17012018SUJCSBXGPFRwithannexures PDF

FEASIBILITY REPORT
for
Proposed Expansion of Liquid Storage Depot
At
Desur Depot, Sy. No 18/1 and 18/2,

Zadshahapur Village and Post, Near Desur
Railway Station Desur – 590 014, Belagavi
District
Prepared by
SAMRAKSHAN
F- 4, I Floor, Swastik Manandi Arcade,
S C Road, Sheshadripuram, Bangalore
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
Contents
Sl. No. Description Page no.
1.1 Introduction 01
1.1.1 Preamble 01
1.1.2 Project at a glance 02
1.1.3 (a) Summary of water, wastewater, air & solid waste details 03
1.1.3(b) Brief summary of project expansion 04
1.1.4 Water requirement and wastewater treatment and discharge details 05
1.1.5 Air pollution details 05
1.1.6 Noise pollution details 07
1.1.7 Solid waste details 07
1.18 Hazardous waste generation and its management during operation 08
phase
1.2 Environmental impacts & mitigation plan 08
1.3 Safety aspects 08
Chapter -2 Introduction to the project background information
2.1 Introduction of project proponent 09
2.2 Brief description about the nature of the project 10
2.3 Need and justification for the proposed expansion 12
2.4 Details of present and proposed capacity with total storage 13
capacities
2.5 Location of the project site 16
2.6 Industries located near the depot 18

2.7 Essential requirements of the depot 19
2.8 Need for the project and its importance to the country and/region: 20
2.9 Employment generation due to the project 20
Chapter 3 Project description
3.1 Type of project 21
3.2 Location of the depot 21
3.3 Basis of selecting the proposed site: 24
3.3.1 Proposed environmental safeguards: 24
3.4 Size/magnitude of operation 25
3.5 Process description: 25
3.5.1 Process flow chart 27
3.6 Details of tanks with product allocation at bpcl belgaum 29
3.7 Resource optimization/recycling and re-use envisaged in the project 29
3.8 Water, energy/power requirement & source 29
3.8.1 Water 29
3.8.2 Water consumption & discharge details 29
3.8.3 Power 30
3.9 Air pollution sources: 30
i
3.10 Noise generation and its management: 31

3.11 Solid waste generation and management 31
3.12 Hazardous waste generation and its management 31
3.12.1 Storage facilities for hazardous waste 32
3.13 Environmental management plan (emp) 34
3.14 Schematic representations of the feasibility & environmental 34
assessment report
Chapter 4 Site analysis
4.1 Connectivity 35
4.2 Land form, land use & ownership: 36
4.2.1 Land use pattern 36
4.3 Existing land use pattern 36
4.4 Existing infrastructure 37
4.5 Soil classification 37
4.6 Climatic data from secondary sources 37
4.7 Social infrastructure 38
Chapter 5 Planning brief
5.1 Planning concept 39
5.2 Population projection 39
5.3 Land-use planning 39
5.4 Assessment of infrastructure demand 39
5.4.1 Roadways & railways 39
5.4.2 Water supply & sewerage infrastructure: 39
Chapter 6 Proposed infrastructure
6.1 Industrial area 40
Chapter 7 Rehabilitation & resettlement plan 40
Chapter 8 Project schedule & cost estimates
8.1 Time schedule 40
Chapter 9 Analysis of proposal 41
ii
List of tables
Table no. Description Pg. no.
2.0 Details of present and proposed storage capacities 14
2.1 industries located near the Depot 18
2.2 Land-use pattern 19
3.1 Firefighting facilities 25
3.2 Air pollution sources, fuel consumption and 30
chimney height details
3.3 Solid waste generation 31
3.4 Hazardous Waste Generation 31
3.5 Storage Facilities for Hazardous Waste 32
4.0 Shows connectivity w.r.to the Depot 35
4.1 Land-use pattern 36
4.2 Classification of Months according to season 37
4.3 Climate between Jan 2017-Dec 2017 38
List of figures
Table no. Description Pg. no.
2.0 Location of project site 16
2.1 Impervious dyke , sprinkler system & foam pourer 17
provided for the storage tanks
2.2 Industries located near the depot 18
3.0 Maps showing boundary & location of the depot 22
3.1 Location of depot on the state map 23
3.2 Process flow chart 27
3.3 Water consumption & discharge 29
3.4 Schematic representation of feasibility and 34
environmental assessment report
4.0 Google map showing connectivity 35
List of annexures
Annexure Description
A Dyke wall details
B Safety initiatives (risk assessment & HAZOP
studies)
C Land records, power of attorney & other records
iii
CHAPTER 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 Preamble
Ministry of Environment, Forests & Climate Change, Govt. of India has issued the
Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 2006, under the Environmental Protection
Act, 1986. For the activities listed in Schedule-I of the notification it is made mandatory that
the proponent shall obtain Environmental Clearance from the Ministry of Environment &
Forests / State Govt. (SEIAA, Karnataka) depending on the category.
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Desur Depot, Sy No 18/1 and 18/2,
Zadshahapur Village and Post, Near Desur Railway Station Desur – 590 014, Belagavi District
proposes the expansion of its total storage capacity from 16,798 KL to 18,256 KL (1,458 KL
additional storage capacity)
The previous Environmental Clearance had been obtained from SEIAA, Karnataka for
additional storage of 8,500 KL vide SEIAA letter No. SEIAA 20 IND 2010, dated 01/08/2011.
Now, it is intended to
a) Increase in the total ethanol storage capacity from 85 KL to 485 KL by the addition of
2 x 200 KL tank and its associated facilities.
b) The addition of two Bio-Diesel tanks of 200 KL and 858 KL capacities.
Pre-Feasibility Report 1
1.1.2 Project at a glance :
Sl. No. Details

1 Project M/s. BHARATH PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED.
Desur Depot, Belagavi
Proposed Expansion of total storage capacity from 16,798 KL
to 18,256 KL (1,458 KL additional storage capacity)
a) Increase in the total ethanol storage capacity from 85 KL to
485 KL by the addition of 2x200 KL tanks and its associated
facilities.
b) The addition of two Bio-Diesel tanks of 200 KL and 858 KL
tanks.
2 Project proponents M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited,

Desur Depot, Near Desur Railway station,
Zadshahpur Village, Belagavi – 590014
3 Location of the site M/s. BHARATH PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED,
Desur Depot, Sy No. 18/1 and 18/2, Zadshahapur Village and
Post, Near Desur Railway Station Desur – 590014, Belagavi
District.
4 Constitution of the Public Sector
Organization
5 Products/services Environmental clearance obtained:
a) Number of products handled: 3 products viz. Ethanol,
High Speed Diesel (HSD) & Motor Spirit (MS)
b) Total Storage Capacity: 16,798 KL
Proposed Expansion :
a) Ethanol storage quantity to be enhanced:
b) Storage of new product to be added: Bio-diesel
After Expansion :
a) Number of products handled: Five products viz.,
Ethanol, High Speed Diesel (HSD), Motor Spirit (MS),
and Bio diesel
b) Total storage capacity: 18,256 KL
6 Project expansion cost Rupees Six Crores Sixty Five Lakhs Only
7 Total manpower 62 Workers (No additional man power is required for the
requirement in the proposed expansion)
Depo General Shift: 6 working days / week
1.1.3 a) Summary of water, wastewater, air& solid waste details

Sl. Particulars Details
No
A Water, wastewater details
1 Water supply The source of water is from Borewell
sources
2 Total water About 1 KLD
requirement
3 Total wastewater About 0.8 KLD
generated
4 Treatment/Disposal Sewage generated is treated in septic tank and disposed in soak pit.
details Domestic organic solid waste generated will be composted and used as
manure.
There is no industrial effluent generation in the Depot.
B Air pollution details
1 Sources of air DG Sets: Fire pumps:
pollution a. 1x7.5 KVA 231 HP – 3 no.s
b. 1x125 KVA
c. 1x200 KVA
d. 1x250 KVA
Existing DG sets & fire pumps are adequate for the proposed expansion
also.
2 Air pollution Air pollution sources Stack height (m) Remarks
control units 250 5 ARL Acoustic
provided DG set 200 3 ARL enclosures
(kVA) 125 3 ARL are proposed
7.5 0 ARL for all DGs
Fire pump (HP) – 3 no.s 231 3 ARL for each -
C Solid/Hazardous wastes
1 Source of solid Domestic sources: Domestic garbage
waste Hazardous sources: Used oil from DG sets & tank bottom sludge
generated whenever cleaning is taken-up.
2 Total quantity of Domestic solid waste:
solid waste About 24 kg/day for 62 workers.
generated Composted and used as manure.
Hazardous waste:
0.2 KLPA waste oil from DG sets is disposed through authorized re-
processor.
7 MT/ 5 years bottom sludge from storage tanks is disposed off through
the agencies approved by Pollution Control Board.
1.1.3b) Brief Summary of Project Expansion
Sl.NO Description EC obtained After Summary

Expansion/conversion
1 Survey Nos. Sy. No. 81/1, 81/2 No change
2 Total plot area 26.325 acres No change -
3 Total storage capacity 16,798 KL 18,256 KL 1,458 KL
4 No. of products 3 4 Bio-Diesel
5 Product name Ethanol Ethanol
HSD HSD
MS MS
Bio-Diesel
6 Total no. of tanks 14 18 4 additional tanks
7 Manpower 62 No change Adequate
8 Water requirement About 1 KLD No change -
9 Wastewater generated About 0.8 KLD No change -
10 Wastewater disposal Treated in septic No change -
options tanks & sent to
soak pit
11 Solid waste - garbage 24 kg/day No change -
12 Air pollution sources DG sets No change Existing DG sets
250 KVA & fire pumps are
200 KVA adequate for the
125 KVA proposed
7.5 KVA expansion.
Fire pump
231 HP – 3 no’s
13 Hazardous waste Used oil from DG No change -
Set - 0.2
KL/Annum
Sludge from
cleaning of
petroleum product
storage tanks (oil
bearing sludge -
once in 5 years) – 7
MT/ 5 years
1.1.4 Water requirement and wastewater treatment and discharge details
I. QUANTITY OF WATER REQUIRED AND WASTEWATER GENERATED
The total quantity of water requirement for the Depot is about One KLD. No additional
manpower is required for the proposed expansion. The break-up of the consumption of
water is as presented in table below.
Domestic water consumption and sewage discharge

Description Consumption Discharge
KLD KLD
Domestic 1 0.8
II. WASTEWATER TREAMENT AND DISPOSAL DETAILS
The treatment methods and the final disposal for wastewater generated is appended in the
table below
Sewage/wastewater treatment and discharge
Sewage/effluent Treatment units Final disposal point
generated from provided
(a) Domestic Septic tank Soak pit
(b) Industrial There is no industrial -
effluent generation
Note: There is only very minimal increase in terms of wastewater, solid waste discharge
which is only a temporary phenomenon during the implementation of the proposed
expansion.
1.1.5 Air pollution details
The total power requirement of the Depot is about 200 KVA. However DG sets of adequate
stack heights are installed as backup power. These are the major air pollution sources from
the Depot. Also there are three diesel operated fire pumps. All these sources are provided
with stacks of adequate height so as to disperse the emanating flue gases containing SPM,
oxides of sulfur and nitrogen without affecting the ground level concentrations.
The sources of air pollution, type of fuel used, fuel consumption and chimney heights for air
pollution sources of the Depot are indicated in the following table.
Air pollution sources, fuel consumption and chimney height details

SI. no. Sources of Air pollution Fuel used Fuel Stack
consumption Height
(L/hr) (m)
1 DG 250 Low Sulphur 60 5 ARL
Sets Content Diesel
2 (kVA) 200 (0.00005%) 80 3 ARL
3 125 20 3 ARL
4 7.5 5 0 ARL
5 Fire 231 3 ARL

pumps
6 (HP) 231 3 ARL
Need basis
7 231 3 ARL
NOTE: Existing DG sets are adequate for the proposed expansion also.
BPCL Belagavi’s Depot is a fully automated Depot with entry and exit control, integrated
tank farm management system, automated TT loading facility, automated Fire Alarm/
fighting facility and network communication system.
Fire protection facilities have been provided fully meeting the requirements of Oil Depot
Safety Directorate Standard (OISD-117). These include the following:
 Fire water storage tanks
 Main fire water pumps and jockey pumps
 Fire water network with hydrants, monitors and medium-velocity sprinkler
systems
 Fixed foam system
 Mobile firefighting equipment
 Portable fire extinguishers
 Fire detection & alarm system including manual call points
The fire water pumps (diesel driven) are provided with stack of stipulated height as per
consent of KSPCB.
1.1.6 Noise pollution details
The major sources of noise pollution in the Depot are the DG sets for which acoustic
enclosures are provided. The movement of trucks in and out of the Depot is yet another
source of noise pollution in the Depot. Also ambient noise levels are ensured within the
ambient standards by inbuilt design of mechanical equipment and building apart from
vegetation (tree plantations) along the periphery and at various locations within the Depot
premises.
1.1.7 Solid waste details
The solid waste generated will be composted and used as manure. No additional man power
is required for the proposed enhancement.
The quantity of solid waste generated from the proposed Depot is detailed in the following
table.
Solid waste generation during the operation phase

Details Existing/proposed
Total no. of employees 62
Assuming per capita solid waste generation rate as 0.4 kg/capita/day
Quantity of solid waste generated 24 kg/day
Organic solid waste : 60 % of the total waste 14.4 kg/day
Inorganic solid waste : 40 % of the total waste 9.6 kg/day
Note: There is only very minimal increase in terms of wastewater, solid waste discharge
expansion.
1.1.8 HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION AND ITS MANAGEMENT DURING

OPERATION PHASE
The hazardous wastes generated is spent oil from DG set which is stored in MS drums and
sent to authorized re-processors & tank bottom sludge. The type and quantities of
Hazardous waste generated from various processes are shown in the following Table
Hazardous waste generation

Hazardous waste Quantity of Category
hazardous waste as per
generated HW
Rules,
2016
Used oil from DG Sets 0.2 KL/annum 5.1
Sludge from cleaning of petroleum 7 MT/ 5 years 3.3
product storage tanks (sludge &
filters contaminated with oil - once
in 5 years)
The existing storage tanks in the Depot are cleaned once in 5 years. The tank bottom sludge
is being handed over to common incineration facility or to the agency approved by Pollution
Control Board. The same procedure shall be followed for proposed tanks as well.
1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS & MITIGATION PLAN
EMP is prepared & detailed in Section 3.13, Chapter 3 of this report.
1.3 SAFETY ASPECTS
Dyke wall is provided all around storage tanks to contain spillages /leakages if any. Details of the
same are appended as Annexure A.
Also, risk assessment & HAZOP studies have been done & the same is explained in detail in Annexure
B.
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION OF PROJECT PROPONENT
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) is an Indian state-controlled oil and gas
company headquartered in Mumbai, Maharashtra. The Corporation operates two large
refineries of the country located at Mumbai and Kochi. The company is ranked 358th on the
Fortune Global 500 list of the world's biggest corporations as of 2016.
BPCL, with an equity base of Rs. 723.08 Crore, is a leading player in the Petroleum Sector in
the country. BPCL currently has Refineries at Mumbai and Kochi with a capacity of 12 Million
Metric Tonnes per Annum (MMTPA) and 9.5 MMTPA respectively for refining crude oil.
BPC's subsidiary at Numaligarh has a capacity of 3 MMTPA. Also, Bharat Oman Refineries
Ltd. (BORL) a joint venture of BPCL, a state-of-art, grass root refinery with a capacity of 6
MMTPA at Bina, Dist. Sagar, Madhya Pradesh is also a part of BPCL. This Refinery is on
stream and completely operational from 2011.
Operations:
Bharat Petroleum operates the following refineries:
Mumbai Refinery: Located near Mumbai, Maharashtra. It has a capacity of 13 million metric
tonnes per year.
Kochi Refineries: Located near Kochi, Kerala. It has a capacity of 9.5 million metric tonnes
per year.
Bina Refinery: Located near Bina, Sagar district, Madhya Pradesh. It has a capacity of 6
million metric tonnes per year. This refinery is operated by Bharat Oman Refineries Limited,
a joint venture between Bharat Petroleum and Oman Oil Company.
Numaligarh Refinery: Located near Numaligarh, Golaghat district, Assam. It has a capacity of
3 million metric tonnes per year.
The company business is divided in seven SBUs (Strategic Business Units), like Retail,
Lubricants, Aviation, Refinery, Gas, I&C and LPG.
They have popular Loyalty Programs like Petrocard, Smartfleet.
9
As per current Marketing Infrastructure Vision 2025-26, the capacity of all refineries viz,
Mumbai, Kochi, Numaligarh and Bina are to be augmented by 2016-17. In line with it Kochi
refinery shall be augmented from 9.5 MMTPA to 15.5 MMTPA by 2015-16. The product of
Kochi Refinery is currently transported to the southern states of Kerala and Tamilnadu
through the Cochin-Coimbatore- Karur Pipeline of Petronet CCK .This pipeline has a
designed capacity of 3.973 MMTPA but currently is just transporting 2.3 MMTPA of
petroleum products. Also subsequent to the expansion of Kochi refinery the capacity of the
CCK pipeline shall be augmented to 7 MMTPA. Thus the spare capacity can be used for
Transporting the products beyond Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
2.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PROJECT

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), Belagavi Depot is one of the major oil Depots
in the country that supplies various industrial fuels to its customers across the country.
The Depot has integrated modern technologies VIZ, Hydrocarbon detectors, HVLR’s, Rim
seal fire protection, SIL PLC etc. providing sophisticated out look to the Depot.
However, BPCL Belagavi Depot proposes the expansion of its total storage capacity from
16,798 KL to 18,256 KL by
 increasing the total ethanol storage capacity from 85 KL to 485 KL by addition of 2x200 KL
tanks and its associated facilities,
 the addition of two bio-diesel tanks of 200 KL and 858 KL tanks.
Ethanol:
Ethanol is derived from molasses and other renewable resources. It is an oxygen-enhancing

additive that helps Motor Gasoline burn cleaner, thus reducing air pollution due to lesser
harmful emissions such as carbon monoxide. It also results in reduction in the use of crude
oil, a non-renewable resource and dependence on import of petroleum products thereby
saving valuable foreign exchange for the country. Ethanol blended Motor Gasoline is
becoming a worldwide practice and is mainly used in countries like, U.S.A., Brazil, Mexico,
Australia, New Zealand, etc. Ethanol Doped Motor Gasoline is widely accepted as Motor
Vehicle Fuel.
It is an agricultural based product, mainly a by-product of sugar industries in our country,

available in sugar belt areas. Anhydrous ethanol is essentially ethanol, which is denatured
for use as fuel in automobile engines. Presently Bureau of Indian Standards under
specification IS 2796: 2015 recommends addition of anhydrous ethanol in Motor Gasoline
up to 10 % vol. Max.
One of the main motives for use of ethanol in Motor Gasoline is to improve air quality. By
switching to these new fuels, the fleet owners are leading the way to energy security and
10
cleaner air. Motor gasoline with ethanol is well suited for replacing gasoline in light duty
vehicles making fuel more environmentally friendly.
Salient features of Ethanol:
 Ethanol is completely soluble in water, which presents potential problems for

storage and handling. However, Ethanol will not be significantly degraded by small
amount of clean water, though water addition dilutes its value as a fuel.
 A higher conductivity suggests that Ethanol dissipates static charges that build up
when pumping fuel during fuel transfers faster than Motor Gasoline. This gives
Ethanol a theoretical safety advantage over Motor Gasoline, as static electrical
charges generated will be dissipated more quickly.
 Viscosity of Ethanol is higher than that of Motor Gasoline. However, it does not pose
any problem in handling in cold weather.
 The auto-ignition temperature of Ethanol is significantly higher than that of Motor

Gasoline. This makes Ethanol less susceptible to ignition when spilled on hot surfaces
such as Engine Exhaust Manifolds.
 The lower flammable limit of Ethanol is higher than Motor Gasoline. This is another
advantage over Motor Gasoline.
 Pure Ethanol burns with a flame that is not clearly visible in bright sunlight.
However, Ethanol doped Motor Gasoline flame is visible.
With a view to ensure ethanol quality by the time it is received at the location, Depot’s
requirement is more stringent in respect of ethanol content 99.6% Vol. and consequently
0.7956 relative density at 15.6 deg. C, and appearance Clear & Bright and free from
suspended matter.
Bio-Diesel:
Bio-Diesel refers to those plant oils that can substitute diesel. Vegetable oils can be directly
used as fuel, but they perform better after chemical treatment. The resulting fuel can be
blended with regular diesel with various concentrations.
Mixing bio-diesel also results in fuel quality improvement such as longer cetane number and
reduced sulphur emissions. Bio-Diesel can be obtained from virtually any plant oil.
11
The project expansion cost for the above being about Rupees 6.65 crores.
2.3 Need and Justification for the Proposed Expansion
The consumption of petroleum products in India is growing at a steady rate. The demand for
fuel and petroleum products rose to 194.2 million tonne in 2016-17, up from 184.6 million
tonne in the previous financial year, according to the data from Petroleum Planning and
Analysis Cell (PPAC) of the oil ministry.
Demand for diesel, the most consumed fuel in the country, grew by 1.8 per cent to 74.6 mt
in 2016-17.
Considering the steady growth rate in the consumption of petroleum products and the
present scenario of the deregulation of prices and expansion of Koch Refinery is planned
from 9.5 MMTPA to 15.5.MMTPA as per Marketing Infrastructure Vision 2025-26, the
volumes available from Kochi Refinery can be moved further to various oil companies in
Tamil Nadu and further to the state of Karnataka. It helps in increasing the market share in
Karnataka, more number of markets attached to the Depot and also to cater the needs of
market in Andhra Pradesh.
Justification for enhancing the storage capacity of Ethanol:
Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas vide its Gazette Notification Extraordinary Part II -
Sec.3, sub section (i) under Sr. No. 4 & resolution no. P-45018/01/2010-CC dated 2nd
January 2013 mandated blending of ethanol with petrol upto 10%.
Also, the Government has allowed procurement of ethanol produced from non-food
feedstocks, like cellulosic and ligno cellulosic materials including petrochemical
route. OMCs (Oil Marketing Companies) have procured 103 crore litres of ethanol during
the ethanol supply year 2015-16 (till 7.11.2016). The potential foreign exchange savings due
to blending of ethanol for the ethanol supply year 2015-16 is approximately USD 353
Million.
So additional storage for ethanol is proposed in the Depot.
12
Justification for Bio-Diesel:
Bio-Diesel refers to those plant oils that can substitute diesel. Vegetable oils can be directly
used as fuel, but they perform better after chemical treatment. The resulting fuel can be
blended with regular diesel with various concentrations.
Mixing bio-diesel also results in fuel quality improvement such as longer cetane number and
reduced sulphur emissions. Bio-Diesel can be obtained from virtually any plant oil.
Government had announced a Bio-diesel Purchase Policy in October 2005. In August 2015,
the Government has allowed sale of Bio-diesel (B100) by private manufacturers to bulk
consumers. Moreover, retailing of bio-diesel blended diesel by Public Sector OMCs has
started on 10th August, 2015.
In order to take advantage of the market trend, storage for biodiesel is proposed in the
Depot.
2.4 Details of present and proposed capacity with total storage capacities
Present storage
Storage facility by M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. at Belgaum was first established
on 31st March 1997.
 Environment clearance from SEIAA, Karnataka was obtained on 1st August 2011 vide
letter no. SEIAA:20:IND:2010 for the additional storage of 8500 KL of petroleum
products by providing 1 x 6000 KL fixed roof above the ground tank for HSD & 1 x
2500 KL floating roof above the ground tanks for motor spirit. The total storage
capacity with addition of 8500 KL is 16,798 KL.
 Consent for Operation was obtained from KSPCB vide combined consent order no.
AW-301098 dated 29-9-2016 for total storage capacity of 16,798 KL. This consent is
valid upto 30-6-2021.
Proposed Expansion:
Now expansion is proposed by increasing the total storage capacity from 16,798 KL to
18,256 KL.
13
Table 2.0: Details of present and proposed storage capacities
SI. Product Class of Existing / EC obtained details Proposed expansion details Total
No. product capacity
Total Storage Dimensions Above or Total Total Storage (m x m) Above or Total
after
no. capacity (m x m) below storage no. capacity Diameter x below storage
expansi
of of each Diameter x ground capacity of of each length/height ground capacit
on
tanks tank length/height (KL) tanks tank (KL) y
(KL)
(KL) (KL)
1 MS- A 5 100 3.2 x 12.6 UG 5,023 - - - - - 5,023
Motor 200 4 x 16.2 UG
Spirit 1,365 11 x 14.38 AG (fixed
roof will be
converted
to internal
floating
roof)
858 9 x 13.5 AG (fixed
roof will be
converted
to internal
floating
roof)
2,500 17.03 x 12 AG/
Floating
(IFR with Al
dome roof)
14
2 Ethanol A 3 20 2 x 6.718 Horizontal 85 2 200 4 x 16.2 Horizontal 400 485

AG AG
20 2 x 6.718 Horizontal 200 4 x 16.2 Horizontal
AG AG
45 2.75 x 8.25 Horizontal
AG
3 HSD- B 6 100 3.2 x 12.6 UG 11,690 - - - - - 11,690
High 100 3.2 x 12.6 UG
Speed 858 9 x 13.5 AG
Diesel 2,316 14.025 x 15 AG
2,316 14.025 x 15 AG
6,000 24.04 x 15 AG/Fixed
4 Bio- B - - - - - 2 200 4 x 16.2 Horizontal 1,058 1,058

Diesel AG
858 9 x 13.5 AG
TOTAL 14 16,798 4 1,458 18,256
15
2.5LOCATION OF THE PROJECT SITE
Fig 2.0 LOCATION OF PROJECT SITE
16
2.5 PROJECT SITE PHOTOGRAPHS
Fig 2.1 Impervious Dyke , Sprinkler System & Foam pourer provided for the
storage tanks
17
2.6 Industries located near the Depot
Fig 2.2 shows the industries located near the Depot
Table 2.1 industries located near the Depot MRPL
Sl.No. Description Distance from BPCL Direction

ltd., (Km)
1 HPCL,Desur Depot Adjacent South
2 IOCL,Desur Terminal 0.2 South
3 Alma Motors 3 South East
18
KIO factory
2.7 ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPOT

