Land Titles and Deeds
2018-19]
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
CHAPTER 5 (SEC. 51 TO 77)
VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH REGISTERED LANDS
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.
An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or
otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may
use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary
instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or
other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this
Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
A. Primary Entry Book (Sec. 56)
Section 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each
Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon
payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception,
all instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him
relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of
all instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be
regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of
each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it refers,
shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as well
as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the payment
of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration.
Every deed or other instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, so
filed with the Register of Deeds shall be numbered and indexed and
endorsed with a reference to the proper certificate of title. All records
and papers relative to registered land in the office of the Register of
Deeds shall be open to the public in the same manner as court records,
subject to such reasonable regulations as the Register of Deeds, under
the direction of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may prescribe.
All deeds and voluntary instruments shall be presented with their
respective copies and shall be attested and sealed by the Register of
Deeds, endorsed with the file number, and copies may be delivered to
the person presenting them.
Certified copies of all instruments filed and registered may also be
obtained from the Register of Deeds upon payment of the prescribed
fees.
VOLUNTARY DEALING
- in accordance with the will of the registered owner;
- necessary to surrender the owner’s duplicate
PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK OR DAY BOOK
- record of all instruments, including copies of writs and processes,
affecting registered lands;
- preliminary process in registration
- instrument shall be regarded as registered only from the moment it is
noted in the day book;
- record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable
REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY DEALINGS
a. Filing and registration in the day book of the notarized deed or
instrument;
b. Surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title; and
c. Payment in full of the proper registration fees within 15 days from date
of entry
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
a) Compliance with the essential requisites of a contract
b) Observance of the formal requirements of public
instruments
c) Performance of the jurisdictional requisites for registration
d) In addition, special laws require the submission of supporting
documents for certain transactions before registration is allowed
DBP vs Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
Entry in the primary entry book alone is considered a complete act of
registration as long as all the requirements are present.
Facts: DBP presented for registration a sheriff's certificate of sale in its
favor of two parcels of land covered, both in the names of the Sps. Bautista
and Calison. The transaction was entered in the Registry's primary Entry
Book. DBP paid the requisite registration fees on the same day. Annotation
of the sale on the covering certificates of title could not, however be
effected because the originals of those certificates were found to be
missing from the files of the Registry, where they were supposed to be
kept, and could not be located. DBP instituted proceedings to reconstitute
said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered in a decision rendered on
June 15, 1982. For reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of
title were reconstituted only on June 19, 1984.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y.
Issue: Whether the certificate of sale could be registered using the old
entry made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the
reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June 19, 1984.
Held: Yes. DBP, complied with all that was required of it for purposes of
both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. So long as the
registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of
entry and annotation, nothing more remains to be done but a duty
incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
Case Doctrine:
1. (Primary) Entry alone produces the effect of registration,
whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so
long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for
purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done
but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
2. The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present
appellee) register of deeds about making annotation of an entry effected
before he assumed that office are more imagined than real. He would only
be making a memorandum of an instrument and of its entry based on or
reciting details which are already of indubitable record and, pursuant to
the express command of the law, giving said memorandum the same date
as the entry. No part of that function is exclusive to the incumbent of the
office at the time entry was made or is forbidden to any of his successors.
National Housing Authority vs Augusto Basa
Reiteration of DBP
Sps. Basa procured a loaned from NHA secured by real estate mortgage.
The loan remained unpaid and NHA foreclosed the mortgage. The sheriff's
certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the owner's
duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the respondents, since the
titles in the custody of the RD were among those burned down when a fire
gutted the QC City Hall. After the redemption period, NHA consolidated
ownership over the foreclosed properties, and the same was inscribed by
the RD on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA. Respondents
theorized that since the sheriff's certificate was only inscribed on the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, and not on the certificate of title in the
possession of the RD, then there was no effective registration and the one-
year redemption period had not begun to run. Thus, respondents sought
to redeem the property.
Issue: Whether the annotation of the sheriff's certificate of sale on the
owner's duplicate certificate of titles is sufficient registration considering
that the inscription on the original certificates could not be made as the
same got burned.
Held: Yes. The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once
the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the
register of deeds.
Durawood vs Candice Bona
Principle: All the requirements must be complied with in order to confer
jurisdiction upon the RD.
Facts: Durawood filed an action for sum of money plus damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against LBB
Construction as payment for construction materials. RTC then issued an
Order for the issuance of a writ of attachment. On June 17, 2004, A Notice
of Levy on Attachment was annotated on the TCT of LBB’s property.
Candice Bona filed a Motion seeking leave to intervene claiming therein
that LBB Construction had sold the property to her and her siblings through
a Deed of Absolute Sale. She asserted that the sale is the subject of an
entry dated June 16, 2004 in the books of the RD, while the levy on
attachment is subject to an entry dated later on June 17, 2004.
Issue: Whether the sale annotated earlier should prevail over the levy on
execution.
Held: No. While it was true that the levy came later, it turned out that the
fee required in the sale was not paid. There was one requirement that was
not complied with which was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the RD.
As such, there was no complete act of registration. For failure to pay the
fee, the levy on execution takes precedence over the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Amodias allegedly conveyed the subject property to respondent
AZNAR. This transaction was registered under Act 3344. Subsequently, the
Amodias conveyed the subject property in favor of Go Kim Chuan. A TCT
was issued in the name of Go Kim Chuan under Act 496. AZNAR filed a
case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale
and Cancellation of TCT alleging that the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an
invalid second sale of the subject property which had earlier been sold to
it.
Issue: Who between Go Kim Chuan and AZNAR was able to validly
register the property.
Ruling: Since the sale in favor of AZNAR was registered under Act No.
3344 and not under Act No. 496, the said document is deemed not
registered. Rather, it was the sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan which was
registered under Act No. 496. AZNAR insists that since there was no
Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and the
Register of Deeds are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at
the time. The contention is untenable. The fact that the certificate of title
over the registered land
Mendoza vs Garana
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
FACTS: During October 6, 1993, the heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong
represented by Belen Uy sought registration of a notice of lis pendens with
the Register of Deeds of Lucena City, which intended to bind plenty of
properties. They were subject to an action for specific performance where
the heirs of Uy wished to compel the sale of such properties. Upon the
entry of the notice of lis pendens, Atty. Marquez, the registrar of RD
Lucena, wrote to the owners, requesting the surrender of the duplicate
copies of titles to annotate the notice of lis pendens. Jalbuena (one of the
registered owners) did not surrender her duplicate copy.
Even before seeking a notice of lis pendens, Uy already caused an
annotation of adverse claims on all titles in August 16 1993, which was
then cancelled on Oct. 4, 1994 upon filing of an affidavit by Umali. RD
Lucena annotated the notice of lis pendens except Jalbuena’s title, whose
original was missing from the vault. The original was with Carmelina
Rodriguez – a clerk at RD Lucena, who processed another transaction with
this title but forgot to annotate the notice of lis pendens.
In 1994, Spouses Garana inquired about Jalbuena’s land for purchase,
later finding out that it was subject to an adverse claim which was
cancelled in 1994. They immediately bought the land in November 7, 1994.
Thus, RD Lucena cancelled the old TCT and issued a new one to the
spouses, which bore no notice of lis pendens. The spouses then mortgaged
the property with Far East Bank and Trust Company (BPI) as security for
a loan. The heirs of Manuel Uy then learned that the land had been sold
and a new title was issued without the notice. They notified RD Lucena of
the lapse and asked for an annotation of the notice to Garana’s new title.
Through Atty. Marquez (substituted by Mendoza), the RD Lucena filed a
petition to annotate the notice of lis pendens in the trial court.
Spouses Garana and BPI opposed the petition, arguing that the annotation
was too late and would be prejudicial, relying on the clean title which would
grant them the status as innocent purchasers for value. BPI also submitted
that when the land was mortgaged, there was no indication that it was
subject to pending litigation.
The trial court ruled in favor of RD Lucena. CA granted the appeal and
reversed the ruling, stating that the subject land is registered under the
Torrens system where no further investigation from the certificate of title
is necessary to determine the property’s condition. CA ruled that the
spouses were innocent purchasers.
Under the present petition, the petitioner admits its procedural lapses of
issuing a new certificate of title without reflecting a notice of lis pendens.
However, they argue that the entry of the notice of lis pendens in the
primary entry book amounted to a valid registration, such that it should
not prejudice the heirs of Uy. They invoke Levin v. Bass, which stated that
in case of involuntary registration (e.g. notice of lis pendens), entry in the
primary book is already sufficient notice to all persons. Petitioner also
argues that the spouses were not innocent purchasers for value because
they already knew of the first annotation of adverse claim before buying
the land – only waiting to buy it upon cancellation of the adverse claim.
ISSUES: Whether or not an entry of a notice of lis pendens in the primary
entry book serves as notice to third persons, to the effect that an absence
of an annotation on the title has no effect towards the binding nature of
the notice of lis pendens to all persons dealing with the land.
RULING: Petition is granted. The ruling is rooted in Villasor v. Camon,
reiterated in Levin v. Bass, stating that there is a difference between a
registration of a voluntary instrument (e.g. sale, mortgage, or lease) vs.
registration of an involuntary instrument (e.g. attachment, lien, notice of
lis pendens). The voluntary instrument requires the owner’s production of
his own duplicate certificate of title before registration because it is the
willful act of the owner where it is expected that he produce all the
necessary documents to facilitate registration. On the other hand, the
involuntary instrument are adverse claims against the registered owner,
so he cannot be expected to provide all the necessary documents like a
duplicate copy.
Such cases were decided under Act No. 496 Sec. 51, 55, and 56, which
basically states that it states that registration in the office of the RD will
be notice to all persons from the time of registration. Furthermore, the
notification in the book of the year, month, day, hour, and minute of
reception of all instruments shall be regarded as registered from the time
so noted. Sec. 55 provides for the rule on voluntary registration (requiring
more than just mere entry in the primary book). This was carried over to
PD 1529, the current law governing land registration.
In the subsequent cases (Caviles, Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit
Association, and Saberon), the same doctrine is pronounced. The same
occurrence regarding the lack of a notice of lis pendens was present in the
following cases, pronouncing in Caviles that persons who caused
registration cannot be held negligent for not checking if the RD performed
its obligations, and that the duty to annotate rests with the Register of
Deeds and not with the registrant. Thus, it ruled in the Caviles case that
the person who first registered his instrument had a superior right over
the other. Such pronouncement carried over to the later cases.
In the case of Casimiro Devt. Corporation v. Mateo, the Court stated that
anything that arouses suspicion should require the vendee to look beyond
the certificate. The mere fact that Umali sought the cancellation of the
adverse claim should have aroused the spouses’ suspicious over the land’s
real condition. They knew that there was a previous adverse claim that
was cancelled and yet did not ask Jalbuena nor Belen Uy. These facts
dispute the assertion of being oblivious to any claim that the heirs had over
the subject land. Such is also true with BPI, who should have exercised a
higher degree of diligence when dealing with the TCT. They can no longer
raise the defense of indefeasibility of title since they did not act in good
faith.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE:
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION; VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH REGISTERED
LANDS; PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK: The law does not require the presentation
as well as the annotation of the involuntary instrument on the owner's
duplicate title, or even on the original title. The mere recording of the
involuntary instrument in the primary entry book or day book is sufficient
to bind the registered land and affect third persons dealing with it. the
Court subsequently reiterated in Levin, that in involuntary registration, the
entry of the instrument in the primary entry book or day book already
serves as adequate notice to all persons of another person's or entity's
adverse claim over a registered land.
B. Double Sales
ART. 1544, NCC. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents
RULE IN CASE OF DOUBLE SALE
• Where two or more TCT are issued to different persons for the same
lots, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
not cancelled when the first TCT was issued to replace the original
title, which title prevails?
• General rule is that in case of 2 certificates of title purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part, comprised
in the earlier certificate
• Where 2 certificates of title purport to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails. In successive registrations, where more than
1 certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the
estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof.
• The vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the latter certificate.
Note: Registration contemplated in this provision refers to registration
under the Torrens System, which considers the act of registration as the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land. This rule precisely applies to cases involving conflicting rights over
registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the
clean title of the properties. Thus, we held that registration must be done
in the proper registry in order to bind the same. (Melencio v. CA)
Melencion vs Ca
FACTS: The subject lot is a 30, 351 sq. m. land in Lapu-Lapu City and a
part of a total area of 30, 777 sq. m. in the name of Go Kim Chuan. The
property was originally owned by Estaban Bonghanoy, who had only one
child – Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of Leoncia Amodia and the
petitioners Melencion and the Amodias. The entire property was under the
Torrens System, but the title was lost during WWII.
On July 10, 1964, the Amodias executed an Extra-Judicial Partition (EJP)
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, conveying the property to Aznar
for P10, 200.00. It was registered in August 10, 1964 under Act 3344
because there was no title on file at the RD Lapu-Lapu City. In Feb. 18,
1989, Melencion and the Amodias executed another settlement with
Absolute Sale to Go Kim Chuan for P70, 000. The lost title was
reconstituted under Act 26, issued in the name of Esteban Bonghanoy and
subsequently a derivative title in Go Kim Chuan’s name. He then controlled
and exercised dominion over the property as an owner.
In Feb. 14, 1990, AZNAR wrote a letter to the petitioners, asking to
withdraw/nullify the sale between the petitioners and Go Kim Chuan while
also filing a Notice of Adverse Claim. Due to no positive response, AZNAR
filed a case against the Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale
and Cancellation of the TCT, claiming that Go Kim Chuan was an invalid
second sale of the subject property. Petitioners denied executing the EJP
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale to AZNAR, stating that signatures
were forged.
RTC dimissed the complaint, declaring Chuan as the real owner, reasoning
that the signatures were found by the document examiner of the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory to be forged. It was brought under the
Land Registration Act which should have complied with the said law.
Finally, AZNAR failed to prove Chuan’s bad faith. The CA granted AZNAR’s
claim, stating that the sale in favor of AZNAR was registered ahead of
Chuan’s, so preference should be given to AZNAR. The adverse claim was
also annotated earlier than the execution of the sale to Chuan, so he
should’ve respected the adverse claims. The finding of the document
examiner was found to be insufficient. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioners argue that the lot was already registered under Act 496,
so the registration in 1964 under Act 3344 produces no legal effect;
assuming the lot was registered as an unregistered land, it is without
prejudice to better rights, and the CA erred in stating that the adverse
claim was already present at the time of sale to Chuan. AZNAR argues that
Chuan was a buyer in bad faith for having constructive notice of the sale
since it was registered under Act 3344, noting the fact that the property
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
wasn’t covered by a Torrens title; that there was no other mode of
registration except Art. 3344; that Chuan could not examine any certificate
of title because he had to wait for reconstitution; that the second sale did
not transfer because it wasn’t within their power to convey anymore; and
finally, AZNAR cites Santiago v. CA stating that the prior registration and
sale under Act 3344 would be constructive notice to Chuan and negates
the claim of good faith.
ISSUES: Who between Go Kim Chuan and AZNAR has the better right over
the subject property?
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
- Original owner may seek annulment of transfer on the ground of
fraud.
2. Generally, a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. But a
forged deed may be the basis of a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of
the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold
to an innocent purchaser for value.
REGISTRATION IS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO THIRD PERSONS

RULING: Go Kim Chuan has the better right. Appropriate here is Art. 1544 • The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
of the NCC, providing the rules on double sale (ownership transferred to affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned
the person who has first recorded it in the Registry of Property if • It is the act of registration which creates a constructive notice to
immovable. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the whole world and binds third persons
the person who in good faith was first in possession, and in absence • Absent such registration, a conveyance doesn’t affect or bind the
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good land
faith). The registration contemplated here refers to registration under the • Under the rule on notice, there is a conclusive presumption that
Torrens system. It applies to cases involving conflicted rights over the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title
registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the • He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and
clean title of the properties. is presumed to know every fact shown by the record and is presumed to
know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed
It is indisputable that the property was under the Torrens system before • Since it is the act of registration which transfers ownership of
conveyances to AZNAR and Chuan were made. Despite this knowledge, the land sold, it has been held that a subsequent claimant cannot claim a
AZNAR registered it under Act 3344, contending that at the time of sale, better right over the land which had been previously registered in the name
there was no title on file. Act 3344 provides a system of recording of another.
transactions or claims over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a • A notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective
third party with a better right. If it is registered under the Land Registration purchaser or encumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation and
Act (LRA), and it is sold and registered not under the LRA but Act 3344, that he should keep his hands off the same, unless he intends to gamble
the sale is not considered registered. The mere fact that the certificate of on the results of the litigation.
title over the land was lost does not convert it into unregistered land.
BUT A PURCHASER WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT OF HIS
AZNAR should have reconstituted the title instead of registration under Act
VENDOR’S TITLE CANNOT CLAIM GOOD FAITH
3344. However, this cannot be the sole basis of awarding subject property
for good faith must accompany registration. The second purchaser must
• A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
be in good faith.
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor
We do not agree that the adverse claim was made prior to issuance of the
• His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists or his willful
TCT to Chuan). The court cannot review facts unless there was a
closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the
misapprehension of facts which would justify a different conclusion. In this
vendor’s title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it
case, the claim was annotated in 1990 after the title was reconstituted an
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that
after issuance of the TCT in 1989. The reliance on Santiago is misplaced
he had no such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had
because the first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, not
he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be
under Act 3344. AZNAR registered the sale under Act 3344 despite
required of a prudent man in a like situation.
knowing that the property is under the Torrens system. Chuan made
verifications with the City Assessor and RD, finding no adverse claim
A FORGED DEED MAY BE THE BASIS OF A GOOD TITLE IN THE
against the Amodias. The good faith of Chuan cannot be doubted,
HANDS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHASER
considering he followed all the necessary procedures to acquire the title in
his name. Finally, AZNAR’s complaint for cancellation of title contains no
• A forged deed may be the root of a valid title in the hands of a
allegation that Chuan was aware of defects in his title.
bona fide purchaser or mortgagee
• Torrens system permits a forged transfer, when duly entered in
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE
the registry, to become the root of a valid title in a bona fide purchaser
• The law erects a safeguard against a forged transfer being
RULES IN DOUBLE SALE: In application of first registration regarding
registered by the requirement that no transfer shall be registered unless
ownership in disputes of double sales, it is important to note that
the owner’s certificate is produced along with the instrument of transfer
registration of the property must be done in the proper registry for it to be
• Public policy, expediency, and the need for a statute of repose
considered registered. Furthermore, mere registration of title is not
as to the possession of land, demand such a rule.
enough. Good faith must accompany the registration. What is important
• The right or lien of an innocent mortgagee for value upon the
for this purpose is not whether the second buyer is a buyer in good faith,
land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor
but whether he registers the second sale in good faith, meaning, he does
obtained his title through fraud.
so without knowledge of any defect in the title over the property sold.
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
C. Buyer in Good Faith
Section 60. Mortgage or lease of registered land. Mortgage and
leases shall be registered in the manner provided in Section 54 of this
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
Decree. The owner of registered land may mortgage or lease it by
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
executing the deed in a form sufficient in law. Such deed of mortgage or
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
lease and all instruments which assign, extend, discharge or otherwise deal
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where
with the mortgage or lease shall be registered, and shall take effect upon
the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from
the title only from time of registration.
the time of such registering, filing or entering.
No mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate of title shall hereafter be
issued by the Registers of Deeds, and those issued prior to the effectivity
Section 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new
of this Decree are hereby deemed canceled and the holders thereof shall
certificate. No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of
immediately surrender the same to the Register of Deeds concerned.
Deeds, unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such
instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon
ESSENCE OF MORTGAGE
order of the court, for cause shown. The production of the owner's
The property has been identified or set apart from the mass of property of
duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the
registration, shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
fulfillment of obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of
default of payment.
registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate or
memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all
REQUISITES OF MORTGAGE (ART. 2085, NCC)
persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in
1. Constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
good faith. In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
2. The mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged;
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud
and
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value
3. That the persons constituting the mortgage have the free
of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the
disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that
original petition or application, any subsequent registration procured by
they be legally authorized for the purpose.
the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed
or other instrument, shall be null and void.
HOW FORECLOSED:
1. JUDICIAL Foreclosure — governed by Rule 68 of the Rules of Court
THINGS TO REMEMBER REGARDING SEC. 53
2. EXTRAJUDICIAL — governed by Act 3135, as amended by Act 411
1. Surrender of owner’s duplicate certificate is authority for the RD to enter
registration. No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the RD unless
the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except THINGS TO REMEMBER REGARDING REM
in cases upon order of the court for cause shown. - Mortgage lien is a right in rem which follows the property;
- The issuance of a new TCT by the RD to the purchaser, w/o the - A REM is a voluntary transaction, as such, you have to present the
presentation of the owner’s duplicate, is unwarranted and confers no owner’s duplicate of copy for purposes of registration;
right on the purchaser. - The REM is the accessory contract; the primary contract is the
- In case of refusal or failure to surrender owner’s duplicate certificate, contract of loan.
the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender
of the same to the RD pursuant to Sec. 107.
Uy vs Fule

Prepared by: Gas

Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
FACTS: The land in dispute is an area of 180, 150 sq. m. in Camarines
Sur that was part of the vast tract of land in the name of Conrado Garcia.
After his death on November 23, 1972, his heirs entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, and then caused registration on
March 7, 1973.
In September 1985, DAR engaged Engr. Sales to conduct a survey over
the disputed land. He issued a joint certification in August 30, 1988, stating
that the land was an “untitled” property owned by Conrado Garcia. It was
supported by a certification in Jan. 30, 1989 by the Office of the RD, stating
that no title covered the said land. In effect, the land was included in the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of DAR under PD 27. In 1988, DAR
and the Office of the RD issued Emancipation Patents (EP) and OCTs to
farmer-beneficiaries (Alcaide, Ronda, Ermita, Marcelo, and the
Pedimontes). Ronda sold his portion to Chisan Uy who registered his title
in the RD. The heirs of Ronda then sold the land to Hector Uy for P10
million, where he registered it in the same place.
In 1997, the old TCT was cancelled following partition, and new ones were
issued in the names of respondent heirs of Conrado Garcia. One TCT
covered the disputed land. In 1998, the President through the DAR
Secretary issued the EPs to the farmer beneficiaries. On December 21,
1998, the respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession, and damages against the DAR Secretary and staff involved, as
well as the farmer-beneficiaries, arguing that they were denied due
process and that the titles of the defendants constituted clouds on their
own title.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that there was no notice of
inclusion of the disputed lands. Appeal was made to the CA by Ronda,
Alcaide, Casaysayan, and Chisan Uy (government officials and other
farmer-beneficiaries did not appeal). They argue that the RTC had no
jurisdiction, erred in holding that the titles were void, and erred in holding
that the proceedings taken by the government officials in generating the
Eps and CLTs were void. They insisted that the RTC erred in holding that
Uy was not an innocent purchaser in good faith. Respondents assert that
the land did not lose its character and registered land. Being registered, it
should not have been subject to another land registration proceeding
where EPs and titles could be derived. CA denied the appeal, stating that
the land was already titled which requires DAR to notify the registered
owner. A land covered by a title cannot be a subject of an application for
registration unless the title which is now indefeasible is nullified by a proper
court proceeding. On the issue of petitioner and Chisan Uy being
purchasers in good faith, CA disagreed stating that even if they had no
notice of defect, no valid title can be passed to them since the transfers
are void ab initio.
Furthermore, in CA’s denial of the motion for reconsideration, CA cited
Baltazar v. CA, stating that where two persons both in good faith and
innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful
holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights. Hector and Chisan Uy’s transferors had no
transmissible rights because their titles were void, coming from an
erroneous declaration that the property was untitled.
The petitioner in his appeal to the SC, argues that he paid the full price of
P10 million, that all documents shown to him by the vendors did not
indicate any defect in the title, that the records state that Ronda was
awarded the OCTs, and that the settlement revealed that he was dealing
with Ronda’s heirs. Absent any irregularities, he did not have to look
beyond the titles presented and could not have been aware of the claim
over the disputed lots. The only time he could have been aware of
constructive notice was after the annotation of adverse claim made 5
months after the sale to him. Thus, the right of an innocent purchaser must
be protected, even if seller obtains title through fraud. On the issue of
applicability of laws, RA 6657 should be applied using the 10-year
prohibition period rather than perpetual prohibition because RA 6657
repealed PD 27’s rules on prohibition against transfer. Ronda secured the
OCTs through hereditary succession and the second transfer was beyond
the 10-year period. Respondents counter that their action for quieting of
title was premised on the illegal acquisition of their decreed and titled
property by the DAR under the OLT program. The title did not lose its
character as being valid since November 23, 1933. The claim of good faith
is denied. He did not exercise due diligence in examining the title of the
heirs of Ronda, stating that the title was acquired erroneously through the
OLT program and that the prohibition made it clear that the lots shall not
be transferred except by hereditary succession or to the government.
ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in failing to find that he was an innocent
purchaser for value who had the better right than the respondents over
the disputed land and failed to find that the applicable law was RA 6657,
not PD 27.
RULING: CA decision is affirmed. According to Bautista v. Silva, the
requisites for the buyer to be in good faith is that he buys the property
with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the
thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it. Thus, he no longer
needs to go beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of
good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions
concur: (1), the seller is the registered owner of the land; (2), the latter is
in possession thereof; and (3), at the time of the sale, the buyer was not
aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of
any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey
title to the property. If one or more requisites are not met, it was no longer
sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he had relied on the face of
the title; he must now also show that he had exercised reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the title.
The deed of sale executed between Ronda and the petitioner shows that
the TCTs were issued only on August 17, 1998, but the deed of sale was
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
executed on July 31, 1998. The argument by petitioner did not address
whether he was in good faith or not; it only addressed whether Ronda held
the right to transfer ownership but did not address whether transfer to
petitioner was valid. Only the OCTs could be examined by petitioner, which
recited the prohibition of non-transferal except by hereditary succession or
to the government. It negates the 3rd condition in the requisites of good
faith, requiring the petitioner to exercise a higher degree of diligence; thus,
the petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and cannot be
awarded the land.
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE
RULES ON BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH: The standard is that for one to be
a purchaser in good faith in the eyes of the law, he should buy the property
of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest
in, such property, and should pay a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief
that the person from whom he receives the property was the owner and
could convey title to the property.
The requisites for the buyer to be in good faith is that he buys the property
with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the
thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it. Thus, he no longer
needs to go beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of
good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions
concur: (1), the seller is the registered owner of the land; (2), the latter is
in possession thereof; and (3), at the time of the sale, the buyer was not
aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of
any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey
title to the property. If one or more requisites are not met, it was no longer
sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he had relied on the face of
the title; he must now also show that he had exercised reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the title.
LBP vs Poblete
FACTS: Poblete is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Occidental
Mindoro. In October 1997, Poblete obtained a P300, 000 loan from
Kapantay (Kabalikat ng Pamayanan ng Nagnanais Tumulong at Yumaman
Multi-Purpose Cooperative), mortgaging the land to guarantee payment of
the loan. In turn, Kapantay used the OCT as a collateral in its Loan Account
in Land Bank.
In November 1998, Poblete decided to sell the land to pay her loan,
instructing her son-in-law Balen to look for a buyer. He referred Maniego
to Poblete, and he agreed to buy the lot for P900, 000 but suggested that
a deed of absolute sale for P300, 000 be executed to reduce taxes. Poblete
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in November 9, 1998 with P300, 000
as consideration and described herself as a widow. She asked Balen to
deliver the deed and receive payment on her behalf, where Balen testified
that he delivered the deed to Maniego but did not receive the agreed
purchase price. Maniego said he would pay the amount upon his return
from the US. In an affidavit, Poblete agreed to have the payment deposited
to her Land Bank Savings account.
Based on a certification issued by LBP Department Manager Pulayan in
August 20, 1999, Maniego paid Kapantay’s loan account for P448, 202.08.
On June 8, 2000, he applied for a loan of P1 million, using the subject
property as collateral. Land Bank stated that as a condition for approval,
the title should first be transferred to Maniego. In August 14, 2000, the RD
of Occidental Mindoro issued a TCT in Maniego’s name. On August 15,
2000, Maniego and Land Bank executed a Credit Line Agreement and Real
Estate Mortgage while simultaneously releasing the P1 million proceeds to
Maniego. He failed to pay the loan, and on November 4, 2002, Land Bank
applied for foreclosure, stating that Maniego’s debt amounted to P1, 154,
388.88.
On December 2, 2002, Poblete filed a complaint for nullification of the Deed
and reconveyance of title and damages. Poblete alleged that despite
demands for payment, she did not receive the payment of P900, 000.
Without her knowledge, Maniego used the deed to acquire the OCT from
Kapantay. The Deed allegedly bore Poblete’s and her dead husband’s
forged signature, presenting the death certificate of her husband in the
NBI. LBP on the other hand claims it is a mortgagee in good faith,
observing due diligence prior to approval of the loan by verifying Maniego’s
title with the RD. It also made a cross-claim against Maniego for payment
of the loan. Maniego denied allegations and stated it was Poblete who
forged the signature. He alleged that he paid the consideration of the sale
and even her loans.
The RTC ruled in favor of Poblete, holding that the sale was a nullity. The
agreed consideration was not paid, and the signatures were proven to be
forgeries. RTC ruled that Lan Bank was not a mortgagee in good faith since
it did not exercise the diligence required of banking institutions since it
would’ve known that the sale was never consummated. However, the
cross-claim was granted. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUES: Whether or not LBP is a mortgagee in good faith?
RULING: LBP is not a mortgagee in good faith. A forged deed was made,
and such conveys no title. Where the deed of sale states that the purchase
price has been paid but not actually paid, the deed is void ab initio for lack
of consideration. The corresponding TCT issued is void. According to Yu
Bun Guan v. Ong, the certificate of title was cancelled upon finding that
the deed of sale was simulated. In Ereña v, Querrer-Kauffman, the court
stated that when the instrument presented for registration is forged, the
registered owner does not lose title and neither does the mortgagee
acquire any right to the property.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
It is settled that the title of Maniego is null and void, but it is without
prejudice to his right to recover from Poblete what he paid to Kapantay.
The real estate mortgage constituted over it is also void since it is essential
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged.
Land Bank insists that it is a mortgagee in good faith since it verified the
title, did a credit investigation, and inspected the lot. However, the Court
has ruled that the rule on mortgagees in good faith not being required to
look beyond the face of the title does not apply to banks. They are required
to observe a higher standard of diligence since it is so impressed with
public interest which requires more prudence than a private individual.
Good faith is a question of intention, ascertained by the evidence as to
conduct and outward acts.
Land Bank processed the loan application upon presentation of title and
ignored the fact that Kapantay previously used Poblete’s title as collateral
in its loan account with Land Bank. In the case of Bank of Commerce v.
San Pablo Jr., the person applying for the loan other than the registered
owner should already have raised suspicion, requiring further inquiry to
confirm the authority to mortgage. Ignoring such a significant fact, the
person is not an innocent purchaser for value. The records not not even
show that Land Bank investigated and inspected the property to ascertain
the actual occupants but only inspected the lot to appraise its value. In
Prudential Bank v. Kim Hyeun Soon, the bank is required to conduct an
ocular inspection not only to appraise the property but also to inquire who
the occupants were.
In conditioning the approval of the loan upon transfer, LBP admits that the
processing was based on assurances that the title would soon be
Maniego’s, but in LBP’s haste, it appears as if the loan was already
processed while the collateral was still in Poblete’s name. LBP did not
ascertain ownership nor the authority of the supposed agent executing the
mortgage; thus, it is not a mortgagee in good faith. Ultimately the lot
remains with Poblete.
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE
RULES REGARDING BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH: It is essential that the
mortgager be the absolute owner of the mortgage; otherwise, the
mortgage is void. The doctrine about a mortgagee in good faith does not
apply to banks which are required to observe a higher standard of
diligence. A bank cannot assume that simply because the title offered a
security is on its face, free of any encumbrance or lien, it is relieved of the
responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the
properties to be mortgage.
Legarda vs CA
Principle: When the subject property is already in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to its original
owner.
Facts: Cathay filed a complaint against Legarda alleging that Legarda
entered into a lease agreement with it, through its representative Cabrera,
and that there was a breach of the terms thereof. Pursuant to a court
order, the property of the Legarda was eventually sold to Cabrera at a
public auction and thereafter registered under his name. After learning the
unfortunate turn of events, Legarda sought to annul the judgment at the
CA. Howver, Legarda was declared in default due to negligence of counsel.
Later, the SC (Gayanco decision) ruled in favor of Legarda on account that
the negligence of her counsel affected her right to due process. It ordered
Cathay to reconvey the property to Legarda and to cancel the registration
of the said property in the name of Cathay. However, after this decision,
Cathay was not able to return the property to Legarda because it nor longer
possessed nor owned the property since such has already been subject to
a series of transfers to innocent third parties at the time of promulgation
of the said judgment.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent transfers of the property are valid
as the sucessors in interest were considered as innocent purchasers for
value.
Held: Yes, the transfers were valid and the successors of interest of
Cabrera are innocent purchasers of good faith. The successors relied on
the clean title of the subject land that were presented by their
predecessors. Since the property is already in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to its original owner by
Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself
Gabutan v. Nacalaban
Facts:
• In 1957, Godofredo Nacablan purchased an 800 sq. m. piece of land
in Cagayan de Oro City from the Daamos. A TCT was issued in the
name of Godofredo and thereafter, he built a house on it. He died in
1974 and was survived by his wife, Baldomera and their children.
• Baldomera issued a certification in favor of her mother Melecia which
provided that she could build and occupy a house on the portion of
the property. The tax declaration showed that Melecia owned the
building previously owned by Godofredo.
• Baldomera died in 1994, and her children subsequently executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Sale to the
College. The old TCT was cancelled and the new one was issued in
the name of the College. Melecia died in 1997 and was survived by
her children. Soon after, the college demanded that the heirs of
Melecia vacate the premises.
• The heirs filed a complaint for reconveyance against Nacalaban and
the College, alleging that: Melecia bought the property with her own
money but Godofredo executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
name, Godofredo and Baldomera were only trustees of the property
in favor of Melecia, the real owner, they only knew about the
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
settlement upon verification with the Register of Deeds, and that the
College was a buyer in bad faith for being aware of the co-ownership.
• The College counter-argued that: it is a buyer in good faith for making
exhaustive investigations from all reliable tolerance, declaring that
the heirs were staying merely by tolerance, the tax declaration
showed that Melecia admitted to Godofredo’s ownership of the lot,
the occupancy permit of Melecia was issued only after Godofredo
issued a certification so that Melecia was allowed to occupy a portion
of the property, and the settlement was published three times
consecutively in a newspaper of general circulation.
• Basically, the College claims it was in good faith because Melecia is
not the real owner; she only possessed by mere tolerance.
• Nacalaban et. al. denied the allegations of the heirs, claiming that
they have acquired the property by intestate succession and also
argued on laches and prescription. Furthermore, they stated that the
action for reconveyance was improper since it was already sold to an
innocent purchaser for value.
• The College filed for a separate complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages in the MTCC against the Heirs of Melecia. The heirs
counterclaimed that they possessed the property in co-ownership
because it was purchased by their predecessor. They reiterated their
previous arguments.
• (UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FILED BY THE COLLEGE) MTCC ruled in
favor of the College, and the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision, giving
the Heirs of Melecia 30 days from notice to vacate. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was denied. Thus, an appeal to the CA
was made.
• (RECONVEYANCE CASE FILED BY HEIRS) RTC rendered a decision in
favor of the heirs, stating that the money of Melecia was used in
buying the property, but Godofredo’s name was used in the title. A
trust was established through Art. 1448 of the Civil Code.
• Both parties filed separate appeals to the CA which consolidated both
appeals. It affirmed the RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case,
stating that the College is a buyer in good faith and that prescription
has not yet set in since the heirs are in actual possession.
• The heirs filed for certiorari, stating that the College is not a buyer in
good faith because it did not buy the property from the registered
owner – Godofredo, not Nacalaban. The College should have
exercised higher diligence.
• Issue: Whether or not the College is a buyer in good faith. (Less
important: Whether or not an action for reconveyance was proper).
• Ruling:
• (ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE) An action for reconveyance is proper.
There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate
is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose
of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is a
trustee while the latter is the beneficiary.
ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH AN IMPLIED TRUST
• There are two elements to establish trust: (1) an actual payment of
money and etc. or an equivalent constituting valuable consideration,
and (2) such must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a
resulting trust.
• Melecia’s money was used to buy the property but was placed in
Godofredo’s name. She purchased it because Felisia, an heir, wanted
to build a pharmacy. Melecia built a residential buiding and allowed
Godofredo to mortgage a house he built on the property because she
trusted him. The title does not operate to vest ownership upon the
property in favor of the College because the title is not a mode of
acquiring ownership (Naval v. CA).
THE COLLEGE IS A BUYER IN BAD FAITH FOR BEING AWARE OF THE HEIRS
OF MELECIA POSSESSING THE PROPERTY, BYPASSING THE GENERAL
RULE OF GOOD FAITH
• (BUYER IN BAD FAITH) The lower court sustained the College’s status
as an innocent purchaser for value on the basis of a lack of annotation
of the heirs’ claim on Godofredo’s title, the proper publication of the
extrajudicial settlement, an issuance of a certification to Melecia
allowing her to occupy a portion of the lot, and the tax declaration.
• Whether one is a buyer in good faith and whether due diligence and
prudence were exercised are questions of fact.
• (Bautista v. Silva) REQUISITES FOR ONE TO BE CONSIDERED A
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH: (1) seller is the registered owner of the
land; (2) latter is in possession thereof; (3) at the time of sale, buyer
was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the
property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in
his capacity to convey the title to the property.
NO LONGER SUFFICIENT TO RELY ON THE FACE OF THE TITLE IF ONE OR
MORE REQUISITES OF GOOD FAITH IS ABSENT
• Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, the law puts the buyer
on notices and obliges the later to exercise a higher degree of
diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all
factual circumstances. It’s no longer sufficient to rely on the face of
the title.
• The College has the burden to prove its status as a purchaser in good
faith. It cannot be discharged by legal presumption, and the College
has failed to discharge such.
• Nacalaban et. al. are not the registered owners, but Godofredo
(Bautista v. CA – sale made not by a registered owner requires a
higher degree of diligence).
• Second, the College was aware that the Heirs of Melecia were in
possession of the property. (Occeña v. Esponilla – the purchaser
should have verified on the authority of the occupants’ possession
instead of relying on the representation of the vendors that they were
squatters).
• "Honesty of intention" which constitutes good faith implies a freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
inquiry. If the land purchased is in the possession of a person other
than the vendor, the purchaser must be wary and must investigate
the rights of the actual possessor. Without such inquiry, the purchaser
cannot be said to be in good faith and cannot have any right over the
property.
Nobleza v. Nuega
Facts:
• Shirley Nuega was married to Rogelio Nuega in September 1990. In
1998 while the couple was still engaged, Shirley was a domestic
helper in Israel while Rogelio was a seaman. Shirley sent Rogelio
money upon his request for the purchase of a lot in Marikina where
they planned to build their home.
• The next year, Rogelio bought the subject house which had an area
of 111 sq. m. Shirley claims that when she arrived to the Philippines,
she settled the balance for the equity of the subject property through
SSS financing and paid for the succeeding monthly amortization. The
TCT issued was solely under the name of Rogelio.
• The following year after their marriage, Shirley returned to Israel for
work but received information that Rogelio had another woman,
Monica Escobar. Upon her return in May 1992, she confirmed that
Rogelio had been introducing the woman as his wife.
• In 1992, she filed two cases for concubinage and legal separation and
liquidation of property. While filing the cases, Shirley learned of
Rogelio’s intention of selling the subject property; thus, Shirley
advised interested buyers – her neighbor and Nobleza – of the
existing cases.
• Despite the warning, Rogelio sold the subject property including an
assumption of the existing mortgage to Nobleza for P380, 000.00
without Shirley’s consent.
• RTC granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community of property.
Rogelio appealed to the CA, which was denied.
• Shirley then instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and
Recovery of Property against petitioner and Rogelio before the RTC
Marikina, which granted the same. Nobleza appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC ruling. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was denied. Nobleza now files the case in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner
not a purchaser in good faith.
Ruling:
DEFINITION OF A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH/INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR
VALUE
• Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value
is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full
and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or
before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some other person
in the property.
• It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who
has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not enough to
invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith.
• Examples of such prudence could be shown by making an ocular
inspection, checking the title of ownership with the Register of Deeds
along with the payment of taxes, the capacity of the seller to dispose
the property which necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil status
of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is secured.
• Petitioner argues that she is a buyer in good faith because she has
examined the TCT which was registered in Rogelio’s name alone;
thus, being an innocent purchaser for value, she is not required to go
beyond the face of the title.
• The SC disagrees. The buyer cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value by relying solely on the TCT and ignoring the
other circumstances.
• (Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong) Similarly, the petitioners
also invoked indefeasibility of the Torrens title, stating that they only
needed to look at the face of the title.
• “She was the grandniece of Eulalia and resides in the same locality
where the latter lives and conducts business, so it is impossible for
her not to acquire knowledge of the business practice of requiring her
biyhaeros to surrender the titles to their properties and sign the deeds
of sale over the properties in her favor. This should have put her on
guard for any abuses that Eulalia may commit with the titles.”
• (Arrofo v. Quiño) The general rule of relying on the title is not
absolute. Arrofo failed to act as a prudent buyer. While she asked her
daughter to verify from the RoD if the property is free from
encumbrances, she admitted that she conducted an ocular inspection
and found a house construction but did not inquire about the
occupants. Myrna was also occupying a room in her house as a lessee,
but the fact that she was renting a room while selling a land with a
house should have put her on guard.`
NOBLEZA IS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH FOR HAVING PRIOR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTE OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY
• Here, Rogelio described himself as single, but as in Raymundo v.
Bandong, the circumstances are also critical in determining good
faith.
• Nobleza’s sister, Hilda Bautista, resided near the respondent’s house.
She could have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose
the subject property. Respondent even testified that she warned them
not to buy the property because of the cases she filed against Rogelio.
• Nobleza denied such warning taking place, arguing that the warning
could not be construed as notice. However, both courts a quo gave
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
value to the testimony, and the respondent failed to present
convincing evidence to the contrary.
NOBLEZA IS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH FOR IRREGULARITIES FOUND
IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE REGARDING CONFLICTING DATES AND
SILENCE ON CIVIL STATUS
• Regarding the issues in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, it
also poses a question on the claim of good faith.
• The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated in December 29,
1992, but the Community Tax Certificates were dated January 2 and
20, 1993.
• The CTC and Deed of Absolute Sale dates on different dates are
material because there is an irregularity, making it seem as though
the sale was made PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION.
• While the TCT shows Rogelio as single, the Deed of Sale did not
include Rogelio’s civil status as a seller, further casting a cloud of
doubt on the claim of petitioner with regard to her status as an
innocent purchaser for value.
• THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE IS VOID IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR BEING
SOLD WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ONE OF THE SPOUSES, THE
PROPERTY TAKING PART OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY
• With regard to the nullity of the deed of absolute sale, the SC confirms
its status as null and void.
• While the TCT only shows Rogelio as the sole owner, respondent was
able to prove that she contributed in the payment of the purchase
price of the subject property, affirmed by the RTC and CA in the case
for liquidation of property.
• However, the nullity is not premised on financial contribution. The
fact that it forms part of their regime of an absolute community of
property makes the sale null and void for a lack of consent from one
spouse.
• Art. 96 of the FC - … In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition
or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Cusi v. Domingo
Facts:
• The property in dispute is a vacant, unfenced lot consisting of 658 sq.
m. in Quezon City under a TCT in the name of Lilia Domingo. In 1999,
She found that there were construction activities taking place in her
property without her consent and soon found many transactions
occurring in her property.
• In 1997, Radelia Sy represented herself as owner of the property and
petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a new owner’s copy of the TCT,
showing a deed of absolute sale made allegedly by Domingo in her
favor and an affidavit of loss which supposedly contained the
duplicate copy. Such was issued and cancelled in view of the deed of
sale, so a new one was issued in the name of Sy.
• Sy subdivided the lot into two and sold each half to Spouses De Vera
and Cusi. The contracts to sell were annotated on Sy’s TCT, where
the consideration was claimed to be P2M in total when the entire
property had an actual value of P14M. A TCT was then issued to
Spouses De Vera and Cusi. Apparently, the construction activities
were from the initiative of the De Veras.
• Domingo filed an action against the De Veras and Cusis seeking for
annulment of title. RTC ruled that the sale between Domingo and Sy
were void, but the De Veras and Cusi were purchasers in good faith
and for value.
• RTC reconsidered its decision upon motion by Sy and Domingo
separately, declaring the De Veras and Cusi as purchasers in bad faith
and revalidating Domingo’s title.
• The CA affirmed the RTC decision, ruling that the sale conveyed no
title to Sy for being forged; therefore, Sy could not acquire the right
to convey to the buyers. They could not be considered purchasers in
good faith because they knew Sy’s TCT was a reconstituted owner’s
copy. They were also aware of other facts like the simultaneous
transactions and undervaluation of the purchase price. CA denied the
motions for reconsideration.
• Cusi and De Vera now contend that: Sy’s TCT was free of liens or
encumbrances that could have raised suspicion, went beyond the face
of the TCT but did not find anything to doubt the title.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith and for
value.
Ruling:
• First, the judgment on the nullity of the transfer of property to
Sy is immutable since it was decided in unanimity by both courts
to the point that Sy no longer came to Court for further review.
• With regard to Cusi and De Veras’ contention, the records do not
support their common contention.
• Generally, one does not need to go behind the certificate of title
because it contains all the information about the title of its holder
to avoid possible conflicts and dispense with the burdensome
task of inquiring further. The exception is when a person has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such an inquiry – the
determination of intent of which is a factual issue.
• The petitioners did put effort to determine whether the property
belonged to Sy, finding no encumbrance, but they were not just
under the obligation to purchase the property in good faith but
also for value.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
A TCT DERIVED FROM A DUPLICATE OWNER’S COPY FROM A LOSS OF THE
ORIGINAL MANDATES GREATER VIGILANCE
• The petitioners lacked vigilance as buyers. Showing that the
property was unfenced and vacant is not enough, considering
that it would be easy for any registered owner to lose property
over illegal occupation. The fact that the TCT was derived from
a duplicate owner’s copy reissued by virtue of loss of the owner’s
copy should have alerted them to suspicion.
• (Barstowe Philippines Corp. v. Republic) “The nature of a
reconstituted TCT of a registered land is similar to that of a
second Owner’s Duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title in that
both are issued on the representation that the original was lost
– a fact that requires more vigilance.”
• (Garcia v. CA) Similar to this situation, the impostor got ahold
of a TCT through a simulated deed of sale and sold the property
to a transferee (registered owner reflected in the TCT) who
mortgaged it to Spouses Lazaro who also claimed good faith.
However, SC ruled against them, claiming that the property was
a second owner’s duplicate TCT which is in effect, a reconstituted
title. This should have alerted them to make the necessary
investigation.
• The fraud committed in Garcia is similar to this case. They did
not investigate beyond the face of Sy’s TCT despite the
certificate being derived merely from a document akin to a
reconstituted TCT.
SIMULTANEOUS TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING THE TITLE SHOULD HAVE
CAUSED SUSPICION
• Considering the other circumstances, the deed was allegedly
executed on July 14, 1997, the affidavit executed on July 17,
1997, the petition for issuance of a duplicate copy granted on
August 26, 1997, and on October 31, 1997, a real estate
mortgage was executed in favor of Turingan. The simultaneous
series of transactions should have put them on guard.
GROSS UNDERVALUATION OF THE PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE PUT THE
BUYERS ON GUARD
• Another circumstance is the gross undervaluation of the property,
priced at P1M when its actual market value was at least P14M. There
is no acceptable reason to acquiesce to the fraud.
• While De Vera insists that she did not have any hand in the
undervaluation, considering that Sy was the one who prepared the
deed of sale, they were contracting parties who transacted with full
freedom from undue influence from Sy or anyone else.
• While petitioners allege that the sale was nearly P7M for each
property, the argument is devoid of factual basis. The recital of the
deeds of sale were controlling on the consideration of the sales.
• The registered owner of realty cannot be deprived of her property
through fraud, unless a transferee acquires the property as an
innocent purchaser for value. A transferee who acquires the property
covered by a reissued owner's copy of the certificate of title without
taking the ordinary precautions of honest persons in doing business
and examining the records of the proper Registry of Deeds, or who
fails to pay the full market value of the property is not considered an
innocent purchaser for value.
