Introductory Questions…

Government involvement in environment.

Why and how are they involved?

Government has power: a right to exercise coercive force – it has the power
to physically move people, landscapes (exploit or protect), make war, etc.

In some countries, government powers are limited.

Who has rights and who doesn’t have rights to use a resource?

Gov’t sets rules for access, pollution, etc.

Constitutive rules: we don’t have an environmental right written into the

Constitution like some other countries.

The US has not taken up such an amendment may be because we already

have a rich body of law and language that allows governance of
environmental measures.

For Discussion: See D. Botkin Articles:

What are some implications of assuming non-equilibrium ecosystem

dynamics for designing environmental laws & implications?

Carrying capacity, Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) – models without real

world variables (they see the environment as a stagnant, balancing point
with fluctuations around that point, rather than environments being
constantly in flux, with multiple variables and inputs).

Sustainability points have not really been established through empirical

research, but have been hypothesized. However, they do not take into
account that such “balancing points” may shift over time.

How does this affect or impact env. law? It needs to be informed by

empirical research, but in the US, laws must provide equal protection.
Therefore, laws covering env. issues have to balance that equal protection
for all with empirical based research about local ecosystems/ env. research.

Each regulation and large area of law (excepting local ordinance, which work
within the overarching legal framework)

The law, the environment, the markets are all dynamic. How does a legal
system take everything into account from the global to the local level?

Ecological Theory Affects Assumptions of Ecological Models

How is the idea of “carrying capacity” addressed by varying assumptions?

• How should we decide which ecological models we use as a basis for law
and regulation?

• Who should decide?

• To what extent must implications of assumptions be tested empirically?

• To what extent must results be modified based on monitoring?

• How should “we” decide when laws & regulations should be changed?
(WHO?)

Many of our laws will decide on how the science will be judged…

It is part of the process of how we decide to protect whichever particular

aspect of the environment.

How do we establish acceptable levels of risk?

Sometimes we need to reevaluate env policy and laws over a period of time
(empirical testing). There is often an urgency or need to protect the env. or
resource that will not want to wait for another 30 years to see if the science
is completely accurate or not, we then will debate risk Ex. Climate Change.
Who gets to decide?

Who is the “we” in our collective action?

What about the “tragedy of the commons”?

1968 (Science):
Economic model illustrates how individual “maximizing” rationality leads to
resource degradation, ultimate reduction in individual returns & collective
dysfunction. –Garrett Hardin

Many users of a resource will often overshoot the carrying capacity of a

given resource, as each individual will look to utilize said resource through
maximum use and efficiency while the harms are shared by all (the
commons).

“Game Theory” in economics

Diminishing returns with resource over-exploitation & degradation.

Positive return to herders by adding an extra animal to graze on the

commons, up to a certain point. At one point, any additional animals
grazing will limit and eventually decrease the returns.

Ex. cattle or sheep grazing, driving in traffic (speeding), parking (impacted

spaces).

The collective resource user pays for the individual over-exploitation of the
resource.

We all wish SOMEONE ELSE would just “do the right thing”!

There is a preemptive psychology driving excessive resource use, this affects

our politics and laws.
But for the individual herder on the common, there is little incentive
to STOP adding more sheep.

Option 1 to protect the pasture & sustain the herder long-term:

Government can restrict the number of sheep any herder can graze on the
common…

…or limit the number of park visitors

…or limit the amount a fisher may catch and where, and when.

Option 2 to protect the pasture and sustain the herder long-term:

The common can be divided, privatized, and fenced. This way, each herder
knows that adding more sheep will only harm his own pasture, and degrade
grazing for his own sheep.

Use of marginal lands increasingly used, with implications for further env.
degradation.

For discussion: (see G. Hardin & J. Walljapser articles)

What implications do the contrasting approaches of Hardin & Ostrom have
for the development of laws and policies to conserve vital environmental
resources and natural systems?

G. Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” warns that privatization of common

resources is the best way to avoid exhausting them…

See PP.
Different Types of Goods
Excludable Non-Excludable
Rivalrous Private goods Common goods (common-
food, clothing, cars, pool resources)
personal electronics fish stocks, timber, coal,
national health service
Non- Club goods Public goods
Rivalrous cinemas, private parks, free-to-air TV, national defense
satellite TV

Game theory: “Free rider” problem & collective action

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