the
services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry
and P50,000.00 for commencing suit for damages in the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the
following pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled Marine Protest executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr.
on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result of the collision, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV sustained a hole at its left side that caused it to sink
with its cargo of 1,050 baeras valued at P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler issued by
Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and Construction on
January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of such
trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of
Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario
showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M,
195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost P1,160,000.00;
Page 396
 (e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D,
would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model
FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to
Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope (5 cir. X 300fl.) would
cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3 cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1)
binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of
floats, P9,000.00 or a total of P197, 150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong Associates Law
Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per appearance fee
of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of 20% of the total
amount recovered and that attorneys fee to be awarded by the court should be
given to Del Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x
100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00;
50 rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18
10kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P146,500 and banera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a
total of P414,065.00
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and
all its equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the quotations were given.
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer
any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by
private respondent were excessive and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers
in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying
that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was a sort of secret scheme. For
this reason, the lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the replacement value of
the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the
recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter with
sufficient evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily
on said witness bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, but they did not
bother at all to present any documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. Evidence to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be credible
in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower courts decision contending
that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for damages; that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming that plaintiff was entitled to
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
damages, the lower court erred in awarding an amount greater than that prayed for in the second
amended complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the issues it had raised
in its memorandum.[16] Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration
expounding on whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
despite therein plaintiffs failure to pay the prescribed docket fee. [17]
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of
merit.[18] Apparently not having received the order denying its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner still filed a motion for leave to file a reply to private respondents opposition to said
motion.[19] Hence, on February 12, 1990, the lower court denied said motion for leave to file a reply
on the ground that by the issuance of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had become
moot and academic.[20]
Unsatisfied with the lower courts decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992.[21] On petitioners
assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and
admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario
as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, it was well within his knowledge and
competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the
vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the nature of market reports or
quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court of Appeals held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of
the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which appears
to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather
than of non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124 [1899], p. 43, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p.
18). Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence
which crystallized through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective
aids in the search for truth and for the effective administration of justice. But in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on
doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial
or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court. If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can
easily be remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et
al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31, 1950; cited in Francisco, Supra). [Underscoring supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily
rebutted by appellants own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court
found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an inconsistent posture by the fact that its own
witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price
quotations) appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence. Hence, it
concluded:
Page 397
 x x x. The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of appellees
documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and which already
included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended complaint. There was
therefore no need for appellee to amend the second amended complaint in so far as to the
claim for damages is concerned to conform with the evidence presented at the trial. The
amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief prayed for in appellees second
amended complaint.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the ruling in Sun
Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion,[22] the additional docket fee that may later on be declared as still owing the
court may be enforced as a lien on the judgment.
Hence, the instant recourse.
In assailing the Court of Appeals decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 as
actual damages should have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base
such award on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no
evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost
vessel, equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the prices quoted in respondents
documentary evidence only amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondents failure to adduce evidence
to support its claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondents failure to
prove the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels. [23]
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to
impose a penalty.[24] In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. [25] There are two kinds of actual or
compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the
other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).[26] Thus:
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to
their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have
to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages
for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of
profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a
going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships,
that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements.x x x.
x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of
profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually
lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if
the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its
profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the
anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill. What the court
has to ascertain in each case is the `capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances, without, of course, taking
into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the
loss.[27] [Underscoring supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory
damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.[28] The burden of proof is on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[29] In other words, damages cannot be
presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.[30]
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondents
general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the
value of the 1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the collision
happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to
items and equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early
1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the
exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the
same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that
the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and
neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof.[31] Clearly ignoring petitioners objections to the
exhibits, the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at
the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosarios testimony. Private
respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in the
price quotations that became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price quotations
are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered
along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the
veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal
knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total
amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it
was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he
was the owner of private respondent corporation[32] whatever testimony he would give with regard
to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his
self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence [33] considering his
familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such
equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. [34] We must, therefore,
Page 398
examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosarios claim as regards the amount of PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
losses.

The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses.[35] Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but Navotas, Metro Manila
on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected
to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.[36] On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any
of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.[37]
Gentlemen:
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to commercial lists and the like under
Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered In accordance to your request, we are pleased to quote our Cummins Marine Engine, to wit.
private respondents exhibits as commercial lists. It added, however, that these exhibits should be admitted
in evidence until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp.
of this class of evidence because the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as
at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle, natural
evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.[38] Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however,
aspirated, 5 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke, 855 cu. In.
would show that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This rule
displacement, keel-cooled, electric starting coupled with
states:
Twin-Disc Marine gearbox model MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons ratio, includes oil cooler, companion flange, manual and
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published standard accessories as per attached sheet.
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
Price FOB Manila - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 580,000.00/unit
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
Total FOB Manila - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 1,160,000.00
and relied upon by them there.
vvvvvvvvv
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement
of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, T E R M S : CASH
register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.
occupation.

Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H[39] are not VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
commercial lists for these do not belong to the category of other published compilations under Section 45
aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, (w)here general words follow an enumeration of
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned.[40] The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued Very truly
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the yours,
collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on
the relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations within the purview of POWER
commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday S
professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation. [41] These are simply letters responding to Y
the queries of Del Rosario.Thus, take for example Exhibit D which reads: S
T
January 20, 1987 E

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 399

 MS,
INC
.
(Sgd.)
E. D. Daclan
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to the
general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary evidence.[42] Hence, in one
case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering an allowance for an automobile upon
purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a price current or commercial list
within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence of the value of the article specified
therein. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a commercial list even though the clerk of the dealer
testified that he had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer.[43]
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those letters
or communications when it held that unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, evidence should
better be admitted rather than rejected on doubtful or technical grounds,[44] the same pieces of evidence,
however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to point
out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
considered at all.[45] On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue.[46] Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary
weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should
be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the
contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value. Thus:
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted without
objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been admitted without objection, the same may
be considered as any other properly admitted testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no
more consideration than if it had been excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held that although
the question of admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first time on appeal, yet if the
evidence is hearsay it has no probative value and should be disregarded whether objected to
or not. `If no objection is made quoting Jones on Evidence - `it (hearsay) becomes evidence by
reason of the want of such objection even though its admission does not confer upon it any
new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic
weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct
primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask
for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. But
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.[47]
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.[48]
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives
private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German
Airlines v. Court of Appeals,[49] the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent
is `entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered. [Underscoring supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded.[50] Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, (t)he adjudication of
nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are
allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury.[51] However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall
be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the
concept and purpose of such damages.[52] The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may
also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case.[53]
Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioners
vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondents complaint claiming the amount
of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an
actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and,
therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance
payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his
complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed
compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and amended complaints
can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint
alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. [54] Private respondent should
be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioners contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private
respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay
the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint
Page 400
should not be considered as having curtailed the lower courts jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[55] the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on
the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for
damages in its amended complaint. DECISION

Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the
ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had
received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[56] participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority
in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the courts This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16,
1985,[57] petitioner did not question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989[58] when 00027 dated April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts decision that petitioner raised the question of the
August 29, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78 of Malolos, Bulacan, in
lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its
own inaction. Crim. Case No. 888-M-2000, convicting herein appellants Alberto Tabarnero (Alberto) and Gary
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G. R. Tabarnero (Gary) of the crime of Murder.
CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby
MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation
in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that:
(1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00)[59] in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto
No pronouncement as to costs.
Canatoy (Ernesto), where the former used to reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar
SO ORDERED.
(Mary Jane), Ernestos stepdaughter.Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation during which the latter

was stabbed nine times, causing his death. The versions of the prosecution and the defense
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168169
Plaintiff-Appellee, would later diverge as regards the presence of other persons at the scene and other
Present:
circumstances concerning Ernestos death.
PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - On March 3, 2000, Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the crime of Murder
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,* and in an Information which read:
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

That on or about the 23rd day of October, 1999, in the municipality

ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO, of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Accused-Appellants. Promulgated:
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
February 24, 2010 together and mutually helping each other, armed with bladed instrument and
with intent to kill one Ernesto Canatoy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 401

 and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
attack, assault and stab with the said bladed instrument the said Ernesto Canatoy, Gary was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead
hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing him serious
pipe. Ernesto was aiming at Garys head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing
physical injuries which directly caused his death.[3]
his left index finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that

point, Gary felt that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernestos back. Losing control of himself,
On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and Alberto were issued by the RTC of
Gary took the bladed weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he
Malolos, Bulacan.[4]
did so.[8]

On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay Tanod Edilberto Alarma.[5] When he was
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, saklolo, tulungan niyo po
arraigned on April 30, 2001, Gary pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. [6] During this time, Alberto
ako three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto,
remained at large.
coming. Alberto asked Gary, anak, ano ang nangyari? To which Gary responded nasaksak ko po

yata si Ka Erning, referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, allegedly out of fear.[9]
On May 21, 2001, a pre-trial conference was conducted. Therein, Gary admitted having killed

Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense. Thus, pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of the
Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he
Rules of Court, a reverse trial ensued.
and Ernesto who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill

him.[10]
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001, testified that

he stayed in Ernestos house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane were living together. Mary Jane is
Garys sister, Gemarie Tabarnero, testified that she was a childhood friend of Mary
the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife[7] of Ernesto. However, Gary left the house shortly before the
Jane. Gemarie attested that Mary Jane was Garys girlfriend from 1995 to 1999. Sometime in 1999,
October 23, 1999 incident because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter allegedly stopped
however, Gary and Mary Jane were prevented from talking to each other. During that time, Gary
the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time.
was always sad and appeared catatonic, sometimes mentioning Mary Janes name and crying.[11]
On October 23, 1999, Gary was allegedly in his house in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan at around

11:40 p.m. with his friend, Richard Ulilian; his father, co-appellant Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and his
On the night of the incident on October 23, 1999, Gemarie observed that Gary was
brother, Jeffrey.Overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernestos
crying and seemed perplexed. Gary told Gemarie that he was going to Ernestos house to talk to
house, but was not able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his
Ernesto about Mary Jane. Gary allegedly did not bring anything with him when he went to
pleas from the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and
Ernestos house.[12]
Mary Jane up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 402

 In the meantime, on August 5, 2001, Alberto was apprehended. [13] On August 20, 2001, he crime. At this time, he was already residing in Hensonville Plaza, Angeles City, Pampanga, where
[14]
pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge. However, while Albertos defense is denial and not self-defense he was assigned when his engineer, Efren Cruz, secured a project in said place. [18]

like Garys, the court decided to proceed with the reverse trial, as it had already started that way. [15]

During cross-examination, Alberto repeated that he did not return to Garys house after

Next on the witness stand was Edilberto Alarma (Alarma), who was a barangay tanod of Longos, the incident. He said that it did not occur to him to inform the authorities about the killing of

Malolos, Bulacan since February 2000. Alarma testified that while he was in a meeting at around 4:00 p.m. Ernesto. Later, Alberto learned from his sibling, whom he talked to by phone, that Gary had

on April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to surrender to him. Gary told him that he was already surrendered. He did not consider surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his

responsible for the incident [that] happened at Daang Riles. Together with his fellow barangay tanod Zaldy name, nobody would work to support his family. He said that he had no previous

Garcia, Alarma brought Gary to the Malolos Police Station, where the surrender was entered in the blotter misunderstanding with Ernesto.[19]

report.[16]

Answering questions from the court, Alberto stated that he immediately went home to

Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders, was Norzagaray because he was afraid to be implicated in the stabbing of Ernesto. It did not occur to

45 years old at the time of his testimony in September 2001. He testified that at the time of the incident, he him to stay and help Gary because he did not know where Gary proceeded after they ran

was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan. On October 23, 1999, however, he went to visit his children, Gary and away. The next time he saw Gary was three months after the incident, when Gary went to

Gemarie, in Barangay Longos, Malolos, Bulacan. Before going to sleep at 11:00 p.m., he realized that Norzagaray.[20]

Gary was not in the place where he would usually sleep. He went downstairs, thinking that Gary was just

urinating. He waited for five minutes; when Gary did not show up, he proceeded to Daang Bakal, where The first to testify for the prosecution was its eyewitness, Emerito Acibar

Gary had many friends. He walked for about 10 minutes. About 400 meters from the site of the incident, he (Emerito). Emerito, the brother of Mary Jane,[21] was inside their house in Daang Bakal, Longos,

saw Gary and asked him what happened and why he was in a hurry, to which Gary replied: Wag na Malolos, Bulacan with his brother and his stepfather, Ernesto, at around eleven oclock on the

kayong magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si Kuya Erning. Alberto and Gary ran in different night of the incident on October 23, 1999. He heard somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored

directions. Alberto passed through the railways and exited in front of the capitol compound to wait for a it. He then heard a kalabog, followed by Ernestos plea for help. Emerito was about to go outside,
[17]
jeepney going to Sta. Maria, his route toward his home in Norzagaray. but, while he was already at the door of their one-room[22] house, he saw Ernesto being held by a

certain Toning Kulit and another person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing Ernesto with fan

Alberto claims that he had no knowledge of the accusation that he conspired with Gary in killing knives.Emerito lost count of the number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto, but each inflicted

Ernesto. It was three months after the incident that he came to know that he was being charged for a more than one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. Emerito shouted for help. The four

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 403

assailants left when somebody arrived, allowing Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan
[23]
Provincial Hospital.
On cross-examination, Emerito confirmed that Gary and Mary Jane used to reside in Ernestos
house. On the date of the incident, however, Gary had already left the house, while Mary Jane had moved
to Abra with Teresita (the mother of Emerito and Mary Jane). According to Emerito, his family did not know
that Mary Jane and Gary had a relationship because they treated Gary like a member of the family.
Ernesto got mad when his wife, Teresita, found out about Gary and Mary Janes relationship. On the night
of the incident, at past 11:00 p.m., Emerito was fixing his things inside their house, when he heard
someone calling from outside, but was not sure if it was Gary. Emerito neither saw Ernesto leaving the
room, nor the fight between Ernesto and Gary. All he saw was the stabbing, which happened seven to
eight meters away from the doorway where he was standing.He was sure that there were four assailants,
two of whom went to a bridge 8 to 10 meters from the incident, where they boarded a yellow XLT-type
[24]
car.
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Ronnie Morales of the Malolos Philippine National Police testified
that he was on duty at the police station on the night of October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito
reported at the police station that Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito proceeded to the
Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very weak due to
multiple injuries. While in the presence of two doctors on duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed
him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from
Longos, Bulacan.[25]
Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified that it was already 1:00 a.m. of the following day when
he and Emerito proceeded to the hospital. As they went to the hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2
Morales that he witnessed the incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did not tell him who
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the suspects were when Emerito reported the incident, because they immediately proceeded to
the hospital, considering that the victim, Ernesto, was still alive. Ernesto was not able to affix his
signature on the Sinumpaang Salaysay[26] because he could no longer talk after the fourth
question. Answering questions from the court, SPO2 Morales further stated that he could not
remember talking to Emerito on their way to the hospital, since they were in a hurry. [27]
The government physician at the Bulacan Provincial Hospital who prepared Ernestos
death certificate, Dr. Apollo Trinidad, clarified that Ernesto died on October 25, 1999. However,
considering the admission by the defense of the fact of death, the cause thereof, and the
execution of the death certificate, the prosecution no longer questioned Dr. Trinidad on these
matters.[28]
Teresitas testimony was likewise dispensed with, in light of the admission by the
defense that she was the common-law wife of Ernesto, and that she incurred P55,600.00 in
expenses in relation to Ernestos death.[29]
On August 29, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting Gary and Alberto of the
crime of murder. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds
accused Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the Crime of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentences them to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay private complainant Teresita Acibar the
amount of P55,600.000 (sic) as actual damages[,] P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of Ernesto Canatoy[,] P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the
costs of suit.[30]
Page 404
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
Gary and Alberto appealed to this Court. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, this CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR

Court, in People v. Mateo,[31] modified the Rules of Court in so far as it provides for direct appeals from the
III.
RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE CULPABLE,
imprisonment. Pursuant thereto, this Court referred[32] the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY[35]
docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027.

The justifying circumstance of

On April 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification as regards self-defense on the part of Gary
cannot be considered
exemplary damages, disposing of the case in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,

Branch 78 dated 29 August 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded because of the
presence of treachery.[33]
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means
to prevent and repel aggression.[36]

From the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court anew when Gary and Alberto
The defense invokes the said justifying circumstance, claiming that all of the above
filed a Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2005.[34] In its Resolution on August 1, 2005, this Court required both
three elements are present in the case at bar. There was allegedly unlawful aggression on the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both parties manifested that they
part of Ernesto when the latter delivered the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the defense,
were adopting the briefs they had earlier filed with this Court.
the means Gary used to defend himself was reasonable, and the shouted professions of his

feelings for Mary Jane could not be considered provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make the
Gary and Alberto, in their brief filed in this Court before the referral of the case to the Court of
unlawful aggression.
Appeals, assigned the following errors to the RTC:

The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove
I.
the alleged unlawful aggression was Garys own testimony. Citing Casitas v. People,[37] the Court
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE of Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Garys intent to kill, and
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT GARY
TABARNERO not merely an intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the

means used by Gary to defend himself was reasonable.

II.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 405

 We agree with the Court of Appeals. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the other two essential requisites for
[38]
self-defense. As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the evidence presented by Gary to prove the alleged self-defense.[43] Having failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is

unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is insufficient and self-serving. The alleged sudden not entitled to the mitigating circumstance, even assuming the presence of the other two elements

appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with the lead pipe the very moment Gary decided to leave of self-defense.

seems to this Court to be all too convenient, considering that there was no one around to witness the start
Gary is not entitled to the
of the fight. mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender

The RTC, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, found Garys

account concerning the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto to be unconvincing. Factual The first assignment of error presents another issue for the consideration of this

findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case, are binding on Court. The defense argues that Garys yielding to Alarma should be credited as a mitigating

this Court and are entitled to great respect.[39] It also bears to emphasize that by invoking self-defense, circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Solicitor General agreed with the defense on this

Gary, in effect, admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the point. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, and held that the delay of six months[44] before

elements of the said justifying circumstance.[40] A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated surrendering negates spontaneity,[45] a requisite for voluntary surrender to be considered

where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in mitigating.

itself.[41]

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

The defense further argues that assuming that Gary is not qualified to avail of the justifying

circumstance of self-defense, he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the

incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: accused, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been

arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating
circumstances: be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites
submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to
necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases
are not attendant. save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him. [46]

We disagree. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no

self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[42] There is incomplete self-defense when the element of

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 406

 In People v. Barcimo, Jr.,[47] the pending warrant for the arrest of the accused and the latters In insisting upon Albertos innocence, the defense claims that there was no conspiracy

surrender more than one year after the incident were considered by the Court as damaging to the plea that between him and his son, Gary. The defense asserts that Alberto just happened to be near the

voluntary surrender be considered a mitigating circumstance. Thus: scene of the crime as he was looking for his son, whom he saw only after the altercation.

