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Operating locations
Head Office
New South Wales
286 Sussex Street (corner of Bathurst Street) HB 13—2000
Sydney NSW 2000
GPO Box 5420 Sydney NSW 2001
Phone: 02 8206 6000
Facsimile: 02 8206 6001
Website: www.standards.com.au
Sales Agencies
Ta s m a n i a
10 Barrack Street
Hobart TAS 7000
Phone: 03 6224 2380
Facsimile: 03 6224 4185
Website: www.standards.com.au
Victoria
19-25 Raglan Street
Electrical
South Melbourne VIC 3205
Phone: 03 9693 3000
Facsimile: 03 9696 1319
equipment
Website: www.standards.com.au
N o r t h e r n Te r r i t o r y
191 Stuart Highway
for
hazardous areas
Parap NT 0820
Phone: 08 8981 9666
Facsimile: 08 8941 0275
Website: www.standards.com.au
Queensland
232 St Pauls Terrace
Fortitude Valley QLD 4006
Phone: 07 3216 1355
Facsimile: 07 3216 0277
Website: www.standards.com.au
Newcastle
475 Hunter Street
Newcastle NSW 2300
Phone: 02 4925 0499
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City Walk Canberra ACT 2601
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Facsimile: 02 6249 8989
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Facsimile: 08 8373 4124
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Western Australia
165 Adelaide Terrace
East Perth WA 6004
Phone: 08 9221 6700
Facsimile: 08 9221 6194
Website: www.standards.com.au

Manufacturing + Engineering

ISBN 0 7337 3587 8

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Electrical 8/25/00 4:26 PM Page 2

HB 13–2000
This Handbook was mainly prepared by a sub-contracted team of experts from
TAFE—NSW Technical and Further Education—Manufacturing and Engineering
Education Services Division, under the supervision of the Joint Technical
Committee P-012, EEHA Competency Standards Advisory Panel.

The following interests are represented on Committee P-012


Auckland Regional Chamber of Commerce
Australian Association of Certification Bodies
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Australian Coal Association
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Association
Australian Industry Group
Australian Institute of Petroleum Ltd
Australasian Society of Engineers in Mining
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (Tas)
Department of Mineral Resources N.S.W.
Department of Mines and Energy (Qld)
Electricity Supply Association of Australia
Electrotechnology - Industry Training Organisation (NZ)
Institute of Electrical Inspectors
Institute of Instrumentation and Control Australia
Institution of Engineers, Australia
Ministry of Commerce NZ
National Utilities and Electrotechnology Industry Training Advisory Body
New South Wales Grain Corporation Limited
New South Wales TAFE Commission
New Zealand Hazardous Areas Electrical Coordinating Committee
The Royal Australian Chemical Institute
WorkCover NSW

Keeping Standards up to date


Standards are living documents which reflect progress in science, technology
and systems. To maintain their currency, all Standards are periodically reviewed,
and new editions are published. Between editions, amendments may be issued.
Standards may be withdrawn. It is important that readers assure themselves
they are using a current Standard, which should include any amendments which
may have been published since the Standard was purchased.

Detailed information about joint Australian/New Zealand Standards can be


found by visiting the Standards Australia web site at www.standards.com.au or
Standards New Zealand web site at www.standard.co.nz and looking up the
relevant Standard in the on-line catalogue.

Alternatively, both organizations publish an annual printed Catalogue with full


details of all current Standards. For more frequent listings or notification of
revisions, amendments and withdrawals, Standards Australia and Standards
New Zealand offer a number of update options. For information about these
services, users should contact their respective notional Standards organization.

We also welcome suggestions for improvement in our Standards, and especially


encourage readers to notify us immediately of any apparent inaccuracies or
ambiguities. Please address your comments to the Chief Executive of either
Standards Australia International or Standards New Zealand at the address
shown on the back cover.

HB 13:2000

Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001


HB 13—2000

Electrical equipment for hazardous


areas

Originated as HB 13—1988.
Previous edition 1992.
Third edition 2000.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

COPYRIGHT
© Standards Australia International
All rights are reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without the written permission of the
publisher.
Published by Standards Australia International Ltd
GPO Box 5420, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia
ISBN 0 7337 3587 8
HB 13—2000 2

PREFACE
In the last decade there has been an increased awareness of the use of electrical equipment
in potentially explosive gas and dust atmospheres. This has lead to a substantial expansion
of recognized explosion-protection techniques, construction and test specifications, codes
of practice and safety legislation.
The range of equipment is extensive, offering designs and types to suit specific situations.
An incorrect selection or installation of equipment may prove to be not only a costly error,
but also unsafe.
Many people have an interest in the safe use of electrical equipment in hazardous areas—
plant management, consulting engineers, manufacturers, electrical contractors, construction
and maintenance personnel, electrical inspectors, workshops and insurance underwriters.
The main objective of this Handbook is to provide a basis for understanding the principles
involved in the identification of a hazardous area, relevant statutory requirements and the
selection and installation, maintenance, testing, overhaul and repair of appropriate electrical
equipment.
This Handbook also provides a basic introduction to the relevant Australian, New Zealand,
Joint (Australian/New Zealand) and International Standards dealing with hazardous areas.
During the 1990s two fundamental changes have occurred in the explosion-protected
electrical equipment field, in Australia and New Zealand.
The first took place in the early 1990s, when an Active Cooperation Agreement between
Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand was signed for the preparation and
marketing of Joint Standards (Australian/New Zealand).
This Agreement came into effect on 1 July 1992 and since then several Joint Standards have
been published within the Hazardous Areas field.
While not all Australian Standards applicable to hazardous areas have progressed to Joint
Standards status, almost all the Australian Standards that are not joint, are applicable in
New Zealand either through citation in regulations, principally by NZECP 24, or through
citation in Joint Standards.
There are a small number of ‘New Zealand only’ Standards applicable to some aspects of
hazardous areas, however they are generally not consistent with the homologous joint series
and therefore should be considered as obsolescent Standards, which are retained for
particular special applications.
As a consequence of this, the term ‘Joint Standard’ should be read in this document to
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

include all Standards referenced, whether or not they are official Joint Standards. Where a
particular Standard does not have applicability in New Zealand that aspect will be
highlighted in the text.
In respect to Standards relating to competencies, there will be slight differences for New
Zealand due to the differing competency and qualification frameworks; however these
differences do not apply to the ‘technical’ aspects of the requirements and therefore the
AS/NZS 4761 Series (EEHA Competency Standards) is fully applicable in New Zealand.
The second major change was the strategic decision made by the Joint Committee EL/14 in
December 1996, to adopt all the relevant IEC Standards and publish them as Joint Standards
(AS/NZS).
3 HB 13—2000

The rationale behind the adoption of the IEC Standards is: Australia and New Zealand are
part of the global economy and must compete on such a basis and to allow freedom of trade.
The recently implemented IECEx Scheme will permit apparatus certified in Member
Countries of the Scheme to be used in Australia and New Zealand without further
certification being required by an Australian or New Zealand testing laboratory (see
Chapter 7 for further details).
At the same time the European countries, who now operate under the ATEX Directives and
EN (CENELEC) Standards, are moving to adopt the IEC Standards.
Leading up to the adoption of the IEC Standards as Joint Standards, both countries had
considerable input into their formulation and it became clear that in the interests of
rationalization there was no impediment from a technical or philosophical point of view in
adopting the IEC Standards in their entirety.
Due to the ongoing alignment with IEC Standards the term ‘equipment’ is being replaced by
the term ‘apparatus’, in the most recent published Joint Standards (AS/NZS). In this
Handbook you may find in some sections references to one or another of these terms, but
they should be considered equivalent.
Regarding the numbering of Standards in Australia and New Zealand, different patterns co-
exist nowadays, and some examples are:
AS 2380.1 (valid in Australia and New Zealand)
NZ 5425 (valid only in New Zealand)
AS/NZS 3800 Joint Standard—Australia/New Zealand
AS/NZS 60079.0 Joint Standard—Australia/New Zealand—adoption of IEC 60079-0.
Preparation of the present edition of HB 13 has been supported by the following parties:
MED Ministry of Economic Development—New Zealand (formerly Ministry
of Commerce—NZ)
NUEITAB National Utilities and Electrotechnology Industry Training Advisory
Board
SAI Standards Australia International
TAFE—N.S.W. Technical and Further Education—Manufacturing and Engineering
Educational Services Division.
The major changes introduced in this edition are—
(a) inclusion of four new chapters covering ‘inspection and testing’, ‘overhaul and
repair’, certified/accredited workshops’ and ‘gas detectors’;
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(b) revision and expansion of all the previous chapters;


(c) alignment with the IEC Standards adopted in Australia/New Zealand;
(d) incorporation of the current National and International Certification Schemes
accepted in Australia/New Zealand, for Ex equipment;
(e) revision and expansion of the previous appendices; and
(f) deletion of the specific Appendix addressing the New Zealand requirements which
have been incorporated throughout the text.
This Handbook will be reviewed periodically to take account of changes in Standards for
Ex equipment and installation practices.
HB 13—2000 4

Committee P-012—EEHA Competency Standards Advisory Panel has overseen the


preparation of this Publication and Committee EL/14—Electrical Equipment in Hazardous
Areas and EL-023—Electrical Equipment in Coal Mines have been requested to cooperate
through the comments of the respective Committee Members.
The cooperation and assistance of Clipsal-Stahl Ex Ltd, Cooper Electrical Australia Pty
Limited, Orica Engineering Ltd, Standards Australia International, TAFE—N.S.W.
(Manufacturing and Engineering Education Services) in the preparation of photos, diagrams
and figures are recognized and highly appreciated.

WARNING
THE INFORMATION IN THIS HANDBOOK IS INTENDED ONLY AS A
GUIDE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE BACKGROUND AND
PRINCIPLES IN THIS EXTREMELY COMPLEX FIELD OF
ELECTROTECHNOLOGY. THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT PURPORT TO
COVER ALL THE ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE IN THE DESIGN, SELECTION,
INSTALLATION, TESTING, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, OVERHAUL OR
MODIFICATION OF EXPLOSION-PROTECTED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT.

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN THE INFORMATION


CONTAINED IN THIS HANDBOOK BE USED AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE RELEVANT STANDARDS OR THE
EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL
DOCUMENTATION.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001
5 HB 13—2000

CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1 WHAT IS A HAZARDOUS AREA?


1.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................9
1.2 HAZARDOUS AREAS...........................................................................................9
1.3 CONDITIONS FOR AN EXPLOSION.................................................................10
1.4 FLAMMABLE MATERIALS...............................................................................10
1.5 PROPERTIES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS .................................................11
1.6 IGNITION SOURCES ..........................................................................................19
1.7 TOXICITY............................................................................................................24

CHAPTER 2 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?


2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................25
2.2 UNDERGROUND COAL MINING .....................................................................25
2.3 OTHER INDUSTRIES..........................................................................................26
2.4 COMPETENCIES OF PERSONNEL....................................................................29

CHAPTER 3 THE IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDS


3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................30
3.2 AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND JOINT STANDARDS (AS/NZS) .........30
3.3 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS.......................................................................33
3.4 OTHER NATIONAL STANDARDS ....................................................................34

CHAPTER 4 CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS AREAS


4.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................36
4.2 RESPONSIBILITY ...............................................................................................36
4.3 RELEVANT INFORMATION..............................................................................37
4.4 TYPE OF HAZARD .............................................................................................37
4.5 ZONES 0, 1 AND 2 (GASES)...............................................................................37
4.6 ZONES 20, 21 AND 22 (DUSTS).........................................................................42
4.7 IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
FOR GAS/VAPOUR AND DUST AREAS...........................................................46
4.8 SUMMARY OF AREA CLASSIFICATION ........................................................48

CHAPTER 5 EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES


5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................49
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5.2 EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES ......................................................49


5.3 Ex d - FLAMEPROOF ENCLOSURE ..................................................................51
5.4 Ex e - INCREASED SAFETY ..............................................................................57
5.5 Ex i - INTRINSIC SAFETY..................................................................................60
5.6 Ex m - ENCAPSULATION...................................................................................68
5.7 Ex n - NON-SPARKING.......................................................................................68
5.8 Ex o - OIL-IMMERSION......................................................................................70
5.9 Ex p - PRESSURIZED ROOMS OR PRESSURIZED ENCLOSURES ................70
5.10 Ex q -POWDER-FILLING ....................................................................................73
5.11 Ex s - SPECIAL PROTECTION ...........................................................................73
5.12 Ex v - VENTILATION..........................................................................................74
5.13 Ex h - HERMETIC SEALING ..............................................................................75
5.14 DIP - DUST IGNITION PROTECTION ...............................................................75
5.15 MIXED TECHNIQUES ........................................................................................78
HB 13—2000 6

Page

CHAPTER 6 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLOSION-PROTECTION


TECHNIQUES AND REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER RELEVANT
STANDARDS
6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................80
6.2 AS 2380.1 AND AS/NZS 60079.0—GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ...................80
6.3 DEGREES OF PROTECTION (IP CODE) ...........................................................84
6.4 CABLE GLANDS.................................................................................................87
6.5 ELECTRICALLY HEATED OVENS ...................................................................88
6.6 BATTERY OPERATED VEHICLES ...................................................................89
6.7 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS OF DISPENSING APPARATUS ...............................89
6.8 ELECTROSTATIC PAINT AND POWDER SPRAY GUNS ...............................89
6.9 GAS DETECTION INSTRUMENTS ...................................................................90
6.10 UNDERGROUND COAL MINING .....................................................................90

CHAPTER 7 CERTIFICATION AND APPROVAL OF APPARATUS


7.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................91
7.2 CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL OF Ex EQUIPMENT IN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND.........................................................................................92
7.3 THE IECEx SCHEME ..........................................................................................96
7.4 OVERSEAS TESTING AND CERTIFICATION, OUTSIDE
THE IECEx SCHEME ..........................................................................................99
7.5 APPROVED MINING EQUIPMENT ................................................................. 100
7.6 EXEMPTION FROM CERTIFICATION............................................................ 103
7.7 PERSONAL EQUIPMENT................................................................................. 103

CHAPTER 8 SELECTION OF APPARATUS


8.1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................... 104
8.2 APPARATUS FOR GASES ............................................................................... 105
8.3 APPARATUS FOR DUSTS................................................................................ 112
8.4 APPARATUS ABOVE A HAZARDOUS AREA ............................................... 116
8.5 APPARATUS NOT PERMITTED ...................................................................... 117
8.6 SELECTION OF REPAIRED OR EXISTING EQUIPMENT............................. 117

CHAPTER 9 INSTALLATION OF EXPLOSION-PROTECTION APPARATUS AND


SYSTEMS
9.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 118
9.2 GENERAL INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS .............................................. 118
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9.3 PROTECTION AND ISOLATION OF ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS ....... 119


9.4 COMPONENTS OF AN INSTALLATION ........................................................ 120
9.5 WIRING SYSTEMS ........................................................................................... 121
9.6 INSTALLATIONS IN ZONE 0 AREAS............................................................. 124
9.7 INSTALLATIONS IN ZONE 1 AND ZONE 2 AREAS ..................................... 124
9.8 INTRINSICALLY SAFE ELECTRICAL APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS ....... 124
9.9 FLAMEPROOF ELECTRICAL APPARATUS .................................................. 127
9.10 INCREASED SAFETY ELECTRICAL APPARATUS....................................... 128
9.11 INSTALLATIONS IN ZONE 20, 21 AND 22 AREAS....................................... 130
9.12 SPECIFIC OCCUPANCIES................................................................................ 132
9.13 VERIFICATION DOSSIER................................................................................ 132
9.14 PRE-COMMISSIONING INSPECTION AND TESTING .................................. 133
7 HB 13—2000