Dela Merced v. GSIS and Spouses Victor
Facts:
• The dispute concerns five registered parcels of land in Pasig City. They
were originally owned by Jose Zulueta. They later mortgaged the lots
to GSIS, which eventually foreclosed the mortgaged properties.
• Dela Merced filed a complaint upon learning of the foreclosure,
praying for the nullity because he was the owner of the lots at the
time of foreclosure. He also impleaded the Manlongats who claimed
that through a sale by GSIS to their daughter Elizabeth, they were
able to own one of the foreclosed properties. He argued that GSIS
had no ownership right that could be transferred.
• He caused an annotation of lis pendens on the TCT. He later died and
was substituted by his heirs, the petitioners in this case.
• After a series of trials, a decision was rendered in favor of Dela
Merced. However, the motion for execution could not be carried out
because of the objections raised by the Register of Deeds and GSIS.
GSIS ARGUES AGAINST EXECUTION SINCE IT IS EXEMPTED FROM
EXECUTION OVER ITS PROPERTIES
• GSIS opposed the motion for execution because RA 8291 (GSIS Act
of 1997) exempts GSIS funds and properties from execution, among
others.
• GSIS filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
implementation of the writ of execution. The CA dismissed the
petition, stating that GSIS never validly acquired ownership over the
subject properties; thus, any rights that GSIS may have had over the
properties were non-existent from the beginning.
• GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. They also
filed an appeal to the SC, but it was also denied.
REGISTER OF DEEDS ARGUES AGAINST EXECUTION FOR INADEQUACY OF
THE WRIT’S DECISION AND NON-EXISTENCE OF OTHER TITLES
• The Register of Deeds of Pasig City argued that he could not enforce
the decision to cancel the titles since GSIS no longer had titles over
the two lots. They already conveyed it in 1985 and 1988 to Bartolome
and Dimaguila (Lot 7 and 8 of Block 2), the lot of Bartolome being
titled under the name of his assignee Victorino. Thus, the RoD claims
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
that the writ must be modified to include cancellation of derivative
titles.
• The RoD found it difficult to implement the cancellation of title over
Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 because no such individual titles
exist in his records, claiming that the two lots must still be included
in the mother title. However, he cannot cancel the mother title since
it would affect the other lots included therein.
• Even arguing that he could cancel the mother title specifically for the
two lots, he could not issue new titles since the office does not have
information about the technical descriptions over the two lots.
• Thus, the RoD requested for a supplemental writ of execution;
however, Judge Fabros denied the petitioners’ motion for
supplemental writ of execution.
ARGUMENTS OVER THE WRIT OF EXECUTION
• Petitioner argues that: the decision can be enforced against GSIS’s
transferees pendente lite because they were given notice of the
pendency. The notice was even carried out in Dimaguila’s and
Victorino’s respective titles. As transferees pendente lite, their titles
are proper subjects of the writs of execution, even if they were not
actual parties to the case. The execution should not be contained only
in the fallo.
• GSIS can no longer raise the issue of exemption since the CA’s
decision on the matter was already affirmed by the SC.
• Basically, petitioners argue against the RoD’s contention, claiming
that the notice of lis pendens was already put in the subsequent titles
of the buyers, so their titles are proper subjects to the writ of
execution.
• Respondent argue that: The petitioners’ motion was properly denied
for trying to modify a final decision. Considering that the final decision
merely ordered cancellation of GSIS’s titles and not the derivative
titles, they can no longer cancel the derivative titles. Furthermore,
they argue that the inclusion of derivative titles would deprive the
holders of due process because they are not bound by the judgment,
being strangers to the action. Finally, GSIS reiterates its argument
on exemption from court processes.
• Basically, GSIS argues that the denial of the motion for supplemental
writ of execution was correct because it would modify a final decision.
Since the final decision was defective for not including derivative
titles, the petitioners can no longer do anything to reclaim the titles
vested to the buyers. Even if they could, the buyers would be
deprived of due process for not being part of the decision.
Issue: (CORE ISSUE) Whether or not a final and executory judgment
against GSIS and Manlongat can be enforced against holders of derivative
titles.
Ruling:
• The issue of GSIS’s exemption was already decided. They can
no longer invoke the same thing twice.
A TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE MUST RESPECT THE OUTCOME OF THE
LITIGATION OVER HIS PROPERTY.
• A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a
real property is in litigation. It serves as a warning that one who
acquires interest over said property does so at his own risk.
• When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of lis
pendens, such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of
litigation by the fact of annotation of lis pendens.
• Considering the existence of these entries to the buyers’ titles, it bars
any defense of good faith. They are merely holders of whatever rights
GSIS might have, which was nothing.
• The title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no
special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good
faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-
in-interest.
• The Court cannot accept GSIS’s narrow interpretation of the decision
because such would render the decision useless. The inclusion of
derivative titles in the writ of execution will not alter the decision in
ordering the cancellation of GSIS’s title.
CANCELLATION OF TITLE MUST BE CARRIED OUT, REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER IT STEMS FROM A MOTHER TITLE OR NOT
• Regarding the cancellation of title, it doesn’t matter whether or not
the titles are individual or contained in the mother title. The RoD has
to carry out their cancellation. If it requires GSIS or the Bureau of
Lands to provide the necessary information, they can be compelled.
• Otherwise, the Court's decision would be rendered inefficacious, and
GSIS would retain ostensible ownership over the lots by the simple
expedience that they are included in a mother title, instead of
individual titles. That result is manifestly contrary to the Court's ruling
and would subvert the very purpose of bringing this case for a
complete resolution.
• When the judgment calls for the issuance of a new title for the winning
party, it also follows that the losing party surrender its title for
cancellation. Petitioners can obtain a court order requiring the
registered owner to surrender the same and directing the entry of a
new certificate of title in petitioners' favor. The trial court should have
granted petitioners' motion for supplemental writ of execution as it
had authority to issue the necessary orders to aid the execution of
the final judgment.
Saberon vs Ventanilla
Principle: Registration is the operative act that conveys ownership or
affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Registration is
constructive notice to third persons.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
FACTS:
History of the case:
• Manila Remnant Co., Inc. (MRCI) was the petitioner, being the
owner of several parcels of land situated in Quezon City, constituting
the subdivision known as Capitol Homes Subdivision Nos. I and II.
• On July 25, 1972, MRCI entered into a contract with A.U. Valencia &
Co. Inc. (AUVC) entitled "Confirmation of Land Development and
Sales Contract,"the latter was to develop the aforesaid subdivision
with authority to manage the sales thereof.
• MRCI and AUVC executed two (2) contracts to sell covering Lots 1
and 2 of Block 17,in favor of the Ventanillas, for the combined
contract price of ₱66,571.00 payable monthly for ten (10) years. The
Ventanillas paid the down payment as stipulated in the two (2)
contracts.
• On March 13, 1970, Valencia, president of MRCI, and without the
knowledge of the Ventanillas, resold the same property to Carlos
Crisostomo
• All the amounts paid by the latter were deposited in Valencia’s bank
account and remitted to MRCI as payments of Crisostomo. The
Ventanillas continued to pay the monthly installment.
• MRCI terminated its business relationship with AUVC on account of
irregularities discovered in its collection and remittances.. Valencia
was
• It was not until March 1978 when the Ventanillas discovered
Valencia’s deception. Believing that they had already remitted the
total amount of ₱73,122.35 for the two lots, the Ventanillas offered
to pay the balance to MRCI. To their shock, their names as lot buyers
did not appear in MRCI’s records.
• MRCI showed them a copy of the contract to sell signed by Valencia,
in favor of Crisostomo. MRCI refused the Ventanillas’ offer to pay for
the remainder of the contract price.
• The Ventanillas commenced an action for specific performance,
annulment of deeds and damages against MRCI, AUVC.
• On November 17, 1980, the CFI Quezon City rendered a decision
declaring the contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas as valid
and subsisting, and annulling the contract to sell in favor of
Crisostomo.
• The CFI Quezon City ruled further that if for any reason the transfer
of the lots could not be effected, MRCI, AUVC and Crisostomo would
be solidarily liable to the Ventanillas for the reimbursement of the
sum of ₱73,122.35, representing the amount they paid for the two
(2) lots, and the legal interest thereon from March 1970, plus the
decreed damages and attorney's fees.
The 1990 case
• MRCI then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari.
• SC i affirmed the decision of the CA and declared the judgment of the
CFI Quezon City immediately executory.
• The Ventanillas moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 26411. The writ was issued on May 3, 1991, and served
upon MRCI on May 9, 1991. A notice of levy was annotated in the
titles of MRCI on May 31, 1991.
• However, the subject properties could not longer be delivered
to the Ventanillas because they had already been sold to
Samuel Marquez (Marquez) on February 7, 1990
The 1994 case
MRCI
• Argued that the sale of the properties to Marquez was valid because
at the time of the sale, the issue of the validity of the sale to the
Ventanillas had not yet been resolved.
• There was no specific injunction against it re-selling the property.
• As a buyer in good faith, Marquez had a right to rely on the recitals
in the certificate of title.
• The subject matter of the controversy having been passed to an
innocent purchaser for value.
VENTILLAS
• The validity of the sale to them had already been established even
while the previous petition was still awaiting resolution.
• The petition only questioned the solidary liability of MRCI to the
Ventanillas.
• The portion of the decision ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed
of sale in their favor had already become final and executory.
• Marquez didn’t protect nor assert his righ over the disputed land.
• The alleged sale to him was merely a ploy of MRCI to evade the
execution of the absolute deed of sale in their favor.
Court’s Decision
The validity of the contract to sell in favor of the Ventanilla spouses is not
disputed by the parties
First, the contract to sell in favor of Marquez was entered into after the
lapse of almost ten years from the rendition of the judgment of the trial
court upholding the sale to the Ventanillas.
Second, the petitioner did not invoke the contract with Marquez during
the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution filed by
the private respondents. It disclosed the contract only after the writ of
execution had been served upon it.
Third, in its manifestation and motion dated December 21, 1990, the
petitioner said it was ready to deliver the titles to the Ventanillas provided
that their counterclaims against private respondents were paid or offset
first.
Fourth, Marquez has not intervened in any of these proceedings to assert
and protect his rights to the subject property as an alleged purchaser in
good faith.
Even if it be assumed that the contract to sell in favor of Marquez
is valid, it cannot prevail over the final and executory judgment
ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the
Ventanillas.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
On March 11, 1992, MRCI registered a deed of absolute sale to Marquez
who eventually sold the same property to the Saberons, which conveyance
was registered in July 1992.
ROD Cleofe opined that a judicial order for the cancellation of the titles in
the name of the Saberons was essential before he complied with the writ
of execution in Civil Case No. 26411
CIVIL Case
• Once again, the Ventanillas were constrained to go to court to seek
the annulment of the deed of sale executed between MRCI and
Marquez as well as the deed of sale between Marquez and the
Saberons, as the fruits of void conveyances.
• Saberons relied on one central argument—that they were purchasers
in good faith, having relied on the correctness of the certificates of
title covering the lots in question; and therefore, holders of a valid
and indefeasible title.
• The Marquez Contract to Sell was in fact the third in a row, and
registered a year later, on May 21, 1991, appears as the first recorded
entry in MRCI’s titles.
• The notice of levy in Civil Case No. 26411 came ten days later, on
May 31, 1991. Then, in February 1992, MRCI executed a deed of
absolute sale to Marquez and when the new titles were issued
in Marquez’ name, the notice of levy was not carried over.
• The said parties were found guilty of bad faith for selling the lots to
Marquez at a time when litigation as to the validity of the first sale to
the Ventanillas was still pending
Present Petition- The main issue
• Saberon filed the present petition
• They were purchasers in good faith and for value.
• Before purchasing the lots, they exercised due diligence and found no
encumbrance or annotations on the titles. They had no notice of any
defect, irregularity or encumbrance in the titles of the property they
purchased.
• They claimed that in 1992, a certain Tiks Bautista offered the lots to
Raul Saberon, who, after being given photocopies of the titles to the
land, inquired with the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City (ROD-QC)
to verify the authenticity of the same. He found no encumbrances
or annotations on the said titles, other than restrictions for
construction and negotiation.
• He then paid Marquez the amount of Two Million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱2,100,000.00) as purchase price for the lots.
• Marquez executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Saberons.
• The ROD-QC then issued TCT Nos. 63140 and 63141 in their names.
• It was only upon receipt of the summons in the case filed by the
Ventanillas with the RTC that they learned of the present controversy.
• The claim of the Ventanillas over the subject properties never ripened
into ownership as they failed to consign the balance on the purchase
price stipulated on the contracts to sell, thus preventing the
obligatory force of the contract from taking effect.
• The Court is beckoned to rule on two conflicting rights over the
subject properties: the right of the Ventanillas to acquire the title to
the registered land from the moment of inscription of the notice of
levy on the day book (or entry book), on one hand; and the right of
the Saberons to rely on what appears on the certificate of title for
purposes of voluntary dealings with the same parcel of land, on the
other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of the notice of levy had produced
constructive notice that would bind third persons despite the failure of the
ROD-QC to annotate the same in the certificates of title?
RULING: YES!
• No bad faith can be ascribed to the parties alike. The Saberons
could not be said to have authored the entanglement they found
themselves in. No fault can be attributed to them for relying on
the face of the title presented by Marquez.
• However, MRCI’s transaction with Marquez "cannot prevail over
the final and executory judgment ordering MRCI to execute an
absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas." Considering
that the deed of sale in favor of Marquez was of later
registration, the notice of levy should have been carried over to
the title as a senior encumbrance.
• A levy of a judgment debtor creates a lien, which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment of the levy itself. Prior registration of the lien creates
a preference, since the act of registration is the operative act to
convey and affect the land.
• Thus, the court ruled on the superiority of the Ventanillas’ notice
of levy and the constructive notice against the whole world which
it had produced and which effectively bound third persons
including the Saberons.
• Verily, the controversy at hand arose not from the
Ventanillas’ fault, but from ROD Cleofe’s misplaced
understanding of his duty under the law.
• In cases of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered
owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of
title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid
deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the
same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the registration
fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power
to perform.The Register of Deeds is duty bound to perform
it.
• In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the
day book is a sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's
duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
deeds. Therefore, in the registration of an attachment,
levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like,
the entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to
all persons of such adverse claim.
• The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated
on the original title on file in the Registry of Deeds, which
resulted in its non-annotation on the title TCT No. PT-94912,
should not prejudice petitioner.
• As long as the requisites required by law in order to effect
attachment are complied with and the appropriate fees duly
paid, attachment is duly perfected. The attachment already
binds the land. This is because what remains to be done lies not
within the petitioner’s power to perform but is a duty incumbent
solely on the Register of Deeds. There is effective registration
once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for
purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be
accomplished lies solely on the Register of Deeds.
• The notice of levy covering the subject property was annotated
in the entry book of the ROD QC prior to the issuance of a TCT
in the name of the Saberons.
• Clearly, the Ventanillas’ levy was placed on record prior to the
sale.
• Nevertheless, the equal footing of the parties necessarily
tilts in favor of the superiority of the Ventanillas’ notice
of levy, as discussed.
Contract to Sell Issue
• The Court also sees no reason to dwell in the contention that the
rights or interests of the Ventanillas in the subject properties
never ripened into ownership. It bears stressing that the
previous decisions discussed herein already sealed the validity
of the contract to sell issued to the Ventanillas decades ago.
Laches
• The attribution of laches against the Ventanillas is flawed.
• While the Ventanillas may have been unaware that
improvements were being erected over the lots, this
obliviousness can, by no means, be treated as a lack of vigilance
on their part. Considering the length of litigation which they had
to endure in order to assert their right over the property which
they have painstakingly paid for decades ago.
Builder in Good faith
• The Court finds the Saberons to be builders in good faith.
• No less than the court a quo observed that "no actual evidence that
the Saberons connived with the MRCI and Marquez to have the titles
registered in their names to the prejudice of the (Ventanillas)" and
that what was obvious was that "the Saberons dealt with clean
certificates of titles."
SHORTER VERSION: ONLY ABOUT THE MAIN ISSUE
Facts: The Ventanillas sought the recovery of two parcels of land which
the vendors, MRCI and AUVC, sold to another party. The Ventanillas
caused the attachment of a notice of levy covering the subject property
and was annotated in the entry book of the RD of QC. MRCI dealt the same
property to Marquez, however, the notice of levy was not carried over to
Marquez’s title. Marquez subsequently sold the property to the Saberons.
The Saberons filed a case on one central argument—that they were
purchasers in good faith, having relied on the correctness of the certificates
of title covering the lots in question. Admittedly, the notice of levy covering
the subject property was annotated in the entry book of the
RD of QC prior to the issuance of a TCT in the name of the Saberons.
Issue: Did the notice on levy annotated in the entry book of the RD of QC
serve as constructive notice to the Saberons?
Held: No bad faith can be ascribed to the parties alike. Nevertheless, the
equal footing of the parties necessarily tilts in favor of the superiority of
the Ventanillas' notice of levy. The fact that the notice of levy on
attachment was not annotated on the original title on file in the RD, which
resulted in its non-annotation on the title of Marquez should not prejudice
petitioner. As long as the requisites required by law in order to effect
attachment are complied with and the appropriate fees duly paid,
attachment is duly perfected. What remained to be done was not within
the Ventanillas’ power to perform but was a duty incumbent solely on the
RD. Clearly, the Ventanillas’ levy was placed on record prior to the sale.
This shows the superiority and preference in rights of the Ventanillas over
the property as against the Saberons.
BPI vs Sanchez
Facts:
• Vicente Victor C. Sanchez (Vicente), Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and
Imelda C. V da. De Sanchez owned a parcel of land located at Quezon
City consisting of 900 square meters. The property was registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 156254.
• On October 10, 1988, Jesus V. Garcia (Garcia), doing business under
the name Trans American Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI) offered
to buy the Subject Property for ₱1,800,000 under certain conditions.
• On October 1988, Felisa Yap (Yap), the widow of Kenneth Nereo
Sanchez, and Garcia agreed to the sale of the subject property.
Pursuant to this agreement, Yap turned over to Garcia the
original owner’s copy of TCT 156254, the copy of the filed
Application for Restitution of Title to the property, and copies of all
receipts for the payment of real estate taxes on the property,while
Garcia paid Yap 50,000 as earnest money.
• Garcia, without Yap’s knowledge and consent, took possession of the
lot and installed his own caretaker thereon with strict instructions not
to allow anyone to enter the property.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
• Yap later learned that Garcia had also demolished the house on the
property and advertised the construction and sale of "Trans American
Townhouse V" thereon.
• Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon.
• However, the last two (2) checks given by Garcia as payment ,
amounting to ₱400,000 each, were dishonored for the reason of
"DAIF" or drawn against insufficient funds.
• Yap wrote a letter dated December 26, 1988 to Garcia informing him
that the two (2) checks were dishonored and asking that the checks
be replaced within five (5) days from receipt of the letter. Such
request was left unheeded.
• On January 10, 1989, Yap informed Garcia in a letter that she and
Vicente were rescinding the Agreement while demanding the return
of the original owner’s copy of TCT 156254.
• Thus, Garcia effectively refused to return the documents and to
vacate the subject property.
• On February 19, 1989, Yap and Vicente discovered that Garcia posted
an advertisement in the classified ads of the Manila Bulletin
offering to sell units at the Trans American Townhouse V
situated at the subject property.
• Thus, on February 27, 1989, Atty. Yap wrote the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) informing the latter of the existing
public advertisement of TSEI offering for sale townhouses illegally
constructed on the subject property and urging the HLURB to cancel
any existing permit or license to sell the said townhouse unitsor to
deny any application therefor.
• On March 17, 1989, the HLURB issued a Cease and Desist
Order19 (CDO) enjoining TSEI and Garcia from further developing and
selling the townhouses.
• Garcia and TSEI have not been issued any permit by said Board for
the townhouse Project on the subject lot.
• Undeterred, TSEI continued its construction and selling activities for
the townhouses. Thus, the HLURB issued an Order dated June 1,
198924 fining TSEI in the amount of ₱10,000.
• Yap also wrote a letter dated April 3, 1989 to the Register of Deeds
in Quezon City informing it that TCT 156254 was no longer in their
possession and requesting that the office clear the matter with them
first before acting on any transaction pertaining to the subject
property.
• Yap and Vicente, , filed a Complaint dated February 14, 1990 for the
rescission of contract, restitution and damages with prayer for
TRO/preliminary injunction against TSEI and Garcia, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-90-4690.
• Garcia managed to cause the cancellation of TCT 156254 and
its replacement with TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI.
However, bore the date of issuance as June 9, 1988,way
before the parties agreed on the sale sometime in October
1988.
• Garcia apparently used TCT 383697 to entice several buyers to buy
the townhouse units being constructed by TSEI on the subject lot.
• Claiming to have bought townhouse units sometime in early 1989,
the following intervened in the instant case: the spouses Jose and
Visitacion Caminas (Caminas), Reynaldo V. Maniwang (Maniwang),
Generoso C. Tulagan (Tulagan), Varied Traders Concept, Inc. (VTCI),
and Arturo Marquez (Marquez). TSEI left the townhouse units
unfinished, leaving these intervenors to finish their townhouses by
themselves.
• The intervenors Caminas, Maniwang, Tulagan, and Marquez
asserted that they were all shown TCT 383697 in the name of
TSEI but nevertheless signed their respective contracts with
TSEI indicating the subject property as covered by TCT
156254. Subsequently, they all got a photocopy of TCT 383697 and
verified the same with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, which
confirmed that the title was clean
• On the other hand, only the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of VTCI,
dated October 30, 1987, reflected that the property sold was covered
by TCT 383697.
• Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) now BPI entered into
a Loan Agreement 44 dated May 22, 1989 with TSEI secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over TCT 156254. Garcia purportedly explained
to FEBTC that the parties were still in the process of transferring the
title.
• Afterwards, Garcia submitted a copy of TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name.
Upon default, FEBTC foreclosed the subject lot and had the
Foreclosure Certificate of Sale annotated on TCT 383697.
RTC
• The Sanchezes have the right to rescind the Agreement they entered
into with Garcia and TSEI under proviso no. 6 of the Agreement.
• The Agreement is in the nature of a contract to sell, the ownership
over the subject property remained with the Sanchezes as the
suspensive condition––that the check payments shall be honored––
was not complied with.
• Thus, the RTC concluded that there was not even any need for
rescission in this case.
• TSEI and Garcia were builders in bad faith as the Sanchezes never
consented to the construction of the townhouses.
• the presentation by Garcia and TSEI to the intervenors of TCT
383697 in TSEI’s name sufficiently shows their bad faith.
• Anent the rights of intervenors, the RTC found the Sanchezes to have
a better right over the subject property..
CA
• Affirmed the RTC’s decision with modifications.
• The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel the
TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name and the reinstatement of TCT 156254 in
the names of the Sanchezes.
• Sanchezes equally in bad faith with TSEI and Garcia
• They blame on the Sanchezes and argue that there was negligence
on the latter’s part when they turned over the owner’s original
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
duplicate copy of TCT 156254 despite receiving only the ₱50,000
earnest money.
• Sanchezes were also negligent for surrendering possession of the
subject property to Garcia and TSEI, and for failing to stop the
construction of the townhouses on the subject property.
RULING:
The Sanchezes are not guilty of negligence
• Garcia committed himself he would personally undertake the
preparation and execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement with
Sale as well as the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No.
156254 on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
• Thus, it was inevitably for plaintiff-appellant/appellee Felisa Yap
to surrender to defendant Garcia the owner’s duplicate copy of
the aforesaid title as well as the other documents pertinent for
such documentation and reconstitution.
• The surrender was purely to comply with and in pursuance to
their earlier agreement with the defendants.
POSSESSION:
• The records would disclose that the plaintiffs
appellants/appellees did not voluntarily surrender possession
thereof to defendants.
• It was defendant Garcia who took possession of the subject
property, without plaintiffs-appellants/appellees knowledge.
The Sanchezes did not act in bad faith
• There is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act
was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
• Sanchezes did take action to oppose the construction on their
property by writing the HLURB and the City Building Official of
Quezon City. As a result, the HLURB issued two (2) Cease and
Desist Orders and several directives against Garcia/TSEI which,
however, were left unheeded.
Garcia, TSEI, BPI, and the intervenors acted in bad faith
a. Garcia and TSEI acted in bad faith
• They knew for a fact that the property still belonged to the
Sanchezes and yet proceeded to build the townhouses not just
without the authority of the landowners, but also against their
will.
b. Intervenors Sps. Caminas, Maniwang, Tulagan, and Marquez acted in
bad faith (IMPORTANT)
• All persons dealing with property covered by a torrens certificate
of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face
of the title.
• Exception:Where the purchaser or mortgagee has knowledge of
a defect or lack of title in the vendor, or that he was aware
ofsufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the property in litigation
• One who buys property withfull knowledge of the flaws
and defects in the title of the vendor is enough proof of
his bad faith and estopped from claiming that he acquired
the property in good faith against the owners
The factual milieu of the case reveals that intervenors are buyers in bad
faith for the following reasons,
• They admitted that they executed either contracts of sale or
contracts to sell indicating that the lot is covered by TCT No.
156254 registered under the name of the respondent
Sanchezes.
• The fact that the lot being sold to them belonged to persons
other than TSEI or Garcia should have driven the intervenors,
as prudence would dictate, to investigate the true status of the
property.
• The intervenors should havebeen suspicious of the explanation
of Garcia that TCT No. 383697, reflecting TSEI as the owner of
the property, has been burned and that he is in the process of
reconstituting the title. Before signing the contract of sale or
contract to sell, they should have asked Garcia where the
reconstitution case has been filed or is pending and proceeded
to verify with the said court the status of the reconstitution.
• The intervenors knew that they were buying a townhouse over
a subdivision lot from TSEI and Garcia. Such being the case,
they should have verified with the HLURB whether said project
is registered with said housing agency and if a license to sell has
been issued to TSEI or Garcia.
VCTI acted in bad faith
FIRST
• VTCI has not shown that it verified with the RD if the alleged TCT
383697 of respondent TSEI is valid and genuine.
• It should be remembered that the duplicate certificate of TCT 156254
was lost and subject of reconstitution. Yet respondents Garcia and
TSEI were not able to show that it was already reconstituted. In
addition, there was no deed of absolute sale executed by the
Sanchezes in favor of TSEI as the latter failed to pay the last two (2)
installments and subsequently, the agreement to sell was rescinded
by the Sanchezes for non-payment.
• There being no deed of absolute sale, there is, consequently, no
ground for the RD to cancel TCT No. 156254 and subsequently issue
TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI.
• This goes to show that TCT 383697 of TSEI appears to be
spurious and a fake title.
• This is buttressed by the fact that the date of the issuance of TCT
383697 is June 9, l988, pre-dating the execution of the Agreement
between the Sanchezes and TSEI on December 8, l988.
• With the failure of VTCI to exert earnest efforts to verify the
authenticity of TCT 383697, then it is not a purchaser in good
faith.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
SECOND
• Garcia and TSEI stopped the construction of the townhouses on March
30, l989 pursuant to the CDO of the HLURB despite the non-
completion of the townhouses, VTCI still fully paid the uniform
price of ₱700,000 for the townhouse on each of the 3 lots
THIRD
• With the CDO and the warnings to the public and prospective buyers
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on April 16, 1989 and in the
Manila Bulletin on April 19, 2014, VTCI should have been aware of
the irregularities in the proposed sale of townhouses by Garcia and
TSEI.
d. BPI cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith
• Considering that Garcia/TSEI were already selling the townhouse
units to the public as early as January 1989, FEBTC was remiss in not
requiring Garcia/TSEI to submit a written approval from the HLSURB
for the mortgage of the subject property where the townhouse units
were being constructed as required
• The purported issuance of TCT 383697 was made more than six (6)
months before Garcia/TSEI approached the bank for the loan. Thus,
FEBTC should have been placed on guard as to why Garcia/TSEI
initially gave it TCT 156254 in the name of the Sanchezes when TCTC
383697 was purportedly already issued and in Garcia’s possession
way before the bank loan was negotiated.
Rescission of the Agreement was not barred by the subsequent
transfer
• Failure of TSEI to pay the consideration for the sale of the subject
property entitled the Sanchezes to rescind the Agreement.
• And in view of the finding that the intervenors acted in bad faith in
purchasing the property, the subsequent transfer in their favor did
not and cannot bar rescission.
Home Bankers Savings vs CA
Principle: The one who mortgaged the property must be the absolute
owner of the property. With respect to banks, they have to go beyond
the title and exercise extraordinary diligence.
Facts: Each of private respondents namely, entered into separate
contracts to sell with TransAmerican through the latter's Owner/General
Manager, Engr.
Jesus Garcia, involving certain portions of land. On May 30, 1989, Engr.
Garcia and his wife obtained a loan from petitioner Home Bankers
without the prior approval of the HLURB and mortgaged eight lots as
collateral. Home Bankers registered its mortgage on these titles without
any other encumbrance or lien annotated therein. However, five out of
these eight titles turned out to be private respondents' townhouses
subject of the contracts to sell with TransAmerican. Home Bankers
eventually foreclosed the mortgage, and a sheriff’s certificate of sale in
its favor was annotated on the titles of the subject lots.
Issue: Whether the mortgage was valid and enforceable against
respondents.
Held: No, the mortagege was null and void. Garcia was not the absolute
owner of the subject parcels. Moeover, Home Bankers cannot be innocent
purchasers because judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of
banks to investigate, examine and assess the real estate offered as
security for the application of a loan. We cannot overemphasize the fact
that the Bank cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or
titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or lien, that it
was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching
implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.
D. Morgagee in Good Faith
Ruiz vs Dimailig
• Respondent Bernardo F. Dimailig (Bernardo) was the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-361747 located in
Alapan, Imus, Cavite.
• In October 1997, he entrusted the owner’s copy of the said TCT to his
brother, Jovannie, who in turn gave the title to Editha Sanggalang
(Editha), a broker, for its intended sale.
• However, in January 1998, the property was mortgaged to Evelyn V.
Ruiz (Evelyn) as evidenced by a Deed of REM without Bernardo’s
knowledge and consent.
• Hence, Bernardo instituted this suit for annulment of the Deed of
REM.
• Evelyn insisted that she is a mortgagee in good faith & for value.
• She met Jovannie when she inspected the subject property and
assured her that Bernardo owned the property and his title thereto
was genuine.
• The REM cannot be annulled and that she had the right to keep the
owner's copy of TCT No. T-3617 4 7 until the loan was fully paid to
her.
• BERNARDO testified that when he went abroad on October 19, 1997,
he left the owner's copy of the TCT of the subject property to Jovannie
as they intended to sell the subject property.
• He argued that his alleged signature appearing therein was merely
forged as he was still abroad at that time.
• When he learned in September or November 1998 that Editha
mortgaged the subject property, be personally told Evelyn that the
REM was fake and demanded the return of his title. Not heeding his
request, he filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of public
document against Editha and Evelyn, The criminal case against
Evelyn was dismissed while Editha was found guilty as charged.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
• JOVANNIE testified that Editha convinced him to surrender the
owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 which she would show her buyer.
• Editha informed him that she misplaced the title
• EDITHA said a certain Parani, introduced himself as "Bernardo",
mortgaged the subject property to her for ₱300,000.00 payable
within a period of three months. She asserted that even after the
expiration of said period, "Bernardo" failed to pay the loan.
• Before accepting the mortgage they inspected the land but she only
stayed in the vehicle as she was still recuperating from an operation.
She admitted that she neither verified from the neighborhood the
owner of the property nor approached the occupant thereof. The
person who introduced himself as Bernardo presented a community
tax certificate and his picture as proof of identity. She admitted that
she did not ask for any identification card from "Bernardo.
RTC: Evelyn was a mortgagee in good faith because she was unaware that
the person who represented himself as Bernardo was an impostor.
Evelyn caused the verification of the title of the property with the RD and
found the same to be free from any lien or encumbrance. Evelyn also
inspected the property and met Jovannie during such inspection.
CA: The "innocent purchaser (mortgagor in this case) for value protected
by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by
the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed.
Since the Deed of REM was forged, and the title to the subject property is
still in the name of the rightful owner, and the mortgagor is a different
person who only pretended to be the owner, then Evelyn cannot seek
protection from the cloak of the principle of mortgagee in good faith.
Issue: WON EVELYN IS A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH
RULING: No. The mortgage contract was forged as it was entered into by
Evelyn with an impostor, the registered owner of the property, Bernardo,
correspondingly did not lose his title thereon, and Evelyn did not acquire
any right or title on the property and cannot invoke that she is a mortgagee
in good faith and for value
RULE 45: The issue of whether a person is a mortgagee in good faith is
not within the ambit of a Rule 45 Petition. The determination of presence
or absence of good faith, and of negligence are factual matters, which are
outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari.
Exception: When there is a different or conflicting factual findings
between the RTC and CA, such as in this case.
MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH:
• Evelyn cannot invoke the protection given to a mortgagee in
good faith.
• No valid mortgage will arise unless the mortgagor has a valid
title or ownership over the mortgaged property.
• Such doctrine of mortgagee in good faith presupposes
"that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the
property, has already succeeded in obtaining a Torrens
title over the property in his name and that, after
obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the
property to another who relies on what appears on the
said title."
• In order for a mortgagee to invoke the doctrine of mortgagee in
good faith, the impostor must have succeeded in obtaining a
Torrens title in his name and thereafter in mortgaging the
property. Where the mortgagor is an impostor who only
pretended to be the registered owner, and acting on such
pretense, mortgaged the property to another, the mortgagor
evidently did not succeed in having the property titled in his or
her name, and the mortgagee cannot rely on such pretense as
what appears on the title is not the impostor's name but that of
the registered owner.
• In the case at hand, the title to the subject property remained
registered in the name of Bernardo. It was not transferred to the
impostor's name when Evelyn transacted with the latter. Hence,
the principle of mortgagee in good faith finds no application;
correspondingly, Evelyn cannot not seek refuge therefrom.
FORGED DOCUMENT:
• During pre-trial, both parties agreed that it was not Bernardo
who signed as the mortgagor in the Deed of REM.
• It was only an impostor - representing himself as Bernardo -
who mortgaged the property.
• This impostor is not only without rightful ownership on the
mortgaged property, he also has no Torrens title in his own
name involving said property.
• Simply put, for being a forged instrument, the Deed of REM is a
nullity and conveys no title
Evelyn did not take the necessary steps to determine any defect in
the title of the alleged owner of the mortgaged property.
• '"Bernardo" introduced himself to Evelyn as the owner of the
property, he did not present any proof of identification.
• To recall, he only exhibited his community tax certificate and a picture
when he introduced himself to Evelyn.
• Evelyn also ignored the fact that "Bernardo'' did not participate in the
negotiations/transactions leading to the execution of the Deed of
REM. Notably, no power of attorney was given to Editha who
supposedly transacted in behalf of Bernardo.
• Evelyn likewise failed to ascertain the supposed title of "Bernardo"
over the property, Evelyn admitted that during the ocular inspection,
she remained in the vehicle. She did not inquire from the subject
property's occupant or from the occupants of the surrounding
properties if they knew "Bernardo" and whether or not he owned the
subject property.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
• Evelyn hastily granted the loan and entered into the mortgage
contract
• Where the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the loan, without
first determining the ownership of the property being mortgaged, the
mortgagee cannot be considered as an innocent mortgagee in good
faith.
E. Sale Involving Real Estate
TO BE ENFORCEABLE:
ART. 1358, NCC xxx [s]ales of real property or of an interest therein are
governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405. xxx
Art. 1403 (2) – xxx In the following cases, an agreement hereafter made
shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged,
or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents xxx
TO BE REGISTRABLE
ART. 1358, NCC – The following must appear in a public document:
(1) Acts and contract which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property xxx GSIS and subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the
subject properties, which (as it turns out) is none at all. What Dimaguila
and Victorino possess are derivative titles of the GSIS's over the subject
parcels, which this Court has finally adjudicated to be null and void.
Esguerra vs Trinidad
FACTS:
Sale of immovable made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain
sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or
decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number
than that stated in the contract.
FACTS:
 Felipe Esguerra and Praxedes de Vera (Esguerra spouses) were the
owners of several parcels of land in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan —
among them a 35,284-square meter parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 10374 and a 23,989-square meter parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 12080.
 [Tax Dec 10374] Half of it (17,642 square meters) they sold to their
grandchildren, herein petitioners Feliciano, Canuto, Justa, Angel,
Fidela, Clara and Pedro, all surnamed Esguerra.
 [Tax Dec 12080] 23,489 square meters of which they also sold to
petitioners, and the remaining 500 square meters they sold to their
other grandchildren, the brothers Eulalio and Julian Trinidad
(Trinidad brothers).
 Also sold to the Trinidad brothers were a 7,048-square meter parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9059, a 4,618-square meter
parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 12081, and a 768-square
meter parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 13989.
 The Esguerra spouses executed the necessary Deed of Sale in favor of
petitioners on August 11, 1937, 1 and that in favor of the Trinidad
brothers on August 17, 1937. 2 Both documents were executed before
notary public Maximo Abaño.
 [IMPORTANT FACTS] Eulalio Trinidad later sold his share of the
land to his daughters-respondents herein, via a notarized Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa 3 dated October 13, 1965. A portion of
the land consisting of 1,693 square meters was later assigned Lot No.
3593 during a cadastral survey conducted in the late 1960s. On
respondents' application for registration of title OCT No. 0-3631 was
issued in their name.
 Meanwhile, on November 10, 1958, petitioners sold to respondents'
parents Eulalio Trinidad and Damiana Rodeadilla (Trinidad spouses) a
portion of about 5,000 square meters of the 23,489-square meter of
land which they previously acquired from the Esguerra spouses. During
the same cadastral survey conducted in the late 1960s, it was
discovered that the about 5,000-square meter portion of petitioners'
parcel of land sold to the Trinidad spouses which was assigned Lot No.
3591 actually measured 6,268 square meters. In a subsequent
application for registration of title over Lot No. 3591 OCT No. 0-6498
was issued in the name of Trinidad.
Petitioners fault the appellate court:
1. . . . in misappreciating the fact that the act of the respondent Eulalio
Trinidad in acquiring the property from Felipe Esguerra constituted fraud.
Based on the testimony of Appellant Pedro Esguerra that he does not know
how appellees were able to secure a title over the lot in question and that
they never sold Lot No. 3593 to Virginia Trinidad since it is part of the
whole lot of 23,489 square meters.
2. . . . in the [i]nterpretation and application of the provisions of Article
1542 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON there is fraud [Not important and not discussed
thoroughly in the case] & WON Article 1542 of Civil Code can apply
in this case because of the discrepancy of the Area of Lot 3593 sold.
[topic]
RULING:
 No. The said testimony is a mere conclusion on the part of appellants.
On the other hand, the evidence shows that appellees acquired title
over the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale executed by their
father Eulalio Trinidad in their favor.
 Under the Torrens System, an OCT enjoys a presumption of validity,
which correlatively carries a strong presumption that the provisions of
the law governing the registration of land which led to its issuance
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
have been duly followed. Fraud being a serious charge, it must be
supported by clear and convincing proof. Petitioners failed to discharge
the burden of proof, however.
1. No. It is clear from the afore-quoted Bilihan ng Lupa that what
appellants sold to Eulalio was the "bahaging palayan." Though
measured as 5,000 square meters, more or less, such
measurement is only an approximation, and not an exact
measurement. Moreover, we take note of the fact that the said
deed of sale mentioned the boundaries covering the whole area
of 33,489 square meters, including the "bahaging palayan." Had
appellants intended to sell only a portion of the "bahaging
palayan," they could have stated the specific area in the deed of
sale and not the entire "bahaging palayan"
Most importantly, the circumstances attendant to the inclusion
of the excess area bare nothing atypical or significant to hint at
unreasonableness. It must be noted that the land was not yet
technically surveyed at the time of the sale. As vendors who
themselves executed the Bilihan ng Lupa, petitioners may rightly
be presumed to have acquired a good estimate of the value and
area of the bahaging palayan.
 On the questioned interpretation and application by the appellate court
of Article 1542 of the Civil Code reading:
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump
sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit
of measure or number, there shall be no increase
or decrease of the price, although there be a
greater or less areas or number than that stated in
the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more
immovables are sold for a single price; but if,
besides mentioning the boundaries, which is
indispensable in every conveyance of real estate,
its area or number should be designated in the
contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all
that is included within said boundaries, even when
it exceeds the area or number specified in the
contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he
shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to
what is lacking in the area or number, unless the
contract is rescinded because the vendee does not
accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In sales involving real estate, the parties may
choose between two types of pricing agreement:
a unitprice contract wherein the purchase price is
determined by way of reference to a stated rate per
unit area (e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or
a lump sum contract which states a full purchase
price for an immovable the area of which may be
declared based on an estimate or where both the
area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for
1,000 square meters, etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court discussed the
distinction:
. . . In a unit price contract, the statement of area
of immovable is not conclusive and the price may
be reduced or increased depending on the area
actually delivered. If the vendor delivers less than
the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the
vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the
contract or demand for the proportionate reduction
of the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If
the vendor delivers more than the area stated in
the contract, the vendee has the option to accept
only the amount agreed upon or to accept the
whole area, provided he pays for the additional area
at the contract rate.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case where the area of the immovable is
stated in the contract based on an estimate, the
actual area delivered may not measure up exactly
with the area stated in the contract. According to
Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real
estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of
a certain sum for a unit of measure or number,
there shall be no increase or decrease of the price,
although there be a greater or less areas or number
than that stated in the contract. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Where both the area and the boundaries of the
immovable are declared, the area covered
within the boundaries of the immovable
prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict
between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which
should prevail. What really defines a piece of
ground is not the area, calculated with more or
less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the
land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale
of land in a mass, it is well established that the
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
specific boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any statement with respect to the area
contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital
consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land
should disclose the area with mathematical
accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively
indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to
identify it. An error as to the superficial area is
immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to
deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch
as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the
determinate object. 28 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar
words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or
deficiency.
 In OCT No. 0-6498, the increase by a fourth of a fraction of the
area indicated in the deed of sale cannot be considered as an
unreasonable excess.
 The complaints were also time-barred, noted that when the complaints
were filed in 1994, more than 27 years had elapsed from the issuance
of OCT No. 0-3631 and more than 20 years from the issuance of OCT
No. 0-6498. The prescriptive period of one (1) year had thus set in.
Arcaina vs. Ingram
Facts:
 Arcaina is the owner of a parcel of land. Her attorney-in-fact,
Banta, entered into a contract with Ingram for the sale of the
property. Banta represented that the property has an area of
more or less 6,200 aquare meters (sq.m.) per the tax
declaration covering it. The contract price was ₱1,860,000.00,
with Ingram making installment payments for the property.
Ingram still had an obligation to pay the remaining balance in
the amount of ₱145,000.00.
 Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be surveyed and
discovered that the lot has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon
learning of the actual area of the property, Banta allegedly
insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains unsold. This
was opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the whole lot
by virtue of the sale; he then instituted the recovery case.
 The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) dismissed the complaint
and declared that, for Ingram to be awarded the excess 5,800
sq. m. portion of the property, she should have presented
evidence that she paid for the surplus area consistent with
Article 1540 of the Civil Code.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed and set aside the Order
of the MCTC. The RTC found that neither of the parties presented
competent evidence to prove the property’s actual area. Hence,
the RTC concluded that the area of the lot as shown by the
boundaries indicated in the deeds of sale is only 6,200 sq. m.
more or less. In addition, the RTC held that Article 1542, which
covers sale of real estate in lump sum, applies in this case.
Having apparently sold the entire lot for a lump sum, Arcaina,
as the vendor, is obligated to deliver all the land included in the
boundaries of the property, regardless of whether the real area
should be greater or smaller than what is recited in the deeds of
sale.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with the RTC that the sale was
made for a lump sum and not on a per-square-meter basis. The
CA explained that in case of conflict between the area and the
boundaries of a land subject of the sale, the vendor is obliged to
deliver to the vendee everything within the boundaries. This is
in consonance with Article 1542 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
now assail the CA’ s declaration that the sale of the property was
made for a lump sum.
 Petitioners insist that they sold the property on a per-square-
meter basis, at the rate of ₱300.00 per sq. m. Since the sale
was on a per-square-meter basis, petitioners argue that it is
Article 1539, and not Article 1542 of the Civil Code, which
governs.
Issue: Is the sale in this case a sale for a lump sum?
If this is a sale for a lump sum, should the excess area then be
awarded to Respondents?
Ruling:
 Yes. In Del Prado v. Spouses Caballero, we were confronted with
facts analogous to the present petition. Pending the issuance of the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in their name, Spouses Caballero sold
a parcel of land to Del Prado. The contract of sale stated both the
property’s boundaries and estimated area of more or less 4,000 sq. m.
 Later, when the OCT was issued, the technical description of the
property appeared to be 14,457 sq. m., more or less. Del Prado alleged
that Spouses Caballero were bound to deliver all that was included in
the boundaries of the land since the sale was made for a lump sum.
Although, we agreed with Del Prado that the sale partakes of the
nature of a lump sum contract, we did not apply Article 1542. In
holding that Del Prado is entitled only to the area stated in the contract
of sale, we explained:
 The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is
not hard and fast and admits of an exception. It held:
 “A caveat is in order, however. The use of “more or less” or similar
words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or
deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description “more
or less” with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all
risk of quantity in the land.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 In a contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated
in the contract must control over any other statement, with respect to
the area contained within its boundaries.
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines the phrase “more or less” to mean:
 “About; substantially; or approximately; implying that both parties
assume the risk of any ordinary discrepancy. The words are intended
to cover slight or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity, Carter v. Finch,
186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d 408; and are ordinarily to be interpreted as
taking care of unsubstantial differences or differences of small
importance compared to the whole number of items transferred.”
 In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all
the land covered within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real
area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.
However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered
by the boundaries and the estimated area stated in the contract of
sale, he/she shall do so only when the excess or deficiency between
the former and the latter is reasonable.
 Applying Del Prado to the case before us, we find that the difference
of 5,800 sq. m. is too substantial to be considered reasonable.
 Further, at the time of the sale, Ingram and petitioners did not have
knowledge of the actual area of the land within the boundaries of the
property. It is undisputed that before the survey, the parties relied on
the tax declaration covering the lot, which merely stated that it
measures more or less 6,200 sq. m. Thus, when petitioners offered
the property for sale and when Ingram accepted the offer, the object
of their consent or meeting of the minds is only a 6,200 sq. m.
property.
Agatep vs. Rodriguez
FACTS:
The subject property was previously owned by herein
respondent Natalia Aguinaldo Vda. de Lim. On July 18, 1975, Lim
mortgaged the lot to the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Lim was not
able to pay her loan prompting PNB to foreclose the property. As a
consequence, TCT No. T-10759 in the name of Lim was canceled
and a new certificate of title (TCT No. T-65894) was issued in the
name of PNB on November 8, 1985. 6
Meanwhile, on August 18, 1976, while the mortgage was
still in effect, Lim sold the subject property to herein petitioner's
husband, Isaac Agatep (Agatep). However, the sale was not
registered. Neither did Lim deliver the title to petitioner or her
husband. Nonetheless, Agatep took possession of the same, fenced it
with barbed wire and introduced improvements thereon.
In July 1992, the subject lot was included among PNB's
acquired assets for sale. Later on, an invitation to bid was duly
published. On April 20, 1993, the disputed parcel of land was sold to
herein respondent Roberta L. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), who is the
daughter of respondent Lim. Subsequently, TCT No. T-65894, in the
name of PNB, was canceled and a new title (TCT No. T-89400) was
issued in the name of Rodriguez.
On January 27, 1995, herein petitioner filed a
Complaint for "reconveyance and/or damages" with the RTC of
Aparri, Cagayan against herein respondents.
Later, the complaint was amended to implead PNB as a
party-defendant.
ISSUE:
1. WON PNB is in good faith in registering the land
2. WON PNB did not acquire ownership over the disputed lot
because the said property was not delivered to it.
3. WON Agatep is bound to recognize and respect the mortgage
entered by Lim to PNB.
RULING:
1. Yes. PNB is innocent.
Petitioner insists that PNB is not a mortgagee in good faith asserting
that, if it only exercised due diligence, it would have found out that
petitioner and her husband were already in adverse possession of the
subject property as early as two years before the same was sold to
them. This claim, however, is contradicted by no less than petitioner's
averments in her Brief filed with the CA wherein she stated that
"[i]mmediately after the sale, the land was delivered to Isaac Agatep .