The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven,
The basis of Albertos conviction, however, is not solely conspiracy. A review of the
namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to proven facts shows that conspiracy need not even be proven by the prosecution in this case,
be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or since Alberto was categorically pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the assailants who
he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. In People v. Viernes [G.R. actively and directly participated in the killing of Ernesto:
No. 136733-35, 13 December 20010], we held that going to the police station to clear
ones name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Q Those 2 persons whom you saw and who stabbed your stepfather in the
evening of October 23, 1999, if they are now in court, will you be
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than able to identify them?
one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the A Yes, sir.
killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime
nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in Q Would you please point to those 2 persons?
his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending A (Witness pointing to the persons who, when asked answered to the name
warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating of Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero)
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Q What was the position of Alberto Tabarnero in that stabbing incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed last my stepfather.
The records show that Gary surrendered on April 22, 2001. [48] The commitment order
xxxx
commanding that he be detained was issued on April 24, 2001.[49] The surrender was made almost one
COURT (TO THE WITNESS):
year and six months from the October 23, 1999 incident, and almost one year and one month from
Q How many times did you see Gary stabbed your father?
the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him on March 27, 2000.[50] We, therefore, rule that the
A I cannot count how many stabs Gary made.
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Gary.
PROS. SANTIAGO:

Alberto is a principal by direct Q Was it many times or just once?

participation in the killing of Ernesto A I cannot count but more than 1.

Q How about Alberto Tabarnero, how many times did you see him stabbing
your stepfather?
A I cannot count also but he was the last one who stabbed my stepfather.[51]

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 407

 Having actually participated in the stabbing of Ernesto, it was adequately proven that Alberto is a
principal by direct participation.
Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2
Morales, that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan who stabbed
him.[52] While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible under Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by
the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid
eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the
deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents
wounds, or other relevant circumstances.[53]
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48
hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was
already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the
questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person
who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the
point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
consideration to speak the truth.[54] It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with
his body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon every remaining strength he
had just to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
The killing of Ernesto is qualified
by treachery
Emerito had testified that he saw Ernesto being held by two persons, while Gary and
Alberto were stabbing him with fan knives:
Q When you said lalabas po sana, what do you mean by that?
A I am at the door and saw what happened.
Q What did you see?
A I saw my stepfather being held by two persons and being stabbed.
Q Will you describe the appearance of your stepfather and the 2 persons
whom according to you were stabbing your stepfather at that time?
A My stepfather is lupaypay and he was being stabbed.
Q When you said lupaypay, will you describe to this Honorable Court his
position and appearance?
A When I saw my stepfather he was about to fall on the ground.
Q Could you describe their appearance?
A They were helping each other in stabbing my grandfather. (sic)
Q Those two persons whom you saw and who stabbed your stepfather in the
evening of October 23, 1999 if they are now in Court, will you be
able to identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please point to those 2 persons?
A (Witness pointing to the persons who, when asked answered to the name
of Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero)
Q What was the position of Alberto Tabarnero in that stabbing incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed last my stepfather.
Page 408
 Q What about Gary, what is his position?
A He was helping in the stabbing.
xxxx
Q What kind of weapon or instrument were used by Gary and Alberto?
A Fan knife, sir.
Q Both of them were armed by a knife?
A Yes, sir.[55]
From said testimony, it seems uncertain whether Emerito saw the very first stabbing being
thrust. Thus, the defense asseverates that since Emerito failed to see how the attack commenced, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be considered, citing People v. Amamangpang,[56] People v.
Icalla,[57] and People v. Sambulan.[58] In said three cases, this Court held that treachery cannot be
appreciated as the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.
Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon
Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less evade, the
assault.[59]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In the cases cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able to observe any
means, method or form in the execution of the killing which rendered the victim
defenseless. In Amamangpang, the first thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate on
the bamboo floor, blood oozing from his neck and about to be struck by the accused. In Icalla, the
witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing from the scene of the crime with a knife in his
hand. In Sambulan, the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with a bolo. Since, in
these cases, there was no restraint upon the victims or any other circumstance which would have
rendered them defenseless, the Court ruled that it should look into the commencement of the
attack in order to determine whether the same was done swiftly and unexpectedly. However, the
swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the defenselessness
of the victim can be ensured.
In People v. Montejo,[60] the prosecution witnesses testified that after challenging the
victim to a fight, the accused stabbed the victim in the chest while he was held in the arms by the
accused and a companion. Not requiring a swift and unexpected commencement to the attack,
the Court held:
Thus, there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a
defenseless situation, as when he was being held by the others while he
was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the accused's purpose was
ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim may offer [People v.
Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v.
Lunar, G.R. No. L-15579, May 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 119.] In the instant case,
it has been established that the accused-appellant stabbed the victim on the
chest while his companions held both of the victim's arms.
In People v. Alvarado,[61] the accused and his companions shouted to the
victim: Lumabas ka kalbo, kung matapang ka. When the victim went out of the house, the
accuseds companions held the victims hands while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling
Page 409
which should have warned the victim of a possible attack, the mere fact that the accuseds companions
held the hands of the victim while the accused stabbed him was considered by this Court to
constitute alevosia.
We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery. However, even
assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in the
Information, this circumstance was not considered in the trial court as the same is already absorbed in
treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him clearly shows
the deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked.
In People v. Gemoya,[62] we held:
Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected
or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime (People vs. Bongadillo, 234
SCRA 233 [1994]). When four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants
in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force
was purposely sought and employed. (Emphasis ours.)
In all, there is no doubt that the offense committed by the accused is murder.
The award of damages should be
modified to include civil indemnity ex
delito
In the Decision of the RTC convicting Gary and Alberto, it awarded the amount of P55,600.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Ernesto, P50,000.00 as moral damages and an
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
unidentified amount as costs of suit.[63] The Court of Appeals modified the RTC Decision by
awarding an additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of the presence
of treachery.[64]
The Solicitor General claims that the award of P55,600.00 in actual damages is not
proper, considering the lack of receipts supporting the same. However, we held in People v.
Torio[65] that:
Ordinarily, receipts should support claims of actual damages, but
where the defense does not contest the claim, it should be
granted. Accordingly, there being no objection raised by the defense on
Alma Paulos lack of receipts to support her other claims, all the amounts
testified to are accepted. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Teresita Acibars testimony was dispensed with on account of the
admission by the defense that she incurred P55,600.00 in relation to the death of Ernesto.[66] This
admission by the defense is even more binding to it than a failure on its part to object to the
testimony. We therefore sustain the award of actual damages by the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor General likewise alleges that a civil indemnity ex delito in the amount
of P50,000.00 should be awarded. Article 2206[67] of the Civil Code authorizes the award of civil
indemnity for death caused by a crime. The award of said civil indemnity is mandatory, and is
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime.[68] However, current jurisprudence have already increased the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto to P75,000.00.[69] We, therefore, award this amount to the heirs of Ernesto.
Page 410

Finally, the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00. An aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended
party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 [70] of the Civil
Code.[71]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated April
29, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellants Alberto and Gary Tabarnero are
further ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Canatoy the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
MARTURILLAS VS PEOPLE - REPEATED CASE (1. OBJECT EVIDENCE)
Petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company is a banking institution duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. In 1981, respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with
petitioner at its Soler Branch in Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement
with respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his current account and he
could draw checks on said account provided there were sufficient funds to cover them.
Furthermore, under a special arrangement with petitioner’s branch manager then, Mr.
Qui,4 respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another person’s account also
within the same branch.5Respondent availed of such arrangement several times by depositing
checks in his account and even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and
transferred them to the other account. These transactions were covered by what were known as
"debit memos" since respondent had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred. 6
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his account. As of
December 14, 1982, the overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According to petitioner,
respondent refused to heed petitioner’s repeated demands for payment. For the period December
14, 1982 to September 15, 1990, the total obligation of respondent reached P297,060.01,
inclusive of interest.7

Thus, in 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover
the P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum from September 16, 1990 until fully paid, attorney’s
G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006 fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-55605
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13.8
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs. Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He contended that the alleged
ERIC GAN, Respondent. overdraft resulted from transactions done without his knowledge and consent.

DECISION In a decision dated March 31, 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioner
was not able to prove that respondent owed it the amount claimed considering that the ledger
cards it presented were merely hearsay evidence. On petitioner’s appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
CORONA, J.:
court’s decision.

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks the reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
October 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45701, the dispositive portion of which read:

I. The honorable Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that petitioner has sufficiently proved its
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Decision now on appeal is hereby AFFIRMED in
cause of action against respondent; and that the ledger cards and the testimony of Mr. Patricio
toto.
Mercado constituted the best evidence of the transactions made by the respondent relative to his
account.
SO ORDERED.3
II. The honorable Court of Appeals erred in not applying the principle of estoppel against
The factual antecedents follow. respondent who has benefited from the special arrangement accorded to him by petitioner which
resulted in an overdraft / negative balance.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 411