Page

CHAPTER 10 MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTIONS


10.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 135
10.2 USE OF GAS DETECTORS............................................................................... 135
10.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONS CARRYING OUT INSPECTIONS
AND MAINTENANCE....................................................................................... 135
10.4 RELEVANT STANDARDS................................................................................ 135
10.5 STATUTORY REGULATIONS ......................................................................... 136
10.6 CURRENT STANDARDS.................................................................................. 136
10.7 IMPORTANT MAINTENANCE ASPECTS....................................................... 136
10.8 RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................................... 146

CHAPTER 11 TESTING AND FAULT FINDING


11.1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................... 149
11.2 TESTING INTRINSICALLY SAFE SYSTEMS................................................. 149
11.3 TESTING OF EXPLOSION-PROTECTED ELECTRICAL APPARATUS
OTHER THAN INTRINSICALLY SAFE APPARATUS. .................................. 150
11.4 TESTS IN THE SAFE AREA ............................................................................. 150
11.5 PORTABLE APPARATUS................................................................................. 150
11.6 FAULT FINDING............................................................................................... 151
11.7 TYPICAL USES AND RESTRICTIONS OF USE OF TEST APPARATUS...... 151

CHAPTER 12 OVERHAUL AND REPAIR


12.1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................... 160
12.2 OVERHAULS..................................................................................................... 160
12.3 TRACEABILITY/MARKING ............................................................................ 161
12.4 MINIMUM MARKING ...................................................................................... 161
12.5 SUBSEQUENT OVERHAULS........................................................................... 161
12.6 OVERHAUL CERTIFICATE ............................................................................. 161
12.7 SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................................. 161
12.8 REPAIR OR REPLACE...................................................................................... 162
12.9 REPAIR WORK NOT AFFECTING THE EXPLOSION-PROTECTION
INTEGRITY........................................................................................................ 164

CHAPTER 13 CERTIFIED /ACCREDITED WORKSHOPS


13.1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................... 165
13.2 THE ACCREDITED/CERTIFIED WORKSHOP................................................ 165
13.3 TYPES OF WORKSHOPS.................................................................................. 165
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13.4 PERSONNEL...................................................................................................... 165


13.5 FACILITIES ....................................................................................................... 165
13.6 EXAMPLE OF A VERIFICATION SCHEME PROGRAM FOR
WORKSHOPS CAPABILITIES ......................................................................... 166
13.7 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT PERSONS ................................. 167
13.8 RECORDS .......................................................................................................... 168
13.9 MARKING.......................................................................................................... 168
13.10 CONDITIONS FOR APPARATUS RELEASE .................................................. 168
HB 13—2000 8

Page

CHAPTER 14 GAS DETECTORS


14.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 169
14.2 WHAT IS THE MAKE-UP OF THE ATMOSPHERE AROUND US?............... 170
14.3 SOME COMMON PROPERTIES OF GASES AND VAPOURS ....................... 171
14.4 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GASES AND VAPOURS............................. 172
14.5 APPLICABLE STANDARDS FOR EXPLOSION-PROTECTION AND
OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF GAS AND VAPOUR DETECTORS ................ 173
14.6 APPARATUS MARKING .................................................................................. 174
14.7 GAS AND VAPOUR DETECTORS TESTED IN AUSTRALIA
PRIOR TO 2000.................................................................................................. 174
14.8 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE USE OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS
AND VAPOUR INSTRUMENTS ...................................................................... 175
14.9 THE INSTRUMENT INSTRUCTION MANUAL .............................................. 177
14.10 SUMMARY OF VARIATIONS TO VAPOUR HAZARDS,
DUE TO TEMPERATURE CHANGES AND OTHER FACTORS. ................... 178
14.11 SOME COMMON TERMS USED WITH TOXIC GASES AND VAPOURS .... 179
14.12 SAFETY WHEN USING A GAS DETECTOR IN A HAZARDOUS AREA ..... 181
14.13 OXYGEN DEFICIENCY.................................................................................... 182
14.14 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS WHEN USING A HIRED, BORROWED, OR
OTHERWISE UNFAMILIAR GAS OR VAPOUR DETECTOR ....................... 183
14.15 THE ‘READ AND RUN’ CONCEPT FOR INEXPERIENCED OPERATORS.. 184
14.16 THE CATALYTIC COMBUSTION DETECTION TECHNIQUE ..................... 184
14.17 CONTAMINATION OF GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS BY LIQUIDS............. 185
14.18 SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT FLASHPOINT AND TEMPERATURE . 186
14.19 SOME INSTALLATION ‘DOs’ AND ‘DO NOTs’ OF PERMANENT GAS
DETECTION ..................................................................................................... 188
14.20 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 189

APPENDICES

A RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY BODIES............................... 190


B AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND JOINT STANDARDS (AS/NZS) ....... 203
C RELEVANT OVERSEAS STANDARDS........................................................... 208
D TESTING STATIONS, CERTIFYING AUTHORITIES AND STANDARDS
BODIES .............................................................................................................. 214
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9 HB 13—2000

HB 13— 2000
Electrical equipment for hazardous areas

CHAP T E R 1 WHAT I S A HAZ ARDOUS ARE A?

1.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a danger of an explosion or fire occurring wherever flammable or combustible
materials are handled. This is graphically illustrated by the dreadful toll taken by coal
mining explosions in the past. For example in England in the last century hundreds of lives
were lost every year.
The hazard today exists not only in the coal mining industry but also in many other
industries. Major industries include the petrochemical, pharmaceutical, chemical, sewage
treatment, and grain handling industries. In 1866, in a series of explosions in the Oaks
Colliery, 361 people were killed in one accident alone. In 1988 the Piper Alpha oil and gas
platform in the North Sea caught fire and exploded killing 167 workers. Smaller industries
involve such areas as paint shops and dry-cleaning premises. In many cases the hazards
occur in areas frequented by the public, for example petrol service stations.
In all these situations, electricity is used.
Where it is necessary to use electrical apparatus in an environment in which there may be
an explosion it is essential that measures are taken to eliminate the likelihood of an
explosive atmosphere occurring around any source of ignition or limiting the possibility of
an ignition source, (e.g. arcs, sparks or hot surfaces) occurring.
To prevent any of the electrical apparatus becoming a source of ignition for an explosion,
special precautions have to be taken in the design, construction, selection, installation and
maintenance of such apparatus.
Many incidents around the world have driven governments into establishing regulating
bodies and appropriate Standards and codes of practice. The codes of practice and
appropriate Standards must be adhered to, for it is not the many tasks performed correctly
but the one task performed incorrectly that could cause death, injury and plant destruction.

1.2 HAZARDOUS AREAS


A hazardous area is defined as an area in which an explosive atmosphere is present, or may
be expected to be present, in quantities such as to require special precautions for the
construction, installation, and use of potential ignition sources.
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The explosive atmosphere may be caused by the presence of a flammable liquid, gas or
vapour or by the presence of combustible dust in suspension or in layers or a combination
of explosive gas and dust atmospheres.
In the design of industrial plants, every effort is usually made to minimize the extent of
hazardous areas but it may be difficult to ensure that an explosive atmosphere will never
occur.
Incorrect design of the plant may result in the occurrence of small, local fireballs which
could ignite other flammable materials and lead to extensive damage to the whole plant,
adverse effects to the environment and serious injuries to personnel.
In situations where there is a high risk of an explosive atmosphere occurring, apparatus
with an extremely low risk of creating an ignition source must be used. Conversely where
there is a lower risk of an explosive atmosphere occurring, apparatus with a higher ignition
risk may be used.

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HB 13—2000 10

1.3 CONDITIONS FOR AN EXPLOSION


Three basic conditions must be present for a fire or explosion to occur—
(a) a flammable or combustible material must be present in sufficient quantities. This can
be a liquid, gas, vapour, mist, dust, fibres or flyings or a combination of combustible
materials;
(b) the material must be mixed with air or oxygen in proportions needed to produce an
explosive mixture;
(c) an ignition source of sufficient energy to ignite the explosive mixture must be
present.
The above may be defined by ‘The Infernal Triangle’, Figure 1.1.

Flammable or
combustible
Air/oxygen material

Ignition source

FIGURE 1.1 THE INFERNAL TRIANGLE

1.4 FLAMMABLE MATERIALS


Materials which may lead to an explosive atmosphere comprise the following:
(a) Flammable liquids having a flashpoint of not more than 61°C. Examples are petrol,
acetone, ethyl alcohol and paint thinner. Normally liquids with a high flashpoint,
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

e.g. greater than 61°C, can only form explosive atmospheres if they and the
surrounding atmosphere are at an elevated temperature.
(b) Flammable vapours. The vapours from a flammable liquid constitute a flammable
vapour.
(c) Flammable gases. Examples are hydrogen, methane, LP gas and natural gas.
(d) Flammable mists. Droplets of flammable liquid or combustible liquid (with a
flashpoint above 61°C) may be dispersed in air so as to form an explosive
atmosphere.
NOTE: In normal usage and throughout this Handbook the terms gas, vapour, and mist are
synonymous. However, a gas and vapour detector will not detect a mist. (see chapter 14 for more
information on gas and vapour detectors.)
(e) Combustible dusts. Examples are the dusts from grain, sugar, wood, starch, coal,
aluminium, and polypropylene.

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11 HB 13—2000

(f) Fibres. Fibres are characterized by flexibility, fineness and high ratio of length to
thickness.
(g) Flyings. Flyings are waste fibres, which fly out into the atmosphere during carding,
drawing, spinning and other similar processes.
NOTE: Combustible dusts as referred to in this Handbook include dusts, fibres and flyings.
Many liquids and solids, though regarded as flammable or combustible, do not normally
burn. The application of heat to such materials serves to release vapour, which may burn
with atmospheric oxygen. The heat of the subsequent reaction serves to release further
vapour for combustion.

1.5 PROPERTIES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS


1.5.1 General
There are a number of properties of flammable materials, which must be considered when
the degree of risk associated with a particular installation is being assessed.
The following describes briefly the relevant properties of flammable materials and how
these relate to the type and extent of a hazardous area. The properties discussed here are
based on the behaviour of the most common materials and do not take into account unusual
materials.
1.5.2 Gases, vapours and mists
1.5.2.1 Vapour pressure
Molecules in a liquid are in continual motion. Near the surface of the liquid they may have
enough energy to escape to form a vapour. This is called evaporation. For any quantity of
liquid evaporating in an enclosed space some molecules will condense into the liquid. The
rate of evaporation depends on the temperature, while the rate of condensation depends on
the number of molecules present per unit volume in the space immediately above the liquid.
A condition of equilibrium will be reached when the number of molecules returning to the
liquid equals the number leaving it. The space is then said to be saturated, and the partial
pressure exerted by the vapour is the (saturation) vapour pressure. At any given temperature
the vapour pressure will vary from liquid to liquid, thus determining their volatility. For
instance, at typical room temperatures, motor spirit has a high vapour pressure, and
evaporates rapidly. This is in contrast with kerosene and diesel oil (distillate), which have
respectively lower vapour pressures and lower evaporation rates (i.e. are less volatile).
For each liquid, the actual vapour pressure depends only on temperature; typically
increasing by a multiplying factor of between 1.5 and 2.1 for each 10°C rise. Therefore,
quite a small temperature change can cause a dramatic difference to the quantity of vapour
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

that can be present in the air. In turn, this can have a significant effect on the practical
hazard of a material.
Where the vapour condenses as clouds in the air, it is known as a mist. As outlined in
Clause 1.4 mists are often not considered as a separate entity when assessing hazardous
areas. A mist will generally revert either to a vapour or to a liquid.
1.5.2.2 Boiling point
A liquid will boil when its vapour pressure equals the external pressure. The boiling point
of a liquid is the temperature at which this occurs at standard atmospheric pressure—
101.3 kPa.
A compound will normally exist as a gas if its boiling point is below normal ambient
temperature.

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1.5.2.3 Flashpoint
This is the lowest temperature at which, under certain standardized conditions, a material
gives off sufficient vapour to form an explosive gas/air mixture in the air immediately
above the surface.
It is the lowest temperature at which effectively the vapour can form a concentration in air
above the lower flammable limit (LFL). Explanation about LFL is given in 1.5.2.5.
Flashpoint data are normally associated with liquids, although there are certain solids which
give off sufficient vapour to form explosive mixtures with air. For these materials, and
those which sublime, i.e. pass from solid to vapour without the normal intermediate liquid
phase, flashpoint data are associated with the material in the solid form.
1.5.2.4 Ignition temperature
The ignition temperature of a solid, liquid or gas is the minimum temperature at which the
compound will ignite and sustain combustion when mixed with air, without initiation of
ignition by spark or flame. The ignition is due to chemical reactions initiated by the
temperature of the local environment, and may therefore in practice be a result of the
temperature of hot surfaces adjacent to the flammable material.
A direct result of established ignition temperatures is the limitation of surface temperatures
of apparatus in hazardous areas.
1.5.2.5 Explosive limits for gases and vapours
Before an explosion can occur there must be a mixture of the flammable gas or vapour with
air. Such a mixture is capable of exploding only when its concentration lies within certain
limits.
These limits are known as the lower flammable limit (LFL) and the upper flammable limit
(UFL) and are expressed as percentages of the material mixed with air by volume. (The
LFL and UFL are often referred to as LEL, lower explosive limit and UEL, upper explosive
limit.)
They cannot be exactly predicted and they are determined by experiment. The latest
internationally accepted values are to be found in AS/NZS 60079.20. Previously NFPA
325M was used as the reference document.
The range of gas/air mixtures between the LFL and the UFL is the explosive range (see
Figure 1.2). Gas/air mixtures outside this range are non-explosive or non-flammable under
normal atmospheric conditions.
Below the LFL the percentage of gas by volume, in the gas/air mixture, is too low to
explode. Above the UFL the percentage of gas by volume, in the gas/air mixture, is too high
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

to explode.
If the gas/air mixture is pre-heated and/or raised to a higher pressure the LFL will be
reduced and the UFL increased thereby widening the explosive range.
Generally in oxygen-enriched atmospheres the LFL is relatively unaffected, but the UFL is
increased thereby widening the explosive range as well as increasing the violence of the
explosion.
Typical LFL and UFL curves for methane and hydrogen are shown in Figures 1.3 (a) and
(b). The ignition energy varies as the gas-vapour/air mixture varies from the LFL to the
UFL. The most easily ignited mixture will occur at the minimum ignition energy (Emin).