. . Since that time up to the present, Isaac Agatep and after his death,
the Appellant have been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and
public possession of the said parcel of land". 24 The foregoing assertion
only shows that petitioner's husband took possession of the subject lot
only after the same was sold to him.
In any case, the Court finds no error in the findings of both the RTC and
the CA that PNB is indeed an innocent mortgagee for value. When
the lots were mortgaged to PNB by Lim, the titles thereto were in the
latter's name, and they showed neither vice nor infirmity. In accepting the
mortgage, PNB was not required to make any further investigation of the
titles to the properties being given as security, and could rely entirely on
what was stated in the aforesaid title. The public interest in upholding the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful ownership
of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee
who, in good faith, relies upon what appears on the face of the certificate
of title.
2. No, PNB acquired ownership.
Petitioner asserts that the execution of a public document does not
constitute sufficient delivery to PNB, considering that the subject
property is in the adverse possession, under claim of ownership, of
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner further assails the
ruling of the CA that PNB, who was the buyer in the foreclosure sale,
became the absolute owner of the property purchased when it
consolidated its ownership thereof for failure of the mortgagor Lim to
redeem the subject property during the period of one year after the
registration of the sale.
The Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable.
The Court's ruling in Manuel R. Dulay Enterprises, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals 26 is instructive, to wit:
Under Article 1498 of the New Civil Code, the mere
execution of the deed of sale in a public document
is equivalent to the delivery of the property.
Likewise, this Court had held that:
It is settled that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute
owner of the property purchased if it is
not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of the sale. As
such, he is entitled to the possession of
the said property and can demand it at
any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance
to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can, in fact, demand
possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to
post a bond in accordance with Section 7
of Act No. 3133, as amended. No such
bond is required after the redemption
period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an
absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. aSIHcT
Therefore, prior physical delivery or possession is
not legally required since the execution of the Deed
of Sale is deemed equivalent to delivery.
This ruling was reiterated in Spouses Sabio v. The
International Corporate Bank, Inc. 28 wherein it was held that:
Notwithstanding the presence of illegal occupants
on the subject property, transfer of ownership by
symbolic delivery under Article 1498 can still be
effected through the execution of the deed of
conveyance. As we held in Power Commercial and
Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals [274 SCRA 597,
610], the key word is control, not possession, of
the subject property. Considering that the deed of
conveyance proposed by respondents did not
stipulate or infer that petitioners could not exercise
control over said property, delivery can be effected
through the mere execution of said deed.
. . . It is sufficient that there are no legal
impediments to prevent petitioners from gaining
physical possession of the subject property. As
stated above, prior physical delivery or possession
is not legally required and the execution of the deed
of sale or conveyance is deemed equivalent to
delivery. This deed operates as a formal or symbolic
delivery of the property sold and authorizes the
buyer or transferee to use the document as proof
of ownership. Nothing more is required. 29
Thus, the execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of PNB,
after the expiration of the redemption period, is deemed equivalent
to delivery.
3. Yes.
As buyers or transferees, petitioner and her husband
simply stepped into the shoes of Lim, who, prior to selling the subject
property to them, mortgaged the same to PNB. As Lim's successors-
in-interest, their possession could not be said to be adverse to that
of Lim. Thus, they are also bound to recognize and respect the
mortgage entered into by the latter. Their possession of the disputed
lot could not, therefore, be considered as a legal impediment which
could prevent PNB from acquiring ownership and possession thereof.
It bears to reiterate the undisputed fact, in the instant case,
that Lim mortgaged the subject property to PNB prior to selling the
same to petitioner's husband. Settled is the rule that a mortgage is
an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the
principal obligation. One of its (mortgage) characteristics is that it is
inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless
of who its owner may subsequently be. 30
This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage
because, pursuant to Article 2126 of the Civil Code, the mortgage
directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable from
the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the property
whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in
ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded.
Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee,
for such mortgage until discharged follows the property.
F. Sale by Co-heir Before Partition
Alejandrino vs. Ca
FACTS:
 The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino,
Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City.
 Upon the death of the spouses, the property should have been divided
among their children, however, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses
was not settled in accordance with the procedures.
 Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of
the lots from her brothers, Gregorio’s, Ciriaco’s and Abundio’s share.
 It turned out, however, that a third party named Nique, the private
respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property from
Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
 However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the
sale in an action for quieting of title and damages.
 The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor of Nique and
declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
 Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property
that had been declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his
own by virtue of purchase.
 The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and Laurencia.
ISSUE: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made?
RULING:
 Yes, although the right of an heir over the property of the
decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise
rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
 Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro
indiviso share. The legality of Laurencia’s alienation of portions
of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was upheld in the
Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by
Laurencia’s withdrawal of her appeal in the CA.
 When Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of
the property that were adjudged in his favor, he was in effect
calling for the partition of the property. Under the law, partition
of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by:
(1) the heirs themselves extra-judicially;
(2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the
course of administration proceedings;
(3) by the testator himself; and
(4) by the third person designated by the testator.
 Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became
the basis for the segregation of the property in favor of Nique.
However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was
offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the
order for segregation of the property sold to Nique.
 Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its
validity on account of the absence of notarization of the
document and the non-publication thereof.
A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
 Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement
of the estate reflected the intention of both Laurencia and
Mauricia to physically divide the property.
 Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and
therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the
estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no
hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document to be valid between the parties.
G. Caveat Emptor Principle
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the
supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the
vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
HOW TO CONDUCT DUE DILIGENCE VERIFICATION OF TITLE:
1. Verify the origin, history, authenticity and validity of the title with
the
2. Register of Deeds and Land Registration Authority
3. Engage the services of a competent and reliable geodetic
engineer to verify the boundary, metes and bounds of the lot
subject of said title based on the technical description in the said
title and the approved survey plan in the Land Management
Bureau
4. Conduct an actual ocular inspection
5. Inquire from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with
respect to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question
Sy v. Capistrano Jr
[IMPORTANT] Minimum requirement of a good faith buyer
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 76496 in the name of Capistrano
had always been in his possession since he gave Scott only a photocopy
thereof pursuant to the latter's authority to look for a buyer of the
property. On the other hand, the Jamilars were able to acquire a new
owner's duplicate copy thereof by filing an affidavit of loss and a petition
for the issuance of another owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 76496. The
minimum requirement of a good faith buyer is that the vendee of the
real property should at least see the owner's duplicate copy of the title
(and not a PHOTOCOPY).
Facts:
 Sometime in 1980, Scott approached respondent Capistrano and
offered her services to help him sell his 13,785 square meters of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 76496. Capistrano
gave her a temporary authority to sell which expired without any sale
transaction being made.
 To his shock, he discovered later that TCT No. 76496, which was in his
name, had already been cancelled on June 24, 1992 and a new one,
TCT No. 249959, issued over the same property on the same date to
Jamilar. TCT No. 249959 likewise had already been cancelled and
replaced by three (3) TCTs (Nos. 251524, 251525, and 251526), all in
the names of the Jamilar spouses. TCT Nos. 251524 and 251526 had
also been cancelled and replaced by TCT Nos. 262286 and 262287
issued to Golpeo and Tan, respectively.
 Thus, the action for reconveyance filed by Capistrano, alleging that his
and his wife's signatures on the purported deed of absolute sale in
favor of Scott were forgeries; that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 76496 in his name had always been in his possession; and that
Scott, the Jamilar spouses, Golpeo, and Tan were not innocent
purchasers for value because they all participated in defrauding him of
his property.
 Ruling of the RTC and CA – in favor of Capistrano
Note:
Capistrano to Scott; Scott to Jamilars; Jamilars to Gilturas; Jamilars and
Gilturas to Golpeo and Tan
Capistrano – Scott – Jamilars– Golpeo and Tan
Issue: WON the buyers of the property are buyers in good faith
Ruling:
 No. First. The purported sale of the property from Capistrano to Scott
was a forgery, and resort to a handwriting expert was not even
necessary as the specimen signature submitted by Capistrano during
trial showed marked variance from that found in the deed of absolute
sale. In the same token, the deed of sale between Scott and the
Jamilars was also forged, as it noted the stark differences between the
signatures of Scott in the deed of sale and those in her handwritten
letters to Capistrano.
 Second. The Jamilar spouses should have known that the signatures
of Scott and Capistrano were forgeries due to the patent variance of
the signatures in the two deeds of sale shown to them by Scott, when
Scott presented to them the deeds of sale, one allegedly executed by
Capistrano in her favor covering his property.
 The CA also correctly found the Gilturas not innocent purchasers for
value, because they failed to check the veracity of the allegation of
Jamilar that he acquired the property from Capistrano.
 In ruling that Sy was not an innocent purchaser for value. Sy knew
that the title to the property was still in the name of Capistrano, but
failed to verify the claim of the Jamilar spouses regarding the transfer
of ownership of the property by asking for the copies of the deeds of
absolute sale between Capistrano and Scott, and between Scott and
Jamilar. Sy should have likewise inquired why the Gilturas had to affix
their conformity to the contract to sell by asking for a copy of the deed
of sale between the Jamilars and the Gilturas. Had Sy done so, he
would have learned that the Jamilars claimed that they purchased the
property from Capistrano and not from Scott.
 [IMPORTANT] Minimum requirement of a good faith buyer The owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 76496 in the name of Capistrano had always
been in his possession since he gave Scott only a photocopy thereof
pursuant to the latter's authority to look for a buyer of the property.
On the other hand, the Jamilars were able to acquire a new owner's
duplicate copy thereof by filing an affidavit of loss and a petition for
the issuance of another owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 76496. The
minimum requirement of a good faith buyer is that the vendee of
the real property should at least see the owner's duplicate copy of the
title (and not a PHOTOCOPY).
Domingo Realty vs. CA
Facts:
 On November 19, 1981, petitioner Domingo Realty filed a complaint
against Antonio Acero, conducting business under the name A.M. Acero
Trading, Victorio, and the Does for recovery of possession of three
parcels of land in Metro Manila. Acero constructed a factory building
for manufacture of hollow blocks.
 The respondents filed their answer (Acero and Victorio), claiming
that Acero merely leased the land from Victorio who claimed to
own the property where the factory stood. Victorio assailed the
TCTs of Domingo Realty, stating that they came from spurious deeds of
sale and that he has been in possession for more than 70 years.
 (AGREEMENT IMPORTANT) Yu presenting Domingo Realty executed
a compromise agreement with Acero and Luis Dy, stipulating
that the Realty’s ownership is recognized, Dy’s title is not
genuine, Acero’s property is encroaching on a portion of
Domingo Realty’s property and shall deliver the property to the
Realty, Dy bought the property in good faith and waives all
claims. RTC Pasay approved the Compromise Agreement.
 Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 In order to implement the decision, Domingo Realty asked the trial court
to conduct a re-survey which was granted.
 Acero filed a Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement, stating
that the resurvey plan as basis of the resurvey would violate the
Compromise Agreement since the whole area he occupied would be
the realty firm’s property. So, Acero filed a Motion to Resurvey
claiming that the parties agreed on re-survey by the Bureau of
Lands which was approved, directing the Director of Lands to conduct
a re-survey. Elpidio Lara, Chief of Technical Services Division of the
Lands Management Section of NCR -DENR, stated in his report that
Domingo Realty’s TCTs covered the land occupied by the hollow
block factory.
 Ayala Steel Manufacturing Co. Inc. filed a Motion for Substitution,
stating that it purchased the subject lots, which was opposed by Acero
claiming that the case was already terminated by the
compromise agreement, so substitution is no longer necessary;
however, it was never resolved. This explains why Domingo Realty and
Ayala Steel are co-petitioners.
 The trial court ordered Acero to conduct his own re-survey and
have it approved by the Bureau of Lands, resulting from his
contention that he occupied only 2,000 sq. m. of the disputed property.
He had Engr. Cruz do it, but the plan was rejected for failure to comply
with requirements.
 (Non-Important Motions) Domingo Realty filed a Manifestation with
Motion praying for denial of the motion to nullify, which was granted.
Subsequently, a motion for execution was filed. The respondent stated
that the Compromise Agreement was only as to the land occupied by
respondent, being approximately 2,000 sq. m. He claimed that the order
modified the agreement, stating it involved only 1, 357 sq. m., not the
entire lot – if not amended, it will result in unjust enrichment.
Meanwhile, the writ of execution was approved. Gutted by fire however,
the records were reconstituted, so the trial court reordered a writ of
execution.
 (Important) Respondent filed a Manifestation and Compliance, alleging
that the Survey Plan was approved by the RD of DENR, so he moved for
annulment of the writ of execution.
 (TRIAL COURT RULING) They issued an order directing Bureau of
Lands Director to determine which of the two were correct. Regional
Technical Director Almazan of the LRA cancelled Acero’s version of
the plan and approved Domingo Realty’s as the real plan.
 (CA RULING) Respondent did not seek annulment of judgment but
reiterated that under the Compromise Agreement, he would only vacate
a portion of the property he was occupying. CA granted the petition
and set aside RTC’s order, sustaining Acero’s contention.
(TO SIMPLIFY) Basically, there are 3 main parties: Domingo
Realty, Acero, and Victorio. Domingo Realty owns the TCTs, Acero
has a construction on one of those lots, and Victorio claims that the
lot is actually his being leased to Acero. Domingo and Acero came
into a compromise agreement, among which stated that Acero
accedes to the ownership of the Realty which part of Acero’s
property encroached upon. They agreed to have it re-surveyed, but
they had a conflict regarding the resurvey. This turned out into two
versions of the plan from Acero’s and the Realty’s engineers. RTC
ruled that the Realty’s plan was correct, but all Acero really wanted
was to recognize the fact that he was only to vacate a PORTION of
his property, not the entirety of it according to his interpretation
of the compromise agreement - which CA granted.
Issue:
1. WON Victorio, not being a party to the Compromise Agreement, can
assail the validity of the Compromise Agreement as not binding upon
him and give rise to another suit.
2. WON the Compromise Agreement is vague as there is still a need to
determine the exact metes and bounds of the encroachment on the
petitioners' lot.
3. WON the compromise judgment can be set aside on the ground of
mistake because respondent Acero gave his consent to the
Compromise Agreement in good faith that he would only vacate a
portion of his lot in favor of petitioner Domingo Realty (MOST
IMPORTANT).
Ruling:
A THIRD-PARTY CAN ASSAIL THE VALIDITY OF A COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT; LEGAL EFFECT ONLY PERTAINS TO BINDING
NATURE
 Yes. The only legal effect of the non-inclusion of a party in a
compromise agreement is that said party cannot be bound by the
terms of the agreement. The Compromise Agreement shall however be
"valid and binding as to the parties who signed thereto.”
THE OBJECT NEED NOT BE SPECIFIC; REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE
OBJECT IS DETERMINABLE
 No. The object of a contract, in order to be considered as "certain," need
not specify such object with absolute certainty. It is enough that the
object is determinable in order for it to be considered as "certain."
Article 1349 provides this.
 In the instant case, the title over the subject property contains a
technical description that provides the metes and bounds of the
property of petitioners. Such technical description is the final
determinant of the extent of the property of petitioners. Thus, the area
of petitioners' property is determinable based on the technical
descriptions contained in the TCTs.
 Findings of fact by administrative agencies, having acquired
expertise in their field of specialization, must be given great
weight by this Court. Even if the exact area of encroachment is not
specified in the agreement, it can still be determined from the technical
description of the title of plaintiff which defendant Acero admitted to be
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
correct. Whether it is only a portion or the entire lot Acero is leasing that
will be affected by the agreement is of no importance.
ACERO CANNOT CLAIM MISTAKE BECAUSE HE WAS ALREADY
AWARE OF HIS ENCROACHMENT; IT WAS HIS OWN UNDOING FOR
SIGNING INTO THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT FULLY
KNOWING THE CONSEQUENCES
 No. Although Articles 2038 and 1330 of the Civil Code allow a party to a
contract, on the ground of mistake, to nullify the agreement. Article 1333
of the Civil Code also provides that "there is no mistake if the party
alleging it knew the doubt, contingency or risk affecting the object
of the contract."
 Prior to the execution of the Compromise Agreement, respondent Acero
was already aware of the technical description of the titled lots of
petitioner Domingo Realty and more so, of the boundaries and area of
the lot he leased from David Victorio.
 Before consenting to the agreement, he could have simply hired a
geodetic engineer to conduct a verification survey and determine
the actual encroachment of the area he was leasing on the titled
lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had he undertaken such a
precautionary measure, he would have known that the entire area he was
occupying intruded into the titled lot of petitioners and possibly, he would
not have signed the agreement.
 In this factual milieu, respondent Acero could have easily averted the
alleged mistake in the contract; but through palpable neglect, he
failed to undertake the measures expected of a person of ordinary
prudence. Without doubt, this kind of mistake cannot be resorted to by
respondent Acero as a ground to nullify an otherwise clear, legal, and valid
agreement, even though the document may become adverse and even
ruinous to his business.
 Moreover, respondent failed to state in the Compromise Agreement
that he intended to vacate only a portion of the property he was
leasing. Such provision being beneficial to respondent, he, in the exercise
of the proper diligence required, should have made sure that such matter
was specified in the Compromise Agreement. Respondent Acero's failure
to have the said stipulation incorporated in the Compromise Agreement is
negligence on his part and insufficient to abrogate said agreement.
CAVEAT EMPTOR PRINCIPLE ENUNCIATED
 We have no power to make or alter contracts in order to save him from
the adverse stipulations in the Compromise Agreement. Hopefully this
case will serve as a precaution to prospective parties to a contract
involving titled lands for them to exercise the diligence of a
reasonably prudent person by undertaking measures to ensure the
legality of the title and the accurate metes and bounds of the lot embraced
in the title. It is advisable that such parties:
(1) verify the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the
Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority.
(2) engage the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer to
verify the boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said title based
on the technical description in the said title and the approved survey plan
in the Land Management Bureau;
(3) conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
(4) inquire from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect
to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question;
(5) put up signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered;
and
(6) undertake such other measures to make the general public aware that
said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
 Respondent Acero, for all his woes, may have a legal recourse against
lessor David Victorio who inveigled him to lease the lot which turned out
to be owned by another.
Locsin v. Hizon
Facts:
 Locsin was the registered owner of a 760-sq.m. lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 235094, located at Quezon City. In 1992, she
filed an ejectment case, ] against one Billy Aceron (Aceron) before the MTC
to recover possession over the land in issue.
 Eventually, the two entered into a compromise agreement, Locsin
later went to the United States without knowing whether Aceron has
complied with his part of the bargain under the compromise agreement.
In spite of her absence, however, she continued to pay the real property
taxes on the subject lot.
 In 1994, after discovering that her copy of TCT No. 235094 was missing,
Locsin filed a petition for administrative reconstruction in order to
secure a new one, TCT No. RT-97467. Sometime in early 2002, she then
requested her counsel to check the status of the subject lot. It was then
that they discovered:
1. One Marylou Bolos (Bolos) had TCT No. RT-97467 cancelled on February
11, 1999, and then secured a new one, TCT No. N-200074, in her favor by
registering a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 3, 1979 allegedly
executed by Locsin with the Registry of Deeds;
2. Bolos later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon (Bernardo) for PhP 1.5
million, but it was titled under Carlos Hizon's (Carlos') name on August 12,
1999. Carlos is Bernardo's son;
3. On October 1, 1999, Bernardo, claiming to be the owner of the property,
filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the
court-approved compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 38-6633; (SIGN
OF BAD FAITH – READ RULING NO 2)
4. The property was already occupied and was, in fact, up for sale.
 On May 9, 2002, Locsin, through counsel, sent Carlos a letter
requesting the return of the property since her signature in the
purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery. In a letter-
reply dated May 20, 2002, Carlos denied Locsin's request, claiming that he
was unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos' title and he is, thus, an
innocent purchaser for value and good faith.
 Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 On June 13, 2002, Bernardo met with Locsin's counsel and discussed
the possibility of a compromise. He ended the meeting with a promise
to come up with a win-win situation for his son and Locsin, a promise which
turned out to be deceitful, for, on July 15, 2002, Locsin learned that
Carlos had already sold the property for PhP 1.5 million to his sister
and her husband, herein respondents Lourdes and Jose Manuel Guevara
(spouses Guevara), respectively, who, as early as May 24, 2002, had a
new certificate of title, TCT No. N-237083, issued in their names. The
spouses Guevara then immediately mortgaged the said property to
secure a PhP 2.5 million loan/credit facility with Damar Credit Corporation
(DCC).
 SUMMARY: Locsin Aceron – Bolos – Carlos (via Bernardo) – Sps
Guevara
Issue: Whether or not due diligence was made; Whether or not
Carlos/Sps. Guevarra is a buyer in good faith.
Ruling:
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN DETERMINATION OF GOOD
FAITH; CAVEAT EMPTOR PRINCIPLE
 An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. As such, a
defective title — or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation — may be the source of a completely legal and valid
title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith,
relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser
for value.
 Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal
rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is
in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.
we emphasized the need for prospective parties to a contract involving
titled lands to exercise the diligence of a reasonably prudent
person in ensuring the legality of the title, and the accuracy of the
metes and bounds of the lot embraced therein, by undertaking
precautionary measures, such as:
(1) verify the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the
Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority.
(2) engage the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer to
verify the boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said title based
on the technical description in the said title and the approved survey plan
in the Land Management Bureau;
(3) conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
(4) inquire from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect
to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question;
(5) put up signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered;
and
(6) undertake such other measures to make the general public aware that
said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
 In the case at bar, Bolos' certificate of title was concededly free from liens
and encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of Carlos and the
spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of caution in light
of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence of transfers from
Bolos to respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine
and inspires the Court's concurrence with petitioner's proposition.
CARLOS IS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH
 No. Carlos is not an innocent purchaser for value. Bernardo negotiated with
Bolos for the property as Carlos' agent. This is bolstered by the fact that
he was the one who arranged for the sale and eventual registration of the
property in Carlos' favor.
 Consistent with the rule that the principal is chargeable and bound by the
knowledge of, or notice to, his agent received in that capacity, any
information available and known to Bernardo is deemed similarly available
and known to Carlos, including the following:
 Bernardo knew that the Bolos never acquired possession over the lot,
having admitted knowledge of Aceron’s lot possession as well as the
compromise agreement between the petitioner and Aceron, the Deed of
Sale was executed on Nov. 3, 1979, but the ejectment case by Locsin
against Aceron was in 1992 – 13 years after property was
supposedly transferred to Bolos, and compromise agreement approved
by the MTC indicating Aceron’s acknowledgement of Locsin’s right to
possession, being the registered owner thereof.
 Having knowledge of the foregoing facts, Bernardo and Carlos, to our
mind, should have been impelled to investigate the reason behind
the arrangement. They should have been pressed to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation in order to protect Carlos'
interest.
 It should have struck them as odd that it was Locsin, not Bolos,
who sought the recovery of possession by commencing an
ejectment case against Aceron, and even entered into a compromise
agreement with the latter years after the purported sale in Bolos' favor.
Instead, Bernardo and Carlos took inconsistent positions when they argued
for the validity of the transfer of the property in favor of Bolos, but in the
same breath prayed for the enforcement of the compromise agreement
entered into by Locsin.
 At this point it is well to emphasize that entering into a compromise
agreement is an act of strict dominion. If Bolos already acquired
ownership of the property as early as 1979, it should have been her who
entered into a compromise agreement with Aceron in 1993, not her
predecessor-in-interest, Locsin, who, theoretically, had already divested
herself of ownership thereof.
SPOUSES GUEVARRA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR
VALUE
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 There is a lack of evidence to support the respondent spouses' position
that the sale was a bona fide transaction. Even if we repeatedly sift
through the evidence on record, still we cannot find any document,
contract, or deed evidencing the sale in favor of the spouses
Guevara. The same goes for the purported payment of the purchase price
of the property in the amount of PhP 1.5 million in favor of Carlos.
 The transfer from Carlos to the spouses Guevara was effected only
fifteen (15) days after Locsin demanded the surrender of the
property from Carlos.
 When Bernardo met with Locsin's counsel on June 13, 2002, and personally
made a commitment to come up with a win-win situation for his son and
Locsin, he knew fully well, too, that the property had already been
purportedly transferred to his daughter and son-in-law, the
spouses Guevara, for he, no less, facilitated the same. This, to us, is
glaring evidence of bad faith and an apparent intention to mislead
Locsin into believing that she could no longer recover the subject property.
 Also, the fact that Lourdes Guevara and Carlos are siblings, and that
Carlos' agent in his dealings concerning the property is his own father,
renders incredible the argument that Lourdes had no knowledge
whatsoever of Locsin's claim of ownership at the time of the
purported sale.
 The fact that the spouses Guevara never intended to be the owner in good
faith and for value of the lot is further made manifest by their lack of
interest in protecting themselves in the case.
 There is also strong reason to believe that even the mortgage in
favor of DCC was a mere ploy to make it appear that the Sps.
Guevara exercised acts of dominion over the subject property. This is
so considering the proximity between the property's registration in their
names and its being subjected to the mortgage. Most telling is that the
credit line secured by the mortgage was never used by the spouses,
resulting in the mortgage's cancellation and the exclusion of DCC as a party
in Civil Case No. Q-02-47925.
 These circumstances, taken altogether, strongly indicate that Carlos
and the spouses Guevara failed to exercise the necessary level of
caution expected of a bona fide buyer and even performed acts that are
highly suspect.
INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS
A. Attachments
Section 69. Attachments — An attachment, or a copy of any writ,
order or process issued by a court of record, intended to create or
preserve any lien, status, right, or attachment upon registered land,
shall be filed and registered in the Registry of Deeds for the province
or the city in which the land lies, and, in addition to the particulars
required in such papers for registration, shall contain a reference to
the number of the certificate of title to be affected and the registered
owner or owners thereof, and also if the attachment, order, process
or lien is not claimed on all the land in any certificate of title a
description sufficiently accurate for identification of the land or
interest intended to be affected. A restraining order, injunction or
mandamus issued by the court shall be entered and registered on the
certificate of title affected, free of charge.
❖ Attachment — is the legal process of seizing another’s property in
accordance with a writ or judicial order for the purpose of securing
satisfaction of a judgement yet to be rendered.
NATURE OF ATTACHMENT
• Legal process of seizing another’s property in accordance with a writ or
judicial order for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment
yet to be rendered
• Writ of attachment is used primarily to seize the debtor’s property to
seize the debtor’s property in order to secure the debt or claim of the
creditor in the event that a judgment is rendered
• Jurisprudence: a party who delivers a notice of attachment to the RD
and pays the corresponding fees has a right to presume that the
official would perform his duty properly
• In involuntary registration, entry thereof in the day book is sufficient
notice to all persons of such adverse claim. The notice of course has
to be annotated at the back of the corresponding original certificate of
title, but this is an official duty of the RD which may be presumed to
have been regularly performed
• DBP v. Acting RD: current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone
produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is
a voluntary or involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied
with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation,
and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on
the RD
• Section 69 states that an attachment or any writ, order or process
intended to create or preserve any lien upon registered land shall be
filed and registered in the RD and shall contain a reference to the
number of the certificate of title to be affected, the registered owner
thereof and a description of the land or interest therein.
Caviles v. Bautista
Facts:
 On Sept. 22, 1982, petitioners herein known as Spouses Caviles filed a
case against Plata for recovery of a sum of money. The complaint
contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. On Sept. 24, 1982, the CFI issued a writ and Depty Sheriff
de Leon issued a Notice of Attachment over a piece of real estate owned
by Plata in Las Piñas.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 The Notice of Attachment was entered into the Primary Entry Book on
Oct. 6, 1982, but it was not annotated on the TCT by the register of
deeds. Neither did the deputy sheriff or the plaintiffs take any steps to
annotate such.
 On Oct. 18, 1982, Plata sold the property to the respondents herein
known as Spouses Bautista, which was free from attachment and any
encumbrance. On the same date, Plata’s TCT was cancelled in favor of
respondents, who have resided in the property since.
 No action was taken by the petitioners to annotate the attachment since
they remained ignorant that the property had already been sold and a
new title was issued until much later. When they attempted execution,
the notice of levy was entered in February 22, 1984. On March 30, 1987,
4 ½ years after the property was bought by respondents and 3 years
after the levy on execution was effected, the property was sold on
execution to Spouses Caviles.
 A Certificate of Sale was entered in the Day Book on April 2, 1987, but
when inscription was made, they found out that Plata’s certificate had
already been cancelled and issued to Spouses Bautista. The entry was
made nonetheless on the title of the Bautistas, but the Register of Deeds
refused to sign such annotation.
 (Consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration) Administrator Bonifacio stated that the certificate of
sale may be annotated on the Bautistas’ TCT.
 Because the Bautistas refused to surrender their copy of the TCT,
Caviles invoked Section 107 of PD 1529, which is an action to compel
surrender of the owner’s duplicate of title for the annotation of a
voluntary instrument.
 (RTC RULING) Ordered the respondents to surrender their duplicate
copy for inscription or annotation.
 (CA RULING) They reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA dismissed
the petition before the trial court and upheld the Bautistas’ TCT.
Issues: Who should acquire title to the subject property arising from a
better right? The right to acquire title to registered land from the moment
of inscription of an attachment on the day/entry book or the right of the
other to rely on what appears on the duplicate certificate of title for
purposes of VOLUNTARY dealings?
Ruling:
BOTH PARTIES ARE IN GOOD FAITH; CAVILES COMPLIED WITH
NECESSARY REQUISITES AND BAUTISTAS RELIED ON FACE OF
TITLE
 Respondents relied on the face of the title which was free from the
notice of attachment, which however, was entered into the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City. The Register of Deeds
failed to annotate the notice of attachment on the original copy of
the title.
 The respondent spouses had no notice of any defect, irregularity, or
encumbrance of the title, and neither did they have any
knowledge of facts or circumstances which should have put them on
inquiry. They were clearly innocent purchasers for value and in good faith
at the time they acquired the subject property.
 (Sandoval v. CA) Reiteration of a long line of decisions declaring that
one need not go beyond the face of the title when registered
under the Torrens system.
 Negligence cannot also be imputed to the petitioners in this case. The
records show that the petitioners obtained a writ of preliminary
attachment of the subject property and was then entered in the
primary entry book of the RoD of Pasay City. When they sought to
inscribe the certificate of sale, they discovered that the latter had been
sold to the Bautistas.
 The notice of attachment was inscribed on the cancelled certificate of title
on Nov. 22, 1983 but was made to appear to be annotated Oct. 6, 1982.
The belated inscription is reflected since said inscription followed the
earlier entry on Oct. 18, 1982 of the sale of the subject property to
respondent spouses.
 CA stated that the petitioners did not take any action to annotate the
attachment. Bautistas would also contend that the problem would not
have come about had the petitioners not been negligent.
 SC disagrees. The petitioners paid the corresponding fees for the
annotation of the notice of attachment and had every right to
presume that the register of deeds would inscribe the said notice
on the original title covering the subject property. He had a duty to
inscribe the notice on the original title.
ENTRY INTO THE DAY BOOK PRODUCES THE EFFECT OF
REGISTRATION; SALE RETROACTS TO THE DATE OF NOTICE OF
ATTACHMENT; CAVILES HAS A BETTER RIGHT OVER PROPERTY
FOR EARLIER REGISTRATION
 In INVOLUNTARY REGISTRATION, such as attachment, levy upon
execution, and etc., it has been held that entry into the day book
is sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim. It should be
annotated at the back of the OCT, but this is the duty of the RoD.
 As held in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, entry
alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or involuntary one, so long as the registrant
has complied with all that is required of him.
 Who has the better right then: Caviles Spouses. Article 1544
states that if both are in good faith and the property in question is
immovable, it should belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
 Notice of Attachment: annotated OCTOBER 6, 1982 while the new
TCT was issued on OCTOBER 18, 1982, the date when Plata sold the
property to the Bautistas. It is consistently ruled that the
auction/execution sale retroacts to the date of the notice of
attachment on Oct. 6, 1982. The earlier registration of petitioners’
levy of preliminary attachment gave them superiority and preference in
rights.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
B. Adverse Claims (Sec. 70)
Section 70. Adverse Claim — Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent
to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under who acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and
a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be
served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as
an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be
effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After
the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the
same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file
a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for
the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse
claim, and shall render judgement as may be just and equitable. If
the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof
shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and
hearing, shall find that the adverse claim this registered was frivolous,
it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand
pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the
lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by
filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
PURPOSE
• Purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed
land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the
ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy
• Notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land
is subject to the outcome of the dispute
FORMAL REQUISITES OF AN ADVERSE CLAIM
1. The adverse claimant must state the following in writing
a) his alleged right or interest
b) how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired
c) the description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed; and
d) the number of certificate of title
2. The statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or
other officer authorized to administer oath; and
The claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices
may be served upon him *Non-compliance with the above requisites
renders the adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective attorney’s
fees consists of a share in the property recovered by the client, such
interest may be the basis of an adverse claim.
LEGAL REQUISITES OF AN ADVERSE CLAIM
1. There must be a claim on the land
2. Claim must be adverse to the registered owner
3. Claim must have a reason subsequent to the original registration —
meaning if the basis of the adverse claim happened BEFORE the title
was issued this is no longer a valid case for adverse claim. It should
be subsequent because registration is proceeding in rem so if you
have any objection by that time they should have raised it during the
application for registration
4. No other remedy is provided for under the property registration decree
to register the interest or the right of the party
REGISTRATION COURT MAY DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF
ADVERSE CLAIM
An adverse claim may be cancelled only after the claim is adjudged invalid
and unmeritorious by the court while passing upon a case where the land
involved is subject of the interest or right being secured by the adverse
claim.
ADVERSE CLAIM NOT IPSO JURE CANCELLED AFTER 30 DAYS;
HEARING NECESSARY.
RD cannot unilaterally cancel the adverse claim. There must be a court
hearing for the purpose. The reason for this is to afford the adverse
claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the
propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the
purpose of determining at least the existence of any encumbrance on the
title arising from such adverse claim.
Sajonas v. CA
Facts:
 Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin (sellers) agreed to sell a
parcel of land to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas
(buyers) through a contract to sell. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas
couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said
Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a
Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the
Sajonas couple which was registered on August 28, 1985. TCT No. N-
109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple.
 The previous notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant
sheriff was carried over to the new title.
 [History] Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed for collection of
sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. When Uychocde failed to
pay, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution which the court granted.
 A notice of levy on execution was then issued on February 12, 1985.
On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City
presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds
of Marikina and the same was annotated. On January 10, 1986, the
Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution. Defendant-appellant Pilares. Plaintiffs-appellees filed this
complaint.
 (SAJONAS’S COMPLAINT) That the annotation of the levy on
execution, as filed by Pilares, which was carried over to the title of said
plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in
view of the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs
on the corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses.
 (PILARES’S ANSWER) Private respondent maintains that the notice of
adverse claim is only effective for 30 days and since the same was
annotated on August 27, 1984, it will be effective only up to September
26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any binding force and effect
pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the
petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their
creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to their
having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on a
compromise agreement.
 (RTC RULING) in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-109417. CA REVERSED THE FINDINGS.
TIMELINE: Annotation of Adverse Claim – August 27, 1984 (which
allegedly expires after 30d)
Annotation of Notice of Levy on Execution – February 12, 1985.
Issue: Whether or not adverse claim is effective only for 30 days;
which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution
and the deed of absolute sale.
Ruling:
ADVERSE CLAIM DOES NOT LOSE FORCE AND EFFECT AFTER 30
DAYS; REQUIRES A NECESSARY ACT
 At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the
effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision
cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in
relation to the sentence following, which reads:
 "After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest."
 If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto
lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not
have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify
and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled.
If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
 The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the
adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse
claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the
propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for
the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on
the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the
provision immediately following:
 "Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim
shall be registered by the same claimant.
 Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property,
the adverse claimant will be precluded from registering a second
adverse claim based on the same ground.
THE ANNOTATION OF A DEED OF SALE SHOULD PREVAIL SINCE A
NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM WAS ANNOTATED WITHOUT LOSING
FORCE AND EFFECT AFTER 30 DAYS
 Since the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the TCT was still in
effect on February 12, 1985 when the notice of levy on execution was
annotated thereto by the Sheriff, he is consequently charged with
knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof.
 Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.
 This can be deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
 Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons. — The levy
on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over
the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at
the time of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing
(such as an adverse claim).
 In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "the subsequent sale of the
property to the De Castro spouses cannot prevail over the adverse claim
of Perez, which was inscribed on the bank's certificate of title on
October 6, 1958. That should have put said spouses on notice, and
they can claim no better legal right over and above that of Perez.
The TCT issued in the spouses' names on July, 1959 also carried the
said annotation of adverse claim. Consequently, they are not
entitled to any interest on the price they paid for the property".
Rodriguez v. CA
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Facts:
 Spouses Calingo were registered owners of a house found in
Parañaque, Metro Manila. The property was mortgaged to
Development Bank of the Philippines which was absorbed by
PAG-IBIG (Home Development Mutual Fund previously).
 On April 27, 1992, Spouses Barrameda (respondents) entered into
a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage. They issued
two checks with Spouses Calingo issuing a receipt dated April 23,
1992. They then informed PAG-IBIG about the sale of property
with assumption of mortgage dated April 23, 1992 but was
only served October 2, 1992.
 On May 29, 1992, spouses Barrameda filed with the RoD
Parañaque an affidavit of adverse claim on the property. On
June 1, 1992, they wrote to PAG-IBIG Mortgage and Loan
Division to inform them that they purchased the property
from the Calingo spouses and also filed an adverse claim. They
sought assistance for the procedure of full settlement of loan and
transfer of property in their names. They moved into the property
June 2, 1992.
 July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment on real
property through a writ of execution was annotated to the
certificate of title of the said property, issued by Judge Santos from
RTC. This was because of a claim by petitioners Spouses
Rodriguez against the Calingos.
 Spouses Barrameda remitted to spouses Calingo the remaining
balance to complete the payment of the agreed purchase price.
The Calingos acknowledged receipt and waived their rights to the
Barramedas, as well as guaranteeing them that the property was
clear of any liens and encumbrances except the mortgage.
 On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda executed a joint
affidavit to state that they are owners of the property, using the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage as proof, that they registered it
with the RoD, and despite that, Sheriff Dolor of RTC Makati levied
the property despite the adverse claim, that they acquired the
property even before the levy was made, and so it was illegal.
 Atty. Loyola (Sppouses Rodriguez’s counsel) pointed out that the
sale was not registered and that the records of PAG-IBIG
showed that the property was still owned by the Calingos.
 November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda found a Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale at their gate announcing the auction sale of their
house. However, respondents Barrameda served a Notice of Third-
Party Claim upon the sheriff. They filed with the RTC a petition for
quieting of title with prayer for preliminary injunction.
 (RTC RULING) RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Rodriguez. The
annotation of the adverse claim was insufficient to establish
their claim. They instead should have registered the title in their
names. Furthermore, the adverse claim lost its effect after 30 days
in accordance with the Land Registration Act. They also found the
Calingos and Barramedas colluding the transfer of properties to
defraud 3rd parties.
 (CA RULING) Reversed the decision, citing Sajonas v. CA. They
stated that the claim was still in effect during the time that the
Rodriguezes caused the annotation of levy. So, it cannot prevail
over the Barramedas’ claim.
TIMELINE: Calingos mortgaged with PAG-IBIG their property ->
judgment in favor of Rodriguez requiring Calingo to pay -> Calingo sold
property to Barramedas -> notice of adverse claim by Barramedas (not
registered) -> notice of levy on property by sheriff -> Barramedas still paid
in full even after notice -> notice of auction made -> Barramedas file a
case in court.
Issue:
Whether or not the inscription of adverse claim will prevail over
the notice of levy.
Ruling:
THE MORTGAGE (OR OTHER VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS) WILL
NOT TAKE EFFECT TO CONVEY OR AFFECT REGISTERED LAND
UNLESS REGISTERED WITH THE REGISTER OF DEEDS.
 It cannot. The Barramedas anchor their claim on the property on the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by the Calingos.
The Property Registration Decree (PRD) requires that the
document be registered with the RoD to be binding on third
persons.
 According to Sec. 51 of the PRD: No mortgage or other voluntary
instrument except a will purporting to convey/affect registered land
shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, and only
operates as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the RoD to make registration. The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned.
 In this case, the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not
registered.
AN ADVERSE CLAIM IS SUFFICIENT TO AFFECT THIRD PARTIES
WHEN THE REGISTRATION OF SUCH INTEREST IS NOT
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW
 (Leviste and Company Inc. v. Noblejas) where the owner
refuses to surrender the duplicate certificate for the
annotation of the voluntary instrument, the grantee may
file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth
his adverse claim, as provided for in Section 110 of Act No.
496. The annotation’s purpose is to protect a person’s interest
and serve as a warning of an adverse claim of interest.
 The respondents’ reasoning for non-registration of the deed of
sale was because the duplicate copy of the certificate of title was
in possession of PAG-IBIG. However, it was never shown that
the Barramedas nor the Calingos exerted any effort to
retrieve the duplicate copy for purpose of registering the
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. They didn’t even
seek to obtain or inform HDMF of the sale. There was haste
in disposing the property when the Calingos informed PAG-IBIG
only on October 2, 1992. In fact, their contract of mortgage
stipulated that the Calingos were prohibited from selling
the property without the written consent of the mortgagee.
 There is no reason for the parties’ failure to seek approval of
PAG-IBIG since the Barramedas were ready to pay in full the
balance of loan plus interest.
 More suspicious is the fact that the Calingos were adjudged to
pay the Rodriguezes in January 27, 1992 which was
before the sale on April 27, 1992. It is also suspicious how
the Barramedas readily remitted the full payment on
August 21, 1992, even with knowledge of the levy. A
prudent buyer is to ensure that the title is clear and free from
any liabilities.
 (Sec. 70 of PD 1529) An annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over his
property where registration of such interest is not otherwise
provided for by the law on registration of real property.
The essence of the case is that unless there is another way of
registration provided for by law, an adverse claim protects the
claimant’s interest. HOWEVER, for mortgages and other voluntary
instruments, YOU STILL NEED TO REGISTER IT WITH THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS TO BIND THIRD PARTIES – a notice of adverse
claim will NOT bind third parties in this situation.
EXCEPTION: THE LEVISTE CASE – WHERE THE OWNER REFUSED TO
SURRENDER THE COPY, A NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM WILL BE
SUFFICIENT INSTEAD. Absent of any justifiable reason on why
registration of a registrable document (deed of sale) cannot be
done, filing of a notice of Adverse Claim, in order to bind third
parties, cannot substitute the registration requirement.
Golden Haven Memorial Park v. Filinvest
Facts:
Basically, two real estate developers who are buyers of the same land.
Who has better title? The one who had annotated a notice of adverse claim
(Golden Haven).
 Yap, Vivars, Cruz, Aquino, Corpuz, and Sobremesana, and other
relatives inherited a parcel of land in Las Piñas City. It was then
subdivided into 13 lots in a judicial partition. 4 of the lots were
distributed as follows: Lots 1+12 to Aquino, Lot 2 to Corpuz
and Sobremesana, and Lot 6 to Yap, Cruz, and the Vivars.
 On March 6, 1989, Yap acting for Lot 6 owners, executed an
agreement to sell the lot in favor of Golden Haven Memorial
Park payable in 3 installments. Aquino also acted for himself,
Corpuz, and Sobremesana, in executing an agreement with
Golden Haven, selling Lots 1, 2, and 12. In both cases, GHM paid
the first installment upon the contract’s execution.
 Golden Haven then caused an annotation of Notice of Adverse
Claim. The sellers of the four lots wrote to Golden Haven that they
were still working on the titling of the lots and whether it was still
interested in proceeding. Golden Haven said yes. They were merely
waiting for the titles to pay the second instalment.
 On August 1989, Filinvest Devt. Corporation applied for the
transfer over Lots 2, 4, and 5 (Lot 2 – Corpuz and Sobremesana’s
lot), but the Las Piñas RoD declined application. Filinvest then
learned that Lot 8, belonging to some other heir from the same
mother title, had been sold to Household Development
Corporation, a sister company of Golden Haven. It held the
duplicate copy of that title.
 Filinvest filed a petition to surrender and cancel the duplicate
copy of HDC over the lot, stating that Filinvest bought Lots 1, 2,
6, and 12 (Lot 1+12 – Aquino’s Lot, Lot 6 – Yap, Cruz, and Vivars’
lot) as shown by the three deeds of absolute sale.
 January 14, 1991, Golden Haven filed against the sellers and
Filinvest a complaint for annulment of deeds of sale before the
RTC.
 (RTC RULING) Golden Haven’s contracts to sell are valid, and
the sale to Filinvest is null and void.
 (CA RULING) Affirmed the RTC decision only with Lot 6. Lots 1, 2,
and 12 are valid in favor of Filinvest.
Issue: Whether or not the contracts to ell that the sellers executed
in favor of Golden Haven covering the same lots to Filinvest are
valid and enforceable.
Ruling:
THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM SERVES AS A WARNING TO
THIRD PERSONS; FILINVEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE
DILIGENT IN BUYING THE LOTS SINCE THE NOTICE WARNED
THEM OF DOUBLE SALE
 To prove good faith, the buyer of registered land only needs to show
that he relied on the face of the title, but it is only true where the
buyer is unaware of any adverse claims; failing that, he must show
a higher degree of diligence to qualify as a buyer in good faith.
 Filinvest was on notice that Holden Haven caused the annotation as
early as August 4, 1989. Despite that, Filinvest still bought Lots 1,
2, 6, and 12 on later dates (Sept. 10, Nov. 18, and Dec. 29).
 Filinvest contends that the title carried a notice of adverse claim only
with respect to Yap’s part of Lot 6 and did not affect Lots 1, 2, 12,
and the remainder of Lot 6. SC disagrees.
 The annotation of an adverse claim is intended to protect the
claimant’s interest in the property. It is a warning to third
parties dealing with the property that someone claims an
interest in it or asserts a better right than the registered owner. It
constitutes a notice to the whole world. While the notice here is only
to one lot, it served as a warning that one of the owners was
engaged in double selling.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 Filinvest also learned upon inquiry with the RoD Las Piñas that Lot 8
was sold to HDC and was given the duplicate copy.
 Thus, Filinvest’s knowledge that Golden Haven bought Lot 6 –
a lot Filinvest was interested in – and had annotated an
adverse claim while maintaining physical possession should
have put Filinvest on caution if it bought the other lots. It should
have investigated the true status of Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12 by asking
Golden Haven the size and shape of its interest in the lands covered
by the same title. The sellers only refused to follow obligations when
they found a better offer.
Martinez v. Garcia
Facts:
 Edilberto Brua was a registered owner of a parcel of land in Rizal.
It was first mortgaged to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) where the mortgage was annotated at the back of
the title on June 5, 1974.
 On February 5, 1980, Brua obtained a loan from his brother-in-
law Garcia, and to secure payment, he executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage. Because it was still in GSIS’s possession,
Garcia could not register the deed. Instead, he executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, registering it with the RoD of Rizal
WHICH REMAINS UNCANCELLED UP TO THIS TIME.
 On October 1991, Brua requested Garcia to pay the loan, so that
it would be released to Garcia. He paid the amount of P400,000,
thus the title was released to him.
 October 22, 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
between Garcia and Brua. As stated by the deed, the subject
property was only a partial payment of Brua’s mortgage
indebtedness to Garcia which he could no longer redeem from
Garcia.
 Garcia registered the Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds,
Rizal and so the new TCT was issued in Garcia and his wife’s name.
However, the annotations of the previous title were carried
over (Notice of Levy of Attachment – Jan. 8, 1981, Notice of Levy
on Execution in favor of Martinez – July 11, 1988, Certificate of
Sale in favor of Garcia – Sept. 2, 1988, Notice of Levy on Execution
in favor of Pilipinas Bank – Dec. 8, 1981, and Cancellation of
Mortgage with GSIS – Oct. 24, 1991).
 All the annotations found at the back of the title of the property
(Notices of Levy and Certificate of Sale) were made in connection
with Martinez’s action for Collection of Sum of Money filed against
Brua where judgment was in favor of Martinez.
 Pilipinas Bank’s Notice of Levy was by virtue of their case against
Brua.
 Garcia and Brua filed with the RTC Pasig an Action to Quiet
Title against Martinez because of the encumbrances/liens
attached to the title. They argued that the encumbrances were
registered subsequent to the annotation of adverse claim made in
1980. Pilipinas Bank was later included.
 (RTC RULING) Dismissed the action. The adverse claim was
predicated on his interest as a mortgagee of a loan because he
was not yet the purchaser as of said date. When the notices of levy
were registered in 1981 and 1998, Garcia’s claim became inferior
as a second mortgagee, and that Garcia’s decision to redeem
and purchase the property when there were already notices
of levy showed bad faith on his part. He did not even testify or
participate in the case. RTC did not uphold the allegation that they
were unaware of a public auction and consequent annotation of the
certificate of sale.