III. The honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court.9
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
It is well established that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be
raised before the Supreme Court. It must be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its
function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties. Factual findings of the trial
court, especially those affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record.10
Here, both the trial court and the CA found that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondent
knowingly incurred an overdraft against his account. We see no reason to disturb this finding.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was the bookkeeper who handled the
account of respondent and recorded his transactions in a ledger. Based on this ledger, respondent
allegedly had a negative balance of P153,757.78. This resulted from transfers of funds from respondent’s
current account to another person’s account. These transfers were made under the authority of
Qui.11 Respondent categorically denied that he ever authorized these "funds transfers." 12
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that
respondent consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely showed that the transfers were
indeed made and that Qui approved them. Petitioner’s claim that respondent availed of a special
arrangement to transfer funds from his account to another person’s account was a bare allegation that was
never substantiated. Admittedly, Mercado had no personal knowledge of this arrangement.13 In fact, when
asked about the details of the alleged consent given by respondent to the transfers, he stated that he could
not remember because respondent talked to Qui and not to him. 14 Petitioner could have presented Qui
whom they alleged allowed the special arrangement with respondent. But it did not.
Neither can we accept petitioner’s argument that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred. Petitioner invokes Section
43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in corporate books required
the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 15
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to testify on the
transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the
ledger entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court. 16
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entries, particularly
those entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of
these entries. We agree entirely with the following discussion of the trial court which was affirmed
by the CA:
The plaintiff submits that the ledger cards constituted the best evidence of the transactions made
by the defendant with the bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section 43 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. There is no question that the entries in the ledgers were made by one
whose duty it was to record transactions in the ordinary or regular course of the business. But for
the entries to be prima facie evidence of the facts recorded, the Rule interpose[s] a very important
condition, one which we think is truly indispensable to the probative worth of the entries as an
exception to the hearsay rule, and that is that the entrant must be "in a position to know the facts
therein stated." Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a position to know the facts of the check deposits
and withdrawals. But the transfers of funds through the debit memos in question?
Let us be clear, at the outset, what the transactions covered by the debit memos are. They are, at
bottom, credit accommodations said to have been granted by the bank’s branch manager Mr.
[Q]ui to the defendant, and they are, therefore loans, to prove which competent testimonial or
documentary evidence must be presented. In the fac[e] of the denial by the defendant of the
existence of any such agreement, and the absence of any document reflecting it, the testimony of
a party to the transaction, i.e., Mr. [Q]ui, or of any witness to the same, would be necessary. The
plaintiff failed to explain why it did not or could not present any party or witness to the transactions,
but even if it had a reason why it could not, it is clear that the existence of the agreements cannot
be established through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for he was [not in] a position to [know] those
facts. As a subordinate, he could not have done more than record what was reported to him by his
superior the branch manager, and unless he was allowed to be privy to the latter’s dealings with
Page 412
the defendant, the information that he received and entered in the ledgers was incapable of being
confirmed by him.
There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in business records which
spring from the duty of other employees to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary course of business
are prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries,
but not when they purport to record what were independent agreements arrived at by some bank officials
and a client. In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports of the official concerned. To
permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at its own instance, to substitute the contract as proof of the
agreements with third parties, is to set a dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as an
exception to the hearsay rule only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being used as a source of undue advantage for the party
preparing them.17 (citations omitted)
Thus, petitioner did not prove that respondent had incurred a negative balance in his account.
Consequently, there was nothing to show that respondent was indebted to it in the amount
claimed.lavvphil.net
Petitioner’s next argument is that respondent was estopped from denying the claim of petitioner since he
benefited from the special arrangement accorded to him resulting in the negative balance. This must
likewise fail. The so-called special arrangement was never established. In addition, there was no evidence
that respondent benefited from it. As held by the CA:
The trial court satisfactorily explained the reason for not applying the principle of estoppel against
defendant-appellee. As held by the trial court:
"There is no scope here for the application of estoppel against the defendant-appellee, since it was not
established that he had ever received copies of the ledgers, and therefore given the opportunity to review
the correctness of the entries. As we see it, the case of the [plaintiff suffers from its failure to document its]
transactions with its clients, and it is hardly right to close our eyes to that infirmity at the expense of the
defendant-appellee."
The temporary overdraft allegedly accorded by plaintiff-appellant to defendant-appellee has not benefited
the defendant-appellee in any manner. The 3 debit memos amounting to P150,000.00 appearing on
defendant-appellee’s ledger consisted of fund transfers from and not to defendant-appellee’s account. The
transfers resulted [in] the benefit of other accounts, not that of defendant-appellee.18
In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45701 is AFFIRMED in toto.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127598. January 27, 1999]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
LEONARDO QUISUMBING AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) seeks to annul the
orders of the Secretary of labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, wherein the
Secretary required MERALCO and its rank and file union- the Meralco Workers Association
(MEWA) to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the remainder of the parties
1992-1997 CBA cycle, and to incorporate in this new CBA the Secretarys dispositions on the
disputed economic and non-economic issues.
MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of
MERALCO.
On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention to re-negotiate the
terms and conditions of their existing 1992-1997 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering
the remaining period of two years starting from December 1, 1995 to November 30,
1997.[1] MERALCO signified its willingness to re-negotiate through its letter dated October 17,
1995[2] and formed a CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. On November 10, 1995, MEWA
submitted its proposal[3] to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented a counter-proposal. Thereafter,
collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However, despite the series of meetings between
the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the parties failed to arrive at terms and
conditions acceptable to both of them.
On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-152-96, on the grounds of
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices. The NCMB then conducted a series of conciliation
meetings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Faced with the imminence of a
strike, MERALCO on May 2, 1996, filed an Urgent Petition[4] with the Department of Labor and
Page 413
Employment which was docketed as OS-AJ No. 0503[1]96 praying that the Secretary assume jurisdiction
over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking employees to go back to work.
The Labor Secretary granted the petition through its Order[5] of May 8, 1996, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute obtaining
between the parties pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Accordingly, the parties are here
enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. To speed up the resolution of the
dispute, the parties are also directed to submit their respective Position Papers within ten (10) days from
receipt.
Undersecretary Jose M. Espanol, Jr. is deputized to conduct conciliation conferences between the parties
to bridge their differences and eventually hammer out a solution that is mutually acceptable. He shall be
assisted by the Legal Service.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and on August 19, 1996, the
Secretary resolved the labor dispute through an Order,[6] containing the following awards:
ECONOMIC DEMANDS
Wage increase - P2,300.00 for the first year covering the
period from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1996
- P2,200.00 for the second year covering
the period December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1997.
Red Circle Rate (RCR) Allowance- all RCR allowances (promotional increases that go beyond the
maximum range of a job classification salary) shall be integrated into the basic salary of employees
effective December 1, 1995.
Longevity Allowance- the integration of the longevity allowance into the basic wage is denied; the present
policy is maintained.
Longevity Increase- the present longevity bonus is maintained but the bonus shall be incorporated into the
new CBA.
Sick Leave- MEWAs demand for upgrading is denied; the companys present policy is
maintained. However, those who have not used the sick leave benefit during a particular year shall be
entitled to a one-day sick leave incentive.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Sick leave reserve- the present reserve of 25 days shall be reduced to 15 days; the employee has
the option either to convert the excess of 10 days to cash or let it remain as long as he wants. In
case he opts to let it remain, he may later on convert it to cash at his retirement or separation.
Vacation Leave - MEWAs demand for upgrading denied & the companys present policy is
maintained which must be incorporated into the new CBA but scheduled vacation leave may be
rounded off to one full day at a time in case of a benefit involving a fraction of a day.
Union Leave- of MEWAs officers, directors or stewards assigned to perform union duties or
legitimate union activity is increased from 30 to 40 Mondays per month.
Maternity, Paternity and Funeral leaves- the existing policy is to be maintained and must be
incorporated in the new CBA unless a new law granting paternity leave benefit is enacted which is
superior to what the company has already granted.
Birthday Leave - unions demand is granted. If birthday falls on the employees rest day or on a
non-working holiday, the worker shall be entitled to go on leave with pay on the next working day.
Group Hospitalization & Surgical Insurance Plan (GHSIP) and Health Maintenance Plan (HMP)-
present policy is maintained insofar as the cost sharing is concerned- 70% for the Company and
30% for MEWA.
Health Maintenance Plan (HMP) for dependents - subsidized dependents increased from three to
five dependents.
Longevity Bonus- is increased from P140.00 to P200.00 for every year of service to be received
by the employee after serving the Company for 5 years.
Christmas Bonus and Special Christmas Grant- MEWAs demand of one month salary as
Christmas Bonus and two months salary as Special Christmas Grant is granted and to be
incorporated in the new CBA.
Midyear Bonus- one months pay to be included in the CBA.
Anniversary Bonus - unions demand is denied.
Christmas Gift Certificate - company has the discretion as to whether it will give it to its
employees.
Retirement Benefits:
Page 414
a. Full retirement-present policy is maintained;
b. one cavan of rice per month is granted to retirees;
c. special retirement leave and allowance-present policy is maintained;
d. HMP coverage for retirees- HMP coverage is granted to retirees who have not reached the
age of 70, with MERALCO subsidizing 100% of the monthly premium; those over 70
are entitled to not more than 30 days of hospitalization at the J.F. Cotton Hospital with
the company shouldering the entire cost.
e. HMP coverage for retirees dependents is denied
f. Monthly pension of P3,000.00 for each retiree is denied.
g. Death benefit for retirees beneficiaries is denied.
Optional retirement - unions demand is denied; present policy is maintained; employee is eligible for
optional retirement if he has rendered at least 18 years of service.
Dental, Medical and Hospitalization Benefits- grant of all the allowable medical, surgical, dental and
annual physical examination benefits, including free medicine whenever the same is not available at the
JFCH.
Resignation benefits- unions demand is denied.
Night work- union demand is denied but present policy must be incorporated in CBA.
Shortswing- work in another shift within the same day shall be considered as the employees work for the
following day and the employee shall be given additional four (4) hours straight time and the applicable
excess time premium if he works beyond 8 hours in the other shift.
High Voltage allowance- is increased from P45.00 to P55.00 to be given to any employee authorized by
the Safety Division to perform work on or near energized bare lines & bus including stockman drivers &
crane operators and other crew members on ground.
High Pole Allowance- is increased from P30.00 to P40.00 to be given to those authorized to climb poles up
to at least 60 ft. from the ground. Members of the team including stockman drivers, crane operators and
other crew members on the ground, are entitled to this benefit.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Towing Allowance- where stockmen drive tow trailers with long poles and equipment on board,
they shall be entitled to a towing allowance of P20.00 whether they perform the job on regular shift
or on overtime.
Employees Cooperative- a loan of P3 M seed money is granted to the proposed establishment of
a cooperative, payable in twenty (20) years starting one year from the start of operations.
Holdup Allowance- the union demand is denied; the present policy shall be maintained.
Meal and Lodging Allowance- shall be increased effective December 1, 1995 as follows:
Breakfast - from P25.00 to P35.00
Lunch - from P35.00 to P45.00
Dinner - from P35.00 to P45.00
Lodging - from P135.00 to P180.00 a night in all MERALCO franchise areas
Payroll Treatment for Accident while on Duty- an employee shall be paid his salary and allowance
if any is due plus average excess time for the past 12 months from the time of the accident up to
the time of full recovery and placing of the employee back to normal duty or an allowance
of P2,000.00, whichever is higher.
Housing and Equity Assistance Loan- is increased to P60,000.00; those who have already availed
of the privilege shall be allowed to get the difference.
Benefits for Collectors:
a. Company shall reduce proportionately the quota and monthly average product
level (MAPL) in terms of equivalent bill assignment when an employee is on
sick leave and paid vacation leave.
b. When required to work on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, an employee shall
receive P60.00 lunch allowance and applicable transportation allowance as
determined by the Company and shall also receive an additional
compensation to one day fixed portion in addition to lunch and transportation
allowance.
c. The collector shall be entitled to an incentive pay of P25.00 for every delinquent
account disconnected.
d. When a collector voluntarily performs other work on regular shift or overtime, he
shall be entitled to remuneration based on his computed hourly
Page 415
 compensation and the reimbursement of actually incurred transportation expenses.
e. Collectors shall be provided with bobcat belt bags every year
f. Collectors cash bond shall be deposited under his capital contribution to MESALA.
g. Collectors quota and MAPL shall be proportionately reduced during typhoons, floods,
earthquakes and other similar force majeure events when it is impossible for a
collector to perform collection work.
Political Demands:
a. Scope of the collective bargaining unit- the collective bargaining unit shall be composed of
all regular rank-and-file employees hired by the company in all its offices and
operative centers throughout its franchise area and those it may employ by reason of
expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies.
b. Union recognition and security -
i. The union shall be recognized by the Company as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees included in the bargaining unit. The
Company shall agree to meet only with Union officers and its authorized
representatives on all matters involving the Union and all issues arising from the
implementation and interpretation of the new CBA.
ii. The union shall meet with the newly regularized employees for a period not to exceed
four (4) hours, on company time, to acquaint the new regular employees of the
rights, duties and benefits of Union membership.
iii. The right of all rank-and-file employees to join the union shall be recognized in
accordance with the maintenance of membership principle as a form of union
security.
c. Transfer of assignment and job security-
i. No transfer of an employee from one position to another shall be made if motivated by
considerations of sex, race, creed, political and religious belief, seniority or union
activity.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
ii. If the transfer is due to the reorganization or decentralization, the distance
from the employees residence shall be considered unless the transfer is
accepted by the employee. If the transfer is extremely necessary, the
transfer shall be made within the offices in the same district.
iii. Personnel hired through agencies or contractors to perform the work done
by covered employees shall not exceed one month. If extension is
necessary, the union shall be informed. But the Company shall not
permanently contract out regular or permanent positions that are
necessary in the normal operation of the Company.
d. Check off Union Dues- where the union increases its dues as approved by the
Board of Directors, the Company shall check off such increase from the
salaries of union members after the union submits check off authorizations
signed by majority of the members. The Company shall honor only those
individual authorizations signed by the majority of the union members and
collectively submitted by the union to the Companys Salary Administration.
e. Payroll Reinstatement- shall be in accordance with Article 223, p. 3 of the Labor
Code.
f. Union Representation in Committees- the union is allowed to participate in policy
formulation and in the decision-making process on matters affecting their
rights and welfare, particularly in the Uniform Committee, the Safety
Committee and other committees that may be formed in the future.
Signing Bonus- P4,000.00 per member of the bargaining unit for the conclusion of the CBA
Existing benefits already granted by the Company but which are not expressly or impliedly
repealed in the new agreement shall remain subsisting and shall be included in the new
agreement to be signed by the parties effective December 1, 1995.
On August 30, 1996, MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration[7] alleging that the
Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction:
1. in awarding to MEWA a package that would cost at least P1.142 billion, a package that is
grossly excessive and exorbitant, would not be affordable to MERALCO and would imperil
its viability as a public utility affected with national interest.
Page 416
 2. in ordering the grant of a P4,500.00 wage increase, as well as a new and improved fringe benefits,
under the remaining two (2) years of the CBA for the rank-and-file employees.
3. in ordering the incorporation into the CBA of all existing employee benefits, on the one hand, and
those that MERALCO has unilaterally granted to its employees by virtue of voluntary company
policy or practice, on the other hand.
4. in granting certain political demands presented by the union.
5. in ordering the CBA to be effective December 1995 instead of August 19, 1996 when he resolved
the dispute.
MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on September 18, 1995, alleging
that the Secretary of Labor did not properly appreciate the effect of the awarded wages and benefits on
MERALCOs financial viability.
MEWA likewise filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to reconsider its Order on the wage
increase, leaves, decentralized filing of paternity and maternity leaves, bonuses, retirement benefits,
optional retirement, medical, dental and hospitalization benefits, short swing and payroll treatment. On its
political demands, MEWA asked the Secretary to rule its proposal to institute a Code of Discipline for its
members and the unions representation in the administration of the Pension Fund.
On December 28, 1996, the Secretary issued an Order[8] resolving the parties separate motions, the
modifications of the August 19, 1996 Order being highlighted hereunder:
1) Effectivity of Agreement - December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
Economic Demands
2) Wage Increase:
First year - P2,200.00 per month;
Second year - P2,200.00 per month.
3) Integration of Red Circle Rate (RCR) and Longevity Allowance into Basic Salary -the RCR allowance
shall be integrated into the basic salary of employees as of August 19, 1996 (the date of the disputed
Order).
4) Longevity Bonus - P170 per year of service starting from 10 years of continuous service.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
5) Vacation Leave - The status quo shall be maintained as to the number of vacation leave
but employees scheduled vacation may be taken one day at a time in the manner that this
has been provided in the supervisory CBA.
6) Sick Leave Reserve - is reduced to 15 days, with any excess payable at the end of the
year. The employee has the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his sick leave
credits up to 25 days for conversion to cash at retirement or separation from the service.
7) Birthday Leave - the grant of a day off when an employees birthday falls on a
non-working day is deleted.
8) Retirement Benefits for Retirees - The benefits granted shall be effective on August 19, 1996,
the date of the disputed order up to November 30, 1997, which is the date the CBA expires and
shall apply to those who are members of the bargaining unit at the time the award is made.
One sack of rice per quarter of the year shall be given to those retiring between August 19,
1996 and November 30, 1997.
On HMP Coverage for Retirees- The parties maintain the status quo, that is, with the Company
complying with the present arrangement and the obligations to retirees as is.
9) Medical, Dental and Hospitalization Benefits - The cost of medicine unavailable at the J.F.
Cotton Hospital shall be in accordance with MERALCOs Memorandum dated September 14,
1976.
10) GHSIP and HMP for Dependents - The number of dependents to be subsidized shall be
reduced from 5 to 4 provided that their premiums are proportionately increased.
11) Employees Cooperative - The original award of P3 million pesos as seed money for the
proposed Cooperative is reduced to P1.5 million pesos.
12) Shortswing - the original award is deleted.
13) Payroll Treatment for Accident on Duty - Company ordered to continue its present practice on
payroll treatment for accident on duty without need to pay the excess time the Union demanded.
Political Demands:
14) Scope of the collective bargaining unit - The bargaining unit shall be composed of all rank and
file employees hired by the Company in accordance with the original Order.
Page 417
15) Union recognition and security - The incorporation of a closed shop form of union security in
the CBA; the Company is prohibited from entertaining individuals or groups of individuals only on matters
that are exclusively within the domain of the union; the Company shall furnish the union with a complete
list of newly regularized employees within a week from regularization so that the Union can meet these
employees on the Unions and the employees own time.
16) Transfer of assignment and job security - Transfer is a prerogative of the Company but the transfer
must be for a valid business reason, made in good faith and must be reasonably exercised. The CBA shall
provide that No transfer of an employee from one position to another, without the employees written
consent, shall be made if motivated by considerations of sex, race, creed, political and religious belief, age
or union activity.
17) Contracting Out - The Company has the prerogative to contract out services provided that this move
is based on valid business reasons in accordance with law, is made in good faith, is reasonably exercised
and, provided further that if the contracting out involves more than six months, the Union must be
consulted before its implementation.
18) Check off of union dues
In any increase of union dues or contributions for mandatory activities, the union must submit to the
Company a copy of its board resolution increasing the union dues or authorizing such contributions;
If a board resolution is submitted, the Company shall deduct union dues from all union members after a
majority of the union members have submitted their individual written authorizations. Only those check-off
authorizations submitted by the union shall be honored by the Company.
With respect to special assessments, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees,
individual authorizations shall be necessary before the company may so deduct the same.
19) Union Representation in Committees - The union is granted representation in the Safety Committee,
the Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature and purpose involving personnel welfare,
rights and benefits as well as duties.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this petition contending that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his
discretion:
1). . . in awarding wage increases of P2,200.00 for 1996 and P2,200.00 for 1997;
2) . . . in awarding the following economic benefits:
a. Two months Christmas bonus;
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
b. Rice Subsidy and retirement benefits for retirees;
c. Loan for the employees cooperative;
d. Social benefits such as GHSIP and HMP for dependents, employees
cooperative and housing equity assistance loan;
e. Signing bonus;
f. Integration of the Red Circle Rate Allowance
g. Sick leave reserve of 15 days
h. The 40-day union leave;
i. High pole/high voltage and towing allowance;
and
j. Benefits for collectors
3) . . . in expanding the scope of the bargaining unit to all regular rank and file employees hired by
the company in all its offices and operating centers and those it may employ by reason of
expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies;
4) . . . in ordering for a closed shop when his original order for a maintenance of membership
arrangement was not questioned by the parties;
5) . . . in ordering that Meralco should consult the union before any contracting out for more than
six months;
6) . . . in decreeing that the union be allowed to have representation in policy and decision making
into matters affecting personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties;
7) . . . in ruling for the inclusion of all terms and conditions of employment in the collective
bargaining agreement;
8) . . . in exercising discretion in determining the retroactivity of the CBA;
Both MEWA and the Solicitor General; on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, filed their
comments to the petition. While the case was also set for oral argument on Feb 10, 1997, this
hearing was cancelled due to MERALCO not having received the comment of the opposing
parties. The parties were instead required to submit written memoranda, which they
did. Subsequently, both petitioner and private respondent MEWA also filed replies to the opposing
parties Memoranda, all of which We took into account in the resolution of this case.
The union disputes the allegation of MERALCO that the Secretary abused his discretion in
issuing the assailed orders arguing that he acted within the scope of the powers granted him by
law and by the Constitution. The union contends that any judicial review is limited to an
examination of the Secretarys decision-making/discretion - exercising process to determine if this
process was attended by some capricious or whimsical act that constitutes grave abuse; in the
Page 418
absence of such abuse, his findings - considering that he has both jurisdiction and expertise to make them
- are valid.
The unions position is anchored on two premises:
First, no reviewable abuse of discretion could have attended the Secretarys arbitral award because
the Secretary complied with constitutional norms in rendering the dispute award. The union posits that the
yardstick for comparison and for the determination of the validity of the Secretarys actions should be the
specific standards laid down by the Constitution itself. To the union, these standards include the State
policy on the promotion of workers welfare, [9] the principle of distributive justice,[10] the right of the State to
regulate the use of property,[11] the obligation of the State to protect workers, both organized and
unorganized, and insure their enjoyment of humane conditions of work and a living wage, and the right of
labor to a just share in the fruits of production.[12]
Second, no reversible abuse of discretion attended the Secretarys decision because the Secretary
took all the relevant evidence into account, judiciously weighed them, and rendered a decision based on
the facts and law. Also, the arbitral award should not be reversed given the Secretarys expertise in his field
and the general rule that findings of fact based on such expertise is generally binding on this Court.
To put matters in proper perspective, we go back to basic principles. The Secretary of Labors
statutory power under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, and, to render an award on compulsory arbitration, does not
exempt the exercise of this power from the judicial review that Sec. 1, Art. 8 of the Constitution
mandates. This constitutional provision states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
Under this constitutional mandate, every legal power of the Secretary of Labor under the Labor
Code, or, for that matter, any act of the Executive, that is attended by grave abuse of discretion is subject
to review by this Court in an appropriate proceeding.To be sure, the existence of an executive power alone
- whether granted by statute or by the Constitution - cannot exempt the executive action from judicial
oversight, interference or reversal when grave abuse of discretion is, or is alleged to be, present. This is
particularly true when constitutional norms are cited as the applicable yardsticks since this Court is the
final interpreter of the meaning and intent of the Constitution.[13]
The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labors arbitral award is not limited to a
determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretarys exercise of his statutory powers. This Court
is entitled to, and must - in the exercise of its judicial power - review the substance of the Secretarys award
when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the appreciation of and the
conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented.
The natural and ever present limitation on the Secretarys acts is, of course, the Constitution. And we
recognize that indeed the constitutional provisions the union cited are State policies on labor and social
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
justice that can serve as standards in assessing the validity of a Secretary of Labors
actions. However, we note that these provisions do not provide clear, precise and objective
standards of conduct that lend themselves to easy application. We likewise recognize that the
Constitution is not a lopsided document that only recognizes the interests of the working man; it
too protects the interests of the property owner and employer as well. [14]
For these reasons - and more importantly because a ruling on the breadth and scope of the
suggested constitutional yardsticks is not absolutely necessary in the disposition of this case - we
shall not use these yardsticks in accordance with the time-honored practice of avoiding
constitutional interpretations when a decision can be reached using non-constitutional
standards. We have repeatedly held that one of the essential requisites for a successful judicial
inquiry into constitutional questions is that the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary in deciding the case.[15]
In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available standard - and one does not
require a constitutional interpretation - is simply the standard of reasonableness. In laymans terms,
reasonableness implies the absence of arbitrariness; [16] in legal parlance, this translates into the
exercise of proper discretion and to the observance of due process. Thus, the question we have to
answer in deciding this case is whether the Secretarys actions have been reasonable in light of
the parties positions and the evidence they presented.
MEWAs second premise - i.e., that the Secretary duly considered the evidence presented -
is the main issue that we shall discuss at length below. Additionally, MEWA implied that we should
take great care before reading an abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary because of his
expertise on labor issues and because his findings of fact deserve the highest respect from this
Court.
This Court has recognized the Secretary of Labors distinct expertise in the study and
settlement of labor disputes falling under his power of compulsory arbitration. [17] It is also
well-settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial
evidence, are entitled not only to great respect but even to finality. [18] We, therefore, have no
difficulty in accepting the unions caveat on how to handle a Secretary of Labors arbitral award.
But at the same time, we also recognize the possibility that abuse of discretion may attend
the exercise of the Secretarys arbitral functions; his findings in an arbitration case are usually
based on position papers and their supporting documents (as they are in the present case), and
not on the thorough examination of the parties contending claims that may be present in a court
trial and in the face-to-face adversarial process that better insures the proper presentation and
appreciation of evidence.[19] There may also be grave abuse of discretion where the board,
tribunal or officer exercising judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the
parties.[20] Given the parties positions on the justiciability of the issues before us, the question we
have to answer is one that goes into the substance of the Secretarys disputed orders: Did the
Secretary properly consider and appreciate the evidence presented before him?
We find, based on our consideration of the parties positions and the evidence on record,
that the Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly with respect to
Page 419
the wage award. The Secretary of Labor apparently also acted arbitrarily and even whimsically in
considering a number of legal points; even the Solicitor General himself considered that the Secretary
gravely abused his discretion on at least three major points: (a) on the signing bonus issue; (b) on the
inclusion of confidential employees in the rank and file bargaining unit, and (c) in mandating a union
security closed-shop regime in the bargaining unit.
We begin with a discussion on the wages issue. The focal point in the consideration of the wage
award is the projected net income for 1996 which became the basis for the 1996 wage award, which in turn
- by extrapolation - became the basis for the (2ndYear) 1997 award. MERALCO projected that the net
operating income for 1996 was 14.7% above the 1999 level or a total net operating income of 4.171 Billion,
while the union placed the 1996 net operating income at 5.795 Billion.
MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 months of 1996 over the
same period in 1995. The union, on the other hand, projected that the 1996 income would increase by
29% to 35% because the consumption of electric power is at its highest during the last two quarters with
the advent of the Yuletide season. The union likewise relied heavily on a newspaper report citing an
estimate by an all Asia capital financial analyst that the net operating income would amount to 5.795
Billion.[21]
Based essentially on these considerations, the Secretary made the following computations and
ordered his disputed wage award:
Projected net operating
Income for 1996 5,795,000,000
Principals and interests 1,426,571,703
Dividends at 1995 rate 1,636,949,000
Net amount left with the Company 2,729,479,297
Add: Tax credit equivalent to 35% of labor cost 231,804,940
Companys net operating income 2,961,284,237
For 1997, the projected income is P7,613,612 which can easily absorb the incremental increase of P2,200
per month or a total of P4,500 during the last year of the CBA period.
xxxxxxxxx
An overriding aim is to estimate the amount that is left with the Company after the awarded wages and
benefits and the companys customary obligations are paid. This amount can be the source of an item not
found in the above computations but which the Company must provide for, that is - the amount the
company can use for expansion.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Considering the expansion plans stated in the Companys Supplement that calls for capital
expenditures of 6 billion, 6.263 billion and 5.802 billion for 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively, We
conclude that our original award of P2,300 per month for the first year and P2,200 for the second
year will still leave much by way of retained income that can be used for
expansion.[22] (Underscoring ours.)
We find after considering the records that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion in
making this wage award because he disregarded evidence on record. Where he considered
MERALCOs evidence at all, he apparently misappreciated this evidence in favor of claims that do
not have evidentiary support. To our mind, the MERALCO projection had every reason to be
reliable because it was based on actual and undisputed figures for the first six months of
1996.[23] On the other hand, the union projection was based on a speculation of Yuletide
consumption that the union failed to substantiate. In fact, as against the unions unsubstantiated
Yuletide consumption claim, MERALCO adduced evidence in the form of historical consumption
data showing that a lengthy consumption does not tend to rise during the Christmas
period.[24] Additionally, the All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a newspaper report that
did not show any specific breakdown or computations. While the union claimed that its cited figure
is based on MERALCOs 10-year income stream,[25] no data or computation of this 10-year stream
appear in the record.
While the Secretary is not expected to accept the company-offered figures wholesale in
determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of discretion to completely disregard data that
is based on actual and undisputed record of financial performance in favor of the third-hand and
unfounded claims the Secretary eventually relied upon. At the very least, the Secretary should
have properly justified his disregard of the company figures. The Secretary should have also
reasonably insured that the figure that served as the starting point for his computation had some
substantial basis.
Both parties extensely discussed the factors that the decision maker should consider in
making a wage award. While We do not seek to enumerate in this decision the factors that should
affect wage determination, we must emphasize that a collective bargaining dispute such as this
one requires due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the
dispute and of those who might be affected by the dispute. To our mind, the best way in
approaching this task holistically is to consider the available objective facts, including, where
applicable, factors such as the bargaining history of the company, the trends and amounts of
arbitrated and agreed wage awards and the companys previous CBAs, and industry trends in
general. As a rule, affordability or capacity to pay should be taken into account but cannot be the
sole yardstick in determining the wage award, especially in a public utility like MERALCO. In
considering a public utility, the decision maker must always take into account the public interest
aspects of the case; MERALCOs income and the amount of money available for operating
expenses - including labor costs - are subject to State regulation. We must also keep in mind that
high operating costs will certainly and eventually be passed on to the consuming public as
MERALCO has bluntly warned in its pleadings.
Page 420
 We take note of the middle ground approach employed by the Secretary in this case which we do 1993 1,350.00 1,682.50 332.50 24.63
not necessarily find to be the best method of resolving a wage dispute. Merely finding the midway point 1994 1,150.00 1,442.50 292.50 25.43
between the demands of the company and the union, and splitting the difference is a simplistic solution TOTAL 3,900.00 4,867.50 967.50 24.81
that fails to recognize that the parties may already be at the limits of the wage levels they can afford. It may
lead to the danger too that neither of the parties will engage in principled bargaining; the company may Based on the above-quoted table, specifically under the column RANK-AND-FILE, it is
keep its position artificially low while the union presents an artificially high position, on the fear that a easily discernible that the total wage increase of P3,800.00 for 1996 to 1997 which we are
Solomonic solution cannot be avoided. Thus, rather than encourage agreement, a middle ground granting in the instant case is significantly higher than the total increases given in 1992 to 1994, or
approach instead promotes a play safe attitude that leads to more deadlocks than to successfully a span of three (3) years, which is only P3,900.00 a month. Thus, the Secretarys grant
negotiated CBAs. of P2,200.00 monthly wage increase in the assailed order is unreasonably high a burden for
MERALCO to shoulder.
After considering the various factors the parties cited, we believe that the interests of both labor and
management are best served by a wage increase of P1,900.00 per month for the first year and We now go to the economic issues.
another P1,900.00 per month for the second year of the two-year CBA term. Our reason for this is that
these increases sufficiently protects the interest of the worker as they are roughly 15% of the monthly 1. CHRISTMAS BONUS
average salary of P11,600.00.[26] They likewise sufficiently consider the employers costs and its overall MERALCO questions the Secretarys award of Christmas bonuses on the ground that what
wage structure, while at the same time, being within the range that will not disrupt the wage trends in it had given its employees were special bonuses to mark or celebrate special occasions, such as
Philippine industries. when the Asia Money Magazine recognized MERALCO as the best managed company in
The records shows that MERALCO, throughout its long years of existence, was never remiss in its Asia. These grants were given on or about Christmas time, and the timing of the grant apparently
obligation towards its employees. In fact, as a manifestation of its strong commitment to the promotion of led the Secretary to the conclusion that what were given were Christmas bonuses given by way of
the welfare and well-being of its employees, it has consistently improved their compensation package. For a company practice on top of the legally required 13th month pay.
instance, MERALCO has granted salary increases[27] through the collective bargaining agreement the The Secretary in granting the two-month bonus, considered the following factual finding, to
amount of which since 1980 for both rank-and-file and supervisory employees were as follows: wit:
AMOUNT OF CBA INCREASES DIFFERENCE
CBA COVERAGE RANK-AND-FILE SUPERVISORY AMOUNT PERCENT We note that each of the grant mentioned in the commonly adopted table of grants has a special
description. Christmas bonuses were given in 1988 and 1989. However, the amounts of bonuses
1980 230.00 342.50 112.50 48.91%
given differed. In 1988, it was P1,500. In 1989, it was month salary.The use of Christmas bonus
1981 210.00 322.50 112.50 53.57
title stopped after 1989. In 1990, what was given was a cash gift of months salary. The grants
1982 200.00 312.50 112.50 56.25
thereafter bore different titles and were for varying amounts. Significantly, the Company explained
TOTAL 640.00 977.50 337.50 52.73
the reason for the 1995 bonuses and this explanation was not substantially contradicted by the
1983 320.00 432.50 112.50 35.16 Union.
1984 350.00 462.50 112.50 32.14
1985 370.00 482.50 112.50 30.41
What comes out from all these is that while the Company has consistently given some amount by
TOTAL 1,040.00 1,377.50 337.50 32.45
way of bonuses since 1988, these awards were not given uniformly as Christmas bonuses or
1986 860.00 972.50 112.50 13.08 special Christmas grants although they may have been given at or about Christmas time.
1987 640.00 752.50 112.50 17.58
1988 600.00 712.50 112.50 18.75
xxxxxxxxx
TOTAL 2,100.00 2,437.50 337.50 16.07
1989 1,100.00 1,212.50 112.50 10.23
1990 1,200.00 1,312.50 112.50 9.38 The Company is not therefore correct in its position that there is not established practice of giving
Christmas bonuses that has ripened to the status of being a term and condition of
1991 1,300.00 1,412.50 112.50 8.65
employment. Regardless of its nomenclature and purpose, the act of giving this bonus in the spirit
TOTAL 3,600.00 3,937.50 337.50 9.38
of Christmas has ripened into a Company practice.[28]
1992 1,400.00 1,742.50 342.50 24.46