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Upper flammable 100%


(explosive) limit Non-explosive
UFL (UEL)

Explosive
Range

Lower flammable
LFL (LEL)
(explosive) limit Non-explosive
0%

FIGURE 1.2 EXPLOSIVE LIMITS

Micro
Joules
2000

Methane
Ignition
energy
Explosion

1000
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Emin

0 20 40 60 80 100
% by
Explosive volume
range

(a)

FIGURE 1.3 (a) EXPLOSIVE LIMITS—METHANE

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Micro
Joules H2
Hydrogen

Ignition
energy
Explosion

40

20

Emin

0 20 40 60 80 100
% by
Explosive range volume

(b)

FIGURE 1.3(b) EXPLOSIVE LIMITS - HYDROGEN

1.5.2.6 Presence of air (oxygen)


An explosion or flame can only occur when the mixture is between the LFL and the UFL.
Whether an explosion or a flame will result will depend on whether or not the atmosphere is
pre-mixed: if it is pre-mixed an explosion will result, otherwise a flame or fire will be the
result. A flame or fire depends on the rate of supply of oxygen and/or fuel to the area. An
explosion in the case of a mixture near the UFL will be usually followed by a fire.
1.5.2.7 Properties of explosive materials
Explosive materials are divided into two main areas:
(a) Flammable – liquid, vapour, gas and mist.
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(b) Combustible – dust, fibres and flyings.


Figure 1.4 shows the transition of materials from solid to gas.

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Automatic ignition above ignition


temperature

Ignition temperature

Gas

Condensation of gas Boiling point


or vapour produces
mist Vapour
Flash point

Liquid
Melting point

Solid

Absolute zero

FIGURE 1.4 TRANSITION OF MATERIALS


FROM SOLID TO GAS

1.5.2.8 Relative vapour density


The relative vapour density of a gas is the mass of a given volume of pure vapour or gas
compared with the mass of the same volume of dry air, at the same temperature and
pressure.
A relative vapour density less than 1, i.e. lighter than air, indicates that the gas or vapour
will rise in a comparatively still atmosphere. A relative vapour density greater than 1, i.e.
heavier than air, indicates that the gas or vapour will tend to sink and may travel at low
levels for a considerable distance (see Figures 1.5 (a) and (b)).
Care should be taken in the application of vapour densities where they are in the range of
about 0.75 to 1.25. Gases or vapours in this range, particularly if released slowly, may be
rapidly diluted to a low concentration and their movement will be similar to that of the air
in which they are effectively suspended.

Gas or
vapour
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<1

Gas or vapour density Air

>1

Gas or
vapour

FIGURE 1.5 (a) EFFECTS OF VAPOUR DENSITY

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Release of heavier
than air gas cloud
Open grate,
cable duct or
drain

Heavier than air gas clouds


can migrate and be ignited
by an ignition source and
then may flash back

FIGURE 1.5(b) EXAMPLE OF THE DANGER OF HEAVIER THAN AIR GASES

Table 1.1 gives the flammability data for some typical gases. (See AS/NZS 60079.20 for a
complete list).

TABLE 1.1
FLAMMABILITY DATA OF APPARATUS GROUP REFERENCE GASES

Relative
Boiling Ignition Apparatus
Flashpoint Explosive limits vapour
Material point temperature group
density
°C °C °C LFL UFL (air = 1)
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Acetylene -83 Gas 305 2.3 100 0.9 IIC†


Ethylene -104 Gas 425 2.3 36 0.97 IIB
Hydrogen -252 Gas 560 4 77 0.07 IIC
Methane -162 Gas 537 4.4* 17.0* 0.55 I
Propane -42 -104/Gas 470 1.7 10.9 1.56 IIA
NOTE: The data given in this Table are derived from IEC 60079.20 (previously derived from NFPA 325M)

* For coal mines the LFL and UFL for methane is taken to be 5% and 15%, as these are the values
written into coal mine legislation, particularly in New South Wales.
† Additional requirements apply to acetylene (See AS 2380.2).

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The vast majority of flammable materials are heavier than air, and some are very much
heavier than air. Octane, a major ingredient of petrol, is four times the density of air.
The heavier than air phenomenon applies principally to the release stage and heavy vapours
can travel considerable distances along the ground or in drains and ducts or in pipes.
However, once the vapours mix to a concentration in the explosive range the density is not
much different to that of air. Contrary to popular belief, once mixed, vapours will NOT
separate again.
1.5.2.9 Minimum ignition energy
Different gas/air mixtures require different amounts of energy to ignite the gas/air mixture.
A certain minimum energy is required for an explosion to occur. If a source of ignition,
such as a spark, has energy below this it cannot cause an explosion.
The minimum ignition energy of a gas is the minimum energy required to ignite the most
easily ignitable mixture of that gas. The minimum ignition energies of gases are typically in
the range of 0.019 mJ (for hydrogen) to 0.29 mJ (for methane). To illustrate the small
amounts of energy required for ignition the human body can store 40 to 60 millijoules of
electrical energy.
1.5.2.10 Summary
The distinction between gases, vapours and mists can generally be drawn as follows:
(a) A gas cannot occur in its liquid form at normal temperature and pressure, as it is
above its boiling point.
(b) A vapour may be in contact with its liquid phases at normal temperature and pressure.
(c) A mist is a cloud of condensed vapour. Generally it will revert either to a vapour, e.g.
when it touches a warm surface, or to a liquid. Mists are not often considered as a
separate entity when assessing hazardous areas.
The following properties must be taken into account when deciding whether an area is
hazardous and where in that area the hazard will occur:
(i) Vapour pressure—which will affect how much vapour will be released from a
liquid.
(ii) Boiling point—which will determine whether the hazard is a gas or a vapour.
(iii) Vapour density—which will affect how much a gas or vapour mixes with air
and whether it will tend to rise, fall or just ‘hang about’.
(iv) Ignition temperature—which will determine whether an explosion could occur
even without an ignition source.
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(v) Flashpoint—which provides a good indication of whether a flammable mixture


of vapour and air is likely to occur above a liquid at a given temperature.
(vi) Flammable limits—which determine whether a particular mixture of gas or
vapour with air will be explosive.
1.5.3 Dusts
1.5.3.1 General
Combustible dusts are those dusts which are combustible or ignitable in mixtures with air.
Inherently explosive dusts (such as gunpowder, propellant powder and lead styphnate),
which require only a specific level of energy for ignition, are not taken into consideration in
this Handbook. Such dusts are hazardous whether airborne or not.
NOTE: ‘Combustible dusts’ as referred to in this Handbook include dusts, fibres and flyings.

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Dust explosions may be initiated by ignition of a cloud of dust. It is not unusual for an
explosion, which starts from the ignition of a dust layer, to cause the dislodging of dust
accumulated on various surfaces, which then leads to a dust cloud explosion.
1.5.3.2 Layer ignition temperature
The layer ignition temperature, previously called the ‘glow temperature’, is the lowest
temperature at which a heated surface can ignite a layer of dust.
1.5.3.3 Cloud ignition temperature
This is the lowest temperature at which a dust cloud ignites.
1.5.3.4 Minimum ignition energy
This is the minimum energy required to ignite a dust cloud. The lowest published ignition
energy for combustible dusts is in the order of 1 mJ, although it may be possible to achieve
lower values under certain experimental conditions. In comparison, hydrogen has a
minimum ignition energy of 0.019 mJ.
Typical values for layer and cloud ignition temperatures and minimum ignition energies of
some common combustible dusts are given in Table 1.2.

TABLE 1.2
CHARACTERISTICS OF SOME COMMON COMBUSTIBLE DUSTS

Minimum
Material ignition energy Ignition temperature
mJ

Cloud, °C Layer, °C
Aluminium 15 550 740
Coal, Pittsburg (experimental mine coal) 60 610 170
Rice 50 440 220
Sugar 30 370 400
Wheatflour 50 380 360

NOTE: The data given in this Table are derived from the old AS 2430.2—1986 (now superseded
by AS/NZS 61241.3).
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Other factors, such as particle size, moisture, mixtures with inert dusts (inerts) and
resistivity, may also need to be considered in determining the degree of hazard involved.
For instance, irregularly shaped particles produced by milling have a high area-to-volume
ratio. This means that they are more easily ignited and represent a more severe explosion
hazard than spherical particles, such as those produced by spray drying. These
characteristics normally need to be determined by test, for each application.
The presence of inert dusts reduces the rate of pressure rise and increases the minimum dust
concentration required for ignition. The use of limestone dust in coal mines is an example
of the practical application of ‘inerts’.
The finer the grain/particle size, the lower the ignition energy and layer ignition
temperature required to cause ignition.
A layer of dust laying on a hot surface may ignite, catch fire, dislodge surrounding dust and
cause a dust explosion.
A typical example of this process is shown in Figure 1.6.

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Dust on hot surface

Dust ignites

Resulting blaze raises


dust to form an
explosive cloud

Dust/air
explodes

FIGURE 1 . 6 TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF THE RESULT OF IGNITION OF DUSTS

1.6 IGNITION SOURCES


An ignition source is a source of energy sufficient to ignite an explosive atmosphere.
Common sources of ignition are flames, welding and cutting operations, electrical and
mechanical sparking, hot surfaces, glowing and smouldering combustion and spontaneous
heating.
The ignition source must possess sufficient energy, temperature or a combination of energy
and time in order to ignite an explosive mixture.
• Energy—there must be sufficient energy to raise the temperature of the gas molecules
or dust particles.
• Temperature—the gas molecules or the dust particles must be raised to a temperature
exceeding the ignition temperature.
• Energy/Time—sufficient time at the ignition temperature for the energy to ignite the
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gas molecules or the dust particles.


If these factors are achieved, the critical velocity of the molecules is reached, releasing
energy, which then causes a chain reaction which may start off as a fire, blaze, explosion or
detonation depending upon the gas/air mixture. Figure 1.7 depicts this phenomenon.

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Explosion
process

Time segments
0– t1 = initial ignition
t1 – t2 = beginning of the
explosion chain τ
process
t2 – t3 = explosion

0 t1 t2 t3 t

τ − inductive ignition time

FIGURE 1.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY,


TEMPERATURE AND TIME

1.6.1 Non-ignition situations


Small amounts of static electricity have a very high temperature but very little energy, so
that the gas molecules or dust particles are not raised above their ignition temperature (T 1)
and therefore do not cause an explosion.
A motor having considerable energy stored as heat will not ignite the gas molecules or the
dust layer or cloud if it has not exceeded the ignition temperature of the gas mixture or the
dust/air mixture.
In both cases ignition will not occur because the variables have not been satisfied.
1.6.2 Typical sources of ignition
Typical sources of ignition from electrical systems and apparatus are—
(a) electrical arcing/sparking when circuits are switched by devices such as motor
contactors, auxiliary relays, switches and contacts.
(b) hot surfaces produced by motors, relay coils, transformers, ballasts, hot joints, cables,
light globes, etc.
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Methods can be adopted that protect the hazardous area from these sources of ignition
through various forms of explosion-protection techniques.
1.6.3 Combustible propagation
The rate of combustion for a material is known as combustible propagation and is the rate
of chain reaction in metres per second.
The rate of propagation will generate a pressure front. Figure 1.8 shows combustible
propagation from the least to the most severe.

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Fire Blaze Explosion Detonation

FIGURE 1.8 COMBUSTIBLE PROPAGATION FROM THE LEAST


TO THE MOST SEVERE

Table 1.3 derived from Electrotechnology in Mining*, shows typical ranges of propagation
and pressure front in the combustible process.
NOTE: Detonation occurs when the flame front coincides with the pressure front (shock wave).

TABLE 1.3
TYPICAL COMBUSTION PROCESS PARAMETERS

Process Rate of flame propagation (m/s) Pressure front (kPa)


Blaze Up to 2
Explosion 0.5 to 30 400 to 1000
Detonation 1000 to 4000 1000 to 6000

1.6.4 Explosive pressures


The explosive pressure front generated varies over a wide range, determined by the gas type
and mixture ratio. Some gases have much higher explosive pressure generation than others,
as shown in Figure 1.9.
If the gas/air mixture is pressurized, the explosive limits will be modified, as shown in
Figure 1.10.
If the temperature of the gas/air mixture is increased, the explosive limits will be increased,
as shown in Figure 1.11.
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All the properties and characteristics of explosive materials must be taken into account
when determining the extent of a possible explosion.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 give the characteristics of some reference gases and some common
combustible dusts, respectively.

* Electrotechnology in Mining N Marinovic. Elsevier. ISBN : 0-444-88272-3 (Volume 6)


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1.0
Mpa
0.9

0.8
Acetylene
0.7

Explosion pressure 0.6

0.5

0.4
Coke oven
gas
0.3 Natural
gas Hydrogen
0.2 (methane)

0.1

1 2 5 8 10 20 50 100

% by volume gas

FIGURE 1.9 EXPLOSIVE PRESSURES VERSUS MIXTURE VOLUME CONCENTRATION


FOR SOME GAS TYPES

Mixture temperature 20ºC


Gas

100
Non-flammable

80
% by volume

Natural gas
60 (methane)
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Explosion
40

5%
6%
Non-flammable
0 10 20 30 40 50 Mpa

Mixture overpressure

FIGURE 1.10 GAS FLAMMABLE LIMITS VERSUS PRESSURE OF THE MIXTURE

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Mixture pressure 1013 mb


Gas

50

Non-flammable
40

% by volume

30

20

Natural gas
10 (methane)
Explosion
4.8%
6% Non-flammable
0 100 200 300 400 500 (ºC)

Mixture temperature

FIGURE 1.11 GAS FLAMMABLE LIMITS VERSUS THE TEMPERATURE OF THE


GAS/AIR MIXTURE

1.6.5 Rate of rise of pressure and energy dissipated


Not only is the pressure level generated an important factor, but also the rate at which it is
generated and the overall energy dissipated. These are shown in Table 1.4.

TABLE 1.4
EXPLOSIVE PRESSURE AND GENERATED PRESSURE

Maximum Energy
% v/v of gas/air Pressure growth
Gas/vapour explosive pressure generated in
mixture in kPa/ms
(kPa) Joules
Methane (CH 4) 9.5 620 28 400
Coke oven gas 20 660 75 1000
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(H2/CH4 was
called town gas)
Hydrogen (H 2) 29.6 660 490 7000
Acetylene (C 2H2 ) 8 920 380 5000

Table 1.4 shows that the pressure growth in kPa/ms and the energy dissipated in joules (J)
for different gas groups varies considerably. When dealing with gases such as hydrogen and
acetylene extreme care must be taken.
For example both hydrogen and methane reach similar maximum explosive pressures
(around 600 kPa). However, hydrogen has a rate of explosive pressure growth
approximately 17.5 times greater than that of methane. This illustrates the need for
differences in the design of explosion-protection apparatus for specific explosive materials.
This leads to the concept of Apparatus Groups.

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1.6.6 Other potential sources of ignition


It should be noted that many items of personal use may be capable of becoming an ignition
source in a hazardous area. Mobile phones, hearing aids, key-ring torches, calculators, car
keys with automatic door locking features, pagers, watches, transistor radios and
communication radios are typical personal items that may be a source of ignition.
Nylon and other synthetic clothing can store static energy and may become ignition capable
in a hazardous area.
Alloy tools, scaffolding or ladders hitting rusty metal, or rusty tools hitting a light alloy
could produce a thermite reaction and hence the possibility of an explosion in a hazardous
area.
NOTE: A typical reaction is rust (iron oxide) + reactive metal (aluminium) gives a reactive metal
oxide + iron + heat.
Other examples of ignition sources include:
(a) An energy source such as electrical sparks and arcs.
(b) A hot surface, e.g. the surface of an electric motor, solenoid or light fitting.
(c) Lightning.
(d) High frequency electromagnetic radiation. The electric field strength from a radio
transmitter can produce sufficient energy to become ignition capable.
(e) Intense light sources such as lasers.
(f) Other sources of static electricity.
These types of ignition sources are directly related to the minimum ignition energy and the
ignition temperature of the material concerned.