 (CA RULING) Reversed and set aside the RTC decision. CA said
that the subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse
claim. While one who buys the property from the registered owner
need not look beyond the title, he is still bound by the liens and
encumbrances annotated. The notice of adverse claim was made
prior to the certificate of sale and notices of levy and gave the
petitioners notice of Garcia’s right to the property.
 Petitioners could no longer be considered buyers in good
faith. CA also claimed RTC erred in concluding that Garcia was
a purchaser in bad faith because the adverse claim was
annotated in 1980. He could not have foreseen that petitioner
would buy the property eight years after. The notice is still valid even
after 30 days pursuant to Sajonas v. CA.
ARGUMENTS BEFORE SC
 MARTINEZ: Garcia’s adverse claim is nothing but a notice of interest
adverse to Brua the amount of the loan secured by a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage. Adverse claim cannot be superior to a final
sale. Sajonas v. CA does not apply because Sajonas’s claim was
made by virtue of a contract to sell while Garcia’s was as a
mortgagee of Brua. She admits that she is obliged as a vendee in
a public sale to pay liens and encumbrances existing, necessarily
including the adverse claim in the amount of P150,000.
 GARCIA: Appropriate remedy should have been petition for review
under Rule 45. There was no grave abuse since CA had legal basis.
Any lien inscribed earlier prevails over any inscribed later.
Issue: Whether or not the notice of levy should prevail over the
notice of adverse claim?
Ruling:
 (Unimportant procedure law) Petition is dismissed. Petitioner should
have filed for petition for review under Rule 45 instead of certiorari
since she is assailing CA decisions. Even if they were to consider
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, CA must be shown to commit
grave abuse of discretion.
LEVY DOES NOT MAKE THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR THE OWNER OF
THE PROPERTY; THE LIEN IS STILL SUBORDINATE TO ALL VALID
CLAIMS EXISTENT AT THE TIME THE LIEN ATTACHED
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Petitioner contends that the adverse claim inscribed on the title is
but a notice that the latter has an interest adverse to Brua’s title and
that such claim cannot be superior to a final sale.
 Sec. 12 Rule 39 of the RoC shows that the levy does not make
the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied upon.
He only obtains a lien. Such levy on execution is still subject and
subordinate to all valid claims existing against property at the
time the execution lien attached like real estate mortgage.
 The adverse claim of Garcia was already existing when the
Notice of Levy on Execution was inscribed on July 11, 1988 and
Sept. 2, 1988. The adverse claim is sufficient to constitute
constructive notice. She was already charged with the knowledge
that the subject property sought to be levied was encumbered by an
interest the same or better than that of the registered owner.
 Martinez cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith.
Petitioner admitted that she saw Garcia’s adverse claim
already inscribed on the title when she registered her notice of
attachment in 1981.
THE ADVERSE CLAIM IS STILL IN FORCE; WHILE THE DEED OF
SALE WAS REGISTERED AFTER THE NOTICE OF LEVY AND
CERTIFICATE OF SALE, THE DEED CLEARLY STATED THAT THE
PROPERTY WAS PARTIAL PAYMENT FOR INDEBTEDNESS
 With regard to the inapplicability of Sajonas v. CA, the SC is not
impressed. She argued that the adverse claim of Sajonas was based
on a contract to sell while Garcia’s was merely based on being a
mortgagee of Brua.
 The issue in Sajonas was whether the adverse claim was still in force
when respondent caused annotation of the notice of levy on
execution on the title. The inscription was still in effect, such that
the respondent therein was charged with knowledge that the subject
property sought to be levied was still encumbered by an interest the
same or better than that of the registered owner.
 In this case, although the deed of sale was done after the
notice of levy on execution was inscribed, it was still clearly
stated in the deed that the subject property was only a partial
payment for the mortgage indebtedness to Garcia. The sale of
the property was by reason of the prior loan. The mortgage was
already existing on the title of the subject property when the notice
of levy and certificate of sale in favor of Martinez was inscribed. So,
her claim must yield to the encumbrance by Garcia.
C. Enforcement of Liens on Registered Land
Enforcement of Liens on Registered Land and Application of New
Certificate Upon Expiration of Redemption Period (Sec. 74-75)
Sec. 74. Enforcement of liens on registered land. — Whenever registered land is
sold on execution, or taken or sold for taxes or for any assessment or to enforce a lien of
any character, or for any costs and charges incident to such liens, any execution or
copy of execution, any officer’s return, or any deed, demand, certificate, or affidavit, or
any other instruments made in the course of the proceedings to enforce
such liens and required by law to be recorded, shall be filled with the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the land lies and registered in the registration book,
and a memorandum made upon the proper certificates of title in each case as lien or
encumbrance.
Sec. 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption
period — Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after
registered land has been sold on execution taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of
any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone
claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate of title to
him. Before the entry of anew certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all
legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annual such proceed ings.
REGISTRATION OF DEEDS RELATING TO EXECUTION AND TAX DELINQUENCY SALES
Whenever registered land is sold on execution, or taken or sold for taxes
or for assessment or to enforce a lien of any character, or for any costs
and charges incident to such liens, any execution or copy of execution, any
officer’s return, or any deed, demand, certificate, or affidavit, or other
instrument made in the course of such proceedings to enforce such liens
and required by law to be recorded, shall be filed with the RD of the
province or city where the land lies and registered in the registration book,
and a memorandum made upon the proper certificate of title in case as
lien or encumbrance
The following incidents on registered land in the nature of involuntary
dealings shall be registered to be effective—
• Continuance, dissolution or discharge of attachments
• Orders and decisions of the court
• Deed of sale, officer’s return, order of execution, and other instruments
TAX DELINQUENCY SALE REQUIRES PERSONAL NOTICE TO
TAXPAYER
Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is
essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
which, vitiates the sale
ENTRY OF NEW CERTIFICATE
In case registered land which has been sold on execution for the
enforcement of any lien, except a mortgage lien, has not been redeemed
for a period allowed by law, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming
under him may petition the court for the issuance of a new certificate of
title to him.
But before the entry of such new certificate, the registered owner may
pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul the
proceedings.
Padilla Jr. v. Phil. Producer’s Cooperative
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Facts:
 Padilla Jr. (petitioner) and his wife are registered owners of 3 lots
situated in Bago City. Philippine Producers Cooperative
(respondent) is a marketing cooperative which had a money claim
against petitioner.
 On April 24, 1987, respondent filed a case against petitioner for
collection of a sum of money in RTC of Bacolod City. Despite
receipt of summons, Padilla Jr. did not file an answer. On March 3,
1988, Philippine Producers Coop. moved to have the
petitioner be declared in default. Trial court granted this.
 On May 31, 1990, the Court issued a writ of execution. On June
4, 1990, the three lots from the Bago Cadastre and registered in
Padilla Jr.’s name were levied. Arimas auctioned off the lots to
satisfy judgment with the Cooperative as the only bidder. So,
a certificate of sale was executed in favor of respondent and
registered with the RoD.
 When petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption
within 1-year, the court ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession for the sheriff to cause delivery of the physical possession
of the properties.
 On May 17, 1995, the respondent filed a motion to direct the
RoD to issue new titles over the properties in his name,
alleging that the RoD of Bago City would not issue new titles unless
the owner’s copies were first surrendered to him. Respondent said
that the surrender was impossible because this was an
involuntary sale and the owner’s copies were with petitioner.
RTC granted the motion. CA affirmed the order.
 Padilla Jr. Contentions: Respondent’s motion for the RD to cancel
the certificate of titles and issue new ones was a real action and
motion was infirm because the respondent did not furnish a
copy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civ. Procedure, the
execution of judgment was barred by prescription since the motion
was filed more than 5 years after the writ of execution was issued.
Respondent failed to follow the correct procedure for cancellation of
a certificate of title and issuance of a new one.
 Sec. 6 - Execution by motion or by independent action. —
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date
Basically, the case is about registration of land that was granted to
the cooperative by virtue of an involuntary sale – levy on execution
and subsequent public auction. The RoD says that he needs the
owner’s copies to give a new title, but the cooperative says it’s
impossible since it was an involuntary sale. Now, Padilla Jr. says
that the motion was not correct because he was not furnished a
copy and was barred by prescription for being filed more than 5
years from the time the writ of execution was given.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s right to have new titles
issued in its name is now barred by prescription.
(2) Whether or not the motion in question is the proper remedy for
cancelling the petitioner’s certificates of title and new ones issued
in its name.
Ruling:
THE RIGHT HAS NOT PRESCRIBED BECAUSE THE
AFOREMENTIONED ARTICLE CITED BY PETITIONER IS WITH
REGARD TO LEVY AND SALE, NOT THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW TITLE
 (Heirs of Blancaflor v. CA) A writ of execution was secured by
Sarmiento Trading Corporation in 1968, and by virtue of that, it levied
real property belonging to Blancaflor. When it was auctioned, the
Corporation was able to acquire it. After the lapse of the redemption
period, it consolidated its ownership over the property. The RoD Iloilo
requested Blancaflor to surrender his duplicate copy, but he did
not comply, so the RoD refused to issue a new title. A prayer for
the surrender of the duplicate copy of the title was made, but the
petitioners refused citing prescription.
 However, SC stated that execution is enforced by fact of levy
and sale, such that the Corporation has acquired right over the
title. Because Blancaflor was unable to redeem, he was
divested of all his rights to the property.
 Padilla’s reliance on Sec. 6 Rule 39 of Civil Procedure is misplaced. The
fact of levy and sale constitutes execution, not the action for
issuance of a new title. Since the levy and sale took place in
June and July of 1990. This was after a year from judgment, so it
was done in a timely fashion.
 Padilla Jr. admits his failure to redeem the properties within the one-
year period by adopting the facts of the CA decision. He is definitely
divested of his ownership over the lots.
A MOTION IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY; A PETITION MUST
BE FILED IN COURT AS STATED BY PD 1529
 Petitioner is correct in assailing the improper filing of a mere
motion for the cancellation of the old TCTs and issuance of new
ones as a result of petitioner’s refusal to surrender his duplicate TCTs.
This called for a separate cadastral action initiated via petition.
 (Sec. 107 of PD 1529) Surrender of withheld duplicate
certificates — Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate
of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the
title of the registered owner against his consent or where a
voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the
refusal of failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court
to compel the surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any
person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the
same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum
upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for
any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot
be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as
well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
(Basically, it states that a petition in court to compel
surrender is required).
 Respondent states that it resorted to filing the contested motion
because it could not attain new certificates of title since the petitioner
refused to surrender his TCTs. The proper course is to file a petition in
court rather than move for issuance of new titles.
 (Blancaflor v CA) Sec. 78 of Act 496 – upon expiration of time,
person claiming under execution may PETITION the court entry of a
new certificate.
 Sec. 75 of PD 1529 – Upon expiration of time, purchaser of such sale
or anyone claiming under him may PETITION the court for entry of
a new certificate.
 The reasons behind the law make sense. It provides due process to
the registered land owner and prevents fraudulent or mistaken
conveyance of land, which the value of may exceed the judgment
obligation.
 In any event, respondent can still file the proper petition with the
cadastral court for the issuance of new titles in its name.
FOR THE SAKE OF REFERENCE:
Sec. 78 of Act 496 - Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by
law for redemption after registered land has been sold on any execution,
or taken or sold for the enforcement of any lien of any description, the
person claiming under the execution or under any deed or other instrument
made in the course of the proceedings to levy such execution or enforce
any lien, may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him,
and the application may be granted: Provided, however, That every new
certificate entered under this section shall contain a memorandum of the
nature of the proceeding on which it is based: Provided further, That at
any time prior to the entry of a new certificate the registered owner may
pursue all his lawful remedies to impeach or annul proceedings under
executions or to enforce liens of any description.
Sec. 75 of PD 1529 - Application for new certificate upon expiration of
redemption period. Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law
for redemption after registered land has been sold on execution taken or
sold for the enforcement of a lien of any description, except a mortgage
lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming under him may petition
the court for the entry of a new certificate of title to him.
Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may
pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such
proceedings.
Reyes vs Tang Soat Ing
FACTS: The controversy arose from a complaint for Enforcement of
Easement and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order filed by MFR Farms, Inc. (MFR) against respondents.
MFR complained of respondents commercial and industrial use of their
property covered by TCT No. T-198753, and sought the enforcement of
the encumbrance contained in their title. MFR likewise asked for the
payment of damages suffered by its pig farm resulting from respondents
illegal use of their property.
RTC granted MFR’s complaint and held that using the land as a chemical
processing site and as a storage facility for chemicals is devoting it to
industrial purposes, which is not allowed under the subsisting
encumbrance on the property. CA affirmed with modification the ruling of
the RTC.
On September 28, 1998, upon motion of MFR, the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution.
On January 4, 1999, Sheriff Legaspi submitted a Sheriffs Report
manifesting:
The caretaker, Rodolfo Mendez, said that Tang Soat Ing has no more
properties and the factory located in the compound is being leased to other
people. On December 10, 1998, the undersigned went back to Tang Soat
Ing at Tungkong Mangga, Sa Jose del Monte, Bulacan but said person was
not there and also Rodolfo Mendez was not around because he was in
Manila.
Thereafter, on January 7, 1999, Sheriff Legaspi presented the Writ of
Execution and the Notice of Levy on Execution of Real Property[11] covering
TCT No. T-198753 to the Register of Deeds of BulacanProvince.
On February 4, 1999, the Notice of Levy was inscribed on TCT No. T-
198753. On May 7, 1999, Sheriff Legaspi issued a Notice of Sale on
Execution of Real Property which he likewise posted on the following
places:
(a) The Bulletin Board of Municipal Hall of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan;
(b) The Bulletin Board of the Church of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan;
(c) The Bulletin Board of the Chapel of Gaya-gaya, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan;
(d) The Bulletin Board of the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol
Building of Malolos, Bulacan; and
(e) The Posting Board of the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff located at
the back of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan Building, Malolos,
Bulacan.
On June 12, 19 & 26, 1999, the Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property
was published in The Times Newsweekly.
On July 19, 1999, at the public auction of the subject property covered by
TCT No. T-198753, MFR was declared as the highest bidder. On even date,
Sheriff Legaspi issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan Province.
After more than five (5) years, on September 17, 2004, with respondents
failing to exercise their right of redemption, MFR filed a Motion asking the
RTC to issue an order directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan Province
to cancel TCT No. T-198753 in the name of respondents, and issue a new
certificate of title in the name of MFR.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
On September 28, 2004, the RTC denied the Motion holding that a
mere motion is not sufficient for the cancellation of a certificate of
title. The RTC ruled that under Section 107 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, the Property Registration Decree, a petition and a hearing are
required for the issuance of a new certificate of title.
In this new petition, MFR impleaded the Register of Deeds as additional
defendant and prayed for the same reliefs as those prayed for in their
previous motion with an additional prayer for the issuance of an order
directing respondents to immediately surrender the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. T-198753.
Respondents, through their new counsel, filed the previously adverted to
Opposition and Motion, opposing Reyes April 27, 2006 Motion and moving
to declare void the sale of the subject property.
The RTC noted that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of [Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court evidenced] in
the Sheriffs Report dated January 4, 1999, as well as the publication and
posting requirements, extant in the records of this case. In conclusion, the
RTC ruled that respondents are estopped from questioning the
proceedings, after keeping silent thereon for a long time, despite notice
thereof. CA annulled and set aside the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE
1. WN the execution sale of the subject property is void – Valid!
2. Proceeding from the validity of the execution sale and the
consolidation of Reyes’ ownership over the subject property,
whether Sec. 107 of PD 1529 contemplates the filing of a separate
cadastral case before the RTC acting as a land registration court –
Yes!
HELD: Petition is partially impressed with merit.
Contrary to the CA's holding, the burden of evidence to prove lack of
compliance with Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court rests on the
party claiming lack thereof i.e., respondents. Respondents made no
attempt to meet this burden of evidence, simply aintaining lack of notice
of the entire proceedings before the trial court. We cannot subscribe to
respondents' belated posturing. The disputable presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed was not overcome by respondents. The
documents on record lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents
had constructive, if not actual, notice of the execution proceedings from
the issuance of the Writ of Execution, the levy on the subject property, its
subjection to execution sale, up to and until the proceedings in the RTC
relating to the issuance of a new certificate of title over the subject
property.
In this case, the purpose of giving notice through posting and publication
under Section 15 (c) of the same rule — to let the public know of the sale
to the end that the best price or a better bid may be made possible to
minimize prejudice to the judgment debtor — was realized.
Another thing militates against respondents' claim of lack of knowledge of
the encumbrance on their property — the separate registrations of: (1) the
Notice of Levy; (2) the Certificate of Sale. In this jurisdiction, we adhere
to the doctrine that registration in a public registry works as constructive
notice to the whole World.
At the very least, respondents' attack on the validity of the execution
proceedings, culminating in the execution sale of the subject property, is
barred by laches.
The records bear out that Sheriff Legaspi served a copy of the Writ of
Execution on respondents, and followed up thereon. With no action
forthcoming from respondents, who are ostensibly evading payment of
their judgment debt, the Sheriff correctly levied on the subject property.
For more than 5 years from the execution sale thereof, with respondents
not exercising their right of redemption, up to the filing of a Motion, and
subsequently, a Petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title over
the property in Reyes' name, respondents made no effort to settle their
judgment debt, much less, to ascertain the status of the execution
proceedings against them and the levy on, and consequent sale of, their
property. Truly significant is the fact that 8 years had lapsed, from the
time respondents received a copy of the Writ of Execution in October 1998
until they, through their new counsel, filed the Opposition and Motion in
May 2006, before respondents were prodded into action.
The facts of this case demonstrate respondents' stubborn refusal to comply
with the judgment against them by claiming lack of notice of the execution
proceedings. We reiterate that this claim is belied by the evidence on
record and cannot invalidate the enforcement and execution of a final and
executory judgment of this Court. On the whole, respondents' silence and
inaction for 8
years from the time the subject property was validly levied upon by the
RTC, bars them from claiming invalidity of the execution proceedings.
Notwithstanding the validity of the execution sale and Reyes' consolidation
of ownership over the subject property upon the lapse of the redemption
period, we hold that Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
contemplates the filing of a separate and original action before the RTC,
acting as a land registration court.
That a succeeding registration of property in another's name, after its
original registration, contemplates a separate original action is reinforced
by our ruling
D. Lis Pendens (sec. 76)
Sec. 76. Notice of lis pendens. — No action to recover possession of real estate, or to
quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgement, and no
proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgement, shall have any effect upon
registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a
memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the
court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution
thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an
adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have
been filed and registered.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
Sec 77 Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be canceled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be canceled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who
caused the registration thereof. At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding
section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed canceled upon the registration of a
certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating
the manner of disposal thereof.
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF LIS PENDENS
• Lis pendens literally means a pending suit
• Doctrine that refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court
acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the
action, until final judgment
• May involve actions that deal not only with title or possession of a
property but also with the use and occupation of a property
• The litigation must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily
affected by the judgment
THE PURPOSE OF LIS PENDENS
• To protect the rights of the party causing the registration of the lis
pendens
• To advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject
property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the
pending litigation
The notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation. The inscription serves as a warning that one
who acquires interest over litigated property does so at his own risk, or
that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the property.
A purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is
in litigation between the vendor and third party stands in the shoes of his
vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and results of the pending
litigation.
REQUISITES OF A VALID LIS PENDENS
I. There must be an action or proceeding affecting the title of real
property on the possession thereof
II. The court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
property
III. That the property is sufficiently described in the complaint
EFFECT OF SUCH NOTICE
1. It keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the
court until the entry of final judgment so as to prevent the defeat of
the latter by successive alienations
2. It binds the purchaser of the land subject of the litigation to the
judgment or decree that will be promulgated thereon whether such
purchaser is a bona fide purchaser or not It is not correct to speak of
it as part of the doctrine of notice, the purchaser pendent elite is
affected not by notice but because the law doesn’t allow litigating
parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property
in dispute so as to prejudice the other party.
WHEN ANNOTATION IS PROPER
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may
be availed of are as follows:
1. Action to recover possession of real property
2. Action to quiet title thereto
3. Action to remove cloud thereon
4. Action for partition
5. Any other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to
the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon
Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not
necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real
property.
This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an
equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien,
a charge or an encumbrance against it.
WHEN ANNOTATION IS NOT PROPER
1. Preliminary attachments
2. Proceedings for the probates of wills
3. Levies on execution
4. Proceedings for the administration of estate of deceased persons
5. Proceedings in which the only subject is the recovery of a money
judgment
• By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply
to attachments, levies of execution, or to proceedings for the probate of
wills, or for administration of the estate of deceased persons in the Court
of First Instance. Also, it is held generally that the doctrine of lis pendens
has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the
recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to
property be incidentally affected.
• It is essential that the property be directly affected, as where the relief
sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the
enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title,
possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring its
transfer or sale.
PRINCIPLE OF PRIMUS TEMPORE, POTIOR JURE; EFFECT OF LIS
PENDENS
• The principle of primus tempore, potior jure gains greater significance in
the law on double sale of immovable property
• Reliance on the principle of constructive notice operates only such upon
the registration of the notice of lis pendens
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
• More fundamentally, a notice of lis pendens is only a warning to the
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in
litigation and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless he intends
to gamble on the results of the litigation
CANCELLATION OF LIS PENDENS
• Ordinarily a notice which has been filed in a proper case cannot be
cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, except in cases
expressly provided for by statute
• It may be cancelled upon order by the court or upon action by the RD at
the instance of the party who caused the registration of the notice
• While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens,
such power is exercised under express provisions of law
- If the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party
- When the annotation isn’t necessary
Viewmaster Construction Vs Maulit, Et Al
Principle: A notice of lis pendens may be registered when an action or a
proceeding directly affects the title to the land or the buildings thereon; or
the possession, the use or the occupation thereof. Hence, the registration
of such notice should be allowed if the litigation involves the enforcement
of an agreement for the co-development of a parcel of land. What is
established here is enforcement of joint-venture agreement which is well
within the definition of notice of lis pendens.
FACTS:
Allen Roxas is one of the stockholders of State Investment Trust, Inc. In
order to gain control and ownership of the said company, Roxas applied
for a loan with First Metro Investment, Inc. First Metro agreed to grant the
loan provided Roxas could procure a guarantor to secure the payment of
the loan.
Petitioner Viewmaster agreed to act as guarantor for the loan in
consideration for its participation in a joint venture project to codevelop
the real estate assets of State Investment Trust, Inc. As a result of the
loans granted, Roxas gained control and ownership of the State
Investment Trust, Inc.
However, notwithstanding the lapse of two years since becoming the
controlling stockholder, Roxas failed to take the necessary action to
implement the joint venture project with Viewmaster to co-develop the
subject properties.
His continued inaction forced Viewmaster to file a complaint for speci0c
performance against State Investment Trust, Inc., its subsidiary
companies, and Allen Roxas.
In connection with this, Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the
Register of Deeds for the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on a
particular title in the name of State Properties Corporation, a subsidiary of
State Investment Trust, Inc.
The respondent Register of Deeds of Las Piñas denied the request. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling and held that petitioner
failed to adequately describe the subject property in the complaint and in
the application for the registration of a notice of lis pendens.
The CA also ruled that a notice of lis pendens can only be registered when
an action directly affects the title to or possession of the real property,
which is not present in this case. Petitioner's complaint clearly warranted
the registration of a notice of lis pendens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property was not particularly described
Whether or not a notice of lis pendens is proper
HELD:
Yes. A copy of the TCT was attached to and made an integral part of
both documents. Consequently, the notice of lis pendens submitted for
registration, taken as a whole, leaves no doubt as to the identity of the
property, the technical description of which appears on the attached TCT.
We stress that the main purpose of the requirement that the notice should
contain a technical description of the property is to ensure that the same
can be distinguished and readily identi0ed. In this case, we agree with
petitioner that there was substantial compliance with this requirement.
Yes. The Complaint shows that the loan obtained by Allen Roxas (one of
the defendants in civil case) from First Metro was guaranteed by petitioner
for two distinct considerations: (a) to enable it to purchase 50 percent of
the stocks that the said defendant may acquire in State Investment and
(b) to co-develop with the defendants the Quezon City and the Las Piñas
properties of the corporation. In other words, the co-development of the
said properties is a separate undertaking that did not arise from
petitioner's acquisition of the defendant's shares in the corporation. To
repeat, the co-development is not merely auxiliary or incidental to the
purchase of the shares; it is a distinct considerations for Viewmaster's
guaranty.
Atty G’s comments: When it is a personal action like specific performance
normally it does not pre detach of the ownership or possession of property.
The property should be the list mota (subject proper) of the litigation. But
SC expanded the interpretation of the notice of lis pendens, it includes also
all suits that seeks to establish a right to or an interest to the property for
the enforcement of a lien, an encumbrance or a charge against him and it
is under the 2nd category where it was applied directly.
Generally a notice of Lis Pendens covers actions pending before the regular
courts however, cases involving real property pending before
administrative agencies such as the HLURB, SEC and the DARAB which are
endowed with quasi-judicial functions have been recognized as proper
basis for the annotation of a Lis Pendens. Availability of lis pendens is not
confined to cases involving the title to or possession of real property. It
applies to suits brought to “establish an equitable estate, interest or right
in specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge or encumbrance
against it.
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. vs Herbal Cove Realty
Principle: Not all liens are subject of lis pendens. The pendency of a
simple collection suit arising from the alleged nonpayment of construction
services, materials, unrealized income and damages DOES NOT justify the
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the title to a property where
construction has been done.
FACTS: Respondent and petitioner entered into a construction contract
whereby petitioner agreed to construct several townhouse units on
respondent's land for a total of almost P17M. Later, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for sum of money with damages and notice
of lis pendens annotated on respondent's land titles.
Petitioner averred that its money claim on the cost of labor and materials
for the townhouses it constructed on respondent's land was a proper lien
that justi9ed the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the land titles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the annotation of lis pendens is proper
HELD: No.
A careful examination of petitioner's Complaint, as well as the reliefs it
seeks, reveals that no such lien or interest over the property was ever
alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction
services and materials plus damages, without mentioning — much less
asserting — a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a
purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any
material averment of any enforceable right, interest or lien in connection
with the subject property.
Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged such lien or
encumbrance in its Complaint, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens
would still be unjustified, because a complaint for collection and damages
is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a contractor's lien.
Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e.,
when the same specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims
of several creditors and the value of such property of the debtor is
insufficient to pay in full all the creditors.
Homeowners Savings vs Delgado
Facts:
• Felonia and De Guzman were the registered owners of a parcel of land
coevered by TCT No. T-402 issued by the register of deeds In June
1990, Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged the property to Delgado to
secure the loan in the amount of ₱1,655,000.00. However, instead of
a real estate mortgage, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
with an Option to Repurchase.
• On 20 December 1991, Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for
Reformation of Contract. RTC rendered a judgment favorable to
Felonia and De Guzman on the findings that it is "very apparent that
the transaction had between the parties is one of a mortgage and not
a deed of sale with right to repurchase.The CA affirmed the trial court
decision. On 16 October 2000, the CA decision became final and
executory.
• Inspite of the pendency of the Reformation case in which she was the
defendant, Delgado filed a "Petition for Consolidation of Ownership of
Property Sold with an Option to Repurchase and Issuance of a New
Certificate of Title" (Consolidation case) in the RTC of Las Piñas, on
20 June 1994. After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC ordered the
issuance of a new title under Delgado’s name.
• Aggrieved, Felonia and De Guzman elevated the case to the CA
through a Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
• On 2 June 1995, Delgado mortgaged the subject property to
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB) using her newly
registered title. 3 days later, or on 5 June 1995, HSLB caused the
annotation of the mortgage. On 20 November1997, HSLB foreclosed
the subject property and later consolidated ownership in its favor,
causing the issuance of a new title in its name, TCT No. 64668.
• On 14 September 1995, Felonia and De Guzman caused the
annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Delgado’s title, TCT No.
44848.
• On 27 October 2000, the CA annulled and set aside the decision of
the RTC, Las Piñas City in the Consolidation case.
• The decision of the CA, declaring Felonia and De Guzman as the
absolute owners of the subject property and ordering the cancellation
of Delgado’s title, became final and executory on 1 December 2000.
• On 29 April 2003, Felonia and De Guzman, represented by Maribel
Frias (Frias), claiming to be the absolute owners of the subject
property, instituted the instant complaint against Delgado, HSLB,
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City and Rhandolfo B. Amansec before
the RTC of Las Piñas City for Nullity of Mortgage and Foreclosure Sale,
Annulment of Titles of Delgado and HSLB, and finally, Reconveyance
of Possession and Ownership of the subject property in their favor.
HSLB
• Felonia and De Guzman are barred from laches as they had slept on
their rights to timely annotate, by way of Notice of Lis Pendens, the
pendency of the Reformation case.
• It should not be bound by the decisions of the CA in the Reformation
and Consolidation cases because it was not a party therein.
• Iit was a mortgagee in good faith because the mortgage between
Delgado and HSLB was annotated on the title on 5 June 1995,
whereas the Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated only on 14
September 1995.
• After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman as the
absolute owners of the subject property. CA affirmed with
modifications the trial court decision (only relating to awards of
damages & attorney’s fees)
ISSUE: Whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee and a purchaser in good
faith
HELD: No. Decision of CA sustained.
Civil Law: Who is a Purchaser in good faith The rights of the parties to the
present case are defined not by the determination of whether or not HSLB
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
is a mortgagee in good faith, but of whether or not HSLB is a purchaser in
good faith. And, HSLB is not such a purchaser.
A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a property without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property
and pays full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice
of the claim or interest of other persons in the property.
In the case at bar, HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions.
At the time the subject property was mortgaged, there was yet no
annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. However, at the time HSLB purchased
the subject property, the Notice of Lis Pendens was already annotated on
the title. When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and circumstances
as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps to qualify as
a purchaser in good faith.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means, a pending suit or a
pending litigation while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the
whole world that a real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that
anyone who acquires an interest over the property does so at his/her own
risk, or that he/she gambles on the result of the litigation over the
property.It is a warning to prospective buyers to take precautions and
investigate the pending litigation.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to protect the rights of the
registrant while the case is pending resolution or decision. With the notice
of lis pendens duly recorded and remaining uncancelled, the registrant
could rest secure that he/she will not lose the property or any part thereof
during litigation.
Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actual
knowledge of the annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding the
same, HSLB continued with the purchase knowing the legal repercussions
a notice of lis pendens details.
Casim v. RD of Las Pinas
Facts:
 Petitioner represented by Casim is a domestic corporation who
had a TCT registered in its name. In 1982, petitioner acquired
the property through a Deed of Absolute Sale, and as a result,
the mother title was cancelled and a new one was issued.
 On March 22, 2004, the petitioner filed with RTC of Las Piñas City
an original petition for cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens as well as other entries of involuntary encumbrances in the
original copy.
 Casim claims that the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT was
clean at the time of delivery and was surprised to learn later on
that the original TCT contained several entries – one of which is
the notice of lis pendens (the notice of lis pendens was filed by
Manalaysay for case Casim v. Sps. Casim & Chavez, Sps. Nobleza,
and Antonio in the Rizal Branch. – NOTE: It says Rizal Branch at
the enumeration but says it was filed in Makati?)
 In order to justify cancellation, petitioner alleged that the notice
of lis pendens was a forgery because there were inconsistencies
in the signature and the fact that the notice was entered later than
that of the previous entry.
 Furthermore, petitioner stated that while Sec. 59 of PD 1529
requires that the existing notices be inscribed in the new
issuances of TCTs, his duplicate copy contained nothing
which made him an innocent purchaser for value especially
since he was never a party to the civil case in the notice. Finally, he
uses the indefeasibility of title despite the mother title containing
defects.
 The Intestate Estate of Bruneo Casim intervened, stating that
the RTC of Las Piñas did not have jurisdiction because
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens lies within the jurisdiction of
the court before which the main action referred to in the notice is
pending (basically, he says that it should have been filed in the
Makati branch because that is where the notice of lis pendens
was issued).
 He said that the notice referred to had attained finality as the SC
had issued an entry in judgment and that the RTC Makati had
ordered execution. There was lack of legal basis for the petition
because there is nothing that hints of any legal ground for
cancellation. As opposed to the allegations of there being no carry
over to the duplicate copy, the original copy of petitioner’s TCT
had the same inscriptions as the mother title but not in the
duplicate copy. There was no lack of transaction record because
the certification issued by the RD merely stated that it could
not be retrieved so it might be lost or destroyed.
 (RTC RULING) It did not have jurisdiction – should be filed where
the main action was filed. Petitioner sought the wrong forum to
determine the existence of forgery and such existence cannot be
presumed from non-chronological entry. (It did not go through CA)
 Petitioner arguments: Trial court erred in dismissing the case
because the rule of following the main action does not always follow
– trial courts have an INHERENT power to cancel notices of lis
pendens. The trial court is wrong for declining to rule on the
allegation of forgery because there is no transaction record with the
RD. The fact that there is no inscription on the title shows he was
never a party to the case referred to in the title.
 Intestate Estate of Casim arguments: reiteration of previous
arguments. The only difference is petitioner replied, stating that non-
chronology is the best evidence and that forgery of the notice
constitutes a sufficient ground for cancellation.
Issue: Whether or not the notice of lis pendens may be validly
cancelled?
Ruling:
THE PURPOSE OF A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS IS TO MAINTAIN
THE COURT’S POWER OVER THE PROPERTY UNTIL FINAL
JUDGMENT AND SERVES AS A WARNING.
 The petition is unmeritorious. Lis pendens means pending suit, and
it refers to jurisdiction, power, or control that a court acquires over
the property involved in a suit pending the continuance of an action
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
and until final judgment. It is intended to keep the properties in
litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated to prevent the defeat of judgment by subsequent
alienation. It serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over the property does so at his own risk.
DIFFERENT MODES OF CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS; INHERENT POWER ARGUMENT FAILS
 Once it is duly registered, it may be cancelled by the trial court
where action involving property is pending. Such power is
inherent and exercised under express provisions of law. Sec. 14
Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the trial court
to cancel a notice of lis pendens where it is shown that the purpose
of annotation is to harass the other party, or when it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
annotated.
 The power to cancel is only in exceptional circumstances, like:
circumstances are imputable to party who caused annotation where
litigation was unduly extended to the other party’s prejudice due
to several continuances, where the case where the notice was based
on is cancelled because of non prosequitur (failure to appear to
prosecute), or where judgment was rendered against party who
caused the annotation.
 Petitioner’s theory that it doesn’t always have to follow the main
action due to inherent power to cancel fails.
 (History of the Annotation) Bruneo Casim filed a case for
annulment of sale and recovery of real property against Jesus and
Margarita Casim – stockholders of the corporation - before the RTC
Makati. Makati RTC rendered a decision against Bruneo. CA reversed,
and an appeal to SC was dismissed for being filed out of time.
 It is a necessary incident of registering a notice of lis pendens that
the property is effectively placed under court’s power until litigation
attains finality. It is in this sense that the power to cancel is inherent
as it is merely stemming from the main action.
 (Vda. De Kilayko v. Judge Tengco, Heirs of Marasigan v. IAC,
and Tanchoco v. Aquino) Precautionary notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled by court having jurisdiction over said action. The same
pronouncement was made in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez Sr. v. Enriquez
citing Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc. v. CA.
 Thus, action should have been filed before the RTC Makati, not
an original action before the court a quo. Even then, petition
could not be pursued in the proper forum as decision in the
annulment case already attained finality. The notice has already
pursued its purpose.
 However, petitioner is not totally out of options. The suitable course
of action is only judicial however, using Sec. 77 of PD 1529 to
cancel the notice. This is by presenting to the RD a certificate
executed by the clerk of court before which the main action was
pending, having it registered.
 The argument of forgery was declined a decision since it requires
factual determination.
E. Levies on Execution
A. Registration of the Levy on Execution
B. Registration of the Certificate on Sale
C. Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale
D. Petition for Issuance of a New Certificate of Title pursuant to
Sec. 75 of P.D. 1529
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT
The Court held that a registered writ of attachment is a proceeding in
rem. It is against a particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached
property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very
dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. An exception to the
preference given to a registered lien is the case where a party has actual
knowledge of the claimant’s actual, open, continuous and notorious
possession of the disputed property at the time the levy or attachment is
registered.
COMMON REGISTRATION PROBLEMS
CAUTIONARY NOTICE
Under the Spanish Mortgage Law, this was a procedure intended to
maintain the right of priority of the interested party while he goes about
correcting the defect of his document. The Spanish Mortgage Law as a
system of registration has been discontinued as of June 11, 1978 by Sec.
3 of P.D. 1529.
OPPOSITION FILED BY LAWYERS
A mere opposition from a lawyer or a third person who claims an adverse
interest in the property involved in a transaction is not sufficient to justify
the Register of Deeds in denying the registration of a voluntary
instrument. (LRC Consulta No. 259)
Litigious matters are to be decided, and the appropriate relief granted,
not by the Register of Deeds, but by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(LRC Consulta No. 57)
CARRYOVER OF ENCUMBRANCES
Sec. 59 of P.D. 1529 provides: “If at the time of any transfer, subsisting
encumbrances or annotations appear in the registration book, they shall
be carried over and stated in the new certificate except so far as they
may be simultaneously released or discharged.
- Exception: Upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all
liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and
the purchaser at public auction acquires the title free from the
subordinate liens. (PNB vs. ICB 199 SCRA 500)
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Pineda v. Arcalas
Facts:
 The subject property contains 3 parcels of land which in total consists
of 50,000 sq. m. These lots are portions of another lot under the
name of Spouses Lateo totaling 74, 708 sq. m. in Laguna.
 Victoria Tolentino bought the property from Spouses Lateo. A
suit for a Sum of Money was instituted by Arcalas against
Tolentino which was based on indebtedness shown by a
promissory note and four post-dated checks which were dishonored.
Quezon City RTC rendered judgment in favor of Arcalas.
 Pineda bought the subject property from Tolentino. He alleged
that upon payment opf the purchase price, she took possession by
allowing a tenant, Bautista to cultivate the same. However, she
failed to register the property in her name.
 In order to execute judgment, RTC Quezon City levied the subject
property and the Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution was
annotated at the back of the TCT.
 Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff an Affidavit of Title and Third-
Party Claim, but Arcalas filed a motion to set aside what
Pineda filed. Arcalas’s motion was granted because the levies
were registered while the Deed of Absolute Sale was not.
 After finality of the order quashing the third-party claim, Pineda
filed with the Office of the RD Laguna another Affidavit of
Third-Party Claim, causing the inscription of a notice of adverse
claim at the back of the TCT.
 Arcalas and Perez purchased the lot at an auction sale
evidenced by a sheriff’s Certificate of Sale issued on the same day
and registered at the back of the TCT.
 Arcalas filed an action for cancellation of the entry of Pineda’s
adverse claim before Laguna RTC (Ruling), which ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Adverse Claim on the ground of
res judicata. This was given due course because the order was final
and executory with no relief being filed by Pineda.
 (CA RULING) Dismissed case when it considered it
abandoned when Pineda failed to file her brief.
TIMELINE: Spouses Lateo own land -> sold to Tolentino -> action
against Tolentino for debt -> meanwhile, Tolentino sold to Pineda,
failed to register -> Arcalas won, levy on execution on subject
property -> Pineda filed dilatory tactics -> Arcalas had to keep
cancelling her claims -> Pineda epic failed and got KO’d at the CA.
Issue: Whether the Alias Writ of Execution exempted Pineda’s
portion. – NO.
Whether possession of her portion is already equivalent to a title.
– NO.
Ruling:
 (Unimportant procedural law) The petition must be dismissed.
CA properly dismissed the case for failure to file a brief in accordance
with Sec. 7 Rule 44 of the RoC, imposing upon the appellant the duty
to file an appellant’s brief in ordinary appealed cases before the CA.
In special cases appealed to CA like certiorari, a memorandum of
appeal must be filed in place of an appellant’s brief (Sec. 10 Rule 44
of RoC). Failure to file will be a ground for dismissal. An appellant’s
brief is required to put the assigned errors in formally. (Casim v.
Flordeliza) The dismissal of the case was done because the brief was
delayed and fell short of some requirements. Pineda did not even
provide justification for failure to file an appellant brief.
 (Still unimportant procedural law) Pineda clearly intended to
delay termination of the case because Quezon RTC already quashed
her third-party claim, yet she filed another adverse claim before the
RD of Laguna, which Arcalas had to again cancel. She then filed a
dilatory appeal and then two motions for reconsideration.
 Pineda avers that she is not a party to the Civil Case and that the
levy on the alias writ of execution can’t affect her subject property,
but this is contrary to law.
A REGISTERED LEVY ON EXECUTION IS SUPERIOR TO A
PRIOR UNREGISTERED SALE
 Sec. 51 and 52 of PD 1529 – A purchaser of land causes the
registration of the transfer of the subject property in her favor, third
persons like Arcalas cannot be bound. Insofar as third persons are
concerned, it is the registration of the deed that transfers or
conveys a person’s interest in real property. Because it was
unrecorded, the deed of sale merely operated as a contract between
Tolentino as the seller and Pineda as the buyer. Levy on execution
duly registered takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale.
 (Valdevieso v. Damalerio) Registered writ of attachment was a
superior lien on an unregistered deed of sale because an
attachment is a proceeding in rem. Nothing can destroy such lien
except the dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. It continues
until debt is paid or sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment.
 Pineda also argues that her possession cures the defect caused
by her failure to register the subject property in her name. It
is inaccurate and inapplicable.
 Notwithstanding the preference given to a registered lien, the Court
has made an exception in a case where a party has actual
knowledge of claimant’s open, actual, and notorious
possession at the time the levy or attachment was registered.
Under this situation, the actual notice and knowledge of a prior
unregistered interest, not the mere possession was held to be
equivalent to registration.
 Pineda didn’t even allege or prove that Arcalas had actual
knowledge of her claim of ownership and possession at the
time the levy was registered. It cannot be equivalent to
registration.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
Valdevieso v. Damalerio
Facts:
 Valdevieso bought from Spouses Uy a parcel of land in General
Santos City. The deed of sale was not registered, nor was the
title of the land transferred to the petitioner.
 The property was declared by petitioner for taxation purposes
with the City Assessor’s Office.
 On April 19, 1996, Spouses Damalerio filed with RTC a
complaint for a sum of money against Spouses Uy with an
application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.
 The trial court issued the writ by virtue of which the property
was levied.
 Meanwhile, it was registered with the RD of General Santos City and
annotated on the TCT. The name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled
and then issued to the name of Valdevieso.
 Petitioner then filed a third-party claim to discharge or annul
the attachment levied on the property on the ground that the
said property belongs to him and no longer to Spouses Uy.
 (TRIAL COURT RULING) Citing Manliguez v. CA and Santos v.
Bayhon, it held that the levy of the property by virtue of attachment
is lawful only when the levied property belongs to the
defendant. Although Uy was the registered owner, he was no longer
the owner as it was sold to petitioner, so writ of attachment was
unlawful.
 (CA RULING) reversed the resolution. An attachment or levy of
execution despite being made later, takes precedence over the sale
if it was registered before the sale was registered. The writ of
attachment being recorded ahead of the sale will take
precedence.
Issue: Whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land
is a superior lien over that of an earlier unregistered deed of sale.
Ruling:
REGISTERED WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ON LAND IS SUPERIOR OVER
THAT OF AN EARLIER UNREGISTERED SALE; IT IS THE FACT OF
REGISTRATION THAT BINDS THIRD PERSONS.
 Petitioner maintains that he has a superior right over the
questioned property because when the same was attached, it was
no longer the property of Spouses Uy. The ownership was then
transferred. He avers that he did not sleep on his rights because
he worked out for the transfer of registration in his name. It
was the fault of the process for taking too long. It is only equitable
that he gets the property.
 Respondents on the other hand, state that the registration of
a deed of sale is the operative act which binds the land and
creates a lien thereon. Before that, third persons cannot be
bound. Because the writ of attachment was registered earlier than
the deed of sale, their writ enjoys preference over the deed of sale.
Art. 1477 and 1498 do not apply because they only apply
between parties to the deed of sale. What binds third parties is
registration of the instrument. Finally, petitioner cannot invoke
equity unless there is an absence of a specific provision on
the matter and the person who invokes it is not guilty.
However, Sec. 51 of PD 1529 is the law on the matter.
 SC agrees with the respondents. Although the subject land was
given to the petitioner as early as Dec. 5, 1995, it wasn’t until June
6, 1998 that the conveyance was registered. During that time gap,
the land was already subjected to a levy on attachment. At the time
of attachment on April 23, 1996, Spouses Uy were still the registered
owners of the property.
 What validly transfers or conveys a person’s interest in real
property is the registration of the deed. When petitioner
bought the property, it was nothing more than a private
transaction between him and Spouses Uy. His registration on
June 6, 1996 was already too late since the attachment was already
made.
 Settled is the rule that levy on attachment, duly registered,
takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a
necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was
covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental
principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
 The subsequent registration of the prior sale does not
diminish the preference because the levy on attachment is a
proceeding in rem. It is a specific lien on the attached property
which nothing can destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment or levy itself. The property is an indebted thing and a
virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. It continues until
debt is paid, sale is had under execution, or until judgment is
satisfied, or attachment is discharged by law.
 The attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature of a
real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. So, the
recording of title and ownership of petitioner’s was not an
absolute but a limited right which was subject to the prior
registered lien.
 The reliance on Manliguez v. CA and Santos v. Bayhon is
misplaced. It did not deal with the same situation. In Santos, it was
machinery that were executed on the ruling of NLRC. It never
appears whether such was registered. Basically, both cases never
had the registration of sale as an issue.
 While it is aware of its equity jurisdiction, it is a court of law. Equity
cannot be enforced as to overrule the provisions of law. Dura lex sed
lex.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
REGISTRATION OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS;
PARTITIONS (SEC. 78-92)
Surrender of Owner’s Duplicate (Sec. 107, PD 1529)
Section 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate certificates. Where it is
necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his
consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason
of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing,
may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate
or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if not
any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the
issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate
and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment
of the outstanding duplicate.
REMEDY WHERE DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE IS WITHHELD
• In case the person in possession of the owner’s duplicate certificate
refuses or fails to surrender the same to the RD so that any
involuntary or voluntary instrument may be registered and a
certificate issued, the party in interest may file a petition in court to
compel the surrender of the same to the RD.
• The court after hearing may order the registered owner or any person
withholding the duplicate certificate and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender
• If the person withholding the certificate is not amenable to the
process of the court, or if for any reason the certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of said certificate and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof
• Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
PETITION TO SURRENDER TITLE MAY BE FILED AS AN INCIDENT
IN
AN ACTION AFFECTING SAID TITLE
• Where the court in an action for specific performance, upheld the sale
to the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to comply with the terms
and conditions to the sale, it was proper for the plaintiff to ask the
court to compel the defendant to surrender the duplicate certificate
of title to the RD for the registration of the sale, this being a necessary
incident in the main case
• Section 107 doesn’t preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under said section, specially if the
certificate of title to be surrendered is intimately connected with the
subject matter of the principal action
• Where the title is subject to a mortgage, the order of the court cannot
in any way prejudice the rights of the mortgagee since any lien
annotated in the certificate is incorporated or carried over to the new
transfer certificate of title to whoever it is issued
AUTHORITY OF COURT TO ORDER THE SURRENDER OWNER’S
DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATE
• In order that the court may order the registered owner to surrender
his owner’s duplicate, it has to determine upon the evidence
presented by the parties whether the registered owner had been
lawfully divested of his title thereto
• That of course requires and involves of the determination of the
question of title to the registered property
• Section 107 doesn’t constitute a reopening of the decree entered as
a result of proceedings in rem for the confirmation of imperfect title
under said act, it cannot be deemed to contravene the purpose or aim
of the Torrens system
Abad v. Filhomes Realty
Facts:
 Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang
Realty Corporation (respondents), co-owners of two lots, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against above-named
petitioners (Abad et. al) before the MeTC.
 Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had
occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their
repeated demands to vacate them.
 Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for
they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development
Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that
the question of ownership must first be settled before the
issue of possession may be resolved.
 On June 30, 2004, while the case is still pending, the City of
Parañaque filed expropriation proceedings (thru its power of
eminent domain) covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque with the intention of establishing a socialized
housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including
petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and
a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.