2.7.1 RESOURCES
Generally for any Depot to perform viably the availability of certain basic essential
requirements is necessary. The essential requirements include
 Fuel
 Transport
 Power
 Water
 Land
 Man power etc.,
In the context of Enhancement of the Storage capacity at BPCL all the above basic
requirements are essentially available as it is an existing Depot
 Land
The BPCL Depot is located in a total area of 69.45 Acres and is sufficient for its activities and
it also maintains adequate green belt area. The proposed additional tanks and its
associated facilities for enhancement of storage capacity is planned within the Depot and
hence no additional land area is required. The land use pattern of the Depot is as follows.
Table: - 2.2 Land-use pattern
Sl. No. Particulars Area Area in Acres Percentage

(m2) (%)
Total plot area 106534 26.325 100

1
Ground coverage 48036 11.869 45.09

2 area/ Storage area
Hard paved area 7600 1.878 7.13

3
Landscape area 50898 12.578 47.78

4
19
 Water
The source of water supply for the Depot is Borewell water. The total water
requirement is about 1KLD
 Power
The source of power supply is from HESCOM. The total power requirement for the
existing project is 180KVA and for expansion the same may be extended up to 200 KVA.
 Transport
Transportation of Products and employees to & from the Depot during the
operation phase is by means of roadways.
An average of 100 truck sis handled per day for dispatch of Product.
 Manpower
The total man power requirement is about 62 workers, working in general shifts,
with 6 working days per week.
2.8 NEED FOR THE PROJECT AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE COUNTRY
AND/REGION:
The project being proposed is important in view of the energy security of the nation and
also contributes to the socio economic development of the region.
The received petroleum products received through Tank wagon/Rakes and tanker sis stored
and dispatched at appropriate time to the outlets through tankers.
2.9 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION DUE TO THE PROJECT
The total direct employment potential of the proposed Depot is about 62 people.
However, there are indirect employment generation due to the project during the
transportations, marketing & distribution etc.
20
CHAPTER 3
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
3.1 TYPE OF PROJECT
 Presently the Petroleum storage tankage capacity being 16,798 KL, M/s.BPCL
Belagavi proposes the expansion of its total storage capacity from 16,798 KL to
18,256 KL by
a) Increasing the total ethanol storage capacity from 85 KL to 485KL by the
addition of a 2 X 200 KL tank and its associated facilities,
b) Installation of 200 KL and 858 KL for Bio –diesel.
3.2 LOCATION OF THE DEPOT
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, (A Govt. of India Enterprise), working under the
aegis of Ministry of Petroleum is having an establishment for storage and distribution of
Petroleum products at Desur Depot, Sy No 18/1 and 18/2, Zadshahapur Village and Post,
Near Desur Railway Station Desur – 590 014, Belagavi District.
Details of the immediate surroundings is appended in the table below
North Vacant land

South HPCL storage depot
East Vacant land
West Railway track
21
Fig 3.0 Maps showing boundary & location of the Depot
APMC yard
Entry from NH 67
Note: Longitude: 15°45'19.6"N Latitude: 74°29'43.1"E MSL :784 M
22
FIG 3.1 SHOWS THE DEPOT ON THE STATE MAP
23
3.3 BASIS OF SELECTING THE PROPOSED SITE:
The Depot is existing facility in currently operation and is located at a convenient distance
for procurement of petroleum products from road & railway.
The proposed expansion involves minimal construction activity viz. foundation for ethanol
storage tanks & bio diesel, dyke wall and tank construction. This is only a temporary
phenomenon during the implementation of the proposed expansion project.
3.3.1 Proposed environmental safeguards:
 Mitigative measures incorporated for control & prevention of water pollution due to
effluent discharge
All the storage tank farms have adequate capacity dyke area. The dyke area details are
appended as Annexure A. Any spillages during loading/unloading or in the event of
accident the same will be collected & pumped back into the tanks.
The Depot is enhancement of storage capacity. Domestic wastewater generated from
project will be treated in septic tank and soak pit. There is no process involved hence
there is no industrial effluent. Therefore no major impacts envisaged.
 Measures incorporated for control & prevention of air pollution due to fugitive
emission of hydrocarbons during loading & unloading
All storage tanks are provided with fixed cone roof which acts as an in-built barrier to
prevent fugitive emissions. In addition, routine inspection schedule will be fixed to check
optimum operation & immediate rectification /repair in case of malfunction/damage.
Good storage & material handling practices will be followed.
 DG exhaust and process exhaust

stacks of adequate heights are proposed for the generator for dispersion of gaseous
emissions at levels as per the guidelines as per KSPCB consent condition. Acoustic
enclosures are provided to control and minimize gaseous emissions.
 Measures proposed for prevention of adverse effect on fragile ecosystem

The Depot is enhancement of storage capacity. Further, the Depot is located at
Zadashahpur Village which is not an ecologically sensitive area surrounded other Oil
Marketing companies and Container Corporation. Therefore, there are no adverse
effects on the fragile ecosystem anticipated.
24
FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES PROVIDED
Table 3.1: Firefighting facilities

Sl. Items Capacity
No.
1 Fire water storage tank 2 x 1365 KL = 2730 KL
2 Surface water storage tank 50 KL
3 Fire ring main Provided to cover the entire depot including
TWD siding (10” size). Ring main is
interconnected with IOCLs fire fighting facility.
4 Hydrant point 35 no’s
5 Monitors 32 no.s
6 Fire water pumps 3 pump’s of 327 m3/hr each (2 main + 1
standby). Designed for a cooling water
requirement of 654m3/hr & to develop a
pressure of 7 kg/cm2 at the remotest hydrant
point.
7 Fire extinguishers 70 kg DCP: 9 no.s
25 kg DCP: 12 no.s
10 Kg DCP : 23 No’s
9 kg DCP: 40 n7.s
CO2:14 no.s
8 Safety helmets & Safety 20 No.s
Shoe’s
9 Mobile water/foam 2 No.s (227 KL/hr /1000 GPM )
monitor
10 Other miscellaneous HVLR, jet nozzles, fog nozzles, universal nozzles,
equipment water curtain nozzle, sand scoops, electrical
siren, hand operated siren etc. have been
provided.
3.4 SIZE/MAGNITUDE OF OPERATION

The Depot “M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited” is a large scale industrial unit. The
proposed investment for the enhancement of storage facility to 18,256 KL is Rs 6.65 Crores.
The existing total storage capacity of the Depot is 16,798 KL with capital investment of Rs.
84.16 Crores.
25
3.5 PROCESS DESCRIPTION:
The project involves 3 steps

a) Receipt
b) Storage
c) Dispatch
Receipt: The products are received through Tank wagon/ Rakes through Rail and Tank trucks
Storage: In Present scenario storage tanks of 16798KL are used for storage of different
products. The details of tanks with sizes are detailed in table 3.1.
Dispatch: The products received are stored in respective tanks and are dispatched to retail
outlets through tankers.
26
3.5.1 PROCESS FLOW CHART

3.2 Fig shows Process Flow Chart
FLOW DIAGRAM OF DEPOT
RECEIVES PRODUCT STORAGE OF FILLING PRODUCT IN DISPATCH OF

THROUGH TANK PRODUCTS IN TANK LORRIES PRODUCT TO RETAIL
WAGON (RAKES) / STORAGE TANKS OUTLETS etc.
TANKERS
FLOW DIAGRAM FOR RECEIPT OF PRODUCT
CHECKING ULLAGE IN INDENTING FOR THE LINING UP OF THE TANK COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY
STORAGE VESSEL PRODUCT REQUIRED TO WHICH PRODUCT LOCATION FOR TANKWAGON /
BASED ON THE ULLAGE WILL BE TAKEN TANKER & RECEIVING OF THE
AVALIABLE PRODUCT IN STORAGE TANK
27
FLOW DIAGRAM FOR RECEIPT FILLING & DISPATCH OF PRODUCT
CHECKING OF EMPTY GENERATION OF FILLING OF TANK DISPATCHING OF THE

LORRY AT MAIN GATE INVOICE / FAN AND LORRY IN TLF GANTRY PRODUCT THROUGH
& FRISKING OF ENTRY INTO LICENSED AND SEALING OF THE TL AS PER PLAN
DRIVER FOR ANY AREA TO GANTRY FOR TL TRUCK DELIVERY PROGRAM
INFLAMMABLE FILLING
MATERIAL
28
3.6 DETAILS OF TANKS WITH PRODUCT ALLOCATION AT BPCL BELGAUM

Details of storage tanks both existing & proposed is appended as table 2.0, Chapter 2 of this
report.
3.7 RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION/RECYCLING AND RE-USE ENVISAGED IN THE

PROJECT
The project is petroleum storage terminal. Hence there is no recycle & reuse option.
3.7.1 DOMESTIC SOLID WASTE:
The total quantity of domestic wastes generated is about 38kg/day which is composed and
used as manure for landscaping.
3.8 WATER, ENERGY/POWER REQUIREMENT & SOURCE
3.8.1 Water
The water demand is about one KLD for domestic use. This is met from borewell water
supply.
3.8.2Water consumption & discharge details
BOREWELL WATER SUPPLY
Domestic water requirement is 01 KLD
Waste water generated is 0.72KLD
WASTE WASTER DISPOSED THROUGH

SEPTIC TANK AND SOAK PIT
Fig 3.3: Water consumption & discharge
29
3.8.3 Power
The total power requirement for the Depot is about 200 kVA which is to be obtained from
Hubli Electricity Supply Company (HESCOM).
Further diesel generators are installed to serve as alternative sources of power supply to
this unit in emergencies during power failure.
3.9 Air pollution sources:

The major air pollution sources from the Depot are DG sets. These generator sets are
provided with stack of stipulated height as per consent of KSPCB which is adequate to
disperse the gaseous emissions of the resort to the surrounding environment.
The sources of air pollution, type of fuel used, fuel consumption and chimney height
details are indicated in the table below.
Air pollution sources Stack height (m) Remarks
250 5 ARL Acoustic
DG set 200 3 ARL enclosures
(kVA) 125 3 ARL are proposed
7.5 0 ARL for all DGs
Fire pump (HP) – 3 no.s 231 3 ARL for each -
Table 3.2: Air pollution sources, fuel consumption and chimney height details
SI. Stack Fuel Fuel Number Stack/s Air
no. attached used consumption, of height, pollution
to L/hr stacks m ARL control
unit
1 DG set HSD 80 1 5 Chimney
250 kVA height
– 1 no. and
2 DG set 200 60 1 3 acoustic
kVA – 1 no. enclosure
3 DG set 125 20 1 3
kVA – 1 no.
4 DG set 7.5 5 1 0
kVA – 1 no.
5 Fire pumps - - 3 3 Chimney

231 HP – 3 height
no.s
30
3.10 Noise generation and its management:
The major source of noise pollution in the Depot is the DG set for which acoustic
enclosure is provided. Vegetation (tree plantations) along the periphery and at various
locations within the Depot premises also controls the noise.
3.11 Solid waste generation and management
The quantity of solid waste generated from the Depot is calculated as follows
Table 3.3: Solid waste generation

Details Existing/proposed
Total no. of employees 62
Assuming per capita solid waste generation rate as 0.25 kg/capita/day
Quantity of solid waste generated 24kg/day
Organic solid waste : 60 % of the total waste 14.4kg/day
Inorganic solid waste : 40 % of the total waste 9.6kg/day
Note: There is only very minimal increase in terms of waste water, solid waste discharge
expansion.
3.12 Hazardous waste generation and its management

The hazardous wastes generated is spent oil from DG set which is stored in MS drums and
disposed through authorized re-processors. The type and quantities of Hazardous waste
generated from various processes are shown in the following Table
Table 3.4: Hazardous Waste Generation
Hazardous waste Quantity of hazardous Category
waste generated
1. Used oil from DG sets 0.2 KLPA 5.1
2. Sludge from cleaning of 7 MT/5 years 3.3
petroleum product storage
tanks (sludge & filters
contaminated with oil - once
in 5 years)
The storage tanks will be cleaned once in 5 years. The tank bottom sludge will be
handed over to KSPCB authorized incinerator or co-incineration in cement kiln.
Authorization has already been obtained from KSPCB vide no. KSPCB SEO
(DWD)/HWMC/IND/2015-16/300-301 dated 05/09/2015. There will be no increase in
the generation of hazardous waste due to additional storage facilities.
31
3.12.1 STORAGE FACILITIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE
The Depot proposes to provide adequate storage facilities for the hazardous wastes.
The details are appended below. Hazardous waste storage facility is shown in fig 3.2
Table: - 3.5 Storage Facilities for Hazardous Waste

Storage facilities at the project Designated impervious structure (MS Drums)
Site is at the project site for collection and storage
of hazardous waste.
Hazardous waste disposal DG set waste oil generated is sent to
authorized re-processors
Mode of transport Road
32
3.13 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN (EMP)
Sl. Environmental Predicted Probable source of Mitigation measures Remarks

no. components impacts impact
1 Ambient air Minor Particulate and The emissions from DG DG sets are
quality negative gaseous emissions sets are let out through used only
impact. from DG sets & fire stacks of adequate heights during power
pumps failure & fire
pumps during
emergencies.
2 Noise Minor Operation of  DG sets are provided -
negative  machineries with acoustic
impact near  DG sets enclosures. They are
noise installed in dedicated
generation utility area, where the
sources inside access is restricted. Also
the premises. the use of PPE (ear
plugs) is mandatory in
this area.
 Green belt at the
project boundary
further acts as noise
barrier and help in
attenuation of noise.
3 Water quality No significant Discharge of  Domestic sewage is Water
adverse domestic sewage. treated in septic tank conservation
impact and discharged into measures are
soak pit. encouraged.
4 Land No negative  Discharge of  Domestic sewage is -
impact wastewater. treated in septic tank
 Storage and and discharged into
disposal of solid soak pit.
wastes.  Domestic solid waste is
composted & used as
manure.
 Hazardous solid waste is
disposed through
Pollution Control Board
authorized channels.
5 Socio- Overall  Employment  Locally available -
economic positive opportunities manpower is utilized to the
impact 33 maximum possible extent.
3.14 SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATIONS OF THE FEASIBILITY & ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT REPORT
Fig 3.4 schematic representation of Feasibility and Environmental Assessment Report
Existing petroleum
storage depot
Expansion of storage
capacity for ethanol
& new facility for
biodiesel
Feasibility study for

expansion
Preparation of
feasibility report
Submit form I &

feasibility report to
SEIAA as per EIA
notification 2016
seeking EC by
considering the
project as B2
Approval by SEAC
Clearance by SEIAA
EC
34
CHAPTER 4
SITE ANALYSIS
4.1 CONNECTIVITY
Fig 4.0: Google map showing connectivity
Table 4.0 shows connectivity w.r.to the Depot
Sl No. Description Distance from Directions

project site (Km)
1 NH 4A – Khanapur Road 0.400 KM North East
2 Desur Railway Station 0.100 KM West
3 Belagavi Railway Station 14.00 KM South East
4 NH 4A – Khanapur Road 0.400 KM North East
35
4.2 LAND FORM, LAND USE & OWNERSHIP:
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, proposes the following expansion which is
carried out in the existing premises at Sy. No. 18/1 and 18/2, Desur depot, Desur Railway
station ,Zadshapur Road Belegavi – 590 014.
Proposed Expansion:
a) Increase the total ethanol storage capacity from 85 KL to 485 KL by the addition of 2x
200 KL tank and its associated facilities,
b) The addition of two Bio-Diesel tanks of 200 KL and 858 KL tanks.
The proposed site is located in the petroleum products storage cluster. The status of the
land is converted for industrial use.
4.2.1 LAND USE PATTERN

Table 4.1 Land-use pattern
Sl. No. Particulars Area Area in Percentage
(m2) Acres (%)
Total plot 106534 26.325 100
1 area
Ground 48036 11.869 45.09

2 coverage
area/
Storage area
Hard paved 7600 1.878 7.13
3 area
Landscape 50898 12.578 47.78

4 area
4.3 EXISTING LAND USE PATTERN

The BPCL Depot is located in petroleum products storage cluster. In this area the major
companies i.e. HPCL, IOCL also have petroleum products storage facilities. All the 3 facilities
are abetting each other and therefore no change in land-use pattern is envisaged.
Note: Land records are appended in Annexure C.
36
4.4 EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE
The list of existing infrastructure at the project site is

1. Petroleum storage facility - details refer Table 2 of Chapter 2.
2. Water supply from Borewell
3. Power supply from HESCOM
4. Storm water drainage system is existing
5. Domestic sewage & domestic garbage treatment is proposed in-house.
4.5 SOIL CLASSIFICATION
The soil at the project site is Black cotton soil
4.6 CLIMATIC DATA FROM SECONDARY SOURCES

Meteorological Data
Assessment of the micro and macro meteorology is important from the standpoint of
understanding the nature and for future prediction of air pollution in the study area.
The classification of months according to the seasons is given in the following table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Classification of Months according to season

Season Period
Summer March to May
Monsoon June to September
Post monsoon October to November
Winter December to February
The metrological data reflecting rainfall in mm for the year 2016 is shown in table 4.3.
The mean maximum temperature in Belagavi for the year 2016 was 320C & minimum was
110 C.
Data is collected from IMD & http://www.myweather2.com
37
Table 4.3: Climate between Jan 2017-Dec 2017

Min. Max. Humidity Precipitation Wind
Temperature Temperature % /Rainfall (mm) Speed
(°C) (°C) km/hr
January 15 28 50 0.0 7 - 35
February 15 31 44 0.8 7 - 41
March 18 34 45 8.2 8 - 39
April 13 43 52 13.0 9 - 81
May 20 34 63 54.6 13 - 63
June 14 39 81 122.4 15 - 74
July 12 35 87 250.7 15 - 96
August 11 36 88 150.1 13 - 59
September 8 38 83 72.9 9 - 48
October 11 34 74 18.7 7 - 52
November 9 39 61 9.7 8 - 44
December 8 39 54 0.1 8 - 56
Source: http://www.myweather2.com/ & IMD
4.7 SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational structure needed for the operation of
a society or enterprise or the services and facilities necessary for an economy to function.
The term typically refers to the technical structures that support a society, such as roads,
water supply, sewers, electrical grids, telecommunications and so forth and can be defined
as "the physical components of interrelated systems providing commodities and services
essential to enable, sustain or enhance societal living conditions”.
Viewed functionally, infrastructure facilitates the production of goods and services and also
the distribution of finished products to markets, as well as basic social services such as
schools and hospitals; for example, roads enable the transport of raw materials to a factory.
38
CHAPTER 5
PLANNING BRIEF
5.1 PLANNING CONCEPT
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited., proposes the expansion of its total storage capacity
from 16798 KL to 18256 KL by
a) Increase the total ethanol storage capacity from 85 KL to 485 KL by the addition of 2x
200 KL tank and its associated facilities,
b) The addition of two Bio-Diesel tanks of 200 KL and 858 KL tanks.
5.2 POPULATION PROJECTION

The total direct employment potential of the Depot is about 62 people during the operation
phase. During the construction phase which is a temporary activity 20 workers are engaged.
However, there is indirect employment generation due to the project during the
transportations, marketing & distribution etc.
5.3 LAND-USE PLANNING

The Depot is designed envisaging adequate area for landscape, product storage, and
internal movement of vehicles as shown in the table 4.1 of Chapter 4.
5.4 ASSESSMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEMAND
5.4.1 Roadways & railways

Roadways & railways are required for transportation of products and employees to & from
the Depot during the operation phase. These are developed & available in close vicinity to
the project site. There is no requirement for enhancing the existing facility.
5.4.2 Water supply & sewerage infrastructure:

Water demand for the Depot is met by Borewell water.
The domestic sewage generated is treated in septic tank & discharged into soak pit within
the Depot premises.
There is no requirement for enhancing the existing demand.
39
CHAPTER 6
PROPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE
6.1 INDUSTRIAL AREA
a) As discussed in the previous chapters the proposed expansion of petroleum storage
facility at the existing premises of Bharat Petroleum Ltd. Is only addition of four
numbers of above ground MS tanks of capacity 3 x 200 KL & 1 x 858 KL. These facilities
will be constructed using the local manpower & procuring the required construction
material in the neighborhood.
b) In the existing premises all necessary infrastructures for operation are in place which
includes railway racking, roadways, electricity, water supply etc. Hence there is no
necessity to improve these infrastructures.
c) The green-belt is also already developed. Emphasis will be given for further
improvements.
CHAPTER 7
REHABILITATION & RESETTLEMENT PLAN
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited proposes the expansion of its total storage
capacity from 16,798 KL to 18,256 KL within the existing facilities and hence no
rehabilitation and resettlement is envisaged.
CHAPTER 8
PROJECT SCHEDULE & COST ESTIMATES
8.1 TIME SCHEDULE
The Depot is in operation for storage and supply of petroleum products. The proposed
enhancement of total storage capacity will be undertaken after obtaining all the required
statutory approvals.
The proposed expansion cost is estimated to be about Rupees 6.65 Crores.
40
CHAPTER 9
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL
With the increase in demand for petroleum products in the country due to developmental
activities as well as life style of the citizens there is requirement to enhance the capacity of
existing facilities & also to create new facilities for receipt, storage & distribution of
petroleum products at various locations in the country.
BPCL, Belgaum depot has rightly decided to enhance the capacity of ethanol storage &
create facility for bio-diesel storage. In Belgaum & Bagalkot districts there are many
distilleries producing ethanol. In these two districts bio-diesel manufacturing is also given
importance. By creating additional facility there is no pressure on the environment or
infrastructure. Therefore, creating facilities for storage of ethanol & biodiesel is justified.
The proposed enhancement of storage capacity is for 1,458 KL.
Out of which, only 400 KL is for ethanol classified as very highly flammable liquid as per
Manufacture, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989. The remaining 1,058
KL is for bio-diesel a non-hazardous fuel.
Considering, the small quantum of expansion & also in view of the fact that all safety
measures are already in place in the existing facility, the project could be classified under
B2 category & exempted from TOR & EIA preparation and to issue the modified
Environmental Clearance.
41
Annexure A
SAFETY INITIATIVES
DYKE WALL DETAILS
Sl. Dyke no. Type of Storage Storage Largest Dyke wall Dyke
No. material tank volume, tank dimensions, volume, m3
dimensions KL within m or KL
dyke
EXISTING
1 Dyke 1 Motor 11 x 14.38 1,365 2,316 75.9 x 49.9 4,608
spirit 9 x 13.5 858 x 1.4 m (excluding
HSD 9 x 13.5 858 height pipelines,
14.025 x 2,316 fire walls
15 etc.)
14.025 x 2,316
15
2 Dyke 2 Motor 17.03 x 12 2,500 6,000 64 x 71 x 7,651
spirit 1.8 m (excluding
HSD 24.04 x 15 6,000 height walkways,
fire walls
etc.)
3 Ethanol dyke Ethanol 2 x 6.718 20 45 10 x 10 x 1 100
2 x 6.718 20 m height
2.75 x 8.25 45
4 Underground HSD 3.2 x 12.6 100 NA
storage 3.2 x 12.6 100
Motor 3.2 x 12.6 100
spirit 4 x 16.2 200
PROPOSED
5 Dyke 3 Ethanol 4 x 16.2 200 200 20 x 15 x 360
4 x 16.2 200 1.2 m
height
6 Bio-diesel Bio diesel 4 x 16.2 200 858 35 x 25 x 1050
dyke 9 x 13.5 858 1.2 m
height
Note: Dyke volume is 1.1 times the largest tank for all dykes as per OISD.
Annexure B
SAFETY INITIATIVES
HAZOP & RISK ASSESSMENT/SAFETY RELATED REPORTS
HAZOP
&
OISD-244 / 118 GAP ANALYSIS
Study Report
Of
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd

Desur Terminal
Prepared by
Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd.