1.7 TOXICITY
There are toxic risks, which are associated with most flammable materials in
concentrations, which are usually very much less than the lower explosive limit. Where
personnel may be exposed to potentially toxic concentrations of flammable material,
additional precautions need to be taken (see Chapter 14—Gas Detectors, for further
information regarding toxicity).
An example of a toxic gas that can cause serious illness, or even death, before it becomes
ignition capable, is hydrogen sulphide, H 2S. Levels of toxicity and flammability of
hydrogen sulphide are listed in Table 1.5. Hydrogen sulphide is a noxious gas found in
abundance during the oil refining processes and it is extremely poisonous.
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TABLE 1.5
TOXICITY AND FLAMMABILITY OF HYDROGEN SULPHIDE

H 2 S Level Parts Per Million (PPM) Percentage (%)


Safe working level 10 0.0001
Serious health danger level 50 0.0005
Lower flammable limit 40 000 4
Upper flammable limit 460 000 46

For further information, refer to the product Material Safety Data Sheets or contact the
relevant department in each State. Further information is available in the NFPA Handbook,
Guide to Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases, and Volatile Solids, 1994
Edition 325 or in ACGIH publications or from the plant safety officer.

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CHAP T E R 2 WHO I S RES P ONS I BLE ?

2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is important to establish early in the process of classification of an area and selection of
apparatus who bears the responsibility for making the correct choices. It is the
owner/occupier since the owner of the property may not be the occupier. The
owner/occupier may delegate the responsibility for classifying an area, but the
owner/occupier must ensure that the delegated person is competent to carry out the task.
Any legal responsibility in Australia and New Zealand stems from an Act of Parliament.
The responsibility may be spelt out in the Act, or in associated Regulations, or in a
document called up by the Act or Regulations.
Each Act may have a set of associated Regulations and provision for these Regulations is
generally made in the Act. Regulations are generally drawn up by the department
administering the Act.
It is important to recognize that the department administering the Act is not just a ‘police
force’ for the relevant legislation. It will also be a source of helpful advice. Table 2.1 has
been compiled to show the significant Acts or Regulations and the responsible department.
In some cases more than one department may be involved.
Appendix A gives details of the addresses for the various government departments in
Australia shown in Table 2.1.
For hazardous areas, the relevant Acts and Regulations fit very definitely into two areas:
underground coal mining and other industries. For both areas the Occupational Health and
Safety Act of the various States may be the overarching legislation.

2.2 UNDERGROUND COAL MINING


Regulations covering coal mining are the responsibility of the State in which the mining is
undertaken. The object of the Regulations is to require mine and plant managers to develop
and implement systems to ensure that the workplace is safe and a safe system of working is
employed. The Regulations are no longer prescriptive but are performance based. They set
out responsibilities and requirements of employers and employees, and may call up
Australian Standards, such as the apparatus Standards. For instance, in New South Wales it
is a requirement of these Regulations that apparatus which is to be used in areas designated
as a hazardous zone, due to the presence of methane, must be approved by the Chief
Inspector of Coal Mines (CICM).
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The classification of a coal mine is specifically laid down in the Regulations and may vary
from State to State. While the general responsibility for the mine’s safe operation rests with
the manager of the mine Part 2 Division 1 of the N.S.W. Coal Mines (General) Regulations
1999, regulation 10 requires ‘a person employed at a mine or declared plant to take steps to
become thoroughly acquainted with the provisions of the Act and the Regulations in so far
as they relate to the person’s employment’. This is in line with the general requirements of
the various Occupational Health and Safety Acts of the States in Australia and the
appropriate legislation in New Zealand.
The Regulations also require Standards of competency to be established for persons
working with relevant apparatus at a mine or declared plant. Competent is defined as
‘having appropriate experience, knowledge, skills and capability’.

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Competency Unit Learning packages for underground coal mines statutory positions based
on National Competency Standards for the coal mining industry were completed in
December 1998 and implemented in 1999. The Competency Unit Learning packages are for
use in New South Wales and Queensland.
NOTE: See Clause 7.5 for ‘Approved Mining Equipment’ in Australia and New Zealand.

2.3 OTHER INDUSTRIES


While the responsibility for coal mines is generally clear cut and covered by legislation, the
same cannot be said for other industries. The most significant difference between coal
mining and other industries is that in coal mining it is required by law that apparatus which
is to be used in areas designated as hazardous be approved by the Chief Inspector of Coal
Mines.
Above ground apparatus shall be certified as complying with a recognized Standard, as
called up by AS/NZS 3000 and in turn AS/NZS 2381.1 (see Chapter 7 for further details on
certification/approval).
Each State/Territory has Electricity Acts, which call up AS/NZS 3000, SAA Wiring Rules.
AS/NZS 3000 specifies the installation requirements for hazardous areas and also calls up
other Standards for classification and apparatus construction. In addition, electricity supply
authorities have service rules, which may also have an effect.
Many ‘State and New Zealand Regulations’ exist that affect hazardous areas (see
Table 2.1).
Other Acts may also call up particular Standards for hazardous areas directly and the
departments administering those Acts may also issue their own requirements.
In New South Wales, for example, the Dangerous Goods Act specifies requirements and
responsibilities in respect of the storage and conveyance of dangerous goods to prevent or
reduce the incidence of explosions. Reference to hazardous gases and dusts also exists in
the Factories, Shops and Industries Act. The Occupational Health and Safety Act, although
not specifically mentioning explosion hazards, makes clear the responsibilities of both
employers and employees in respect of safe industrial practices.
New Zealand has additional requirements also.
For industries other than coal mines, many people may have either a responsibility or an
interest in a particular area. These include:
(a) The occupier of the area—the ultimate responsibility for an installation generally
rests on the occupier (or employer). This responsibility is greater in those States that
have introduced occupational health and safety legislation, namely New South Wales,
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South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia and New Zealand.


(b) The electrical inspecting authority—it is generally the practice for an installation to
be inspected by the relevant inspecting authority, or delegated body, and found to be
in compliance with AS/NZS 3000 before power is connected. However the
responsibility for ensuring that an installation complies with AS/NZS 3000 is
dependent upon the legislation enacted in each Australian State and New Zealand.
(c) The insurance company—the company insuring a plant may well have requirements
that need to be fulfilled. Often the Insurance Council of Australia/New Zealand
becomes involved.
(d) Consultants—where consultants are employed to advise on classification, apparatus
selection and installation, they also carry a responsibility.

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(e) Regulatory authorities—all of the Acts and Regulations shown in Table 2.1 are
administered by government bodies. In many instances these specify particular
responsibilities, e.g. for classification or inspection.
(f) Others—many other organizations and individuals may have some form of
responsibility for the safe design, installation, and operation of a plant, e.g. design
staff, apparatus manufacturers, testing and certifying personnel, installation staff and
maintenance staff.

TABLE 2.1
ACTS AND REGULATIONS

Australian
State/Territory Responsible
Act or regulation
and department
New Zealand
Australian Dangerous Goods Act 1984 Department Urban
Capital Territory Services
Dangerous Goods Regulations 1978
Electricity Act 1971
Electricity Regulations
Health Act 1993 Worksafe Australia
Health Regulations
Occupational Health and Safety Regulations
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1989
Machinery Act 1949 Chief Ministers Dept
Machinery Regulations
New South Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 Department Mineral
Wales Resources
Coal Mines (General) Regulation 1999
Coal Mines (Underground) Regulation 1999
Coal Mines (Open cut) Regulation 1999
Coal Mines (Investigation) Regulation 1999
Mines Inspection Act 1901
Mines Inspection General Rules 2000
Electricity Safety Act 1945 Department of Energy
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and Utilities
Electricity Safety (Electrical Installations) Regulation 1998
Electricity Safety (Equipment Safety) Regulation 1999
Dangerous (General) Regulation 1999 WorkCover Authority
Dangerous Goods Act 1975
Factories, Shops and Industries Act 1962
Occupational Health and Safety (Administration) Regulation
1992
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983

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Australian
State/Territory Responsible
Act or regulation
and department
New Zealand
New Zealand Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 Ministry for the
Environment
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Regulations
(pending)
Electricity Act 1992 Ministry of Economic
Development
Electricity Regulations 1997
Dangerous Goods Regulations (Class 2—Gases) 1980 Department of Labour
(under review)
Dangerous Goods Regulations (Class 3—Liquids) 1985
(under review)
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
Health and Safety in Employment Regulations 1995
Health and Safety in Employment (Mining Underground)
Regulations 1999
Northern Dangerous Goods Act 1980 Work Health Authority
Territory Dangerous Goods Regulation 1994
Work Health Act 1986
Work Health Regulation 1996
Mining Act 1980 Department of Mines
and Energy
Mining Regulation 1996
Mines Safety Control Regulation 1984
Electricity Act 1978 Power and Water
Electricity Workers and Contractors Regulation 1991 Authority

Queensland Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 Department Mines and
Electricity Act 1994 Energy

Electricity Regulations 1994


Explosives Act 1999
Explosives Regulations 2001
Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999
Health Act 1937 Department of
Health Regulations 1996 Employment,
Training and Industrial
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Hazardous Substances Management Act 2000 Relations


South Australia Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 Workcover
Occupation Health, Safety and Welfare Regulations 1995 Department for
Administrative and
Information Services
(Workplace Services)

Electricity Act 1996 Primary Industries and


Electricity (General) Regulations 1997 Resources SA
(Office of the Technical
Regulator SA)

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Australian
State/Territory Responsible
Act or regulation
and department
New Zealand
Tasmania Dangerous Goods Act 1998 Workplace Standards
Authority
Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995
Electricity Industry Safety Administration Act Hydro-Electric
Hydro-Electric Corporation Act 1995 Commission

Victoria Dangerous Goods Act 1985 WorkCover Authority


Dangerous Goods Explosives Regulation 1988
Dangerous Goods Storage and Handling Regulation 1989
Occupation Health and Safety Regulation 1988
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
Electricity Safety (Installations) Regulation 1999 Office of Chief
Electrical Inspector
Electricity Safety (Equipment) Regulations 1999
Electricity Safety Act 1998
Western Mines Regulation 1981 Department Minerals
Australia Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 and Energy

Mines Safety and Inspection Regulation 1995


Mining Act 1978
Explosives and Dangerous Goods Act 1961 Worksafe
Explosives Regulations 1963
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1984
Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 1996
Electricity Act 1945 Office of Energy
Electricity Act Regulations 1947

NOTES:
1 All the Acts and Regulations were current at the time this document was published, but it is
recommended to check their currency, as they are amended frequently.
2 For updated information on all Commonwealth and State Acts consult the website of the Australian
Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII) at www.austlii.edu.au; this information is updated daily.

2.4 COMPETENCIES OF PERSONNEL


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AS/NZS 2381.1:1999 requires personnel who carry out design, construction, maintenance,
testing and inspection of installations covered by the Standard to be competent.
Competent Person is defined in AS/NZS 2381.1:1999 as ‘a person who can demonstrate a
combination of knowledge and skills to effectively, efficiently and safely carry out activities
in hazardous areas, covered by this Standard’.
The Joint Series of Competency Standards AS/NZS 4761:2000 sets out the general
competencies required by personnel working with electrical apparatus in hazardous areas
and the scope of technical training required to achieve those competencies.
The training required to meet the definition of ‘competent’ includes training on the various
types of explosion-protection apparatus and the installation practices associated with each
explosion-protection discipline, the relevant rules and regulations and the general principles
of area classification.
Appropriate continuing education or training should be undertaken by personnel on a
regular basis.

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CHAP T E R 3 T HE I MP ORT ANCE OF


S T AND ARDS

3.1 INTRODUCTION
It is not possible to carry out any detailed appraisal of hazardous areas without frequent
reference to Standards. Standards deal with a range of subjects from classification of areas,
through apparatus design and selection, to installation, maintenance, overhaul and repair.

3.2 AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND JOINT STANDARDS (AS/NZS)


3.2.1 Australian Standards
Standards Australia International (SAI), trading as Standards Australia, is the officially
recognized national Standards body in Australia. It is an independent body and its principal
function is to prepare and publish Australian Standards and to promote their adoption.
Through a Memorandum of Understanding, Standards Australia is recognized by the
Commonwealth Government as the peak non-government Standards body in Australia and
represents Australia on the two peak international Standards organizations, ISO and IEC.
Standards Australia was founded in 1922, originally called the Australian Commonwealth
Engineering Standards Association; became the Standards Association of Australia in 1929,
and was incorporated under a Royal Charter in 1951. Later, in 1988 the name was changed
to Standards Australia, and on 1 July 1999 became Standards Australia International
Limited.
As part of the Closer Economic Relations Agreement, Standards Australia maintains strong
links with Standards New Zealand, with whom it has a formal agreement for preparing and
publishing Joint Standards where appropriate. Standards Australia is a founding member of
the Pacific Area Standards Congress (PASC), and also cooperates closely with the
Australian government in the Standards and conformance activities of APEC and ASEAN-
CER.
Australian Standards take many forms including specifications for apparatus, products and
materials; codes relating to such matters as procedures, practices, design and installation;
methods of analysis and test; guides containing recommended procedures; glossaries of
terms, and nomenclatures. Standards seek to achieve fitness for purpose, simplified
production and distribution, replacement interchangeability, adequate variety of choice
without wasteful diversity, conservation of resources, commonality of interpretation in
technical and scientific communication, and uniformity in regulations relating to safety of
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life and property.


Australian Standards are prepared by a voluntary consensus process for the overall benefit
of the national economy. Their preparation is undertaken by representative committees
embracing all interests concerned—manufacturers and suppliers, government departments
and instrumentalities, professional and trade associations, academic and research
organizations, purchasers, users and consumers.
Australian Standards are widely circulated for comment before publication, are subject to
periodic review and are kept up to date by the issue of amendments or new editions as
necessary.
In order to ensure that every new Standard is a credible document which has the support of
the community and is developed in a an open and transparent manner, the development
process is clearly and rigorously defined.

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The major steps of the development process of Australian Standards are:


(a) Request for a Standard.
(b) Project approved by the appropriate Technical Committee and Standards Sector
Board.
(c) Formation of a Technical Committee (if required).
(d) Preliminary Draft.
(e) Committee Draft.
(f) Draft for Public Comment.
(g) Consideration of public comment.
(h) Draft for Postal Ballot.
A final approval is then given by the relevant Standards Sector Board on behalf of the
Council of Standards Australia, and the Standard is then ready for publication.
Full details of all Australian Standards can be found in the Catalogue of Publications and
this is supplemented each month by the Standards Australia journal The Australian
Standard, which gives brief details of new publications, new editions and amendments, and
of withdrawn Standards. A Web site is also available (www.standards.com.au), and
Standards can be directly downloaded from the Web shop.
Suggestions for improvements to Australian Standards are always welcomed and any
inaccuracy or ambiguity found in an Australian Standard should be directed to Standards
Australia without delay in order that the matter may be investigated and appropriate action
taken.
Current Australian Standards and publications dealing with explosion-protected electrical
apparatus and hazardous areas are listed in Appendix B and are discussed in detail in later
chapters.
3.2.2 New Zealand Standards
A New Zealand Standard is a document that is developed through processes involving
consensus decision-making and public consultation in response to community or industry
need to make informed decisions. It is approved by the New Zealand Standards Council.
Standards New Zealand is the trading arm of the Standards Council, which is a crown entity
operating under the Standards Act 1988.
The Standards Council, an appointed body with representatives from all sectors of the
community oversees the development and adoption of Standards and Standards-related
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products.
Standards New Zealand is an independent, self-funding organization serving its members in
industry and commerce throughout New Zealand. Its objectives include improvement of the
quality of goods and services and promotion of public safety through the development and
use of Standards.
Standards New Zealand is heavily involved in the development and application of national,
regional and international Standards, many of which are developed in partnership with
Australia. As New Zealand’s representative in the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and its sister organization, the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), Standards New Zealand ensures that New Zealand’s voice is heard
world wide. The New Zealand Electrotecnical Committee is administered by Standards New
Zealand and is the New Zealand national member of the IEC.