 Petitioners contested that they have a better right on the land
since they are beneficiaries of the expropriation proceedings but
nowhere in the ordinance stated any beneficiaries.
 (METC RULING) The MeTC rendered judgment (in the unlawful
detainer case) in favor of the respondents ordering plaintiffs to
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
vacate and surrender possession of the premises. But since no
payment (just compensation for the expropriation?) had been made
yet to respondents for the lots, the MeTC held that they
(respondents) still maintain ownership thereon. It added that
petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a
Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.
 (RTC RULING) The RTC reversed the MeTC decision and
dismissed respondents’ complaint on the ground that there was no
toleration and therefore the unlawful detainer case must not
prosper; and (1) the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the City bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer
proceedings, and (2) since the judgment had already been rendered
in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the
lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the
final judgment and writ of possession due to non-payment of
just compensation.
 (CA RULING) The respondents appealed to the CA and the appellate
court ruled in favor of respondents. It held that petitioners’
occupation of the property without the permission of the
previous owner — Pilipinas Development Corporation — as an
indicium of tolerance by respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
ruled in favor of respondents. It also held that (2) the issuance of
a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings does not signify
the completion of the expropriation proceedings.
Issue: WON the expropriation proceedings initiated by the City of
Parañaque bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer case.
WON the issuance of a writ of possession signifies the completion
of the expropriation proceedings and thus transferred ownership
of the subject land to the City.
Ruling:
EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY SUSUPENDED;
REQUIRES PAYMENT OF RENT
 As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary
nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in abeyance
despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. However,
Section 1 of CA 538 provides:
Section 1. “when the Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any
estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment
against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically
suspended, for such time as may be required by the
expropriation proceedings OR the necessary negotiations for the
purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the
benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the
landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit
the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been
instituted.”
 Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned
in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension. They
nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of
expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a
better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance
authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings
designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they
are entitled to continue staying there.
EXPROPRIATION IS COMPLETED UPON DETERMINATION OF
PROPRIETY AND JUST COMPENSATION
 It is only upon the completion of the two stages that an
expropriation can be said to have been completed. The process
is not complete until payment of just compensation. To
effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC
to pay the property owners the final just compensation.
 Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
 The first phase is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
 The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the court of "the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners.
 It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process
is not complete until payment of just compensation.
WRIT OF POSSESSION DOES NOT FINISH
PROCEEDINGS; PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
EFFECTUATES TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP.
 Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this
case does not write finish to the expropriation
proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is
necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.
 In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of
possession in the expropriation proceedings did not
transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such
issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even
no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor
of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots,
contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
ASSURANCE FUND
CHAPTER 7 (SEC. 93 – 102)
Claims against Assurance Fund (Sec. 95)
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without
negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or
any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the land
under the operation of the Torrens system of arising after original
registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error,
omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry
or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the provisions of this
Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law
from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or
interest therein, may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction
for the recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
REQUISITES:
1. Person suffers LOSS/DAMAGE/DEPRIVATION of any ESTATE or
INTEREST IN LAND
2. On account of BRINGING LAND UNDER the operation of the TORRENS
SYSTEM arising AFTER original registration
3. Thru FRAUD, ERROR, OMISSION, MISTAKE OR MISDESCRIPTION in a
certificate of title or entry or memorandum in the registration book
4. WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE on his part [he protected his interests]
5. He is BARRED OR PRECLUDED from bringing an ACTION FOR THE
RECOVERY of such land or estate or interest therein
WHAT CONSTITUTES ASSURANCE FUND?
Upon the original registration of land under the Land Registration Act, and
also upon the entry of a certificate showing title as registered owners in
heirs of devisees, there is required to be paid to the register of deeds one-
tenth of one per centum of the assessed value of the real estate on the
basis of the last assessment for the municipal taxation. This constitutes
what is known Assurance Fund.
PURPOSE:
Assurance Fund is created for the purpose of paying any damages which
may result from an improper or illegal registration. It is intended to relieve
innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is
conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land, and from any injustice
which may arise to them by operations under the Land Registration Act,
whether such injustice arises from the fraud or error of someone connected
with the registry office or some third person dealing with the land.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ASSURANCE FUND
• Section 95 provides a remedy where a person who sustains loss or
damage or is deprived of any estate or interest in land in consequence of
the operations of the Torrens system of registration, without negligence
on his part, may bring an action for the recovery of damages to be paid
out of the Assurance fund
• Public policy demands that those unjustly deprived of their rights over
real property by reason of the operation of our registration laws be
afforded remedies
• According to the principles of the Torrens system, it is a condition sine
que non that the person who brings an action for damages against the
Assurance fund be the registered owner, and as to holders of transfer
certificates of title that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value
• There must also be a showing of loss or damage or deprivation of any
land or interest thereon by the operation of PD1529
• Where plaintiff is solely responsible for the plight in which it finds itself,
the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer are exempt from any
liability
Register of Deeds Negros Occidental v. Anglo Sr.
(KEEP IN MIND: Atty. Gimarino wanted us to read the case because
the case shows how to strike a balance between good faith and the
caveat emptor principle).
Facts:
 de Ocampo filed an application before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 2 to register two parcels of
prime sugar land. This was contested by the Bureau of
Education (Republic).
 The Republic argues that the lots de Ocampo sought to registered
were given to the Bureau of Education by Jalandoni in 1926.
As such, the Bureau owned the lots evidenced by their TCTs.
 While registration proceedings were pending, de Ocampo entered
into an agreement with Anglo Sr. in 1926. It was a Deed of
Conditional Sale that de Ocampo would transfer one lot
entirely and a part of the other lot under certain conditions.
 On Dec. 28, 1965, the Republic filed a Petition for Relief from
judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding
before the CFI in San Carlos City.
 In 1966, Ocampo sold what was agreed upon in the conditional sale.
The deed was registered and annotated at the back of the
OCT, which was cancelled. A new TCT covering the lots was issued
in favor of Anglo Sr.
 On a later date (March 3 and August 24, 1966), the Republic
annotated notices of lis pendens in Anglo’s TCT.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 (CFI RULING ON PETITION FOR RELIEF) Dismissed. The appeal
before the CA was also dismissed. An appeal by certiorari was filed
to the court, entitled Republic v. CA.
 Despite the notice of lis pendens, Anglo Sr. conveyed the lots
to Anglo Agricultural Corporation (the Corporation) in
exchange for shares of stock. In the Deed of Conveyance, Anglo
Agricultural Corporation assumed the risk of an adverse decision
as stated in the notices of lis pendens.
 After a new CT was given to the Corporation, they amended the
agreement such that Anglo Sr. would assume all risks in case of an
adverse decision.
 (REGARDING THE CASE PENDING IN SC) The court remanded
the case back to the CA to be decided on its merits and was
reinstated in 1983. The CA rendered a decision against de Ocampo,
which declared the OCT in favor of de Ocampo and the TCT in Anglo’s
name null and void, ordering cancellation. The case was remanded
to the RTC for execution.
 The RD of Negros Occidental wrote a letter to Anglo requiring him
to surrender his TCT, and he complied.
 On April 1988, Anglo Sr and Anglo Agricultural Corporation filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Damages from the Assurance Fund
against the RD and National Treasurer of the Philippines,
stating that Anglo Sr. acquired the lots in good faith and for value
without negligence.
 The only remedy left for Anglo Sr. and the Corporation was to
recover the value of the lots from the Assurance Fund
according to Act. No 496 and PD 1529. This is because de Ocampo
already died without any property left to his heirs.
 During trial, only Anglo Sr. and the Corporation presented witnesses.
Atty. Lozada confirmed that there were no annotations of notices of
lis pendens in the OCT at the time of sale. Anglo Sr. testified that de
Ocampo possessed the lots prior to the sale. The RD and National
Treasurer did not file an Opposition. They only submitted a
Memorandum.
 (RTC RULING) Awarded damages in favor of Anglo Sr. and the
Corporation, computing the fair market value at the time the
Corporation suffered the loss.
 (CA RULING) The CA affirmed the award of damages because it
fell within the requisites of Sec. 95 of PD 1529 but excluded
attorney’s fees.
 RD and National Treasurer Arguments before the SC: Anglo Sr.
is a purchaser in bad faith. He was negligent because he didn’t
ascertain the legal condition of the title of the property he was
buying. He purchased the properties with the OCT having entries in
its Memorandum of Incumbrances.
 Anglo Sr. and the Corporation’s loss was caused by the fraud
committed by de Campo in registering and obtaining his OCT.
Contrary to the CA’s ruling, they were precluded from the assurance
fund because they could not show that they were deprived of their
lots as a consequence of bringing the lots or interest under the
provisions of PD 1529 (this was because de Ocampo was not the real
owner of the lots) or because registration was made my mistake,
omission, or misdescription in any certificate or owner’s duplicate.
 In addition to this, they argue that Anglo Sr. and the Corporation
failed to include de Ocampo as a party. According to PD 1529
Sec. 97, the law requires that if the deprivation is caused by persons
other than the government, it should first be brought against such
person – de Campo.
 Anglo Sr. and Anglo Agricultural Corporation Arguments: They
are entitled to a claim from the Assurance Fund because Anglo Sr.
purchased the lots in good faith and for value, so a legitimate TCT
was issued in his name. No negligence could be attributed because
he relied on an OCT. Loss was not due to a breach of trust but was
caused by fraud from the original owner in obtaining the OCT.
 Contrary to failing to implead de Ocampo, they argue that it is
allowable because de Ocampo already died several years before the
suit was filed and had no property left.
TIMELINE: de Ocampo registers land -> Bureau of Education
opposes; files petition for relief-> de Ocampo sells land to Anglo
Sr.; new TCT given to Anglo -> BoE annotates notice of lis pendens
on TCT -> Despite this, Anglo conveys property to Corporation ->
SC ruling on case annuls TCT (check case timeline) -> Claim for
Recovery of Damages -> RTC and CA grant petition -> SC denied
claim for recovery.
CASE TIMELINE: WHILE CONTESTING LAND, petition for relief by
BoE thru Republic -> Went to SC -> remanded to CA; TCT null and
void -> RTC for execution -> Surrender of Duplicate Copy
Issue: Whether or not Anglo Sr. and the Corporation are entitled to
damages from the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95 of PD 1529.
Whether or not Anglo Sr. and the Corporation should have
impleaded de Ocampo in their Complaint.
Ruling:
THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES SINCE ANGLO SR. SOLD
HIS INTEREST TO THE CORPORATION; THE CORPORATION WAS
IN BAD FAITH FOR BEING AWARE OF THE NOTICES UPON
TRANSFER
 They do not meet the criteria to recover damages. Although
Anglo Sr. acted in good faith, he no longer had an interest over
the lots after he had transferred these to the Corporation for
shares of stock. The Corporation cannot be considered a transferee
in good faith since it was aware of the notices of lis pendens.
 Every certificate of title contains an attestation that the person
named is the owner of the property described in the certificate. When
a certificate is clean and free from any encumbrance, purchasers
have every right to rely on such certificate. Those who rely on
such are referred to as innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith.
 The Court has also recognized the rule of caveat emptor. To
exercise the diligence required, each potential buyer must
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
inspect the real property’s CT. The purchaser is required to be
aware of the supposed title and one who buys without checking takes
all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. Their rights are
always limited by the rights of the seller as stated in the CT. It is not
enough that buyers rely on the CT presented by their seller. They
have to check whether it corresponds to the public record of
the certificate in the RD. Each buyer presumes that the seller
may not provide complete information (economics – called
information asymmetry).
 Such asymmetry is corrected by making sure the pertinent
information is of public record. It goes through a process that is
in rem and binds not only the government but the entire world.
Without the Torrens system, there would be a requirement for
meticulous due diligence and more expenses in hiring lawyers.
 However, the Torrens System is not infallible because fraud or
error may occur, letting a person who is not the owner acquire a
certificate of title over the property. That is why there is an
Assurance Fund.
 According to PD 1529, for every CT issued to a registered owner,
the owner contributed ¼ of 1% of the assessed value of the real
estate on the basis of the last assessment for taxation purposes. This
is to contribute to the Assurance Fund. If it has not yet been
assessed, the contribution will be based on the value determined by
two disinterested persons, pooled together under the custody of the
National Treasurer.
 (Estrellado v. Martinez) The assurance fund is to safeguard rights
of prejudiced parties rightfully entitled to an interest in land but shut
off from obtaining titles thereto. It is not intended to block any right
which a person might have against another for the loss of his land.
Damages cannot be recoverable from the assurance fund if it can be
recovered from the person who caused the loss. It is to relieve
innocent persons from the harshness of a certificate being conclusive
evidence of an indefeasible title.
 (Spouses de Guzman Jr. v. National Treasurer) Two types of
claimants under the Assurance Fund and requirements: (note:
NOT AS USEFUL NA NI. For purposes of discussion nalang
gyud ugh *eyeroll*).
A. Person who sustains loss or damages under the condition that:
(1) no negligence on his part, and (2), the loss was sustained through any
omission, mistake, or malfeasance of court personnel, RD, his deputy, or
other employees of the Registry in the performance of respective duties
under the Property Registration Decree (PRD).
B. Any person who has been deprived of any land under the
condition that: (1) no negligence on his part, (2) he was deprived as a
consequence of bringing his land or interest under the provision of the PRD
or by registration by any other person as owner of land, or by mistake,
omission, misdescription in any certificate of owner’s duplicate, or in any
entry/memorandum in the register or other official book, or by any
cancellation, and (3) he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing
an action for recovery of such land or claim upon the same.
HOWEVER, ANG GI-LISTA DIAY DIRI KAY GIKAN DIAY SA ACT NO.
496 -_-. NAAY MAS BAGO NGA LAW GIKAN SA PD 1529 NA
REQUISITES…
(REVELANT) PD 1529 REQUISITES:
(1) Individual must sustain loss or damage, or individual is deprived of
land or any estate or interest,
(2) individual must not be negligent,
(3) loss, damage, or deprivation is a consequence of either:
(a) fraudulent registration under the Torrens system after original
registration,
(b) any error, omission, mistake, or misdescription in any CT or in any
entry or memorandum in the registration book,
(4) individual must be barred or precluded under law from bringing an
action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein.
 (La Urbana v. Bernardo) It is a condition sine qua non that the
person who brings an action for damages against the assurance fund
be the registered owner, or in the case of TCTs, they are innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value.
 (Gayondato v. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands) erroneous
registration of property leading to the exclusion of one of the co-
owners. Excluded owner was a minor and was not negligent, so the
treasurer was secondarily liable for the disenfranchised co-owner’s
claim for damages.
 (Treasurer of the Philippines v. CA) Seller is not the real owner
of the property but pretended to be. After 2 years, real owner
discovered the sale and sued to have the sale made. The claim was
denied because the sale did not convey any title or interest to the
buyers because the vendor had no title or interest in the first place.
 HOWEVER, Spouses de Guzman or the Treasurer cases do not
apply here. Here, there are two different CTs, one in favor of de
Campo and the other to the Bureau for the same lots. In the two
cases, the titles involve the same certificate of title.
 We need to DEPART FROM THE RULE IN BOTH CASES THAT
THE SALE CONVEYED NO INTEREST BECAUSE VENDOR HAD
NONE ALSO. INNOCENT PURCHASERS SHOULD NOT BE
PREJUDICED BY INDIVIDUALS WHO ONLY APPEAR TO BE
OWNERS BUT ARE NOT THE ACTUAL OWNERS.
BOTH PARTIES HERE MUST BE TREATED SEPARATELY;
 Although the Corporation and Anglo Sr. have similar interests,
they have to be treated as separate entities with different legal
personalities to evaluate compliance with Section 95. The RTC
and CA both saw them as single parties.
 Anglo Sr. meets the second requirement as he was a buyer in
good faith. The encumbrances in the OCT did not include claims
of the Republic at the time Anglo bought the lots. He however
did not meet the 1st and 3rd requirements. There was no error in
de Ocampo’s CT, and the fraudulent registration is not the cause
of the loss suffered by Anglo Sr.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 He sold the lots to the Corporation and got shares with values of
P100.00 each. He could not have suffered loss since he was able
to recover money from the sale. Anglo Sr. only suffered loss
because of the subsequent agreement between him and the
corporation. The undertaking caused loss for respondent Anglo
Sr. and not de Ocampo’s fraudulent registration. HE SUSTAINED
A LOSS UNDER A DIFFERENT CAPACITY.
 Whatever good faith sustained by Anglo Sr. transaction no
longer existed because the adverse claim was already annotated
through notices of lis pendens on the TCT. Anglo Agricultural
Corporation already knew of conflicting claims of ownership over
the lots.
BOTH PARTIES HERE MUST BE TREATED SEPARATELY; BOTH DO
NOT MEET THE REQUISITES FOR ANGLO SR.’S LOSS WAS NOT
DUE TO MISTAKE FROM THE CERTIFICATE; THE CORPORATION IS
IN BAD FAITH AND IS NEGLIGENT
 The Corporation is presumed to have taken cognizance of the
notices. Its act of entering into a Deed of Conveyance is an act
of negligence on the part of the Corporation. So, the act fails to
comply with the second requirement.
 (Leyson v. Tañada) Certificate of title also contained a notice of
lis pendens before the property was sold at a public auction. The
court decided that the purchaser in the public auction was bound
by the pending litigation. Such is also true for the Corporation
for being aware of the notices.
 The Corporation also does not meet the first requirement
because it is Anglo Sr. who undertook all liability according to
their agreement in June 7, 1976.
 With regard to the 3rd requirement, the Corporation is not
precluded from an action against Anglo Sr. for its loss. On the
other hand, Anglo Sr. is barred from recovering the land because
it is the Bureau that holds a valid certificate of title, so he meets
the 3rd requirement. Because of non-compliance, he still cannot
avail of damages.
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT WAS MET; PROOF WAS SHOWN
THAT DE OCAMPO WAS DEAD AND HAD NO PROPERTIES LEFT
 With regard to the procedural requirement under PD 1529, Anglo
Sr. and the Corporation were able to substantially comply with
the need to implead the person causing fraud.
 They presented evidence that de Ocampo was dead and that he
had no properties left. Republic did not present countervailing
evidence to show that de Ocampo or his estate was still a viable
party.
 The Assurance Fund is only liable as a last resort. The person
causing the fraud is liable first. If judgment cannot be executed,
the Assurance Fund is insurance for the innocent purchaser who
relied on the validity of property’s CT.
VARGAS: I think what Atty. Gimarino is trying to emphasize with
this case is the fact that the principles of the caveat emptor
principle and the reliance on the face of the title is balanced by the
existence of an assurance fund. Because the Torrens system is not
infallible, the assurance fund serves as an insurance to make sure
that such will soften the blow of the harshness of an indefeasibility
of title, subject to conditions set by the law.
Torres vs. Court of Apeals
Facts:
 The parcel of land located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and
Raon Street (now Gonzalo Street), and the building erected thereon
known as "M. Torres Building" is owned by Mariano Torres, the herein
petitioner, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53628-
Manila issued in his name.
 Sometime in 1966, Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law,
filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133, where he, misrepresenting to be the
attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the owners'
duplicate copy of TCT No. 53628 was lost, succeeded in obtaining
a court order for the issuance of another copy of the
certificate.
 Once in possession thereof, Fernandez forged a simulated deed
of sale of the realties in his favor. Whereupon TCT No. 53628 in
the name of Torres was cancelled and TCT No. 86018 was issued in
Fernandez' name. On various dates from December, 1966 to
November, 1967 Fernandez mortgaged the realties to Rosario Mota,
wife of Ernesto Cue, and also to Angela Fermin, who later assigned
her credit to the spouses Cue. The mortgages were annotated at the
back of TCT No. 86018 and so was the deed of assignment.
 Torres, who up to this time still had possession of his owner's
duplicate certificate of title and who was still collecting rentals from
the occupants of the subject building, upon learning of the fraud
committed by Fernandez, caused, on March 18, 1968, the
annotation on the latter's TCT a notice of adverse claim.
 On March 30, 1968, Torres filed Civil Case No. 72494 against
Fernandez to annul TCT No. 86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC
GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133. On April 2, 1968, a notice of lis pendens
was annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT.
 In the meantime, Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which
prompted the Cues to institute an extra judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage.
 On February 11, 1969, Fernandez filed Civil Case No. 75643 against
the spouses Cue for the annulment of the mortgage with preliminary
injunction.
 After the foreclosure was enjoined, the parties entered into an
amicable settlement, approved by the court whereby it was stipulated
that Fernandez acknowledged and promised to pay his debt to the
Cues for Five Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Five
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
and 28/100 (P562,955.28) Pesos on or before, March 30, 1970, while
the spouses bound themselves to execute and deliver, within ten (10)
days from receipt of the sum mentioned such documents as are
necessary to release the mortgages in favor of defendants on
plaintiffs' property.
 Before Fernandez could pay his obligation under the settlement
agreement, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 72494 where it
was declared that the proceedings held in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec.
No. 133 was void and that TCT No. 86018, issued in the name
of Fernandez, is without force and effect as TCT No. 53628 in the
name of Torres is the true and legal evidence of ownership of the
subject immovables.
 Fernandez appealed from this decision to the Court of Appeals where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46386-R. The Court of Appeals, on
April 20, 1979, affirmed the decision of the trial court. There being
nothing on the records that would indicate that the judgment of the
appellate court was elevated here, it would appear that it had become
final and executory.
 But meanwhile, prior to the Court of Appeals' decision
mentioned above, Fernandez failed to comply with his
obligation under the amicable settlement and whereupon the
Cues applied for and were granted a writ of execution.
 The subject realties were then levied upon and sold at public
auction where Rosario Mota was the highest bidder.
 On August 31, 1971, the redemption period for the subject
immovables having lapsed without Fernandez nor Torres redeeming
the properties, Rosario Mota was issued the Sheriff's Deed of Sale.
Thereafter, TCT No. 86018 was cancelled and TCT No. 105953 was
issued in her name.
 On December 7, 1971 Mota, through her lawyer, notified the tenants
occupying "M. Torres Building" that she is the new owner thereof and
henceforth, payment of their rentals should be made to her.
 On December 17, 1971 Torres filed a complaint, which later gave rise
to this petition, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed
as Civil Case No. 85753, against Fernandez and his spouse and the
Cues to restrain the latter from collecting rentals and for the
declaration as void TCT No. 105953.
 The Cues in turn filed a cross-claim against Fernandez spouses
and a third party complaint against the National Treasurer as
the custodian of the Assurance Fund.
 During the proceeding, Mariano Torres, having died sometime in
1974, was substituted by his widow. On June 3, 1977, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring TCT No. 105953 in the name of
Rosario Mota null and void as it upheld the validity of TCT No. 53628
in the name of Torres as the true evidence of title to the disputed
realties, and at the same time dismissing the Cue's third party
complaint and cross claim.
Issues:
 Who has the better right over the property in question?
 WON Spouses Cue’s third party complaint against the
Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance
Fund will prosper.
Ruling:
TORRES HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY
 There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres
performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized
his peaceful dominion over his realties.
 The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an
innocent mortgagee protected under Section 65 of the Land
Registration Law, held that Torres was bound by the
mortgage. Inevitably, it pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where
Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that
the certificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of
Torres'. (CFI was wrong)
 As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, his properties
were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and
hence, the purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of
adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of
Fernandez' TCT.
 Moreover, even if We grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee,
the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged
instrument may become the root of a valid title, cannot be
applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing
certificate of title covering the same interest in a realty.
 The doctrine would apply rather when the forger thru insidious
means obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
converts it in his name, and subsequently sells or otherwise
encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a case
the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec. 55, Act 496;
Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner holds a valid and existing
certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the whole
world, and not that of the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior
jure."
 We have applied this doctrine in the case of the Register of Deeds
v. P.N.B. where We noted that said ruling is "a mere affirmation of
the recognized principle that a certificate is not conclusive evidence
of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered
and an earlier certificate for the same land is in existence." Again in
the case of Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78728, We held
that as between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both
innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful
holder of registered title over the transfer of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights.
Spouses Cue’s third party complaint against the Treasurer of the
Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund will not prosper.
Land Titles and Deeds [EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 The trial court also dismissed the Cues' third party complaint against
the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund To Whom Granted Requirements
after finding them negligent in protecting their interest. Home- Any Filipino citizen - does not own more than 24
 The trial court recognized the principle that a person dealing with stead over hectares of
registered lands need not go beyond the certificate of title but Patent 18 years or head of a land in the Phils. or has not had
nevertheless pointed out that there are circumstances in this case family the
which should have put the Cues on guard and prompted them benefit of any gratuitous allotment
to investigate the property being mortgaged to them, thus: of
"The property in question is a very valuable property, in fact more than 24 hectares
accepted by defendants Mota and Medina Cue as collateral for - must have resided continuously
more than half a million pesos in loans granted by them to for at
Fernandez. Its value lies principally in its income potential, in least 1 year in the municipality
the form of substantial monthly rentals. Certainly, the registered where
title does not yield any information as to the amount of rentals the land is situated
due from the building, much less on who is collecting them, or - must have cultivated at least 1/5
who is recognized by the tenants as their landlord. Any of the
prospective buyer or mortgagee of such a property, if prudent land applied for
and in good faith, is normally expected to inquire into all these Free Any natural born - does not own more than 12
and related facts and circumstances. Patent Filipino hectares of
"Besides, by the course of visible dimensions of the M. Torres land
Building, it should be readily obvious to any one that the area of - has continuously occupied and
the two lots . . . covered by TCT No. 86018 cannot accommodate cultivated, either by himself or his
the building, as in fact it also rests upon a lot covered by TCT predecessor-in- interest tract/s of
No. 56387, and partly upon a lot leased by (Torres) from the agricultural public land subject to
City of Manila. Had (the Cues) known of this fact would they disposition
have accepted the mortgage alone over TCT No. 86018? The Sales Filipinos of lawful age - to have at least 1/5 of the land
answer is obvious. And yet, to all indications, they never Patent or broken
bothered to look into this fact about the M. Torres Building. those not of legal and cultivated within 5 years from
"xxx xxx xxx age the
Another thing that defendants Mota and Medina Cue must have but who is a head of date of the award
investigated, as any prudent buyer or mortgagee should before the - shall have established actual
consummating any transaction on real property, is the matter of family may purchase occupancy , cultivation and
payment of taxes on the property. After all, the big value of the public agricultural improvement of at least 1/5 of the
property in question necessarily means that even real estate land land until the date of such final
taxes on it alone would involve big amounts of money, and if of not more than 12 payment
there are tax arrearages, any buyer or subsequent owner of the hectares
property will have to come face to face with the tax lien attaching Special Non-Christian - DILG Secretary shall certify that
to the property wherever its owner may be. . . ." Patent Filipinos the
 We likewise take note of the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor under Sec. 84 of the majority of the non-Christian
General that the Cues failed to contest the ruling of the trial Public Land Act inhabitants of any given
court negating the liability of the Assurance Fund. reservation
 For these reasons, We hold that the Cues' remedy merely is to go have advanced sufficiently in
against Francisco Fernandez or rather his estate since record civilization
shows that he died sometime in 1983.
Yap vs Republic

REGISTRATION OF PATENTS Principles:

CHAPTER8 (SEC. 103) 1. A Torrens title emanating from a free patent which was
secured through fraud does not become indefeasible because
the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of
no effect whatsoever.
Certificates of Titles Pursuant to Patents (Sec. 103)
2. A free patent that was fraudulently acquired, and the
certificate of title issued pursuant to the same, may only be
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. Whenever
assailed by the government in an action for reversion,
public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any
pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this
 Consuelo V d a. dela Cruz applied for free patent over a parcel of land
Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of
constituting about 1,292 square meters, designated as Lot No. 9087,
alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to
Cad. 102, located in Daliao, Toril, Davao City. As she could not wait
cause such instrument to be filed with the Register of Deeds of the province
for the approval of her application, she executed a Deed of
or city where the land lies, and to be there registered like other deeds and
Waiver/Quitclaim on November 25, 1981 in favor of Rollie Pagarigan.
conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be entered as in other
 Pagarigan led his own Free Patent Application (FPA) and
cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate issued to the grantee.
subsequently, Free Patent No. (XI-I) 5133 was issued to him over
The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government
said lot. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11182 was thereby
to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but
issued in his name on November 25, 1982.
shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee
 On September 5, 1989, Pagarigan mortgaged the lot to Banco Davao-
and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
Davao City Development Bank (the Bank). For failure to pay his loan,
It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and
the property was foreclosed, and was eventually sold to the Bank at
convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree, registration shall be
public auction on October 26, 1990. These proceedings were duly
made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where
annotated in the title.
the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After
 However, the land covered by OCT No. P-11182 was allegedly
due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be
occupied by Teodoro Valparaiso and Pedro Malalis (protestants). On
deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.
October 24, 1990, the they led a formal protest with the Bureau of
Lands (Bureau). They prayed for the recall of the free patent issued
SCOPE OF SECTION 103
to Pagarigan, and for the institution of a corresponding action for
• The instruments mentioned in this section whereby public lands are
reversion considering that they have been in adverse, exclusive, and
alienated, granted or conveyed are instruments transferring ownership and
continuous occupation of the subject property since 1945, cultivating
not just mere documents of lease or transferring mere possession
it, and planting various crops, nip a palms and coconut trees on said
• Provision directs the issuance to the grantee of an owner’s duplicate
land.
certificate
 On January 27, 1992, the protestants caused the annotation
• After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, the land shall
of a notice of lis pendens in OCT No. P-11182. Assigned as
be deemed registered land for all intents and purposes under the Property
Entry No. 647677, said notice of lis pendend pertained to Civil Case
Registration Decree
No. 20-435-9 instituted by the protestants against Pagarigan,
• Public land patents when duly registered are veritable Torrens title
Menardo Metran and Rene Galope to enjoin them from demolishing
subject to no encumbrances except those stated therein, and those
the former's houses pending the determination of the Department of
specified by the statute.
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on the propriety of
• They become private property which can no longer be the subject of
cancelling the title obtained by Pagarigan.
subsequent disposition by the Director of Lands
• Where disposable public land is granted by the government by virtue of
Secretary of DENR decision of the administrative case filed by
a public land patent, the patent is recorded and the corresponding
protestants against Pagarigan on the issuance of a free patent
certificate of title is issued to the grantee, thereafter, the land is
title:
automatically brought within the operation of PD1529, entitled to all the
 From the Investigation Reports submitted by both the Department's
safeguards of a veritable Torrens title. Upon the expiration of 1 year from
Regional Office involved and this Office as well as from the other
its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and
pieces of evidence available, both documentary and testimonial, it is
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding
obvious that actual fraud and bad faith have been committed by
• A certificate of title issued pursuant to a patent has the force and effect
[Pagarigan] in his subject public land application which led to the
of a torrens title issued through judicial registration proceedings
issuance of the title.
• But a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over
 The following facts and circumstances are uncontroverted, to wit:
a parcel of land for registration of title cannot be divested of said
 that the [protestants] have been in actual occupation of the land
jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance
in dispute since 1945 and have introduced improvements
by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel
thereon;
of land.

Prepared by: Gas

Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 that [Pagarigan] never occupied the same nor his predecessor-
in-interest, Consuelo dela Cruz, that [Pagarigan]
misrepresented in his application that he was the actual
occupant and that there were no others who occupied the lot in
dispute;
 that the title was issued sans an actual ground survey; and
 that [Pagarigan] did not post a copy of his Notice for [FPA] on
both the Bulletin Boards of Daliao and Lizardo as required by
law.
Continuation of Facts (Yap’s inclusion in the case):
 Meanwhile, on November 5, 1992, without consolidating title over the
land in its name, the Bank sold the subject property to herein
petitioner Beverly Anne C. Yap (Yap) and Rosanna F. Villamor
(Villamor).
 Upon the execution of the deed of sale, OCT No. P11182 was delivered
to them and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 366983 16 16 was
eventually issued in the name of Yap and Villamor on December 16,
2003. On February 28, 1997, the Department of Transportation and
Communication led a complaint for expropriation of a portion of the
subject lot before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 13, docketed as Civil
Case No. 25,084-97.
Confronted with the issue of who among the claimants shall be
entitled to just compensation, on February 19, 2003, the RTC
Branch 13 rendered its Decision. (Take note, this is the ruling for
just compensation, not the cancellation of free patent title)
 WHEREFORE, it is the judgment of this court that[:]
1. The plaintiff is entitled to expropriate the land subject of this
case for the purpose of road right of way to the Davao Fish Port,
which is for public use;
2. The just compensation for the land is P278,[000].00;
3. [Villamor and Yap] are the ones entitled to the payment of just
compensation for the property subject of this case, and plaintiff
is directed to pay the said amount to the said defendants;
4. The Commissioner's Fee of P3,850.00 shall be paid by plaintiff
to Asian Appraisal Company, Inc., and may be deducted from
the just compensation for the land being expropriated. This case
is now considered closed. SO ORDERED.
RTC Branch 16 Decision on the Cancellation of Free Patent:
 On May 22, 2003, the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), led the Complaint for Cancellation of Patent,
Nullication of Title and Reversion with the RTC of Davao City.
 The case was raffled to Branch 16 thereof. On October 24, 2008, the
RTC Branch 16 rendered a Decision dismissing the respondent's
complaint. The court ruled that since the subject land has already
been sold to third persons, it must be shown that the latter were part
of the fraud and/or misrepresentation committed by the original
grantee, or at least were aware of it.
 However, since the RTC Branch 13 already declared in its
decision in Civil Case No. 25,084-97 that Yap and Villamor
were purchasers in good faith and for value of the land in
question, RTC Branch 16 maintained that, as a court of co-
equal jurisdiction, it is bound by the said finding under the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
 Moreover, the fact that it took the respondent 26 years, from the
issuance of the free patent before it instituted an action for reversion,
militates against its cause.
CA Decision on the Cancellation of Free Patent:
 The respondent elevated its case to the CA.
 On June 30, 2011, the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing
that of the trial court. In so ruling, the CA adopted the findings of
the DENR as to the commission of fraud by Pagarigan in his
FPA, and held that neither the Bank nor Yap and Villamor were
innocent purchasers for value.
 Further, the CA maintained that the decision of the RTC Branch 13
did not constitute res judicata insofar as the same has not yet
attained finality.
Yap’s Arguments:
 Yap asserts that she and Villamor purchased the subject property in
good faith and for value. She maintains that on its face, nothing
appears in OCT No. P-11182 indicating that some other person has a
right to, or interest over the property covered thereby.
 As such, there was no obligation on their part to look beyond the
certificate of title to determine the legal condition of the concerned
property.
 Granting that a notice of lis pendens was annotated in OCT No.
P-11182 led before the Register of Deeds of Davao City, the
same, however, was not offered in evidence and should not
have been considered.
 Accordingly, the presumption that Yap and Villamor were purchasers
in good faith and for value was not effectively rebutted.
 Moreover, in the case for expropriation heard before the RTC Branch
13, they were already adjudged as innocent purchasers for value.
Under the principle of res judicata it was but proper for RTC Branch
16 to uphold said pronouncement.
 Accordingly, it was an error on the part of the CA to reverse the same.
Invoking the Court's ruling in Saad Agro-Industries, Yap asserts
that the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving the
alleged fraud and misrepresentation which attended Pagarigan's FPA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA decision runs counter to the rule on
conclusiveness of judgement?
2. Whether or not Yap and Villamor are innocent purchasers for
value?
3. Are respondents barred by estoppel or laches?
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
4. How to assail a fraudulently acquired free patent (in relation
to our topic on free patents).
Ruling
The CA decision does not runs counter to the rule on
conclusiveness of judgement
 In a catena of cases, the Court discussed the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, as a concept of res judicata as follows:
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a
fact a fact or question or question which was in issue in a former suit
and was there which was in issue in a former suit and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned
and cannot be again litigated in any future action between concerned
and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action,
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action,
while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
 While the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action
can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that
the issue be identical.
 If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and
the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point
or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point
or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit x x x.
 Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity
of issue. In Nabus v. CA , the Court stressed that when a party
seeks relief upon a cause of action different from the one asserted by
him in a previous one, the judgment in the judgment in the former
suit is conclusive only as to such points or questions as were the
former suit is conclusive only as to such points or questions as were
actually in issue or adjudicated therein actually in issue or adjudicated
therein.
 However, in Calalang v. Register of Deeds Quezon City, the Court
clarified that the bar on re-litigation of a matter or question
extends to those questions necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made
in reference thereto, and although those matters were directly
referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. "If the record of the former trial shows that the
judgment could "If the record of the former trial shows that the
judgment could not have been rendered without deciding a particular
matter, it will be not have been rendered without deciding a particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all
future actions between the considered as having settled that matter
as to all future actions between the parties." parties."
 Verily, as developed, these principles now embody paragraph (c) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads: (c) In any
other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
 The question of whether or not Yap and Villamor are innocent
purchasers was not an actual issue of fact in the case before
the RTC Branch 13, and which called for said court's
adjudication. "An issue of fact is a point supported by one party's
evidence and controverted by another's."
 That Yap and Villamor were buyers in good faith is merely an
allegation which was not proven in court. The RTC Branch 13
did not actually make any clear pronouncement on the matter.
 The expropriation proceeding was led on February 28, 1997.
The protestants caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on the original copy of OCT No. P11182 on January
27, 1992.
 Accordingly, if indeed the question on whether Yap and Villamor are
buyers in good faith was an actual issue of fact before the
expropriation proceeding, the protestants could have easily
controverted such claim by the mere expedience of presenting a
certified original copy of OCT No. P-11182.
 Forsooth, the notice at the back of a Torrens title serves as notice to
the whole world of the pending controversy over the land so
registered. The RTC Branch 13 basically anchored its judgment on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
 Pursuant to the well-settled rule that a certificate of title cannot be
subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified, or
cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law, it was clear
that the trial court was without jurisdiction in an expropriation
proceeding, to rule whether the title issued to Pagarigan is void —
notwithstanding the decision of the DENR Secretary.
 Thereupon, since the position of the protestants rests mainly on the
validity of Pagarigan's title which cannot be considered in the action,
RTC Branch 13, in effect, posited that there was no legal way for it to
rule otherwise.
 Accordingly, and as similarly advanced by the OSG in its
Comment, the RTC Branch 13's pronouncement that Yap and
Villamor were buyers in good faith was, at best, a mere obiter
dictum. Contrary to Yap's claim, there was nothing final or conclusive
with the decision of the RTC Branch 13 which the CA should be bound.
Yap and Villamor are NOT innocent purchasers for value.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 "[F]actual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which
are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial
evidence."
 The fact that Pagarigan fraudulently secured his free patent
was duly established by the investigation conducted by the
DENR through Senior Special Investigator Domingo Mendez. The
decision of the DENR is very clear in this regard, thus: The following
facts The following facts and circumstances are uncontroverted and
circumstances are uncontroverted, to wit; that the [protestants] have
been in actual occupation of the land in dispute since 1945 and have
introduced improvements thereon; that [Pagarigan] never occupied
the same nor his predecessor-in-interest, Consuelo dela Cruz; that
[Pagarigan] misrepresented in his application that he was the actual
occupant and that there were no others who occupied the lot in
dispute; that the title was issued sans an actual ground survey; and
that [Pagarigan] did not post a copy of his Notice for [FPA] on both
the Bulletin Boards of Daliao and Lizardo as required by law.
 However, as adverted to above, Section 32 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 mandates that for a reversion case to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the original grantee of a patent has
obtained the same through fraud; it must also be proven that
the subject property has not yet been acquired by an innocent
purchaser for value, because fraudulent acquisition cannot affect
the titles of the latter.
 Henceforth, the ultimate resolution of this case boils down to the
determination on whether the subsequent conveyances of the subject
lot from Pagarigan were made to innocent purchasers for value.
Specically, based on the records, can we regard the Bank, and
thereafter, Yap and Villamor as innocent purchasers for value?
 Verily, the Court is in full accord with the following disquisitions of the
CA on the matter, thus: It cannot be overemphasized that [the
Bank], being in the business of extending loans secured by
real estate mortgage, is familiar with rules on land
registration. As such, it was, as here, expected to exercise
more care and prudence than private individuals in its
dealings with registered lands.
 Accordingly, given inter alia the suspicion-provoking presence of
occupants other than the owner on the land to be mortgaged, it
behooved them to conduct a more exhaustive investigation on the
history of the mortgagor's title.
 That appellee Bank accepted in mortgage the property in
question notwithstanding the existence of structures on the
property and which were in actual, visible, and public possession of
persons other than the mortgagor, constitutes gross negligence
amounting to bad faith.
 As pointed out by the CA, the respondent argued that at the time
Yap and Villamor purchased the said lot from the Bank, a
notice of lis pendens was already annotated on OCT No. P-
11182; hence, they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for
value.
 Time and again, the Court has ruled that the burden of proof to
establish the status of a purchaser and registrant in good faith lies
upon the one who asserts it.
 This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the
legal presumption of good faith. It must be emphasized that aside
from the fact that a notice of lis pendens was already annotated on
OCT No. P-11182 even before Yap and Villamor purchased the subject
property, it was also established that when they did so, the said
property was still registered in the name of Pagarigan since
the Bank did not consolidate its title thereto.
 Stated simply, Yap and Villamor purchased the subject property
not from the registered owner. [T]he law protects to a greater
degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself.
Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one
who buys from a person who is not the registered prudence
from one who buys from a person who is not the registered
owner, although the land object of the transaction is
registered.
 While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look
behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the
registered one who buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title
but all owner is expected to examine not only the certificate
of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his
capacity to transfer the flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his
capacity to transfer the land. This Court has consistently applied the
stricter rule stricter rule when it comes to deciding the issue of good
faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but
who exhibits a certificate of title.
Respondents are not barred by estoppel or laches
 No. In Saad Agro-Industries, free patent was alleged to have been
mistakenly issued over a property that was claimed by therein
respondent as inalienable for being part of a track of land classified
as forest land. However, it was established that government has not
yet classified the lot in question as forest reserve prior to the issuance
of the concerned free patent. Moreover, it was also established that
therein subject property was already conveyed to an innocent
purchaser for value, Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. before the action for
reversion was instituted.
 In the instant case, it was established that Pagarigan's FPA was
secured on the basis of his fraudulent representations. The
respondent cannot be faulted for having been misled into
believing that an applicant is legally qualified to be granted free
patent as to render it estopped from asserting its right to recover its
own property.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 While the action for reversion was instituted only in 2003, the
circumstances leading to the institution of the case hardly spells
inaction or neglect on the part of the respondent as to be considered
guilty of laches.
 Forsooth, there was no prolonged inaction on the part of the
respondent in this case. This can be gleaned in the decision of
the DENR Secretary.
 Shortly after the protestants led a formal protest with the Bureau on
October 24, 1990, the Officer-in-Charge, Regional Executive Director
(RED) of the DENR Region XI, Davao City immediately ordered an
investigation on November 15, 1990, and the same commenced on
November 19, 1990.
 On February 14, 1994, the RED issued a decision dismissing the
protestants' protest. Undaunted, the protestants elevated their case
to the Office of the DENR Secretary.
 On May 15, 1995, the DENR Secretary set-aside the RED's decision
and ordered the institution of appropriate action for the cancellation
of OCT No. P-11182, and for the reversion of the property covered
thereby to the government.
Discussion (Atty. Gimarino):
How to assail a fraudulently acquired free patent (in relation to
our topic on free patents).
A free patent that was fraudulently acquired, and the certificate of title
issued pursuant to the same, may only be assailed by the government in
an action for reversion, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. In
Sherwill Development Corporatio n v. Sitio Sto . Niño Residents
Association, Inc . , he Court pointed out that: It is also to the public
interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public
land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should,
therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized
officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any
such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any
other officer who may be authorized by law, may le the corresponding
action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject
thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In
other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not
a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has
been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether
or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
Alonzo v. Cebu Country Club
Facts:
 Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and
sole heir of the late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion
Medalle. Francisco died during the pendency of this case, and
was substituted by his legal heirs, namely: his surviving spouse,
Mercedes V. Alonso, his son Tomas V. Alonso (Tomas) and his
daughter Asuncion V. Alonso.
 In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his
father Tomas N. Alonso had acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or about the year 1911;
that the original vendee of Lot No. 727 had assigned his sales
certificate to Tomas N. Alonso, who had been consequently
issued Patent No. 14353. The sales patent, however, and even
the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the
Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of
the latter. This is because there were basic requirements not
complied with, the most important of which was that the deed of
sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
 Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot
No. 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been
"administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate" of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 in the name of United
Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of respondent Cebu
Country Club, Inc. (Cebu Country Club).
 On September 25, 1992, Francisco commenced against Cebu
Country Club in the RTC in Cebu City an action for the declaration
of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of
certificates of title, and the recovery of property.
SUPREME COURT RULING IN CASE 130876
 On January 31, 2002, this Court decided G.R. No. 130876,
declaring that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. The
Court found that the petitioners did not validly acquire ownership of
Lot No. 727-D-2.
Enactment of RA 9443, which declares the gov’t the owner
of the Banilad Friar Lands
 In late 2004, the Government, through the OSG, filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution. However, The Congress
ultimately enacted a law (RA 9443) to validate the TCTs and
reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu
City.
 On December 28, 2007, therefore, the RTC denied the OSG's
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution through the first
appealed order. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
questioning the denial of the OSG's motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution.
Government’s Desistance from the Decision of Case 130876
 The OSG manifested in writing that the Government was no
longer seeking the execution of the decision in G.R. No.
130876, subject to its reservation to contest any other titles within
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, should clear evidence show such
titles as having been obtained through fraud.
 (RTC RULING) After the filing of the OSG's comment, the RTC
issued the second appealed order, denying the petitioners' motion
for reconsideration, giving the following reasons:
1. The party who had a direct interest in the execution of the decision
and the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for execution was the
OSG; hence, the petitioners had no legal standing;
2. R.A. No. 9443 "confirms and declares as valid" all "existing" TCTs and
reconstituted titles; thereby, the State in effect waived and divested
itself of whatever title or ownership over the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate;
3. The situation of the parties had materially changed, rendering the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment unjust, inequitable, and
impossible, because Cebu Country Club was now recognized by the State
itself as the absolute owner of Lot 727 D-2.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners Francisco or Tomas are owners
of Lot No. 727.
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Ruling:
PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE OWNERS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH REQUIREMENTS – APPROVAL OF THE DEED OF SALE BY THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
 The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of
Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso. The
sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale
were not registered with the Register of Deeds and no title
was ever issued in the name of the latter.
 This is because there were basic requirements not complied with,
the most important of which was that the deed of sale executed by
the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void.
"Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
indispensable for the validity of the sale."
 (Jesus P. Liao v. CA) Court has ruled categorically that approval by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands
is indispensable for its validity, hence, the absence of such
approval made the sale null and void ab-initio.
 Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of
such sale or assignment. Consequently, petitioner Francisco's
father did not have any registerable title to the land in question.
Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir,
petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latter's heirs.
 Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession of the land
since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes
thereon based on tax declarations in its name with the title number
indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership.
 This Court has ruled that although tax declarations or realty tax
payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or constructive possession.
PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE RIGHTFUL OWNERS; THERE IS NO
LEGAL STANDING
 Since Francisco and Tomas are not the rightful owners of Lot
727, they have no locus standi.
 An appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in
interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the
litigant must of necessity continue to hold a real or present
substantial interest that entitles him to the avails of the suit on
appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an exercise in futility.
So, it is with the petitioners.
 In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No.
727-D-2, is the only party adversely affected by the denial, and
is the proper party entitled to assail the denial. However, its manifest
desistance from the execution of the decision effectively barred any
challenge against the denial, for its non-appeal rendered the denial
final and immutable.
Egao v. CA
Facts:
 The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and
recovery of possession and ownership against the
petitioners. Apparently, they (respondents) claim they are the
owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered
into with Roberto Marfori to whom the petitioners allegedly sold their
land to.
 The Egaos acquired their land title by virtue of a free patent
and transferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue
of a deed of sale. However, the Certificate of Title was not
transferred in Marfori’s favor. Upon purchase of the land from
Marfori, the respondents introduced improvements thereon and paid
taxes for the property.
 However, the petitioners illegally occupied portions of the
land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by
virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds
pursuant to their Free Patent.
 (RTC RULING & CA RULING) The RTC ruled in favor of Egao.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on
grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly
sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the
ownership to the respondents.
 The CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for
violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141
against encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thru
free patent or homestead patent.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 They cannot therefore obtain affirmative relief. It also declares
the respondents as innocent purchasers for value who the
obtained the duplicate of the OCT still in the name of the Egaos from
Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physical
possession of the property.