(An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Company)
Chennai, India
www.cholarisk.com
March 2016
HAZOP & OISD-244/118 Gap Analysis Study for
BPCL – (Desur) POL Terminal
Document ID: HAZOP & OISD/SR/BPCL/15-16/19
Revision No. 00
DOCUMENT HISTORY
Revision Comment/Nature of
S. No. Document Identification
No. Date changes
Preparation of Original
1 HAZOP & OISD / SR / BPCL / 15-16/19 00 08-03-2016
Document
Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

Mohamed Thaslim
Dy. Manager
Karthikeyan S,
Dy. General Manager
Gopal Mani,
Manager
Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Cholamandalam MS Risk Bharat Petroleum
Ltd Services Ltd Corporation Limited.
Page 2 of 74
Revision No. 00
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BPCL : Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
CMSRS : Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd.
HAC : Hazardous Area Classification
HAZOP : Hazard & Operability Study
HSD : High Speed Diesel
MOV : Motor Operated Valve
MS : Motor Spirit
NRV : Non-return valve
OISD : Oil Industry Safety Directorate
OMC : Other Marketing Company
P&ID : Piping & Instrumentation Diagram
PSV : Pressure Safety Valve
PM : Preventive maintenance
POL : Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants
PRV : Pressure Relief Valve
ROSOV : Remote Operated Shutoff Valve
SKO : Superior Kerosene
SOP : Standard Operating Practices
TOP : Take Off Point
TAS : Terminal Automation Systems
SRV : Surge Relief valve
Page 3 of 74
Revision No. 00
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 5
CHAPTER 1 ..............................................................................................................................11
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................11
1.1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................12
1.2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION..................................................................................................12
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY............................................................................................14
1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY ...........................................................................................................14
1.5 ABOUT THE CONSULTANTS ..........................................................................................14
1.6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................14
1.7 DISCLAIMER ....................................................................................................................15
CHAPTER 2 ..............................................................................................................................16
METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................................16
2.1 METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................................17
CHAPTER 3 ..............................................................................................................................20
NODES OF THE STUDY ...........................................................................................................20
3.1. NODES OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................................21
CHAPTER 4 ..............................................................................................................................24
RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................24
4.1 STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................25
APPENDIX 1: HAZOP WORKSHEETS .....................................................................................31
APPENDIX 2: OISD 244/118 GAP ANALYSIS & OISD AUDIT NON COMPLIANCE ................60
APPENDIX 3: ATTENDANCE SHEETS ....................................................................................72
Page 4 of 74
Revision No. 00
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited intends to conduct the Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP),
QRA and OISD-244 / 118 Gap analyses for its Oil terminal in Desur. Cholamandalam MS Risk Services
Limited carried out the study on 29th February 2016, 01st & 02nd March 2016. This report summarizes
the outcome of the discussions from HAZOP and OISD Gap Analysis.
The following were the salient findings of the HAZOP study:
S.
Recommendations Occurrence
No
SOP for TWD shall be displayed at TWD spur area (in
1 1.1.2
English and local language)
Explore the feasibility to provide TWD-ESD push button in
2 1.1.3
spur area
3 Consider providing MCP in spur area 1.1.3
Consider periodic inspection of containment drain valves

4 1.1.3
and housekeeping to be improved
Consider providing differential pressure indicator across

5 1.1.5, 5.1.4
suction strainers
Consider providing pump running indication in control

6 1.1.6, 1.2.1
room during automation jobs
Ensure TWD and TLF pumps are conforming to API

7 1.1.6, 5.1.5
standard
8 Ensure PM for pumps conform to OISD-STD-119 1.1.6
SOP for pump operation shall be displayed at TWD Pump

9 1.2.1
house (in English and local language)
Pipelines dedicated for BPCL to be marked for easy

10 1.5.2
identification
Ensure expansion valves are in locked-open condition and

11 1.6.2
sealed
12 Ensure periodic inspection of valves in the expansion lines 1.6.2
Consider providing Eye wash/safety shower for the spur

13 1.12.1
area
Page 5 of 74
Revision No. 00
S.
No
Ensure that tanks shall be provided with at least two
numbers of independent level instruments, Out of these
one shall be of radar type that shall have HH alarm. For
“H” alarm separate level indicator shall be utilized.
14 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3
In addition to above gauges, in the tanks, an independent
HH level switch shall be provided, operation
of which shall auto-actuate shut off of ROSOV in
inlet/outlet line of the respective tank.
Ensure periodic testing/calibration of level indicators of 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.1, 3.1.1,
15
the tank 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.1
SOP for tank operation in Dyke-2 shall be displayed (in

16 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4
Ensure ROSOV/MOV position status in control room as a

17 2.1.2, 3.1.4
part of automation
Ensure periodic inspection/calibration of ROSOV as a part

18 2.1.2, 3.1.2, 3.1.4
of PMS
Suitable interlock for low level shall be provided to trip

2.2.1, 2.2.4, 2.4.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.4,
19 the TLF pump with outlet ROSOV closure as per OISD-STD-
3.4.1
244
20 Consider providing MCP for each dyke in tank farm 2.2.2, 3.2.2
Consider provision of ESD pushbuttons in tank farm as a

21 2.2.2, 3.2.2
part of automation jobs
22 Drain valves of tanks shall be lock-closed with seal 2.2.7
SOP for tank operation in Dyke-1 shall be reviewed and

23 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.4
displayed (in English and local language)
24 Semi-fixed foam system shall be provided for TK-08 3.2.2
Drain lines shall be provided with double isolation and

25 3.2.7
lock-closed with seal
Drencher system at the roof top shall be replaced by Fixed

26 sprinkler system around the tank (TK-08) as per OISD-STD- 3.3.1
117
Consider providing electronic type level measurement/HH

27 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.5
Level switch for ethanol tanks
Page 6 of 74
Revision No. 00
S.
No
Ethanol Dyke drain shall be routed to OWS with isolation
28 4.1.1, 4.2.3
valve and position indicator
One point type HC detector shall be provided for Ethanol

29 4.1.1, 4.2.3
dyke drain
SOP for ethanol tank operation shall be displayed outside

30 4.1.2, 4.2.2
the dyke (in English and local language)
Consider providing ROSOV/MOV in the ethanol tank inlet

31 4.1.2, 4.2.2
and outlet lines
Consider providing impervious dyke arrangement for

32 4.1.3, 4.2.3
ethanol storage
33 Consider providing MCP for ethanol storage 4.2.1

34 4.2.1
35 Drain valves of ethanol shall be kept lock-closed with seal 4.2.6
Consider replacing manual valves at pump discharge with

36 5.1.2
MOV as a part of automation
Consider providing low pressure switch at pump suction

and high pressure switch at pump discharge and
37 5.1.2
interlocked to trip the pump and shut off the discharge
MOV
SOP for TLF pump house to be displayed (in English and

38 5.1.2
local language)
39 Consider providing MCP in TLF gantry 5.1.3, 5.7.1
Consider providing manual recirculation valves for pumps

40 5.1.6
to prevent overheating
Page 7 of 74
Revision No. 00
The following were the salient findings of the OISD-244 / 118 Gap Analysis study:
S. No. Section Recommendation
It is recommended to maintain the Hazardous area

5.0 Hazardous Area
1 Classification Documents at site as per OISD 244 and also
Classification
it should be display in board in the location.
It is recommended to provide adequate space for one

2 6.1 Layout Philosophy
way road movement.
It is recommended to provide fire resistant construction

3
for boundary wall where the distance not meeting.
1,2,3,4,5,6 & 8 Were the inter distance between the
facility to OWS is not meeting, it is recommended to
provide foam system (mobile/fixed) for the OWS and to
ensure that OWSs are continuously monitored via CCTVs.
7. The pool fire radiation of 12.5 kW /m2 will reach up to

a distance of 25.23m. The pool fire radiation of 4 kW/ m2
will reach up to a distance of 42.32m in 5D weather
condition. Considering the effect of radiation based on
the 12.5kW/m2. it is recommended the following:
6.3 General Consideration for
4
the Layout of the Facility
a. Fire resistant wall around the Fire monitor and Fire
Hydrant raiser.
b. Also provide the Fire retardant paint for fire monitor

and Fire Hydrant to avoid any damage in the fire water
monitor and Fire hydrant.
8. Ensure fire fighting facilities (Fire Extinguishers) in

Substation conforms to OISD-STD-117 section-4.6.1
(Table).
It is recommended to provide the Drain trench around

5
the TT Gantry and it should be routed to OWS
6 6.4.1 Dyked Enclosures Consider providing floating roof for MS storage
Consider providing impervious dyke for Ethanol handling

7
dyke.
Page 8 of 74
Revision No. 00
1. Ensure all the tanks Dyke valves are closed position and
also ensure Dyke Interconnecting drain valves are closed
and provided with chain lock arrangement with close
position tag.
8
2. Consider providing Ethanol Tanks dyke drain pit which
should be inside periphery of the dyke enclosure with
Drain valve and position switch.
Consider increasing the required lux level in the facility as

9 6.4.4 General Requirements
per OISD 149.
Consider providing the emergency route to non

10 6.4.5 Protection of Facilities: congested area i.e. Directly to main road (Without any
obstructions).
Also it has been observed that the plant control room and
automation work in progress and hence it is
recommended to ensure the control room provided with
the below mentioned action:
11 7.6.2 Tank Manifold
As per MBLR it is recommended not to open / stop the
ROSOV from control room and only the close operation
should be from control room.
12 7.10 Dip Hatch/ Sampling Ensure that all the instruments are SIL classified
1. Ensure that all the pumps are meeting the API std
13 (I) Loading/Unloading Pumps:
2. Consider the abnormal vibration-excessive noise check
to be done and records to be maintained
Consider providing MCP for the following locations:
1. TWD Spur area,
14 2. TWD Pump house,
3. Tank farm area,
4. TLF Pump house and Gantry area etc.
Ensure that the respective expansion lines valve is
15
provided with seal arrangement in open position.
(II) Truck loading /unloading Consider providing automation to stop the TLF pump in
16
gantry case of batch controller is fails.
17
Page 9 of 74
Revision No. 00
8.0 Safe Operating Practices in Consider providing the SOP for Wagon Spur area, TWD
18 Storage and Handling of Bulk pump house, TLF Pump house, Storage tanks dyke areas
Petroleum Products and Ethanol dyke area.
8.12 RECEIPT, STORAGE AND Consider changing the silica gel visible glass to check the
19
HANDLING OF ETHANOL silica gel condition.
It is recommended to provide the SOP and emergency
20
instruction for the Ethanol storage dyke
Consider providing Visual and Audio Alarm repeated at
9.3 H C DETECTION &
21 additional location of security room to ensure corrective
ANNUNCIATION
action is taken.
9.2.6 Fire Protection System:
22 Consider providing one Fixed or mobile Foam monitor
Fire Water Tank
Ensure that the fire Drencher on tank TK-8 is replaced
23 with fixed water sprays system & Fixed or semi fixed
foam system is provided during MBLR works.
Page 10 of 74
Revision No. 00
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Page 11 of 74
Revision No. 00
1.1 INTRODUCTION
CMSRS was approached for providing the HAZOP consultancy for the project. Accordingly HAZOP
experts from CMSRS carried out the site visit on 29th February 2016, 01st & 02nd March 2016. The
HAZOP & OISD 244 Gap analysis report was prepared based on the discussions during site visit and
data provided by BPCL and recorded.
1.2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION
M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), a Government of India Enterprise, is engaged in
Refining, Storage and Marketing of Petroleum Products.
The BPCL Desur Depot is set up near Zadshapur Village at Desur in Belgaum District of Karnataka
State. It is 12 kms from Belgaum towards Goa on Khanapur Road, The depot covers about 25 acres of
land. The depot is adjoining to Desur Railway Station where major trains do not stop. The site is
connected by road and rail. The depot is handling receipt, storage and distribution of Class -A & B
(Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel (HSD), and Superior Kerosene (SKO)), through Tank Wagons
from Hassan, Panewadi, and Irimpanam etc. The TWDS facility is common for BPCL, HPCL and IOCL.
The plant was commissioned in year 1997.
Receipt: The MS, HSD, SKO products are being received through Tank Wagons from Hassan,
Panewadi, and Irimpanam etc. The tank trucks filling operation is fully automatic and governed by
electronic flow meters.
Storage: The products are stored in above ground / underground tanks having a total capacity of
16798 KL.
Delivery: From the Desur depot, Motor Spirit (MS) and High Speed Diesel (HSD) are dispatched to
190 retail outlets, Superior Kerosene (SKO) to 4 SKO Dealers and HSD to 7 direct customers in
Belgaum and its neighboring revenue districts catering to 7 revenue districts viz. Belgaum, Dharwad,
Bagalkot, Bijapur, Gadag, Haveri to part North Kanara.
Page 12 of 74
Revision No. 00
As the Petroleum Products are flammable and can catch fire if exposed to ignition, facilities and
Operations of the Terminal are designed and maintained to prevent any incidence of fire. All internal
electrical facilities in the Terminal are designed to prevent generation of spark.
Tank Trucks are allowed to enter the Terminal with spark arrestors only so that sparks do not come
out with exhaust from the trucks. Earthing system is provided to dissipate static electrical charges to
eliminate the chances of spark during product handling. Precautions are taken during execution of
maintenance and project works involving welding, cutting, grinding or any other action that can
generate spark.
The Terminal takes adequate care and precautions in its Operations, however in an unlikely event of
fire the Terminal is equipped with fire fighting facilities which include water storage tanks of capacity
2730 KL, Fire Hydrant System, Monitors, and dry chemical powder extinguishers. Foam required to
fight Petroleum fires is kept ready in the Terminal for instant use in case of emergency.
Page 13 of 74
Revision No. 00
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
HAZOP
To objective is to identify the hazard and operability problems and to reduce the probability and
consequences of an incident in the Terminal.
OISD-244 / 118 GAP ANALYSIS
The objective is to review locations pending OISD audit non compliances appearing as infeasible
due to design deficiencies and suggesting necessary mitigating measures to make it OISD
complaint.
To review the interspacing distances of all facilities and other non compliance with respect to
OISD codes (OISD STD 244 / OISD STD 118) within installations.
1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY
Scope of the study covers BPCL Desur terminal.
1.5 ABOUT THE CONSULTANTS

CMSRS is a joint venture between the Murugappa Group and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group of
Japan. CMSRS offers specialized and innovative risk management solutions to clients in India and
rest of Asia. CMSRS has carried out more than 2500 assignments in the field of risk management
consultancy and training services across 32 industrial sectors including refineries and petrochemical
units. In addition to industrial sector and service sector located in Kuwait, India, Hong Kong and
Thailand, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India and insurance companies
located in India, Sri Lanka and Singapore have been engaging the services of CMSRS to carry out a
number of risk analysis and specialized safety studies. The team members have wide experience in
risk management studies and have carried out studies for a number of industrial sectors including
refineries located in India and rest of Asia.
1.6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CMSRSL gratefully acknowledges the co-operation received from the BPCL Tada during the study.
The CMSRSL team in particular would like to thank the participants of HAZOP for their support and
help throughout the study: The CMSRSL team would like to thank in particular the following persons
for their support throughout the study
Page 14 of 74
Revision No. 00
1. Mr. V. Milind Rangate (Location In-charge)

2. Mr. Anish Ramesan (Asst. Manager HSSE - Retail)
1.7 DISCLAIMER
The advice rendered by CMSRS is in the nature of guidelines based on good engineering practices
and generally accepted safety procedures and CMSRS does not accept any liability for the same. The
priorities of suggestions shown in the report are advisory in nature and not binding on the parties
involved viz CMSRSL and BPCL.
Page 15 of 74
Revision No. 00
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY
Page 16 of 74
Revision No. 00
2.1 METHODOLOGY
HAZOP
A HAZOP study is a formal systematic procedure used to review the design and operation of a
potentially hazardous process facility. It is used to identify deviations from normal safe operation,
which could lead, to hazards or operability problems, and to define any actions necessary to deal
with these.
The method involves several repetitive steps (Reference is invited to Figure 2.1 on next page):
Step 1: Identify a section of plant on the P&I diagram.
Step 2: Define the design intent and normal operation conditions of the section.
Step 3: Identify a deviation from design intent or operating conditions by applying a system
of guidewords.
Step 4: Identify possible causes for, and consequences of, the deviation. A deviation can be
considered meaningful if it has credible cause and can result in harmful consequences.
Step 5: For a meaningful deviation, decide what action, if any is necessary.
Step 6: Record the discussion and action.
Step 3 to 6 is repeated until all the guidewords have been exhausted and the team is satisfied that
all meaningful deviations have been considered. The team then goes back to step 1 and repeats the
procedure for the next section of the plant.
In the HAZOP method, the guidewords are systematically applied to a segment of process
equipment in order to promote discussion on possible deviations from the design intention. The
guidewords represent deviations to the design intent and their use leads to systematic highlighting
of hazards and operability problems.
Page 17 of 74
Revision No. 00
Fig. 2.1 HAZOP Methodology

Start
Explain overall design
Select a Node
Examine and agree design

intent
Identify relevant elements
Identify whether any of the

elements can be usefully sub-
divided into characteristics
Select an element (a
characteristic if any)
Select a guideword
Apply the guideword to the

selected elements (and to
each of its characteristics as
relevant) to obtain a specific
deviation
Investigate cause, consequences

Yes
Is deviation credible? and protection or indication on
No document
Have all interpretation of the
guideword and
element/characteristics
No combinations been applied?
Yes
Have all the guidewords applied
No to a selected element
Yes
Have all the elements been
examined?
No
Yes
Have all nodes been examined?
No
Yes
Stop
Page 18 of 74
Revision No. 00
The method identifies the causes of a deviation from the design intent by application of the
guidewords. The ultimate consequences are then identified and recorded without reference to the
safeguards, which are in place (examples of safeguards are plant design, control systems, and
procedures). The consequences are then compared with the safeguards and the HAZOP team then
decides whether the current safeguards are adequate. If the team considers them inadequate, then
a recommendation is made to consider or add further safeguards.
The HAZOP study was based on the P&I diagrams, the following documents were also used during
the HAZOP sessions:
P & ID
Flow charts
Process description
Operating manual
HAZOP Recording:
Two methods of recording of a HAZOP study can be employed:
1. Complete - in which details of all discussion points are noted; and
2. By Exception - in which only those deviations that require action are recorded.
Recording of this study is 'complete recording' wherein all discussions of significance were recorded.
The discussion from the study is recorded on log sheets. Information is recorded in columns on the
log sheets as follows:
Guideword
Parameter
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
Page 19 of 74
Revision No. 00
CHAPTER 3: NODES OF THE STUDY
Page 20 of 74
Revision No. 00
3.1. NODES OF THE STUDY

Node1: Pipeline from Railway siding to Storage tank
Deviation Guideword Parameter

1. No / Low Flow No/Low Flow
2. High Flow High Flow
3. Reverse / Misdirected Flow Reverse/Misdirected Flow
4. Part of Flow Part of Flow
5. Other than Other than Flow
6. High Pressure High Pressure
7. Low Pressure Low Pressure
8. High Temperature High Temperature
9. Low Temperature Low Temperature
10. Corrosion
11. Static charge
12. Sampling
Node-2: Floating roof MS Storage tank (TK-15)

1. High Level High Level
2. Low Level Low Level
7. Variation of composition Variation of Composition
8. Corrosion
9. Static charge
Page 21 of 74
Revision No. 00
Node-3: Fixed roof HSD Storage tank (TK-08)

7. Variation of composition Variation of Composition
8. Corrosion
9. Static charge
Node- 4: Ethanol Storage tanks (TK-13)

7. Corrosion
8. Static charge
Page 22 of 74
Revision No. 00
Node-5: From Storage tanks to TLF Gantry via pump house

1. No / Low Flow No/Low Flow
2. High Flow High Flow
3. Part of Flow Part of Flow
4. Other than Other than Flow
9. Corrosion
10. Static charge
11. Sampling
Page 23 of 74
Revision No. 00
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS
Page 24 of 74
Revision No. 00
4.1 STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are the recommendations emerged at the end of HAZOP study. Necessary references have
been provided with respect to the worksheet causes for easy tracking.
S.
No
SOP for TWD shall be displayed at TWD spur area (in
1 1.1.2
Explore the feasibility to provide TWD-ESD push button in
2 1.1.3
spur area
3 Consider providing MCP in spur area 1.1.3
Consider periodic inspection of containment drain valves

4 1.1.3
and housekeeping to be improved
Consider providing differential pressure indicator across

5 1.1.5, 5.1.4
suction strainers
Consider providing pump running indication in control

6 1.1.6, 1.2.1
room during automation jobs
Ensure TWD and TLF pumps are conforming to API

7 1.1.6, 5.1.5
standard
8 Ensure PM for pumps conform to OISD-STD-119 1.1.6
SOP for pump operation shall be displayed at TWD Pump

9 1.2.1
house (in English and local language)
Pipelines dedicated for BPCL to be marked for easy

10 1.5.2
identification
Ensure expansion valves are in locked-open condition and

11 1.6.2
sealed
12 Ensure periodic inspection of valves in the expansion lines 1.6.2
Consider providing Eye wash/safety shower for the spur

13 1.12.1
area
Page 25 of 74
Revision No. 00
S.
No
Ensure that tanks shall be provided with at least two

numbers of independent level instruments, Out of these
one shall be of radar type that shall have HH alarm. For
“H” alarm separate level indicator shall be utilized.
14 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3
In addition to above gauges, in the tanks, an independent
HH level switch shall be provided, operation
of which shall auto-actuate shut off of ROSOV in
inlet/outlet line of the respective tank.
Ensure periodic testing/calibration of level indicators of 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.1, 3.1.1,
15
the tank 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.1
SOP for tank operation in Dyke-2 shall be displayed (in

16 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4
Ensure ROSOV/MOV position status in control room as a

17 2.1.2, 3.1.4
part of automation
Ensure periodic inspection/calibration of ROSOV as a part

18 2.1.2, 3.1.2, 3.1.4
of PMS
Suitable interlock for low level shall be provided to trip

2.2.1, 2.2.4, 2.4.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.4,
19 the TLF pump with outlet ROSOV closure as per OISD-STD-
3.4.1
244
20 Consider providing MCP for each dyke in tank farm 2.2.2, 3.2.2

21 2.2.2, 3.2.2
22 Drain valves of tanks shall be lock-closed with seal 2.2.7
SOP for tank operation in Dyke-1 shall be reviewed and

23 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.4
displayed (in English and local language)
24 Semi-fixed foam system shall be provided for TK-08 3.2.2
Drain lines shall be provided with double isolation and

25 3.2.7
lock-closed with seal
Drencher system at the roof top shall be replaced by Fixed

26 sprinkler system around the tank (TK-08) as per OISD-STD- 3.3.1
117
Consider providing electronic type level measurement/HH

27 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.5
Level switch for ethanol tanks
Page 26 of 74
Revision No. 00
S.
No
Ethanol Dyke drain shall be routed to OWS with isolation
28 4.1.1, 4.2.3
valve and position indicator
One point type HC detector shall be provided for Ethanol

29 4.1.1, 4.2.3
dyke drain
SOP for ethanol tank operation shall be displayed outside

30 4.1.2, 4.2.2
the dyke (in English and local language)
Consider providing ROSOV/MOV in the ethanol tank inlet

31 4.1.2, 4.2.2
and outlet lines
Consider providing impervious dyke arrangement for

32 4.1.3, 4.2.3
ethanol storage
33 Consider providing MCP for ethanol storage 4.2.1

34 4.2.1
35 Drain valves of ethanol shall be kept lock-closed with seal 4.2.6
Consider replacing manual valves at pump discharge with

36 5.1.2
MOV as a part of automation
Consider providing low pressure switch at pump suction

and high pressure switch at pump discharge and
37 5.1.2
interlocked to trip the pump and shut off the discharge
MOV
SOP for TLF pump house to be displayed (in English and

38 5.1.2
local language)
39 Consider providing MCP in TLF gantry 5.1.3, 5.7.1
Consider providing manual recirculation valves for pumps

40 5.1.6
to prevent overheating
In the above mentioned recommendations table the Occurrences are mentioned in such a manner
that the first digit represents node number of HAZOP study; Second digit represents the deviation &
third digit represents the cause.
For e.g. 4.3.1 indicates the 4th Node, 3th Deviation in that node and the 1st Cause of that deviation.
Page 27 of 74
Revision No. 00
Following are the recommendations emerged at the end of OISD-244/118 Gap Analysis study.
It is recommended to maintain the Hazardous area

5.0 Hazardous Area
1 Classification Documents at site as per OISD 244 and also
Classification
it should be display in board in the location.
It is recommended to provide adequate space for one

2 6.1 Layout Philosophy
way road movement.
It is recommended to provide fire resistant construction

3
for boundary wall where the distance not meeting.
1,2,3,4,5,6 & 8 Were the inter distance between the
facility to OWS is not meeting, it is recommended to
provide foam system (mobile/fixed) for the OWS and to
ensure that OWSs are continuously monitored via CCTVs.
7. The pool fire radiation of 12.5 kW /m2 will reach up to

a distance of 25.23m. The pool fire radiation of 4 kW/ m2
will reach up to a distance of 42.32m in 5D weather
condition. Considering the effect of radiation based on
the 12.5kW/m2. it is recommended the following:
6.3 General Consideration for
4
the Layout of the Facility
a. Fire resistant wall around the Fire monitor and Fire
Hydrant raiser.
b. Also provide the Fire retardant paint for fire monitor

and Fire Hydrant to avoid any damage in the fire water
monitor and Fire hydrant.
8. Ensure fire fighting facilities (Fire Extinguishers) in

Substation conforms to OISD-STD-117 section-4.6.1
(Table).