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Depending upon the circumstances, New Zealand Standards are either developed by New
Zealand experts representing all interest groups or, if suitable Standards are available from
overseas sources, these may be adopted for use in New Zealand (with or without
amendment) and approved by the Standards Council as New Zealand Standards.
Standards developed in New Zealand are sometimes referred to as original New Zealand
Standards and can be identified in the Catalogue by their NZS prefix and the absence of any
indication of relationship with an overseas Standard. Overseas Standards that have been
approved as New Zealand Standards are those that have an NZS prefix but also show a
relationship with an overseas Standard.
Standards that have been approved by the Standards Council of New Zealand and Australia
for use in both countries are identified as Joint Standards.
Information about Standards New Zealand, current draft Standards available for comment,
new Standards recently published, the Standards catalogue, Standards Update magazine,
membership, current seminars and other topical material is available on the Standards New
Zealand internet Website at www.standards.co.nz.
The bi-monthly magazine Standards keeps members up to date with information on new
Standards developments in New Zealand and overseas, details of projects in hand and
feature articles on new Standards published or special topics. The Standards Update
provides monthly updating information supplementary to the Catalogue.
The New Zealand Standards Catalogue lists all current New Zealand Standards and
overseas or international Standards that have been approved as suitable for use in New
Zealand.
3.2.3 Joint Australian/New Zealand Standards (AS/NZS)
Joint Standards are all Standards that are prepared by Joint Technical Committees
(including Members of both countries) and are approved by the Standards Council of
Australia and New Zealand, for use in both countries.
This process of preparing and publishing Joint Standards is part of a formal agreement
signed by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, as part of the existing Closer
Economic Relations Agreement between Australia and New Zealand.
Some years ago the Joint Committee EL/14, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous Areas,
decided to adopt all the IEC Standards relevant to hazardous areas and explosion-protected
electrical equipment, in order to achieve full alignment with IEC in a ten year period.
As a consequence, in recent years, dozens of Joint Standards (AS/NZS) relating to
explosion-protected equipment and hazardous areas have been published, most of them
identical to the corresponding IEC Standards prepared by TC 31 (IEC Technical
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Committee 31, Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Atmospheres).


3.2.4 How Australian, New Zealand and Joint Australian/New Zealand Standards
(AS/NZS) are used
These Standards are not legal documents in themselves, but because of their convenience
and the willingness of all parties to adopt them, many of them are called up in Federal,
State or National legislation, and then become mandatory. Currently about 2400 Australian
Standards are referenced in this way, however most are used voluntarily.
Also, Standards represent accepted community practice and while compliance with
Australia, New Zealand and Joint Australian/New Zealand Standards is not automatically
mandatory by legislation, their compliance provides a significant defence in satisfying
obligations under duty of care.

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Australian/New Zealand Standards for explosion-protected electrical apparatus and


hazardous areas are generally enforced by one or more of the following means:
(a) The Wiring Rules
AS/NZS 3000 is called up in legislation or contractually in each State/Territory of
Australia and New Zealand and its requirements are therefore mandatory. (In New
Zealand AS/NZS 3000 is a recognised means of compliance with the legislation).
Section 7.9, Hazardous Areas, of AS/NZS 3000 calls up AS/NZS 2381.1, which in
turn permits the use of apparatus complying with the relevant Australian/New
Zealand Standard. By reference to other Australian/New Zealand Standards, it also
specifies acceptable protection techniques and details installation requirements.
(b) As outlined in Chapter 2, other legislation may call up Australian/New Zealand
Standards directly, for instance the various mining Regulations and flammable liquids
Acts.
(c) Tender or contract documents may specify that apparatus and installations must
comply with the relevant Australian/New Zealand Standards.
(d) Compliance with Australian/New Zealand Standards is often required by the user.
Further to any compulsory aspect of Australian/New Zealand Standards it should also be
realized that they are perhaps one of the best sources of information on hazardous areas.
Australia and New Zealand started, some years ago, the process of adoption of IEC
Standards and recent Joint Australian/New Zealand Standards (e.g. AS/NZS 2381.1) reflect
already this alignment with the IEC. Such Australian/New Zealand Standards will continue
to be used by the electrical regulatory structures in Australia and New Zealand. (For
information on the IEC see Clause 3.3)
3.2.5 Explosion-protection Standards format (How to read the Standards)
The explosion-protection series of Standards is similar in format to the AS/NZS 3000 (the
Wiring Rules) with the exception that there is no index. This, in some cases, makes it more
onerous on the users, for they may have to use several Standards to obtain the relevant
information. Even though the item in question may be covered in the general explosion-
protection Standard, additional requirements relative to a particular explosion-protection
technique may be covered in another Standard.. Therefore all Standards about that
explosion-protection technique must be consulted for additional information.
The Standards are only the minimum requirements for the explosion-protection technique in
question. The Standards cannot be used to relax the requirements of the certification/
approval documentation.
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The Standards may contain ‘normative’ appendices, which are mandatory, and
‘informative’ appendices which are recommendations only.

3.3 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS


The production of Standards is not just a national exercise. Because of the need for
international trade, several international or semi-international organizations have been
formed whose purpose is to foster international standardization.
Probably the most important of such organizations are the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). These
organizations operate on a committee principle similar to Standards Australia and Standards
New Zealand except that the committee members represent countries. Standards Australia
International and Standards New Zealand are the Australian and New Zealand members for
both ISO and IEC.

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IEC is the authority for international Standards in electrical and electronic engineering. It is
composed of national committees in some 51 countries, formed to represent in international
discussions all their national electrical and electronics interests, including manufacturers,
users, trade associations, the engineering profession and government. IEC Standards,
developed by over 200 Technical Committees and Sub-Committees, are used as the basis of
national rules and Standards in over 100 countries, and for the purposes of international
trade.
The Technical Committee of IEC which is concerned with hazardous areas is TC 31,
Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Atmospheres. This committee is involved with all
aspects including classification, selection, design, installation and maintenance.
Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand have a policy of adopting International
Standards wherever possible. This policy is in line with obligations under the World Trade
Organization’s Code of Practice, which requires the elimination of Standards as technical
barriers to international trade.
With this strategic policy in mind, the Joint Committee EL/14, Electrical Equipment in
Hazardous Areas, has taken a leading role in deciding to fully align with the respective IEC
Standards, through their adoption.
This has paved the way for allowing the full participation of Australia and New Zealand in
the incoming IECEx Scheme, since all the equipment Standards are being adopted as
identical to the IEC Standards which will facilitate the certification process of Ex
equipment.
The relevant overseas Standards are listed in Appendix C.

3.4 OTHER NATIONAL STANDARDS


3.4.1 British Standards
Because it has an active coal mining industry, Britain has a long history in the development
of appropriate techniques for use in hazardous areas. In the past many of the
Australian/New Zealand Standards for hazardous areas have closely followed the British
Standards. This is particularly noticeable in the Standards for flameproof enclosures and
intrinsically safe apparatus and also in the various codes of practice.
A list of the current British Standards is included in Appendix C. Although the UK is now
using the CENELEC Standards (see below), various British Standards still remain in force.
3.4.2 European Standards
The European Community (EC) has had a major impact on Standards. In the hazardous area
field EC issued a directive in the mid 1970s that all member countries should certify
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apparatus to a common Standard, which would then permit trade between any member
country of the EC.
Each of the member countries may issue the CENELEC Standards as an endorsed Standard
of their own. For example, in Britain they are issued as a series of documents under the
number BS EN 500XX.
Prior to the issue of the CENELEC Standards each European country used its own
Standards. The most significant of these are the German VDE Specifications, which are
sometimes used in addition to the CENELEC Standards, particularly where continuous gas
hazards exist.

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Currently the EU (European Union) handles the ATEX products* through mandatory
Directives which officially recognise the applicable and available CENELEC Standards. At
the moment, the Europeans are in a transition period which will end at July 2003 when the
Directive 94/9/EC regarding CE Marking becomes mandatory for all the ATEX products.
In recent years the trend for alignment between IEC and CENELEC Standards has been
enhanced and, in the foreseeable future, full alignment should be achieved.
3.4.3 U.S.A. Standards
There is no single body charged with producing hazardous area Standards in the U.S.A.
Standards for coal mining apparatus are produced by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. For above ground industry, the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) has a major impact through the National Electrical Code and various other
publications on classification of hazardous areas, apparatus design techniques and
properties of hazardous materials.
Other organizations also produce Standards, such as the American Petroleum Institute, the
Underwriters Laboratories, Factory Mutual and the Instrument Society of America.
3.4.4 Canadian Standards
The Canadian Electrical Code, which is similar to the US National Electrical Code, is used
for all electrical installations, including those in hazardous areas. This code is published by
the CSA International. Apparatus Standards are published as parts of Part II of the Canadian
Electrical Code: Safety Standards for Electrical Apparatus.
3.4.5 Japanese Standards
There are Japanese Industrial Standards for both coal mining (JIS C 0901) and other
industries (JIS C 0903). These are similar to European requirements. The Ministry of
Labour’s Research Institute of Industrial Safety also issues a Recommended Practice for
Explosion-protected Electrical Installations in General Industries.
Recently Japan has started to accept foreign equipment complying with the IEC Standards.
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* ATEX products are defined as ‘equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially
explosive atmospheres’.
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CHAP T E R 4 CLAS S I FI C AT I ON OF
HAZ ARDOUS ARE AS

4.1 INTRODUCTION
Area classification is a method of analysing and classifying the location where explosive
atmospheres may exist. From this the plant management can implement appropriate control
procedures. One of these is the proper selection and installation of electrical apparatus for
that location.
The hazard can be due to flammable liquids, vapours, mists, gases, combustible dusts,
fibres or flyings.
The ‘area classification’ must be carried out before any apparatus can be installed (‘area
classification’ is sometimes referred to as ‘area delineation’).
The area classification is actioned in the following way:
(a) The type of hazard is defined, i.e. gas or dust or a combination of gases and dusts.
(b) The probability of an explosive atmosphere actually occurring is assessed (release
frequency and duration).
The nature of the hazard, in particular the relevant properties of the hazardous material, is
considered. For gases, vapours, mists and flammable liquids the area classification
establishes the zone, gas classification, temperature classification, the extremes of ambient
temperature that may be encountered and any specific requirements of the location. For
dusts the area classification establishes the zone, minimum cloud ignition energy, ignition
temperature of a dust cloud and a dust layer, the explosion severity, the ignition sensitivity,
dust layer thickness, the extremes of ambient temperature that may be encountered and any
specific requirements of the location.
Area classification can be carried out for a particular installation or it may be a Standard
procedure for common installations (see AS/NZS 2430.3.1 to 3.9).
Once the area is classified, it is then possible to make a selection of appropriate explosion-
protection techniques (see Chapter 5).

4.2 RESPONSIBILITY
The owner/occupier of the premises is usually responsible for the recognition and
classification of hazardous areas. Where a statutory authority has jurisdiction, it may be
necessary to have the classification accepted by that authority.
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Area classification should be carried out by those who are competent and have full
knowledge of the processes, systems and apparatus concerned and of safety and personnel.
The agreement reached on the classification should be formally recorded and copies kept in
the verification dossier. The dossier needs to include an outline of the methods used to
determine the area classification and reasoned argument for justification of any decision
that might prove controversial.
The dossier should include diagrams, which show zone/s, apparatus group, temperature
classification and any special conditions. The diagrams should be readily available for all
personnel who may be expected to carry out work in the area.

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4.3 RELEVANT INFORMATION


4.3.1 General
Due to the alignment with IEC Standards the previous divisions of Class I for gases and
vapours and Class II for dusts have been replaced with the current sets of ZONES as
follows: Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2 for gases and vapours and Zones 20, 21 and 22 for
dusts.
This change has been formalized through the publication of AS/NZS 2381.1:1999 and the
adopted IEC Standards (series 60079 for gases and vapours and series 61241 for dusts).
4.3.2 Gases
Information on the classification of hazardous gas areas is given in AS 2430.1,
Classification of hazardous areas, Part 1: Explosive gas atmospheres, NZS 6101.1
Classification of Hazardous Areas Part 1: Flammable gas and vapour atmospheres and
AS/NZS 2430.3 Parts 3.1 to 3.9: Examples of areas classification.
AS/NZS/IEC 60079.20: Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres Part 20: Data
for flammable gases and vapours, relating to the use of electrical apparatus is the Standard
used as the source for the properties of flammable materials.
For important information on gases, liquids and vapours, which will affect the selection of
appropriate explosion-protected apparatus, it is also necessary to refer to AS/NZS 2381.1,
Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Selection, installation and maintenance,
Part 1: General requirements.
4.3.3 Dusts
AS/NZS 61241.3 Part 3: Classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may be
present, details the classification of Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas, based on the risk due to the
presence of explosive dust/air mixtures or combustible dust layers and takes into account
the properties of the dusts, both electrically conductive and electrically non-conductive.
NOTE: AS/NZS 61241.1.2, Sections 1, 2 and 3 contain the test requirements for establishing the
characteristics of combustible dusts.

4.4 TYPE OF HAZARD


For this, it is only necessary to decide whether the hazard is a flammable gas (or vapour or
mist) or a combustible dust (or fibres or flyings). The following classification can then be
assigned, depending on the probability and duration of release:
(a) Zone 0, 1 and 2—Gases.
(b) Zone 20, 21 and 22—Dusts.
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NOTE: Many existing apparatus will still be marked using the Class I and II classification.

4.5 ZONES 0, 1 AND 2 (GASES)


4.5.1 Probability of a gas hazard
The probability of a gas hazard actually occurring is dependent on:
(a) There being a source of flammable material.
Sources of flammable material are called sources of release. These are broken down
into three basic grades by AS 2430.1/NZS 6101.1.
(i) Continuous grade source of release—a source, which will release continuously
or is expected to release for long periods or for short periods, which occurs
frequently.

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(ii) Primary grade source of release—a source that can be expected to release
periodically or occasionally during normal operation.
(iii) Secondary grade source of release—a source which is not expected to release
in normal operation and if it releases is likely to do so only infrequently and for
short periods.
(b) The properties of the material, which will determine the type and extent of the
hazardous area (see Chapter 1).
(c) The nature of the environment, in particular whether we are dealing with enclosed or
open areas.
The nature of the environment, in particular the ventilation, is most important because
a flammable gas will generally disperse very rapidly where there is substantial air
flow. There would be quite a difference in the classification of an installation in the
open compared with a similar installation in a closed building. This is an important
fact that should be considered when designing installations with potentially hazardous
areas. It may be possible to reduce or even eliminate a hazardous area by the use of
ventilation.
If, in accordance with the foregoing, it has been established that there is some probability of
an explosive concentration of a gas, vapour or mist occurring, then it must be assumed that
the area is hazardous.
4.5.2 Area classification
4.5.2.1 General
Once it has been decided that an area is hazardous the next step is to classify the area.
Areas which are hazardous because of flammable gases (or vapours or mists) are designated
Zone 0, 1 and 2.
For gas atmospheres, the word ‘zone’ is internationally accepted as indicating the
probability of a hazardous area and by its dimensions, the extent, shape and volume in
which the hazardous material can be expected.
4.5.2.2 Zones
AS 2430.1 and NZS 6101.1 define three zones:
Zone 0—an area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or is present
for long periods. Examples would be the vapour space of vented vessels, vapour space of
vented storage tanks and immediately adjacent to a continuous source of release.
Zone 1—an area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur periodically in
normal operation. Examples would be where pumps are liable to leak under normal
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conditions, or where vents, relief valves or sample points are likely to release vapour to the
atmosphere.
Zone 2—an area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal
operation and if it does occur it will exist for a short period only. Examples would be where
vessels, pumps, compressors and pipes containing flammable gases and liquids are
constructed and maintained to prevent leakage under normal operating conditions.