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 421

 It is MERALCOs position that the Secretary erred when he recognized that there was an established
practice of giving a two-month Christmas bonus based on the fact that bonuses were given on or about
Christmas time. It points out that the established practice attributed to MERALCO was neither for a
considerable period of time nor identical in either amount or purpose. The purpose and title of the grants
were never the same except for the Christmas bonuses of 1988 and 1989, and were not in the same
amounts.
We do not agree.
As a rule, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation; [29] it may nevertheless be
granted on equitable consideration[30] as when the giving of such bonus has been the companys
long and regular practice.[31] To be considered a regular practice, the giving of the bonus should have
been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.[32] Thus
we have ruled in National Sugar Refineries Corporation vs. NLRC:[33]
The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed
to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring
payment thereof.
In the case at bar, the record shows the MERALCO, aside from complying with the regular
13th month bonus, has further been giving its employees an additional Christmas bonus at the tail-end of
the year since 1988. While the special bonuses differed in amount and bore different titles, it can not be
denied that these were given voluntarily and continuously on or about Christmas time. The considerable
length of time MERALCO has been giving the special grants to its employees indicates a unilateral and
voluntary act on its part, to continue giving said benefits knowing that such act was not required by law.
Indeed, a company practice favorable to the employees has been established and the payments
made by MERALCO pursuant thereto ripened into benefits enjoyed by the employees. Consequently, the
giving of the special bonus can no longer be withdrawn by the company as this would amount to a
diminution of the employees existing benefits.[34]
We can not, however, affirm the Secretarys award of a two-month special Christmas bonus to the
employees since there was no recognized company practice of giving a two-month special grant. The
two-month special bonus was given only in 1995 in recognition of the employees prompt and efficient
response during the calamities. Instead, a one-month special bonus, We believe, is sufficient, this being
merely a generous act on the part of MERALCO.
2. RICE SUBSIDY and RETIREMENT BENEFITS for RETIREES
It appears that the Secretary of Labor originally ordered the increase of the retirement pay, rice
subsidy and medical benefits of MERALCO retirees. This ruling was reconsidered based on the position
that retirees are no longer employees of the company and therefore are no longer bargaining members
who can benefit from a compulsory arbitration award. The Secretary, however, ruled that all members of
the bargaining unit who retire between August 19, 1996 and November 30, 1997 (i.e., the term of the
disputed CBA under the Secretarys disputed orders) are entitled to receive an additional rice subsidy.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The question squarely brought in this petition is whether the Secretary can issue an order
that binds the retirement fund. The company alleges that a separate and independent trust fund is
the source of retirement benefits for MERALCO retirees, while the union maintains that
MERALCO controls these funds and may therefore be compelled to improve this benefit in an
arbitral award.
The issue requires a finding of fact on the legal personality of the retirement fund. In the
absence of any evidence on record indicating the nature of the retirement funds legal personality,
we rule that the issue should be remanded to the Secretary for reception of evidence as whether
or not the MERALCO retirement fund is a separate and independent trust fund. The existence of a
separate and independent juridical entity which controls an irrevocable retirement trust fund
means that these retirement funds are beyond the scope of collective bargaining: they are
administered by an entity not a party to the collective bargaining and the funds may not be
touched without the trustees conformity.
On the other hand, MERALCO control over these funds means that MERALCO may be
compelled in the compulsory arbitration of a CBA deadlock where it is the employer, to improve
retirement benefits since retirement is a term or condition of employment that is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
3. EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE
The Secretarys disputed ruling requires MERALCO to provide the employees covered by
the bargaining unit with a loan of 1.5 Million as seed money for the employees formation of a
cooperative under the Cooperative Law, R.A. 6938. We see nothing in this law - whether
expressed or implied - that requires employers to provide funds, by loan or otherwise, that
employees can use to form a cooperative. The formation of a cooperative is a purely voluntary act
under this law, and no party in any context or relationship is required by law to set up a
cooperative or to provide the funds therefor. In the absence of such legal requirement, the
Secretary has no basis to order the grant of a 1.5 million loan to MERALCO employees for the
formation of a cooperative.Furthermore, we do not see the formation of an employees cooperative,
in the absence of an agreement by the collective bargaining parties that this is a bargainable term
or condition of employment, to be a term or condition of employment that can be imposed on the
parties on compulsory arbitration.
4. GHSIP, HMP BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS and HOUSING EQUITY LOAN
MERALCO contends that it is not bound to bargain on these benefits because these do not
relate to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment hence, the denial of
these demands cannot result in a bargaining impasse.
The GHSIP, HMP benefits for dependents and the housing equity loan have been the
subject of bargaining and arbitral awards in the past. We do not see any reason why MERALCO
should not now bargain on these benefits. Thus, we agree with the Secretarys ruling:
Page 422
x x x Additionally and more importantly, GHSIP and HMP, aside from being contributory plans, have been
the subject of previous rulings from this Office as bargainable matters. At this point, we cannot do any less
and must recognize that GHSIP and HMP are matters where the union can demand and negotiate for
improvements within the framework of the collective bargaining system. [35]
Moreover, MERALCO have long been extending these benefits to the employees and their
dependents that they now become part of the terms and conditions of employment. In fact, MERALCO
even pledged to continue giving these benefits. Hence, these benefits should be incorporated in the new
CBA.
With regard to the increase of the housing equity grant, we find P60,000.00 reasonable considering
the prevailing economic crisis.
5. SIGNING BONUS
On the signing bonus issue, we agree with the positions commonly taken by MERALCO and by the
Office of the Solicitor General that the signing bonus is a grant motivated by the goodwill generated when
a CBA is successfully negotiated and signed between the employer and the union. In the present case,
this goodwill does not exist. In the words of the Solicitor General:
When negotiations for the last two years of the 1992-1997 CBA broke down and the parties sought the
assistance of the NCMB, but which failed to reconcile their differences, and when petitioner MERALCO
bluntly invoked the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor in the resolution of the labor dispute, whatever
goodwill existed between petitioner MERALCO and respondent union disappeared. xxx.[36]
In contractual terms, a signing bonus is justified by and is the consideration paid for the goodwill that
existed in the negotiations that culminated in the signing of a CBA. Without the goodwill, the payment of a
signing bonus cannot be justified and any order for such payment, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. This is more so where the signing bonus is in the not insignificant total amount of P16 Million.
6. RED-CIRCLE-RATE ALLOWANCE
An RCR allowance is an amount, not included in the basic salary, that is granted by the company to
an employee who is promoted to a higher position grade but whose actual basic salary at the time of the
promotion already exceeds the maximum salary for the position to which he or she is promoted. As an
allowance, it applies only to specifics individuals whose salary levels are unique with respect to their new
and higher positions. It is for these reasons that MERALCO prays that it be allowed to maintain the RCR
allowance as a separate benefit and not be integrated in the basic salary.
The integration of the RCR allowance in the basic salary of the employees had consistently been
raised in the past CBAs (1989 and 1992) and in those cases, the Secretary decreed the integration of the
RCR allowance in the basic salary. We do not see any reason why it should not be included in the present
CBA. In fact, in the 1995 CBA between MERALCO and the supervisory union (FLAMES), the integration of
the RCR allowance was recognized. Thus, Sec. 4 of the CBA provides:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
All Red-Circle-Rate Allowance as of December 1, 1995 shall be integrated in the basic salary of
the covered employees who as of such date are receiving such allowance. Thereafter, the
company rules on RCR allowance shall continue to be observed/applied. [37]
For purposes of uniformity, we affirm the Secretarys order on the integration of the RCR
allowance in the basic salary of the employees.
7. SICK LEAVE RESERVE OF 15 DAYS
MERALCO assails the Secretarys reduction of the sick leave reserve benefit from 25 days
to 15 days, contending that the sick leave reserve of 15 days has reached the lowest safe level
that should be maintained to give employees sufficient buffer in the event they fall ill.
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the Secretarys ruling that the sick leave
reserve is reduced to 15 days, with any excess convertible to cash at the end of the year. The
employee has the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his sick leave credits up
to 25 days for conversion to cash at his retirement or separation from the service. This
arrangement is, in fact, beneficial to MERALCO. The latter admits that the diminution of this
reserve does not seriously affect MERALCO because whatever is in reserve are sick leave credits
that are payable to the employee upon separation from service. In fact, it may be to MERALCOs
financial interest to pay these leave credits now under present salary levels than pay them at
future higher salary levels.[38]
8. 40-DAY UNION LEAVE
MERALCO objects to the demand increase in union leave because the union leave granted
to the union is already substantial. It argues that the union has not demonstrated any real need for
additional union leave.
The thirty (30) days union leave granted by the Secretary, to our mind, constitute sufficient
time within which the union can carry out its union activities such as but not limited to the election
of union officers, selection or election of appropriate bargaining agents, conduct referendum on
union matters and other union-related matters in furtherance of union objectives. Furthermore, the
union already enjoys a special union leave with pay for union authorized representatives to attend
work education seminars, meetings, conventions and conferences where union representation is
required or necessary, and Paid-Time-off for union officers, stewards and representatives for
purpose of handling or processing grievances.
9. HIGH VOLTAGE/HIGH POLE/TOWING ALLOWANCE
MERALCO argues that there is no justification for the increase of these allowances. The
personnel concerned will not receive any additional risk during the life of the current CBA that
would justify the increase demanded by the union. In the absence of such risk, then these
personnel deserve only the same salary increase that all other members of the bargaining unit will
get as a result of the disputed CBA. MERALCO likewise assails the grant of the high voltage/high
pole allowance to members of the team who are not exposed to the high voltage/high pole
risks. The risks that justify the higher salary and the added allowance are personal to those who
Page 423
are exposed to those risks. They are not granted to a team because some members of the team are
exposed to the given risks.
The increase in the high-voltage allowance (from P45.00 to P55.00), high-pole allowance
(from P30.00 to P40.00), and towing allowance is justified considering the heavy risk the employees
concerned are exposed to. The high-voltage allowance is granted to an employee who is authorized by the
company to actually perform work on or near energized bare lines and bus, while the high-pole allowance
is given to those authorized to climb poles on a height of at least 60 feet from the ground to work
thereat. The towing allowance, on the other hand, is granted to the stockman drivers who tow trailers with
long poles and equipment on board. Based on the nature of the job of these concerned employees, it is
imperative to give them these additional allowances for taking additional risks. These increases are not
even commensurate to the danger the employees concerned are subjected to. Besides, no increase has
been given by the company since 1992.[39]
We do not, however, subscribe to the Secretarys order granting these allowances to the members of
the team who are not exposed to the given risks. The reason is obvious- no risk, no pay. To award them
the said allowances would be manifestly unfair for the company and even to those who are exposed to the
risks, as well as to the other members of the bargaining unit who do not receive the said allowances.
10. BENEFITS FOR COLLECTORS
MERALCO opposes the Secretarys grant of benefits for collectors on the ground that this is grossly
unreasonable both in scope and on the premise it is founded.
We have considered the arguments of the opposing parties regarding these benefits and find the
Secretarys ruling on the (a) lunch allowance; (b) disconnection fee for delinquent accounts; (c) voluntary
performance of other work at the instance of the Company; (d) bobcat belt bags; and (e) reduction of quota
and MAPL during typhoons and other force majeure events, reasonable considering the risks taken by the
company personnel involved, the nature of the employees functions and responsibilities and the prevailing
standard of living. We do not however subscribe to the Secretarys award on the following:
(a) Reduction of quota and MAPL when the collector is on sick leave because the previous CBA has
already provided for a reduction of this demand. There is no need to further reduce this.
(b) Deposit of cash bond at MESALA because this is no longer necessary in view of the fact that
collectors are no longer required to post a bond.
We shall now resolve the non-economic issues.
1. SCOPE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT
The Secretarys ruling on this issue states that:
a. Scope of the collective bargaining unit. The union is demanding that the collective bargaining unit shall
be composed of all regular rank and file employees hired by the company in all its offices and operating
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
centers through its franchise and those it may employ by reason of expansion, reorganization or
as a result of operational exigencies. The law is that only managerial employees are excluded
from any collective bargaining unit and supervisors are now allowed to form their own union (Art.
254 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 6715). We grant the union demand.
Both MERALCO and the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this ruling because if
disregards the rule We have established on the exclusion of confidential employee from the rank
and file bargaining unit.
In Pier 8 Arrastre vs. Confesor and General Maritime and Stevedores Union,[40] we
ruled that:
Put another way, the confidential employee does not share in the same community of interest that
might otherwise make him eligible to join his rank and file co-workers, precisely because of a
conflict in those interests.
Thus, in Metrolab Industries vs. Roldan-Confesor,[41] We ruled:
..that the Secretarys order should exclude the confidential employees from the regular rank and
file employees qualified to become members of the MEWA bargaining unit.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that employees holding a confidential position are
prohibited from joining the union of the rank and file employees.
2. ISSUE OF UNION SECURITY
The Secretary in his Order of August 19, 1996,[42] ruled that:
b. Union recognition and security. The union is proposing that it be recognized by the Company as
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees included in the
bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment. For this reason, the Company shall agree to
meet only with the Union officers and its authorized representatives on all matters involving the
Union as an organization and all issues arising from the implementation and interpretation of the
new CBA. Towards this end, the Company shall not entertain any individual or group of individuals
on matters within the exclusive domain of the Union.
Additionally, the Union is demanding that the right of all rank and file employees to join the Union
shall be recognized by the Company. Accordingly, all rank and file employees shall join the union.
xxxxxxxxx
Page 424
These demands are fairly reasonable. We grant the same in accordance with the maintenance of
membership principle as a form of union security."
The Secretary reconsidered this portion of his original order when he said in his December 28, 1996
order that:
x x x. when we decreed that all rank and file employees shall join the Union, we were actually decreeing
the incorporation of a closed shop form of union security in the CBA between the parties. In Ferrer v.
NLRC, 224 SCRA 410, the Supreme Court ruled that a CBA provision for a closed shop is a valid form of
union security and is not a restriction on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution,
citing Lirag v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87.
MERALCO objected to this ruling on the grounds that: (a) it was never questioned by the parties; (b)
there is no evidence presented that would justify the restriction on employee's union membership; and (c)
the Secretary cannot rule on the union security demand because this is not a mandatory subject for
collective bargaining agreement.
We agree with MERALCOs contention.
An examination of the records of the case shows that the union did not ask for a closed shop
security regime; the Secretary in the first instance expressly stated that a maintenance of membership
clause should govern; neither MERALCO nor MEWA raised the issue of union security in their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Secretarys first disputed order; and that despite the parties clear
acceptance of the Secretarys first ruling, the Secretary motu proprio reconsidered his maintenance of
membership ruling in favor of the more stringent union shop regime.
Under these circumstances, it is indubitably clear that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion
when he ordered a union shop in his order of December 28, 1996. The distinctions between a
maintenance of membership regime from a closed shop and their consequences in the relationship
between the union and the company are well established and need no further elaboration.
Consequently, We rule that the maintenance of membership regime should govern at MERALCO in
accordance with the Secretarys order of August 19, 1996 which neither party disputed.
3. THE CONTRACTING OUT ISSUE
This issue is limited to the validity of the requirement that the union be consulted before the
implementation of any contracting out that would last for 6 months or more. Proceeding from our ruling
in San Miguel Employees Union-PTGWO vs Bersamina,[43] (where we recognized that contracting out
of work is a proprietary right of the employer in the exercise of an inherent management prerogative) the
issue we see is whether the Secretarys consultation requirement is reasonable or unduly restrictive of the
companys management prerogative. We note that the Secretary himself has considered that management
should not be hampered in the operations of its business when he said that:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
We feel that the limitations imposed by the union advocates are too specific and may not be
applicable to the situations that the company and the union may face in the future. To our mind,
the greater risk with this type of limitation is that it will tend to curtail rather than allow the business
growth that the company and the union must aspire for. Hence, we are for the general limitations
we have stated above because they will allow a calibrated response to specific future situations
the company and the union may face.[44]
Additionally, We recognize that contracting out is not unlimited; rather, it is a prerogative
that management enjoys subject to well-defined legal limitations. As we have previously held, the
company can determine in its best business judgment whether it should contract out the
performance of some of its work for as long as the employer is motivated by good faith, and the
contracting out must not have been resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the
result of malicious or arbitrary action.[45] The Labor Code and its implementing rules also contain
specific rules governing contracting out (Department of Labor Order No. 10, May 30, 1997,
Sections. 1-25).
Given these realities, we recognize that a balance already exist in the parties relationship
with respect to contracting out; MERALCO has its legally defined and protected management
prerogatives while workers are guaranteed their own protection through specific labor provisions
and the recognition of limits to the exercise of management prerogatives. From these premises,
we can only conclude that the Secretarys added requirement only introduces an imbalance in the
parties collective bargaining relationship on a matter that the law already sufficiently
regulates. Hence, we rule that the Secretarys added requirement, being unreasonable, restrictive
and potentially disruptive should be struck down.
4. UNION REPRESENTATION IN COMMITTEES
As regards this issue, We quote with approval the holding of the Secretary in his Order of
December 28, 1996, to wit:
We see no convincing reason to modify our original Order on union representation in
committees. It reiterates what the Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Codes provides: To ensure the
participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and
welfare. Denying this opportunity to the Union is to lay the claim that only management has the
monopoly of ideas that may improve management strategies in enhancing the Companys
growth. What every company should remember is that there might be one among the Union
members who may offer productive and viable ideas on expanding the Companys business
horizons. The unions participation in such committees might just be the opportune time for
dormant ideas to come forward. So, the Company must welcome this development (see also PAL
v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. 85985, August 13, 1995). It must be understood, however, that the
committees referred to here are the Safety Committee, the Uniform Committee and other
committees of a similar nature and purpose involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as
well as duties.
Page 425
 We do not find merit in MERALCOs contention that the above-quoted ruling of the Secretary is an
intrusion into the management prerogatives of MERALCO. It is worthwhile to note that all the Union
demands and what the Secretarys order granted is that the Union be allowed to participate in policy
formulation and decision-making process on matters affecting the Union members right, duties and
welfare as required in Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Code. And this can only be done when the Union
is allowed to have representatives in the Safety Committee, Uniform Committee and other committees of a
similar nature. Certainly, such participation by the Union in the said committees is not in the nature of a
co-management control of the business of MERALCO. What is granted by the Secretary
is participation and representation. Thus, there is no impairment of management prerogatives.
5. INCLUSION OF ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THE CBA
MERALCO also decries the Secretarys ruling in both the assailed Orders that-
All other benefits being enjoyed by the companys employees but which are not expressly or impliedly
repealed in this new agreement shall remain subsisting and shall likewise be included in the new collective
bargaining agreement to be signed by the parties effective December 1, 1995.[46]
claiming that the above-quoted ruling intruded into the employers freedom to contract by ordering the
inclusion in the new CBA all other benefits presently enjoyed by the employees even if they are not
incorporated in the new CBA. This matter of inclusion, MERALCO argues, was never discussed and
agreed upon in the negotiations; nor presented as issues before the Secretary; nor were part of the
previous CBAs between the parties.
We agree with MERALCO.
The Secretary acted in excess of the discretion allowed him by law when he ordered the inclusion of
benefits, terms and conditions that the law and the parties did not intend to be reflected in their CBA.
To avoid the possible problems that the disputed orders may bring, we are constrained to rule that
only the terms and conditions already existing in the current CBA and was granted by the Secretary
(subject to the modifications decreed in this decision) should be incorporated in the CBA, and that the
Secretarys disputed orders should accordingly be modified.
6. RETROACTIVITY OF THE CBA
Finally, MERALCO also assails the Secretarys order that the effectivity of the new CBA shall retroact
to December 1, 1995, the date of the commencement of the last two years of the effectivity of the existing
CBA. This retroactive date, MERALCO argues, is contrary to the ruling of this Court in Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confessor[47] which mandates that the effective date of the new
CBA should be the date the Secretary of Labor has resolved the labor disputes.
On the other hand, MEWA supports the ruling of the Secretary on the theory that he has plenary
power and discretion to fix the date of effectivity of his arbitral award citing our ruling in St. Lukes Medical
Center, Inc. vs. Torres.[48] MEWA also contends that if the arbitral award takes effect on the date of the
Secretary Labors ruling on the parties motion for reconsideration (i.e., on December 28, 1996), an
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
anomaly situation will result when CBA would be more than the 5-year term mandated by Article
253-A of the Labor Code.
However, neither party took into account the factors necessary for a proper resolution of this
aspect. Pier 8, for instance, does not involve a mid-term negotiation similar to this case, while St.
Lukes does not take the hold over principle into account, i.e., the rule that although a CBA has
expired, it continues to have legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA has been
entered into.[49]
Article 253-A serves as the guide in determining when the effectivity of the CBA at bar is to
take effect. It provides that the representation aspect of the CBA is to be for a term of 5 years,
while
x x x [A]ll other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be re-negotiated not later
than 3 years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement entered into within 6 months from the date of expiry of the term of such
other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If such agreement is entered into beyond 6 months, the parties
shall agree on the duration of the effectivity thereof. x x x.
Under these terms, it is clear that the 5-year term requirement is specific to the
representation aspect. What the law additionally requires is that a CBA must be re-negotiated
within 3 years after its execution. It is in this re-negotiation that gives rise to the present CBA
deadlock.
If no agreement is reached within 6 months from the expiry date of the 3 years that follow
the CBA execution, the law expressly gives the parties - not anybody else - the discretion to fix the
effectivity of the agreement.
Significantly, the law does not specifically cover the situation where 6 months have elapsed
but no agreement has been reached with respect to effectivity. In this eventuality, we hold that any
provision of law should then apply for the law abhors a vacuum. [50]
One such provision is the principle of hold over, i.e., that in the absence of a new CBA, the
parties must maintain the status quo and must continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement until a new agreement is reached. [51] In this manner, the law
prevents the existence of a gap in the relationship between the collective bargaining
parties. Another legal principle that should apply is that in the absence of an agreement between
the parties, then, an arbitrated CBA takes on the nature of any judicial or quasi-judicial award; it
operates and may be executed only respectively unless there are legal justifications for its
retroactive application.
Consequently, we find no sufficient legal ground on the other justification for the retroactive
application of the disputed CBA, and therefore hold that the CBA should be effective for a term of
2 years counted from December 28, 1996 (the date of the Secretary of Labors disputed order on
the parties motion for reconsideration) up to December 27, 1999.
Page 426
 WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The parties are
directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in
the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors order of August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and
the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for
reception of evidence and determination of the legal personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.
SO ORDERED.
D. OPINION RULE
[G.R. No. 150897. April 11, 2005]
TURADIO C. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. JOSE C. DOMINGO, LEONORA DOMINGO-CASTRO and her
spouse JUANITO CASTRO, NUNCIA DOMINGO-BALABIS, ABELLA DOMINGO
VALENCERINA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision[1] dated November
26, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59331, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Judgment dated January 6,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, in Civil Case No. Q-89-3820. The trial
court dismissed herein petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-89-3820 for declaration of the nullity of a
deed of absolute sale over a house and lot located at Project 4, Quezon City.[2]
Petitioner is the oldest of the five children of the late Bruno B. Domingo, formerly the registered
owner of the properties subject of this dispute. Private respondents Leonora Domingo-Castro, Nuncia
Domingo-Balabis, Abella Domingo, and Jose Domingo are petitioners siblings. A family quarrel arose over
the validity of the purported sale of the house and lot in Project 4 by their father to private respondents.