5
6 6.4.1 Dyked Enclosures Consider providing floating roof for MS storage
Consider providing impervious dyke for Ethanol handling

7
dyke.
Page 28 of 74
Revision No. 00
1. Ensure all the tanks Dyke valves are closed position and
also ensure Dyke Interconnecting drain valves are closed
and provided with chain lock arrangement with close
position tag.
8
2. Consider providing Ethanol Tanks dyke drain pit which
should be inside periphery of the dyke enclosure with
Drain valve and position switch.
Consider increasing the required lux level in the facility as

9 6.4.4 General Requirements
per OISD 149.
Consider providing the emergency route to non

10 6.4.5 Protection of Facilities: congested area i.e. Directly to main road (Without any
obstructions).
Also it has been observed that the plant control room and
automation work in progress and hence it is
recommended to ensure the control room provided with
the below mentioned action:
11 7.6.2 Tank Manifold
As per MBLR it is recommended not to open / stop the
ROSOV from control room and only the close operation
should be from control room.
12 7.10 Dip Hatch/ Sampling Ensure that all the instruments are SIL classified
1. Ensure that all the pumps are meeting the API std
13 (I) Loading/Unloading Pumps:
2. Consider the abnormal vibration-excessive noise check
to be done and records to be maintained
Consider providing MCP for the following locations:
1. TWD Spur area,
14 2. TWD Pump house,
3. Tank farm area,
4. TLF Pump house and Gantry area etc.
Ensure that the respective expansion lines valve is
15
provided with seal arrangement in open position.
(II) Truck loading /unloading Consider providing automation to stop the TLF pump in
16
gantry case of batch controller is fails.
17
Page 29 of 74
Revision No. 00
8.0 Safe Operating Practices in Consider providing the SOP for Wagon Spur area, TWD
18 Storage and Handling of Bulk pump house, TLF Pump house, Storage tanks dyke areas
Petroleum Products and Ethanol dyke area.
8.12 RECEIPT, STORAGE AND Consider changing the silica gel visible glass to check the
19
HANDLING OF ETHANOL silica gel condition.
It is recommended to provide the SOP and emergency
20
instruction for the Ethanol storage dyke
Consider providing Visual and Audio Alarm repeated at
9.3 H C DETECTION &
21 additional location of security room to ensure corrective
ANNUNCIATION
action is taken.
9.2.6 Fire Protection System:
22 Consider providing one Fixed or mobile Foam monitor
Fire Water Tank
Ensure that the fire Drencher on tank TK-8 is replaced
23 with fixed water sprays system & Fixed or semi fixed
foam system is provided during MBLR works.
Page 30 of 74
Revision No. 00
APPENDIX 1: HAZOP WORKSHEETS
Page 31 of 74
HAZOP & OISD-244/118 Gap Analysis Study for BPCL – (Desur) POL Terminal
Revision No. 00
Node-1 : Pipeline from Railway Siding to Storage Tank

Operating Pressure: 2-3 bar, Operating Temperature: Ambient, Flow rate: 120 KL/hr of MS
S.
Deviation Cause Consequence Effective Safeguards Recommendations
No
1. No pumping of material from wagon 1. Continuous level measurement
1. No level in Tank to tank leading to done during unloading operation
wagon 1. Delay in operation 2. Effective communication by
2. Pump running dry wagon officer through VHF
1. TWD done by trained man
2. Manual valve in
1. There is a possibility of damage to power
the suction line
the pump due to dry run leading to fire 2. Manual valve
from wagon 1. SOP for TWD shall be displayed at
and explosion inspection/maintenance
unloading area to TWD spur area (in English and local
periodically
pump is kept/ language)
struck in closed 3. Pressure gauge is available at
No / 2. Delay in operation
1 position pump suction and discharge
Low flow
1. 1 no. of open path HC detector
is present at the TWD pump
3. Leak/Rupture in house 2. Explore the feasibility to provide
the suction line of TWD-ESD push button in spur area
1. Fire and explosion hazard 2. ESD for TWD is available at the
pump/underground pump house
line from the
wagon unloading 3. Pressure testing of pipelines
area are done once in a year 3. Consider providing MCP in spur
4. Adequate fire fighting facilities area
2. Wastage of product
are available at TWD area
Page 32 of 72
Revision No. 00

S.
No
5. Wrap coating is done for
underground pipelines 4. Consider periodic inspection of
6. Leak containment is provided containment drain valves and
for TWD pump suction manifold housekeeping to be improved
routed to OWS
1. Pressure/elongation testing of
1. Spillage leading to Fire and explosion hoses done at 3.5 Ksc periodically
hazard 2. AUDCO valves are present for
individual isolation.
4. Rupture of 3. Drain drencher is available, 1. Consider providing Eye
unloading hose routed to OWS wash/safety shower for the spur area
2. Health effect of person involved
4. Dedicated supervisors are
present during decantation
5. TWD spur area is under CCTV
surveillance
1. Strainer cleaning is done once
1. Possibility of damage to the pump in 3 months
5. Choking of due to dry running 5. Consider providing differential
strainer in suction 2. Standby pumps are available pressure indicator across suction
line of pump 3. Pressure gauge is available at strainers
2. Delay in operation
pump suction
Page 33 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No
6. Consider providing pump running
1. Delay in operation 1. Standby philosophy is available indication in control room during
automation jobs
6. Malfunction of
2. Ammeter is present for all 7. Ensure TWD and TLF pumps are
pump
2. Possibility of damage to internals of pumps in TWD PH conforming to API standard
the pump 3. Pressure gauge at discharge 8. Ensure PM for pumps conform to
line is provided OISD-STD-119
7. NRV in the 1. Pressurization of discharge line up to 1. Pressure gauge at discharge
discharge line of NRV ensures fluid flow
pump is stuck in
closed position/ 2. NRV positioning done under
position in the 2. Delay in operation supervision of maintenance
reverse direction officers
1. Pump operation is decided by 6. Consider providing pump running
wagon officer based on indication in control room during
1. Simultaneous requirement automation jobs
running of more 1. Increase in pressure in discharge line 2. Ammeter is present for all
2 High Flow
than the intended leading to Leak/rupture pumps in TWD PH 9. SOP for pump operation shall be
number of pumps displayed at TWD Pump house (in
3. Trained manpower for TWD English and local language)
operation
Page 34 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No
1. AUDCO valves are isolated
1. Product reversal from Tank to wagon
after unloading preventing
and overflow in wagon
1. Pump discharge reverse flow
3 Reverse Flow
NRV Failure 2. Manual valves at pump suction
2. Pump failure and discharge are also isolated
after pump is stopped
4 Part of 1. Not Applicable

1. Unintended
wagon connected 1. Product quality is checked and
to the intended line 1. Possibility of quality deterioration hose connection is verified by
at the spur TWD officer
Other unloading area
5
than
2. BPCL wagon
2. Loading labels in the wagon
connected to other 10. Pipelines dedicated for BPCL to
2. Product loss and wastage are verified with loading sheets
pipelines (either be marked for easy identification
by Wagon officer
HPCL or IOCL)
1. Refer High flow
condition
High 2. Expansion valve 11. Ensure expansion valves are in
6 1. Expansion is given for pipelines locked-open condition and sealed
Pressure kept closed leading
1. Spillage & Fire hazards from pump discharge to tank
to leak/rupture of 12. Ensure periodic inspection of
inlet
the flanged joints valves in the expansion lines
Page 35 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No
7 Low Pressure 1. Not applicable
High 1. Refer High

8
Temperature Pressure
Low
9 1. Not applicable
Temperature
1. Wrap coating is done for

1. Underground 1. Pipeline may fail causing fire and
10 Corrosion underground pipelines in TWD
Pipelines explosion hazard
area
1. Improper 1. Rail spur is earthed separately

earthing of
2. Pipelines are electrically
Wagons, Pipelines 1. Leakage of electrical charges
Static continuous to the tanks and
11 and Pumps establishing a source of fire in a
Charge tanks are earthed properly
hazardous environment
2. Discontinuity in 3. Periodical resistance
electrical bonding measurement is done for earth
in pipelines pits
1. Direct contact of
13. Consider providing Eye
12 Sampling sample with the 1. Health effect to personnel involved 1. PPEs are used while sampling
wash/safety shower for the spur area
personnel
Page 36 of 74
Revision No. 00
Node-2 : Floating Roof MS Storage Tank (TK-15)

Operating Pressure: Atmospheric Operating Temperature: Ambient Operating Capacity: 2500 KL
S.
No.
1. Tank high level leading to overflow, 1. Radar gauge for level 14. Ensure that tanks shall be
seal damage measurement is available. provided with at least two numbers
2. Magnetic type high level of independent level instruments,
2. Fire and Explosion hazard, switch is provided with alarm Out of these one
Environmental damage annunciation in TWD pump shall be of radar type that shall have
house HH alarm. For “H” alarm separate
level indicator shall be utilized.
In addition to above gauges, in the
1. Receipt of the tanks, an independent HH level
product in the tank switch shall be provided, operation
3. Loss of product 3. Fire fighting facilities available
1 High Level continuously more of which shall auto-actuate shut off
than the intended of ROSOV in inlet/outlet line of the
quantity respective tank.
15. Ensure periodic
4. HC detectors are available in
testing/calibration of level indicators
the dyke area
4. Pressure build up in the tank due to of the tank
continuous pumping to tank also can
lead to temperature build up 16. SOP for tank operation in Dyke-2
5. Dedicated manpower present
shall be displayed (in English and
at the site during transfer
local language)
Page 37 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Tank high level leading to overflow, 14. Ensure that tanks shall be
seal damage provided with at least two numbers
of independent level instruments,
Out of these one
shall be of radar type that shall have
HH alarm. For “H” alarm separate
level indicator shall be utilized.
2. Fire and Explosion hazard, In addition to above gauges, in the
Environmental damage tanks, an independent HH level
switch shall be provided, operation
2. MOV/ROSOV in of which shall auto-actuate shut off
the inlet line in of ROSOV in inlet/outlet line of the
1. Refer above safeguards
kept/stuck in open respective tank.
position or passing
15. Ensure periodic
3. Loss of product testing/caliberation of level
indicators of the tank
16. SOP for tank operation in Dyke-2
shall be displayed (in English and
4. Pressure build up in the tank due to local language)
continuous pumping to tank also can
lead to temperature build up 17. Ensure ROSOV/MOV position
status in control room as a part of
automation
Page 38 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
18. Ensure periodic
inspection/calibration of ROSOV as a
part of PMS
1. Tank high level leading to overflow,
1. Manual gauging is done
3. seal damage
15. Ensure periodic
Failure/malfunctio 2. Fire and Explosion hazard, 2. Magnetic type high level testing/calibration of level indicators
n of the level Environmental damage switch is provided with alarm of the tank
instruments annunciation in TWD pump
3. Loss of product house
1. Tank high level leading to overflow
4. Wrong 1. Tank nomination is done 16. SOP for tank operation in Dyke-2
nomination of tank 2. Fire and Explosion hazard, effectively by TWD officer shall be displayed (in English and
during transfer Environmental damage local language)
3. Loss of product 2. Trained/skilled operation
1. Tank high level leading to overflow
5. Water ingress and seal damage
1. Dome roof is present that
due to Rim real 2. Product loss due to product
prevents the rain water
failure of floating accumulation on the roof
ingression to floating roof
Roof tank 3.Imbalance buoyancy over the roof
leading to roof failure
Page 39 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
4. Flammable atmosphere due to leak
15. Ensure periodic

testing/caliberation of level
1. Malfunction of indicators of the tank
1. TLF pump may run dry leading to seal
level measuring 1. Manual gauging is available 19. Suitable interlock for low level
leak/ fire hazard
instruments shall be provided to trip the TLF
pump with outlet ROSOV closure as
per OISD-STD-244
2 Low Level 1. One open path and one point
1. Delay in operation due to market type HC detectors are available in 20. Consider providing MCP for each
demand the dyke dyke in tank farm
2. Leak/Rupture in
2. Dyke-2 is of impervious type
the shell and roof
of the storage tank 3. Foam pourer system is
available 21. Consider provision of ESD
2. Creates flammable atmosphere pushbuttons in tank farm as a part of
4. Tank farm is under CCTV
automation jobs
surveillance
Page 40 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Maintenance of tanks is done
3. Leak/rupture of once in 5 years. UT
1.. Environmental impact due to ground
bottom plate of measurement, bottom plate
water contamination
storage tank thickness measurement are
carried out after maintenance
19. Suitable interlock for low level
4. Continuous
1. Radar gauge for level shall be provided to trip the TLF
pumping of 1. Pump running dry
measurement is available. pump with outlet ROSOV closure as
product
per OISD-STD-244
1. HC detectors are available at
5. Leak/Rupture in the dyke
1. Spillage & Fire hazards
the inlet line 2. Pressure testing of pipelines
done periodically
1. Pump dry run 1. Manual gauging is done
6. Wrong inventory
2. Vapor cloud formation due to opening 2. Tank nomination for TLF
calculation
of auto bleeder valve when level loading is done by TLF/planning
decreases leading to explosion hazard officer
7. Drain valves of 1. Tank drains are provided with 22. Drain valves of tanks shall be lock-
1. Leak leading to fire hazards
the tank is kept in double isolation closed with seal
Page 41 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
open position or 2. Valve operation under
passing 2. Loss of product
supervision
1. Pivot master type roof drain
8. Roof drain line system is provided.
1. Creates flammable atmosphere
leak 2. Roof drains are monitored
periodically
1. Sprinkler arrangement is
1. External Fire 1. Pressure buildup in the tank
provided for external cooling
2. Roof is stuck at
High 2. Leak/rupture of tank leading to Fire 2. 3 nos. of HVLR and 2 nos. of
3 a position during
Pressure hazards MEFG are provided for Dyke-2
operation
3. Auto bleeder 3. Leakage of water or product can lead 2. Visual inspection of Floating
vent is choked to imbalance of rim seal roof roof is done as per schedule
1. Continuous
19. Suitable interlock for low level
pumping out of 1. Auto bleeder vents are
shall be provided to trip the TLF
4 Low Pressure product from the 1. Buckling (implosion) up of tank available which opens when the
pump with outlet ROSOV closure as
tank when roof is roof de-floats
per OISD-STD-244
settled on the legs
High 1. Refer high

5
Temperature pressure deviation
Page 42 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
Low
6 Temperatur 1. Not applicable
e
1. Due to operator
fault while
connecting the
Variation of 1. Mixing up of material leading to 1. Individual pipelines are
7 pipe lines of
composition quality issues provided for different products
simultaneous
product which is
not intended
1. Presence of
water at the 1. Possibility of leak leading to 1. Water level is not maintained
8 Corrosion
bottom of the tank environmental impact. for product tanks
leads to corrosion
1. Improper
continuous to storage tanks and
earthing of tank 1. Leakage of electrical charges
Static tanks are earthed
9 establishing a source of fire in a
Charge 2. Discontinuity in 2. Periodic resistance
electrical bonding measurement is done for earth
in roof rails pits
Page 43 of 74
Revision No. 00
Node-3 : Fixed Roof HSD Storage Tank (TK-08)

S.
No.
1. Tank high level leading to overflow, seal 1. Manual and mechanical level 14. Ensure that tanks shall be provided
damage measurement is available. with at least two numbers of
independent level instruments, Out of
2. Fire and Explosion hazard, these one
2. Fire fighting facilities available shall be of radar type that shall have
Environmental damage
HH alarm. For “H” alarm separate level
indicator shall be utilized.
1. Receipt of the tanks, an independent HH level switch
product in the tank 3. Loss of product shall be provided, operation
1 High Level continuously more 3. Tank farm is under CCTV of which shall auto-actuate shut off of
than the intended surveillance ROSOV in inlet/outlet line of the
quantity respective tank.
15. Ensure periodic testing/calibration

of level indicators of the tank
4. Pressure build up in the tank due to
continuous pumping to tank also can lead
to temperature build up 23. SOP for tank operation in Dyke-1
4. Dedicated manpower present at
shall be reviewed and displayed (in
the site during transfer
Page 44 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Tank high level leading to overflow, seal 14. Ensure that tanks shall be provided
damage with at least two numbers of
these one
shall be of radar type that shall have
HH alarm. For “H” alarm separate level
indicator shall be utilized.
2. Fire and Explosion hazard, In addition to above gauges, in the
Environmental damage tanks, an independent HH level switch
shall be provided, operation
2. ROSOV/Manual of which shall auto-actuate shut off of
valve in the inlet line ROSOV in inlet/outlet line of the
1. Refer above safeguards
in kept/stuck in open respective tank.
position or passing
15. Ensure periodic testing/calibration
3. Loss of product

shall be reviewed and displayed (in
4. Pressure build up in the tank due to English and local language)
continuous pumping to tank also can lead
to temperature build up 18. Ensure periodic
inspection/calibration of ROSOV as a
part of PMS
Page 45 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Tank high level leading to overflow, seal 15. Ensure periodic testing/calibration
damage of level indicators of the tank
14. Ensure that tanks shall be provided

with at least two numbers of
3. 2. Fire and Explosion hazard,
these one
Failure/malfunction Environmental damage shall be of radar type that shall have
1. Manual gauging is done
of the level HH alarm. For “H” alarm separate level
instruments indicator shall be utilized.
tanks, an independent HH level switch
shall be provided, operation
3. Loss of product
of which shall auto-actuate shut off of
ROSOV in inlet/outlet line of the
respective tank.
1. Tank high level leading to overflow shall be reviewed and displayed (in
1. Tank nomination is done English and local language)
4. Wrong
effectively by TWD officer
nomination of tank 2. Fire and Explosion hazard,
during transfer 17. Consider providing ROSOV position
Environmental damage
status in control room as a part of
3. Loss of product 2. Trained/skilled operation automation
Page 46 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
15. Ensure periodic testing/caliberation

1. Malfunction of
1. TLF pump may run dry leading to seal
level measuring 1. Manual gauging is available 19. Suitable interlock for low level shall
leak/ fire hazard
instruments be provided to trip the TLF pump with
outlet ROSOV closure as per OISD-STD-
244
1. Delay in operation due to market surveillance 20. Consider providing MCP for each
demand dyke in tank farm
2. Dyke-1 is of impervious type
2 Low Level 2. Leak/Rupture in
the shell and roof of 21. Consider provision of ESD
the storage tank pushbuttons in tank farm as a part of
3. 3 nos. of HVLR and 2 nos. of automation jobs
2. Creates flammable atmosphere
MEFG are provided for Dyke-1
24. Semi-fixed foam system shall be
provided for TK-08
1. Maintenance of tanks is done
3. Leak/rupture of once in 5 years. UT measurement,
1.. Environmental impact due to ground
bottom plate of bottom plate thickness
water contamination
storage tank measurement are carried out after
maintenance
Page 47 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
19. Suitable interlock for low level shall
1. Manual and mechanical level
4. Continuous be provided to trip the TLF pump with
1. Pump running dry measurement is available.
pumping of product outlet ROSOV closure as per OISD-STD-
2. Open vent is provided
244
5. Leak/Rupture in surveillance
1. Spillage & Fire hazards
the inlet line 2. Pressure testing of pipelines
done periodically
1. Both manual and mechanical
6. Wrong inventory gauging system is available
1. Pump dry run
calculation 2. Tank nomination for TLF loading
is done by TLF/Planning officer
7. Drain valves of the 25. Drain lines shall be provided with

1. Leak leading to fire hazards 1. Valve operation under
tank is kept in open double isolation and lock-closed with
supervision
position or passing seal
2. Loss of product
1. External Fire 1. Pressure buildup in the tank 26. Drencher system at the roof top
1. Drencher system is provided for shall be replaced by Fixed sprinkler
3 High Pressure
2. Vent line is 2. Leak/rupture of tank leading to Fire external cooling system around the tank (TK-08) as per
chocked hazards OISD-STD-117
Page 48 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
3. Leakage of water or product can lead to 2. Visual inspection is done for roof
imbalance of rim seal roof vents
1. Continuous 19. Suitable interlock for low level shall

pumping out of be provided to trip the TLF pump with
4 Low Pressure 1. Buckling (implosion) up of tank 1. Open vents are available
product from the outlet ROSOV closure as per OISD-STD-
tank 244
High 1. Refer high

5
Low
6 1. Not applicable
Temperature
1. Due to operator
fault while
Variation of connecting the pipe 1. Mixing up of material leading to quality 1. Individual pipelines are provided
7
composition lines of simultaneous issues for different products
product which is not
intended
Page 49 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Presence of water
at the bottom of the 1. Possibility of leak leading to 1. Water level is not maintained for
8 Corrosion
tank leads to environmental impact. product tanks
corrosion
1. Improper earthing
continuous to storage tanks and
of tank 1. Leakage of electrical charges
Static tanks are earthed
9 establishing a source of fire in a hazardous
Charge 2. Discontinuity in environment 2. Periodic resistance measurement
electrical bonding in
is done for earth pits
roof rails
Page 50 of 74
Revision No. 00
Node-4 : Ethanol Storage Tanks (TK-13)

S.
No.
1. Proper Planning is done before 27. Consider providing electronic
1. Tank high level leading to overflow transfer and the intake quantity type level measurement/HH Level
which can lead to is fixed. switch for ethanol tanks
1. Fire and explosion hazard 28. Ethanol Dyke drain shall be
2. Loss of product 2. Open path HC detector is
1. Receipt of the routed to OWS with isolation valve
present in the ethanol dyke
product in the tank and position indicator
continuously
2. Pressure build up in the tank due to
29. One point type HC detector shall
continuous pumping to tank also can 3. PV valves are available
be provided for Ethanol dyke drain
lead to temperature build up
1 High Level
1. Proper Planning is done before

1. Tank high level leading to overflow transfer and the intake quantity 30. SOP for ethanol tank operation
is fixed. shall be displayed outside the dyke
2. Manual valve in (in English and local language)
the inlet line is 2. PV valves are available
kept/stuck in open 2. Pressure build up in the tank due to 3. Tank inlet is provided with
position or passing continuous pumping to tank also can 31. Consider providing ROSOV/MOV
double isolation valves
lead to temperature build up in the ethanol tank inlet and outlet
4. Periodic maintenance of lines
manual valves are done
Page 51 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
27. Consider providing electronic
type level measurement/HH Level
3. Wrong inventory switch for ethanol tanks
1. Tank high level leading to overflow 1. Manual gauging is done
calculation 32. Consider providing impervious
dyke arrangement for ethanol
storage
1. Transfer the product done
4. Wrong 1. Tank high level leading to overflow
under supervision
nomination of tank
during unloading 2. Manual level measurement is
2. Product contamination
available
1. Delay in operation 1. Adequate fire fighting facility is 33. Consider providing MCP for
available ethanol storage
2. Spillage
1. Leak/Rupture of
storage tank (TK-13) 3. Fire and explosion hazards 34. Consider provision of ESD
2. Open path HC detector is
pushbuttons in tank farm as a part of
present in the ethanol dyke
2 Low Level 4. Environmental damage automation jobs
2. Manual valve is 30. SOP for ethanol tank operation

1. Manual level measurement is
stuck in open shall be displayed outside the dyke
done
position at outlet 1. Low level in the tank (in English and local language)
due to mechanical 2. Tank outlet is provided with 31. Consider providing ROSOV/MOV
failure double isolation valves in ethanol tank inlet and outlet lines
Page 52 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Open path HC detector is 32. Consider providing impervious
present in the ethanol dyke dyke arrangement for ethanol dyke
1. Spillage & Fire hazards 28. Ethanol Dyke drain shall be
3. Leak/Rupture in 2. Hydro testing of pipelines are
routed to OWS with isolation valve
the outlet line done periodically
and position indicator
2. Tank farm is under CCTV 29. One point type HC detector shall
surveillance be provided for Ethanol dyke drain
4. Continuous 1. Manual level measurement is
pumping of product 1. Possibility of pump running dry done
type level measurement/LL Level
from the tank 2. PV valves are present switch for ethanol tanks
5. Wrong inventory 1. Transfer the product done
1. Possibility of pump running dry type level measurement/LL Level
calculation under supervision
switch for ethanol tanks
6. Drain valve of
the tank is kept in 1. Leak leading to environmental 1. Drain lines are provided with 35. Drain valves of ethanol shall be
open position or damage and fire hazards double isolation kept lock-closed with seal
passing
1. External Fire 1. Manometer is available
1. Leak/rupture of tank leading to Fire
3 High Pressure 2. PV valve is 2. PV valves inspection and
and Explosion hazards
chocked testing are done periodically
Page 53 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Continuous 1. PV valve is available

pumping out of
4 Low Pressure 1. Buckling (implosion) up of tank
product from the
tank 2. Manometer is available
High 1. Refer high

5
Low
6 1. Not applicable
Temperature
1. Possibility of leak leading to

1. Tanks handling 1. Corrosion inhibitor is added to
7 Corrosion 1. Product loss
corrosive fluids tank trucks while unloading
2. Environmental impact
1. Improper
earthing of tank 1. Leakage of electrical charges
Static 1. Pipelines are continuous to
8 2. Discontinuity in establishing a source of fire in a
Charge tanks and tanks are earthed
electrical bonding in hazardous environment
pipelines
Page 54 of 74
Revision No. 00
Node-5 : From Storage Tanks to TLF Gantry via Pump House

Operating Pressure: 2.5 - 4 bar Operating Temperature: Ambient Flow rate: 120 KL/hr of MS
S.
No.
1. Manual and mechanical level
measurement is done
1. No pumping of material from tank
2. Pressure gauge is provided at
1. No level in leading to
pump suction
Storage Tank 1. Delay in operation
2. Pump running dry 2. Tank for dispatch is nominated
by TLF/Planning officer
36. Consider replacing manual valves

at pump discharge with MOV as a
No / part of automation
1
Low flow
2. Manual valve in 1. There is a possibility of damage to
1. Periodic maintenance of 37. Consider providing low pressure
the the pump due to dry running leading
manual valves are done switch at pump suction and high
suction/discharge to fire and explosion
pressure switch at pump discharge
line of pump is
and interlocked to trip the pump and
kept in closed
shut off the discharge MOV
position
38. SOP for TLF pump house to be
2. Dedicated/trained manpower
2. Delay in operation displayed (in English and local
for pump house operation
language)
Page 55 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Open path HC detector is
1. Fire and explosion hazard
installed at TLF pump house
2. Pressure testing of pipelines
3. Leak/Rupture in 2. Wastage of product
are done periodically
the 39. Consider providing MCP in TLF
suction/discharge 3. Dyke wall arrangement routed gantry
line of the pump to OWS is provided for pipeline
3. Environmental hazard manifold in TLF Pump house
4. ESD for TLF is provided in
pump house
1. Strainers are cleaned once in 3
4. Choking of 1. Possibility of damage to the pump months
due to dry running 5. Consider providing differential
strainer in the 2. Standby pumps are available
pressure indicator across suction
suction line of for each product
strainers
pump 3. Pressure gauge is available at
2. Delay in operation
pump suction
1. PM schedule is adhered 7. Ensure TWD and TLF pumps are
5. Failure of pump 1. Delay in operation
2. Standby pumps are available conforming to API standard
6. NRV in the 1. NRV positioning done under 40. Consider providing manual
1. Pressurization of discharge line up
discharge line of supervision of maintenance recirculation valves for pumps to
to NRV
pump is stuck in officer prevent overheating
Page 56 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
closed
3. Pressure gauge at discharge
position/wrongly 2. Delay in operation
ensures fluid flow
positioned
1. PM schedule for
inspection/calibration is adhered
7. Failure of batch with a periodicity of once a year
1. No flow to the respective bays of
controller of
TLF gantry
respective bays 2. TLF gantry operation is
supervised by Gantry officer
1. Simultaneous 1. TLF pumps are operated based

1. Pressurization in discharge line
running of more on requirement in auto mode
than the intended
number of pumps 2. Pressure gauge is provided at
2 High Flow 2. Pressurization in discharge line
pump discharge
2. Malfunction of 1. PM schedule for

automatic flow 3. Possibility of truck overflow inspection/calibration is adhered
meter with a periodicity of once a year
3 Part of 1. Not Applicable
Page 57 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
4 Other than 1. Not Applicable
High
5 Refer High flow
Pressure
6 Low Pressure 1. Not applicable
1. Adequate fire fighting facility is

1. External Fire 1. Fire and Explosion hazard
available
High 39. Consider providing MCP in TLF
7
Temperature gantry
2. Pump is running 2. Open path HC detector is
1. Damage to internals of the pump
dry installed at TLF pump house
Low
8 1. Not applicable
Temperature
1. Pipelines
1. Pipeline may fail causing fire and 1. Corrosion inhibitor is added to
9 Corrosion handling corrosive
explosion hazard tank trucks while unloading
fluids (Ethanol)
Page 58 of 74
Revision No. 00

S.
No.
1. Improper
earthing of
1. Leakage of electrical charges
Static pipelines 1. Pipelines are continuous to
10 establishing a source of fire in a
Charge 2. Discontinuity in tanks and tanks are earthed
electrical bonding
in pipelines
1. Direct contact of 1. PPEs are used while sampling
11 Sampling sample with the 1. Health effect to personnel involved 2. Eye wash/safety shower is
personnel
available near the Gantry
Page 59 of 74
Revision No. 00
APPENDIX 2: OISD 244/118 GAP

ANALYSIS & OISD AUDIT NON
COMPLIANCE
Page 60 of 72
Revision No. 00
OISD 244_ GAP ANALYSIS
S.
Section Questions: Observation Recommendation
No.
5.0 Hazardous Area Classification
It has been observed that the It is recommended to maintain the Hazardous
Are Hazardous area classification
Hazardous area Classification area Classification Documents at site as per
1 done for the systems, Where ever
Documents were not available at OISD 244 and also it should be display in board
required?
site in the location.
6.0 Design and Layout
It has been observed that the
road approaches been provided
Have 2 road approaches been with sand with one way
provided with min one way road movement width of 3.5 meters
movement width of 3.5 meters? It is recommended to provide adequate space
6.1 Layout Philosophy 2
during site visit it is found that for one way road movement.
Is alternative access provided for near T-08 road width is not found
each facility for fire fighting as adequate (One Tree found
which is blocking the road
movement).
The distance between the Rail
Spur to Boundary wall is 19M &
16.6M respectively which is not It is recommended to provide fire resistant
Is Rail spur located close to the
3 meeting as per OISD 244. However construction for boundary wall where the
boundary of the installation?
the fire fighting facility is 15M & distance not meeting.
17.5M which is meeting as per
OISD
Page 61 of 72
Revision No. 00
S.
No.
The Inter distance between the
following facility not meeting as
1, 2, 3,4,5,6 & 8. Where the inter distance
per OISD 244
between the facility to OWS is not meeting. It is
recommended to provide foam system
1. The Inter distance between the
(mobile/fixed) for the OWS and to ensure that
control rooms to OWS is 16 M
OWSs are continuously monitored via CCTVs.
which should be 50M
7. The pool fire radiation of 12.5 kW /m2 will
reach up to a distance of 25.23m. The pool fire
Class A to OWS is <50 M which
radiation of 4 kW/ m2 will reach up to a
should be 50M
distance of 42.32m in 5D weather condition.
Are the inter distances between Considering the effect of radiation based on the
6.3 General Consideration 3. The Inter distance between the
facilities are maintained as per OISD- 12.5kW/m2. it is recommended the following:
for the Layout of the 4 Class B to OWS is <50 M which
244
Facility should be 50M
a. Fire resistant wall around the Fire monitor
and Fire Hydrant raiser.
gantry to OWS is 23M which
b. Also provide the Fire retardant paint for fire
should be 50M
monitor and Fire Hydrant to avoid any damage
in the fire water monitor and Fire hydrant.
Fire water Pump House to OWS is
8. Ensure fire fighting facilities (Fire
30 M which should be 50M
Extinguishers) in Substation conforms to OISD-
STD-117 section-4.6.1 (Table).
Rail Spur to OWS is 12.7 M which
should be 50 M
Page 62 of 74
Revision No. 00
S.
No.