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4.5.2.3 Methods for classification


Areas can be classified into the above zones either by category of occupancy or by
assessment.
(a) Classification by category of occupancy
There are a number of commonly occurring areas where the degree of hazard (due to
flammable gases or vapours) is well defined and the relevant authorities have agreed
to their classification and delineation. These areas are dealt with in AS/NZS 2430.3:
Parts 3.1 to 3.9.
The types of occupancies, with examples of classification, include:
(i) Vehicle workshops, vehicle parking, fuel dispensing stations and aircraft
hangars.
(ii) Flammable liquids.
(iii) Flammable gases.
(iv) Refineries and major processing plants.
(v) Laboratories including fume cupboards and flammable medical agents.
(vi) Landfill gas, sewage treatment and sewage pumping plants.
(vii) Surface coatings and adhesives.
(viii) Miscellaneous.
(ix) Fruit ripening room.
(x) Processing, handling and storage areas.
(xi) Residential garages.
An example of an area classification diagram for gases is shown in Figure 4.1.
NOTE: The situation covered by the examples of area classification can be varied by
considerations under AS 2430.1/NZS 6101.1
(b) Where there are no examples of classification for the occupancy, classification should
be carried out by assessment, using the general methods given in
AS 2430.1/NZS 6101.1.
Whatever method is used, it is important that the classification is formally recorded and a
copy placed in the ‘verification dossier’.
4.5.2.4 Examples of classification of gas areas
A practical example of classification of gas areas is given in Figure 4.1.
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R3.0 3.0
Vent

Bund wall

4.0 4.0 Bund wall


1.0 Liquid level
Ground level

4.0 to 15.0 4.0 to 15.0

Source of release Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2

FIGURE 4.1 ABOVE GROUND FIXED ROOF VENTED STORAGE TANKS,


ADEQUATELY VENTILATED

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Classification applicable to the example in Figure 4.1 is as follows:


(a) Inside tank ...................................................................................................Zone 0
(b) Outside the tank, within a space from the ground to 3 m vertically above the tank
shell and extending laterally to 3 m from the shell; then reducing to 4 m above
ground level, and extending laterally from the shell to the bund wall .............Zone 1
(c) Outside that described in Item (b) and extending vertically from ground level to the
height of the bund or 1 m whichever is greater, and laterally to a distance from the
tank shell of—
Capacity of the tank (kL) Lateral distance (m)
2 4
4 5
7 6
10 7
25 8
50 9
200 12
500 15 ..............................Zone 2
NOTE: The distances specified may be interpolated for capacities between the Figures shown.
(d) Within 3 m radius of a tank vent outlet..........................................................Zone 1
4.5.3 Apparatus Group (colloquially known as Gas Group)
Electrical apparatus for hazardous gas areas are grouped as:
(a) Group I—Coal mining (methane).
(b) Group II—Other industries.
For some explosion-protection techniques, in particular flameproof (Ex d) and intrinsic
safety (Ex i), Group II may be further subdivided into subgroups IIA, IIB and IIC.
Therefore, it may be necessary to determine which subgroup of apparatus is appropriate for
the gas or vapour in the hazardous area. For flameproof enclosures, gases and vapours are
subdivided into these sub-groups according to their maximum experimental safe gaps
(MESG). For intrinsic safety, gases and vapours are also subdivided but according to the
ratio of their minimum igniting currents (MIC). For most gases and vapours it is sufficient
to make only one determination of either MESG or MIC to classify the gas or vapour. For
further details of MESG and MIC see AS/NZS 60079.12:2000 and Chapter 5.
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4.5.4 Maximum surface temperature


4.5.4.1 General
To prevent the hot surfaces of electrical equipment from creating ignition, the maximum
surface temperature of electrical equipment exposed to gas must not exceed the ignition
temperature of the gases that may be present in the area.
The maximum surface temperature is defined as the highest temperature which is attained in
service under the most adverse conditions (but within the recognized tolerances) by any part
or surface of an electrical apparatus, which would be able to produce an ignition of the
surrounding explosive atmosphere.
The relevant surface temperature may be internal or external to an enclosure, depending
upon the type of protection employed.

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4.5.4.2 Group I
For Group I electrical apparatus, the maximum surface temperature is not allowed to exceed
the following, based on an ambient of 40°C:
(a) Where coal dust can form a layer . . . 150°C.
(b) For internal surfaces, if the above risk is avoided, for instance by sealing against the
ingress of dust . . . 450°C.
4.5.4.3 Group II
For Group II electrical apparatus, the maximum surface temperature must not exceed one of
the values in Table 4.1, which corresponds to the temperature class of the apparatus.

TABLE 4.1
MAXIMUM SURFACE TEMPERATURE
GROUP II APPARATUS

Maximum surface temperature


Class
°C
T1 450
T2 300
T3 200
T4 135
T5 100
T6* 85
* There are only two known gases which require a T6 classification:
carbon disulphide and ethyl nitrite.

For convenience, a temperature class may also be assigned to the gas or vapour, based on
its ignition temperature. The ignition temperature of the gas or vapour is determined in
accordance with AS/NZS 60079.4, Method of test for ignition temperature. The temperature
class to be assigned is selected from the maximum surface temperature, which is one class
immediately below the ignition temperature—see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
Ignition temperatures are shown in AS/NZS 60079.20, Data for flammable gases and
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vapours relating to the use of electrical apparatus, and if not available, the alternative
ignition temperatures shown in NFPA 325M may be used, although because of the test
methods used they are sometimes lower.
Group II apparatus may be used in a hazardous gas or vapour of equal or lower temperature
class number. For example, apparatus of temperature class T4 may be used with gases or
vapours of temperature classes T4, T3, T2 or T1. Figure 4.2 illustrates a typical situation.
For further details refer to AS/NZS 2381.1 for ‘Selection with respect to temperature
classification’ for Group II equipment.
NOTE: The gas group and temperature classifications of a hazardous area are determined by the
characteristics of the gas or vapour present, not by the apparatus.

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HAZARDOUS GAS OR VAPOUR PRESENT


If gas or vapour ignition temperature = 170°C,
then gas temperature class = T4

Parameters Suitable Unsuitable


electrical electrical
apparatus apparatus
Ambient temperature 40°C 40°C
Temperature rise 80 K 100 K
Max. surface temperature 120°C 140°C
Temperature class T4 T3

FIGURE 4.2 TYPICAL WAY OF ASSIGNING TEMPERATURE CLASS

4.6 ZONES 20, 21 AND 22 (DUSTS)


4.6.1 Characteristics of dusts
4.6.1.1 General
Unlike gas or vapour zones, dust areas cannot be divided into normal and abnormal
conditions dependent on time. Once a dust layer has been formed it is cumulative and semi-
permanent unless physically cleared.
A dust cloud of hazardous concentration may be a fundamental feature of the operational
design; it may occur as a result of leakage from apparatus or dislodgment of quiescent dust
or it may be the result of operator error.
4.6.1.2 Dusts
The term ‘dust’ refers to solids with a diameter less than 0.5 mm. If such materials are
prepared by design, they are known as powder or flour. Dust can also arise, however, from
the abrasion of coarse-grain material (e.g. grain) during transport or in the treatment and
processing of solids (e.g. sawdust, swarf). Small dust fractions in the coarse material must
also be taken into consideration.
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4.6.1.3 Dust explosion


When a dust layer is ignited, a fire breaks out. Ignition of a dust cloud, on the other hand,
can lead to an explosion which, in contrast to the fire, is associated with (generally very
rapid) pressure changes and sudden heat development. This exceptionally violent reaction is
responsible for the particular hazards associated with a dust explosion.
4.6.1.4 Occurrence of a dust explosion
A dust explosion can occur when the following conditions are met—
(a) fine, combustible solid in the form of a dust cloud mixed with air in certain
proportions (concentration), with
(b) sufficient oxygen for the combustion, and
(c) an effective ignition source
are all simultaneously present at the one place.

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4.6.1.5 Probability of a dust explosion


As a rule, dust explosions can occur at concentrations greater than 20 grams per cubic metre
of air. Such concentrations occur frequently inside apparatus (e.g. grinders, mixers, and
elevators). They can arise in the room owing to leaks in apparatus, during filling, on
machining materials and occasionally through the air-borne dispersion of dust deposits. It is
possible for dust explosions to occur at concentrations of a few thousand grams per cubic
metre in air.
4.6.1.6 Oxygen concentration and ignition source energy required for a dust explosion
The normal atmospheric oxygen content must be considered sufficient. Some dusts,
however, ‘explode’ at lower oxygen concentrations. When the oxygen concentration is
greater than that of air, more violent explosions occur.
Ignition sources are effective when they supply enough energy to the dust/air mixture to
cause initiation of a self-sustaining propagation of the combustion.
4.6.2 Area classification
4.6.2.1 General
The series of Standards covering electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible
dusts is the AS/NZS 61241 series and they are listed in Appendix B.
Areas where combustible dusts, fibres or flyings occur in dangerous quantities must be
classified according to the probability of an explosive mixture occurring and they are
referred to as Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas. Dusts can be subdivided according to the level of
electrical conductivity into:
(a) Electrically conductive dusts.
(b) Electrically non-conductive dusts.
The distinction between these two types of dusts affects the selection of apparatus for dust
areas classified as Zone 22 (see Chapter 5).
Some examples of where area classification for dusts might occur are: grain storage,
flourmills, dairy-powder manufacturing plants, pharmaceutical plants, and others.
Installations in which combustible dust is handled, produced or stored should be designed,
operated and maintained so that any releases of combustible dust, and consequently the
extent of the classified areas, are kept to a minimum.
In the case of maintenance activities, the extent of the zone can be temporarily affected, but
it is expected that this would be dealt with by a permit-to-work system.
In a situation where explosive dust/air mixtures are possible, the following steps should be
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taken—
(a) eliminate the likelihood of an explosive dust/air mixture and combustible layers; or
(b) eliminate the likelihood of any source of ignition.
If this cannot be done, then measures should be taken to reduce the likelihood of the
occurrence of either or both so that the likelihood of coincidence is so small as to be
acceptable. In some cases, it can be necessary to employ some form of explosion-
protection.
4.6.2.2 Area classification objectives
Area classification is a method of analysing and classifying the plant or installation
environment according to the likelihood of occurrence of explosive dust/air mixtures and
combustible dust layers. This will facilitate proper selection of electrical apparatus to be
used safely in that environment, taking into account the characteristics of the dust.

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4.6.2.3 Zones
AS/NZS 61241.3 defines three zones for dusts. The zones are based upon the frequency and
duration of the occurrence of explosive dust/air mixtures. Dust layers are also taken into
account. The three zones for dusts are:
Zone 20: An area in which combustible dust, as a cloud, is present continuously or
frequently, during normal operation, in sufficient quantity to be capable of producing an
explosive concentration of combustible dust mixed with air, and/or where layers of dust of
uncontrollable and excessive thickness can be formed.
This can be the case inside dust containment areas where dust can form explosive mixtures
frequently or for long periods of time. This occurs typically inside apparatus.
Zone 21: An area not classified as Zone 20 in which combustible dust, as a cloud, is likely
to occur during normal operation, in sufficient quantities to be capable of producing an
explosive concentration of combustible dust mixed with air.
This Zone can include, amongst others, areas in the immediate vicinity of powder filling or
emptying points and areas where dust layers occur and are likely in normal operations to
give rise to an explosive concentration of combustible dust mixed with air.
Zone 22: Areas not classified as Zone 21 in which combustible dust clouds may occur
infrequently, and persist for only a short period, or in which accumulations or layers of
combustible dust may be present under abnormal conditions and give rise to combustible
mixtures of dust in air. Where, following an abnormal condition, the removal of dust
accumulations or layers cannot be assured then the area is to be classified Zone 21.
This Zone can include, amongst others, areas in the vicinity of apparatus containing dust in
which dust can escape from leaks and form deposits (such as milling rooms in which dust
can escape from the mills and then settle).
4.6.2.4 Example of Zone classification of dust areas
A practical example of classification of dust areas is shown in Figure 4.3.
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FIGURE 4.3 BAG EMPTYING STATION WITHOUT EXHAUST VENTILATION


OUTSIDE A BUILDING

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Classification applicable to the example in Figure 4.3 is as follows:


(a) Inside the hopper, because an explosive dust/air mixture is present frequently or even
continuously during normal operation, and layers of dust of uncontrollable and
excessive thickness are formed or are present............................................... Zone 20.
(b) The open manhole is a primary grade source of release; it is likely that an explosive
dust/air mixture occurs. Consequently, a Zone 21 is to be defined around this manhole
with a width of 1 m from its edge and down to the floor ............................... Zone 21.
(c) Because of outside effects, the Zone 22 area will be limited to an additional 1 m
around Zone 21 ........................................................................................ Zone 22.
NOTES:
1 All distances are only for the sake of this explanation. In practice, other distances are
possible.
2 Additional protection measures such as explosion venting or explosion isolation, weather-
proofing, etc may be necessary.
4.6.3 Ignition sensitivity and explosion severity
AS 2430.2 (now superseded by AS/NZS 61241.3) used to refer to two quantities, ‘ignition
sensitivity’ and ‘explosion severity’.
The hazard of a dust is related to its ease of ignition and the severity of the resultant
explosion. The ease of ignition may be considered a function of the ignition temperature,
the minimum energy for ignition and the minimum explosion concentration. The severity of
an explosion is dependent on the maximum pressure and rate of pressure rise. To facilitate
evaluation of the explosibility of dusts empirical indices were developed in the U.S.A. to
compare values for these parameters relative to similar values for Standard Pittsburgh coal
dust.
The ignition sensitivity and explosion severity of a dust used to be defined in AS 2430.2
as—
(Tc × E × C )1
(a) Ignition sensitivity =
(Tc × E × C ) 2

( P × Q) 2
(b) Explosion severity =
( P × Q)1

where
subscript 1 = Pittsburgh coal dust
subscript 2 = test dust
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Tc = cloud ignition temperature


E = minimum ignition energy
C = minimum explosion concentration
P = maximum explosion pressure
Q = maximum rate of pressure rise
The indices are dimensionless quantities and have a numerical value of 1 for a dust
equivalent to the Standard Pittsburgh coal dust.
The relative ignition and explosion hazard of dusts may be further classified as weak,
moderate, strong or severe as shown in Table 4.2.