 It thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the
absolute owners of the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the
petitioner and its transfer thereof to the respondents and to
surrender peaceful possession of the land to the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their
ownership to Marfori to resolve the rights of the respondents over
the land in dispute.
Ruling:
SALE FROM EGAO TO MARFORI IS NULL AND VOID;
PURCHASER IS IN BAD FAITH FOR BUYING LOT WITHIN
THE 5-YEAR RESTRICTION PERIOD
 No. Egao sold the patent within the 5-year prohibition
therefore the sale between Egao to Marfori is null and void.
Also, respondent is a purchaser in bad faith since he knew that
the title was not yet in the name of Marfori.
 The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold
the lot to Marfori within the 5-year restriction period provided by law
on Free Patent based on the Deed of Sale entered into by the parties.
Although the petitioners denied the validity of the Deed of
Sale the court held that it was notarized and a notarial
document has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
 When the land was sold to the respondents, they knew that the
OCT is still registered under the name of the petitioners. Thus,
they are not considered to be innocent purchaser as contrary to the
ruling of the CA.
 Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and
closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor, purchases the property without making any further
investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith
for value.
 A private individual cannot bring an action for reversion or
any action which would have an effect of canceling a free
patent and the certificate of title issued on the basis thereof since
the land covered will form part again of the public domain.
 Sec. 124 of the Public Land Act provides that deeds of sale of
patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period
are null and void thus the Egaos have no title to pass to Marfori and
nobody can dispose that which does not belong to him.
 Conclusion: The respondents are not innocent purchasers for value
with no standing to question the rights of the petitioners over the
land and to file an action to quiet the title. The petitioners
remained to be the registered owners and entitled to remain
in physical possession of the disputed property. Respondents
are ordered to deliver the OCT to the petitioners without prejudice
to an action for reversion of the land to be instituted by the Solicitor
General for the State.
CERTIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFER,
EMANCIPATION PATENT
CHAPTER 9 (SEC. 104 — 105)
Certificate of Land Transfer
Section 104. Provisional Register of Documents. The Department of
Agrarian Reform shall prepare by automate data processing a special
registry book to be known as the "Provisional Register of Documents issued
under PD-27" which shall be kept and maintained in every Registry of
Deeds throughout the country. Said Registry Book shall be a register of:
a. All Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) issued pursuant to P.D. No. 27;
and
b. All subsequent transactions affecting Certificates of Land Transfer
such as adjustments, transfer, duplication and cancellations of
erroneous Certificates of Land Transfer.
Section 105. Certificates of Land Transfer Emancipation Patents.
The Department of Agrarian reform shall pursuant to P.D. No. 27 issue in
duplicate, a Certificate of Land Transfer for every land brought under
"Operation Land Transfer", the original of which shall be kept by the
tenant- farmer and the duplicate, in the Registry of Deeds. After the
tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant
of title under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover
previously titled or untitled property shall be issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The Register of Deeds shall complete the entries on the
aforementioned Emancipation Patent and shall assign an original certificate
of title number in case of unregistered land, and in case of registered
property, shall issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title without
requiring the surrender of the owner's duplicate of the title to be canceled.
In case of death of the grantee, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall
determine his heirs or successors-in-interest and shall notify the Register
of Deeds accordingly.
 In case of subsequent transfer of property covered
by an Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of Title emanating from an
Emancipation Patent, the Register of Deeds shall affect the transfer only
upon receipt of the supporting papers from the Department of Agrarian
Reform. No fee, premium, of tax of any kind shall be charged or imposed
in connection with the issuance of an original Emancipation Patent and for
the registration or related documents.
AGRARIAN REFORM PROVISION IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
Article 13, Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of
all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect
the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM OF 1998 (RA 6657)
• Agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular
farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till, or in case of other farm workers, to receive a just share on the
fruits thereof
• To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution
of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention limits set
forth in the law, taking into account ecological, developmental, and equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation
• The State shall respect the right of small landowners, and shall provide
for voluntary land-sharing
PETITIONS AND ACTIONS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
CHAPTERX (SECTIONS 107 - 110)
Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate (Sec. 107)
Section 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate certificates. Where it
is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his
consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason
of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing,
may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate
or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if not
any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the
issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate
and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment
of the outstanding duplicate.
REMEDY WHERE DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE IS WITHHELD
• In case the person in possession of the owner’s duplicate certificate
refuses or fails to surrender the same to the RD so that any involuntary or
voluntary instrument may be registered and a certificate issued, the party
in interest may file a petition in court to compel the surrender of the same
to the RD
• The court after hearing may order the registered owner or any person
withholding the duplicate certificate and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender
• If the person withholding the certificate is not amenable to the process
of the court, or if for any reason the certificate cannot be delivered, the
court may order the annulment of said certificate and the issuance of a
new certificate of title in lieu thereof
• Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate
PETITION TO SURRENDER TITLE MAY BE FILED AS AN INCIDENT
IN AN ACTION AFFECTING SAID TITLE
• Where the court in an action for specific performance, upheld the sale to
the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to comply with the terms and
conditions to the sale, it was proper for the plaintiff to ask the court to
compel the defendant to surrender the duplicate certificate of title to the
RD for the registration of the sale, this being a necessary incident in the
main case
• Section 107 doesn’t preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under said section, specially if the
certificate of title to be surrendered is intimately connected with the
subject matter of the principal action
• Where the title is subject to a mortgage, the order of the court cannot in
any way prejudice the rights of the mortgagee since any lien annotated in
the certificate is incorporated or carried over to the new transfer certificate
of title to whoever it is issued
AUTHORITY OF COURT TO ORDER THE SURRENDER OWNER’S
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE
• In order that the court may order the registered owner to surrender his
owner’s duplicate, it has to determine upon the evidence presented by
the parties whether the registered owner had been lawfully divested of
his title thereto
• That of course requires and involves of the determination of the
question of title to the registered property
• Section 107 doesn’t constitute a reopening of the decree entered as a
result of proceedings in rem for the confirmation of imperfect title under
said act, it cannot be deemed to contravene the purpose or aim of the
Torrens system
INSTANCES WHERE THE SURRENDER OF THE ODC MAY BE
DISPENSED WITH
1. The registered owner is a party of the case;
2. There’s already a final and executory decision of the court;
3. There’s already an order of the issuance of Certificate of Title in
favor of the prevailing parties.
Toledo Banaga v. CA
Facts:
CASE FOR REDEMPTION OF PROPERTY
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 In an action for redemption filed by Banaga, the trial court declared
that she had lost her right to redeem the property earlier
foreclosed and which was subsequently sold at public auction
to private respondent.
 Certificates of Title covering the said property were issued to
private respondent over which Banaga annotated a notice of
lis pendens. CA reversed the decision and allowed her to
redeem the property.
ATTEMPT TO EXECUTE THE REDEMPTION
 On June 11, 1992, Banaga tried to redeem the property by
depositing with the trial court the amount of redemption
which was financed by co-petitioner Tan. Damalerio
(respondent) opposed the redemption stating that it was made
beyond the time given to her by the court in the earlier case.
 (LOWER COURT RULING) The lower court decided on August 7,
1992, that the redemption was valid and ordered the RD to
cancel respondent’s CT and issue new titles in Banaga’s name.
 Respondent appealed and filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
while later causing another notice of lis pendens on the CTs. CA
issued a TRO to stop execution of the decisions of the lower
court.
 On January 7, 1993, Banaga sold the property to Tan with the deed
of sale which mentioned that the CT of respondent was not yet
cancelled. Despite the notice, Tan subdivided the property under
a subdivision plan made in the name of private respondent.
 When the TRO expired, Tan asked the RD to issue new titles in
her name and such was granted with the previous annotations of
the notices of lis pendens still written into the CT.
 (CA RULING) CA later declared on October 28, 1993 the private
respondent the absolute owner of the subject property for
failure to redeem the property within the 30-day period previously
granted to her by the court. The decision became final and review
was dismissed for lack of merit.
CORRECT REMEDY TO REGISTER THE LOT IN RESPONDENT’S
NAME
 The trial court issued a writ of execution to order the RD to
reinstate the CTs in respondent’s name. The fact that CA’s decision
declared him as the absolute owner entitles him to a writ of
execution to reinstate the titles in Damalerio’s name.
 However, the RD refused to comply with the writ of execution,
stating that the CT issued to Tan must first be surrendered.
 Respondent moved to cite RD in contempt of court which was denied
because the trial court said that the remedy is by consulta to
the Commission of Land Registration. They also denied the
motion for an issuance of a writ of possession because the
appropriate remedy is to declare the CTs of Tan void.
 CA granted the petition upon appeal by certiorari and mandamus.
SC upheld the same in the present case. It was puzzled as to why
the petition of Tan and Banaga (petitioners) seek to set aside the
two orders by respondent judge not named (the orders to set aside
were the denial of a writ of possession (March 29, 1996) and denial
of a motion for reconsideration (Jan. 4, 1993 – pero Jan. 4, 1995
ang gibutang sa SC).
 Petitioners argue that:
(1) Tan is a buyer in good faith.
(2) Proper remedy is for private respondent to secure the titles in
his name by consulta to the Land Registration Commissioner, not
contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not the argument of petitioner Tan is in good faith is
valid. – res judicata
Whether or not private respondent's remedy is a direct or
independent civil action for cancellation of petitioner Tan's titles. -
No
Whether or not the execution of the final and executory decision
which is to issue titles in the name of private respondent cannot
be compelled by mandamus because of the "formality" that the
registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title
for cancellation – No
Whether or not petitioner Tan has better right.
Ruling:
RES JUDICATA HAS ALREADY SET IN; RENDERING THE
ARGUMENT OF GOOD FAITH MOOT
 Petitioners again raise the issue of ownership which has already been
ruled upon by CA and the SC where the respondent was adjudged
to be the rightful and absolute owner thereof. Res judicata has
already set in, with the elements present:
(1) former judgment must be final.
(2) court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter.
(3) must be a judgment on the merits.
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
 Banaga clearly was unable to exercise her right to
redemption and as a consequence, lost her claim of ownership to
the lot.
THE REMEDY IS NOT FOR CANCELLATION OF TITLE BECAUSE THE
CASE WILL BE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE REDEMPTION SUIT
WHICH WAS FINAL AND EXECUTORY
 The remedy is not for cancellation of Tan’s titles. The facts, evidence,
circumstances, and arguments invoked in the final decision are the
same matters that will be established in the independent suit. It
doesn’t matter if it was a redemption suit or a cancellation of title
because the test of identity of causes of action is not in form
but whether the same evidence would support and establish
the former and present causes of action.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
Basically, it wouldn’t matter if the present case was for a
redemption suit or a cancellation of title because everything used
in the redemption suit would be re-used in a cancellation of title.
In a test of identity of causes of action, what is important is
whether the same evidence would be used to support the previous
and present causes of action.
SURRENDER OF DUPLICATE IS IMPLIED FROM THE EXECUTORY
DECISION; ARGUMENT IS BLASPHEMOUS TO THE DECISIONS
RENDERED BY THE COURTS
 The petitioners argue that the winning party must wait execution
until the losing party has complied with the formality of surrender of
the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the
absurd and has no place in our legal system. Precisely, the Supreme
Court had already affirmed the CA's judgment that Certificates of
Title be issued in private respondent's name.
 (IMPORTANT!!!) If execution cannot be done just because the
losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire proceedings of
the courts would be rendered useless. The surrender of the
duplicate is implied from the executory decision since the
petitioners were themselves parties thereto.
 Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial
function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision
of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name
of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained
finality, as in this case.
 The enforcement of a final and executory judgment is likewise
a ministerial function of the courts and does not call for the
exercise of discretion. Being a ministerial duty, a writ of
mandamus lies to compel its performance.
 Moreover, it is axiomatic that where a decision on the merits is
rendered and the same has become final and executory, as in
this case, the action on procedural matters or issues becomes
moot and academic.
 Thus, the so-called consulta to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, which is not applicable herein, was only a naive and
belated effort resorted to by petitioners in order to delay
execution. If petitioners desire to stop the enforcement of a final
and executory decision, they should have secured the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, but which they did not avail knowing
that there exist no legal or even equitable justifications to support
it.
TAN IS A BUYER IN BAD FAITH AND HAS NO RIGHT TO
POSSESSION; RIGHT OF POSSESSION IS A NECESSARY INCIDENT
OF OWNERSHIP
 Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire better rights
than her predecessor in interest, for she merely stepped into the
shoes of the latter. Such finding of bad faith is final and may
not be re-opened for the law cannot allow the parties to trifle with
the courts.
 With respect to the issue of possession, such right is a
necessary incident of ownership. The adjudication of ownership
to private respondent includes the delivery of possession since
the defeated parties in this case has not shown by what right
to retain possession of the land independently of their claim of
ownership which was rejected.
 Otherwise, it would be unjust if petitioners who has no valid
right over the property will retain the same. Thus, the CA
correctly disagreed with the trial court's order denying private
respondent's motion for writ of possession.
Ligon v. CA
Facts:
 On October 19, 1990, respondent Iglesia ni Kristo filed with the RTC
of Quezon City a complaint for specific performance with
damages against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP).
 Respondent INK alleged that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of
Sale dated April 20, 1989, IDP sold to it 2 parcels of land
located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Cuilat, Quezon City, both of which
IDP is the registered owner.
 The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall
undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the
property within 45 days from execution, but IDP failed to fulfill its
obligation. So, INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply
with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and
pay damages to INK.
 IDP’s answer: It was INK which violated the contract; delayed
payment of purchase price. IDP then prayed that the contract
of sale be rescinded and revoked.
 June 15, 1991: INK filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact. The trial court rendered partial judgment on
September 12, 1991, and an amended partial judgment on October
7 granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except the prayer for
damages.
 January 22, 1992: INK filed a motion (A MOTION, NOT A
PETITION) praying that petitioner (Leticia Ligon), who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties as
mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the same to the
Register of Deeds of Quezon CIty for the registration of the
Absolute Deed of Sale in its name; they alleged that the document
could not be registered due to the refusal/failure of petitioner
to deliver the certificates despite repeated requests.
 Ligon: filed an opposition alleging that IDP was not served copy of
the motion; ownership of INK over the property was still in
issue since rescission was sought by IDP. Should the motion be
granted, she asked for the RD to be directed to deliver the owner’s
duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 (RTC AND CA RULING) granted the motion of INK, ordered
petitioner to surrender the owner’s copy of the certificates in
open court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in INK’s
name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of
petitioner on the new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK.
Upon the filing of a motion by Ligon, it then reconsidered its order
by directing her to deliver the certificates of title to the RD of
Quezon City. CA affirmed RTC ruling.
 IDP: prior to issuance by the trial court of its 1992 order, its legal
Board of Trustees filed a motion for intervention stating that the sale
was not executed by it but was made possible by a fake Board so the
sale is void. Trial court denied the motion since SEC had jurisdiction
over the incident. SEC declared sale as void. IDP uses this
decision to also nullify orders of the trial court.
TIMELINE: IDP sells land to INK -> stipulated that they drive
squatters out -> complaint for specific performance against IDP -
> IDP allegedly fails to comply accdng. to INK; INK delayed
payment accdng. to IDP -> motion for partial summary judgment
(everything granted except damages in partial judgment) ->
motion to surrender duplicate copy -> RTC granted -> RTC
reconsidered -> CA affirmed.
MEANWHILE: motion for intervention by IDP -> denied for lack of
jurisdiction by trial court -> SEC declared sale as void.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court erred:
a. In ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner;
b. In upholding the orders of the trial court even as they violated
the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of action and
forum shopping;
c. In holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled
to registration of its ownership; and
d. In holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of
the owner’s copies of the certificates of title.
Ruling:
Note: Before the enactment of PD 1529, Act No. 496 had established that
summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner’s
duplicate certificate of title could only be filed with and granted by the RTC
sitting as a land registration court if there was unanimity among the parties
or there was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party-
in-interest, otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial it
should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the
incident properly belonged.
RTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER; ACTION FOR
SPECFIC PERFORMANCE IS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION
 Under Sec. 2 of PD 1529, Courts of First Instance (RTC) are
conferred with the authority to act on all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
 The principal action filed by INK was one for specific performance
with damages based on a document of sale and was well within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
WHILE THE LAW SPEAKS OF A PETITION TO COMPEL SURRENDER
OF CERTIFICATES, IT DOES NOT PRECLUDE INCLUDING THAT AS
A RELIEF, ESPECIALLY IF THE TITLE IS INTIMATELY CONNETED
TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTION
 When IDP did not question the validity of the deed of sale, the
summary judgment issued by the court was an exercise of its general
jurisdiction.
 Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the
same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title
to surrender the same for the registration of the deed of sale subject
of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the
main case.
 Even while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of a petition which can be
filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates
of title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to
a pending case to include as an incident therein the relief
stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of
title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the
subject matter of the principal action.
 This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with
the policy against multiplicity of suits.
GENERAL RULE: REQUIRES A PETITION TO COMPEL.
EXC: IF SUCH IS INCIDENTAL TO PRINCIPAL CASE.
INK IS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AND ENTITLED TO
REGISTRATION OF ITS OWNERSHIP; INK HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT
TO THE POSSESSION OF THE OWNER’S COPIES OF THE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE
LIGON’S RIGHTS AS MORTGAGE
 Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate
certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in
some cases or upon the order of the court for cause shown. In
case the person in possession refuses or fails to surrender the same
to the RD so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new
certificate issued, Sec. 107 of P.D. No. 1529 states:
 …Where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason
of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s
duplicate, the party in interest may file a petition in court to
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
compel surrender of the same to the RD. The court, after
hearing, may order the registered owner or any person
withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and
direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such
surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is
not amenable to the process of the court, of if for any reason
the outstanding owner’s duplicate cannot be delivered, the court
may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of
a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
 Pursuant to Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, the distinction between the
RTC’s general and the limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a
cadastral court has been eliminated.
 Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTCs the
authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions.
 Even while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of a petition which can
be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the
certificates of title to the RD, this does not preclude a party to
a pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated
under said section, especially if the subject certificates of title
to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject
matter of the principal action.
 The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of
petitioner appears in both certificates of title.
 Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of
the same to the RD in order that the deed of sale in favor of
INK can be registered cannot in any way prejudice her rights
and interests as a mortgage of the lots.
 Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which
subsists should be incorporated or carried over to the new
TCTs. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership.
Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage.
Amendment and Alteration of Certificates (Sec. 108)
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after
the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the
attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper
Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an
interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds
with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by
petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing
on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not
appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an
omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person
on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has
married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been
dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear
and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation
of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which
shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate
for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their
written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented,
a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section. All
petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other
provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled
in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.
WHERE TO FILE PETITION
• All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered
• This provision doesn’t require that it be under oath
• Provision was adopted with an intelligent purpose in view—to allow such
petitions and motions to be filed and disposed of elsewhere would
eventually lead to confusion and render it difficult to trace the origin of the
entries in the registry
GROUNDS FOR THE AMENDMENT OR ALTERATION OF A
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
a. when registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased;
b. when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear
upon the certificate;
c. when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate
certificate;
d. when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed;
e. when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as
married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest
of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected;
f. when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been
dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its
dissolution; and
g. when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of
title
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
NO TIME LIMIT TO FILE PETITION
• No limitation or period is fixed for filing a petition to annotate a deed of
sale at the back of a certificate of title
• If any person claims that a person registered a deed of sale can no longer
do so, because the deed was executed more than 10 years before, such
objection must be raised in an ordinary civil action
• Where there is no question as to the existence and validity of the deed
of sale, the registration of the sale and issuance of a TCT are ministerial
duties of the RD
Republic v. Galeno
Facts:
 On September 2, 2003, respondent Carmen Santorio Galeno
(respondent) filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No.
2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle Cadastre (subject property)
before the RTC.
 She alleged therein that she is one of the co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated July 6, 1962.
The survey and subdivision of the subject property was duly
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) per its Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot No.
2285.
 Galeno further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the
subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they
discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject property
as appearing in OCT No. 46417, in that the title reflects an area
of 20,948 square meters, while the Certification issued by the
DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management
Services, shows an area of 21,298 square meters.
 Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property
in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified
the adjoining owners.
 There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the
presentation of respondent's evidence ex parte before the Branch
Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements.
RTC Ruling
 In an Order dated October 13, 2006, the RTC granted the petition
upon a finding that respondent was able to substantiate the
allegations in her petition to warrant a correction of the area
of the subject property.
 Hence, it directed the Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo to
correct such area in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 to 21,298 square
meters.
OSG Motion
 Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the adjoining owners had not
been notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional
requirement.
RTC Ruling
 In the Order dated January 22, 2007, the RTC denied the motion,
finding that a Notice of Hearing was sent to the adjoining
owners. As such, respondent was able to prove compliance with the
said jurisdictional requirement.
 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
 In a Decision dated June 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Order.
 It found that respondent, by a preponderance of evidence, was able
to prove, based on the records of the proper government
authority, i.e., the Office of the Technical Director, Land Management
Services of the DENR, that the true and correct area of the
subject property was 21,298 square meters as shown in the
approved plan.
 Moreover, petitioner failed to rebut with contrary evidence
respondent's claim that she and her co-owners followed the
boundaries in the technical description of OCT No. 46417 when they
caused its resurvey.
 In fact, no proof had been adduced to show that the boundaries
had been altered.
 Also, the CA pointed out that none of the adjoining owners, who
were properly notified of the proceedings and who stand to be
adversely affected by the change in the land area of the subject
property, objected to respondent's petition.
TIMELINE: Deed of sale in favor of Galeno and co-owners -> survey
and subdivision plan approved by DENR -> discovered discrepancy
in sq. m. between title and certification -> petition for correction -
> RTC granted -> OSG motion for reconsideration -> RTC denied;
co-owners were given notice -> CA upheld.
Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the correction of the area of
the subject property in OCT No. 46417. - YES
Ruling:
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY GALENO IN FAVOR OF CHANGING
DISCREPANCY CANNOT BE GIVEN PROBATIVE WEIGHT; PUBLIC
OFFICERS DID NOT TESTIFY TO THE SAME
 A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent
before the court a quo shows that the former failed to prove that
there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area
of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square
meters to 21,248 square meters.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following
documents: (a) the Certification issued by a certain Althea C.
Acevedo (Acevedo), Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services
Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land
Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which states that
"the true and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is
21,928 square meters;" (b) the technical description of Lot No.
2285, a copy of which was certified by Ameto Caballero
(Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was
certified correct by Acevedo; and (c) the approved subdivision
plan of Lot No. 2258, certified by Rogelio M. Santome
(Santome), Geodetic Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas),
Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin
(Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land Management
Services, DENR. On the strength of these pieces of evidence,
respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property
with the records of the DENR.
 Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not
sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for.
 The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view
of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not
testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.
 (Republic v. Medida) the Court held that certifications of the
Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that: Public
documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence as follows:
a. The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
c. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
 Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents
referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy x x x.
 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: "Sec.
23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
 The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
 The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
captain in the ship's logbook.
 The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody
of a government office. The certifications are not even records
of public documents. x x x28 (Emphases supplied)
 As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the
other public officers who issued respondent's documentary
evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are
bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein.
 At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their
due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
CERTIFICATION CONTENTS ARE HEARSAY BECAUSE WITNESS
WAS INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY; HEARSAY GIVEN NO PROBATIVE
VALUE
 In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because
respondent's sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno
Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their
contents, as she did not prepare any of the certifications, nor was
she a public officer of the concerned government agencies.
 Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented
petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing
evidence in the proceedings in the court below, it should be borne
in mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule," which do not, however, obtain in this case.
 Verily, while respondent's documentary evidence may have
been admitted due to the opposing party's lack of objection, it
does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any
probative weight.
 The Court has explained that: The general rule is that hearsay
evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to
hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But
one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations
are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for it has no probative value.
LACK OF OPPOSITION FROM THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT
ESTOP OFFICIALS FROM ASSAILING GRANT OF
RECONSTITUTION
 Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from
government agencies is of no controlling significance because
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or
error of its officials or agents.
 Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the
petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on
the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no
merit."
 Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defendant's."
 In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any
competent evidence to prove that the true and correct area of
the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of 20,948
square meters to warrant a correction thereof in OCT No. 46417.
 Accordingly, respondent's petition for the correction of the said
Certificate of Title must be denied, and the present petition be
granted.
Paz v. Republic
Facts:
 On November 29, 2000, the petitioner brought a petition for the
cancellation MADE UNDER SEC. 108 OF PD 1529 of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 684.
 The petition, made under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, impleaded
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), Filinvest Development
Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI) as
respondents.
 The petition averred that the petitioner was the owner of Parcel
1, Plan 11-69 and Parcel 2 Plan 11-69; that OCT No. 684 was
registered in the name of the Republic, and included Lot 392
of the Muntinlupa Estate; that Lot 392 was segregated from OCT
No. 684, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 185552, also in the name of the Republic; that FDC and
FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision based on their joint venture
agreement with the Government; that Lot 392 was further
subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT No. 185552, and the
issuance of TCTs in the names of the Republic and FAI; and that
the subdivision lots were then sold to third parties.
 The petition for cancellation prayed that OCT No. 684 in the
name of the Republic, TCT No. 185552 in the name of the Republic
and all subsequent titles derived from said TCT No. 185552 be
cancelled and Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City be ordered
to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Luciano P. Paz
free from all liens and encumbrances, and defendants be ordered
to vacate the property covered by said title.
Filinvest Development Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest Alabang,
Inc. (FAI)
On January 19, 2001, FDC and FAI moved to dismiss the petition for
cancellation on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Petition for cancellation of title is litigable in an ordinary action
outside the special and limited jurisdiction of land registration
courts and thus removed from the ambit of Sec. 108 of the
Property Registration Decree;
2. Lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the persons of the
respondents who were not validly served with summons but
only a copy of the Petition;
3. Docket fees for the Petition have not been paid.
4. The Petition does not contain the requisite certificate of non-
forum shopping.
Paz:
 The petitioner countered that his petition for cancellation was
not an initiatory pleading that must comply with the regular rules
of civil procedure but a mere incident of a past registration
proceeding and that a service of the petition sufficed to bring the
respondents within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
RTC Ruling:
 On May 21, 2001, the RTC granted FDC and FAI's motion to
dismiss, stating that the petition at bench bears all the elements of
an action for recovery.
 This action although entitled a Petition for cancellation of a title, which
is a complaint by itself, is complete with the name of the parties, the
subject matter, the cause of action, and the reliefs prayed for, which
are all components of a regular complaint.
 It is in fact an initiatory pleading which should be filed and
entitled under the original land registration case under the
instructions of Sec. 2 of PD 1529.
 The petitioner assailed the dismissal in the CA via petition for
certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.
CA Ruling:
 On August 1, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
stating that the burden is on Petitioner to prove not merely reversible
error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for the part of Public Respondent.
 As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more
than errors of judgment which are reversible by timely appeal
and not by a special civil action of certiorari (Tomas Claudio Memorial
College, Inc. vs. CA, 316 SCRA 502, Jalandoni vs. Drilon, 327 SCRA
107).
 Applying the aforecited jurisprudence, the Petitioner has failed to
overcome the burden of proving how Public Respondent may
be faulted with having acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering judgment ordering the dismissal of his Petition.
 That the court a quo cannot share Petitioner's interpretation of
certain alleged laws and jurisprudence hardly constitute the
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
abuse of discretion contemplated under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure
 CA denied the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration.
TIMELINE: Petition for cancellation -> opposed by Filinvest -> RTC
granted dismissal of case, pleading should be filed under the
original land registration case under Sec. 2 PD 1529 -> CA
affirmed, stating that certiorari was not the correct remedy for
errors in judgment
Issue: Whether or not petition filed under Section 108 of P.D. 1529
should be dismissed because it was exempt from the requirements
of paying docket fees, of service of summons, and of the
certification against forum shopping due to its not being an
initiatory pleading.
Ruling:
DISMISSAL WAS PROPER BECAUSE RTC DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION
 The dismissal of the petition for certiorari by the CA was proper and
correct because the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all
gravely. Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 reads as follows: (just
included, in case asked to be read)
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No
erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First
Instance. A registered owner or other person having interest in the
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with
the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply
by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interest
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or
inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased;
or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen
or been created; or that an omission or an error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate: or that the same or any person in the certificate
has been changed or that the registered owner has married, or, if
registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and
no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or
that a corporation which owned registered land and has been
dissolved has not yet convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court
may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in
interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate,
the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or
grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security and bond if necessary, as it may consider proper;
Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed
to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree
of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by
the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a
purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or
his heirs and assigns without his or their written consent.
Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar
petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any
other provision of this decree after original registration shall be
filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered.
PETITION DID NOT FALL UNDER ANY OF THE 7 INSTANCES;
IN REALITY, IT WAS REQUESTING RECONVEYANCE, NOT
CANCELLATION AS CONTEMPLATED BY SEC. 108
 Based on the provision, the proceeding for the amendment and
alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529
is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely:
(a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased;
(b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate;
(c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering
a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate
certificate;
(d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been
changed;
(e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered
as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected;
(f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been
dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after
its dissolution; and
(g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or
alteration of title.
FILING OF PETITION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF
REOPENING THE DECREE AND IMPAIR RIGHTS OF INNOCENT
PURCHASERS; ONE YEAR PERIOD HAS LAPSED
 Here, the petitioner was in reality seeking the reconveyance of
the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of
a certificate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529.
 Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations
covered by Section 108, and was for that reason rightly
dismissed.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 Moreover, the filing of the petition would have the effect of
reopening the decree of registration, and could thereby impair
the rights of innocent purchasers in good faith and for value.
 To reopen the decree of registration was no longer permissible,
considering that the one-year period to do so had long ago lapsed,
and the properties covered by OCT No. 684 had already been
subdivided into smaller lots whose ownership had passed to third
persons.
 Thusly, the petition tended to violate the proviso in Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529, to wit:
. . . Provided, however, that this section shall not be construed
to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the
court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser
holding a certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and
assigns without his or their written consent. Where the owner's
duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be
filed as provided in the preceding section.
 Accordingly, he should perform jurisdictional acts, like paying
the correct amount of docket fees for the filing of an initiatory
pleading, causing the service of summons on the adverse
parties in order to vest personal jurisdiction over them in the
trial court, and attaching a certification against forum
shopping (as required for all initiatory pleadings).
 He ought to know that his taking such required acts for granted was
immediately fatal to his petition, warranting the granting of the
respondents' motion to dismiss.
Cabañez v. Solaño
Facts:
 Subject of the present controversy are 2 parcels of lands owned by
respondent Maria Cabanez who is married to Benjamin Cabanez,
the petitioner.
 On Feb. 12, 2007, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a
“Petition for Correction of the Name and Marital Status of the
Registered Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title of the Registry
of Deeds for Muntinlupa City.”
RTC Ruling
 On June 28, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 203, rendered its
Decision in favor of the Petitioner.
 It held that from the evidence presented by respondent, it has
been satisfactorily established that the subject properties
should indeed be in respondent’s name and that her status
should be single.
CA Ruling
 Not satisfied with the ruling of RTC, petitioner filed with the CA a
Petition for annulment of judgment on the ground that
petition was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation and other persons who may have interest in the
properties were not served summons.
 This was granted by the CA and annulled and set aside the decision
of the RTC. Respondent failed to comply with requirements under
Rule 108 of Rules of Court; she also failed to serve summons to
petitioner.
 Respondent Filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that
the provisions of PD 1529 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, should be applied in the present case; posting of notice of
respondent’s petition is deemed constructive notice; petition is an
action in rem where jurisdiction of the defendant is not a prerequisite
to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.
 CA rendered a decision in favor of respondent. PD 1529 is the
governing law; nothing under the provisions state that
publication is a requirement for RTC to acquire jurisdiction
over respondent’s petition. Petitioner also failed to prove
existence of extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulling assailed
judgment of RTC.
 Petitioner filed a MR but was denied by the CA.
TIMELINE: Cabanez (girl) filed petition for correction of name and
marital status in CTs -> RTC granted -> Cabanez (male) filed
petition for annulment with CA -> CA granted -> Cabanez (girl)
filed a motion for reconsideration -> CA granted -> MFR denied by
CA
Issues:
 Whether or not amendment and alteration of Certificates of
Title Provided for under section 108 of PD 1529 is an in rem
proceedings that requires strict compliance with the
publication requirements.
 Whether or not sec. 3 and 4 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
suppletorily apply to the proceedings provided for under
section 108 of PD 1529 wherein the requirement of
publication is mandatory.
Ruling:
PRAYED AMENDMENTS ARE CONTROVERSIAL; SEC. 108 OF
PD 1529 APPLIES ONLY TO NON-CONTROVERSIAL
AMENDMENTS
 The court finds merit in the petition, but for reasons which are not
identical as those by petitioner.
 The CA ruled on the basis of the provisions of PD 1529, specifically,
the CA cited Sections 2 and 108 of the said law which provides
that:
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of
courts. — Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Courts
of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and
interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall
furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of
all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance
thereof.
SECTION 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No
erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of
Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner of other person having an interest in registered
property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval
of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to
the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been
created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate
certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been
changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered
as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has
not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or
upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen
the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done
or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his
heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may
be filed as provided in the preceding section.
 All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any
other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed
and entitled in the original case in which the decree or
registration was entered.
 The Court notes that the petition was clearly one which was filed
after original registration of title, as provided under the above
quoted Section 2 of PD 1529.
 Moreover, respondent's petition was filed with the RTC for the
purpose of correcting supposed errors which were committed
when entries were made in the subject TCTs, as contemplated
under Section 108 of the same law.
 However, under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated
instances for amendment of alteration of a certificate of title
under Section 108 of PD 1529 are non-controversial in nature.
They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as not to
be genuine issues.
 The proceedings thereunder are summary in nature,
contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but
certainly not controversial issues.
 In the present case, the Court notes that in a separate action for
annulment of title and recovery of ownership filed by
petitioner's wife against respondent, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 137, in its decision in Civil Case No. 91-2648, dated July 5,
1993, made a categorical finding that petitioner and his wife
are the lawful owners of the subject properties and ordering
respondent to surrender possession thereof to the said spouses.
 This RTC judgment was later affirmed by the CA in its Decision 18 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49446, dated April 29, 1997.
 Respondent, on the other hand, claims that she together with
petitioner and his wife subsequently executed an amicable
settlement dated June 22, 2000, which was approved by the RTC,
wherein petitioner's wife waived her rights and interests over
the said properties.
 She also alleged that petitioner executed an Affidavit of
Declaration against Interest, dated January 22, 2007, indicating
that he has no right or interest over the subject properties.
 Petitioner, nonetheless, claims that he executed a subsequent
Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest, dated January 14, 2008,
claiming that he was deceived by respondent into signing the
said Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest and that he was
seriously ill at the time that he affixed his signature.
 From the foregoing, there is no question that there is a serious
objection and an adverse claim on the part of an interested
party as shown by petitioner's subsequent execution of his
Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest.
 The absence of unanimity among the parties is also evidenced by
petitioner's petition seeking the annulment of the RTC Decision which
granted respondent's petition for correction of entries in the subject
TCTs.
 These objections and claims necessarily entail litigious and
controversial matters making it imperative to conduct an
exhaustive examination of the factual and legal bases of the
parties' respective positions.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 Certainly, such objective cannot be accomplished by the court
through the abbreviated action under Section 108 of PD 1529.
 A complete determination of the issues in the present case can only
be achieved if petitioner and his wife are impleaded in an adversarial
proceeding.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS; WHERE
AUTHORITY IS CONFERRED BY STATUTE, MANNER OF OBTAINING
JURISDICTION IS MANDATORY; CA ERRS IN STATING THAT
PUBLICATION IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT
 Respondent failed to comply with the said requirements. In all cases
where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings
will be utterly void.
 It is wrong for the CA to rule in its Amended Decision that
publication is not a jurisdictional requirement for the RTC to
take cognizance of respondent's petition.
 The appellate court's reliance on the case of Chan v. Court of
Appeals is misplaced. In the said case, this Court considered the
notice to the Register of Deeds as substantial compliance with
the notice and publication requirements of the law simply
because in the petition for correction filed by the petitioner therein,
only the said petitioner and the Register of Deeds had an interest in
the correction of titles sought for.
 This Court ruled that there is therefore no necessity to notify
other parties who had no interest to protect in the said petition.
This is not true, however, in the present case. As discussed
above, on the bases of petitioner's serious objection and adverse
claim, it is apparent that he has an interest to protect. Thus, the
ruling in Chan finds no application in the instant case.
Notice and Replacement of Lost Duplicate Certificate (Sec. 109)
Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate.
In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice
under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the
loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate
to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the
fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or
other person in interest and registered. Section 109 is the applicable law
in petitions for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate certificate which are
lost or stolen or destroyed RA 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of
lost or destroyed original certificates of title on file with the RD
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
a. The registered owner or other person in interest shall send notice, under
oath, of the loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title
to the RD of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or
destruction is discovered;
b. The corresponding petition for the replacement of the loss or destroyed
owner’s duplicate certificate shall then be filed in court and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered;
c. The petition shall state under oath the facts and circumstance
surrounding such loss or destruction;
d. The court shall set the petition for hearing, after due notice to the RD
and all other interested parties as shown in the memorandum of
encumbrances noted in the original or transfer certificate of title on file in
the office of the RD;
e. After due notice and hearing, the court may direct the issuance of a new
duplicate certificate which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it
is issued in place of the lost or destroyed certificate and shall in all respects
be entitled to the same faith and credit as the original duplicate.
PETITION, WHERE FILED
A petition for replacement shall be filed with the RTC of the place where
the land lies and this is true even if the title was issued pursuant to a public
land patent registered in accordance with Section 103 of this decree
Things to Remember:
- There is no requirement for publication of the petition for replacement
of lost or destroyed certificate.
- If the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was never lost or destroyed,
a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy is
unwarranted, as in fact, the court has no jurisdiction over the petition,
and any issuance pursuant to such is null and void.
- Petition shall be filed with the RTC of the place where the land lies
Coombs v. Castañeda
Facts:
 This case stemmed from a petition for annulment of judgment
to declare the August 26, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 206, Muntinlupa City in LRC Case No. 04-035 as null
and void, filed by herein petitioner Mercedita C. Coombs (Coombs)
before the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the lost
owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title [No.] 6715
of the Registry of Deeds of Muntinlupa City as null and void.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is ordered
to issue a new owner's duplicate copy of the said TCT No. 6715
under the same terms and conditions as the original thereof and
to include thereon all annotations which have not been lawfully
ordered cancelled by the Court upon payment of all fees
prescribed by law.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Petitioner Coombs is the owner of the real property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6715 situated on Apitong
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
 Sometime in March 2005, when she tried to pay the real property tax
due relative to the real property covered by TCT No. 6715, she was
told that said real property was no longer listed under her
name.
 Upon further verification, she came to know that TCT No. 6715
had already been cancelled and had been replaced by TCT No.
14115 issued in the name of herein respondent Virgilio Veloso
Santos (Santos); that TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by the
RTC in a Decision dated August 26, 2004 in LRC Case No. 04-035,
entitled "In Re: Petition for the Issuance of Second Owner's Duplicate
Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6715, [by
Mercedita C. Coombs, represented by her Atty.-in-Fact
Victoria C. Castaneda".
 Petitioner neither authorized Victoria C. Castaneda
(Castaneda) to file the petition for issuance of a second
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 sometime in 2004, nor
asked her to sell the subject property to herein respondent
Santos; that Santos, in turn, sold the same to herein
respondents Pancho and Edith Leviste (spouses Leviste ); that
the spouses Leviste executed a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in favor of herein respondent Bank of the Philippine
Islands Family Savings Bank (BPI Family).
 Petitioner Coombs anchored her prayer for the annulment of the
RTC Decision on the ground that, since the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 6715 had never been lost as it had always
been in her custody, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035.
CA Decision:
 Relying mainly on Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment.
RULE 47 - Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and
Resolutions
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment
by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief.
 The CA said that there is no allegation in the petition that the
petitioner has failed to avail of any of the remedies in Section
1 through no fault of his own before instituting the present petition.
The petition is also not sufficient in substance.
 Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the grounds
for Annulment of Judgment are:
(a) lack of jurisdiction of the lower court; and
(b) extrinsic fraud.
 The CA said that the ground petitioner obviously relied upon in
the present action is extrinsic fraud.
 However, the petitioner failed to state the facts constituting
extrinsic fraud as a ground.
 Since the petitioner failed to avail of any of aforementioned remedies
in Section 1 without justification and that the ground relied upon was
not substantiated, the petition, therefore has no prima facie merit.
 Petitioner Coombs filed a Motion for Reconsideration. She
insisted that her petition was grounded on lack of jurisdiction,
not extrinsic fraud.
 In fact, she explicitly spelled out in her petition that the RTC did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-
035 because the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was
never lost.
 The Court of Appeals denied the said motion and explained that
the RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real
property and land registration cases.
 Thus, it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No.
04-035. It further held that petitioner Coombs failed to append
affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting her cause of
action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
 It cited Veneracion v. Mancilla, where it was held that failure to
append the necessary documents may prompt the appellate court to
dismiss the petition outright or deny the same due course.
TIMELINE: Coombs owns property -> tried to pay real property tax
but was told it was not listed in her name -> discovered that her
TCT was cancelled and issued to Santos thru Castaneda (filed
petition for issuance of duplicate copy) -> Santos sold to Pancho
and Leviste -> Leviste executed real estate mortgage over subject
property with BPI -> Petition for annulment of judgment by
Coombs to CA -> CA dismissed petition, failing to state facts
constituting extrinsic fraud
Issues:
 Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC
Case No. 04-035?
 Is the failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies under Sec.
1 of Rule 47 fatal to her case?
 Is the failure of petitioner to append affidavits of witnesses as
required by Sec. 4 of Rule 47 fatal to her case?
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Ruling:
THE RTC DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER; RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER MATTERS WHERE
CERTIFICATE SOUGHT TO BE RECONSTITUTED WAS NEVER LOST
OR DESTROYED BUT IN THE POSSESSION OF ANOTHER PERSON
 In her petition, petitioner Coombs averred as follows:
 Since the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 is not lost or
destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of the petitioner,
there is no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court. The
Regional Trial Court Branch 206 in Muntinlupa City never acquired
jurisdiction to entertain the petition and order the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate. Hence, the newly issued duplicate of TCT
No. 6715 is null and void.
 Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner Coombs was clearly
grounded on lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject
matter of the case, and not extrinsic fraud.
 The allegations in her petition made out a prima facie case of
annulment of judgment that should have warranted the Court of
Appeals' favorable consideration.
 In Manila v. Manzo, the Court held that in a petition for
annulment of judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction, it is
not enough that there is an abuse of jurisdictional discretion.
It must be shown that the court should not have taken
cognizance of the case because the law does not confer it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
 It is doctrinal that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter is conferred by law.
 Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 vests the RTC with jurisdiction over
the judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate of
the certificate of title.
 However, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the subject
matter of LRC Case No. 04-035 was within the RTC's jurisdiction,
being a court of general jurisdiction.
 In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the RTC has no
jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted
was never lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of
another person.
 In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is
jurisdictional.
 Thus, petitioner Coombs' mere allegation that the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 7615 was never lost and has in fact
always been with her gave rise to a prima facie case of the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the proceedings in LRC Case No.
04-035. This is exactly the situation a petition for annulment of
judgment aims to remedy.
FAILURE TO AVAIL OF THE REMEDIES UNDER SEC. 1 OF RULE 47
IS NOT FATAL TO HER CASE; JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IS FUNDAMENTALLY VOID
 When a petition for annulment of judgment is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner need not allege that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the judgment sought
to be annulled are no longer available through no fault of her
own.
 This is because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is
fundamentally void.
 Thus, it may be questioned any time unless laches has already
set in.
FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO APPEND AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES
AS REQUIRED BY SEC. 4 OF RULE 47 IS NOT FATAL TO HER CASE
 Petitioner annexed to her petition the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 6715 and the RTC Decision - which sufficiently support the
petition's cause of action.
 A copy of the TCT alleged to have been missing supports the claim
that the same was never lost. In the same vein, a copy of the RTC
Decision, in conjunction with supporting jurisprudence,
supports petitioner Coombs' averment that said decision was
rendered without jurisdiction.
 Her allegations coupled with the appropriate supporting documents
give rise to a prima facie case that the RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035.
 As we ruled in Tan Po Chu v. Court of Appeals, if allegations of this
nature turned out to be true, the RTC Decision would be void
and the Court of Appeals would have been duty-bound to
strike it down.
 Thus, the appellate court erred when it brushed aside this duty and
dismissed the case outright based on a strict interpretation of
technical rules.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed
to REINSTATE the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
Tan Po Chu v. CA
Principle: When the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost,
but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted
certificate is void because the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter — the allegedly lost owner's duplicate. The correct remedy
for the registered owner against an uncooperative possessor is to compel
the surrender of the owner's duplicate title through an action for replevin.
Facts:
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Fiber Technology Corporation (FiberTech) was a Philippine
corporation with (SEC) Registration No. 0000142818.
 It was also the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Marikina (subject lot) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 157923 entered on November 28, 1988.
 The SEC allegedly revoked FiberTech's registration on
September 29, 2003.
 On April 4, 2005, respondent Felix Chingkoe executed an affidavit
of loss of TCT No. 157923 allegedly on behalf of FiberTech.
 On June 2, 2005, FiberTech — supposedly represented by
respondent Rodrigo Garcia pursuant to a December 2, 2004 Board
Resolution— filed a petition for the reissuance/replacement of
its owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923.
 The petition was based on the affidavit of loss that Felix
executed. The petition alleged:
(1) that Felix and his wife Rosita acquired 100% ownership
of FiberTech in 2004 pursuant to an award by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC);
(2) that Felix was elected Corporate Secretary soon after;
(3) that Felix asked the former directors and officers of
FiberTech to turn over the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923,
but the latter denied knowledge or possession thereof; and
(4) that after conducting an exhaustive search, the subject title
was nowhere, to be found.
RTC Ruling
 The petition was raffled to the RTC, Marikina City, Branch 193 and
docketed as LRC Case No. 2005-771-MK.
 On July 23, 2006, the RTC granted the petition.
 It declared the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 157923 as lost
and ordered its reissuance.
 On December 21, 2007, Tan Po Chu — mother of Fibertech's
incorporators Faustino and respondent Felix Chingkoe — filed a
petition before the CA for annulment of judgment against the
RTC's decision.
 The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101727 with Tan Po
Chu and FiberTech as petitioners.
 Tan alleged:
(1) that the missing owner's duplicate of TCT was in her
custody as the responsible officer of FiberTech;
(2) that Felix was aware of this fact;
(3) that Felix committed perjury when he executed the
Affidavit of Loss;
(4) that Felix and Rosita had not acquired 100% ownership
of FiberTech;
(5) that Rosita and Rodrigo Garcia were not even
stockholders of record in Fibertech; and
(6) that the respondents had no authority to file the petition
for reissuance of the owner's duplicate copy on behalf of FiberTech.
 Citing New Durawood Co. v. Court of Appeals and Serra Serra v.
Court of Appeals, Tan further argued that if an owner's duplicate TCT
has not been lost, but is in fact possessed by another person, then
the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the
decision never acquired jurisdiction.
CA Ruling
 However, the CA dismissed Tan's petition outright on January
16, 2008 on the grounds that the petition suffered from
procedural infirmities and lacked substantial merit.
 The CA observed that:
(1) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were
executed alone by Tan Po Chu without showing that she had the
authority to sign for and on behalf of the corporation;
(2) Tan's actual address was not indicated in the petition as
required by Rule 46, Section 3; and
(3) the attached copy of the owner's duplicate TCT No. 157923
was not a certified true copy.
 The CA also brushed aside Tan's substantive argument. It held
that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case after
complying with the notice and hearing requirements under
Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree.
 Tan moved for reconsideration. However, on July 16, 2008, the
CA denied the motion, insisting that Tan's assertion that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction was without merit.
TIMELINE: Fibertech was registered with SEC and had registered
land -> SEC revoked registration -> Chingkoe filed an affidavit of
loss -> Fibertech filed a petition for replacement of duplicate copy
based on affidavit of loss -> RTC granted -> Tan Po Chu filed a
petition for annulment of judgment -> CA dismissed petition for
procedural infirmities
Issues:
 Was the remedy of certiorari instead of an appeal proper?
 Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Tan
Po Chu’s petition regarding the matter on lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC?
Ruling:
APPEAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE PROPER REMEDY; HOWEVER,
BECAUSE PUBLIC WELFARE DICTATES, THE PROCEDURAL LAPSE
IS DEEMED CURED
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 The proper remedy should have been an appeal. Certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy of last resort for when another remedy is
present, certiorari is not available.
 It is a limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction.
 An error of jurisdiction is one where the officer or tribunal
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 On the other hand, an error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. They only involve
errors in the court or tribunal's appreciation of the facts and of the
law. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of
judgment, only by appeal.
 (BUT) Ordinarily, this Court would have dismissed the petition
outright for being an improper remedy. As a general
rule, certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal.
 However, an exception to this rule is where public welfare and
the advancement of public policy so dictates.
 This Court cannot ignore the implications if the petitioner's
allegations — that she has the original owner's duplicate TCT
of the subject lot and that the SEC revoked FiberTech's
registration in 2003 — are true.
 There currently exists two owners’ duplicate TCTs over the
same property possessed by two contending factions in an
intra-corporate dispute of a defunct corporation.
 This anomalous situation can potentially bring considerable
harm to the general public and to the integrity of our Torrens
system. This Court, therefore, cannot simply leave the parties as
they were.
GENERAL RULE: Certiorari is not the proper remedy as a substitute
for appeal.
EXC: Where public welfare and advancement of public policy
dictates, it shall be allowed.
CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
 The CA committed a grave error when it brushed aside Tan's
argument that the RTC rendered its decision without jurisdiction.
 It ruled that the replacement of a lost duplicate certificate is a
proceeding in rem, directed against the whole world; therefore, the
RTC acquired jurisdiction when it complied with the notice and
hearing requirements under Section 109 of P.D. 1529.
 The CA completely missed the point because Tan did not assail the
RTC's jurisdiction by alleging noncompliance with the
requirements of notice and hearing; she questioned the RTC's
jurisdiction over the res by claiming that the allegedly lost
owner's duplicate was, in fact, not lost but was in her custody.
Therefore, the RTC's compliance with Section 109 of P.D. 1529 was
irrelevant.
 We have consistently held that when the owner's duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the
possession of another person, then the reconstituted
certificate is void because the court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter — the allegedly lost
owner's duplicate.
 The correct remedy for the registered owner against an
uncooperative possessor is to compel the surrender of the
owner's duplicate title through an action for replevin.
 Moreover, the CA's dismissal based on technical grounds was
erroneous. The CA raised the following procedural infirmities: .
..
(1) the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was executed alone by affiant Tan Po Chu without any
showing that [s]he had the authority to sign for and in behalf of
petitioner corporation pursuant to Sec. 5(1), Rule 7 and Sec. 4(3),
Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure considering that
[s]he is one of the incorporators and stockholders of her co-petitioner
corporation;
(2) The actual address of petitioner Tan Po Chu is not
indicated in the petition as required by Sec. 3 (1), Rule 46 of the
same Rule;
(3) The copy of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923 is not
certified as a true copy of the original owner's duplicate by the
proper government agency as alleged by the petitioners.
 First, we note that Tan alleged that FiberTech's corporate existence
had already ceased when the SEC revoked its corporate
registration on September 29, 2003, and that she was a trustee
of the corporation for the purpose of its dissolution. We note
further that the petition for annulment was filed in the names
of both FiberTech and Tan Po Chu.
 While FiberTech may no longer have judicial personality to
initiate the suit or authorize Tan Po Chu to file the case, Tan
Po Chu remained a real party-in-interest as the lawful
possessor of the allegedly lost owner's duplicate TCT.
 The respondents could not legally oust her of this possession
by reconstituting the owner's duplicate instead of filing an
action for replevin. Therefore, the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping remained valid with respect to Tan Po Chu even
though it might have been defective with respect to FiberTech.
 Second, we also note that Tan Po Chu submitted her address in
her motion for reconsideration to cure the defect in the petition.
Her motion for reconsideration substantially complies with Rule
46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
 Finally, a petition for annulment of judgment only requires the
inclusion of a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof. It does not require the petitioner to annex certified true
copies or duplicate originals of his evidence to the petition because
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
these may be presented during the evidentiary hearings of the case.
To our mind, none of the procedural infirmities warranted the CA's
outright dismissal of the case.
 Fallo: WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The January 16,
2008 and the July 16, 2008 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Court of
Appeals is further DIRECTED to PROCEED hearing the case.
Gocheco v. Estacio
Facts:
 Cesario Gocheco, legitimate son of Paulino Gocheco, filed a
petition in court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy
of his father’s title to a parcel of land in Margosarubig, Zamboanga
del Sur.
 The owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title No. O-
1385 was lost despite diligent search to ascertain its
whereabouts. Moreover, the records in the Register of Deeds of the
said title was found to be intact and complete.
 However, Francisco T. Estacio, et.al. opposed the petition alleging
that they have been in continuous, peaceful, lawful, public,
and adverse possession of the said property. Gocheco, on the other
hand, averred that the oppositors had no personality to
intervene in the proceedings.
 Moreover, the oppositors failed to show up for the hearing
despite notice. The trial court then decided to suspend the hearing
of the petition and ordered Gocheco to either (a) publish within 30
days his petition or (b) file a testate or intestate proceeding in order
to secure the appointment of a legal representative to the estate.
 Unfortunately, Gocheco failed to comply with the order. Hence,
the oppositors filed an ex-parte motion to dismiss. The trial
court however required Gocheco to make his reply as to why the
petition should not be dismissed. Gocheco manifested that he will be
submitting evidence but subsequently the court dismissed the
petition.
Issues:
 Whether or not publication is necessary for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of title.
 Whether or not appointment of a legal representative of the
estate and filing of testate or intestate proceedings is
necessary for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
title.
Ruling:
On both issues.
 No. Neither publication nor filing of testate or intestate
proceedings is necessary for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate certificate of title.
 In this case, the petition was only for the issuance of an owner’s
duplicate copy of a title that was lost.
 The petition was not one for reconstitution which would
require publication. Neither is the petition about the
distribution of the decedent’s estate. Hence, there is no
necessity for the order coming from the trial court.
 Moreover, with the existence of a complete record in the Register of
Deeds, the petition should have been given due course as only the
owner’s duplicate copy is to be issued to the petitioner who is a person
in interest as legal heir of the registered owner.
On oppositor’s claim.
 They should institute a separate, independent, and ordinary civil
action for their claim of ownership or possession of the property. They
have no personality to intervene based on their grounds for
intervention.
Fallo:
 IN VIEW HEREOF, the order of June 29, 1957 of the Trial Court,
appealed from, is set aside, and another entered, directing the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, to issue to the petitioner a
new owner's duplicate copy which was lost. With costs on the
oppositors-appellees.
Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Torrens Title (Sec.
110)
Section 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens
title. Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in the offices
of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands
covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent
with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of
lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act is hereby abrogated.
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be given
to the Register of Deeds of the place where the land is situated and to the
Commissioner of Land Registration. No order or judgment ordering the
reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final until the lapse of
thirty days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner
of Land Registration of a notice of such order or judgment without any
appeal having been filed by any of such officials.
Note: The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes the restoration in
its original form and condition of a lost or destroyed original or transfer
certificate of title on file in the office of the RD.
Purpose: To have the title reproduced in exactly the same way it was at
the time of its loss or destruction.
PROOF REQUIRED FOR RECONSTITUTION
a. That the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
b. That the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to
warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title;
c. That the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein;
d. That the certificate of title was in force at the was lost or destroyed; and
e. That the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same and those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
SOURCES OF RECONSTITUTION FOR OCT (SEC. 2, RA 26)
Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
b. The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of
title;
c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register
of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the
case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient
and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
TWO TYPES OF RECONSTITUTION
1. Administrative Reconstitution — a proceeding in rem; once issue,
anybody who has a claim or interest has 2 years to inform the court if his
claim; such claim was not carried over the reconstituted title issued
2. Ex Parte reconstitution — a proceeding not in rem; court has discretion
whether or not it is proper to re-annotate a previously existing annotation
at the back of title
WHERE TO FILE PETITION; CONTENTS
Shall be filed by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having
interest in the property with the proper RTC where the same is based on
sources enumerated earlier
Contents shall be as followed—
1. That the owner’s duplicate had been lost or destroyed
2. That no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, lessee’s, duplicate had been issued
or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed
3. The location, area and boundaries of the property
4. The nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any,
which don’t belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses
of the owners of such buildings or improvements
5. The names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who
may have any interest in the property
6. A detailed description of the encumbrances if any, affecting the property
7. A statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property
have been presented for registration, or if there be any, the registration
thereof hasn’t been accomplished
REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION, POSTING AND
MAILING
1. To be published twice, at the expense of the petitioner, in successive
issues of the Official Gazette
2. To be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated
3. Copy of the notice to be sent by registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address
is known, within 30 days prior the date of hearing. The jurisdiction of the
court is hedged in the forewalls of the petition and the published notice of
hearing which define the subject matter of the petition.
COMPLIANCE WITH JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IS
MANDATORY
• The court doesn’t acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition
• It is not enough that there is publication in the OG only for there is a
posting requirement also. Failure to comply will nullify the proceedings.
RECONSTITUTED TITLES: EXTRAJUDICIAL -VS- JUDICIAL
Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and legal effects as to the
originals thereof unless the reconstitution was made extrajudicially. In
contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in
rem, the administrative reconstitution is essentially ex-parte and without
notice. The reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same
indefeasible character of the original certificates of title for the following
reason: The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title of a
registered land is similar to that of a second Owner’s Duplicate Transfer
Certificate of Title. Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the
representation of the registered owner that the original of the said TCT,
respectively, was lost and could not be located or found despite diligent
efforts exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore, are subsequent copies of
the originals thereof. A cursory examination of these subsequent copies
would show that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing with such
copies are put on notice of such fact and thus warned to be extra careful.
(Barstowe Phils. Corp. vs. Republic 519 SCRA 238)
Note: PD 1529 discontinued administrative reconstitution which was
provided under RA 26. However, administrative reconstitution was
reinstated by RA 6732 to address the problem of the Quezon City fire. This
does not apply only to the Quezon City incident, but also where at least
10% of the records of a city is destroyed, or at least 500 titles, the
administrator will declare that the city/province where the RD is located
may avail of RA 6732.
Saint Mary Crusade v. Riel
Facts:
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the
original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire
that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80's. Initially,
respondent Judge gave due course to the petition, but after the
preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for
reconstitution.
 The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, attaching
the following documents to support its petition for reconstitution,
namely: (1) the copy of the original application for registration
dated January 27, 1955; (2) the notice of initial hearing dated June
23, 1955; (3) the letter of transmittal to the Court of First Instance
in Quezon City; (4) the copy of the Spanish Testimonial Title No.
3261054 dated March 25, 1977 in the name of Eladio Tiburcio; (5) the
copy of Tax Assessment No. 14238; and (6) the approved Plan
SWD-37457.
 On February 5, 2007, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to
reconsider.
 Hence, petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that
respondent Judge had "unfairly abused his discretion and
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act”. He filed for certiorari
and mandamus.
Comment of Respondent Judge
 On May 23, 2007, Respondent Judge justified the dismissal of the
petition for reconstitution by citing the opposition by the OSG and
the UP, as well as the recommendation of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA).
 He averred that petitioner did not present its Torrens title to be
reconstituted; that the petitioner’s claim was doubtful given the
magnitude of 4,304,623 square meters as the land area involved; and
that the UP's ownership of the portion of land covered by
petitioner's claim had long been settled by the Court in a long line
of cases. (this is true).
Comment of OSG and UP
(Note: UP sought to intervene on November 13, 2007 and was granted by
the Court).
 On July 19, 2007, OSG (and UP) argued that the petitioner had availed
itself of the wrong remedies by directly coming to the Court by petition
for certiorari and mandamus; it alleged that the petitioner failed to
observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
 Moreover, petitioner had no factual and legal bases for
reconstitution due to its failure to prove the existence and
validity of the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, in
addition to the ownership of the land covered by the petition for
reconstitution.
 Allegedly, petitioner’s claim over the land was derived from the Deed
of Assignment executed by one Marcelino Tiburcio – the same
person whose claim had long been settled and disposed of in
Tiburcio v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation and
University of the Philippines (106 Phil. 477), which vested title in
the UP, and in Cañero v. University of the Philippines (437 SCRA 630);
 Finally, it concluded that Deed of Transfer and Conveyance dated
November 26, 1925 executed by Tiburcio in favor of St. Mary
Village Association, Inc. was not a basis for the judicial
reconstitution of title accepted under Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 26.
Issues:
 Whether or not petitioner’s motion for certiorari and
mandamus should be dismissed.
 Whether or not petitioner has complied with the procedures
for reconstitution of lost title.
Ruling:
THE SUBJECT LOT SOUGHT TO BE RECONSTITUTED BELONGS TO
UP
 The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how
respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or
exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 Under Section 12 21 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial
reconstitution of a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as the
successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title.
 Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in
acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge
gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that the petition for reconstitution
involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as
confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to
law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition
for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
 The land covered by the petition for judicial reconstitution related to
the same area that formed the UP campus. The UP's registered
ownership of the land comprising its campus has long been
settled under the law.
 Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by
respondent Judge only safeguarded the UP's registered ownership.
PETITIONER DID NOT PRESENT THE DUPLICATE OR CERTIFIED
COPY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
 The petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of
OCT No. 1609 hence it disobeyed Section 2 and Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly listed the
acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens title,
to wit
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from
such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in
the following order:
a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
b) The co-owners’, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the
certificate of title;
c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by
the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of
title was issued;
e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the
property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and
f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:
a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title; (basically
the same as the previous one).
PETITIONER RESORTED TO THE WRONG REMEDY
 With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the
application for judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the
RTC to do in the case. Therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner
was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15
days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration.
 By allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking
action, it squandered its right to appeal.
 Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary
remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
 Moreover, there being no special, important or compelling reason, the
petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts,
warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
NO GAD
 In so doing, respondent Judge actually heeded the clear warnings to
the lower courts and the Law Profession in general against mounting
or abetting any attack against such ownership.
 One such warning was that in Cañero v. University of the
Philippines, as follows:
 We strongly admonish courts and unscrupulous lawyers to stop
entertaining spurious cases seeking further to assail respondent UP’s
title. These cases open the dissolute avenues of graft to unscrupulous
land-grabbers who prey like vultures upon the campus of respondent
UP. By such actions, they wittingly or unwittingly aid the hucksters
who want to earn a quick buck by misleading the gullible to buy the
Philippine counterpart of the proverbial London Bridge. It is well past
time for courts and lawyers to cease wasting their time and
resources on these worthless causes and take judicial notice of
the fact that respondent UP’s title had already been validated
countless times by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such
doctrine is to be viewed as a deliberate intent to sabotage the rule of
law and will no longer be countenanced.
Republic v. Sanchez
Facts:
 On 28 May 1996, respondents filed a petition ("LRC Case No. Q-96-
8296") in the trial court to reconstitute the original of TCT No.
252708. Respondents claimed that TCT No. 252708 was issued in the
name of respondent Marina.
 Respondents alleged that the original of TCT No. 252708 was among
the documents destroyed by the fire which razed the Office of the
Register of Deeds, Quezon City in June 1988. Respondents sought
reconstitution under Section 3(a) of RA 26 based on Marina's
duplicate title.
 The Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition, noting that
since the petition is based on Section 3(a) of RA 26, the trial court
should defer acting on the petition until the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) has submitted its Report on the petition as required
under LRA Circular No. 35.
 In response to the Solicitor General's Comment, respondents
submitted a First Report signed by Bustos, Chief, Reconstitution
Division, LRA and endorsed to the trial court in a letter signed by
Oriel, Chief, Docket Division, LRA. Apart from the First Report.
 (RTC RULING) [October 1996 Order] The trial court granted
reconstitution and ordered TCT No. 252708 reconstituted finding that
TCT No. 252708 "does not appear to overlap previously
plotted/decreed properties in the area (later, it turns out that it
overlapped).
 In a letter, LRA’s Oriel submitted to the trial court Second
Report, informing the trial court that the First Report was fake
and recommended that the trial court set aside its October
1996 decision granting the reconstitution of TCT 252708.
 Petitioner, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion to set aside the
28 October 1996 Order. Petitioner contended that respondents'
petition should be considered as having been filed under Section 3(f)
of RA 26, that is, based on "any other document."
 Petitioner pointed out that a petition for reconstitution of lost
or destroyed titles based on Section 3(f) should not only be
published and posted but also served on, among others, the
owners of the adjoining properties. For non-compliance with this
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
requirement, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case
No. Q-96-8296.
 [July 1998 Resolution] The trial court set aside the 28 October
1996 Order and dismissed LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 and held:
“Records reveal that TCT No. 252708, the title to be reconstituted,
overlaps TCT Nos. 187040 and 187042 of Uy and Zalamea.
Petitioners' design of having their title reconstituted,
notwithstanding the fact that the same is covered in two other
titles, eludes the comprehension of this Court.
 This Court is of the view that the failure to notify the registered
owners of TCT Nos. 187040 and 187042 of the Reconstitution
proceeding proved to be a mistake.
 Section 13, RA 26 provides that: “The Court shall likewise cause
a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise,
at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named
therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to
the date of the hearing. Said notice shall state among other
things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title,
if known, the name of the registered owner, the name[s] of
the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owner[s] of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the
date on which all persons having any interest therein, must appear
and file their claim o[r] objection to the petition. The petitioner shall,
at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of
the notice as directed by the court.
 Petitioners' failure to comply with this provision is a fatal defect for
the same is mandatory and jurisdictional.
 (CA RULING) The Court of Appeals granted respondents' petition,
set aside the trial court's 17 July 1998 and 4 January 1999
Resolutions, and reinstated the 28 October 1996 Order ruling “until
the trial court declares TCT No. 252708 to be void and orders its
cancellation, we cannot but recognize the validity of the same.”
 Petitioner reiterates its claim that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 for lack of
actual notice to all interested parties as required under Section
13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26. Respondents countered that the
actual notice requirement in Section 13 does not apply to LRC Case
No. Q-96-8296 because that case was based on Marina's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 252708.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case
No. Q-96-8296.
Ruling:
THE EXEMPTION FROM NON-REQUIREMENT OF SERVICE OF
NOTICE IS NON-APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE TITLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR IS FICTITIOUS
 Respondents are correct in saying that the service of notice of the
petition for reconstitution filed under RA 26 to the occupants of the
property, owners of the adjoining properties, and all persons who may
have any interest in the property is not required if the petition is
based on the owner's duplicate certificate of title or on that of
the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's.
 (Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.) This involves
a petition filed for the reconstitution of the original of two Torrens
certificates of title based on Puzon's duplicate certificates of title.
Serving a notice is not required if the petition is based on the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title or of the co-owner’s, etc.
 RA 26 Sec. 12: x x x The requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do
not apply to all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those
based on any of the sources specified in Section 12, that is,
"sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act.
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the
certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was
issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the
property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate of the
certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of
deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated
copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and
pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property
the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
 In the present case, the source of the Petition for the
reconstitution of title was petitioner's duplicate copies of the
two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition is
governed, not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA
26.
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinabove provided shall prevent any
registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition
mentioned in Section Five of this Act directly with the proper
Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in
Section 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act. Provided,
however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition, before
hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated
in Section Nine hereof: And provided, further, That certificates of title
reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the
encumbrance referred to in Section Seven of this Act.
 Nothing in this provision requires that notices be sent to
owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that requirement is found in
Section 13, which does not apply to petitions based on an
existing owner's duplicate TCT.
 However, contrary to respondents' claim, Puzon finds no
application here. No report from a pertinent government agency
challenging the authenticity of Puzon's duplicate certificates of title
was presented in Puzon. Thus, when Branch 80 granted
reconstitution, Puzon's duplicate transfer certificates of title
remained unchallenged.
 In contrast, the trial court in the present case was misled into
treating LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 as having been filed under
Section 3(a) based on Marina's purported duplicate title.
 Thus, the trial court followed Section 10 in connection with Section 9
of RA 26 to publicize LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. Relying on the First
Report's finding that TCT No. 252708 "does not appear to overlap
previously plotted/decreed properties in the area," the trial court
granted reconstitution.
 However, petitioner later informed the trial court of the First Report's
spuriousness, the serious doubts on TCT No. 252708's authenticity,
and the existence of two other titles that overlapped Lot No. 1. After
hearing the parties, the trial court dismissed LRC Case No. Q-96-8296
for lack of jurisdiction as all interested parties were not actually
notified of the petition as required under Section 13 in relation to
Section 12 of RA 26.
THE RECONSTITUTION OF A FAKE AND FICTITIOUS
DUPLICATE TITLE FALLS UNDER SEC. 3 (F) AND NOT 3(A);
THUS, IT REQUIRES THE REQUIREMENT OF SERVICE OF
NOTICE
 (Director of Lands v. CA) The instant petition for judicial
reconstitution falls squarely under Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 26,
because the Director of Lands claims that the respondent's duplicate
of the Certificate of Title No. T-12/79 or TCT No. 42449 are fake and
fictitious.”
 Consequently, we applied Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and held that
for non-compliance with these provisions, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
 For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d),
2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another
requirement: that the notice be mailed to occupants, owners
of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an
interest in the property. To repeat, mailing the notice is not
required for a petition based on Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and
4(a), as in the present case.
 It is Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 which applies
to LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. Hence, in addition to its posting
and publication, the notice of hearing of LRC Case No. Q-96-
8296 should also have been served through mail on the
owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may
have any interest in the property.
 The records show that neither the adjoining owners nor the
other interested parties, Uy and Zalamea, were issued, were
notified of respondents' petition in LRC Case No. Q-96-8296.
ACTUAL NOTICE REQUIREMENT IS JURISDICTIONAL
 These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The petition
for reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional facts; the notice of
hearing must also be published and posted in particular places and
the same sent to specified persons.”
 For non-compliance with the actual notice requirement in
Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. The
proceedings in that case were thus a nullity and the 28 October 1996
Order was void.
Summary:
(D&D Summary) If reconstitution of title is based on documents under:
Section 3(a, b) = posting and publication only
Section 2(c, d, e, f) 3(c, d, e, f) = posting and publication + notice by
mailing of the (reconstitution) case
Heirs of Venturanza v. Republic
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
Facts:
 The title in question, TCT No. 2574, was issued sometime in 1959
in the name of Gregorio Venturanza. The memorandum of
registration shows that TCT No. 2574 was derived from TCT No. RT-
40 (140), which is a reconstituted title issued to one Florencio
Mora who sold the property therein described to Gregorio
Venturanza in 1956 for P107,730.00.
 The same memorandum of registration, however, does not
show when the land covered by TCT No. 2574 was originally
registered and the other data were merely noted as (NA).
 In 1964, Gregorio Venturanza and the then Abaca Development
Board entered into an agreement for purchase and sale of the
property covered by TCT No. 2574. The government's negotiation
committee assigned a deputy clerk of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) to verify the true copies of TCT No. 2574 in the
name of Gregorio Venturanza.
 It was found out that Venturanzas' TCT No. 2574, was derived
from TCT No. RT-40 (140) in the name of one Florencio Mora
(Mora). In turn, TCT No. RT-40 (140) appears to have been
reconstituted from TCT No. 140 which was issued to one Sebastian
Moll on June 7, 1928. TCT No. 140, on the other hand, appears to be
a transfer from Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 3480 issued to one
Casimiro Natividad.
 In the report submitted by the LRC deputy clerk, the latter
made a finding that the Venturanzas' TCT No. 2574, from TCT
No. RT-40 (140) which was, in turn, derived from TCT No. 140,
covers only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters
and NOT 23,944,635 square meters or 2,394 hectares which
practically comprise the entire Municipality of Buhi.
 The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a complaint
for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2574
and the Reversion of the Land.
 (RTC & CA RULING) Resolved the suit in favor of the Republic.
The trial court principally anchored its judgment on the ground that
the reconstituted title issued in the name of Florencio Mora
could have been fraudulently secured, hence, does not legally
exist. The court further ruled that since the reconstituted title issued
to Florencio Mora is a nullity, then the order for its reconstitution did
not attain finality and therefore may be attacked anytime.
 The Venturanzas went on appeal to the CA arguing that Mora's
reconstituted title from where their TCT No. 2574 was derived is
already indefeasible; that they are protected by law as buyers in good
faith; and Republic's action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and
the reversion of the land described therein to the mass of public
domain was already barred by the decision of the CA in Florencio Mora
v. Venancio Infante which granted the petition for reconstitution of
Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140). CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the cancellation of TCT
No. 2574
Ruling:
A RECONSTITUTED TITLE DERIVED FROM A FRAUDULENT TITLE
DOES NOT ATTAIN INDEFEASIBILITY
 Petitioners maintain that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140) is
already indefeasible the same having attained finality one (1) year
after the CA granted its reconstitution.
 Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer
to original decrees of registration and not to orders of
reconstitution.
 As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration
Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been
brought within the operation of said law.
THE TCT WAS NOT REGISTERED; THEREFORE, NO COURT COULD
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO ORDER RECONSTITUTION OF MORA’S
TCT
 The evidence shows that TCT No. 2574, the title in question, derived
its existence from RT-40 (140) in the name of Florencio Mora which
was a reconstituted title based on TCT No. 140 allegedly obtained by
Florencio Mora during the Japanese occupation.
 The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do
not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in
the name of Florencio Mora was registered.
 Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was entered, the
OCT number or LRC Record Number.
NO RES JUDICATA; NO PROTECTION FOR A BUYER IN GOOD
FAITH IF THEY BOUGHT A VOID TITLE
 The judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R did not operate as res
judicata which would bar the Republic's action because there
was no identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R
and the instant case.
 The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora's evidence
in Special Proceedings No. 674 and the procedures adopted by
him for the reconstitution of certificate of title alleged to have
been lost or destroyed were in conformity with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 26.
 The questions of ownership and whether or not the property
or portion thereof was registrable, being a timberland, were
never put at issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R.
 Neither the non-existence of the original title from which Mora's TCT
No. RT-40 (140) and petitioners' TCT No. 2574 were derived, nor the
non-registrability of the timberland included in the area in question
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
which constitute Republic's cause of action against the herein
petitioners, were ever raised, much less, decided by the CA in CA-
G.R. No. 20681-R.
 Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law
considering that they were buyers in good faith. Again, this
assertion is without basis considering that Mora's
reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140), from where petitioners'
TCT No. 2574 was derived, is void.
 The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the
subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the
petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own
name.
Republic v. Lorenzo
Facts:
 In seeking the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980, respondents averred
before the trial court:
3. That during the lifetime of Pedro Fontanilla and herein petitioner
Concepcion Lorenzo, husband and wife, respectively, they acquired
a parcel of residential land;
4. That subject parcel of land is identical to Lot 18 of Echague Cadastre
210, covered by and embraced under ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 3980 of the Land Records of Isabela, in the name of Antonia
Pascua as her paraphernal property and being the mother of Pedro
Fontanilla;
5. That because of the death of Pedro Fontanilla the lot as
covered by the aforesaid title was settled and adjudicated
among the herein petitioners;
6. That the OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPY OF OCT NO. 3980 was
handed and delivered unto the spouses Pedro Fontanilla and
Concepcion Lorenzo which they have been keeping only to find
out thereafter that it was eaten by white ants (Anay);
7. That the original and office file copy of said OCT NO. 3980 kept and
to be on file in the Registry of Deeds of Isabela is not now
available, utmost same was included burned and lost beyond
recovery when the office was razed by fire sometime in 1976, a
certification to this effect as issued by the office is hereto marked as
ANNEX "D";
8. That for taxation purposes, the lot as covered by OCT NO. 3980,
still in the name of Antonia Pascua for Lot 18, Cad. 210, with an
assessed value of P16,920.00;
9. That no mortgagee's and/or lessee's co-owner's copy to the
subject OCT NO. 3980 was ever issued, and likewise no related
documents affecting the land covered thereby is presented and
pending for registration in favor of any person whomsoever, and
henceforth, it is free from lien and encumbrance;
xxx xxx xxx
11. That in support for the reconstitution of [OCT] No. 3980, the
following documents which may constitute as source or basis for the
purpose are herewith submitted:
(a) S[E]PIA PLAN with Blue Prints . . .;
(b) Certified technical description of Lot 18, Cad. 210 . . .;
(c) Certification by LRA as to the non-availability of a copy of DECREE
NO. 650254
(RTC & CA RULING)
 The trial court granted respondents' petition and directed the
Register of Deeds of Isabela to reconstitute OCT No. 3980 in the name
of Antonia Pascua on the basis of the deed of sale, the technical
description and the sketch plans, and to issue another owner's
duplicate copy of the said Torrens certificate of title.
 Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals
arguing that the trial court erred in granting respondents' petition for
reconstitution of Torrens title since they failed to present
substantial proof that the purported original certificate of title
was valid and existing at the time of its alleged loss or destruction,
and that they failed to present sufficient basis or source for
reconstitution. CA affirmed the trial court ruling.
(OSG CONTENTION)
 OSG argues that the alleged loss or destruction of the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No. 3980 has no evidentiary basis and that
there is no sufficient basis for the reconstitution of OCT No.
3980.
 OSG likewise maintains that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record.
 Lastly, OSG insists that, contrary to respondents' assertion, the
government of the Republic of the Philippines is not estopped by the
mistakes, negligence or omission of its agents.
(RESPONDENT ARGUMENTS)
 Respondents maintain that they have complied with Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 26 considering that there was no opposition from
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); that the OSG is guilty of
estoppel; that there was a valid basis for reconstitution of OCT No.
3980;
 that there was compliance with jurisdictional requirements; that both
the original file copy and the owner's copy of the subject OCT for
reconstitution were lost or destroyed beyond discovery; and that
questions of fact are not subject to review by this Court.
Issues:
 Whether or not the reconstitution of OCT No. 3980 was in
accordance with the pertinent law and jurisprudence on the
matter.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
Ruling:
 The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or
destroyed Torrens certificate of title is Republic Act No. 26.
Section 2 of said statute enumerates the following as valid sources
for judicial reconstitution of title (pls refer to the previous pages kay
luod na copy balik atong taas)
X X X (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court,
is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
 As borne out by the records of this case, respondents were unable to
present any of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e)
above. Thus, the only documentary evidence the respondents
were able to present as possible sources for the reconstitution
of OCT No. 3980 are those that they believed to fall under the class
of "any other document" described in paragraph (f).
DOCUMENTS REFERRED IN SEC. 2(F) MAY BE RESORTED ONLY IN
ABSENCE OF THE PRECEDING DOCUMENTS IN THE LIST AND WHEN
THERE IS IN EFFORT TO FIND THEM IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO BE
PRESENTED
 As correctly pointed out by petitioner, we had emphasized in
Republic v. Holazo that the term "any other document" in
paragraph (f) refers to reliable documents of the kind described
in the preceding enumerations and that the documents referred
to in Section 2 (f) may be resorted to only in the absence of the
preceding documents in the list.
 Therefore, the party praying for the reconstitution of a title
must show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such
documents and failed to find them before presentation of
"other documents" as evidence in substitution is allowed.
 (Republic v. Holazo) When Rep. Act No. 26, Section 2(f), or 3(f) for
that matter, speaks of "any other document," it must refer to similar
documents previously enumerated therein or documents ejusdem
generis as the documents earlier referred to. The documents alluded
to in Section 3(f) must be resorted to in the absence of those
preceding in order. If the petitioner for reconstitution fails to
show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such prior
documents (except with respect to the owner's duplicate copy
of the title which it claims had been, likewise, destroyed) and
failed to find them, the presentation of the succeeding
documents as substitutionary evidence is proscribed.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF WHAT MUST BE SHOWN BEFORE A
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE CAN BE MADE
 What should be shown are:
a. that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
b. that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and
proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title;
c. that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had
an interest therein;
d. that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed; and
e. that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same and those contained in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
 In the case at bar, the respondents were unable to discharge the
burden of proof prescribed by law and jurisprudence for the
reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title.
 First, respondents failed to prove that the owner's duplicate
copy of OCT No. 3980 was indeed eaten by termites while in the
custody of respondent Concepcion Lorenzo and her late husband
Pedro Fontanilla who, inexplicably, did not execute an affidavit of loss
as required by Section 109 17 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
 Second, The Certification 18 dated April 23, 2001 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela did not categorically state
that the original copy of OCT No. 3980, which respondents
alleged to be on file with said office, was among those
destroyed by the fire that gutted the premises of said office on
December 4, 1976. The document only stated that said office "could
not give any information/data involving the existence of
Original/Transfer Certificate of Title No. Lot No. 18, area 770 sq. m.,
located at Taggapan, Echague, Isabela."
 Third, a comparison between the aforementioned certification
and the technical description and sketch plan will reveal that
there was a discrepancy in the land area of the lot allegedly
covered by OCT No. 3980. What was reflected on the former was
a land area of 770 sq. m. while the latter two documents
pertained to a land area of 811 sq. m.
 Furthermore, respondents were not able to show adequate proof
that a Torrens certificate of title was issued covering the
subject parcel of land or that the same piece of land is what is
covered by the allegedly lost or destroyed OCT No. 3980.
 The Certification dated December 3, 2001 issued by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) which indicates that Decree No.
650254 issued on September 1, 1937 is not among the
salvaged decrees on file in the LRA and is presumed to have been
lost or destroyed as a consequence of World War II does not
support respondents' assertion that OCT No. 3980 did exist
prior to its loss or destruction because said document failed to
show a connection between Decree No. 650254 and OCT No. 3980.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that "the enumeration of the preferential documents to be
produced as provided under Section 2 of Republic Act 26 had been
substantially complied with" had no foundation based on the evidence
on record.
THE ABSENCE OF ANY DOCUMENT MENTIONING THE NUMBER OF
THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND DATE WHEN IT WAS ISSUED
DOES NOT WARRANT THE GRANTING OF THE PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION
 Likewise, the deed of sale purportedly between Antonia Pascua,
as seller, and Pedro Fontanilla, as buyer, which involves OCT
No. 3980 cannot be relied upon as basis for reconstitution of
Torrens certificate of title.
 An examination of the deed of sale would reveal that the number
of the OCT allegedly covering the subject parcel of land is
clearly indicated, however, the date when said OCT was issued
does not appear in the document.
 This circumstance is fatal to respondents' cause as we have
reiterated in Republic v. El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas that the
absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the
number of the certificate of title and the date when the
certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting
of a petition for reconstitution.
Estoppel in Action for Cancellation of Title
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes
or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is
also subject to exceptions, viz:
“Estoppel against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except in rare and unusual circumstances and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should
be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.”
Judicially reconstituted titles are superior to administratively
reconstituted titles.
Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and legal effect as the
originals thereof unless the reconstitution was made extra-judicially. In
contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in
rem, the administrative reconstitution is essentially ex-parte and without
notice. The reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same
indefeasible character of the original certificates of title. It is only fair and
reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against
the government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.
Barstowe Phils. Corp. vs. Republic
Facts: BASICALLY INVOLVES CONFLICTING TITLES OF LOTS.
FIRST TRANSACTION (SERVANDO TO BPC)
 BPC traces its titles to the subject lots back to Servando with TCTs
No. 200629 and 200630 over the subject lots. Servando executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject lots to his son Antonio.
 Despite his prior sale of the subject lots to Antonio, Servando,
transferred/conveyed the subject lots to BPC in exchange for
subscription of 51% of the capital stock of BPC.
 About a year after the death of Servando, Antonio executed another
Deed of Conveyance of the subject lots in favor of BPC in exchange
for subscription of 2,450 shares of its capital stock.
 Due to the fire that gutted the Office of the Quezon City
Register of Deeds, Antonio sought the administrative
reconstitution of the original copies and owner's duplicate copies of
TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. LRA issued TCTs No. RT-23687 and
RT-23688.
 Sometime later, TCTs No. RT-23687 and RT-23688 were cancelled
and in lieu thereof, TCTs No. 30829, 30830, 30831, and 30832 in the
name of BPC were issued. BPC then acquired from the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a permit to develop
the subject lots into a residential subdivision.
 Subsequently, BPC entered into Joint Venture Agreements with other
corporations for the development of the subject lots into a subdivision
called Parthenon Hills.
SECOND TRANSACTION (FPHC TO REPUBLIC)
 Meanwhile, according to the Republic, the subject lots were owned
by First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC) which sold the
subject lots to the Republic. TCT No. 275443 and 288417 was
issued in the name of the Republic.
 Because of the fire which razed the Quezon City Office of the
Register of Deeds and destroyed the original copies of TCTs No.
275443 and 288417, the Republic applied for administrative
reconstitution of the same with the LRA.
 It was then that the Republic came to know that another party had
applied for reconstitution of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 which also
covered the subject lots.
 This prompted the Republic to file a petition for cancellation of title
against Antonio, Servando, and BPC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-
11806.
(RTC & CA RULING)
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 Judgment declaring BPC and Republic as buyers in good faith
but upheld BPC’s rights over the Republic since it was registered
earlier. CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
Issue:
 Who between BPC and the Republic has a better title over the
subject lots?
Ruling:
 The Republic has the better right. BPC, the intervenors Abesamis,
Nicolas-Agbulos, spouses Santiago, and Servando’s heirs derived their
title to the subject lots from Servando’s TCTs No. 200629 and 200630.
 This Court then is compelled to look into the validity, authenticity, and
existence of these two TCTs. However, there is an absolute dearth
of information and proof as to how Servando acquired
ownership and came into possession of the subject lots.
 Relying on the findings of the LRA, it was established that TCTs
No. 200629 and 200630 were forged and spurious, their
reconstitution was also attended with grave irregularities. BPC
was unable to attack the authenticity and validity of the titles of the
Republic to the subject lots, and could only interpose the defense that
it was a buyer in good faith.
 It points out that it purchased the subject lots from Servando and
registered the same, way before the titles of Servando were
declared null by the RTC.
 Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by
Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner of
registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof
on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without
prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a
certificate of title.
 A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property
of another, without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
 It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be
the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value
intervenes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor without the
authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and registration will
not validate what otherwise is an invalid document.
 However, where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger and, while it
remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what
appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate.
 Now the question is whether BPC qualifies as an innocent purchaser
for value which acquired valid titles to the subject lots, despite the fact
that the titles of its predecessor-in-interest were found to be forged
and spurious. This Court finds in the negative.
BPC IS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH; ANYONE DEALING
WITH RECONSTITUTED/DUPLICATE COPIES ARE PUT ON
NOTICE OF SUCH FACT AND WARNED TO BE VIGILANT
 BPC cannot really claim that it was a purchaser in good faith
which relied upon the face of Servando’s titles. It should be
recalled that the Quezon City Register of Deeds caught fire on 11 June
1988. Presumably, the original copies of TCTs were burnt in the said
fire. Servando’s heirs sought the administrative reconstitution of the
TCTs.
 If BPC bought the subject lots after TCTs were destroyed when
the Quezon City Register of Deeds burned down, but before the
said certificates were reconstituted, then on the face of what
titles did BPC rely on before deciding to proceed with the
purchase of the subject lots?
 There was no showing that there were surviving owner’s
duplicate copies of TCTs. Without the original copies and owner’s
duplicate copies of TCTs, BPC had to rely on the reconstituted
certificates. Under section 7 of Republic Act No. 26, "Reconstituted
titles shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals
thereof" unless the reconstitution was made extrajudicially.
 In this case, TCTs were reconstituted administratively, hence,
extrajudicially. In contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost
certificate of title which is in rem, the administrative reconstitution is
essentially ex-parte and without notice.
 The reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same
indefeasible character of the original certificates of title for the
reason that the nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title of
registered land is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate
Transfer Certificate Of Title.
 Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation
of the registered owner that the original of the said TCT or the original
of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be
located or found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both,
therefore, are subsequent copies of the originals thereof.
 A cursory examination of these subsequent copies would show
that they are not the originals.
 Anyone dealing with such copies are put on notice of such fact and
thus warned to be extra-careful. The fact that the TCTs were
reconstituted should have alerted BPC and its officers to conduct an
inquiry or investigation as might be necessary to acquaint themselves
with the defects in the titles of Servando.
 This Court cannot declare BPC an innocent purchaser for value,
and it acquired no better titles to the subject lots than its
predecessors-in-interest, Servando and Antonio.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED UNLESS THERE IS AN
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE, WHICH BPC IS NOT
 At this point, it would seem that the Republic does hold better
titles to the subject lots. Nonetheless, another level of transactions
involving the subject lots was brought by intervenors to the attention
of this Court. The Republic is held to be barred by estoppel as to the
lots sold to the intervenors considering that the latter were innocent
purchaser for value from BPC.
 (Republic v. CA) The general rule is that the State cannot be put
in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz:
"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be
invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be
invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of
a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where
the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part
or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well
as against private individuals.
 Exception: innocent purchasers for value: “Significantly, the other
private respondents bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying
on the clean certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in
them either. It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable
principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an
injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.”
Republic v. CA and Santos
Facts:
 Private respondent St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. is the registered
owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision
plan (LRC) PSD-52368 and TCT No. 22660. Sometime in 1966,
private respondent subdivided the said lot under subdivision plan
(LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the Register ofDeeds of
Caloocan City cancelled TCT. No. 22660 and in lieu thereof issued
Certificates of Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068.
 The subdivision of Lot 865-B-1 was later found to have
expanded from its original area of 40,523 square meters to
42,044 square meters or an increase of 1,421 square meters. The
expansion in area was confirmed by the Land Registration
Commission.
 Thereafter, private respondent sold the subdivided lots to
different buyers including herein private respondents Sps. Catalino
Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos, Sps. Domingo Calaguian and
Felicidad de Jesus, Virginia Dela Fuente, and Lucy Madaya.
 On January 29, 1985, then, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
filed an action seeking the annulment of Transfer Certificates
of Title of herein private respondents on the ground that said
Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of a null and void
subdivision plan (LRC) PSD 55643 which expanded the original area
of TCT No. 22660 in the name of St. Jude's Enterprises Inc.
 Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Madaya were declared in default for
failure to file their respective answers within the reglementary
period.
 The Sps. Santos interposed claimed that they acquired the lots
in question in good faith from their former owner, defendant
St. Jude. and for value and that the titles issued to the said
defendants were rendered incontrovertible, conclusive and
indefeasible after one year from the date of the issuance of the titles
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
 On the other hand, St. Jude interposed claimed that the cause
of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that the
subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the
government is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision
plan; and the plaintiff's allegation that the area of the subdivision
increased by 1,421 square meters is without any basis in fact and in
law.
 (RTC & CA RULING) The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The trial court concluded that the government was already in estoppel
to question the approved subdivision plan because the said plan was
presumed to have been subjected to investigation, study and
verification by the LRC and there was no one to blame for the increase
in the area but the Republic of the Philippines, for having allowed and
approved the subdivision plan.
 The Solicitor General appealed the trial court's decision to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Issues:
 Whether or not the Republic is barred by estoppel;
 Whether the CA erred when it did not consider the Torrens
System merely as a means of registering title to land;
 Whether the CA erred when it failed to consider petitioner’s
complaint was filed before the lower court to preserve the
integrity of the Torrens system.
Ruling:
RTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER; ACTION FOR
SPECFIC PERFORMANCE IS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION
 YES. The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. However, like
all general rules, this is also subject to exception. Estoppels against
the public are little favored.
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 They should not be invoked except in a rare and unusual
circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would
operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and
should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of
justice clearly require it.
 Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals.
 In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance
of St. Jude's titles in 1996 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985),
petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in
the land area of St. Jude.
 Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is
tantamount to laches, which means "the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do what which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
 The Court notes private respondents' argument that, prior to
the subdivision, the surveyors erred in the original survey of
the whole tract of land covered by TCT No. 22660, so that less
than the actual land area was indicated on the title. Otherwise,
the adjoining owners would have complained upon the partition of the
land in accordance with the LRC-approved subdivision plan. As it is,
Florenci Quintos, the owner of the 9,146 square-meter Quintos Village
adjoining the northern potion of St. Jude's property (the portion
allegedly "expanded"), even attested on August 16, 1973 that "there
[was] no overlapping of boundaries as per my approved plan (LRC)
PSD 147766 dated September 8, 1971."
 None of the other neighboring owners ever complained against
St. Jude or the purchaser of its property. It is clear, therefore, that
there was no actual damage to third persons caused by the resurvey
and the subdivision.
BUYERS WERE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
 Significantly, the other private respondents — Spouses Santos,
Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya — bought such
"expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificates of St.
Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only
fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel
by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to the
innocent purchasers for value.
 Furthermore, it should be stressed that the total area of 40,623
square meters indicated on St. Jude's original title (TCT No.
22660) was not an exact area. Such figure was followed by the
phrase "more or less."
 This plainly means that the land area indicated was not precise.
The discrepancy in the figures could have been caused by the
inadvertence or the negligence of the surveyors. There is no proof,
though, that the land area indicated was intentionally and
fraudulently increased. The property originally registered was the
same property that was subdivided.
 It is well-settled that what defines a piece of titled property is
not the numerical data indicated as the area of the land, but
the boundaries or "metes and bounds" of the property
specified in its technical description as enclosing it and showing its
limits.
 Petitioner miserably failed to prove any fraud, either on the part
of St. Jude or on the part of land registration officials who had
approved the subdivision plan and issued the questioned TCTs.
 Other than its peremptory statement in the Complaint that the
"expansion" of the area was "motivated by bad faith with intent to
defraud, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of public
interest," petitioner did not allege specifically how fraud was
perpetrated to cause an increase in the actual land size
indicated. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the
allegation.
 That the land registration authorities supposedly erred or committed
an irregularity was merely a conclusion drawn from the "table survey"
showing that the aggregate area of the subdivision lots exceeded the
area indicated on the title of the property before its subdivision. Fraud
cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats
its own cause.
PURPOSE OF TORRENS SYSTEM IS TO QUIET TITLE; INTEGRITY
OF TORRENS SYSTEM CANNOT BE SULLIED BY INEPTITUDE OF
LAND REGISTRATION OFFICIALS
 We cannot, therefore, adhere to the petitioner's submission that, in
filing this suit, it seeks to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system.
To the contrary, it is rather evident from our foregoing
discussion that petitioner's action derogates the very integrity
of the system.
 Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of
an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name
appears thereon.
 True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to
lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.
Consequently, land erroneously included in a Torrens certificate of
title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such certificate.
 But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the
titleholder be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons.
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land to put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of
the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time
of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
 Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars
petitioner from questioning private respondents' titles to the
subdivision lots.
 Third, it was never proven that St. Jude was a party to the fraud
that led to the increase in the area of the property after its
subdivision.
 Finally, because petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any
error that might have been committed by its agents who had
surveyed the property, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions must be respected.
 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner
purportedly aims to protect by filing this case, shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.
Schedule of Fees, Special Fund
Section 111. Fees payable. Refer to the law
FORMS USED IN LAND REGISTRATION AND
CONVEYANCE
CHAPTER 12 (SECTION 112)
Section 112. Forms in conveyancing. The Commissioner of Land
Registration shall prepare convenient blank forms as may be necessary to
help facilitate the proceedings in land registration and shall take charge of
the printing of land title
forms. Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or
unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public
instruments shall be registerable: Provided, that, every such instrument
shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same in the
presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and
shall acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or
persons executing the same before a notary public or other public officer
authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the instrument so
acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each
page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each page of the copy to be
kept by the notary public, except the page where the signatures already
appear at the foot of the
instrument, shall be signed on the left margin thereof by the person or
persons executing the instrument and their witnesses, and all the ages
sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages
shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where the instrument
acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two
or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in
said acknowledgment.
DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LANDS
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered
lands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be
valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall
have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
a. The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary
Entry Book and a Registration Book. The Primary Entry Book shall
contain, among other particulars, the entry number, the names of the
parties, the nature of the document, the date, hour and minute it was
presented and received. The recording of the deed and other
instruments relating to unregistered lands shall be effected by any of
annotation on the space provided therefor in the Registration Book,
after the same shall have been entered in the Primary Entry Book.
b. If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law,
the Register of Deeds shall forthwith record the instrument in the
manner provided herein. In case the Register of Deeds refuses its
administration to record, said official shall advise the party in interest
in writing of the ground or grounds for his refusal, and the latter may
appeal the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration in
accordance with the provisions of Section 117 of this Decree. It shall
be understood that any recording made under this section shall be
without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
c. After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall
endorse among other things, upon the original of the recorded
instruments, the file number and the date as well as the hour and
minute when the document was received for recording as shown in
the Primary Entry Book, returning to the registrant or person in
interest the duplicate of the instrument, with appropriate annotation,
certifying that he has recorded the instrument after reserving one
copy thereof to be furnished the provincial or city assessor as required
by existing law.
d. Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim
and other instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with
respect to unregistered lands, if made in the form sufficient in law,
shall likewise be admissible to record under this section.
e. For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this
section, he shall collect the same amount of fees prescribed for similar
 Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
services for the registration of deeds or instruments concerning
registered lands.