Rail Spur to boundary wall is
16.6M & 19M which should be 20
M.

OWS to Electrical substation is 25
M which should be 45 M
Are drains provided around the T/T
gantry loading platform area?? and It has been observed that the Dain It is recommended to provide the Drain trench
5 whether the Same shall be trench around the TT gantry is not around the TT Gantry and it should be routed to
maintained clean and routed to provided OWS
OWS/ ETP
6.4 Layout of Storage Tanks
Whether aggregate capacity
(Combined safe capacity) of tanks is
being adhered to? Class A product (MS) stored in the
6.4.1 Dyked Enclosures 6 1. 60,000 m3 for group of fixed roof Tank T-04 & T-05 (Dyke-1) which is Consider providing floating roof for MS storage
storage tanks fixed roof tank.
2. 120,000 m3 for group of floating
roof tanks.
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S.
No.
Whether the material used for the
construction of dyke wall is Consider providing impervious dyke for Ethanol
7 Ethanol Dyke is not impervious
impervious (earth, concrete or solid handling dyke.
masonry)?
It has been observed that the dyke
drains are provided inside
periphery of the dyke enclosure
valve and Dyke Drain valves are
provided outside the periphery of
the dyke enclosure valve and the
drains valves are provided with
Are dyke drains provided along the position indicator with visual & 1. Ensure all the tanks Dyke valves are closed
inside periphery of the dyke audio alarm in the control room. position and also ensure Dyke Interconnecting
enclosure valve? The following Drain valves are drain valves are closed and provided with chain
noticed in open condition during lock arrangement with close position tag.
8
Whether dyke drain valves are site visit.
provided with position indicator and 1. Dyke - 2 Drain valve was in open 2. Consider providing Ethanol Tanks dyke drain
alarm in the control room on condition. pit which should be inside periphery of the dyke
operations? Is it working effectively? 2. Dyke -2 Dyke Interconnecting enclosure with Drain valve and position switch.
drain valves was open condition.
3. Dyke -1 Dyke Interconnecting
drain valves was open condition.
There is no Drain pit arrangement
with Drain valve and position
switch is available at Ethanol Dyke
area.
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S.
No.
Whether illumination after sun set is
adequate is it in line with OISD 149?? It has been observed that the Lux
6.4.4 General Consider increasing the required lux level in the
9 Is the lux level of the electrical level has to be improve for Truck
Requirements facility as per OISD 149.
fittings checked periodically? Give parking area as per the discussion
details.
The emergency gate is located in
the licensed and non license area
Is the emergency gate located away and it is found that the path way is Consider providing the emergency route to non
6.4.5 Protection of
10 from the main gate and free from not directly to the main road with congested area i.e. Directly to main road
Facilities:
obstruction? free from obstruction, it is through (Without any obstructions).
lorry parking area and it is very
congested.
7.0 Design Considerations
Are Open/Close push buttons of Also it has been observed that the plant control
ROSOV (Remote Operated Safety room and automation work in progress and
It has been observed that the
valve) provided in field i.e. just hence it is recommended to ensure the control
ROSOSV Open/Close push buttons
outside the dyke? Push button room provided with the below mentioned
provided in field i.e. just outside
7.6.2 Tank Manifold 11 assembly should be mounted at action:
the dyke and Push button
easily visible & accessible place
assembly is mounted at easily
As per MBLR it is recommended not to open /
visible & accessible place.
Is ROSOV is close operation from stop the ROSOV from control room and only the
control room?? close operation should be from control room.
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S.
No.
Only the DYKE no 2 Floating Roof

Is a SIL classification study carried out
& Fixed Roof Tanks are installed
7.10 Dip Hatch/ Sampling 12 as per Part 1 of EN 61511 to Ensure that all the instruments are SIL classified
with Radar type level
determine the required SIL level?
measurement
7.13 Bulk Loading/Unloading Operations

1. Since pump data sheet (Old)
were not available at site.
Are Loading / Unloading Pumps:
1. conforms to relevant API 2. The Earthing/bonding
standards connections apparently sound 1. Ensure that all the pumps are meeting the
API std
(I) Loading/Unloading 2. Earthing/bonding connections 3. It has been observed that the
13
Pumps: apparently sound? TLF pump house HSD pumps are 2. Consider the abnormal vibration-excessive
leaking and product spread noise check to be done and records to be
3. Whether any abnormal vibration- around the pump and also the maintained
excessive noise from pump motors abnormal vibration-excessive
noticed? noise from pump motors not
monitored and also no records has
been maintained in the site.
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S.
No.
Communication system as Hand
siren, ESD and VHF is available for
the following location TWD, TLF
Pump house & TLF GantryESD is
provided in the following
location:1. TWD Pump house with
visual alarm in the control room
and it is integrated with main siren
for audio annunciation, As per the
Whether portable fire extinguishers interlock once the TWD ESD
Consider providing MCP for the following
are in place as per OISD 117? Are pressed the TWD pump will stop
locations:1. TWD Spur area,2. TWD Pump
14 they in place?Whether proper and main siren will start. 2. TLF
house,3. Tank farm area,4. TLF Pump house and
communication system is present? Is Pump house with visual alarm in
Gantry area etc.
it working? the control room and Audio alarm
in the gantry also it is integrated
with main siren for audio
annunciation, As per the interlock
once the TLF - ESD pressed the TLF
pump will stop and main siren will
start also the barrier gate will
open. 3. Dyke valve Position
Indicator - Visual & Audio Alarm in
the control room.
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S.
No.
Are Receiving lines as well as

discharge lines provided with
thermal safety relief device to relieve
pressure due to ambient
temperature rise?.
It has been observed that all the
Ensure that the respective expansion lines valve
tanks are provided with expansion
15 Thermal Safety relief device may is provided with seal arrangement in open
line at inlet to the tank and it is
vent into a tank or piped to OWS position.
routed to respective tanks.
located in safe area. When
connected to tank, whether it is
provided with isolation valve on
either side and break flange/union
on tank side?
Are Automated locations provided

(II) Truck loading with suitable overfill protection Consider providing automation to stop the TLF
16 Batch controllers provided
/unloading gantry system to prevent any overflow and pump in case of batch controller is fails.
hazards arising out of that?
Is the drain lines covered with It has been observed that the Dain It is recommended to provide the Drain trench
17 gratings so as not to endanger trench around the TT gantry is not around the TT Gantry and it should be routed to
movement of personnel? provided OWS
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S.
No.
8.0 Safe Operating Practices in Storage and Handling of Bulk Petroleum Products
Safe Operation Practices:
Is Terminal/depot Control room
8.0 Safe Operating manned on continuous basis during SOP for Wagon unloading
Consider providing the SOP for Wagon Spur
Practices in Storage and operations and in emergency? operation not displayed. However
18 area, TWD pump house, TLF Pump house,
Handling of Bulk TLF gantry loading and unloading
Storage tanks dyke areas and Ethanol dyke area.
Petroleum Products Are SOPs developed and displayed operations are displayed
on the board near the location where
applicable?
Is Silica Gel trap provided in the vent It has been found that the silica
pipe of the tank to prevent ingress of gel is provided for vent pipe of the
moisture into the tank? tank. However the silica gel
8.12 RECEIPT, STORAGE visibility to check the color not
Consider changing the silica gel visible glass to
AND HANDLING OF 19 Regular check on the Color of silica possible due to visible glass is not
check the silica gel condition.
ETHANOL gel shall be maintained (Blue Color) in good condition.
and shall need immediate
replacement on showing signs of Also found that the tank T-11 silica
saturation by way of change of color. gel visible glass is damaged.
a. “SOP” shall be displayed. Persons
handling ethanol shall be trained for
handling of ethanol. It is recommended to provide the SOP and
SOP for Ethanol dyke is not
20 b. Emergency instructions, emergency instruction for the Ethanol storage
available.
Hazardous instruction shall be dyke
displayed and PPE as per MSDS
requirement shall be in place.
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S.
No.
9.0 Fire Protection Facilities: (The Fire Protection Facilities for Petroleum Depots and Terminals, The minimum requirement for the design of the system shall
be as per OISD STD 117)
Is Appropriate annunciation system
available to ensure all the alarms
generated, both, audio & visual are
HC detector is located in the
reported to the installation
hazardous area and the detection
personnel at local and remote Consider providing Visual and Audio Alarm
9.3 H C DETECTION & indication (Visual & Audio) alarm
21 control panel? repeated at additional location of security room
ANNUNCIATION is provided in the control room
to ensure corrective action is taken.
and provision of Audio Alarm is in
The alarms both, audio and visual
under progress
can be repeated at additional
location to ensure corrective action is
taken.
Is Fire water pumps & storage is
located far away from the potential
30M away from any leak sources.
leak sources / tankages are and
9.2.6 Fire Protection However the Firewater pump Consider providing one Fixed or mobile Foam
22 shall be at least 30 M (minimum)
System: Fire Water Tank house should be 50 M away from monitor
away from equipment or where
OWS - 2 which is not meeting
hydrocarbons are handled or
stored.
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S.
No.
It has been observed that, the
Installations where inter distances
inter distance between the
between tanks in a dyke and / or
Storage tanks are not met and
within dykes are not conforming to
hence the system is provided with
the extant provisions of OISD-STD-
the following arrangement.I). The
118 / 244, the following additional
fixed water sprays system 3 LPM Ensure that the fire Drencher on tank TK-8 is
facilities shall be provided to
is provided for all tanks in Dyke replaced with fixed water sprays system & Fixed
23 enhance safety. I). The fixed water
No.1 and 3LPM & 1 LPM is or semi fixed foam system is provided during
sprays system on all tanks,
provided for all tanks in Dyke No:2 MBLR works.
irrespective of diameter in the
installations. II). The Fixed or semi
installations. II). The Fixed or semi
fixed foam system on all tanks,
fixed foam system on all tanks,
installation.
installation.
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APPENDIX 3: ATTENDANCE SHEETS
Page 72 of 72
Revision No. 00
Session on 29th February 2016
Session on 01st March 2016
Page 73 of 72
Revision No. 00
Session on 02nd March 2016
Page 74 of 74
Quantitative Risk Assessment
For
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
POL Terminal, Desur
Conducted by
Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd.

(An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Company)
Chennai, India
www.cholarisk.com
March 2016
Page 1 of 98
QRA Study report of BPCL POL Terminal - Desur
Document ID: QRA/SR/BPCL/15-16/19
Revision No. 00
DOCUMENT HISTORY
S. Revision Comment/Nature of
Document Identification
No. No. Date changes
Preparation of original
1 QRA/SR/BPCL/15-16/19 00 09.03.2016
document
Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

Gopal Mani
Manager
Karthikeyan. S
&
Dy. General Manager
Mohamed Thaslim. M
Dy. Manager
Bharat petroleum
Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd
corporation Ltd.,
Page 2 of 98
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Disclaimer
This report is for the sole use by BPCL for the purpose for which they have claimed it is required. We
are not responsible to any other person/party for any decision of such person/party based on this
report. It is hereby notified that reproduction, copying or otherwise quoting of our report or any part
thereof other than the aforementioned purpose, can be done only with our prior permission.
The report cannot be used or relied by BPCL for any other purpose or any other third party for any
purpose whatsoever and we will not be liable which BPCL may incur on this account including in tort
(including but not limited to negligence) arising out of or in connection with this Report. This Report
is not intended to identify all hazards which may exist nor is it intended to be an exhaustive review
of all possible eventualities. The recommendations for risk improvement contained in the report are
purely advisory and the decision and responsibility for implementation rests with BPCL.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Cholamandalam MS Risk Services gratefully acknowledges the co-operation received from the
management of BPCL, Desur during the study. The CMSRSL team in particular would like to thank the
following for their support and help throughout the study.
Mr. Milind Rangate – Location In charge
Mr. Anish Ramesan – Assistant Manager (HSSE)
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ALARP : As Low As Reasonably Practicable
BPCL : Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
CMSRS : Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd.
HAC : Hazardous Area Classification
HAZOP : Hazard & Operability Study
HC : Hydrocarbon
HSD : High Speed Diesel
MBLR : M B Lal Recommendations
MOV : Motor Operated Valve
MS : Motor Spirit
NRV : Non-return valve
OISD : Oil Industry Safety Directorate
P&ID : Piping & Instrumentation Diagram
PSV : Pressure Safety Valve
PM : Preventive maintenance
POL : Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants
PRV : Pressure Relief Valve
ROSOV : Remote Operated Shutoff Valve
QRA : Quantitative Risk Assessment
SOP : Standard Operating Practices
TFMS : Tank farm Management System
TLF : Truck Lorry Filling
Page 5 of 98
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................................................... 4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... 5
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 12
1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 13
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY ........................................................................................................... 13
1.3 ABOUT THE CONSULTANTS .................................................................................................. 14
1.4 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED ................................................................................................... 14
CHAPTER 2: FACILITY DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................ 16
2.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................ 17
CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTION TO QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................... 19
3.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................... 20
3.2 RISK CONCEPT...................................................................................................................... 20
3.3 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE ............................................................................................ 21
3.3.1 SOFTWARE USED ................................................................................................................. 23
CHAPTER 4: RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 24
4.1 QRA METHODOLGY .............................................................................................................. 25
4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RELEASE SCENARIOS ..................................................... 26
4.3 FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS........................................................................ 26
4.4 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS ............................................................................................... 28
4.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS............................................................................................ 29
4.5.1 SOURCE STRENGTH PARAMETERS ....................................................................................... 29
4.5.2 CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS ................................................................................................... 29
4.6 SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA ........................................................................................ 30
4.7 PROBABILITIES ..................................................................................................................... 32
4.7.1 POPULATION PROBABILITIES ............................................................................................... 32
4.7.2 FAILURE / ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES .................................................................................... 32
4.7.3 WEATHER PROBABILITIES .................................................................................................... 33
4.7.4 IGNITION PROBABILITIES ..................................................................................................... 35
4.7.5 MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................................. 36
CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 37
5.1 SCENARIOS .......................................................................................................................... 38
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5.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 39

5.3 SUMMARY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS:............................................................................... 41
CHAPTER 6: RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 51
6.1 FREQUENCY CALCULATIONS ................................................................................................. 52
6.2 RISK PRESENTATION ............................................................................................................. 54
CHAPTER 7: RISK CONTROL MEASURES .......................................................................................... 56
7.1 EXISTING RISK CONTROL MEASURES ..................................................................................... 57
7.2 RISK ACCEPTANCE ................................................................................................................ 59
7.3 RISK CONTROL MEASURES SUGGESTED ................................................................................ 60
CHAPTER 8: REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 62
8.1 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 63
CHAPTER 9: ANNEXURES................................................................................................................. 64
Annexure-1: Event Tree Analysis...................................................................................................... 65
Annexure-2: Layout of Installation ................................................................................................... 98
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LIST OF TABLES
Table-1: Storage facilities at BPCL- Desur ............................................................................ 17

Table 2: Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation...................................................... 31
Table 3: Effects due to Incident Radiation Intensity ............................................................. 31
Table 4: Damage Due To Overpressures .............................................................................. 32
Table 5: LOC Scenarios identified for the study ................................................................... 38
Table 6: Flammable Gas Dispersion results.......................................................................... 41
Table 7: Jet Fire Results ....................................................................................................... 43
Table 8: Pool Fire Results .................................................................................................... 45
Table 9: Vapour Cloud Explosion Results ............................................................................. 47
Table 10: Accident Event Frequency .................................................................................... 52
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL) intends to conduct the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
study for the POL terminal located at Desur. M/s Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd (CMSRSL) was
approached for QRA consultancy service for the project. Accordingly the specialists from the CMSRSL
carried out the site visit from 29th February to 02nd March, 2016. Based on the site study, potential
scenarios, which can cause significant consequences like fire, explosion etc were identified, and the
consequences of the scenarios were assessed using the software PHAST v6.7 software and the risk
levels were evaluated using Phast Risk v6.7 developed by DNV.
Overall Individual Risk
8.75E-005 per avg.year
Overall Societal Risk
With reference to the risk acceptance criteria specified by HSE, UK in IS 15656:2006 - Code of
Practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis it is observed that the risk levels of the facility are
in ALARP region. However if all the existing risk control measures are followed, in addition to the
Risk Control measures recommended in this report, the risks levels can be maintain in ALARP level or
brought down to acceptable limits.
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The following risk control measures are recommended in addition to the existing risk control
measures to bring down the risk levels:
Ensure level control systems in storage tanks that are being implemented are conforming to
OISD-STD-244 section-7.11 (ii) and Annexure-1
Suitable interlocks to be provided in storage tanks in case of HH level, Low level as per OISD-STD-
244 section-8.2 (x)
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) of the tank level control must be implemented and independent
overfill protection meeting the requirement of Part 1 of EN 61511 shall be provided. Ensure that
all the instruments in the level control loop are SIL rated. (Recommendation based on MB Lal
Committee report on Jaipur Terminal Fire).
Provide ESD pushbuttons in tank farm area.
Hydro carbon detector shall be provided for Ethanol dyke drain as per OISD-STD-244 section-9.3
(ii).
Ensure tank TK-08 in Dyke-1 is provided with fixed water spray & Foam pourer system.
Ensure all the tanks in Dyke – 1 is provided with MOV at the upstream of the ROSOV instead of
manual valve
ROSOV operation shall be as per MBLR section-10.3 (b)
Tank drain lines shall be provided with double isolation and lock-closed with seal
Ethanol Dyke drain shall be routed to OWS with isolation valve and position indicator.
Provide ROSOV/MOV in the Ethanol tank inlet and outlet lines and also provide level control
system interlock with ROSOV.
Impervious dyke arrangement shall be provide for Ethanol storage.
Minimum flow protection (recirculation line) for TLF Pumps shall be provided for centrifugal
pumps in order to prevent failures due to low flow conditions (overheating). This is in
accordance with OISD-STD-119.
Ensure preventive maintenance schedule for products pumps are conforming to OISD-STD-119
(Annexure-2)
Periodical inspection and calibration of various types of instruments shall be followed as per
OISD-STD-153.
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Conclusion:
Risk control measures are followed, in addition to the risk Control measures recommended in this
report, the risks levels can be maintain in ALARP level or brought down to acceptable limits.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL) intends to conduct the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
study for the 20 POL locations in Southern region as per the DMP plan 2014. Cholamandalam MS
Risk Services Ltd. (CMSRSL), a specialist in Process Safety as consultant carried out the Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA) for BPCL POL Desur location. Accordingly the experts from the CMSRSL
carried out the site visit from 29th February to 02nd March, 2016.
The purpose of the study includes the following:
To identify and assess those hazards and risks arising from their activities connected to the BPCL
Desur installation that require management to comply with regulatory requirements, company
policy and business requirements
To eliminate or reduce to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) in terms of risk to human
health, risk of injury, risk of damage to plant, equipment and environment, business interruption
or loss etc.
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

The main scope of the study is to carry out the QRA as per the Indian Standard IS-15656:2006 Code
of practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, including identification, screening and ranking
of various risk scenarios, consequence analysis of the various risk scenarios, recommendation and
preparation of reports and relevant drawing showing damage and risk contours.
The scope of the QRA is given below:
a. To conduct Consequence analysis for various identified credible emergency scenarios covering
all facilities within BPCL premises like tank farm, tank lorry filling gantry, product pump houses,
oil water sewers, transfer product pipelines, product pipeline exchange pit manifold, Electrical
Substation, Fire pump house, T/L parking area etc., including all catastrophic situations.
Consequences will consider onsite and offsite effects of the overall installation of the facilities.
b. To tabulate the consequences in terms of distances to radiation levels, Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL) and explosion overpressure for different weather classes according to specific damage
criteria and threshold limits.
c. To verify and prevent risk of the facility in terms of individual and societal risk levels.
d. To provide mitigation measures commensurate with the risk evaluated including action plan at
this location.
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e. Provide necessary mitigation measures for all credible scenarios. Approaches need to be
explored as alternate mitigating measures where the buildings/units in the existing layout within
the installation area at fixed locations and it is not practical /feasible to provide the prescribed
separation distances.
1.3 ABOUT THE CONSULTANTS

CMSRSL is a joint venture between the Murugappa Group and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group of
Japan. CMSRSL is an approved HSE consultant of Kuwait Oil Company. CMSRSL offers specialized and
innovative risk management solutions to clients in India and rest of Asia. CMSRSL has carried out
consultancy and training services to over 2500 units/locations of various organizations belonging to
32 industrial sectors including refineries and petrochemical units. In addition to industrial sector and
service sector located in Kuwait, India, Hong Kong and Thailand, the Ministry of Environment and
Forests, Government of India and insurance companies located in India, Sri Lanka and Singapore
have been engaging the services of CMSRSL to carry out a number of risk Assessment and specialized
safety studies. CMSRSL also carries out similar studies for companies like Kuwait Oil Company,
located outside India. The team members have wide experience in risk management studies and
have carried out studies for a number of industrial sectors including refineries located in India and
rest of Asia.
1.4 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED

Detailed data request for risk Assessment study was submitted to the client before carrying out site
visit to familiarize the site officials on the nature of information that would be collected during site
visit. During site visit, CMSRS engineers had made a brief presentation to the site officials on the
objective, scope, methodology and deliverables of the risk Assessment study. Subsequently, site visit
was carried out for the entire facility to identify the potential hazard scenarios.
Then Risk Assessment calculations based on the collected data have been carried out at CMSRS
office using PHAST Risk v6.7 software. Finally, risk reduction measures have been suggested based
on the risk levels.
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The above adopted methodology has been depicted in the form of flow chart below:
Introduction to study
Site visit, data collection and

discussion with BPCL engineers
Data input into Risk Analysis

software
Consequence and Risk assessment

of identified LOC scenarios
Risk presentation and

Recommendations
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CHAPTER 2: FACILITY DESCRIPTION
Page 16 of 98
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2.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