The facts of this case, as synthesized from the findings of the trial court and affirmed by the court a
quo, are as follows:
Bruno B. Domingo, a widower and retired military man, was the registered owner, as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 128297, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, of a house
and lot with an area of 269.50 square meters, located at 34 H. Honrubia St., Project 4, Quezon City.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In December 1970, Bruno needed money for his medical expenses, so he sold said
properties. On December 28, 1970, he signed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
abovementioned properties to his children Leonora, Nuncia, Abella, and Jose for a consideration
of P10,000. The deed was witnessed by Concesa Ibaez and Linda Noroa and notarized by Atty.
Rosauro V. Noroa.[3]
Jose then brought the deed to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, as a result of which
TCT No. 128297 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. 247069 was issued in the names of the
vendees.
Bruno Domingo died on April 6, 1975.[4]
Sometime in 1981 petitioner, who by then was residing on the disputed property, received a
notice from the Quezon City Hall declaring him a squatter and directing him to demolish his shanty
on the lot. Petitioner found out that the planned demolition was at the instance of his brother, Jose
and sister, Leonora.
Sometime in 1986, petitioner learned of the existence of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale
when an ejectment suit was filed against him. Upon advice of his counsel, he had the then
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now Philippine National Police or
PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City compare the signature of Bruno on the said
deed against specimen signatures of his father. As a result, the police issued him Questioned
Document Report No. 192-86 to the effect that the questioned signature and the standard
signatures were written by two different persons. Another Questioned Document Report, No.
007-89, subsequently issued by the police came up with the same conclusion.
Petitioner filed a complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by
private individuals against his siblings and Atty. Noroa before the public prosecutor of Quezon City.
But after it conducted an examination of the questioned documents, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) came up with the conclusion that the questioned signature and the specimen
signatures were written by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. The public prosecutor
dismissed the criminal complaint on June 22, 1989. Petitioner appealed the order of dismissal to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the latter affirmed the prosecutors action. A similar criminal
complaint filed by petitioner before the public prosecutor of Manila was likewise dismissed.
On October 23, 1989, petitioner instituted Civil Case No. Q-89-3820 before the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, reconveyance of the disputed
property, and cancellation of TCT No. 247069. Petitioner alleged that Bruno B. Domingos
signature on the deed in question was forged. He likewise averred that the sale was done in
violation of the restriction annotated at the back of Brunos title, to the effect that prior approval of
the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)[5] was needed to effect any sale.
In their answer, private respondents relied heavily on the findings of the NBI that Bruno B.
Domingos signature on the deed was genuine, and hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale was not a
forgery.
On January 6, 1998, the trial court disposed of Civil Case No. Q-89-3820 in this wise:
Page 427
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered DISMISSING the complaint in this case.
All other claim/s including counterclaim/s are dismissed for lack of legal and/or factual basis.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court disregarded the conflicting reports of the police crime
laboratory and the NBI for failure of the offering party or parties to show that the standard or specimen
signatures were indeed those of Bruno B. Domingo.[7] The trial court likewise found that petitioner failed to
substantiate his claim that prior PHHC approval was needed before a valid sale of the properties in dispute
could be made.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed his appeal as
CA-G.R. CV No. 59331. He contended that the lower court erred in ruling that the vendors signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale of December 28, 1970 was not a forgery.
On January 11, 2000, petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the appellate court on the ground of
newly discovered evidence consisting of a letter of Bruno B. Domingo dated February 1, 1972 purportedly
requesting from PHHC permission to mortgage the house and lot in Project 4, Quezon City. Also on March
22, 2000, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for new trial with the Court of Appeals, attaching the letter
dated February 2, 1972, of PHHC to Bruno B. Domingo, granting the latters request on July 6, 2000.
Petitioner moved that the appellate court grant him authority to put up a sari-sari store on a portion of the
disputed lot, allegedly to augment his meager pension.
In its resolution dated December 29, 2000, the appellate court denied all foregoing motions. [8] In
denying the motions for new trial, the appellate court noted that there was no showing whatsoever that the
letter-request could not have been discovered and produced prior to the trial below by the exercise of
reasonable diligence andis of such a character as would probably change the result. [9] It likewise pointed
out that both the motion for new trial and the supplemental motion for new trial were not accompanied by
affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence. [10]
On November 26, 2001, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 59331 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, the instant petition for review interposed by petitioner grounded on the following reasons for
allowance of writ:
The declaration that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1970 was executed by Bruno B.
Domingo over the properties covered by TCT No. 128297, is not valid, proper and legal, because said
Deed of Absolute Sale was not executed by said Bruno B. Domingo, as per findings of the [PC-INP] in its
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
laboratory examination, and that the said Deed of Absolute Sale was in violation of the prohibition
annotated at the back of said title, and that the sale was done within the prohibited period of five (5)
years. Moreover, said Bruno B. Domingo should [not have] requested for authority to mortgage
the property in question from the Peoples Homesite [and] Housing Authority on February 1, 1972,
if he really sold the same in 1970.[12]
The crucial issue for our resolution is: Did the court a quo err when it held that the trial court
correctly applied the rules of evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI questioned
document reports?
Before this Court, petitioner insists that both the trial court and the appellate court should
have considered the PC-INP questioned document report as reliable, without showing any cogent
reason or sufficient arguments why said report should be deemed reliable.
Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved by the following:
(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument; [13]
(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion
thereon,[14] such opinion being an exception to the opinion rule;[15]
(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine
specimen thereof;[16] and
(4) Expert evidence.[17]
The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between the different
means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person.[18] It is likewise clear from the
foregoing that courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of
handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.[19]
In finding that the trial court correctly disregarded the PC-INP Crime Laboratory questioned
document report, the appellate court observed:
The PC-INP used as standards of comparison the alleged signatures of Bruno in two documents,
namely: letter to the Bureau of Treasury dated April 1, 1958 and Republic Bank Check No.
414356 dated November 2, 1962. These documents precede by more than eight years the
questioned Deed which was executed on December 30, 1970. This circumstance makes the
PC-INPs finding questionable.[20]
We find no reason to disagree with the Court of Appeals. The passage of time and a
persons increase in age may have decisive influence in his handwriting characteristics. Thus, in
order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be
as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. [21] As correctly found by the
appellate court, the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did not conform to
the foregoing standard. Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were
Page 428
on documents executed several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may involve
characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1970. Hence, neither the trial court nor
the appellate court may be faulted for refusing to place any weight whatsoever on the PC-INP questioned
document report.
We likewise sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning the testimonies of Clerma
Domingo, Leonora, and Jose to the effect that they saw Bruno affixing his signature to the questioned
deed.[22] They were unrebutted. Genuineness of a handwriting may be proven, under Rule 132, Section 22,
by anyone who actually saw the person write or affix his signature on a document. Petitioner has shown no
reason why the ruling made by the trial court on the credibility of the respondents witnesses below should
be disturbed by us. Findings by the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest
respect, and even finality by appellate courts, since the former is in a better position to observe their
demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[23]
Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a notarized document. Being a
public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein expressed.[24] It has the presumption of
regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.[25] Petitioner has failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 26, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59331 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117609. December 29, 1998]
HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO, represented by its Administratrix BUENCONSEJO PINEDA VDA.
DE VIVAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO SANTOS, ROSALINA
PALOMO, SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA LUI TAN, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which reversed the holding of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Civil
Case No. Q-49254, entitled Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio, et al., vs. Rosalina Palomo, vs. spouses Wilson
and Benita Lui Tan, nullified the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale, dated July 14, 1971, as falsified,
fictitious and forged, and adjudged the defendant spouses, Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan, as
purchasers/holdersin bad faith.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
As culled by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are, as follows:
Spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan are the registered owners of a 1,381.1 square meter lot
located along Quezon Blvd., Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 349788 issued by the register of
Deeds of Quezon City.
The lot was previously owned by Severa Gregorio as evidenced by TCT No. 8787 issued to her on
January 4, 1949.
Sometime in 1965, Shell company leased the lot from Severa for a period of twenty (20) years.
On September 20, 1976, Severa died intestate leaving behind three (3) legitimate children -
Buenconsejo Vivar, Jesusa aGalang and Cecilio Pineda. On March 9, 1982, Cecilio died.
In late September or October,1986, after the lease with Shell Company expired, Buenconsejo
Vivar tried to sell the lot to one Federico Ng. So she asked her son Oliver to get certified true
copies of the pertinent documents from the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Oliver was able to
secure certified true copies of (1) deed of absolute sale dated July 18,1971 executed by Severa
Gregorio in favor of Ricardo Santos; (2) deed of absolute sale dated September 17, 1986
executed by Ricardo Santos in favor of spouses Wilson and Benita Tan; and (3) deed of
assignment executed by spouses Felicisimo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson and
Benita Tan.
Buenconsejo was shocked to find that her brothers title, TCT No. 8787, was cancelled and that in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 349787 was issued to spouses Tan.
Records show that Severa Gregorio sold to Ricardo Santos 2/3 portion of the lot. Santos, in turn,
sold the same 2/3 portion to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan for P1,400,000.00.
With respect to the remaining 1/3 portion, it appears that in 1978, spouses Felicisimo and
Rosalina Palomo filed with the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City an action for a sum of
money against Jesusa Galang (Severas daughter) and her husband Victoriano Galang. The court
decided the case in favor of the Palomos. On December 20, 1978, the 1/3 undivided share of
Jesusa in the lot was sold on execution to the Palomos, being the highest bidders. The Galangs
failed to redeem the property within one year. Hence, a final deed of sale in favor of the Palomos
was confirmed by the court and recorded in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.
On September 18, 1986, the Palomos assigned to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan that 1/3 portion
of the lot for P800,000.00.
Page 429
On the same day, September 18, 1986, at the instance of spouses Tan, (1) the deed of sale between
Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos, (2) the subsequent deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and
spouses Tan and (3) the deed of assignment between spouses Palomo and spouses Tan were registered
in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Consequently, TCT No. 8787 in the name of Severa Gregorio was
cancelled and TCT No. 349788 was issued in the name of spouses Tan covering the entire lot.
On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant complaint against
spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging that the deeds of
conveyance were forged and are therefore void.
Thereafter, or on June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire records of this case
were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of the deed of sale between Severa
Gregorio and Ricardo Santos dated July 14, 1971 covering 2/3 portion of the lot; the original copy of the
deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan covering the same portion dated September 17,
1986; the original copy of the deed of assignment from spouses Palomo to spouses Tan covering 1/3
portion of the same lot dated September 18, 1986; and the original copy of TCT No. 349788 in the names
of spouses Tan were all burned.
On July 10, 1989, the trial court issued an order for the reconstitution of the records. The parties had hardly
started the reconstitution when, on September 29, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio filed an amended and/or
supplemental complaint which was admitted by the court. The supplemental matters revolved around the
signature of Severa Gregorio affixed to the July 14, 1971 deed of sale between her and Ricardo
Santos. On February 12, 1990, spouses Tan filed an answer to the amended complaint alleging that the
deed of sale was genuine and that they purchased the property in good faith.
Summons on defendant Ricardo Santos was effected through publication on May 28, June 4, and June 11,
1990. However, Santos did not file any answer. He was accordingly declared in default on September 13,
1990.
During the trial, the heirs of Gregorio presented as their witnesses Bienvenido Albacea, a Questioned
Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Dr. Wilhelmina Vibar, daughter of
Buenconsejo Vibar; and Viterbo Cahilig, Records Officer, Quezon City Register of Deeds. Spouses Tan
presented appellant Wilson Tan; Atty. Jose Ramos Sunga, counsel of spouses Tan; Records Officer
Viterbo Cahilig; and June Pangilinan, OIC of the Records Section of the Regional Trial Court in Kalookan.
Defendants Palomo did not present any evidence but adopted all the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced by spouses Tan.
On December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in this case as follows:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
1. Declaring the forged Deed of Sale purportedly signed and executed by Severa P. Gregorio in
favor of defendant Ricardo G. Santos dated July 18, 1971 conveying the subject property covered
by TCT No. 8787 null and void ab initio;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ricardo G. Santos in favor of spouses Wilson
C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan dated September 17, 1986 conveying 2/3 undivided portion of the
subject property covered by TCT No. 8787 null and void ab initio;
3. Declaring and maintaining the validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by Spouses
Felicisimo Palomo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benito Lui Tan
dated September 18, 1986 regarding 1/3 undivided portion of the subject property covered by
TCT No. 8787;
4. Declaring null and void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 349788, Quezon City Registry,
in the name of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan;
5. Declaring null and void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 349789, Quezon City Registry,
in the name of Ricardo G. Santos;
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reinstate TCT No. 8787, Quezon
City Registry, in the name of the registered owner Severa P. Gregorio including all the entries in
the memorandum of encumbrances;
7. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annotate the memorandum of encumbrance
of TCT No. 8787, the Deed of Assignment of 1/3 undivided share of spouses Felicisimo Palomo
and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan dated September 18,
1986;
8. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of P50,000.00;
9. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay and return to spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita
Lui Tan the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the subject property in the sum of P1,400,000.00 with
legal rate of interest to be computed from the date of the filing of this case until it is fully paid;
10. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan
P100,000.00 moral damages and P50,000.00 attorneys fees;
11. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan the sum
of P69,946.41 by way of reimbursement of the taxes paid for the subject property by spouses
Tan.[1]
Page 430
 From the aforesaid Decision, both the plaintiffs and defendant spouses Tan appealed to the Court of
Appeals - the plaintiffs with respect to the ruling below (a) ordering them to reimburse the spouses Tan the
sum of P69,946.41 representing unpaid realty taxes allegedly paid by the latter for the property, (b)
declaring as valid the deed of assignment between the spouses Palomo and defendant spouses Tan
over the 1/3 undivided portion of subject lot, and (c) disallowing the removal and/or demolition of whatever
improvements plaintiffs may have introduced on the property. Defendants appealed with respect to the
finding by the trial court that they were not innocent purchasers for value of the 2/3 undivided portion or
interest in the property and that the notarized Deed of Sale dated July 14, 1971 was falsified and forged.
On April 29, 1994, the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision[2] reversing
the aforementioned findings of the trial court, and disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ownership and title of spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan over the entire disputed lot are declared
valid. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants heirs of Severa Gregorio.
SO ORDERED. [3]
Hence, the appeal by the heirs of Severa Gregorio assigning as errors, that:
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT FOR THE REASON THAT WHAT
HE TESTIFIED ON IN COURT WAS A MERE XEROX COPY OF THE QUESTIONED
DEED OF SALE, AND
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT
SPOUSES TAN ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH
WITH RESPECT TO THE 2/3 PORTION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONVEYED TO THEM
BY RICARDO SANTOS.
The assignment of rights by the spouses Palomo to respondent spouses Tan over a 1/3 portion of
subject property sold on execution to the Palomos in satisfaction of a final judgment is not raised as
an issue in this appeal.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of NBI handwriting
expert Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question and concluded that the signature
thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa Gregorio, is forged. They contend that, as borne out by the
records, (1) on September 10, 1987, Albacea conducted an examination of the original copy of subject
deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the basis of
such examination, he arrived at the conclusion that the signature appearing thereon was forged; (3)
unfortunately, as a result of the fire of June 11, 1988, which destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the records of
the case were all burned including the original copy of the aforesaid deed of sale; and (4) the said original
copy of the deed of sale could not be produced in court thereby necessitating the presentation of a certified
true xerox copy thereof.[4]
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Following the ruling in U.S. vs. Gregorio[5] and Borje vs. Sandiganbayan[6], the Court of
Appeals reversed the findings by the trial court and ruled out the testimony of the NBI handwriting
expert, holding that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is sought to be proved or
disproved through comparison of standard signatures with the questioned signatures, a xerox
copy or photo copy cannot be used by the expert witness in lieu of the original. It
disregarded the expert testimony of the said witness who presented during his testimony in court
only a mere photostat (xerox) copy of the subject deed of sale.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents
are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.[7] This is especially true when the issue is that
of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence[8] and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best
evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged
signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized
upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature,
one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a
mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable
results.
Petitioners claim that what was actually examined by the NBI expert on September 10, 1987
at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was the original copy of the deed of sale
dated July 14, 1971 but a fire accident supervened preventing its introduction during trial.
This contention of petitioners is untenable. Due to the technicality of the procedure involved
in the examination of forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is
usually helpful. However, resort to questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while
probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. [9] A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such
testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgement on the issue of
authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert. In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals [10] (citing the case of Alcon vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of signatures
... is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning , e.g., quantum
physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly
much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical
issue.
Page 431
A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity and this cannot be done without the original copy being
produced in court.
Neither can we discern any sustainable basis for the second assigned error relied upon by
petitioners.
The Court of Appeals found that the petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption of good
faith which benefits defendant spouses Tan and that
At any rate, the heirs of Gregorio failed to present evidence of any dishonest purpose or moral obliquity on
the part of the spouses Tan. In fact, no bad judgment or negligence can be attributed to them because
they took the necessary steps to protect their investment.[11]
It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is
adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent
enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. In the case under examination, the burden of
proving bad faith therefore lies with petitioners (plaintiffs below) but they failed to discharge such onus
probandi. Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor
of respondents stands.
In view of the indefeasibility of a torrens title, every person dealing on registered lands may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go
beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the
property.[12] The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and
acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the
cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of
land registration.[13]
When a portion of registered property was sold and the sale was duly registered (and annotated in
the certificate of title of the vendor), the vendee technically becomes the owner of the sold portion as of the
registration of the sale although the title to said property is still in the name of the vendor.[14]
It bears stressing, however, that the indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means
to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Mere registration of sale is not good enough.
Good faith must concur with registration because otherwise registration becomes an exercise in futility.[15]
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of purchase or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of someother person in the property.[16] As good faith primarily
refers to a state of mind and is always a question of intention, evidence as to conduct and outward acts are
usually resorted to in order to arrive at a reasonable determination of the inward motive or intention. [17]
In this case, when the spouses Tan purchased the subject property from defendant Santos, the title
was clean and free from any lien and encumbrance except for the claim of the spouses Palomos by virtue
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
of a final judgment in court awarding 1/3 undivided portion of the lot to the latter. As a matter of
fact, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in agreement with the following factual findings,
to wit:
Wilson Tan testified that...they did not know or meet Severa P. Gregorio but they came across her
name in 1986 when the property was offered to them by Zapata Realty. x x x They asked for a
xerox copy of the title and they were given a xerox copy of the titlein the name of Severa Gregorio
and a Deed of Sale between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos. He verified the title in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and found the title clean except for that portion
belonging to the Palomos. So he agreed to purchase the lot at the offered price of P2,000.00 per
sq.m. x x x ( RTC Decision, p. 13)
The Court of Appeals likewise found as follows:
x x x Tan did not know the Gregorio family before he purchased the lot. He learned about the lot
being offered for sale through Zapata Realty, a professional real estate broker . Ricardo Santos
showed Tan the original 1971 deed of sale from Severa Gregorio to him (Santos) and the
duplicate original copy of her TCT No. 8787. Tan went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and satisfied himself with the authenticity of the documents shown by Santos. With
respect to the 1/3 portion, Tan had the title cleaned of all adverse claims before he purchased the
share of the Palomos. Also, before buying the lot , he visited it to check its condition. (Rollo, p.35)
Good faith is the opposite of fraud and consists of the honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.[18] From the evidence on
record, it can be gleaned that respondent spouses Tan were not personally acquainted with
Santos prior to the sale. They bought the property through a real estate broker, Zapata Realty,
and not from Santos himself. But they satisfied themselves that subject certificate of title was
clean, and of the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of sale of Santos, by personally
verifying the same with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Such verification, in fact, disclosed
that subject certificate of title was free from any adverse claim except that of the
Palomos. Respondent spouses Tan even consulted a lawyer before proceeding with the
sale. Verily, the latter were not amiss in their duty to ascertain their vendors capacity to sell the
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision appealed
from AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 166470
MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-
SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-
Page 432
VILLA ABRILLE[1] and NATIVIDAD Present: Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable
CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10
CARPIO,
years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu
CORONA, stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
- v e r s u s - BERSAMIN, JJ. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her
estate.[3] Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix
continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993,
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and
Respondent. petitioners undertook various projects involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly
purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou
x---------------------x Subdivision.[4] In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal
property[5] was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney[6](SPA) believing
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 169217 that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact
MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ- unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company
for P18,206,400.[7] Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare
SAGUN and TERESA C.
property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she
HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, could have a car and driver at her disposal.
Petitioners,
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent
Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She
-versus- confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home
and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.

Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,[2] urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp
Respondent. Promulgated: without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated
August 7, 2009 in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for
medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes
from which she was suffering several complications.[8]

Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate
from petitioners.[9] However, the demand was ignored.

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix
Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during
childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship[10] in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late
husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal
partnership.

On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus
Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille. competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal
guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 433

 They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of
executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their
respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper
subject of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among
those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the sale between Felix
and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of
limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences
with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother,
half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family.
However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a luxurious lifestyle.
When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while
she was made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the
alarming state of her health.[11] Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering
from its complications,[12] she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was
aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level
(which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and
self-administer her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,[13] the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical
and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu.
Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property
of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient
to secure Lulus P50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.[14] The motion, however, was
denied.[15]
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court
of Appeals (CA).[16] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of
the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.[17] It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to
prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care
of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents
appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them
was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound
to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.
Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.[18]
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was
provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted
from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime
Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in
Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio
subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad
because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.[19]
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus[20] in the CA
alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in
Rodriguez, Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as
her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. [21]
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a
resolution dated July 12, 2005.[22] Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who
requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians[23] regarding her mental
state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore
failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been
presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason,
Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family
Code,[24] legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support
each other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She
disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and
convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive
behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and
imaginary pets she called Michael and Madonna.[25] The November 21, 2005 medical
report[26] stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant
improvements in her behavior.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. [27] Lulu's attending physicians
spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior
and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. [28] The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence[29] establishing the person's state of mental
sanity will suffice.[30] Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,[31] persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable
of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind.
Page 434
Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the
evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take
cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.[32] We
thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety
of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.[33] We therefore affirm her appointment as
such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate
as well.[34]
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful
custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.[35] Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu,
was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have
custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of
the custody of her ward.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful
accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the
proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the
dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of
her legal guardian.
Treble costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116918 June 19, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
In an information filed before Branch 121 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City on March 8,
1994, accused-appellant Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified persons were charged with
the special complex crime of robbery with rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th of December, 1991 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping with (sic) one another, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation
employed upon the persons of MICHAEL BUENVINIDA Y SOLMAYOR, POL BONGGAT,
SHERWIN SOLMAYOR, JONATHAN BONGGAT, JUNIOR SOLMAYOR, GLORIA SOLMAYOR
and GLORIVIC BANDAYANON Y QUIAJO while the aforesaid persons were inside the house of
ERNESTO BUENVINIDA viewing television program, said accused, all armed with guns of
unknown caliber, tied the hands of the occupants of the house, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles belonging to ERNESTO
BUENVINIDA, to wit:
1. Radio Cassette Recorder worth P3,000.00
2. Assorted imported perfumes 30,000.00
3. Assorted imported canned goods 5,000.00
4. Cash money amounting to 8,000.00
5. Cash money in U.S. Dollar $1,000.00
that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with one
GLORIVIC BANDAYON Y QUIAJO, against the latter's will and without her
consent. 1
Although the two Does remained unknown and at large, appellant was arrested on March 3, 1994
for soliciting funds for a fictitious volleyball competition. 2 After his arrest, he was confined at the
Bagong Silang Sub-station detention cell for an hour and was later transferred to the Caloocan
City Jail. 3 Appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
C-46704 (94) on March 21, 1994. 4
As collated from the transcripts of the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Glorivic
Bandayanon 5 and Michael Buenvinida, 6 the indicated coverage of which yield the particular facts
hereunder narrated, the circumstances attendant to the crime charged are detailed in the
paragraphs that follow.
Page 435
Michael Buenvinida, Michelle Buenvinida, Gloria Solmayor, Sherwin Solmayor, Junior (JR) Solmayor, Paul
Bonggat, Jonathan Bonggat and Glorivic Bandayanon were in Ernesto and Cornelia Buenvinida's house
situated at Lot 25, Block 20, Wallnut St., Rainbow Village, Caloocan City when the crime was committed
on December 28, 1991.
Michael and Michelle are the children of Ernesto and Cornelia. Gloria is a sister-in-law of Cornelia who was
in the house for a visit, while Sherwin, Junior, Paul and Jonathan are Cornelia's nephews. Glorivic is a
friend of Cornelia who volunteered to look after the latter's children while she is in Sweden. Ernesto was at
the office at the time of the commission of the crime.
While the occupants of the house were watching a television show in the living room at around 6:30 P.M.,
Michael noticed a man wearing short pants and holding a handgun jump over the low fence of their house.
The man entered the house through its unlocked front door and introduced himself to the surprised group
as a policeman. The intruder then told them that Michael's father got involved in a stabbing incident in the
local basketball court. As if on cue, two men followed the first man in entering the house and promptly
thereafter covered their faces with handkerchiefs. These two were wearing long pants and also carried
handguns. The first man who entered the house did not cover his face.
With guns pointed at them, the occupants of the house were brought to the master's bedroom where they
were tied and detained by the three intruders.
Later, one of the armed men, identified by Michael as herein appellant, untied Michael and ordered him to
pull out the plugs of the appliances in the house, such as the television set, the V.H.S. player and the radio
cassette recorder. Appellant and the other masked man then began to search the house for valuables in
the living room and in the kitchen.
Meanwhile, the first man remained in the master's bedroom and found cash money, in pesos and dollars,
and bottles of perfume. The men then placed in a big bag the radio cassette player, canned goods, money
and perfumes that they had found inside the house.
Thereafter, the first intruder, whom Glorivic referred to as the mastermind of the group, returned to the
master's bedroom and asked the terrified group for jewelry's. Unable to get any jewelry, he brought
Glorivic to the children's (Michael and Michelle's) bedroom opposite the master's bedroom. Upon entering
the room, the man turned on the lights there. In the meanwhile, his two masked companions continued
looking around the house for other valuables.
Inside the bedroom, the ostensible leader of the gang untied Glorivic and ordered her to search the room
for jewelries. After Glorivic failed to find any, the man directed her to remove her clothes and pointed his
gun at Glorivic's head. Despite her pleas and cries, the man removed the shirt, long pants and underwear
of Glorivic while keeping the gun leveled at her. Shortly after, the man put the gun on top of the ironing
board beside the bed, then pushed Glorivic towards the bed and lay on top of her. Glorivic's resistance
proved to be futile as the man was able to violate her chastity.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
Before the first man could leave the room, another member of the group entered and pushed
Glorivic again to the bed when she was just about to put on her dress. Upon entering the room,
the second man's cloth cover tied around his face fell and hang around his neck. After threatening
to kill her, the man put a pillow on her face, forcibly spread Glorivic's legs and had sexual
congress with her. Glorivic would later point to appellant during the trial as this second man.
After the second man was through, the third man came in. While Glorivic was still sitting on the
bed and crying, the third man took the bed sheet and covered her face with it. Just like what his
companions did before him, the third man had sexual intercourse with Glorivic through force and
intimidation, but not without first removing the handkerchief tied over his face.
Michael was able to see the three malefactors enter and leave the room one after the other as the
door of the master's bedroom was left open. He was also able to hear Glorivic crying and her
implorations to her tormentors in the opposite room.
After the consummation of the odious act, the third man told Glorivic to dress up. Glorivic felt blood
flowing down her thighs as she put on her clothes. Thereafter, the third man tied her up and
brought her back to the company of the other occupants of the house. Michael saw Glorivic with
disheveled hair and wearing her pants turned inside out, with blood on the lower parts.
The felons left after intimating to the group by way of a threat that they were going to explode a
hand grenade. Around five minutes later, after ascertaining that the culprits had left, Michael and
the others untied each other. Thereafter, they went to the house of his father's friend located two
blocks away and, from there, they proceeded to the Urduja police detachment.
Glorivic met appellant again on March 7, 1994. Policemen came to her place of work and asked
her to come with them as they had a person in custody who they suspected to be herein appellant.
At the Caloocan City Jail, Glorivic was made to face eight detainees. She was able to readily
recognize appellant among the group because of the mole on his right cheek. Before she picked
him out from the other men, she carefully saw to it that the one she pointed out was really
appellant.
On the part of Michael, he stated that he was fetched by policemen on March 7, 1994 at his school
to make an identification at the Dagat-Dagatan police station. Appellant was with six other inmates
when they arrived at the station. Michael pointed to appellant as one of the robbers who entered
their house, after readily remembering that he was the one who ordered him to unplug the
appliances. Michael could never be mistaken in appellant's identity because he could not forget
the prominent mole and its location on appellant's right cheek.
Testifying at the trial, 7 appellant denied any participation in the robbery with rape committed in the
Buenvinida residence. Appellant claimed that it was only on March 7, 1994 that he first met
Glorivic Bandayanon and insisted that he does not know Michael Buenvinida.
Page 436
He claimed that he was in his house in Wawa, Parañaque together with his wife and children the whole
day of December 28, 1991. He moved to Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in 1993 after he was able to find
work as a mason under his brother who lives in the same district. On cross-examination, appellant denied
having visited his brother at Bagong Silang from 1991 to 1992. However, upon further questioning by the
public prosecutor, appellant admitted that he made several visits to his brother in 1991. Moreover, he
explained that it usually took him three hours to travel to Caloocan City from Parañaque by public utility
bus.
Giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and rejecting appellant's defense of
alibi, the trial court 8 found appellant guilty of the composite crime of robbery with rape. Although the
proper imposable penalty is death, 9 considering the lower court's finding of two aggravating
circumstances of nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon, appellant was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua in observance of the then constitutional prohibition against the imposition of capital punishment.
With regard to his civil liabilities, appellant was ordered to indemnify Ernesto Buenvinida in the sum of
P73,000.00 as the value of his stolen and unrecovered personal properties, and to pay Glorivic Bandaya
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus the costs of suit. 10
In this present appellate review, appellant inceptively faults the lower court for convicting him despite the
supposedly undependable and untrustworthy identification made by the eyewitnesses. He claims that
Glorivic Bandayanon and Michael Buenvinida could have been mistaken in their identification 11 because
(1) of the long interval of time before they were able to confront him; (2) his face was covered with a
handkerchief as they themselves narrated in court; and (3) they could have been so gravely terrified by the
criminal act as to have their mental faculties impaired.
When an accused assails the identification made by witnesses, he is in effect attacking the credibility of
those witnesses who referred to him as the perpetrator of the crime alleged to have been
committed. 12 The case then turns on the question of credibility.
It has long been a well-entrenched rule of evidence and procedure that the issue of credibility of witnesses
is almost invariably within the exclusive province of a trial court to determine, under the principle that the
findings of trial courts deserve respect from appellate tribunals. 13 The foregoing rule notwithstanding, we
expended considerable time and effort to thoroughly examine the records and objectively assay the
evidence before us, considering the gravity of the offense charged. However, we find no compelling
reasons to overturn the lower court's conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of the witnesses'
identification of appellant as one of the persons who robbed the house of the Buenvinidas and raped
Glorivic.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the prosecution were not only consistent with and
corroborative of each other. The transcripts of stenographic notes which we have conscientiously reviewed,
further reveal that their narrations before the lower court were delivered in a clear, coherent and
unequivocal manner.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
There was no perceptible hesitation or uncertainty on the part of Glorivic and Michael when they
unerringly identified appellant during the trial. The unhurried, studious and deliberate manner in
which appellant was identified by them in court added strength to their credibility 14 and
immeasurably fortified the case of the prosecution.
The records also show that the memory of these witnesses were not in any way affected by the
passage of two years and three months since the tragedy. Glorivic categorically stated on the
witness stand that the lapse of those years did not impair her memory and she could still identify
those who raped her. 15 Michael asserted that he could still positively identify appellant because of
the latter's mole, as well as the several opportunities of the former to take a good look at
appellant's face during the robbery, 16 and the same is true with Glorivic. Appellant's mole on his
right cheek provided a distinctive mark for recollection and which, coupled with the emotional
atmosphere during the incident, would be perpetually etched in the minds of the witnesses.
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance
of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face
and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim's minds which
cannot be easily erased from their memory. 17
While appellant claims that his face was covered during the commission of the crime, there were
providential points in time when the two witnesses were able to freely see his face and scan his
facial features closely to as to enable them to identify him later on.
Although appellant placed a pillow on her face. Glorivic declared that when the latter two offenders
raped her, their faces were no longer covered. In the case of appellant, the handkerchief on his
face fell upon his entering the room and he left it that way while he raped Glorivic. 18 And when the
latter two transgressors entered the house, their faces were then exposed and it was only when
they were already inside the house that they covered their faces with handkerchiefs. 19 These
circumstances gave Michael and Glorivic sufficient time and unimpeded opportunity to recognize
and identify appellant.
There is no evidence to show that the two eyewitnesses were so petrified with fear as to result in
subnormal sensory functions on their part. Contrarily, in a recently decided case, we held that fear
for one's life may even cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings. 20 The ample
opportunity to observe and the compelling reason to identify the wrongdoer are invaluable
physiognonomical and psychological factors for accuracy in such identification.
The records do not disclose any improper motive on the part of the witnesses to falsely point to
appellant as one of the robber-rapists. Appellant even admitted that he did not know Glorivic and
Michael prior to the commission of the crime. It is doctrinally settled that in the absence of
evidence showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper-motive, their
identification of the accused as the assailant should be given full faith and credit. 21
Page 437
Where conditions of visibility are favorable, as those obtaining in the Buenvinida residence when the
crimes were committed, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertions as to the identity of
the malefactor should be accepted as trustworthy. 22
For his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court should not have ordered him to
pay the value of the unrecovered personalties to Ernesto Buenvinida, damages to Glorivic Bandayanon,
and the costs of suit because he is not criminally liable as shown by the failure of the witnesses to properly
identify him.
We find speciosity in this second contention of appellant because such argument flows from the premise
that he is not guilty. As the trial court found, and with which we resolutely agree as already explained,
appellant is culpable beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of robbery with rape
committed in the early evening of December 28, 1991 at Caloocan City.
However, we deem worthy of elucidation the matter of the value of the items established to have been
stolen from the house of the Buenvinidas. Incidentally, appellant claims in his brief that the amounts
alleged in the information as the bases of his civil liability for robbery were just concocted and founded on
speculation and conjectures. 23
To prove the value of the burglarized properties, the prosecution presented an affidavit executed by
Ernesto Buenvinida 24 on March 7, 1994, containing a list of the stolen movables and with their
corresponding values, as now found in the information. This affidavit was identified and marked as Exhibit
H 25 for the prosecution during the testimony of SPO4 Abner Castro, 26 the police officer who conducted an
investigation of the incident on December 28, 1991. In addition to testifying on the arrest and investigation
of appellant, Castro repeated in open court the respective values of the personal properties as explained
to him by Ernesto Buenvinida and how he helped Ernesto in the preparation thereof. 27 The same was
formally offered in evidence 28 to prove, among others, the facts and amounts contained therein and as
testified to by witness Castro. Although objected to by appellant as self-serving, 29the lower court admitted
said document for the purpose for which it was offered and as part of the testimony of said witness. 30
It may be theorized, and in fact appellant in effect so postulates, that the prosecution has failed to prove
the value of the stolen properties and, for lack of evidence thereon, the civil liability therefor as adjudged by
the court below may not be sustained. It is true that the evidence presented thereon consisted of the
testimony of the investigator, Abner Castro, who based his evaluation on the report to him by Ernesto
Buenvinida. These are legal aspects worth discussing for future guidance.
While it is claimed that hearsay testimony was involved, it is actually and not necessarily so. The rule that
hearsay evidence has no probative value does not apply here, since SPO4 Abner Castro was presented
as a witness and testified on two occasions, during which he explained how the value of the stolen
properties was arrived at for purposes of the criminal prosecution. During his testimony on his investigation
report and the affidavit of Ernesto Buenvinida on the amounts involved, appellant had all the opportunity to
cross examine him on the correctness thereof; and it was this opportunity to cross-examine which negates
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
the claim that the matters testified to by the witness are hearsay. And, said documents having
been admitted as part of testimony of the policeman, they shall accordingly be given the same
weight as that to which his testimony may be entitled.
Again, even under the rule on opinions of ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items was
established. It is a standing doctrine that the opinion of a witness is admissible in evidence on
ordinary matters known to all men of common perception, such as the value of ordinary household
articles. 31 Here, the witness is not just an ordinary witness, but virtually an expert, since his work
as an investigator of crimes against property has given him both the exposure to and experience
in fixing the current value of such ordinary articles subject of the crime at bar. Incidentally, it is
significant that appellant never dared to cross-examine on the points involved, which opportunity
to cross-examine takes the testimony of Castro out of the hearsay rule, while the lack of objection
to the value placed by Castro bolsters his testimony under the cited exception to the opinion rule.
Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice, in this
case of the value of the stolen goods, because
these are matter of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. 32 The
lower court may, as it obviously did, take such judicial notice motu proprio. 33 Judicial cognizance,
which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. 34 Surely,
matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume (especially since the trial
court was presided by a lady judge) are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of
unquestionable demonstration.
Finally, as a matter of law and not on the excuse that after all appellant cannot satisfy his civil
liability, the real value of the asported properties would nonetheless be irrelevant to the criminal
liability of appellant. Insofar as the component crime of robbery is concerned, the same was
committed through violence against or intimidation of persons, and not through force upon things,
hence the value of the property subject of the crime is immaterial. 35The special complex crime of
robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his
cohorts, with all acts of rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime. The value
of the objects of the apoderamiento relates only to the civil aspect, which we have already
resolved.
One final complementary disposition is called for Victim Glorivic Bandayanon was subjected by
appellant and his co-conspirators to multiple rape, and under humiliating circumstances
equivalent to augmented ignominy since she was abused by the three accused successively and
virtually in the presence of one after the other. The award of P30,000.00 for moral damage made
by the court below should accordingly be amended.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in full, with the sole
MODIFICATION that the damages awarded to the offended party, Glorivic Bandayanon, is hereby
increased to P50,000.00.
Page 438
SO ORDERED. subject property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property[4] executed by the latter on May 25, 1992.
NANCY T. LORZANO, G.R. No. 189647 The respondent claimed that their father did not execute the said deed of sale. He
Petitioner, pointed out that the signature of their father appearing in the said deed of sale was a forgery as
Present: the same is markedly different from the real signature of Tabayag.