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TABLE 4.2
CORRELATION OF INDICES WITH RELATIVE
DEGREE OF HAZARD

Degree of hazard Ignition sensitivity Explosion severity


Weak 0.2 0.5
Moderate 0.2 – 1.0 0.5 – 1.0
Strong 1.0 – 5.0 1.0 – 2.0
Severe 5.0 2.0

The data used for Pittsburgh coal dust for the above were:
Cloud ignition temperature 610°C
Minimum ignition energy 0.06 J
Minimum explosion concentration 0.055 g/L
Maximum explosion pressure 83 psig
Maximum rate of pressure rise 2300 psi/s
4.6.4 Hazard reduction
Ventilation is often used to eliminate or reduce gas hazards. In dust areas (i.e. Zones 20, 21
and 22), ventilation may lead to dust clouds and create a greater hazardous condition. The
presence of an airflow may in fact stir up quiescent dust into a hazardous dust cloud.
A dust cloud of hazardous concentration can occur in several ways. It may be a fundamental
feature of the operational design. It may occur as a result of leakage from apparatus or
dislodgment of quiescent dust or it may be the result of operator error.
The first problem can be overcome by the use of a wet process although often this is not
feasible. For the others it is important that dust accumulation is minimized by good
housekeeping (removing the dust) and maintenance of the apparatus to prevent leakage.

4.7 IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR GAS/VAPOUR


AND DUST AREAS
This step is the most vital and the most overlooked. The area classification documents,
drawings and justifications must be placed in a verification dossier. This dossier must be
made available to all personnel who work on the plant.
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Every employee, contractor, supervisor and manager must be made aware, not only of the
extent of the hazardous areas under their control or area of work, but the fragility of the
installation, and how minor modifications can be the source of tragedy. The simple act of
leaving one securing bolt out in a flameproof enclosure cover could lead to an explosion.
Other conditions must also be defined such as areas for smoking, use of mobile phones and
pagers and specific industry requirements.
Safe operational management, maintenance, initial training, induction programmes,
refresher training and emergency response procedures must be put in place, continually
reviewed and rigidly adhered to, to ensure safe operation of the plant.
The installation, maintenance and overhaul flow diagram is shown in Figure 4.4, as a guide
to handling electrical installations in hazardous areas.

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Plant design

Area classification

Selection of
appropriate
explosion-protected
equipment

Hazardous
areas
verification
dossier
Installation of
selected equipment
and wiring systems

Commissioning and All documents for


test verification repair or overhaul and
traceability

Overhaul and Certified workshop and


Maintenance competent personnel
schedule repair
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Authorized
modifications

FIGURE 4.4 DOCUMENTATION FLOW COVERING ALL FUNCTIONS/ACTIVITIES


RELATED TO HAZARDOUS AREAS

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4.8 SUMMARY OF AREA CLASSIFICATION


The classification of the hazardous areas and the selection of suitable apparatus are only the
beginning of the design, selection, installation and maintenance procedure.
Area classification can be considered as the evaluation of two levels of probability, which
result in an acceptable level of safety (degree of risk), as shown below.
NOTE: The addition of any apparatus may change the area classification.

Probability of
gas/air or dust/air
mixture being
present

Degree of risk Area classification

Probability of
source of ignition
being present
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CHAP T E R 5 E XP LOS I ON- P ROT E CTI ON


T E CHNI QUE S

5.1 INTRODUCTION
Once it has been decided that an area is hazardous and it has been classified, suitable
electrical apparatus can be chosen.
The first step, and one that is often overlooked, is to consider whether the electrical
apparatus can be located outside the hazardous area. If this cannot be achieved then step
two is to provide for its location in the least hazardous area. The reasons for carrying out
these two steps are:
(a) Apparatus is more likely to be available for non-hazardous areas or areas of low
hazard, e.g. Zone 2. Significant restrictions exist on the use of apparatus in Zone 0.
(b) The cost of apparatus and installation for hazardous areas will almost certainly be
higher.
(c) The delivery times on apparatus for hazardous areas may be very long, especially if
modification or certification is required to comply with a particular Standard.
(d) The risk of an explosion is greater when apparatus is used in a hazardous area
compared with a non-hazardous area. It is also probable that, in practice, the risk will
be lower in an area of lower hazard, e.g. Zone 2 compared with Zone 1.

5.2 EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES


Explosion-protection techniques (also called type of protection or explosion-protected
apparatus) is a generic term, which describes the use of particular techniques of
construction of electrical apparatus for use in hazardous areas.
Most of the techniques for explosive atmospheres are recognized internationally and are the
subject of IEC Standards (see Appendix C), which have in turn formed the basis for
Australian/New Zealand Standards in the past and are now being adopted as Joint
AS/NZS Standards.
Each of these techniques has a name and is also identified by the symbol Ex, followed by a
letter corresponding to the type of protection. The exception is DIP (where the symbol Ex is
not used).
There are several different types of explosion-protection techniques for electrical apparatus,
which may be grouped together by their principal method of protection. These are shown in
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Table 5.1.

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TABLE 5.1
EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES

Method Symbol Type of protection


Exclusion DIP Dust ignition protection
Ex m Encapsulation
Ex n Non-sparking (hermetically sealed devices, sealed devices and
restricted breathing)
Ex o Oil-immersion
Ex p Pressurized enclosure
Ex q Powder filled (sometimes called ‘sand filled’)
Explosion Ex d Flameproof enclosure
containment
Ex n Non-sparking (enclosed-break devices)
Energy limitation Ex i Intrinsic safety
Ex n Non-sparking (non-incendive components and energy limitation)
Dilution Ex v Ventilation
Avoidance of Ex e Increased safety
ignition source
Ex n Non-sparking (inherently non-sparking)
* Ex s Special protection
* Special protection, Ex s, is used to cater for those types of electrical apparatus, which, by their nature, do
not comply with the construction, or other requirements specified for the above techniques but which,
nevertheless, can be shown, by test, to be suitable for use in hazardous areas.

The different methods of protection can be summarized as follows:


(a) Exclusion: This method involves the exclusion of the hazardous material, either gas
or dust, from the apparatus so that a spark or hot surface inside the apparatus cannot
cause ignition. This is achieved by sealing the apparatus enclosure, by the use of
enclosed devices or by filling the apparatus with some substance, which may be solid,
liquid or inert gas.
(b) Explosion containment: This method aims to contain an explosion, if it does occur, in
the apparatus. A flameproof enclosure is probably the best known and most widely
used of all techniques, but it is only appropriate for gas hazards.
(c) Energy limitation: This method uses energy limitation. Flammable gases and
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combustible dusts have minimum ignition energies, below which it is not possible for
an arc or spark to cause an explosion. If the energy in an electrical circuit can be
maintained below these levels, it cannot cause an explosion. Intrinsic safety is the
most common technique used to achieve this.
(d) Dilution: This method involves dilution of a hazardous gas atmosphere below the
LFL by ventilation. It is not appropriate for combustible dust areas.
(e) Avoidance of ignition source: This method aims to prevent an ignition source from
occurring. The most common technique is increased safety. This is used for apparatus
or parts of apparatus, such as terminal boxes, that do not arc or spark in normal
service.
Whichever method is used it is necessary to ensure that, in addition to avoiding an
explosion due to sparks, ignition due to thermal effects is also avoided. As noted in
Chapter 4 this is done by assigning a temperature class to the apparatus based on the
maximum surface temperature.
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The place where the surface temperature is measured will depend on the technique used.
For apparatus using exclusion or explosion containment, the temperature is measured on the
external surface of the apparatus. For apparatus using energy limitation or avoidance of
ignition source, the temperature must be measured on the surfaces inside the apparatus.
Temperature classification is not normally applicable to dilution techniques where the
method of protection is to reduce the concentration of the gas around the apparatus below
the LFL.
In general, Standards for explosion-protection techniques specify requirements for the
design, construction and testing of the apparatus.
Installation and maintenance personnel must be trained and competent in the installation
and maintenance of all Ex apparatus.
The following sections deal with each of the various types of explosion-protection
techniques.

5.3 Ex d - FLAMEPROOF ENCLOSURE


5.3.1 General
The flameproof Ex d is a containment explosion-protection technique.
The requirements for flameproof enclosures (Ex d) are given in AS 2380.2, Electrical
apparatus for explosive atmospheres— Explosion-protection techniques, Part 2: Flameproof
enclosure d, which defines a flameproof enclosure as:
‘Type of protection for electrical apparatus in which the enclosure will withstand an
internal explosion of a flammable mixture which has penetrated into the interior, without
suffering damage and without causing ignition, through any joints or structural openings in
the enclosure, of an external explosive atmosphere consisting of one or more of the gases or
vapours for which it is designed.’
The important aspects of this definition are:
(a) Without suffering damage. Substantial pressures can be generated due to an explosion
within a flameproof enclosure. Typical pressures are in the range of 200 to 1000 kPa.
It is most important that an enclosure can withstand the particular pressures that it
may encounter in service. The pressure created by the explosion within the enclosure
is released to the atmosphere so that the enclosure is not permanently deformed in a
way that can impair the integrity of the enclosure.
(b) Without causing ignition. Consider the example of a typical enclosure shown in
Figure 5.1. As the explosive pressure within the enclosure forces its way through the
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gaps in the enclosure the explosion flame is carried with it. If the energy of the
explosion is not reduced as it forces its way through the gaps the explosion pressure
front could have sufficient energy to ignite a surrounding explosive atmosphere. The
gaps and joints in the enclosure are designed to act as energy sinks and reduce the
level of energy in the accompanying explosion flame below the level needed to ignite
the surrounding explosive atmosphere. The specially designed gaps and joints in the
enclosure are referred to as flame paths.

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A common misconception is that flameproof enclosures are ‘gastight’. This is not


necessarily the case. Gas is permitted to enter, and, if there is an ignition in the enclosure,
there will be an explosion which will escape through the flanges as shown in Figure 5.1.
The shortest path the flame can take is referred to as the flamepath. As the flame from the
explosion passes through this path it is cooled by the flanges. By the time the flame reaches
the external atmosphere the heat is no longer sufficient to ignite the surrounding flammable
gases. Magison from the U.S.A. gives a detailed explanation of this phenomenon*.
AS 2380.2 specifies the minimum requirements for the length of the flamepath and the
allowable gaps or diametrical clearances. Notwithstanding the above, some parts of a
flameproof enclosure may in fact be sealed, e.g. cemented windows and cable glands.
The maximum surface temperature of the enclosure must be also be below the ignition
temperature of the gas.

FIGURE 5 . 1 FLAME TRANSMISSION IN A FLAMEPROOF ENCLOSURE

Flameproof enclosures are indicated by the letter ‘d’.


The flameproof enclosure technique is one of the oldest and probably the most widely used
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in Australia and New Zealand. Until quite recently it was virtually the only technique used
to protect high energy switching or consuming apparatus in the coal mining industry.
There is a wide range of flameproof apparatus in use by industry, such as control stations,
switches, motor starters, lighting fixtures, plugs and socket-outlets, junction boxes and
instrument enclosures. Figures 5.2(a) and (b) show some examples of Ex d apparatus.

* Electrical Instruments in Hazardous Locations Ernest C. Magison. The Instrument Society of America.
ISBN: 1-55617-638-4.

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(a) Flameproof switch (b) Flameproof terminal box

FIGURES 5.2(a) AND (b) TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF Ex d APPARATUS

Figure 5.3 shows a typical flameproof enclosure with a large number of cover bolts and
Figure 5.4 shows a typical flameproof light fitting.
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FIGURE 5.3 TYPICAL FLAMEPROOF ENCLOSURE WITH LARGE NUMBER


OF COVER BOLTS

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FIGURE 5.4 TYPICAL FLAMEPROOF LIGHT FITTING

5.3.2 Apparatus groups


A particular flameproof enclosure may not be suitable for all gases. Various gases produce
different pressures and require different minimum flamepath lengths and gaps.
AS 2380.2 divides electrical apparatus into the following groups and subgroups:
Group I—Coal mining (methane)
Group II—Other industries
Group IIA (propane)
Group IIB (ethylene)
Group IIC (hydrogen)
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Group IIC (acetylene)


The gases shown in parentheses are normally used as representative of the group.
NOTE: Additional requirements apply to acetylene (see AS 2380.2).
5.3.3 Subgroups
The subdivision of Group II for flameproof apparatus is based on the maximum
experimental safe gap (MESG). This is the maximum safe gap (expressed in mm) for a
25 mm wide flamepath that will not propagate an explosion through a flameproof joint. The
method of determining MESG for gases is detailed in IEC 60079-1 (Supplement 1A):
Method of test for ascertainment of maximum experimental safe gap, and the group of gases
according to these values is given in AS/NZS 60079.12: Classification of mixtures of gases
or vapours with air according to their maximum experimental safe gaps and minimum
igniting currents.

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The subgroups of Group II are:


(a) IIA: MESG above 0.9 mm.
(b) IIB: MESG between 0.5 mm and 0.9 mm.
(c) IIC: MESG below 0.5 mm.
The above are listed in increasing order of severity. A Group IIB enclosure is suitable for
Group IIA and a Group IIC enclosure for IIA and IIB.
Up until 1991, when AS 2480 was superseded by AS 2380.2, the Standard for flameproof
apparatus (AS 2480) did not include requirements for acetylene, which is a Group IIC gas.
AS 2380.2—1991 contains particular requirements for enclosures to be used in acetylene
atmospheres.
An enclosure suitable for Group IIC hydrogen atmosphere may not be suitable for an
acetylene atmosphere. The certification documents must be checked, before an enclosure
that is suitable for use in a hydrogen atmosphere is used in an acetylene atmosphere.
5.3.4 Major tests
In addition to dimensional requirements for flamepaths, there are a number of tests
specified in AS 2380.2. Most of these are type tests, i.e. they are only carried out on a
prototype or representative sample of the apparatus.
The most significant of these tests are:
(a) Determination of explosion pressure
This test consists of igniting an explosive test mixture inside the enclosure and of
measuring the pressure developed with the gaps within the limits of manufacturing
tolerances indicated in the descriptive documents. The test is carried out at least three
times and may be repeated using various ignition points and transducer positions to
determine the conditions, which give the highest pressure.
(b) Pressure test
This test is carried out at the highest pressure obtained above, multiplied by a factor
of safety. The factor of safety is generally 1.5 but may be higher in certain
circumstances. If enclosure is not fabricated then a 4 times reference pressure test
may be done. The pressure test may be done either statically or dynamically.
(c) Flameproof test
In this test the enclosure is placed in a large chamber. For Groups I, IIA and IIB, the
enclosure is tested in its normal condition with the joints being within the
manufacturing tolerances and with a more severe gas mixture than encountered in
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service to provide a safety factor. For Group IIC enclosures, either one of two
methods may be used. The enclosure can be tested with increased gaps or in its
normal condition, but with increased ambient pressure.
Both the enclosure and the chamber are then filled with a gas/air mixture. The
mixture in the enclosure is then ignited. For the enclosure to pass, the gas in the
surrounding atmosphere must not be ignited. This test is carried out at least five
times.
A flameproof enclosure with a 20 cm × 20 cm lid would experience a force of about
5 tonnes on the lid during an explosion that increases the internal pressure by about ten
times.