M/S Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), a Government of India Enterprise, is engaged in
Refining, Storage and Marketing of Petroleum products.
The Depot is set up near Zadshapur Village at Desur in Belgaum District of Karnataka State. The plant
was commissioned in year 1997. It is 12 kms from Belgaum towards Goa on Khanapur Road. The
depot covers about 25 acres of land. The nearest Airport is situated at Sambra around 35 kms away
from Depot. Nearest major Railway Station is Belgaum which is around 11 kms from depot. The
water source for domestic and fire fighting is underground water. The site is connected by road and
rail. The site is situated on the Broad Gauge line connecting Belgaum and Londa. The TWDS facility is
common for BPCL, HPCL and IOCL
Receipt: It is engaged in receiving petroleum products viz. Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel
(HSD), Superior Kerosene (SKO), through Tank Wagons from Hassan, Panewadi, and Irimpanam etc.
Storage: The products are stored in above ground/underground tanks having a total capacity of
16798 KL.
Delivery: The terminal supplies Motor Spirit (MS) and High Speed Diesel (HSD) to 190 retail outlets
and HSD to 7 direct customers in Belgaum and its neighboring revenue districts. The terminal caters
to 7 revenue districts viz. Belgaum, Dharwad, Bagalkot, Bijapur, Gadag, Haveri to part North Kanara.
The following table depicts the various materials stored at BPCL Desur Installation:
Table-1: Storage facilities at BPCL- Desur
Tank Tank
S. Material Inventory
Storage dia Ht/Lt Type of tank
No stored (m3)
(m) (m)
DYKE-1
1 TK-04 MS 1304 11 14.38 Aboveground
2 TK-05 MS 817 9 13.5 Aboveground
3 TK-06 HSD 817 9 13.5 Aboveground
4 TK-07 HSD 2267 14.025 15 Aboveground
5 TK-08 HSD 2262 14.025 15 Aboveground
DYKE-2
6 TK-15 MS 2387 17 12 Aboveground
7 TK-16 HSD 5967 24 15 Aboveground
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Tank Tank
S. Material Inventory
Storage dia Ht/Lt Type of tank
No stored (m3)
(m) (m)
ETHANOL DYKE
8 TK-11 Ethanol 20 2 6.718 Aboveground
9 TK-12 Ethanol 20 2 6.718 Aboveground
10 TK-13 Ethanol 45 2.75 8.25 Aboveground
UNDERGROUND STORAGE
11 TK-01 HSD 97 3.2 12.6 Underground
12 TK-02 MS 97 3.2 12.6 Underground
13 TK-03 HSD 97 3.2 12.6 Underground
14 TK-14 MS 188 4 16.2 Underground
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CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTION TO
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
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3.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk Assessment is proven valuable as a management tool in assessing the overall safety
performance of the chemical process Industry. Although management systems such as engineering
codes, checklists, and reviews by experienced engineers have provided substantial safety
assurances, major incidents involving numerous casualties, injuries and significant damage can occur
– as illustrated by recent world-scale catastrophes. Risk Assessment techniques provide advanced
quantitative means to supplement other hazard identification, analysis, assessment, and control and
management methods to identify the potential for such incidents and to evaluate control strategies.
The underlying basis of risk Assessment is simple in concept. It offers methods to answer the
following four questions:
1. What can go wrong?
2. What are the causes?
3. What are the consequences?
4. How likely is it?
This study tries to quantify the risks to rank them accordingly based on their severity and probability.
The report should be used to understand the significance of existing control measures and to follow
the measures continuously. Wherever possible the additional risk control measures should be
adopted to bring down the risk levels.
3.2 RISK CONCEPT

Risk in general is defined as a “measure of potential economic loss or human injury in terms of the
probability of the loss or injury occurring and magnitude of the loss or injury if it occurs”. Risk thus
comprises of two variables:
Magnitude of consequences and;
The probability of occurrence.
The results of risk Assessment are often reproduced as Individual and groups risks and are defined as
below.
Individual Risk is the “probability of death occurring as a result of accidents at a plant, installation or
a transport route expressed as a function of the distance from such an activity”. It is the frequency at
which an individual or an individual within a group may be expected to sustain a given level of harm
(typically death) from the realization of specific hazards. Such a risk actually exists only when a
person is permanently at that spot (out of doors).
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The exposure of an individual is related to:

The likelihood of occurrence of an event involving a release;
Ignition of hydrocarbon;
The vulnerability of the person to the event;
The proportion of time the person will be exposed to the event (which is termed 'occupancy'
in the QRA terminology).
The second definition of risk involves the concept of the summation of risk from events involving
many fatalities within specific population groups. This definition is focused on the risk to society
rather than to a specific individual and is termed Societal Risk. In relation to the process operations
we can identify specific groups of people who work on or live close to the installation; for example
communities living or working close to the plant.
3.3 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

Hazard identification and risk assessment involves a series of steps as follows:
Step 1: Identification of the Hazard

Hazard identification is a critical step in Risk Assessment. Many aids are available, including
experience, engineering codes, checklists, detailed process knowledge, equipment failure
experience, hazard index techniques, What-if Analysis, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies,
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). In this phase all
potential incidents are identified and tabulated. Site visit and study of operations and documents
like drawings, process write-up etc are used for hazard identification.
Step 2: Assessment of the Risk

Consequence estimation is the methodology used to determine the potential for damage or injury
from specific incidents. A single incident (e.g. rupture of a pressurized flammable liquid tank) can
have many distinct incident outcomes (E.g. Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE), Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), flash fire, etc.)
Likelihood assessment is the methodology used to estimate the frequency or probability of

occurrence of an incident. Estimates may be obtained from historical incident data on failure
frequencies or from failure sequence models, such as fault trees and event trees. In this study the
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historical data developed by software models and those collected by CPR18E – Committee for
Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands (Edition: PGS 3, 2005) are used.
Risks arising from the hazards are evaluated for its tolerability to personnel, the facility and the
environment. The acceptability of the estimated risk must then be judged based upon criteria
appropriate to the particular situation.
Step 3: Elimination or Reduction of the Risk

This involves identifying opportunities to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of an accident
Where deemed to be necessary.
Risk assessment combines the consequences and likelihood of all incident outcomes from all
selected incidents to provide a measure of risk. The risk of all selected incidents are individually
estimated and summed to give an overall measure of risk.
Risk-reduction measures include those to prevent incidents (i.e. reduce the likelihood of occurrence)
to control incidents (i.e. limit the extent and duration of a hazardous event) and to mitigate the
effects (i.e. reduce the consequences). Preventive measures, such as using inherently safer designs
and ensuring asset integrity, should be used wherever practicable.
In many cases, the measures to control and mitigate hazards and risks are simple and obvious and
involve modifications to conform to standard practice. The general hierarchy of risk reducing
measures is:
Prevention (by distance or design);

Detection (E.g. fire and gas, Leak detection);
Control (E.g. emergency shutdown and controlled depressurization);
Mitigation (E.g. fire fighting and passive fire protection);
Emergency response (In case safety barriers fail).
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3.3.1 SOFTWARE USED
PHAST v6.7 and PHAST Risk v6.7
The software developed by DNV is used for risk assessment studies involving flammable and toxic
hazards where individual and societal risks are also to be identified. It enables the user to assess the
physical effects of accidental releases of toxic or flammable chemicals.
PHAST v6.7 is used for consequence calculations and PHAST Risk v6.7 is used for risk calculations. It
contains a series of up to date models that allow detailed modeling and quantitative assessment of
release rate pool evaporation, atmospheric dispersion, vapor cloud explosion, combustion, heat
radiation effects from fires etc., The software is developed based on the hazard model given in TNO
Yellow Book as the basis.
The software is developed based on the various incidents that had occurred over past 25 years.
CMSRS has used the latest version of PHAST software for developing the consequences and risks for
each model.
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CHAPTER 4: RISK ASSESSMENT

METHODOLOGY
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4.1 QRA METHODOLGY
Define the Goal (Statutory, Emergency

Planning, Consequence, Etc.
Location, Layout, Process Parameters
Hazard Identification
Quantification of Hazard
Select most Credible Scenario Select Worst Case Scenario
Frequency Estimation Estimate Consequence
Estimate Effect of Damage
Is Risk Yes
End
Acceptable?
Recommendation
No to reduce the
Estimate Frequency of Occurrence consequence
Estimate Risk
Prioritize and Reduce Risk
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4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RELEASE SCENARIOS

Containment is defined as one or several devices; any parts which are permanently in open contact
with one another, and which are intended to contain one or multiple substances. A Loss of
Containment is one containment system that will not lead to the release of significant quantities of
hazardous substance from other containment systems.
The following data were collected to envisage scenarios:
Composition of materials stored in storage tanks/flowing through pipeline;
Inventory of materials stored in storage tanks/tank trucks;
Flow rate of materials passing through pipelines;
Storage tanks/pipeline conditions (phase, temperature, pressure);
Connecting piping and piping dimensions.
Accidental release of flammable liquids/gases can result in severe consequences. Delayed ignition of
flammable gases can result in blast overpressures covering large areas. This may lead to extensive
loss of life and property. In contrast, fires have localized consequences. Fires can be put out or
contained in most cases; there are few mitigating actions one can take once a flammable gas or a
vapor cloud gets released. Major accident hazards arise, therefore, consequent upon the release of
flammable gases.
4.3 FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

In any installation, main hazard arises due to loss of containment during handling of flammable
chemicals. To formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards, an understanding of
contributory factors is essential.
Inventory
Inventory analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short listing of
release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential hazard. Larger the
inventory of a vessel or a system, larger is the quantity of potential release. A practice commonly
used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks and major releases from fractures of
pipelines and vessels/tanks containing sizable inventories.
Parameters
Potential vapor release for the same material depends significantly on the operating conditions. This
operating range is enough to release a large amount of vapor in case of a leak/rupture, therefore the
storage tank/pipeline leaks and ruptures need to be considered in the risk assessment calculations.
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Blast overpressures depend upon the reactivity class of material and the amount of gas between
two explosive limits. For example, LPG once released and not ignited immediately is expected to give
rise to a vapor cloud. These vapors in general have medium reactivity and in case of confinement of
the gas cloud, on delayed ignition may result in an explosion and overpressures.
Initiating Events
The range of initiating events and incidents covered affects both complexity of study and number of
incident outcome cases. This not only reflects the inclusion of accidents and/or non-accident-
initiated events, but also the size of those events.
For instance, studies may evaluate one or more of the following:
Catastrophic failure of storage tanks, tank trucks and process vessels
Large hole (large continuous release)
Small hole (continuous release)
Leaks at fittings or valves (small continuous release)
In general, quantitative studies do not include very small continuous releases or short duration small
releases if past experience or preliminary consequence modeling shows that such releases do not
contribute to the overall risk levels.
Selection of initiating events and incidents
The selection of initiating events and incidents should take into account the goals or objectives of the
study and the data requirements. The data requirements increase significantly when non-accident –
initiated events are included and when the number of release size increase. While the potential range
of release sizes is tremendous, groupings are both appropriate and necessitated by data restrictions.
The main reasons for including release sizes other than the catastrophic rupture are to reduce the
conservatism in an analysis and to better understand the relative contributions to risk of small versus
large releases.
There may be number of accidents that may occur quite frequently, but due to proper control
measures or fewer quantities of hydrocarbons released, they are controlled effectively. A few
examples are a leak from a gasket, pump or valve, release of a chemical from a vent or relief valve,
and fire in a pump due to overheating. These accidents generally are controlled before they escalate
by using control systems and monitoring devices.
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4.4 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS

Considering the present case the outcomes expected are:
Jet fires
Pool Fire
Flammable Gas Dispersion
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)
Note: In this study, “toxic effects are not applicable”
Jet fires
Jet fire occurs when a pressurized release (of a flammable gas or vapor) is ignited by any source.
They tend to be localized in effect and are mainly of concern in establishing the potential for domino
effects and employee safety zones rather than for community risks.
The jet fire model is based on the radiant fraction of total combustion energy, which is assumed to
arise from a point slowly along the jet flame path. The jet dispersion model gives the jet flame
length.
Pool fires
This represents a situation when flammable liquid spillage forms a pool over a liquid or solid surface
and gets ignited. Flammable liquids can be involved in pool fires where they are stored and
transported in bulk quantities.
Early pool fire is caused when the steady state is reached between the outflow of flammable
material from the container and complete combustion of the flammable material when the ignition
source is available. Late pool fires are associated with the difference between the release of material
and the complete combustion of the material simultaneously. Late pool fires are common when
large quantity of flammable material is released within short time.
Flammable Gas Dispersion

Flammable vapors, after loss of containment, will normally spread in the direction of the wind. If it
finds an ignition source before being dispersed to below its Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), a flash
fire is likely to result and the flame may travel back to source of the release. Any person caught in a
flash fire is likely to suffer fatal burn injuries.
Typically the burning zone is defined as ½ LFL and LFL limit back to the release point, even though
the vapor concentration might be above UFL.
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Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Vapor cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent
dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapor cloud. Turbulence is the governing
factor in blast generation, which could intensify combustion to the level that will result in an
explosion. Obstacles in the path of vapor cloud or when the cloud finds a confined area, e.g. as
under the bullets, often create turbulence. The VCE will result in overpressures.
4.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS

In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the physical
effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the damage (lethality, injury,
material destruction) of the effects.
Accidental release of flammable liquids can result in severe consequences. Immediate ignition of the
pressurized chemical will result in a jet flame. Delayed ignition of flammable vapors can result in
blast overpressures covering large areas.
The calculations can roughly be divided in three major groups:
a. Determination of the source strength parameters;
b. Determination of the consequential effects;
c. Determination of the damage or damage distances.
The basic physical effect models consist of the following.
4.5.1 SOURCE STRENGTH PARAMETERS

Calculation of the outflow of liquid vapors out of a vessel/tank or a pipe, in case of rupture.
Also two-phase outflow can be calculated.
Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the
dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.
Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool
dimensions and wind velocity.
Source strength equals pump capacities, etc. in some cases.
4.5.2 CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS

Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength, relative
density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical situation of the surrounding area.
Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire or a BLEVE, as a function of the distance
to the source.
Energy of vapor cloud explosions [in N/m2], as a function of the distance to the distance of
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the exploding cloud.

Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of evaporated
chemical. The latter can be either explosive or toxic.
It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study strongly
depend upon the type of material involved:
Gas, vapor, liquid, solid?
Inflammable, explosive, toxic, toxic combustion products?
Stored at high/low temperatures or pressure?
Controlled outflow (pump capacity) or catastrophic failure?
4.6 SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA

The damage criteria give the relation between the extents of the physical effects (exposure) and the
effect of consequences. For assessing the effects on human beings consequences are expressed in
terms of injuries and the effects on equipment / property in terms of monetary loss.
The effect of consequences for explosion or fire can be categorized as:
Damage caused by heat radiation on material and people
Damage caused by explosion on structure and people
In consequence analysis studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are
distinguished:
1. Heat radiation due to fires - in this study, the concern is that of Jet fires and pool fires
2. Explosions
3. Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.
In this study, “toxic effects are not applicable”.
The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure. Following are
the criteria selected for damage estimation:
Heat Radiation
The effect of fire on a human being is in the form of burns. There are three categories of burn such
as first degree, second degree and third degree burns. The consequences caused by exposure to
heat radiation are a function of:
2
The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m ];
The exposure duration [sec];
The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).
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The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for second-degree
burns are given in the table below:
Table 2: Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation
Exposure Radiation energy Radiation energy (2nd Radiation energy (1st
Duration (1% lethality), kW/m2 degree burns), kW/m2 degree burns), kW/m2
10 sec 21.2 16 12.5
30 sec 9.3 7.0 4.0
Table 3: Effects due to Incident Radiation Intensity

Incident Radiation Type of Damage
(kW/m2)
0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation
1.6 No discomfort for long exposure
Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first degree burns are
4.0
likely)
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. second degree burns after 20 sec.
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing
12.5
etc.
37.5 Heavy Damage to process equipments
Reference: CCPS, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis

The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the models arising
out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and others. The radiation
output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and the flame
temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide and water vapor in the
intervening atmosphere. Finally the incident flux at an observer location would depend upon the
radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance from the flame surface, the observer’s
orientation and the flame geometry.
As per the guidelines of CPR 18 E Purple Book:
The lethality of a jet fire and pool fire is assumed to be 100% for the people who are caught
in the flame. Outside the flame area, the lethality depends on the heat radiation distances.
For the flash fires, lethality taken as 100% for all the people caught outdoors and for 10%
who are indoors within the flammable cloud. No fatality has been assumed outside the flash
fire area.
Overpressure more than 0.3 bar corresponds approximately with 50% lethality.
An overpressure above 0.2 bar would result in 10% fatalities.
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An overpressure less than 0.1 bar would not cause any fatalities to the public.
100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within the cloud proper.
Table 4: Damage Due To Overpressures
Peak
Damage Type Description
Overpressure
0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment structure
0.10 bar Moderate Damage Repairable damage to plant equipment and structure
0.03 bar Significant Damage Shattering of glass
0.01 bar Minor Damage Crack in glass
4.7 PROBABILITIES
4.7.1 POPULATION PROBABILITIES
It is necessary to know the population exposure in order to estimate the consequences and the risk
resulting from an incident. The exposed population is often defined using a population density.
Population densities are an important part of a QRA for several reasons. The most notable is that the
density is typically used to determine the number of people affected by a given incident with a
specific hazard area. Sometimes, population data are available in sketchy forms. In the absence of
specific population data default categories can be used.
The population density can be averaged over the whole area that may be affected or the area can be
subdivided into any number of segments with a separate population density for each individual
segment.
In this study, based on the discussions with BPCL officials, the following population data were
considered for the study for the habitations located in the vicinity of the facility.
Inside Plant facility :109
Outside BPCL facility within 1 Km : 200
4.7.2 FAILURE / ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES

The failure data is taken from CPR 18E – Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, developed by
the Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands.
The impacts due to internal domino effects are not explicitly covered in QRA. An internal domino
needs to be considered only in case of a situation in which the failure of one component clearly
leads to the failure of another component. As the biggest vessel/ tank are considered for
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instantaneous failure the impact due to internal domino effects are assumed to get covered in the
analysis.
Event Tree Analysis

A release can result in several possible outcomes or scenarios (fire, explosions, unignited release
etc.). This is because the actual outcome depends on other events that may or may not occur
following the initial release. Event tree analysis is used to identify potential outcomes of a release
and to quantify the risk associated with each of these outcomes.
The sample event tree is shown below.
Initiating F&G Fire Probability
Probability Explosion Outcome
Event Detection Protection of Delayed Event Outcome
of Ignition Probability Frequency
Frequency System System Ignition
Success
0.80 YY
Controlled, Protected Jet/pool Fire
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 YY
Controlled unprotected Jet/pool Fire
6.50E-02
Fail
0.60 YY Uncontrolled Jet/pool Fire
XX Success
0.80 YY Unignited, Protected Release
Explosion
Success 0.40 YY VCE
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 YY Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
9.35E-01 YY Unignited Release
Explosion
0.40 YY VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
0.60 YY Flash Fire
No
9.35E-01 YY Unignited Release
Please refer Annexure 1 for Event Tree Analysis for all storage tanks, tank truck, pipelines and
unloading arms.
4.7.3 WEATHER PROBABILITIES

As per CPR 18E there are 6 representative weather classes:
Stability Class Wind Speed
B Medium
D Low
D Medium
D High
E Medium
F Low
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Low wind speed corresponds with 1-2 m/s

Medium wind speed corresponds with 3-5 m/s
High wind speed corresponds with 8-9 m/s
Observations in the Pasquill stability classes C, C/D and D are allocated to stability class D. Wind
speeds below 2.5 m/s, between 2.5 m/s and 6 m/s and above 6 m/s are allocated to the wind speed
categories low, medium and high respectively.
Wind Speed A B B/C C C/D D E F
-1
<2.5 m s D Low F Low
B Medium
2.5-6 m s -1 D Medium E Medium
The wind speed in each weather class is equal to the average wind speed of the observations in the
weather class.
For this study, as per the standard meteorological data available for the site, wind velocity varies
between
« 1.5 F (Where F denotes Stable Condition – night with moderate clouds and light
moderate winds; 1.5 denotes wind velocity in m /sec)
« 5.0 D (where D denotes neutral condition – little sun and high wind or over cast / windy
night;
In general the largest effect distance for release of substances is found with stable weather.
Temperature and Relative Humidity:
Based on climatological data from the Indian Meteorological Department, an average temperature
of 25°C and relative humidity of 63% is found pre-dominant in Desur.
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4.7.4 IGNITION PROBABILITIES

Immediate Ignition Probability:
Immediate ignition can be considered as the situation where the fluid ignites immediately on release
through auto-ignition or because the accident which causes the release also provided an ignition
source. Immediate ignition probability is assumed based on the Reference manual BEVI risk
assessments version 3.2, developed by the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment
(RIVM), Centre for External Safety, Netherlands.
Probability of Immediate Ignition
Source term Source term Probability of

Substance category
Continuous Instantaneous direct ignition
< 10 kg/s < 1,000 kg 0.2
Category 0
10 – 100 kg/s 1000 – 10,000 kg 0.5
average/ high reactivity
> 100 kg/s > 10,000 kg 0.7
< 10 kg/s < 1,000 kg 0.02
Category 0
10 – 100 kg/s 1000 – 10,000 kg 0.04
low reactivity
> 100 kg/s > 10,000 kg 0.09
Category 1 All flow rates All quantities 0.065
Category 2 All flow rates All quantities 0.01
Category 3, 4 All flow rates All quantities 0
Category 1(Flammable):
Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point greater than or equal to 21 °C and less than or
equal to 55 °C
Delayed Ignition Probability:
Delayed ignition is the result of the build-up of a flammable vapor cloud which is ignited by a source
remote from the release point. It is assumed to result in flash fires or explosions, and also to burn
back to the source of the leak resulting in a jet fire and/or a pool fire. Delayed ignition probability is
assumed based on the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Centre for
External Safety, Netherlands.
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Probability of Delayed Ignition

Source type Ignition source Probability of ignition
Point source Adjacent process installation 0.5
Flare 1.0
Oven (outside) 0.9
Oven (inside) 0.45
Boiler (outside) 0.45
Boiler (inside) 0.23
Line source high-voltage cable (per 100 m) 0.2
Ship 0.5
Population source Households (per person) 0.01
Offices (per person) 0.01
4.7.5 MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS

In addition to the methods and assumptions in the modeling as noted above, the following
assumptions are used:
For the PHAST modeling the ‘horizontal’ option is selected for release orientation, this
provides the maximum horizontal distances.
Jet fires in PHAST have been modeled using the un-impinged jet model. This leads to
conservative, longer jet fire lengths as the model assumes that there are no obstacles to
reduce jet momentum and therefore jet length and distances to radiation levels.
Considered isolation time (includes time for detection & isolation) as mentioned below for
the released inventory calculations:
TWD area : 1800 seconds
Storage tanks: 600 seconds
TLF pump house: 600 seconds
Pipelines: 1800 seconds
TNT explosion model is used in the study.
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CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
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5.1 SCENARIOS
This section documents the consequence-distance calculations, which have been computed for the
accident release scenarios considered.
In risk assessment studies contributions from low frequency - high severity effect as well as high
frequency - low severity events are distinguished. Following are the potential Loss of Containment
scenarios envisaged for the Project BPCL-Desur.
Table 5: LOC Scenarios identified for the study
S.
Scenarios
No
Storage tanks, Tank wagon and Tank truck
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon
12 Leak of MS Tank truck
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck
Pipelines, Hoses and Arms
14 Leak of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01
15 Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01
16 Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01
17 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01
18 Leak of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15
19 Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15
20 Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08
21 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08
22 Leak of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01
23 Rupture of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01
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S.
Scenarios
No
24 Leak of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01
25 Rupture of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01
26 Leak of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry
27 Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry
28 Leak of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry
29 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry
30 Leak of MS unloading hose
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose
32 Leak of MS loading arm
33 Rupture of MS loading arm
5.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Sudden release of flammable materials can result in a number of accident situations. As large
number of failure cases can lead to the same type of consequences, representative failure cases are
selected for this analysis. The failure cases are based on conservative assumptions and engineering
judgment. Typically, failure models are considered for 100% pipe diameter/catastrophic rupture of
vessels for rupture and 10% leak (hole size max 50 mm) for pipelines and 10mm leak size for vessels,
based on the guidelines of CPR 18 E.
Bulk storage
S. Inventory Temperature
Scenarios Pressure
No (m3) (°C)
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04 1304 Atmospheric 25
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04 1304 Atmospheric 25
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08 2262 Atmospheric 25
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08 2262 Atmospheric 25
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15 2387 Atmospheric 25
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15 2387 Atmospheric 25
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13 45 Atmospheric 25
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13 45 Atmospheric 25
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14 188 Atmospheric 25
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon 68 Atmospheric 25
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon 68 Atmospheric 25
12 Leak of MS Tank truck 24 Atmospheric 25
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck 24 Atmospheric 25
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Pipelines & Loading arm

Flow
S. Pressure Temp
Scenarios rate
No (bar) (°C)
(m3/hr)
14 Leak of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01 120 0.1 25
15 Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01 120 0.1 25
16 Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01 250 0.1 25
17 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01 250 0.1 25
18 Leak of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15 120 2 25
19 Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15 120 2 25
20 Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08 250 2 25
Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-
21 250 2 25
08
22 Leak of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01 120 0.4 25
23 Rupture of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01 120 0.4 25
24 Leak of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01 120 0.4 25
25 Rupture of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01 120 0.4 25
26 Leak of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry 120 2 25
27 Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry 120 2 25
28 Leak of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry 120 2.5 25
29 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry 120 2.5 25
30 Leak of MS unloading hose 40 0.1 25
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose 40 0.1 25
32 Leak of MS loading arm 20 0.2 25
33 Rupture of MS loading arm 20 0.2 25
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5.3 SUMMARY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS:

Table 6: Flammable Gas Dispersion results
Distance to concentration results
1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition
S.
Scenarios LFL
No LFL LFL LFL Fraction
Fraction
m m
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04 28.12 37.97 12.38 23.94
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04 153.42 227.46 147.48 228.42
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08 4.78 4.80 4.94 5.01
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08 51.80 51.90 59.96 60.06
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15 26.80 36.09 11.66 22.74
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15 199.43 289.36 175.62 272.17
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13 2.94 2.96 3.12 3.61
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13 16.22 30.00 12.52 28.73
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14 9.21 14.46 13.78 19.52
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon 19.02 25.29 7.21 15.08
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon 86.67 151.75 56.11 94.18
12 Leak of MS Tank truck 15.76 21.04 4.44 9.55
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck 55.98 90.37 41.86 67.32

Leak of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS
14 14.36 19.73 6.45 13.70
pump no.01
Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD
15 84.71 140.84 19.45 35.17
MS pump no.01
Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD
16 2.60 2.60 2.63 2.64
HSD pump no.01
Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to
17 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.73
TWD HSD pump no.01
Leak of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01
18 44.99 61.90 23.91 39.94
to MS tank TK-15
Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump
19 175.26 227.56 40.52 73.00
no.01 to MS tank TK-15
Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump
20 8.93 8.97 9.13 9.13
no.01 to HSD tank TK-08
Page 41 of 98
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Distance to concentration results

1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition
S.
Scenarios LFL
No LFL LFL LFL Fraction
Fraction
m m
Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump
21 8.60 25.11 8.88 15.96
Leak of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF
22 40.50 52.42 17.73 30.23
MS pump no.01
Rupture of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to
23 104.86 151.84 30.22 55.47
TLF MS pump no.01
Leak of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to
24 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.18
TLF HSD pump no.01
Rupture of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08
25 1.69 1.69 1.68 1.68
to TLF HSD pump no.01
Leak of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01
26 44.51 61.48 23.26 39.16
to TLF gantry
Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump
27 205.35 264.98 44.29 78.76
no.01 to TLF gantry
Leak of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01
28 7.80 7.80 8.13 8.19
to TLF gantry
Rupture of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump
29 6.50 18.39 6.66 13.03
no.01 to TLF gantry
30 Leak of MS unloading hose 1.95 1.96 2.29 2.31
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose 51.93 72.84 16.27 27.91
32 Leak of MS loading arm 2.44 2.45 3.51 5.25
33 Rupture of MS loading arm 62.49 82.28 19.65 34.77
Analysis:
Storage Tanks and Tank truck

In case of, Rupture of MS tank TK-15, the LFL concentration is present up to a maximum downwind
distance of 199.43m and LFL Fraction concentration is present up to a maximum distance of
289.36m in 1.5F weather condition.