CARPIO, J., Further, the respondent asserted that the said deed of sale was acknowledged before a
person who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public. The deed of sale was acknowledged by
Chairperson,
the petitioner before a certain Julian P. Cabaes (Cabaes) on May 25, 1992 at Iriga City. However,
- versus - BRION, as per the Certification[5] issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC on May 16, 2002,
PEREZ, Cabaes has never been commissioned as a Notary Public for and in the Province of Camarines
SERENO, and Sur and in the Cities of Iriga and Naga.
REYES, JJ.
The respondent alleged that the petitioner purposely forged the signature of Tabayag in the said
Promulgated: deed of sale to deprive him and their other siblings of their share in the subject property. He then
averred that the subject property was already covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
JUAN TABAYAG, JR.,
1786[6] issued by the Register of Deeds of Iriga City on January 9, 2001 registered under the
Respondent. February 6, 2012 name of the petitioner. OCT No. 1786 was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 051716 which was
procured by the petitioner on June 24, 1996.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x For her part, the petitioner maintained she is the owner of the subject parcel of land having
purchased the same from Tabayag as evidenced by the May 25, 1992 deed of sale. Further, the
petitioner asserted that the respondent failed to establish that the signature of Tabayag appearing
on the said deed of sale was a forgery considering that it was not submitted for examination by a
DECISION handwriting expert.

REYES, J.: The RTC Decision

Nature of the Petition On April 28, 2006, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision[7] the decretal portion of
which reads:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Nancy T. Lorzano
(petitioner) assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated March 18, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
September 16, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 87762 entitled Juan Tabayag, Jr. v. Nancy T. Lorzano.
a. Declaring the supposed Deed of Sale null and void and of no
legal effect;
The Antecedent Facts
b. Ordering the [petitioner] to reconvey to the heirs of the late
The instant case stemmed from an amended complaint [3] for annulment of document and Juan Tabayag, Sr. the land subject matter of this case[;]
reconveyance filed by Juan Tabayag, Jr. (respondent) against the petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No.
Ir-3286, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City. c. Declaring the property described in the complaint and in the
spurious deed of sale to be owned in common by the heirs of
The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan Tabayag (Tabayag) Juan Tabayag, Sr. as part of their inheritance from said Juan
who died on June 2, 1992. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Sto. Domingo, Iriga City (subject Tabayag, Sr[.];
property). Right after the burial of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she
be allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject property until after her d. Ordering [petitioner] to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred
eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioners siblings acceded to the said request. Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)by way of moral damages;

After the petitioners eldest son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them the e. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the attorneys fees in the
possession of the subject property so that they could partition it among themselves. However, the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00), based on
petitioner refused to relinquish her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased the quantum meruit;

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 439


f. Dismissing the counterclaim for lack of merit[;]
g. Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The RTC opined that a cursory comparison between the signature of Tabayag appearing on the
said deed of sale and his signatures appearing on other documents would clearly yield a conclusion that
the former was indeed a forgery. Moreover, the RTC asserted that the nullity of the said May 25, 1992
deed of sale all the more becomes glaring considering that the same was purportedly acknowledged
before a person who is not a duly commissioned Notary Public.
The CA Decision
Thereafter, the petitioner appealed the decision with the CA. On March 18, 2009, the CA
rendered the assailed decision affirming in toto the RTC decision.[9] The CA held that the testimony of a
handwriting expert in this case is not indispensable as the similarity and dissimilarity between the
questioned signature of Tabayag as compared to other signatures of the latter in other documents could
be determined by a visual comparison.
Further, the CA upheld the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the
respondent as the petitioners conduct caused great concern and anxiety to the respondent and that the
latter had to go to court and retain the services of counsel to pursue his rights and protect his interests.
Undaunted, the petitioner instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari before this Court
asserting the following: (1) the questioned signature of Tabayag in the May 25, 1992 deed of sale could
not be declared spurious unless first examined and declared to be so by a handwriting expert; (2)
considering that the subject property was registered under the petitioners name pursuant to a free patent,
reconveyance of the same in favor of the respondent is improper since only the Government, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), could assail her title thereto in an action for reversion; and (3) the
respondent is not entitled to an award for moral damages and attorneys fees.
In his Comment,[10] the respondent claimed that the issues raised in the instant petition are
factual in nature and, hence, could not be passed upon by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Likewise, the respondent asserted that the petitioners free patent, having been
issued on the basis of a falsified document, does not create a right over the subject property in her favor.
Issues
In sum, the threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the lower courts erred in
declaring the May 25, 1992 deed of sale a nullity; (b) whether an action for reconveyance is proper in the
instant case; and (c) whether the respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
First and Third Issues: Nullity of the Deed of Sale and Award of Moral Damages and Attorneys Fees
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
This Court shall jointly discuss the first and third issues as the resolution of the same
are interrelated.
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[11]
That the signature of Tabayag in the May 25, 1992 deed of sale was a forgery is a
conclusion derived by the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon this
Court as it involves the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, which is a matter not for this Court
to resolve.[12] Where a petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by
the CA regarding the existence of forgery is a question of fact. [13]
In any case, the CA aptly ruled that a handwriting expert is not indispensable to prove
that the signature of Tabayag in the questioned deed of sale was indeed a forgery. It is true that
the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the experts function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. Handwriting
experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical
procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
as to its authenticity.[14]
For the same reason, we would ordinarily disregard the petitioners allegation as to the
propriety of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the respondent as it is a
question of fact. Thus, questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to
justify the award of damages or whether or not there was a causal connection between the given
set of facts and the damage suffered by the private complainant or whether or not the act from
which civil liability might arise exists are questions of fact.[15]
Essentially, the petitioner is questioning the award of moral damages and attorneys
fees in favor of the respondent as the same is supposedly not fully supported by evidence.
However, in the final analysis, the question of whether the said award is fully supported by
evidence is a factual question as it would necessitate whether the evidence adduced in support of
the same has any probative value. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[16]
Nevertheless, a review of the amount of moral damages actually awarded by the lower courts in
favor of the respondent is necessary.
Here, the lower courts ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00. We find the said amount to be excessive.
Moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant.
Rather, these are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
Page 440
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering that resulted by reason of the defendants
culpable action. The purpose of such damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or
correction. In other words, the award thereof is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; therefore, it must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
proportional to the wrong committed.[17]
Accordingly, the amount of moral damages must be reduced to P30,000.00, an amount reasonably
commensurate to the injury sustained by the respondent.
Second Issue: Propriety of the Reconveyance of the Subject Property to the Heirs of the late Juan
Tabayag
The petitioner asserted that the CA erred in not finding that her ownership over the subject property was by
virtue of a free patent issued by the government and, thus, even assuming that the subject deed of sale is
invalid, her title and ownership of the subject property cannot be divested or much less ordered
reconveyed to the heirs of Tabayag.
Simply put, the petitioner points out that the subject property, being acquired by her through a grant of free
patent from the government, originally belonged to the public domain. As such, the lower courts could not
order the reconveyance of the subject property to the heirs of Tabayag as the latter are not the original
owners thereof. If at all, the subject property could only be ordered reverted to the public domain.
An issue cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal as it is already barred
by estoppel.
This Court notes that the foregoing argument is being raised by the petitioner for the first time in
the instant petition. It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised
in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court,
as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.[18]
Accordingly, the petitioners attack on the propriety of the action for reconveyance in this case
ought to be disregarded. However, in order to obviate any lingering doubt on the resolution of the issues
involved in the instant case, this Court would proceed to discuss the cogency of the petitioners foregoing
argument.
Title emanating from a free patent
fraudulently secured does not become
indefeasible.
The petitioner asserts that the amended complaint for annulment of document, reconveyance and
damages that was filed by the respondent with the RTC is a collateral attack on her title over the subject
property. She avers that, when the said amended compliant was filed, more than a year had already
lapsed since OCT No. 1786 over the subject property was issued under her name. Thus, the petitioner
maintains that her title over the subject property is already indefeasible and, hence, could not be attacked
collaterally.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
We do not agree.
A Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; is not the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares of land; has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
agricultural public land subject to disposition, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6940; and has paid the real taxes thereon while the same has not been occupied
by any person.[19]
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land
covered thereby ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property, and the
Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of such issuance.[20] However, a title emanating from a free patent which was
secured through fraud does not become indefeasible, precisely because the patent from whence
the title sprung is itself void and of no effect whatsoever. [21]
On this point, our ruling in Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.[22] is instructive:
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title [is]
issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the
patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However,
this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System
is not a mode of acquiring ownership.[23] (citations omitted)
A fraudulently acquired free
patent may only be assailed by
the government in an action for
reversion.
Nonetheless, a free patent that was fraudulently acquired, and the certificate of title
issued pursuant to the same, may only be assailed by the government in an action for reversion
pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[24] In Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio
Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc.,[25] this Court pointed out that:
It is also to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring
title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State
should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized
officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any
such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other
officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for
the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to
disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired,
if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had
Page 441
 been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion
may be filed by the Government.[26]
In Kayaban, et al. v. Republic, et al.,[27] this Court explained the reason for the rule that only the
government, through the OSG, upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands, may bring an action
assailing a certificate of title issued pursuant to a fraudulently acquired free patent:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the corresponding free
patents in their favor in his capacity as administrator of the disposable lands of the
public domain, the action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least
with his prior authority and consent.[28]
An action for reconveyance is proper in
this case.
However, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. A recognized exception is that situation
where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant public land unlawfully and in breach of
trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust.[29]
A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title
thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who
secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. [30]
In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda,[31] we stated that if a patent had already been issued through fraud or
mistake and has been registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration
is an action for reconveyance, thus:
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the
granting of the patent or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The
purpose is not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent
statements were made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was
given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and
occupants of the property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it can
be instituted within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code,
as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the
patent here has already been issued, the land has the character of registered property
in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act
No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been injured by the fraudulent
registration is an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds,
92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)[32]
In the same vein, in Quiiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[33] we stressed that:
The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason in a
1953 decision, Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: The sole remedy
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree,
not to set aside the decree, as was done in the instant case, but, respecting
the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages." Such a doctrine goes back to the 1919 landmark decision
of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it were otherwise the institution
of registration would, to quote from Justice Torres, serve "as a protecting
mantle to cover and shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then Justice,
later Chief Justice, Bengzon: "A different view would encourage fraud and
permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another." It
would indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under the
circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as having lost his
right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one thing to protect an innocent
third party; it is entirely a different matter, and one devoid of justification, if
[deceit] would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of
his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions
coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to
be guarded against. So it has been before; so it should continue to
be.[34] (citations omitted)
Here, the respondent, in filing the amended complaint for annulment of documents,
reconveyance and damages, was not seeking a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or
the decree issued in the registration proceedings. What the respondent sought was the
reconveyance of the subject property to the heirs of the late Tabayag on account of the fraud
committed by the petitioner. Thus, the lower courts did not err in upholding the respondents right
to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. To hold otherwise would be to make
the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud.
That the subject property was not registered under the name of the heirs of Tabayag
prior to the issuance of OCT No. 1786 in the name of the petitioner would not effectively deny the
remedy of reconveyance to the former. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.[35]
It cannot be gainsaid that the heirs of Tabayag, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, had already acquired a vested right over the subject property. An open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial
by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessors whereby the land ceases to be public, to become private property, at least by
presumption.[36] Hence, the right of the heirs of Tabayag to ask for the reconveyance of the subject
property is irrefutable.
At this juncture, we deem it necessary to reiterate our disquisition in Naval v. Court of
Appeals,[37] thus:
The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate
to vest ownership upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a
Page 442
 mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership
or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud;
neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in
favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in
trust for another person by the registered owner.[38] (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated March 18, 2009 and Resolution dated September 16, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 87762 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is ordered to pay
the respondent moral damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
E. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
[G.R. No. 139070. May 29, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in
Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98), which sentenced accused-appellant Noel Lee to death for the murder of
Joseph Marquez.
On May 27, 1998, an Information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with the crime of
murder committed as follows:
th
That on or about the 29 day of September 1996, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one JOSEPH
MARQUEZ y LAGANDI, with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical
injuries, which ultimately caused the victims death.
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented
the following witnesses: (a) Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr. Darwin Corpuz, a
resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a police
officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
The prosecution established the following facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29,
1996, Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the living
room of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house
was an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people
and activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other was a store
catering to customers. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on
television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her,
Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their house and the television was to his
right. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To her complete
surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She
looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun
aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and
simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and
three (3) shots more two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were fired,
Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the
direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for
help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital
where he later died.
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the shooting incident.
Herminia told them that her son was shot by Noel Lee. From the hospital, Herminia went to the St.
Martin Funeral Homes where Josephs body was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the
Caloocan City Police Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the shooting. [2]
Upon request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem examination was made on
Josephs body. Dr. Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service made the following findings:
FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. Conjunctiva are pale, Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic. A needle
puncture mark was noted at the dorsum of the right hand.
Page 443
HEAD:
(1) Gunshot wound, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, just right of the anterior midline, 161 cm from
heel, with an upbraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm superiorly and laterally, 0.1 cm medially and inferiorly
directed posteriorwards, downwards and to the left fracturing the frontal bone, lacerating the brain. A
deformed slug was recovered embedded at the left cerebral hemisphere of the brain.
(2) Gunshot wound, occipital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, 2 cm left of the posterior midline, 162 cm
from heel, with a uniform 0.2 cm upbraded collar, directed slightly anteriorwards, downwards and
lateralwards, fracturing the occipital bone and lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was recovered at the
left auricular region.
(3) Contusion, right eyebrow, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline.
There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles and positive for alcoholic odor.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wounds. Head.[3]
At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by the Santos Enterprises Freight Services
earning P250.00 a day.[4] He left behind two children by his live-in partner who are now under his mothers
care and support. Herminia spent approximately P90,000.00 for the funeral and burial expenses of her
deceased son. The expenses were supported by receipts[5] and admitted by the defense.[6]
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant. The complaint, docketed as I.S. No.
96-3246, was however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence in a Resolution dated December 4, 1996 by
Prosecutor Dionisio C. Sison with the approval of Caloocan City Prosecutor Rosauro J.
Silverio.[7] Herminia appealed the order of dismissal to the Secretary of Justice. In a letter dated March 16,
1998, Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III reversed and set aside the appealed Resolution and ordered
the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City to file an information for murder against the
accused-appellant.[8] Accordingly, the Information was filed and a warrant of arrest issued against
accused-appellant on June 8, 1998. On October 16, 1998, appellant was arrested by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in
1989.[9]
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor;
and (b) himself. He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
of September 29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de Castro St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. He was having some drinks with his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver,
Nelson Columba. They were enjoying themselves, drinking and singing with the videoke. Also in
the house were his wife, children and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando and Nelson went
home and accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following
day and learned that Joseph Marquez, a neighbor, was shot to death. To appellants surprise, he
was tagged as Josephs killer.[10]
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two
blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six
days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car
trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victims bad reputation,
appellant presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo
Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the
letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked
on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might
not just steal but kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.[11]
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984
and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims
desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his
crime.[12]
In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty and
sentenced him to the penalty of death. The court also ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the
victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P90,000.00, moral damages
of P60,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the prosecution having established beyond an
iota of doubt the guilt of accused NOEL LEE of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, this court, in view of the
presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling and without any mitigating
circumstance to offset it, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH; to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to pay the
private complainant actual damages of P90,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages
of P60,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively; and to pay the costs.
Consistent with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, let the entire records hereof including the complete transcripts of stenographic notes
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within the reglementary
period set forth in said section.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Page 444
 Hence, this appeal. Before us, accused-appellant assigns the following errors: Herminias testimony on direct examination is as follows:

I xxx

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE SELF-SERVING
AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY OF THE MOTHER OF THE VICTIM, HERMINIA
MARQUEZ, WHOSE NARRATION OF THE CHAIN OF OCCURRENCE THAT LED TO THE
DEATH OF JOSEPH MARQUEZ WAS BEYOND BELIEF.
ATTY. OPENA: Now who was your companion, if any, at that time?
WITNESS: Me and my son, Joseph Marquez, and the wife upstairs putting the baby to sleep.
Q: What were you and your son, Joseph, doing then?

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HASTILY TAGGING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, NOEL LEE, AS THE ASSAILANT BASED MERELY ON THE
BIASED DECLARATION OF THE MOTHER WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE SHADY
CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM AGAINST WHOM OTHERS MIGHT HAVE AN AXE TO
GRIND.
A: Watching TV.
Q: Will you please tell us your position, I am referring to you and your son in relation to the
television set where you are watching the show.
A: We were facing each other while watching television which is on the left side.
Q: Will you please tell us where exactly was your son, Joseph, seated while watching
television?

A: At the end most of the sofa.

III
Q: The sofa you are referring to is the one near the window.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION OF FINDING GUILT ON THE A: Yes, sir. Dikit lang po.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT EVEN RAISING A FINGER IN SATISFYING ITSELF
THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINING IN 1996 ARE STILL PREVAILING IN 1999 Q: Will you give us an idea or describe to us that window which you mentioned awhile ago?
WHEN THE CASE WAS TRIED ON THE MERITS SO AS TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY
A: Transparent glass.
OF THE ASSAILANT BEYOND DOUBT.
Q: How high is it from the ground?
IV
COURT: Which one?

THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING WITH LENIENCY HERMINIA ATTY. OPENA: The window glass?
MARQUEZS VACILLATION WITH RESPECT TO THE BUTAS NG BINTANA AS
CONTAINED IN HER SWORN STATEMENT AND THE BUKAS NA BINTANA AS PER HER WITNESS: About three feet from the ground.
REPAIRED TESTIMONYA SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ANOMALY THAT ASSAULTED THE ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Q: You said three feet. What do you mean by that? Is that window elevated from the ground?
V A: The same height as this court window which is about three feet from the ground, and from
one another about four by four window [sic], three feet by the ground.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF
DEATH UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE OBVIOUS REASONABLE DOUBT.[14] Q: Now, you demonstrated by showing a portion, you mean to tell us that window was
mounted on a concrete or hollow block?

The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the credibility of Herminia Marquez, the lone A: Hollow block, po.
prosecution eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court should not have accepted Herminias
testimony because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent. Q: How high is that hollow block that you were referring to?

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 445

 COURT: She said three feet. Q: And after your son was slumped, what did you do?

ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS: A: I went to my son and carried him to take him to the hospital.

Q: Which is higher, that sofa which is posted near the window or the hollow block? Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Hollow block. A: Five shots.

Q: By how many inches or feet? Q: That was prior to helping your son?

A: About half a foot. A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said the sofa was long. Will you please tell us in what portion of your sofa your son Joseph was Q: And how many times was your son hit?
seated?
ATTY. VARGAS:
ATTY. VARGAS: Already answered, your Honor. She said dulo, end of the sofa.
Q: Objection, your honor. It was already answered. Because according to her it was five
COURT: Sustained. shots.

ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS: COURT: It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the witness may answer.

Q: When you said end of sofa which portion, the left side or the right side? WITNESS: Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the sofa and one shot on the cement.

A: The right. COURT: How about the other one?

Q: Now, while you and your son were watching television, was there anything unusual that transpired? A: Doon po sa semento.

A: Yes, sir. ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:

Q: Tell us what was that all about. Q: And who fired these shots?

A: Mayroon po akong napansin na kamay na nakatutok sa anak ko. Nakita ko po si Noel Lee na A: Noel Lee.
nakatayo sa may bintana.
Q: That Noel Lee that you are referring to, will you please point at him if he is around?
Q: What do you mean by the word kamay?
A: (Witness going down the witness stand and pointing to accused Noel Lee).
A: Hawak hawak po niya iyong baril, nakatutok po sa anak ko.
Q: How do you know that it was Noel Lee who shot your son?
Q: What did you do with what you saw?
A: Kitang kita ko po. Magkatapat po kami.
A: Nakita ko pong gumanoon siya, sumilip na ganoon, sabay putok ng baril. Tumingin po siya sa may
bintana, ganoon po, sabay putok ng baril. Q: Will you please describe to us?

COURT: You said he turned the head. Who turned the head? Sino ang gumanyan sa sinabi mo? A: Maliwanag po kasi ang ilaw. Maliwanag din po sa labas, may nananahi doon. Nandoon po
kaming dalawa ng anak ko nanonood ng television. (Witness sobbing in tears).
A: (Witness demonstrating that the victim peeped through the window). Napakasakit sa akin. Hindi ko man lang naipagtanggol and anak ko.

Q: And then? COURT: She was emotionally upset.

A: At the same time the firing of the gun [sic] and I saw my son slumped. ATTY. OPENA: Ill just make it on record that the witness was emotionally upset. May I ask if
she can still testify?
ATTY. OPENA TO THE WITNESS:

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 446

 xxxxxxxxx counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet she stuck to her testimony given in
the direct examination. She readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the physical
WITNESS: Masakit lang po sa loob ko ang pagkawala ng anak ko. arrangement of the sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa, the wall and the window,
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS: because the crime happened right in her own living room. She explained that she was unable to
warn Joseph because she was shocked by the sight of accused-appellant aiming a gun at her son.
Q: You saw that the light was bright. Where were those lights coming from? The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the time she took hold of herself, her son had been shot
dead.
A: Maliwanag po sa loob ng bahay namin dahil may fluorescent na bilog. Saka sa labas may nananahi
po doon sa alley katapat ng bahay namin. At saka po doon sa kabila, tindahan po tapat po A sons death in his mothers house and in her presence is a painful and agonizing
namin, kaya maliwanag ang ilaw. experience that is not easy for a mother to forget, even with the passing of time. Herminias
testimony shows that she was living with a conscience that haunted and blamed her own self for
Q: After trying to help your son, what happened? failing to protect her son or, at least, save him from death.
A: I was able to hold on to my son up to the door. Upon reaching the door, I asked the help of my Nonetheless, accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness testimony. In
kumpare. her affidavit of September 30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia declared that while
she and Joseph were watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her son. The
Q: Meanwhile, what did the accused do after shooting five times?
hand and the gun came out of a hole in the window, i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-examination,
A: He ran to the alley to go home. Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., bukas na bintana.
According to accused-appellant, this inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be repaired by
Q: Now you said he ran to an alley towards the direction of their house. Do you know where his house her statement on the witness stand.
is located?
The inconsistency between her affidavit and her testimony was satisfactorily explained by
A: Yes, sir. 142 M. de Castro Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Herminia on cross-examination:
Q: How far is that from your residence? xxxxxxxxx
A: More or less 150 to 200 meters. ATTY. VARGAS
Q: Where did you finally bring your son? Q: You said that you saw a hand from a hole in the window with a gun, is that correct?
A: MCU. A: Bukas na bintana. Not from a hole but from an open window.
Q: When you say MCU, are you referring to MCU Hospital? Q: Madam witness, do you recall having executed a sworn statement before the police, right
after the shooting of your son?
A: Yes, sir. MCU Hospital.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At MCU, life-saving devices were attached to my son. Later, after reaching 11:00, he died.
Q: I will read to you paragraph 8 of your statement which is already marked as your Exhibit A
COURT: 11:00 P.M.?
in which is stated as follows: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang buong pangyayari? Answer:
A: Yes, maam. Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996 habang ang aking anak
ay nanonood ng palabas sa TV ng basketball malapit sa kanyang bintana sa labas at
Q: Same day? ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo malayo ng konti sa
kanya, mayroon akong napansin na kamay na may hawak ng baril at nakaumang sa
A: Yes, maam.
aking anak sa may butas ng bintana, do you recall that?
x x x x x x x x x.[15]
A: Opo.
Herminias testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her narration of the
Q: What you saw from that butas is a hand with a gun, is that correct?
shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her sons death. She was subjected by defense

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 447

 A: Opo.
Q: Madam witness, your window is just like the window of this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your testimony, you did not mention what part of the window was that hand holding a gun that
you saw? Is that correct?
A: Hindi naman po butas, kundi bukas na bintana. Nakabukas iyong bintana namin.
Q: So in your sinumpaang salaysay in the statement that you said butas na bintana is not correct?
A: Mali ho kasi, hindi ko na napansin iyan, kasi ito napansin ko, kinorect ko.
COURT: You show to the witness. There, butas na bintana.
WITNESS: Mali po ang letra, Bukas hindi butas.
x x x x x x x x x.[16]
Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and the gun coming
out of the open window, not from a hole in the window. In her direct testimony, Herminia presented a
photograph of her living room just the way it looked from her side on the night of the shooting. [17] The sofa
on which Joseph was seated is against the wall, with the window a few inches above the wall. The window
is made of transparent glass with six (6) vertical glass panes pushing outwards. The entire window is
enclosed by iron grills with big spaces in between the grills. The living room is well-lit and the area outside
the house is also lit by a fluorescent lamp.
Between Herminias testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency therein
does not necessarily discredit the witness.[18] Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court
declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and
inaccurate.[19] Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that transpired.[20] They are usually not prepared
by the affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own language in
taking the affiants statements.[21]
Accused-appellant argues that since Herminia declared in her affidavit that she saw a hand coming
from the window, she did not see the person holding the gun, let alone who fired it.[22] A complete reading
of the pertinent portion of Herminias affidavit will refute appellants arguments, viz:
xxxxxxxxx
T- Isalaysay mo nga sa akin and buong pangyayari?
S Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi, petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996, habang ang aking anak ay nanonood
ng palabas sa T.V. ng basketball malapit sa aming bintanan [sic] sa labas, at ako naman ay nakaupo sa
EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases)
sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo malayo ng kaunti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin akong
[sic] kamay na hawak-hawak na baril na nakaumang sa aking anak sa butas na bintana na
nakaawang, maya-maya ng kaunti ay nakarinig na ako ng putok at ang unang putok ay tumama
sa ulo ng aking anak kaya napayuko siya, pagkatapos noon ay sunod-sunod na ang putok na
narinig ko, mga limang beses, kaya kitang kita ko siya ng lapitan ko ang aking anak at nakita
ko itong si NOEL LEE, pagkatapos noon ay tumakbo na ito papalabas ng iskinita papunta
sa kanila.
x x x x x x x x x.[23]
It is thus clear that when Herminia approached her son, she saw that the person firing the
gun was accused-appellant. Appellant continued firing and then ran away towards the direction of
his house. This account is not inconsistent with the witness testimony in open court.
Herminias declarations are based on her actual account of the commission of the crime.
She had no ill motive to accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify falsely against
appellant. Accused-appellant himself admitted that he and Herminia have been neighbors for
years and have known each other for a long time. Appellant is engaged in the business of buying
and selling scrap plastic and Herminia used to work for him as an agent. [24] She would not have
pointed to appellant if not for the fact that it was him whom she saw shoot her son.
Indeed, the Solicitor General points out that it was appellant himself who had strong motive
to harm or kill Joseph.[25] Appellant revealed that six days before the shooting, he caught Joseph
inside his car attempting to steal the stereo. The alibi that appellant was drinking with his friends
that fateful night of September 29, 1996 does not rule out the possibility that he could have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The victims house is merely two blocks
away from appellants house and could be reached in several minutes.[26]
The lone eyewitness account of the killing finds support in the medico-legal report. Dr.
Rosalie Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two gunshot woundsone to the right of the
forehead, and the other, to the left side of the back of the victims head.[27]Two slugs were
recovered from the victims head. Judging from the location and number of wounds sustained, Dr.
Cosidon theorized that the assailant could have been more than two feet away from the
victim.[28] Both gunshot wounds were serious and fatal.[29]
Accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their community. He alleges
that the victims drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of
the persons from whom he had stolen.[30] As proof of Josephs bad character, appellant presented
Herminias letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs rehabilitation from drugs.
On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything
about her sons thievery.[31]
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz:
Page 448
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:-- the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer
evidence of the defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would
(a) In Criminal Cases: have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal. [38]

Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the the accused.[39] And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
moral trait involved in the offense charged. charged, meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the
act charged,[40] e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. integrity.[41] Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of
the offended party.[42] Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
offense charged. Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability
assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.[43]
of the offense charged.
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with
x x x x x x x x x. frequency in sex offenses and homicide.[44] In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any
prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the
willingness of a woman is material, the womans character as to her chastity is admissible to show
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
whether or not she consented to the mans act.[45] The exception to this is when the womans
distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common
consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape[46] or rape with violence or intimidation.[47] In the
report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. [32] Good moral character includes all the
crimes of qualified seduction[48] or consented abduction,[49] the offended party must be a virgin,
elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and veracity,
which is presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation,[50] or a virtuous woman of good
especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people of the
reputation.[51] The crime of simple seduction involves the seduction of a woman who is single or a
community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which
widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x. [52] The burden of
attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.[33]
proof that the complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad reputation.[53]
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1)
allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
as evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the
have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all,
accused.[54] The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his
the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous
calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining
cause.[34] There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. [55] When the evidence tends to prove
criminal and civil cases.
self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. [56]
accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine
where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit
the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was
the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high reputation
the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the
is not likely to have committed the act charged against him.[35] Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such
light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he
evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair
could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a
speculation.
person of bad character.[36] The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant,
and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. [37] Once

EVIDENCE (Rule 130 Cases) Page 449

 Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed SO ORDERED.
with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, [57] a murder case, the defense tried to prove the
violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial
court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:

x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),[58] such is not necessary in
the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof
of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3,
p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder.[59]

In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and
evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room
watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot
him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against
his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the
assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by
treachery, proof of the victims bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating
circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victims bad character to establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to
murder.

As to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this cannot be appreciated to increase

the penalty in the absence of direct evidence showing that accused-appellant deliberately planned and
prepared the killing of the victim.[60]

Neither can the aggravating circumstance of dwelling found by the trial court be applied in the instant
case. The Information alleges only treachery and evident premeditation, not dwelling. Under Sections 8
and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or Information must specify the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the offense.[61] The Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, and Section 8, Rule 110 is favorable to the accused.
It may be applied retroactively to the instant case.

Accordingly, without the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty of death was erroneously
imposed by the trial court. There being no aggravating circumstance, there is no basis for the award of
exemplary damages.[62]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,
Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as accused-appellant Noel Lee is found
guilty of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence imposed by the trial court is
however reduced to reclusion perpetua, there having been no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of said crime. Except for the award of exemplary damages, the award of civil indemnity, other
damages and costs are likewise affirmed.

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