REGISTRATION OF INSTRUMENTS DEALING WITH UNREGISTERED
LAND
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 113 until the land shall have
been brought under the operation of the Torrens system
RECORDING OF MINISTERIAL OFFICERS
• Opening paragraph in substance declares that no instrument or deed
affecting rights to real property not registered under the Torrens system
shall be valid except as between the persons thereto, until such instrument
or deed shall have been registered in the manner prescribed therein
• This provision cannot be interpreted to include conveyances made by
ministerial officers, such as sheriff’s deeds
• It contemplates only instruments as may be created through agreement
between parties
RECORDING SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO A THIRD PERSON
WITH BETTER RIGHT RECORDING OF RD MINISTERIAL
• RD doesn’t exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial power in the registration
of sheriff’s deeds or certificates of sale
• If the RD refuses to register the instrument, he shall advise the party in
interest in writing of the grounds for his refusal, and the latter may elevate
the matter to the Administrator en consulta
HOW RECORDING IS EFFECTED
• The RD shall keep a primary entry book and a registration book  Tirol and Ngo purchased a 2,000 sq. m. parcel of land from Jenkins,
• The primary entry book shall contain an entry number, names of parties,
nature of the document, and the date, hour and minute it was presented
• The recording shall be effected by annotating on the registration book
after the same shall have been entered in the primary entry book
• After recording, the RD shall endorse on the original of the instrument
the file number and the date as well as the hour and minute when the 
instrument is received, returning to the registrant the duplicate of the
instrument with a certification that he has recorded the same.
Radiowealth v. Palileo
Facts:
 Defendant spouses Castro sold to private respondent Palileo, a
parcel of unregistered coconut land. The sale is evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The deed was not registered in
the Registry of Property for unregistered lands.
 Sometime later, a judgment was rendered against Castro to pay
petitioner Radiowealth. For failure to pay, a writ of execution was
issued. Defendant Sheriff Eviota levied upon and finally sold at public
auction the subject land (that defendant Enrique Castro had sold to
appellee Palileo) to Radiowealth, being the only bidder. After the 
period of redemption had expired, a deed of final sale was also
executed by the same Provincial Sheriff. Both the certificate of
sale and the deed of final sale were registered with the Registry
of Deeds.
 Learning of what happened to the land, Palileo filed an action for
quieting of title.
 (TRIAL COURT & CA RULING) In favor of Palileo. CA affirmed
trial court decision.
Issues: Who, as between two buyers of unregistered land, is the
rightful owner — the first buyer (Palileo) in a prior sale that was
unrecorded, or the second buyer (Radiowealth) who purchased the
land in an execution sale whose transfer was registered in the 
Register of Deeds.
Ruling:
RULES ON DOUBLE SALES OF IMMOVABLES DOES NOT APPLY TO
UNREGISTERED LANDS
 The rule on double sales of immovables does not apply to
unregistered lands.
 There is no doubt that had the property in question been a registered land, 
this case would have been decided in favor of petitioner since it was
petitioner that had its claim first recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
 For, as already mentioned earlier, it is the act of registration that
operates to convey and affect registered land. Therefore, a bona fide
purchaser of a registered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as
against a prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded. However, it
must be stressed that this case deals with a parcel of unregistered land
and a different set of rules applies. We affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF INTEREST IF THE VENDOR IS NO
LONGER THE OWNER OF THE LAND WHEN HE HAS SOLD IT
PREVIOUSLY, EVEN IF THE PREVIOUS SALE WAS NOT RECORDED
 Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered 
lands is "without prejudice to a third party with a better right". The
aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in one's favor does not give him any right over the
land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. 
 Basically, mere registration of Radiowealth of the sale in his favor
does not give him any right over the land because the vendor
(Castro) was not the owner of the land anymore, having previously
sold the same to Palileo, even if the earlier sale was unrecorded).
RULES ON DOUBLE SALES DO NOT APPLY TO LAND THAT IS NOT
REGISTERED UNDER ACT NO. 496
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
 (Carumba v. CA) It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like
in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same
unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and
was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted
from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original
owners.
 Applying Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 this
Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked
to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter
was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered.
 It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered
land at a sheriff's execution sale only steps into the shoes of the
judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
 Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of
petitioner (Radiowealth) is of no effect because the land no
longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said
execution sale.
MCIAA v. Tirol
Facts:
 The case started with a complaint for quieting of title filed on August
8, 1996 by respondents Edito, Tirol, and Spouses Ngo against MCIAA.
a Filipino citizen married to Mr. Jenkins, an American citizen, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale in Sept. 15, 1993. It was bought on the
strength of a clean title by vendor Jenkins shown by a Tax Declaration and
a TCT under Elma Jenkins’ name which had no annotation of adverse
claims.
They succeeded in titling the said lot under their names and
proceeded to pay realty taxes. Only on January 1996 did they discover
a cloud on their title when their request for a Height Clearance with
the DOTC was referred to MCIAA, based on their ownership of the land
through purchase in 1958.
 The ownership of the lot started with Spouses Cuison and Cosef
(similar background story for both ends here). According to Tirol, it was
under Spouses Cuison and Cosef who sold to to Spouses Cuizon and
Patalinghug. They succeeded in securing a reconstitution of the OCT
as shown by a Court Order which became final and executory – issued
in the name of Cuison and Cosef. A Deed of Absolute Sale between Spouses
Cosef/Cuison and Spouses Cuizon/Patalinghug was registered and
annotated. The latter spouses sold a portion to Mrs. Jenkins in 1987
who sold the same to the plaintiffs. Appellees would be in constructive,
uninterrupted, and peaceful possession for 62 years as of the date of their
filing of a Complaint for quieting of title.
On the other hand, MCIAA claims that the Spouses Cuison and Cosef
sold the lot to Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). In a Certificate
in 1959, Cuison confirmed he was the possessor and actual owner of the
lot located in the Mactan Alternate International Airport, and that the
duplicate copy of the CT was lost or destroyed without him or anyone else
receiving a copy. Since then, the government through MCIAA, has been in
OCEA (adverse) possession of the property in the concept of an owner. It
became part of Clear Zone of Runway 22 for clearance for take-off and
landing. MCIAA asserts that Tirol is no more than a trustee who was
merely a successor-in-interest of Spouses Cosef/Cuison. In bad faith, the
spouses sold it to Spouses Cuizon/Patalinghug to Mrs. Jenkins. They
further impute bad faith on the basis that their title came from a
reconstituted one.
(TRIAL COURT RULING) In favor of MCIAA. It held that there was a
valid transfer of title from Cuison/Cosef to CAA, and the respondents
did not buy the lot from a person who could validly dispose of it. It further
ruled that the government has been in possession of the land it bought
since 1958 where a public Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in its favor.
Respondents were in bad faith since they ignored peculiar
circumstances that should have arouse their suspicion, i.e. the fact that
the lot is only 320 meters away from the center of the runway and has
been vacant for several decades (should have made them think that the
lot could be part of the airport).
(MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CA RULING) A motion for
reconsideration was filed, and petitioner filed its Opposition to the motions.
The trial court reversed its decision, holding that Art. 1544 (double
sales) finds application to the case. The Court is not convinced that
the buyers were in bad faith. The registration of the defendant in 1959 is
not the one contemplated under the law. Registration under Act. No. 3344
differs materially from registration under Spanish Mortgage Law and under
the Land Registration Act. According to the Spanish Mortgage Law, there
is an express provision that provides that titles recorded
thereunder cannot be annulled or invalidated by prior unrecorded
rights. The LRA states that only transactions noted in the CT and
entered in registry books can bind the land. Transactions under Act
No. 3344 cannot defeat a third person with a better right. Recordings under
this act are not preceded by any investigation as to the validity or efficacy
of the title sought to be recorded.
The lot was a registered land where at the time of registration of
defendant’s document of sale, there was no CT because of the war. At
the time the TCT was issued to plaintiffs and the predecessors-in-interests,
there were no annotations of the alleged claim of the defendant, so they
had good reasons to rely on validity of the title.
The peculiar circumstances stated earlier were not enough to warn
third persons. Such fact was merely for purpose of construction of
buildings, not for realty ownership. CA affirmed the trial court ruling.
TIMELINE: Quieting of title over land -> MCIAA wins -> Motion for
Reconsideration -> Tirol wins -> CA affirms -> SC affirms on
different grounds.
 Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
PURCHASE HISTORY ACCDNG. TO TIROL: Spouses Cosef/Cuison -
> Spouses Cuizon/Patalinghug -> Mrs. Jenkins -> Tirol and co.
PURCHASE HISTORY ACCDNG. TO MCIAA: Spouses Cosef/Cuison -
> Civil Aeronautics Administration -> MCIAA (still CAA)
Issues: Between Tirol and MCIAA, who has the superior right to
the subject property?
Ruling:
ART. 1544 ON DOUBLE SALES DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE BOTH
DO NOT HAVE THE SAME SELLER - A REQUISITE
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents on different grounds.
 (Cheng v. Genato) For Art. 1544 to apply, the two sales transactions
must be valid sales, must pertain to exact same subject matter, different
owners have conflicting interests, and they must have bought from the
very same seller. The provision has no application in cases where the
sale is initiated not by just one vendor but several successive vendors.
MCIAA got the lot from Cuison/Cosef but Tirol got it from Jenkins,
another transferee. Both of them do not have the same seller.
IMPROPER REGISTRATION DOES NOT BIND THIRD PARTIES;
MCIAA REGISTERED THE SALE UNDER ART. 3344 WHEN THE LAND
WAS REGISTERED UNDER A TORRENS TITLE; LOSS OF A
CERTIFICATE DOES NOT CONVERT THE LAND’S REGISTRATION
 MCIAA does not contest the fact that the lot was registered under Act No.
496 before the World War II. Cuison stated in his certification that the
duplicate copy of the CT was lost or destroyed during the last war
without him receiving it.
 Well-settled is the rule that the registration of instruments must be
done in the proper registry to effect and bind the land. Act No. 496
governed the recording of transactions involving REGISTERED
LAND. Act No. 3344 provided for the system of recording of
unregistered lands without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. If a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold but the sale is
registered under Act No. 3344, the sale is not considered registered and
the registration of the deed does not operate as a constructive notice to
the whole world.
 MCIAA registered its Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344 but the
subject was a registered land. It is the act of registration that binds the
land, and absent such, the instrument executed by the parties remains
only as a contract between them.
 Respondents are not buyers in bad faith because an improper registration
is no registration at all. Incorrect registrations do not affect third persons
at all.
 MCIAA contends that registration under Act No. 3344 is permissible since
the duplicate copy of the CT was lost or destroyed.
 (Melencion v. CA – note, old case sa ato LTD) Aznar argued the same
point. However, the fact that the CT over registered land is lost does not
convert it into unregistered land. A CT is merely evidence of ownership
over the property described. They should have reconstituted the
lost CT instead of registration under Act No. 3344.
 MCIAA did not bother to have the lost title reconstituted, even when the
sale was executed in 1958. The controversy could have been avoided had
it not been for MCIAA’s negligence.
 Furthermore, a person dealing with registered land may rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title and the law will in no way
oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of property
except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonable cautious man to make such inquiry. SC then
copy-pasted the ruling the trial court in its reconsideration of the case.
Tirol never thought the proximity was strange because there were
private houses beside the vacant lot, suggesting that the property
must be of private ownership and not that of the airport. He took great
care in verifying the clean title by deputizing an employee to do research.
ATO aviation rules merely proscribe the installation of buildings and other
physical structures except landing facilities. It does not prohibit realty
ownership.
Sabitsana Vs. Muertegui
Facts: Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent
Juanito over a a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration
issued in Garcia’s name. Juanito’s father Domingo and brother took actual
possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They
also paid the real property taxes on the lot. Garcia sold the same lot to the
Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana through a notarized
deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds.
A new one, TD No. 5327 was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. He also
paid real property taxes. He introduced concrete improvements on the
property, which shortly thereafter were destroyed by a typhoon. When
Juanito’s father passed away, his heirs applied for registration and
coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No.
141. Atty. Sabitsana addressed to the DENR’ CENRO/PENRO office his
letter opposing the application, claiming that he was the true owner of the
lot. Juanito filed an action for quieting of title and preliminary injunction
against Petitioners claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are
exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same, which acts
thus constitute a cloud over his title.
Issue: Who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the
disputed lot?
Ruling: Respondent has a better right to the lot. What applies in this case
is Act No. 3344 which provides for the system of recording of transactions
over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any
registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. The sale to respondent Juanito was executed in 1981 via an
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a
notarized document only in 1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito
who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent
sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller
Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. The fact that the sale to Juanito
was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and
Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a
public document under the Civil Code is only for convenience, and not for
validity or enforceability. And because it remained valid as between Juanito
and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners,
for his ownership thereof had ceased. Nor can petitioners’ registration of
their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere registration
of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the
same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Neither could it
validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title.
Moreover, Petitioners’ actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito
makes them purchasers in bad faith.
THE CONDOMINIUM ACT (RA 4726)
PD 957 – the National housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the real estate trade and business xxx.
JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD (SEC. 1, P.D. NO. 1344)
1. Unsound real estate practices
2. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by a subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker, or salesman
3. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner.
SUMMARY OF CASES OR ACTIONS OVER WHICH THE HLURB HAS
JURISDICTION
a. For a determination of the rights of parties under a contract to sell
a subdivision lot
b. For the delivery of title against the subdivision owner
c. For the refund of reservation fees for the purchase of a subdivision
lot
d. For specific performance filed by a lot buyer against the seller of a
subdivision lot
e. For the annulment of the mortgage constituted by the project owner
without the buyer’s consent, the mortgage foreclosure sale and the
condominium certificate of title issued to the highest bidder at the
said foreclosure sale
f. For the collection of the balance of the unpaid purchase price of a
subdivision lot filed by the developer of a subdivision against the lot
buyer; and
g. For incidental claims for damages. (Fajardo vs. Bautista, May 10,
1994)
h. Between homeowner’s association and their members (R.A. 8763)
Discussion: It is an indispensable requirement that all incorporators of a
condominium corporation must be shareholders thereof. To be a
shareholder, one must necessarily be an owner of a condominium unit. (p.
834, Agcaoili)
Atty G: An owner or developer may convert a property into a condominium
project by executing a legal document called Master Deed. The Master
Deed is the act that creates the condominium. It is submitted in the Office
of the Register of Deeds and it is annotated prior to the issuance of the
corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title.
They will have to secure a clearance from the HLURB and they have to
submit a plan including the brochures regarding warranties prior to the
HLURB granting them a license to sell.
Same with subdivisions: In subd, the lot that is considered to be a subd
project under P.D. 957, there must also be a deed that will be submitted
to the RD. They will also submit a license to sell coming from HLURB.
Sec. 2 (RA 4726) — A condominium is an interest in real property
consisting of separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or
commercial building and an undivided interest in common, directly or
indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of
the building. A condominium may include, in addition, a separate interest
in other portions of such real property. Title to the common areas,
including the land, or the appurtenant interests in such areas, may be held
by a corporation specially formed for the purpose (hereinafter known as
the "condominium corporation") in which the holders of separate interest
shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others,
in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units in the
common areas. The real right in condominium may be ownership or any
other interest in real property recognized by law, on property in the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws.
Warranties and Representations
Sec 19 (PD 957) Advertisements. — Advertisements that may be made
by the owner or developer through newspaper, radio, television, leaflets,
circulars or any other form about the subdivision or the condominium or
its operations or activities must reflect the real facts and must be
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
presented in such manner that will not tend to mislead or deceive the
public.
BPI vs ALS Management Corp.
Principle:
1. HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction on cases enumerated in sec 1
PD 1344
Facts:
1. "On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a
complaint for a Sum of Money against ALS Management and
Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that on July 22,
1983,[petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro Manila
a Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin
Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner Apartment
Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit E-4A
comprising of 271 squares [sic] meters more or less, together with
parking stalls identified as G022 and G-63.
2. T he Co n do mi ni um Ce r ti fi cate o f T i tl e N o . 48 0 0 o f t he
Regi st ry o f Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was issued after the
execution of the said Deed of Sale.
3. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in
causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate
of Title.
4. Und er t he De ed o f S al e, i t i s sti pu l a te d that the VENDEE
[respondent] shall pay all the expenses for the preparation
and registration of this Deed of Sale and such other documents as
may be necessary for the issuance of the corresponding
Condominium Certificate of Title.
5. A ft er th e [p eti ti o ner ] co m pl i ed w i th i t s o bl i gati o ns u nd er
th e sai d De ed of Sale, [respondent], notwithstanding demands
made by [petitioner],failed and refused to pay [petitioner]
its legitimate advances for the expenses mentioned above.
6. In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, [Respondent]
averred among others that it has just and valid reasons for refusing
to pay [petitioner’s] legal claims.
a. I n cl ear a nd di re ct co n tr av e nti o n o f S ec ti o n 25 o f
Pr esi de nti al Decree No. 957 which provides that ‘No fee except
those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the
Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such
title’, the[petitioner] has jacked-up or increased the amount of its
alleged advances for the issuance and registration of the
Condominium Certificate of Title in the name of the[respondent],
by including therein charges which should not be collected from
buyers of condominium units.
b. "[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented to the
[respondent] that the condominium unit will be delivered
completed and ready for occupancy not later than December31,
1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the descriptions and
warranties contained in the aforementioned brochures which has
a general disclaimer of “ … Destined to reflect condominium
living at its very best and it’s design … will make the project
the only one of its kind in the Philippines.” and other sales
propaganda materials when [respondent ]agreed to buy Unit E-4A
of the Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00
considering that the Twin Towers was then yet to be built. In
contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and of good engineering
practices, the condominium unit purchased by [respondent]
suffered from defects and/or deficiencies. Respondent
7. Trial court ruled:
a. Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the
sum of P26,300.45, with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint up to full payment thereof, representing the amount
spent for the registration of the title to the condominium unit
in [respondent’s]name;
b. Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at
[petitioner’s]exclusive expense/cost or appoint a licensed
qualified contractor to do the same on its behalf, the following
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the
[respondent.
c. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following:
i. The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for
expenses incurred for the materials/labor in installing
walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms and bar counter cabinet.
ii. The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned income
iii. The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-
one (21) months (from May 1985 to January
1987),representing unearned income
8. Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that
"while[petitioner] succeeded in proving its claim against the
[respondent]for expenses incurred in the registration of [the latter’s]
title to the condominium unit purchased, x x x for its part
[respondent] in turn succeeded in establishing an even bigger claim
under its counterclaim."
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the
respondent’s counterclaims
2. Whether or not the decision of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts warranting a review of the factual
findings.
3. Whether or not the award of damages is conjectural warranting
a review of the factual findings.
Ruling:
First Issue: JURISDICTION
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Trial court has no jurisdiction on cases involving specific
performance and damages as provided by Sec. 1 of PD 1344, it fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of HLURB.
Sec. 1 of PD 1344 expanded the jurisdiction the jurisdiction of NHA and it
granted exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
performance and damages, in this case the correction of defects and
deficiencies in the condo unit. The regulatory function of NHA were
transferred to the HSRC pursuant to EO 648 and the functions of HSRC
were transferred to the HLURB pursuant to EO 90. Therefore HLURB has
sole jurisdiction on the respondent’s counterclaim.
However, the petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches and is barred from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court because BPI only raised the
question only after an adverse decision had been rendered. BPI is
considered to have voluntarily submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
The doctrine of laches is based on equity and fairness, if the petitioner’s
prayer is granted then it would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case and compel the judgment creditors to
go up their Cavalry once more.
Second and Third Issues: APPRECIATION OF FACTS
Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great respect, but may
be reviewed if they do not conform to law and to the evidence on record.
In this case the court modify the award granted by the CA.
Warranties and Representations in the Brochure
The brochure that was disseminated indicated features that would
provide each condo unit and therefore would form part of the sales
warranties of BPI. ALS management relied on the brochure in its decision
to purchase a unit.
However, general disclaimer which are intended to give a general
idea of the project to be undertaken are not to be relied as
statements or representation of facts.
“ … Destined to reflect condominium living at its very
best and it’s design … will make the project the only
one of its kind in the Philippines.”
This disclaimer should not apply to the feature and amenities that the
brochure promised to provide each condo unit.
Storage Facilities – cancelled by the court bec. It was not alleged.
The non-delivery had not been alleged in respondent’s Answer with
Counterclaim. As a general rule issues in each cases are limited to those
presented in the pleadings. The exception to the rule which is that
evidence has been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part
of the opposing parties to support their respective contention and to
refute each other’s evidence is not present in the case at bar.
Damages for Delay in Delivery – cancelled by the court bec. of
insufficiency of evidence
The only evidence the respondent have is the testimony of its witness
that a lease contract had indeed been intended to commence in January
1982, instead of the actual implementation on June 18, 1982.
Condominium Defects (balcony passageway) – cancelled by the court
bec. it was not intended to be a walkway
Respondent was able to establish through its witness testimony
confirmed by an inspection report that the condominium unit suffered
from defects. BPI’s contention that the claim has already prescribed must
fail for being raised for the first time on appeal.
However, BPI are not required to correct the balcony bec. The portion in
controversy was not intended to be a walkway as testified by the
architect. The building plain had not specified the with. It was not shown
that the balcony was insufficient to serve its purpose for which it was
intended.
Reimbursement for Completion of Work – cancelled by the court bec. ALS
failed to proved the actual amount spent.
Respondent failed to establish with reasonable certainty the actual
amount spent. ALS failed to present document such as receipt to support
the expenses. In determining actual damages it must depend on
competent proof not on mere assertion or guesswork.
Unearned Lease Income – cancelled by the court bec. ALS failed to
proved gihapon
ALS failed to adduce evidence that unit had been offered for lease to
others, but that there were no takers because of the defects. However,
ALS is entitled to temperate damage because it suffered damages when
its lessee vacated the condominium.
San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs BF Homes, Inc.
Principle:
1. HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction on cases enumerated in
sec 1 PD 1344, it does not have to rely on the findings of
others to discharge its adjudicatory functions.
2. Condominium Act is under the exception of doctrine of
primary jurisdiction because it involves public interest.
3. Upon full payment the owner or developer is mandated by
law to deliver the title to the buyer.
FACTS:
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
 BF Homes is the owner of several parcels of land, particularly
identified as Italia II lots. BF Homes represented by Orendain as
rehabilitation receiver appointed by the SEC entered into three
successive Deed of Absolute Sale with SMPI.
 SMPI completed the payments for the 130 Italia II lots. BF
Homes delivered the TCTs to SMPI but only for 110 of the 130
Italia II lots purchased by SMPI. SMPI filed a Complaint for
specific performance with damages before the HLURB to compel
BF Homes to deliver the remaining 20 TCTs to SMPI.
 In its Answer (with Counterclaim), BF Homes alleged that the
Deed of Absolute Sale were entered by Orendain without
authority, as his appointment as receiver was revoked by the
SEC. BF Homes also averred that the consideration paid by SMPI
was inadequate and the Deed of Absolute Sale were undated
and not notarized.
 SMPI in its Reply (Answer with Counterclaim) countered that the
validity of the 3 Deed of Absolute Sale was already upheld by
SEC and were deemed final, executory, and unappealable. As a
result the sale were binding on BF Homes. SMPI further
maintained that Orendain was authorized bec. He was acting in
behalf of FBO Networks(the receiver who replaced Orendain)
being the Chairman of FBO Networks. SMPI additionally asserted
that absent substantiation, the allegation of BF Homes of
inadequate consideration was self-serving; and that despite
being undated and not notarized, the Deed of Absolute Sale were
valid since they contained the essential elements of a contract.
 HLURB ruled that the issue on whether or not Mr. Orendain has
no authority must first be resolved by the SEC and suspended
the proceeding of the instant complaint until final resolution
pending before the SEC.
 SMPI filed a Petition for Review with the HLURB Board of
Commissioner contending that the principle of suspending a case
due to a prejudicial question only applies to criminal cases and
that BF homes was mandated by law under PD957 to deliver the
TCTs of the remaining 20 Italia II lots, which had already been
paid in full.
 The HLURB Board of Commissioners denied that petition for
review applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
 SMPI appealed the decision before the Office of the President
which ruled that HLURB does not have to rely on the
findings of others to discharge its adjudicatory functions.
The OP then proceeded to resolve the case and reversed and set
aside the decision of HLURB ordering BF to deliver to SMPI the
titles to the lots subject of the instant case.
 BF Homes filed a Petition for Review with the CA which affirmed
that the proceedings before the HLURB should not be
suspended, however, CA ordered the remand of the case to
HLURB in recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the HLURB did not have to suspend the
proceedings? Yes
2. Whether or not there is a need to remand the case to
HLURB? No
3. Whether or not SMPI is entitled to the delivery of the
remaining 20 TCTs for the lots it purchased? Yes
RULING:
First Issue: Suspension of proceedings by the HLURB
HULRB has exclusive jurisdiction in a complaint for specific
performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a
subdivision lot [BPI vs ALS]. In the exercise of its exclusive
jurisdiction, HULRB did not have to suspend the proceedings and should
have went ahead to resolve the complaint for specific performance filed by
SMPI given its statutory mandate under Sec.1 of PD 1344. A ruling by the
SEC that Orendain did not have authority as a receiver is not absolutely
determinative of the fate of the complaint for specific performance of SMPI
before the HLURB. The HLURB could already make a preliminary finding on
the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Orendain for the
purpose of ascertaining the right of SMPI to the delivery of the 20 TCTs.
Under PD 957 HULRB is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and
determine the rights of private parties under these contracts. This ancillary
power, generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the
extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.
Second Issue: Remanding of the case to HLURB
Returning the instant case to the HLURB for further proceedings
will simply be circuitous and inconsistent with the summary nature of
HLURB proceedings. The objective of the Revised Rules of Court is to
promote a just, speed, and inexpensive disposition/determination of every
action.
Pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, generally “
the courts cannot determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where it requires
special knowledge to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and
a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered”. However, there is an exception where
judicial intervention is urgent and when strong public interest is
involved, which are present in this case. Under PD 957 subdivision and
condominium development involves public interest and welfare because
shelter is a basic human need whose fulfillment cannot afford any kind of
delay.
If the case is no longer remanded, BF Homes cannot claim
denial of due process because in the instant case SMPI and BF Homes
were afforded the opportunity to present and address each other’s
arguments through exchange of pleadings, as well as to submit their
respective evidence before the HLURB Arbiter. To remand the case and
repeat the entire process once again before the HLURB Arbiter is
impractical, unreasonable and oppressive for SMPI.
Third Issue: Delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
Sec. 25 of PD 957 explicitly mandate that the owner or developer
shall deliver the title to the buyer upon full payment. SMPI submitted
adequate proof showing full payment to and receipt by BF Homes of the
purchase price for the 130 Italia II lots as fixed in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Upon full payment by SMPI, it became mandatory upon BF Homes to
deliver the TCTs, the seller loses all its rights and interest to the unit in
favor of the buyer. [G.O.A.L. vs CA].
The following are the grounds of BF Homes of its refusal to deliver the
remaining 20 TCTs:
(1) The Deeds of Absolute Sale were not notarized
The requirement of a public document in Art 1358 is not for
validity of the instrument but for its efficacy. Although a conveyance of
land is not made in a public document, it does not affect the validity of
such conveyance. The effect of non-compliance with the requirements of
Statutes of Fraud is simply that no action can be enforced, the form is
required for evidentiary purposes only. As private documents, the Deeds
are still binding and valid. SMPI could compel BF Homes to comply with
the formality requirement under Art. 1358.
Statute of Frauds is only applicable to executory contracts and
not those which has been fully paid like in this case. Under Art 1405
acceptance of benefits ratifies unenforceable contracts. The Deeds were
already ratified as BF homes had accepted the benefits from said contracts
when it received full payment from SMPI the purchase price of 130 Italia
II lots. The Deeds were also substantially performed considering that BF
Homes had previously delivered 110 out of 130 TCTs.
(2) Orendain did not have authority entering into the contracts
of sale with SMPI
When Orendain signed the Deeds of Absolute Sale, he did so as
a Chairman of FBO Networks Management Inc., the appointed receiver of
BF Homes. Under SEC Reorganization Act, the receiver is empowered to
take custody and control of all existing assets and properties of such
corporations under its management. The acts of the receiver, being
appointed officer of the SEC, enjoy the presumption of regularity. While
BF Homes questioned the acts of Orendain/FBO as receiver before the SEC,
the SEC terminated the rehabilitation proceedings without definitely ruling
on the same and recognized the transfer of jurisdiction over such subject
matter to RTC with the passage of RA 8799. There is no showing whether
BF Homes pursued before the RTC any case to nullify or invalidate the
alleged unauthorized or irregular acts of Orendain/FBO as receiver.
Moreover, even assuming Orendain is without authority the said
contracts were merely unenforceable and could be ratified. BF Homes
ratified the Deeds with SMPI by accepting full payment from SMPI of
the purchase price for the 130 Italia II lots, and fully implementing the
transaction covered by the 2 Deeds and partially implementing the 3 rd by
delivering the TCTs for 110 out of 130 lots. Also BF Homes is estopped
from denying the authority of Orendain after accepted the benefits.
(3) the consideration for the said Italia II lots were grossly
inadequate and disadvantageous for BF Homes
The Revised Rules of Court presumes private transactions have
been fair and regular. The only evidence submitted by BF Homes is the
appraisal report which valued at P3,500 and P3,000 per sqm. The appraisal
report, does not necessarily prove that the purchase price averaged at
P2,500 as grossly inadequate. SMPI explained that it was granted a lower
price because it bought the Italia II lots in volume, and BF Homes was
unable to repudiate said explanation.
SEC vs HLURB Jurisdiction
In the ARRANZA case, the Supreme Court said that:
For the SEC to acquire jurisdiction over any controversy
under these provisions, two elements must be considered: (1) the
status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must
arise "out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and
among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and the
State in so far as it concerns their individual franchises. DHITCc
In the instant case, [SMPI] is not a stockholder, member or
associate of [BF Homes]. It is a lot buyer in the subdivision developed by
[BF Homes.]
The second element requires that the dispute among the
parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation or the internal
affairs of the corporation, partnership or association.
the Supreme Court also said:
P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the SEC;
while P.D. No. 957, as amended, delineates that of the HLURB. These two
quasi-judicial agencies exercise functions that are distinct from
each other. The SEC has authority over the operation of all kinds of
corporations, partnerships or associations with the end in view of
protecting the interests of the investing public and creditors. On the other
hand, the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating to observance of
laws governing corporations engaged in the specific business of
development of subdivisions and condominiums. The HLURB and the SEC
being bestowed with distinct powers and functions, the exercise of those
functions by one shall not abate the performance by the other of its own
functions. As respondent puts it, "there is no contradiction
between P.D. No. 902-A and P.D. No. 957.
Redemption of Mortgaged Amortization
SEC 25. (PD 957) Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall
deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot
or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of
sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such
title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time
of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall
redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six
months from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or
unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
De Vera vs CA
FACTS: Q. P. San Diego Construction, Inc. (QPSDCI), owned a parcel of
land located at 101 Panay Avenue, Quezon City, on which it built Lourdes
I Condominium. On 10 June 1983, to finance its construction and
development, Q.P San Diego Construction Inc., (QPSDCI), entered into a
Syndicate Loan Agreement with respondent banks (here collectively known
as Funders) to finance the construction and development of Lourdes
Condominium I. QPSDCI mortgaged to the creditor banks as security its
Panay Avenue Property and the condominium constructed thereon. De
Vera and QPSDCI entered into a Condominium Reservation Agreement
where petitioner undertook to buy Unit 211-2C of the condominium.
Petitioner's remaining balance of the purchase price was to be secured
through his housing loan, P160,00.00. The loan approved was only
P139,00.00 and not 160,000.00, De Vera negotiated the deficiency to
which QPSDCI agreed.
The condominium project was substantially completed in June
1984 and the unit was turned over to De Vera Jr. the following month.
Accordingly, petitioners paid QPSDCI P23,916.67 shortfall between the
balance and the granted loan. Meanwhile, QPSDCI failed to pay its
obligations to the Funders. Asiatrust extra-judicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the condominium units, including that of petitioner.
ASIATRUST through its V-Presidebt Oerdi V. Lucero wrote asking the unit
buyers to pay in advance the cost of the transfer of titles and registration
of their PAG-IBIG loan mortgages. ASIATRUST also wrote a letter to
petitioner informing him that his housing loan would only be implemented
upon the following conditions: (a) Payment of the remaining equity directly
to ASIATRUST Development Bank; and (b) Signing of all Pag-IBIG
documents not later than 20 October 1984. IN SHORT WALA NA GRANT
ANG IYAHANG LOAN.
ASIATRUST informed QPSDCI that it could no longer extend the
bridge financing loan to some of the buyers, including petitioner, for
various reasons,10 among which was that petitioner had already exceeded
the age limit, hence, he was disqualified
As petitioner failed to get the loan, he failed to pay the purchase
price. QPSDCI sent him a letter13 dated 6 August 1987 presenting him
with two options: (a) to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price,
with interest, which had already ballooned to P263,751.63, on or before
15 August 1987; or, (b) to pay rent for the use of the unit from 28 July
1984 to June 1987.
Since petitioner had already invested a substantial amount in
remodeling and improving his unit, rescinding the sale was no longer a
viable option. QPSDCI suggested that De Vera be
QPSDCI failed to pay its obligation to the FUNDERS, ASIATRUST
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on 27 condominium units,
including that of De Vera. The units were sold at a public auction with the
FUNDERS as the highest bidder, such was annotated on the CCT’s.
De Vera filed a complaint against the respondents which was raffled and
to Branch 107 of the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case x
(2) Who has a better right over the condominium unit in question?
RULING:
1. No, the HLURB has jurisdiction.
The regular courts have no jurisdiction over the case since the
proper venue is with the HLURB. Petitioner is partly to blame for filing it
with the regular courts and since the respondents also filed their
counterclaims in the lower court, then they are estopped.
2. The petitioner De Vera has better right.
The mortgage in favor of the FUNDERS did not bind petitioner in
as much as it is not registered with the NHA contrary to the mandate of
Sec. 18 of PD 957. QPSCDI also violated its contract with petitioner by its
failure to remit the latter’s payment.
The appellate court further found that QPSDCI breached its
warranties as seller under Art. 1547, and also violated its obligation to
deliver to petitioner a clean title as required by Sec. 4 of PD 957. It
declared that delivery of the unit to petitioner operated to transfer
ownership to him from QPSDCI.
In, Sec 25 of PD 957, it is clear that upon full payment, the seller
is duty-bound to deliver the title of the unit to the buyer. Even with a valid
mortgage over the lot, the seller is still bound to redeem said mortgage
without any cost to the buyer apart from the balance of the purchase price
and registration fees. It has been established that respondent QPSDCI had
been negligent in failing to remit petitioner's payments to ASIATRUST. If
QPSDCI had not been negligent, then even the possibility of charges, liens
or penalties would not have arisen. Therefore, as between QPSDCI and
petitioner, the former should be held liable for any charge, lien or penalty
that may arise.
Extrajudicial foreclosure was rendered null and void.
Respondents did not appeal. Petitioner contests the decision of
the Court of Appeals only insofar as it deleted the award of actual and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The only issue to be addressed
by this Court therefore is the propriety of the award of damages in favor
of petitioner.
IT IS NOT THE ISSUE BUT THE COURT DISCUSSED WHO IS LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES – ASIATRUST for misrepresenting.
NOTE:
The rule is when it comes to a condominium projects, it is not
supposed to mortgage the unit without the approval of the HLURB. The
moment a mortgage is constituted on a condominium, it starts first with
the lot, with the title to the land. The moment we issue the corresponding
condominium title, the mortgage constituted on the lot will be carried over
to the condominium certificate of titles. So every time somebody buys a
condominium unit, under the law, the developer is under obligation to
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
cause the release of the mortgage. So the title should be issued to him, it
must be clean and the developer must pay for the mortgage constituted.
So in this case, De Vera was not bound by the mortgage constituted on
the property and even if there was a valid mortgage, assuming the
approval of the HLURB, the seller or developer is mandated under the law
to redeem the real estate mortgage and deliver the title or unit to him as
soon as it is paid in full without any additional charge in the registration
fee or outstanding balance. So this PD 957 really provided protection both
to condominium and subdivision buyers. Respondent ASIATRUST had
made several representations to petitioner that his loan had been
approved. The tenor of the letters sent by ASIATRUST would lead a
reasonable man to believe that there was nothing left to do but await the
release of the loan. ASIATRUST cannot hide behind the pithy excuse that
the grant of the bridge financing loan was subject to the release of the
Pag-IBIG loan
Suspension of Monthly Amotization
OPTION TO SUSPEND PAYMENT OR DEMAND FOR REIMBURSEMENT
GIVEN TO BUYER
In case the developer of a subdivision or condominium fails in its obligation
under Section 20 of P.D. No, 957, Section 23 of the law gives the buyer
the option to demand reimbursement of the total amount paid, or to wait
for further development of the subdivision, and when the buyer opts for
the latter alternative, he may suspend payment of installments until such
time that the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligation to him.
Law provides two remedies in case of incomplete development of the
subdivision project:
1. reimbursement of the total amount paid, including amortization
interest but excluding delinquency interests, with interest
thereon at the legal rate; or
2. for the buyer to suspend amortization payments until the
completion of the project
These remedies are available to the prospective buyer to give effect to the
law’s intent to protect the buyers from abusive owners/developers of
subdivisions. In cases of incomplete development, it is the developer who
is the one at fault, as it would then have violated its promise to the
prospective buyers to provide the necessary facilities in the subdivision.
The aggrieved party, therefore, is the prospective buyer because of the
non-fulfillment of the developer’s commitment. As such, it is but logical
that the option is given to the prospective buyer, not to the developer.
Gold Loop Properties Inc. v CA
FACTS: Respondents Bhavna Harilela and Ramesh Sadhwani submitted
through St. Martin Realty Corporation, a realtor agent of petitioner Gold
Loop Properties, Inc. a signed pro forma reservation application addressed
to GLPI for the purchase of one (1) condominium unit at Gold Loop Towers
residential complex. One of the terms of the reservation was the exectution
of a contract to sell once a the downpayment was paid in full.
The Sadhwanis paid GLPI the amount of P819,531.25.
Subsequently, Bhavna Harilela signed a "Contract To Sell"2 with GLPI,
represented by its President Emmanuel Zapanta. Ms. Guina assured them
that they would be furnished with a copy of the contract after its
notarization, and that the amount, representing the balance of the
purchase price, would be included in a loan application with a bank.
However, the contract to sell was not notarized, as the private respondents
were not able to supply GLPI with a copy of their passports.
Under the contract, GLPI agreed to sell to Sadhwanis a 198.75
square meters condominium unit particularly Unit R-84 of Southwest
Tower. The contract price was P2,484,375.00, inclusive of a reservation
deposit of P50,000.00.
GLPI informed the Sadhwanis that the bank loan accommodation
which was to serve as payment of the balance of the purchase price was
disapproved, and thus, per the terms of the Contract to Sell, the balance
would become payable through the Co-terminus Payment Plan schedule of
payments.
Respondent Ramesh J. Sadhwani demanded a copy of the
contract to sell, noting that his wife had no official document to show that
she bought a condominium unit from GLPI and there were conditions
and/or stipulations in the contract which she could not be expected to
comply with, unless a copy of the same be given to her. Spouses
NOTE!: Sadhwanis failed to pay any of the monthly amortizations in the
payment plan. Petitioners sent a letter demanding payment of the balance
and informed the Sadhwanis that GLPI will rescind the Contract to Sell and
automatically forfeit their down payment should they fail to pay. Sadwanis
- offered to resell their rights over the condominium to GLPI but was
rejected because the purchase price was unreasonable, unfair and
inequitable. Spouses Sadhwanis failed to pay any of the monthly
amortizations in the payment plan. Petitioners sent a letter demanding
payment of the balance amounting to P1,614,814.80, and informed the
Sadhwanis that GLPI will rescind the Contract to Sell and automatically
forfeit their down payment should they fail to pay within five (5) days from
receipt of the letter in accordance with section 8 of the contract to sell.5
Spouses Sadhwanis filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(hereinafter referred to as HLURB), a complaint for specific performance
(give them a copy of the Contract to Sell) with an alternative prayer for
refund against GLPI.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may suspend payment of their
monthly amortizations due to failure of petitioners to furnish them copy of
the contract to sell.
RULING: Yes, Private respondents may suspend their payment.
Respondents were indeed justified in suspending payment of their monthly
amortizations. The failure of petitioners to give them a copy of the Contract
Land Titles and Deeds
Disclaimer: For exclusive personal use only. Not for sale.
to Sell sued upon, despite repeated demands therefor, and
notwithstanding the private respondents payment of P878,366.35 for the
subject condominium unit was a valid ground for private respondents to
suspend their payments.
The private respondents are entitled to a copy of the contract to sell,
otherwise they would not be informed of their rights and obligations under
the contract.
NOTE!: In this case, as you have noticed, the developer Gold Loop always
refused to give a copy to the
respondents of the Contract to Sell because at the back of their minds,
they already have an intention to rescind the contract because of the
default in the payments by the spouses. DEFAULT ANG NAG-UNA
That’s why if you enter into contracts like this, you should insist for a copy
as a matter of fact you can ask that the contract to sell be annotated in
the cert of title or in the condominium cert of title. So, this is a valid ground
to suspend the payment of the monthly amortizations. The spouses
Sadhwani in this case were saved because they have in fact defaulted in
their payments and they were able to use this defense and they were also
aided by a lawyer to guide them.
Alteration of Plans
Sec. 22. (PD 957) Alteration of Plans. — No owner or developer shall
change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public
use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the
approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements,
without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or
consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence
of the latter, by majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision
G.O.A.L Inc. v CA
FACTS: GOAL and the National Housing Authority (NHA) entered into an
agreement whereby NHA extended to GOAL a loan of 4.425 million for the
construction of Gemin I Condominium. A Contract Agreement was entered
into between GOAL and Matson International Corporation for the
construction of the condominium within 1 year at the cost of 4.2 million.
However, the contractor abandoned the project with only 60%
of it finished. GOAL offered the condominium units for sale with private
respondents among its buyers, NHA. To remedy the situation brought
about by the abandonment of the project by the first contractor, GOAL
subsequently pursued the construction of the fifth floor with NHA granting
additional funding on the condition that it would hold on to the
condominium certificates of title of private respondents.
Private respondents filed with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA), a complaint against GOAL. Among the issues raised were
the illegal construction of the fifth floor of Gemin I Condominium, the
failure to deliver the title of private respondent Filomeno Teng despite his
repeated demands, and the failure to provide adequate parking spaces for
the unit owners.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the construction of the floor is illegal.
RULING:
(1) Yes, it is illegal.
The above provision is clear. We do not have to tussle with legal
hermeneutics in the interpretation of Sec. 22 of P.D. 957. The written
approval of the National Housing Authority alone is not sufficient. It must
be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly organized
homeowners association or the majority of the lot buyers. Failing in this,
the construction of the fifth floor is violative of the decree (Sec. 22 of PD
957) invoked.
Failure to deliver the title
GOAL’s contention that it should not have been faulted for failing
to deliver the title to private respondent Teng as the proximate cause
thereof was the abandonment of the construction project by the first
contractor, hence, due to force majeure. There is no one else to blame but
itself. Upon full payment of the agreed price, petitioner is mandated
by law to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer.
Second contention, GOAL attempts to justify its failure to deliver the
certificate of title of private respondent Teng by claiming that it used the
title as part collateral for the additional loan NHA had extended for the
construction of the fifth floor.
While we empathize with petitioner in its financial dilemma we cannot
make innocent parties suffer the consequences of the former's lack of
business acumen. Upon full payment of a unit, petitioner loses all its right
and interests to the unit in favor of the buyer. Consequently, it has no right
to use the certificate of title of respondent Teng as collateral for a new
loan. The title of Teng must be released to him as provided by law.
1.) Off-street parking vs indoor parking areas
With respect to the second issue, petitioner contends that the decision of
the Court of Appeals is contrary to law considering that under Sec. 12-D,
No. 2, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of P.D. 957, what should be given
for free are only "off-street" parking spaces and not indoor parking areas.
Petitioner is wrong. It has for purposes of its own construed "off-street" to
mean "not including indoor." On the other hand, the law does not exclude
"indoor parking." What it specifically excludes is "street parking."
Therefore, parking may be in the basement or, in the absence thereof, in
the first floor.
Furthermore, at this point, a definition of terms may be necessary. In a
condominium, common areas and facilities are "portions of the
condominium property not included in the units," whereas, a unit is "a part
of the condominium property which is to be subject to private
ownership."5 Inversely, that which is not considered a unit should fall
under common areas and facilities.
Hence, the parking spaces not being subject to private ownership form
part of the common area over which the condominium unit owners hold
Prepared by: Gas
Source: Atty. Gimarino’s Discussion, Suan Notes, Vargas/Negado Case Digests
[EH 408 S. Y. 2018-19]
undivided interest. As such, petitioner cannot invoke Sec. I, Art. III, of the
Bill of Rights which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." Petitioner alone does not
own the parking area. The parking space is owned in common by the
developer and the unit owners. Private respondents must be allowed to
use the parking area.
SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM PROTECTIVE
BUYER’S
DECREE (PD 957)
Jurisdiction of HLRUB
According to P.D. No. 1344, the National Housing Authority (now the
HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
a. Unsound real estate business practices;
b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman.
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Court Of Appeals
DOCTRINE: Its jurisdiction is limited to those cases filed by the buyer or
owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit and based on any of the
causes of action enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344.
FACTS: Petitioner, a realty company, developed the Ortigas Center. This
case concerns the Pasig City side of the commercial district known as the
Ortigas Center, known in 1969 as Capitol VI Subdivision.
Respondent filed a complaint against Ortigas for specific compliance. It
alleged that Ortigas failed to comply with Mun Ordinance 5, Series of 1966
which required it to designate appropriate recreational and playground
facilities at its former Capitol VI Subdivision (regarded as a residential
site), now the Pasig City side of the Ortigas Center. Further, it alleged that
despite the fact that the plan was only approved by the Municipal Council
as to layout, petitioner proceeded to develop the property without securing
a final approval.
Ortigas alleged that its development plan for the subject land was for a
commercial subdivision, outside the scope of MO 5 that applied only to
residential subdivisions; that the City cannot assail the validity of that
development plan after its approval 25 years ago. Ortigas filed a motion
to dismiss the case on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over it,
such jurisdiction being in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) for unsound real estate business practices.
RTC denied the motion and held that HLURB's jurisdiction pertained to
disputes arising from transactions between buyers, salesmen, and
subdivision and condominium developers. In this case, the City is a lgu
seeking to enforce compliance with a mun ordinance, an action that is not
within the scope of the disputes cognizable by the HLURB.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction over the City's action lies with the
RTC, not with the HLURB.
RULING: Yes. Executive Order 648 empowers the HLURB to hear and
decide claims of unsound real estate business practices against land
developers. Ultimately, whether or not the HLURB has the authority to hear
and decide a case is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the
subject matter or property involved, and the parties. Section 1 of P.D.
1344 vests in the HLURB the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
(a) unsound real estate business practices;
(b) claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker, or salesman; and
(c) cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
Unlike paragraphs (b) and (c) above, paragraph (a) does not state which
party can file a claim against an unsound real estate business practice.
But, in the context of the evident objective of Section 1, it is implicit that
the "unsound real estate business practice" would, like the offended party
in paragraphs (b) and (c), be the buyers of lands involved in development.
The policy of the law is to curb unscrupulous practices in real estate trade
and business that prejudice buyers.
Not every case involving buyers and sellers of subdivision lots or
condominium units can be filed with the HLURB. Its jurisdiction is limited
to those cases filed by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or
condominium unit and based on any of the causes of action enumerated in
Section 1 of P.D. 1344. The City had not bought a lot in the subject area
from Ortigas which would give it a right to seek HLURB intervention in
enforcing a local ordinance that regulates the use of private land within its
jurisdiction in the interest of the general welfare. It has the right to bring
such kind of action but only before a court of general jurisdiction such as
the RTC.