In case Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry, the LFL concentration is
present up to a maximum downwind distance of 205.35m and LFL Fraction concentration is present
up to a maximum distance of 264.98m in 1.5F weather condition. Presence of an ignition source may
lead to flash fire in this zone.
Page 42 of 98
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Table 7: Jet Fire Results

Jet fire radiation downwind damage distances in m
S. 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition
Scenarios
No 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
kW/m2 kW/m2
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04 14.94 11.72 9.60 13.15 9.94 7.92
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04 NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08 1.75 NR NR 1.63 NR NR
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08 NA NA NA NA NA NA
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15 13.37 10.48 8.64 11.67 8.81 6.97
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15 NA NA NA NA NA NA
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13 4.49 NR NR 3.79 NR NR
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13 NA NA NA NA NA NA
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14 NA NA NA NA NA NA
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon 5.33 3.19 NR 4.48 3.19 NR
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon NA NA NA NA NA NA
12 Leak of MS Tank truck 3.85 2.59 NR 3.28 1.95 NR
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck NA NA NA NA NA NA

14 5.25 3.80 NR 4.44 3.19 NR
pump no.01
15 18.27 14.94 12.75 18.51 14.67 12.31
MS pump no.01
16 NR NR NR NR NR NR
HSD pump no.01
17 2.37 NR NR 3.91 2.72 NR
TWD HSD pump no.01
18 30.93 24.21 19.98 28.92 21.73 17.42
to MS tank TK-15
19 38.69 30.52 25.18 41.39 31.68 25.91
20 8.58 6.51 5.79 8.06 5.89 4.32
21 9.24 7.11 6.35 9.49 7.11 5.45
22 Leak of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF 13.76 10.82 8.98 11.91 9.06 7.23
Page 43 of 98
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Jet fire radiation downwind damage distances in m

Scenarios
No 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
kW/m2 kW/m2
MS pump no.01
23 24.95 20.00 16.72 30.14 23.53 19.58
TLF MS pump no.01
TLF HSD pump no.01
25 2.94 NR NR 4.07 2.89 NR
26 30.93 24.21 19.98 28.92 21.73 17.42
to TLF gantry
27 49.42 38.75 31.90 52.49 39.84 32.35
no.01 to TLF gantry
28 6.20 4.55 3.42 5.94 4.22 2.81
to TLF gantry
29 7.10 5.30 4.23 7.50 5.54 4.14
no.01 to TLF gantry
30 Leak of MS unloading hose 1.48 NR NR 1.18 NR NR
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose 15.03 12.06 10.17 12.73 9.95 8.15
32 Leak of MS loading arm 3.18 NR NR 2.71 1.38 NR
33 Rupture of MS loading arm 17.78 14.19 11.76 15.04 11.71 9.63
Legend:
NA- Not Applicable
NR- Not Reached
Analysis:
Maximum damage due to jet fire radiations will be caused by Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS
pump no.01 to TLF gantry at a weather condition of 5D. The jet fire radiation of 37.5 KW/m2
(corresponding to 100% fatality) will reach up to a distance of 32.35m at 5D weather condition. The
jet fire radiation of 12.5 KW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 39.84m at 5D weather condition. The
equipment within a distance of 39.84m will be subjected to major damage or piloted ignition of
wood, melting of plastics & tubing etc is possible within this distance. The jet fire radiation of 4
KW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 52.49m at 5D weather condition. First degree burns may be
caused for persons who are within 52.49m distance.
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Table 8: Pool Fire Results

Pool fire radiation downwind damage distances in m
Scenarios
No 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
kW/m2 kW/m2
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04 44.49 20.32 NR 50.48 25.55 NR
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04 80.34 34.07 NR 104.27 35.53 NR
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08 48.60 21.84 NR 58.31 24.92 NR
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08 77.20 34.07 NR 95.31 35.60 NR
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15 43.83 20.03 NR 49.46 25.54 13.50
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15 85.23 36.57 NR 110.33 38.11 NR
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13 22.60 13.34 6.13 23.82 15.98 6.13
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13 22.60 13.34 6.13 23.82 15.98 6.13
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14 32.45 15.84 6.05 36.37 22.35 6.05
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon 39.24 18.80 10.75 42.32 25.23 10.08
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon 140.39 66.56 NR 176.57 68.17 NR
12 Leak of MS Tank truck 37.73 18.44 9.78 40.36 25.04 9.20
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck 91.86 40.24 NR 118.01 42.16 NR

14 44.12 18.21 NR 51.49 22.67 NR
pump no.01
15 121.35 55.95 NR 145.19 52.95 NR
MS pump no.01
16 62.04 27.31 NR 76.19 29.06 NR
HSD pump no.01
17 210.13 111.73 NR 249.23 112.71 NR
TWD HSD pump no.01
18 53.64 24.19 NR 64.22 27.20 NR
to MS tank TK-15
19 170.36 84.90 NR 205.38 83.01 NR
20 99.22 49.99 NR 119.65 51.56 NR
21 244.35 135.35 NR 287.52 136.08 NR
22 50.41 21.11 NR 60.65 23.70 NR
MS pump no.01
Page 45 of 98
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Pool fire radiation downwind damage distances in m

Scenarios
No 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
kW/m2 kW/m2
23 131.89 62.24 NR 162.67 61.70 NR
TLF MS pump no.01
24 55.38 24.38 NR 67.48 26.83 NR
TLF HSD pump no.01
25 133.70 66.04 NR 161.34 67.32 NR
26 52.85 23.92 NR 63.36 27.29 NR
to TLF gantry
27 174.30 87.66 NR 211.12 86.39 NR
no.01 to TLF gantry
28 60.81 29.00 NR 73.84 31.51 NR
to TLF gantry
29 179.20 94.39 NR 213.35 95.32 NR
no.01 to TLF gantry
30 Leak of MS unloading hose 29.32 16.52 6.78 30.77 21.00 7.98
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose 80.96 35.16 NR 99.12 34.40 NR
32 Leak of MS loading arm 32.17 17.75 7.59 34.06 23.06 8.39
33 Rupture of MS loading arm 80.48 35.23 NR 100.22 35.11 NR
Legend:
NA- Not Applicable
NR- Not Reached
Analysis:
Maximum damage due to pool fire radiations will be caused by Rupture of MS Tank wagon at a
weather condition of 5D. The pool fire radiation of 12.5 kW /m2 will reach up to a distance of
68.17m at 5D weather condition. The equipments within a distance of 68.17m will be subjected to
major damage or piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastics & tubing etc is possible within this
distance. The pool fire radiation of 4 kW/ m2 will reach up to a distance of 176.57m at 5D weather
condition. First degree burns may be caused for persons who are within 176.57m distance.

Maximum damage due to pool fire radiations will be caused by Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD
HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08, at a weather condition of 5D. The pool fire radiation of 12.5
Page 46 of 98
Revision No. 00
kW/ m2 will reach up to a distance of 136.08m at 5D weather condition. The equipments within a
distance of 136.08m will be subjected to major damage or piloted ignition of wood, melting of
plastics & tubing etc is possible within this distance. The pool fire radiation of 4 kW/ m2 will reach up
to a distance of 287.52m at 5D weather condition. First degree burns may be caused for persons
who are within 287.52m distance.
Table 9: Vapour Cloud Explosion Results
Over pressure damage distances in m

Scenarios
No 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.03 0.1 0.3
bar bar
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04 56.50 41.30 35.64 35.40 26.57 23.28
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04 475.58 319.12 267.73 454.69 280.79 231.78
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08 NR NR NR NR NR NR
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08 103.47 72.81 61.39 116.49 84.09 72.03
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15 62.13 43.70 36.84 34.59 26.22 23.11
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15 605.59 407.80 342.77 537.41 334.36 277.32
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13 NR NR NR NR NR NR
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13 63.83 37.99 28.98 60.64 31.60 24.02
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14 28.13 17.73 13.86 22.46 15.32 12.65
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon 43.09 29.85 24.92 18.24 13.52 11.76
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon 241.83 165.42 137.67 145.01 94.45 85.11
12 Leak of MS Tank truck 48.56 32.18 26.08 NR NR NR
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck 154.72 106.01 87.98 99.28 66.91 58.44

14 33.68 20.10 15.04 19.67 14.13 12.06
pump no.01
15 363.27 235.22 187.55 85.07 53.49 41.73
MS pump no.01
HSD pump no.01
Page 47 of 98
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Over pressure damage distances in m

Scenarios
No 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.03 0.1 0.3
bar bar
TWD HSD pump no.01
18 123.63 87.14 73.55 54.41 40.41 35.20
to MS tank TK-15
19 571.27 365.85 292.83 209.36 129.43 99.68
21 33.38 25.71 22.85 22.22 15.21 12.60
22 132.80 85.31 67.63 60.41 42.97 36.48
MS pump no.01
23 363.69 241.13 195.51 147.30 91.50 70.72
TLF MS pump no.01
TLF HSD pump no.01
26 127.14 88.63 74.30 53.19 39.89 34.94
to TLF gantry
27 620.18 389.75 324.38 195.41 123.48 96.71
no.01 to TLF gantry
to TLF gantry
29 17.75 13.30 11.65 16.82 12.91 11.45
no.01 to TLF gantry
30 Leak of MS unloading hose NR NR NR NR NR NR
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose 183.77 112.79 90.75 55.82 35.28 27.63
32 Leak of MS loading arm NR NR NR NR NR NR
33 Rupture of MS loading arm 208.76 134.91 107.42 76.27 49.73 39.85
Legend:
NA- Not Applicable
NR- Not Reached
Analysis:
Page 48 of 98
Revision No. 00
The maximum damage can be felt in case of Rupture of MS tank TK-15. An overpressure of 0.3 bar
can be felt up to a distance of 342.77m, Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from
foundation within this distance, and it can also cause a lethality of around 50% for persons who are
within this distance. An overpressure of 0.10 bar can be felt up to a distance of 407.80m; equipment
within this range can suffer repairable damages. An overpressure of 0.03 bar can be felt up to a
distance of 605.59m which leads to shattering of glass etc.
The maximum damage can be felt in case of Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF
gantry. An overpressure of 0.3 bar can be felt up to a distance of 324.38m, Steel frame building
distorted and pulled away from foundation within this distance, and it can also cause a lethality of
around 50% for persons who are within this distance. An overpressure of 0.1 bar can be felt up to a
distance of 389.75m; equipment within this range can suffer repairable damages. An overpressure of
0.03 bar can be felt up to a distance of 620.18m which leads to shattering of glass etc.
Analysis on inter-distance criteria:
1. The inter distance between the following facility is not meet as per OISD 244:
a. The Inter distance between the control room to OWS is 16 M against 50M
b. The Inter distance between the Class A to OWS is <50 M against 50M
c. The Inter distance between the Class B to OWS is <50 M against 50M
d. The Inter distance between the gantry to OWS is 23M against 50M
e. The Inter distance between the Fire water Pump House to OWS is 30 M against 50M
f. The Inter distance between the Rail Spur to OWS is 12.7 M against 50 M.
Where the inter distance between the facility to OWS is not meeting. It is recommended to provide
foam system (mobile/fixed) for the OWS and to ensure that OWSs are continuously monitored via
CCTVs.
2. The Inter distance between the Rail Spur to boundary wall is 16.6M & 19M against 20 M.
The pool fire radiation of 12.5 kW /m2 will reach up to a distance of 25.23m. The pool fire radiation
of 4 kW/ m2 will reach up to a distance of 42.32m in 5D weather condition. Considering the effect of
radiation based on the 12.5kW/m2. It is recommended the following:
Page 49 of 98
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1. Fire resistant wall around the Fire monitor and Fire Hydrant raiser to be provided.
2. Also provide the Fire retardant paint for fire monitor and Fire Hydrant to avoid any damage in the
fire water monitor and Fire hydrant.
8. The Interdistance between the OWS to Electrical substation is 25 M against 45 M

Ensure fire fighting facilities (Fire Extinguishers) in Substation conforms to OISD-STD-117 section-
4.6.1 (Table)
Page 50 of 98
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CHAPTER 6: RISK ANALYSIS
Page 51 of 98
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6.1 FREQUENCY CALCULATIONS

For calculating the frequency to be applied for modeling the following factors are taken into
consideration and multiplied with the basic failure frequency to calculate the calculated failure
frequency:
1. Blocking systems :
The blocking systems are used to limit the released quantity following a LOC. A blocking system
consists of a detection system (e.g. gas detection, hydrocarbon detection, etc combined with shut-
off valves). The shut-off valves can be closed automatically or manually. Blocking systems are further
classified into Automatic, semi-automatic and non-automated (Manual) system. Semi Automatic
blocking system has been considered for this study.
2. Fire suppression systems
The fire protection systems and fire fighting facilities which are used to restrict fire, the various
factors affecting the fire protection systems are:
« Response effectiveness (i.e. the system is responsive to a specific scenario)
« On-line availability (i.e. the system is online at the time of the emergency)
« Operational reliability (the system functions properly at the time of emergency)
3. Human Intervention / Intervention by operators
4. Ignition probabilities
Table 10: Accident Event Frequency
Base Software
S.
Scenarios failure I/P failure
No
frequency frequency
1 Leak of MS tank TK-04 1.00E-04 9.17E-06
2 Rupture of MS tank TK-04 5.00E-06 4.59E-07
3 Leak of HSD tank TK-08 1.00E-04 8.32E-06
4 Rupture of HSD tank TK-08 5.00E-06 4.16E-07
5 Leak of MS tank TK-15 1.00E-04 9.17E-06
6 Rupture of MS tank TK-15 5.00E-06 4.59E-07
7 Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13 1.00E-04 9.17E-06
8 Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13 5.00E-06 4.59E-07
9 Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14 1.00E-08 8.32E-10
10 Leak of MS Tank wagon 5.00E-07 4.16E-08
11 Rupture of MS Tank wagon 1.00E-05 8.32E-07
Page 52 of 98
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Base Software
S.
Scenarios failure I/P failure
No
frequency frequency
12 Leak of MS Tank truck 5.00E-07 4.16E-08
13 Rupture of MS Tank truck 1.00E-05 8.32E-07
14 Leak of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01 5.00E-07 1.44E-05
15 Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01 1.00E-07 2.87E-06
16 Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01 5.00E-07 1.44E-05
17 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01 1.00E-07 2.87E-06
18 Leak of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15 2.00E-06 1.66E-05
19 Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15 3.00E-07 2.50E-06
20 Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08 5.00E-07 3.12E-06
21 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08 1.00E-07 6.24E-07
22 Leak of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01 5.00E-07 7.06E-06
23 Rupture of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01 1.00E-07 1.41E-06
24 Leak of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01 5.00E-07 6.51E-06
25 Rupture of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01 1.00E-07 1.30E-06
26 Leak of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry 2.00E-06 8.32E-06
27 Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry 3.00E-07 1.25E-06
28 Leak of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry 2.00E-06 8.32E-06
29 Rupture of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry 3.00E-07 1.25E-06
30 Leak of MS unloading hose 4.00E-05 3.90E-04
31 Rupture of MS unloading hose 4.00E-06 3.90E-05
32 Leak of MS loading arm 3.00E-07 9.01E-06
33 Rupture of MS loading arm 3.00E-08 9.01E-07
Page 53 of 98
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6.2 RISK PRESENTATION
Individual Risk:
The Individual Risk calculation can be done using the specific locations of the known sources at the
establishment. If the cloud is not ignited at the establishment, ignition is assumed to take place at
maximum cloud area, with cloud area defined as the foot-print of the cloud. If contour is not present
outside the establishment, e.g., the spill of a flammable liquid in a bund, and if the ignition does not
occur at the establishment, ignition is assumed not to take place.
Societal Risk:
The Societal Risk calculation can be done using the specific locations of the known sources at the
establishment and outside the establishment. The distribution of ignition sources in the
establishment should be known or can be anticipated. If only a few (weak) ignition sources are
present, there is a probability that the ignition of the cloud will not occur.
Risk Summary
Overall Individual Risk:
The overall individual risk for this Installation is found to be 8.75E-005/avg.year
Page 54 of 98
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Analysis:
The risk levels are found to be lying in the ALARP region
Societal Risk:
Analysis:
The risk levels are found to be lying in the ALARP region
With reference to the risk acceptance criteria specified by HSE, UK in IS 15656:2006 - Code of
Practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis it is observed that the risk levels of the facility are
in ALARP region. However if all the existing risk control measures are followed, in addition to the risk
Control measures recommended in this report are implemented, the risks levels can be brought
down within acceptable limits.
Page 55 of 98
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CHAPTER 7: RISK CONTROL MEASURES
Page 56 of 98
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7.1 EXISTING RISK CONTROL MEASURES

Fire Protection system:
1. Fire Protection system i.e. Hydrants, Monitors and Hose Boxes are provided in the Terminal
premises. Following are the details:
a. Fire Water Storage capacity 2730 KL (1365 KL*2)
b. Fire water Pumps (Diesel engine drive) 03 nos. (327 m³/hr*2 + One Standby)
c. Jockey pumps 02 nos. (30 m³/hr*2)
d. Fire Hoses 20 nos.
e. Hydrants 26 nos.
f. Water Monitors 04 nos.
g. Foam Monitor 10 no.
h. Jet/ Fog/ Universal Nozzles 29 nos.
i. Foam Branch 05 nos.
j. Foam Compound 14000 Ltr.
k. Portable DCP 2 nos.
L. Mobile Foam Monitor 1 nos.
m HVLR Monitor 4 nos.
2. All the strategic locations of the terminal are covered with portable fire extinguishers.
3. Fixed water spray & Foam pourer system is provided for all classes of petroleum products in
Dyke -1 & 2. However for tank TK-08 in Dyke -1 fixed water spray & Foam pourer system is under
progress along with MBLR work.
4. BPCL Desur Depot has written mutual aid agreement with HPCL (POL) & IOCL (POL) to aid / help
when required.
Fire Prevention measures:
« Fire break walls of 600mm height are provided to prevent spills from each tank.
« Large spills contained inside the tank bund are routed to oily water separator (OWS) systems.
« Fixed Hydrocarbon detectors are provided in the following locations:
o TWD Pump House - 1 Open Path
o Tank Farm-Dyke 1 - 1 Open Path and 1 Point type
o Tank Farm-Dyke 2 - 1 Open Path and 1 Point type
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o TLF Pump House - 1 Open Path

« CCTVs (Fixed/PTZ) are installed around the Installation and continuously monitored.
« Total Emergency shutdown system for Electrical systems are provided at Admin building,
Security room, TLFG, TLFPH and at TWD.
« Spill kit for sampling leaks are available
« Periodic inspection of pipeline done as per BPCL regulations
« Self Contained Breathing Apparatus along with the spare cylinders are available in sufficient
numbers for the operators for use during any leakage.
« Wind socks are installed for knowing wind direction during emergency.
« Flame proof equipments are provided at all hazardous zone areas.
« Bonding clips/Crocodile clip arrangement is in practice for the dissipation of static electricity
during loading in bay areas.
« Work permit system is strictly followed for all the activities at the terminal.
« SOP is adhered for various operations in the terminal.
« ERDMP for the terminal (Jan 2013) is in place.
Page 58 of 98
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7.2 RISK ACCEPTANCE

In India, there are no defined criteria for risk acceptance. However, in IS 15656 – Code of Practice for
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis. The Extracts for the risk criteria adopted in some countries
are presented below:
RISK CRITERIA IN SOME COUNTRIES
Maximum Tolerable Risk Negligible Risk

Authority and Application
(Per Year) (Per Year)
VROM, The Netherlands (New) 1.0E-6 1.0E-8
VROM, The Netherlands (Existing) 1.0E-5 1.0E-8
HSE, UK (Existing Hazardous Industry) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (New Industries) 1.0E-5 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (Substance Transport) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (New Housing Near Plants) 3 x 1.0E-6 3 x 1.0E-7
Hong Kong Government (New Plants) 1.00E-5 Not Used
To achieve the above risk acceptance criteria, ALARP principle was followed while suggesting risk
reduction recommendations
Unacceptable region
Risk cannot be justified
10-4 Per annum
The ALARP or tolerability Tolerable only if further risk

Region (risk is undertaken reduction is impractical, or the cost
Only if a benefit is is not proportionate to the benefit
Desired)
gained
Broadly acceptable
Negligible risk
Region
10-6 Per annum
Risks closer to the unacceptable region merit a closer examination of potential risk
reduction measures
Page 59 of 98
Revision No. 00
7.3 RISK CONTROL MEASURES SUGGESTED

The following risk control measures are recommended in addition to the existing risk control
measures to bring down the risk levels:
Ensure level control systems in storage tanks that are being implemented are conforming to
OISD-STD-244 section-7.11 (ii) and Annexure-1
Suitable interlocks to be provided in storage tanks in case of HH level, Low level as per OISD-STD-
244 section-8.2 (x)
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) of the tank level control must be implemented and independent
overfill protection meeting the requirement of Part 1 of EN 61511 shall be provided. Ensure that
all the instruments in the level control loop are SIL rated. (Recommendation based on MB Lal
Committee report on Jaipur Terminal Fire).
Provide ESD pushbuttons in tank farm area.
Hydro carbon detector shall be provided for Ethanol dyke drain as per OISD-STD-244 section-9.3
(ii).
Ensure tank TK-08 in Dyke-1 is provided with fixed water spray & Foam pourer system.
Ensure all the tanks in Dyke – 1 is provided with MOV at the upstream of the ROSOV instead of
manual valve
ROSOV operation shall be as per MBLR section-10.3 (b)
Tank drain lines shall be provided with double isolation and lock-closed with seal
Ethanol Dyke drain shall be routed to OWS with isolation valve and position indicator.
Provide ROSOV/MOV in the Ethanol tank inlet and outlet lines and also provide level control
system interlock with ROSOV.
Impervious dyke arrangement shall be provide for Ethanol storage.
Minimum flow protection (recirculation line) for TLF Pumps shall be provided for centrifugal
pumps in order to prevent failures due to low flow conditions (overheating). This is in
accordance with OISD-STD-119.
Ensure preventive maintenance schedule for products pumps are conforming to OISD-STD-119
(Annexure-2)
Periodical inspection and calibration of various types of instruments shall be followed as per
OISD-STD-153.
Page 60 of 98
Revision No. 00
Conclusion:
Risk control measures are followed, in addition to the risk Control measures recommended in this
report, the risks levels can be maintain in ALARP level or brought down to acceptable limits.
Page 61 of 98
Revision No. 00
CHAPTER 8: REFERENCES
Page 62 of 98
Revision No. 00
8.1 REFERENCES
« IS 15656:2006: Hazard identification and risk analysis - Code of Practice
« Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment CPR 18E (Purple book), Committee for the
Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands (Edition: PGS 3, 2005)
« Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures - Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1992.
Page 63 of 98
Revision No. 00
CHAPTER 9: ANNEXURES
Page 64 of 98
16/01
Revision No. 00
Annexure-1: Event Tree Analysis
1. Leak of MS tank TK-04

Success
0.80 2.08E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 5.20E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
0.60 3.90E-06 Uncontrolled Jet/pool Fire
1.00E-04 Success
0.80 5.24E-05 Unignited, Protected Release
Explosion
Success 0.40 3.40E-07 VCE
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 5.11E-07 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
9.35E-01 1.22E-05 Unignited Release
Explosion
0.40 7.29E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
0.60 1.09E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 65 of 98
Revision No. 00
2. Rupture of MS tank TK-04

Success
0.80 1.04E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 2.60E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
5.00E-06 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 2.55E-08 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 3.65E-08 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 66 of 98
Revision No. 00
3. Leak of HSD tank TK-08
Initiating F&G Fire Probability of

Probability of Explosion Outcome
Event Detection Protection Delayed Event Outcome
Ignition Probability Frequency
Success
0.70 1.82E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 7.80E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.29E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.09E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 67 of 98
Revision No. 00
4. Rupture of HSD tank TK-08

Success
0.70 9.10E-08
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 3.90E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
5.00E-06
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 3.65E-08 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 5.47E-08 Flash Fire
No
Page 68 of 98
Revision No. 00
5. Leak of MS tank TK-15

Success
0.80 2.08E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 5.20E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-04 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 5.11E-07 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 7.29E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 69 of 98
Revision No. 00
6. Rupture of MS tank TK-15

Success
0.80 1.04E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 2.60E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
5.00E-06 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 2.55E-08 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 3.65E-08 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 70 of 98
Revision No. 00
7. Leak of Ethanol tank TK-13

Success
0.80 2.08E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 5.20E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-04 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 5.11E-07 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 7.29E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 71 of 98
Revision No. 00
8. Rupture of Ethanol tank TK-13

Success
0.80 1.04E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 2.60E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
5.00E-06 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 2.55E-08 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 3.65E-08 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 72 of 98
Revision No. 00
9. Rupture of UG MS tank TK-14

Success
0.70 1.82E-10
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 7.80E-11
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-08
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.29E-11 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.09E-10 Flash Fire
No
Page 73 of 98
Revision No. 00
10. Leak of MS Tank wagon

Success
0.70 9.10E-09
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 3.90E-09
6.50E-02
Fail
5.00E-07
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 3.65E-09 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 5.47E-09 Flash Fire
No
Page 74 of 98
Revision No. 00
11. Rupture of MS Tank wagon

Success
0.70 1.82E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 7.80E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.29E-08 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.09E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 75 of 98
Revision No. 00
12. Leak of MS Tank truck

Success
0.70 9.10E-09
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 3.90E-09
6.50E-02
Fail
5.00E-07
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 3.65E-09 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 5.47E-09 Flash Fire
No
Page 76 of 98
Revision No. 00
13. Rupture of MS Tank truck

Success
0.70 1.82E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 7.80E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.29E-08 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.09E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 77 of 98
Revision No. 00
14. Leak of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01

Success
0.70 3.14E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 1.35E-06
6.50E-02
Fail
1.73E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 1.26E-06 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.89E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 78 of 98
Revision No. 00
15. Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD spur to TWD MS pump no.01

Success
0.70 6.28E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 2.69E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
3.45E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 2.52E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 3.77E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 79 of 98
Revision No. 00
16. Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01

Success
0.70 3.14E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 1.35E-06
6.50E-02
Fail
1.73E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 1.26E-06 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.89E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 80 of 98
Revision No. 00
17. Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD spur to TWD HSD pump no.01

Success
0.70 6.28E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 2.69E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
3.45E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 2.52E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 3.77E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 81 of 98
Revision No. 00
18. Leak of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15

Success
0.70 3.64E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 1.56E-06
6.50E-02
Fail
2.00E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 1.46E-06 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 2.19E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 82 of 98
Revision No. 00
19. Rupture of MS pipeline from TWD MS pump no.01 to MS tank TK-15

Success
0.70 5.46E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 2.34E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
3.00E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 2.19E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 3.28E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 83 of 98
Revision No. 00
20. Leak of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08

Success
0.70 6.83E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 2.93E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
3.75E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 2.73E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 4.10E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 84 of 98
Revision No. 00
21. Rupture of HSD pipeline from TWD HSD pump no.01 to HSD tank TK-08

Success
0.70 1.37E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 5.85E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
7.50E-06
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 5.47E-08 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 8.20E-08 Flash Fire
No
Page 85 of 98
Revision No. 00
22. Leak of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01

Success
0.80 1.60E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 4.00E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
7.70E-05 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 3.93E-07 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 5.62E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 86 of 98
Revision No. 00
23. Rupture of MS pipeline from MS tank TK-15 to TLF MS pump no.01

Success
0.80 3.20E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 8.01E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
1.54E-05 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 7.86E-08 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 1.12E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 87 of 98
Revision No. 00
24. Leak of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01

Success
0.80 1.48E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 3.69E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
7.10E-05 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 3.62E-07 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 5.18E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 88 of 98
Revision No. 00
25. Rupture of HSD pipeline from HSD tank TK-08 to TLF HSD pump no.01

Success
0.80 2.95E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.20 7.38E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
1.42E-05 Success
Explosion
0.70 Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
No 0.20 0.60 7.25E-08 Flash Fire
9.35E-01 No
Explosion
0.40 1.04E-07 VCE
Yes
Fail 6.50E-02
0.30 Flash Fire
No
Page 89 of 98
Revision No. 00
26. Leak of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry

Success
0.70 1.82E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 7.80E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.29E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.09E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 90 of 98
Revision No. 00
27. Rupture of MS pipeline from TLF MS pump no.01 to TLF gantry

Success
0.70 2.73E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 1.17E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.50E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 1.09E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.64E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 91 of 98
Revision No. 00
28. Leak of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry

Success
0.70 1.82E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 7.80E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.00E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.29E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.09E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 92 of 98
Revision No. 00
29. Rupture of HSD pipeline from TLF HSD pump no.01 to TLF gantry

Success
0.70 2.73E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 1.17E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.50E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 1.09E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.64E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 93 of 98
Revision No. 00
30. Leak of MS unloading hose

Success
0.70 8.52E-05
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 3.65E-05
6.50E-02
Fail
4.68E-03
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 3.41E-05 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 5.12E-05 Flash Fire
No
Page 94 of 98
Revision No. 00
31. Rupture of MS unloading hose

Success
0.70 8.52E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 3.65E-06
6.50E-02
Fail
4.68E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 3.41E-06 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 5.12E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 95 of 98
Revision No. 00
32. Leak of MS loading arm

Success
0.70 1.97E-06
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 8.45E-07
6.50E-02
Fail
1.08E-04
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.90E-07 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.18E-06 Flash Fire
No
Page 96 of 98
Revision No. 00
33. Rupture of MS loading arm

Success
0.70 1.97E-07
Success
0.40
Fail
Yes 0.30 8.45E-08
6.50E-02
Fail
1.08E-05
Success
No Explosion
9.35E-01 0.40 7.90E-08 VCE
Yes
6.50E-02
Fail Flash Fire
0.30 0.60 1.18E-07 Flash Fire
No
Page 97 of 98
Revision No. 00
Annexure-2: Layout of Installation
Page 98 of 98
Annexure C
LAND RECORDS, POWER OF ATTORNEY
HALF YEARLY COMPLIANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCE REPORT
No. SEIAA: 20: IND: 2010, dated 01/08/2011
FOR
ADDITIONAL STORAGE OF 8500KL
OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BY PROVIDING
1X6000KL FIXED ROOF ABOVE GROUND TANK FOR HSD
&
1X2500KL FLOATING ROOF ABOVE GROUND TANKS FOR MS
OF
M/S. BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED
DESUR DEPOT, NEAR DESUR RAILWAY STATION
ZADSHAPUR ROAD
BELGAUM-590014
SUBMITTED TO
Regional Office (Southern Zone),
Ministry of Environmental & Forests,
Kendriya sadhan, 4th Floor, E & F wings,
17th Main Road, 2nd block, Koramangala,
Bangalore – 560 034.
CONTENTS:
1. COMPLIANCE REPORT
2. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCE LETTER
3. ANNEXURES
A) WATER QUALITY TESTING REPORT
B) AMBIENT AIR QIALITY MONITORING REPORTS
C) AMBIENT NOISE LEVEL MONITORING REPORT
D) STACK MONITORING REPORT
E) HAZARDOUS WASTE AUTHORIZATION
Project at glance
1 Project Proponent M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation

Limited, Desur Depot, near Desur Railway
station, Zadshapur road.
Belgaum-590014
2 Project Additional storage of 8500kL of petroleum

products by providing 1x6000KL fixed roof
above ground tank for HSD & 1x2500KL
floating roof above ground tanks for MS
Objective of the Report:
The Environmental Clearance accorded stipulates preparation and
submission of Compliance report and also the objective of preparation of
the report is elucidating the status of compliance to the conditions of the
Environmental Clearance letter and also to assess the quality of
environment during the implementation of the project.
The following Environmental Parameters are monitored for the project
which include:
1. Analysis of Water.
2. Ambient Air quality
3. Analysis of stack Emissions.
4. Analysis of Soil Sample

Sl, Specific Conditions Compliance to the conditions
No
1 No ground water shall be used for the project. Complied.

The water requirement for the project shall be
For rain water harvesting three numbers
sourced from the rainwater harvesting system
of recharge pits have been provided at
developed within the premises. Water
strategic locations. At present water is
consumption shall be only for domestic
sourced from public supply for domestic
purpose.
purpose.
3 Domestic wastewater shall be discharged into Complied.

septic tank/ soak pit system.
The domestic waste water is being
discharged in a septic tank and soak pit
4 The storm water drains shall be kept dry and Complied.

shall not be used for discharge of any kind of
There is no generation of trade effluent.
waste. The project proponent shall prepare an
The storm water drain carries only the
Action Plan for the monsoon period in which
run off from the plant area. It is ensured
the water quality flowing outside the premises
that the there is no overflow from the
shall be monitored for hydrocarbon and oil and
tank form area, spillages if any are
grease parameters and its records shall be
collected and taken back to the tank.
maintained and submitted to KSPCB.
However, the monitoring of parameters
HC and Oil and grease will be taken up
during the first rain of the 2017 monsoon.
5 Gaseous emissions at workplaces shall be complied

controlled and kept below the limits prescribed
The gaseous emissions is controlled
by the factories Act and Rules. Their records
within the limits specified and necessary
shall be maintained.
records are maintained. Copy of the
report is enclosed for
6 The gaseous emissions and particulate matter Complied.

from various process shall confirm to the
This is only a storage facility of the
standards prescribed by KSPCB. At no time, the
petroleum products. There is no process
emission levels shall go beyond the stipulated
emissions. For emissions form the DG
standards. In the event of failure of pollution
sets 3 nos of capacity 125 KVA, 200 KVA,
control system adopted by the unit, the
respective unit shall not be restarted until the 250 KVA and 7.5 KVA and fire pumps of
control measures are rectified to achieve the capacity 152.2 BHP, individual chimney
prescribed standards. of 3mts heights have been provided as
per the Consent issued by the KSPCB
under the Air Act. These sources are also
being monitored for SO2
7 The unit must strictly comply with the rules and Complied.
regulations with regards to handling and
BPCL strictly complies with the rules and
disposal of Hazardous waste in accordance with
regulations with regard to handling and
the Hazardous waste (management and
disposal of Hazardous waste in
handling) Rules 2003. Authorization from the
accordance with the Hazardous waste
KSPCB must be obtained for collection/
(management and handling) Rules 2003.
treatment/ storage/ disposal of hazardous
Authorization from the KSPCB is
wastes.
obtained for collection/storage/ disposal
of hazardous wastes. About 10 to 12 KL
per annum of used oil generated from the
DG sets. The same is being disposed to
authorized recycler. So far Tank bottom
residues are not generated.
8 The project management shall strictly comply Complied.

with the provisions made in Manufacture
BPCL Management strictly complies with
Storage and Impact of Hazardous Chemicals
the provisions made in Manufacture
Rules 1989 as amended in 2000 for handling of
Storage and Impact of Hazardous
hazardous chemicals. Necessary approvals from
Chemicals Rules 1989 as amended in 2000
the Govt. Authorities shall be obtained before
for handling of hazardous chemicals.
commissioning of the project, if applicable.
Necessary approvals from the Govt.
Authorities is obtained before
commissioning of the project.
9 All Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals Complied.

shall be as per the motor vehicle Act and Rules.
All Transportation of Hazardous
Chemicals is maintained as per the
regulations of motor vehicle Act and
Rules.
10 Hazardous materials storage shall be at an Complied.
isolated designated location, bund/dyke walls
Hazardous materials storage is at isolated
shall be provided for storage tanks for
designated location, and necessary
Hazardous Chemicals.
bund/dyke walls are provided for storage
tanks. It conforms to the regulatory
requirement.
11 All transportation routes within the factory Complied.

premises shall have paved roads to minimize
All transportation routes within the
splashes and spillages.
factory premises is asphalted
(Photograph is enclosed)
12 Mock drills shall be conducted at regular Complied.

intervals as per statutory requirements and their
Mock drills are conducted regularly to
records shall be maintained.
assess emergency preparedness and
records are maintained. It is as per the
regulatory requirement.
13 Necessary dyke wall along with spill collection Complied.

sump shall be provided around the storage
Dyke walls are provided around storage
tanks to arrest the spillage /leakage.
tanks to prevent spillages /leakages. It is
as per the regulatory requirement.
14 All the storage tanks in the premises shall be Complied.

provided with sprinkler as per OISD norms.
All storages tanks are provided with
sprinkler arrangement as per OISD norms
( Photograph Enclosed)
15 Fire protection system shall be upgraded for the Complied as per the OISD standards.
additional storage tanks installation and shall
confirm to OISD standards.
16 Necessary flameproof fittings shall be provided Complied.

in the storage facility.
Flameproof arrangements are made for
the storage tanks as per the required
standards. It is as per the regulatory
requirement.
17 Proper ventilation shall be provided in the All storage facilities are open to sky.
whole premises. Hence providing ventilation does not
arise.
18 All venting equipment shall have vapour The storage facilities are totally closed,
recovery system. All the pumps and other they are not in pressurized condition, and
equipments where there is a likelihood of hence there is no possibility of escape of
leakages shall be provided with Leak detections vapours from the system. For Motor
and Repair system. Provisions for immediate Spirit storage, floating roof type storage
isolation of such equipment in case of a leakage tank is provided to avoid escape of
shall also be made. The detector sensitivity shall vapours.
be in ppm levels.
19 All the storage tanks shall be fitted with Complied.

appropriate controls to avoid any leakages.
The storage tanks are fitted with controls
Close handling system for chemicals shall be
to avoid any leakages. Closed handling
provided. Double mechanical seals shall be
system for chemicals are provided.
provided for pumps / agitators for reactors for
Double mechanical seals are provided for
reduction of fugitive emissions and leakages.
pumps / agitators for reactors for
Traps shall be installed wherever necessary.
reduction of fugitive emissions and
leakages. It is as per the regulatory
requirement.
20 During material transfer, spillages shall be Complied.

avoided and garland drain be constructed to
Areas where material transfer is done
avoid mixing of accidental spillages with
spillages are avoided. Tank forms have
domestic waste and storm water drain.
been provided with arrangement for
accidental spillage collection. The spilled
material is retrieved and taken to storage.
It is as per the regulatory requirement.
21 Personal protective equipment shall be Complied.

provided to workers and its usage shall be
Personal protective equipment are
ensured and supervised.
provided to workers and its usage is
ensured and supervised.
22 First Aid Box and required antidotes for the Complied.
chemicals used in the unit shall be made readily
First Aid Box with required antidotes for
available in adequate quantity at all the times.
the chemicals used in the unit are made
readily available in adequate quantity at
all the times.
23 Training shall be given to all personnel on Complied.

safety and health aspects of handling petroleum
Trainings are given to all personnel on
products including regular mock drills.
safety and health aspects of handling
petroleum products through regular
mock drills by the safety department of
the plant.
24 Occupational health surveillance of the workers Complied.

shall be carried out on a regular basis and
Occupational health surveillance of the
records shall be maintained as per the Factories
workers are done periodically and
Act and Rules pre-employment and periodical
records are maintained as per the
medical examination for all workers shall be
Factories Act and Rules. The copies are
undertaken as per statutory requirement.
submitted to the Inspector of Factories. It
is as per the regulatory requirement. No
adverse impact is noticed in the health of
the workers.
25 The project management shall prepare a Complied.

detailed Disaster Management Plan (DMP) for
BPCL has in place Emergency
the project as per the guidelines from
Preparedness Plan and DMP for the
directorate of Industrial Safety and Health.
project as per the guidelines from
directorate of Industrial Safety and
Health. It is as per the regulatory
requirement.
26 On site Emergency Control Plan and Off Site Complied.

Emergency Plan shall be updated and its
On site Emergency Control Plan and Off
recommendation shall be implemented.
Site Emergency Plan updated version is
in place and its recommendation are
implemented. It is as per the regulatory
requirement.
27 Design of the storage tanks shall be done in Complied.

accordance with the applicable OISD, IS, API,
All the storage tanks are designed in
ASME standards.
accordance with the applicable OISD, IS,
API, ASME standards.
28 Necessary permissions from the Chief Complied.

Controller of Explosive-Nagpur, State
Necessary permissions from respective
Department of Safety and Health, and other
departments are taken prior
relevant Government agencies shall be taken
commencement of the project.
prior commencement of the project.
29 Ambient air quality status with respect to VOC Ambient air quality status with respect to
in the area shall be monitored in consultation PM10, Sulphur di oxide and Nitrogen di
with Karnataka State Pollution Control Board oxide are monitored. Ambient Air quality
and its records shall be submitted to SEIAA. test reports are appended as Annexure B.
VOC will be monitored in consultation
with the KSPCB.
30 First Aid Box, fire extinguishers, foams, sand Complied.

etc. shall be made readily available quantity at
First Aid Box, fire extinguishers, foams,
all the times. Necessary tie up with the nearby
sand etc. are made readily available.
fire stations and other emergency services shall
Necessary tie up with the nearby fire
be made ensure that the required aids reach
stations and other emergency services is
within the shortest possible time in case of any
also made ensure that the required aids
adverse conditions.
reach within the shortest possible time in
case of any adverse conditions.
31 The unit shall undertake following waste Complied.
minimization measures:
c. Automated and close filling
a. Use of automated and close filling to system is in place.
minimize spillages. b. The storage facilities are totally
b. Venting equipment through vapour closed, they are not in pressurized
recovery system. condition, and hence there is no
possibility of escape of vapours from the
system. For Motor Spirit storage,
floating roof type storage tank is
provided to avoid escape of vapours.
32 The unit shall develop green belt within BPCL has developed green belt within
premises as per the CPCB guidelines. premises as per the CPCB guidelines.
Sl.No General Conditions Compliance to the Conditions

The project authorities must strictly adhere The stipulations made by the Karnataka
1 to the stipulations made by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB) are
State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB). strictly complied.
No further expansion or modifications in No further expansion or modifications in
the plant shall be carried out without prior the plant will be carried out without prior
approval of the SEIAA / Ministry of approval of the SEIAA / Ministry of
Environment and Forests as the case may
Environment and Forests.
be. In case of deviations or alterations in the
2
project proposal from those submitted to
this Authority to assess the adequacy of
conditions imposed and to add additional
environmental protection measures
required, if any.
The gaseous emissions (Nox, SO2 and SPM) The gaseous emissions (Nox, SO2 and
and particulate matter along with RSPM SPM) and particulate matter along with
levels from various process units shall RSPM levels from DG, Fire Engines
conform to the standards prescribed by the
conform to the standards prescribed by
3 concerned authorities from time to time. At
KSPCB, the reports are appended as
no time, the emission levels shall go beyond
the stipulated standards. In the event of Annexure
failure of pollution control system(s)
adopted by the unit, the respective unit shall
not be restarted until the control measures
are rectified to achieve the desired
efficiency. Stack monitoring for NOx, SO2
and SPM shall be carried.
The project authorities shall strictly comply Complied.
with the rules and regulations under
manufacture, storage, and import of Provisions under the MSIHC Rules are
Hazardous Chemicals rules, 1989 as complied with. All other statutory
4
amended subsequently. Prior approval from requirements under Fire Safety, Factories
chief Inspector of Factories, Chief Controller Act and Explosive regulations are strictly
of Explosives, Fire Safety Inspectorate etc. complied with.
must be obtained, wherever applicable.
Complied.
The project authorities must strictly comply
Hazardous Waste authorization bas been
with the rules and regulations with regard
to handling and disposal of hazardous obtained from KSPCB for handling and
waste in accordance with the Hazardous disposal of hazardous waste in
5
Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, accordance with the Hazardous Waste
2003. Authorization from KSPCB must be (Management and Handling) Rules, 2003.
obtained for collection, treatment, storage, A copy of the same is appended as
disposal of hazardous wastes.
Annexure
The overall noise levels in and around the Overall noise levels in and around the
plant area shall be kept well within the plant area is kept well with standards by
standards (85 dBA) by providing noise providing all noise control measures.
control measures including acoustic hoods, Copy of noise monitoring report is
silencers, enclosures etc. on all sources of appended as
6
noise generation. The ambient noise levels Annexure.
shall conform to the standards prescribed
under Environment (Protection) Act, Rules,
1989 viz, dBA(daytime) and 70dBA(night
time)
A separate Environmental management cell Complied
equipped with full-fledged laboratory
facilities must be set up to carry out the The Environmental Management aspects
environmental management and monitoring of the plant headed by Plant Head and
functions. supported by Technical Staff.
7
Environmental Monitoring is being done
by NABL accredited laboratory. As the
facility is not very significant to have a
dedicated services of Environmental
Engineer the requirement is met by out
sourcing.
The project authorities will provide Complied.

adequate funds both recurring and non-
recurring to implement the conditions BPCL allocates necessary funds towards
stipulated by the SEIAA, Karnataka as well Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and
8 as the State government along with the recurring cost for environmental
implementation schedule for all the management aspects, to meet the
conditions stipulated herein. The funds so
regulatory requirements and beyond.
provided shall not be diverted for any other
purposes.
The MoEF, Regional Office at Bangalore / Monthly compliance status reports is
KSPCB/Department of Ecology and submitted to monitoring agencies.
Environment, government of Karnataka,
M.S. Building, and Bangalore will monitor
9
the stipulated conditions. A half yearly
compliance report and the monitored dated
along with statistical interpretation shall not
be submitted to them regularly.
The project proponent shall inform the Complied.
public that the project has been accorded
environmental clearance by the SEIAA and BPCL has informed the public that the
copies of the clearance letter are available project has been accorded environmental
with the KSPCB and may be seen at website clearance by the SEIAA and copies of the
of the Authority at clearance letter are available with the
http://www.seiaa.kar.nic.in. This shall be
KSPCB and may be seen at website of the
advertised within seven days from the date
Authority at http://www.seiaa.kar.nic.in
10 of issue of the clearance letter, at least in two
local newspaper that are widely circulated putting up a notice in two local
in the region of which one shall be in the newspapers that are widely circulated in
vernacular language of the locality the Karnataka both in English and
concerned and a copy of the same be Kannada the vernacular language of the
forwarded to the MoEF Regional Office at state.
Bangalore / KSPCB / CPCB and the
Department of Environmental & Ecology,
Bangalore.
The project authorities shall inform the Industry is operated only after obtaining
MoEF. Regional Office at Bangalore / necessary approvals from concerned
KSPCB / CPCB and the Department of regulatory agencies.
11 Environmental & Ecology, Bangalore, the
date of financial closure and final approval
of the project by the concerned authorities
and the date of start of the project.
The SEIAA, Karnataka may revoke or --
suspend the clearance, if implementation of
12
any of the above conditions is not
satisfactory.
The SEIAA, Karnataka reserves the right to …
stipulate additional conditions, if found
13
necessary. The company in a time bound
manner will implement these conditions.
Any Appeal against this environmental ------
clearance shall lie with the National
Environment Appellate Authority, if
14
preferred, within a period of 30 days as
prescribed under section 11 of the National
Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997.
The above conditions will be enforced, inter Agreed
–alia under the provisions of the Water
(Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act,
1981, the Environment (Protection) Act,
15
1986. Hazardous Waste (Management and
Handling) Rules, 2003 and the Public
Liability Insurance Act, 1991 along with
their amendments and rules.
The issue of Environment Clearance does All necessary clearances and approvals
not confer any right to the project proponent have been obtained before the
16 to operate / run the project without commissioning of the facility.
obtaining statutory clearances / sanctions
from all other concerned authorities.
The project proponent should display the The Environmental Clearance copy is
conditions prominently at the entrance of displayed at a prominent place in the
17
the project site on a suitable size board for plant
the information of the public.
Concealing factual data or submission of The information provided true to the best
false/fabricated data and failure to comply of the knowledge of the organization.
with any of the conditions mentioned above
18
may result in withdrawal of this clearance
and attract action under the provisions of
environmental (protection) Act, 1986.
Any appeal against this environmental -------
clearance shall lie with the National
Environment appellate Authority, if
19 preferred, within a period of 30 days as
prescribed under section 11 of the National
Environmental Appellate Authority
Act,1997
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Desur Depot, Belagavi
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FEASIBILITY REPORT

Proposed Expansion of Liquid Storage Depot

Desur Depot, Sy. No 18/1 and 18/2,

2.6 Industries located near the depot 18

3.10 Noise generation and its management: 31

1.1.2 Project at a glance :

Sl. No. Details

2 Project proponents M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited,

1.1.3 a) Summary of water, wastewater, air& solid waste details

1.1.3b) Brief Summary of Project Expansion

Sl.NO Description EC obtained After Summary

1.1.4 Water requirement and wastewater treatment and discharge details

I. QUANTITY OF WATER REQUIRED AND WASTEWATER GENERATED

Domestic water consumption and sewage discharge

II. WASTEWATER TREAMENT AND DISPOSAL DETAILS

1.1.5 Air pollution details

Air pollution sources, fuel consumption and chimney height details

5 Fire 231 3 ARL

1.1.6 Noise pollution details

1.1.7 Solid waste details

Solid waste generation during the operation phase

1.1.8 HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION AND ITS MANAGEMENT DURING

Hazardous waste generation

1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS & MITIGATION PLAN

EMP is prepared & detailed in Section 3.13, Chapter 3 of this report.

1.3 SAFETY ASPECTS

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

2.1 INTRODUCTION OF PROJECT PROPONENT

2.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PROJECT

Ethanol is derived from molasses and other renewable resources. It is an oxygen-enhancing

It is an agricultural based product, mainly a by-product of sugar industries in our country,

Salient features of Ethanol:

 Ethanol is completely soluble in water, which presents potential problems for

 The auto-ignition temperature of Ethanol is significantly higher than that of Motor

2.3 Need and Justification for the Proposed Expansion

Justification for enhancing the storage capacity of Ethanol:

So additional storage for ethanol is proposed in the Depot.

Justification for Bio-Diesel:

Table 2.0: Details of present and proposed storage capacities

2 Ethanol A 3 20 2 x 6.718 Horizontal 85 2 200 4 x 16.2 Horizontal 400 485

4 Bio- B - - - - - 2 200 4 x 16.2 Horizontal 1,058 1,058

TOTAL 14 16,798 4 1,458 18,256

2.5LOCATION OF THE PROJECT SITE

Fig 2.0 LOCATION OF PROJECT SITE

2.5 PROJECT SITE PHOTOGRAPHS

2.6 Industries located near the Depot

Fig 2.2 shows the industries located near the Depot

Table 2.1 industries located near the Depot MRPL

Sl.No. Description Distance from BPCL Direction

2.7 ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPOT

Table: - 2.2 Land-use pattern

Sl. No. Particulars Area Area in Acres Percentage

Total plot area 106534 26.325 100

Ground coverage 48036 11.869 45.09

Hard paved area 7600 1.878 7.13

Landscape area 50898 12.578 47.78

2.9 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION DUE TO THE PROJECT

3.2 LOCATION OF THE DEPOT

Details of the immediate surroundings is appended in the table below

North Vacant land

Fig 3.0 Maps showing boundary & location of the Depot

Note: Longitude: 15°45'19.6"N Latitude: 74°29'43.1"E MSL :784 M

FIG 3.1 SHOWS THE DEPOT ON THE STATE MAP