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If two Ex d enclosures are joined by a nipple or conduit without a seal an explosion in one
of the enclosures will allow the gas in the second enclosure to be pre-compressed before the
explosion flame front in the first enclosure reaches the second enclosure and ignites the gas
in the second enclosure. This is called ‘pressure piling’. The effect of pressure piling is to
increase the gas pressure in the second enclosure from atmospheric pressure (which is the
pressure that the enclosure was initially tested at) to ten to twenty times atmosphere
pressure and the resultant explosion of the pre-compressed gas causes a rise in pressure
many times this amount. This pressure could destroy the enclosure. Pressure piling can also
be created in other ways, such as by fitting additional apparatus in to the enclosure or by
space splitting caused by the insertion of barriers into the enclosure. Figure 5.5(a) and (b)
illustrate the effects of pressure piling.

Increased explosion
pressure caused by
precompression from 1

Pe Pe2 = K Pe1

No seal
Pe2
installed Time

Pe

1
Pe1
Time
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(a) Two connected enclosures

1 2 Pe2 = K Pe1

(b) Single enclosure with a partition (barrier)

FIGURE 5.5 (a) and (b) THE EFFECTS OF PRESSURE PILING.

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5.4 Ex e - INCREASED SAFETY


5.4.1 General
The Ex e explosion-protection technique is one of avoidance of arcs or sparks or hot
surfaces.
The requirements for increased safety apparatus are specified in AS 2380.6, Electrical
apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Explosion-protection techniques—Part 6: Increased
safety which, based on the definition, can be described as:
‘An explosion protection technique by which additional measures are applied to electrical
apparatus so as to give increased security against the possibility of excessive temperatures
and of the occurrence of arcs and sparks during the service life of the apparatus. It applies
only to electrical apparatus of which no parts produce arcs or sparks or exceed the limiting
temperature in normal service.’
This type of protection is denoted by ‘e’.
This technique was pioneered in Germany where it is extensively used, and has gained
acceptance in Australia and New Zealand.
Figure 5.6(a) and (b) illustrate typical ‘Ex e’ apparatus.
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FIGURE 5.6(a) TYPICAL INCREASED SAFETY MARSHALLING BOX

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FIGURE 5.6(b) TYPICAL INCREASED SAFETY TERMINAL BOX

As stated in the definition, increased safety only applies to apparatus that does not produce
arcs or sparks in normal service. AS 2380.6 specifies requirements to ensure that the
apparatus is suitable for operation in hazardous areas. For example:
(a) Insulation materials must be of higher integrity than would normally be expected.
This is achieved by requiring better quality materials, either by the use of additional
insulation or by derating conventional insulating materials (e.g. for motors).
(b) Minimum distances are specified for clearances between live parts and creepage
across the surface of insulation to avoid arcing or tracking between live parts.
(c) Requirements for protection against ingress of solid bodies or water are specified.
(d) All unprotected surfaces of the apparatus must be maintained within the temperature
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limits appropriate to the temperature class or specific limits given in the Standard.
(e) Additional requirements are also given for specific types of apparatus. For motors, for
example, minimum values for air gaps and running clearances are required and
criteria are given for full load to starting ratio, to ensure overtemperature protection
can be provided under stalled motor conditions with current dependent devices.
(f) General-purpose connection and junction boxes are allocated a permissible maximum
dissipating power to ensure that the limiting temperatures are not exceeded in service.
The boxes may be fitted with any number of components up to the maximum
permitted by the physical constraints of the enclosure and within the permissible
maximum dissipating power.

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5.4.2 Groups
Increased safety apparatus may be used for either Group I or Group II. Additional
requirements are applied to Group I, e.g. shrouding of bolts or nuts; higher impact test
energies for luminaires.
There is no subdivision within Group II unless the apparatus incorporates components such
as switches, which use flameproof techniques. Increased safety apparatus is generally
designated IIC in Australia and New Zealand (II in other countries) to show that it is
suitable for all Group II applications.
5.4.3 Major tests
Most of the assessment of increased safety apparatus involves checking that the
manufacturer has complied with the design parameters of the Standard. The amount of
physical testing is limited, but does include the following:
(a) Test of creepage distances
This involves determining the comparative tracking index of the insulating material.
Using special apparatus, test voltages are applied to the material via two electrodes
spaced 4 mm apart. Drops of ammonium chloride are applied at a specified rate to the
area between the electrodes. The comparative tracking index and therefore the grade
of the material is determined, based on the maximum voltage that can be used under
the test conditions without the surface breaking down. Based on the grade of
insulating material and the rated voltage of the apparatus, a minimum creepage
distance is given for distances across the surface of the insulation between live parts.
Ceramic material is exempted from this test.
(b) Temperature-rise test
A temperature-rise test is carried out to determine the temperature class of the
apparatus. Unlike flameproof apparatus, all surfaces, including internal surfaces of
the apparatus, are considered. Exceptions would be internal components using
exclusion or containment techniques, e.g. encapsulation or flameproofing. Another
important aspect is that, in addition to determining the temperature class, all
components must operate within the temperature limits of the insulating material
used. These limits may be in accordance with industry Standards, e.g. cable
insulation, or are given in AS 2380.6, e.g. insulation of motor windings.
(c) Degree of protection tests
Various levels of protection against the ingress of solid objects or water are specified
which must be tested in accordance with AS 1939, Degrees of protection provided by
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enclosures for electrical apparatus (IP Code). For enclosures containing live bare
parts the minimum IP rating is IP 54. For enclosures containing only insulated parts a
minimum IP 44 rating is required. Rotating electrical machines may be assigned a
lower IP rating (refer to AS 2380.6)
5.4.4 Limiting temperature
The importance of temperature in the technique of increased safety protection cannot be too
highly emphasized. Two main aspects of increased safety are to limit the temperature so
that no explosion can take place and to ensure that the materials used do not deteriorate in
service. The latter will, ultimately lead to breakdown and consequent arcing between
exposed live parts through the failure of insulating materials or loosening of connections.

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5.4.5 Motor protection


It is important to select precise overload protection for increased safety motors. The device
must be able to disconnect the motor under all conditions of overload and locked rotor
before the limiting temperature has been exceeded. At the same time it must allow the
motor to gain full speed under normal service conditions.
Because of the heating problems associated with VVVF drives, a specific controller must be
tested with each motor against a specified duty cycle before certification can be obtained. It
is therefore essential to have adequate protection to ensure that the temperature class of the
motor is not exceeded.
5.4.6 Enclosure materials
The ‘avoidance’ technique associated with increased safety allows for a greater selection of
materials as no explosion and resultant pressures can be tolerated. This results in the use of
reinforced plastic materials that will withstand the impact tests of the general requirements
Standard. The use of this material and relatively light sheet metal enclosures simplifies the
installation and maintenance of the equipment. Consideration must be given to the
environmental conditions with regard to ultraviolet light or chemical attack - and weather
generally - in the selection of those materials used for Ex e enclosures.
5.4.7 Enclosures
Major use of the Ex e type of protection, apart from electric motors, is in terminal or
marshalling boxes and luminaires. All plastics enclosures or a combination of plastics and
metal are used. In all assemblies, there is a need to ensure that the maximum watts
dissipation is not exceeded and information for terminal boxes is given in AS 2380.6
Appendix E.
Lamp types and maximum wattage allowed within each enclosure are important and the
installation and specific explosion-protection Standards specify acceptable types. The
manufacturer/certificate holder should label the types and wattage permitted on each
luminaire.

5.5 Ex i - INTRINSIC SAFETY


5.5.1 General
Because of its design complexity and the fact that intrinsic safety cannot only depend on the
circuitry and precise component specification but also on the precise materials of
construction, AS/NZS 3800 prohibits the repair of intrinsically safe apparatus by anyone
other than the manufacturers or their authorized agents.
Intrinsic safety is an energy limitation technique. The requirements for intrinsically safe
apparatus are specified in AS/NZS 60079.11, Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
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atmospheres, Part 11: Intrinsic safety i.


The Standard does not define intrinsic safety as such, but it does contain the following
definitions:
(a) ‘Intrinsically safe circuit—a circuit in which any spark or thermal effect produced in
the test conditions specified in this Standard, which include normal operation and
specified fault conditions, is not capable of causing ignition of a given explosive gas
atmosphere.’
An intrinsically safe circuit could include a single cable passing through a hazardous
area, a single instrument loop in the hazardous area or a number of assemblies
interconnected in the same circuit.
(b) ‘Intrinsically safe electrical apparatus—electrical apparatus in which all circuits are
intrinsically safe.’
The apparatus may be self-contained or may form part of an intrinsically safe
electrical system.
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An intrinsically safe electrical system is defined in the European Normative EN 50039 as:
‘An assembly of interconnected items of electrical apparatus described in descriptive
system documents in which the circuits or parts of circuits intended to be used in a
potentially explosive atmosphere are intrinsically safe circuits.’
A typical intrinsically safe electrical system could be an instrument loop in a hazardous
area, which consists of two or more pieces of electrical apparatus connected together to
measure certain parameters. Before the safe area wiring enters the hazardous area it passes
through energy limiting apparatus. The combined capability of all the individual pieces of
electrical apparatus, including the wiring, to cause ignition must be assessed to ensure that
the system complies with the installation requirements.
IS systems may be used also for dust explosive atmospheres, as outlined in Clause 8.3.
A typical intrinsically safe installation is shown in Figure 5.7.

Circuit of the apparatus


contains complex and
energy storing devices
Special conditions

Ex i
Safety description V MAX,
I MAX, PMAX, L 0 , C0 , L/R
Cable
parameters

Power

Entity parameters
highest V i, I i , Pi , Ceq ,
L eq , residual values

FIGURE 5.7 TYPICAL IS INSTALLATION


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The most important aspects of these definitions are:


(a) Spark or thermal effect. As a general rule, gases are not excluded from the inside of
intrinsically safe apparatus. The apparatus design concept is based firstly on the fact
that the energy available in the circuit can be maintained below the minimum ignition
energy of the gas and so a spark cannot ignite the gas. Secondly, a temperature
classification is assigned, based on the maximum surface temperature of any part of
the circuit.
(b) Specified fault conditions. In order to ensure an adequate safety margin, faults are
applied to the circuits when they are tested and/or assessed. This is done to ensure
that the apparatus will remain safe under any service conditions that may reasonably
be expected to occur. Close attention is also given to design requirements, which limit
the possibility of a fault condition occurring. The specified faults are discussed in
Clause 5.5.3.
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It should be noted that the assessment or test of spark energy and maximum temperature of
components is made with specified faults already applied.
Intrinsic safety has become one of the major explosion-protection techniques, particularly
in the instrumentation area. It originated in the coal mining industry but now finds
application in all hazardous areas.
5.5.2 Apparatus groups
AS/NZS 60079.12 classifies gases and vapours for intrinsic safety according to the ratio of
their minimum igniting currents (MIC) with that of laboratory methane. The subdivisions of
Group II are:
(a) IIA: MIC ratio above 0.8.
(b) IIB: MIC ratio between 0.45 and 0.8.
(c) IIC: MIC ratio below 0.45.
It is important to note the correlation between the MIC and the MESG values in
AS/NZS 60079.12 (see Clause 5.3.3). This justifies having the same groupings for
flameproof and intrinsically safe apparatus.
5.5.3 IS Categories
There are two categories of intrinsically safe electrical apparatus, ia and ib. Essentially ia
involves the application of more arduous testing conditions and provides a higher
confidence of safety, which allows its use in zones of higher risk (see Chapter 8).
The two categories are:
(a) Category ia
With the maximum r.m.s. a.c. or d.c. voltage (U m ) applied to the non-intrinsically
safe terminals of the associated apparatus and the maximum (peak a.c or d.c.)
voltage (U i) applied to the terminals of the intrinsically safe circuits, the
intrinsically safe circuits shall not be capable of causing ignition in each of the
following circumstances as set out in Table 5.2.
Refer to AS/NZS 60079.11 for more information on Ex ia categories.

TABLE 5.2
SPARK IGNITION SAFETY FACTORS FOR ‘ia’ APPARATUS

Circuit condition Safety factor


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In normal operation and with the application of those non-countable 1.5


faults which give the most onerous condition
In normal operation and with the application of one countable fault 1.5
plus those non-countable faults which give the most onerous condition
In normal operation and with the application of two countable faults 1.0
plus those non-countable faults which give the most onerous condition

(b) Category ib
With U m and U i applied, the intrinsically safe circuits shall not be capable of causing
ignition in each of the circumstances set out in Table 5.3.
Refer to AS/NZS 60079.11 for more information on Ex ib categories.

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TABLE 5.3
SPARK IGNITION SAFETY FACTORS FOR ‘ib’ APPARATUS

Circuit condition Safety factor


In normal operation and with the application of those non-countable 1.5
faults which give the most onerous condition
In normal operation and with the application of one countable fault 1.5
plus those non-countable faults which give the most onerous condition

‘Non-countable faults’ are assumed to have happened before a count is taken.


‘Non-countable’ faults may be due to inadequate segregation, creepage or clearance
between circuit or thickness of insulation or ‘potting’ of components. Components that
operate at more than 2/3 of any of their rated parameters (which usually means almost all
semiconductor chips and most three terminal devices, etc) will be ‘non-countable faults’.
‘Countable faults’ are faults occurring in specified ways as defined in the Standard e.g.
between two conductors where separation is less than a permitted distance and more than
one third of that distance, may be considered as connecting together for one countable fault
(if less than one third of the distance is a ‘non-countable fault’).
This also means that no modifications, other than those permitted in the certification
documents for a system or entity, may be made to an intrinsically safe circuit. A small
change can affect many design parameters.
5.5.4 Intrinsically safe electrical apparatus and systems.
Intrinsically safe electrical apparatus may be self-contained or it may be connected to
associated electrical apparatus, generally located in a safe (non-hazardous) area. This
second case is called an intrinsically safe electrical system. Even though the electrical
apparatus is located in the safe area or protected by some other means (e.g. a flameproof
enclosure) it will still affect the safety of the apparatus to which it is connected.
5.5.5 Safety barriers
A safety barrier is a device, which is connected between associated electrical apparatus and
intrinsically safe electrical apparatus as shown in Figure 5.8.
Since the early 1960s the most common application of this technique was the shunt diode
safety barrier, the requirements for which are specified in AS/NZS 60079.11. The shunt
diode safety barrier (as shown in Figure 5.9) restricts the current by means of a resistor and
the voltage by means of a zener diode and fuse. In the event of an excessive voltage being
placed on the barrier input, the zener diode will conduct and this will cause the fuse to
rupture, before the zener diode fails due to overheating. The system relies on maintaining a
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low resistance path for the fault current.


Modern arrangements involve modules using a transformer, conforming to intrinsic safety
‘infallibility’ requirements and relays or opto-couplers (galvanic isolation) to achieve the
safety barrier as shown in Figure 5.10. For this arrangement earthing is not as critical.
These galvanic isolation arrangements are now the most commonly used in IS systems.

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Assembly of one or
more barriers

1 3

Equipment in
Power the hazardous
Equipment in
2 4 area
the safe area

Terminals to Terminals to
safe area hazardous area
Earthed busbar

FIGURE 5.8 USE OF A SAFETY BARRIER

Optional resistor to
limit prospective
F1 current R1 R2
1 3

Input from non-


intrinsically safe Output to
electrical equipment hazardous
normally located in D1 D2 area
a safe area
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2 4

FIGURE 5.9 THEORETICAL CIRCUIT OF A TYPICAL


SHUNT DIODE SAFETY BARRIER

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Barrier

Segregation to
250 V
Low voltage
Source of
restricted power
power
Intrinsically safe
electrical equipment

Output Feedback circuit


circuit

Feedback
magnetic or
optical

FIGURE 5.10 MODERN BARRIER ARRANGEMENT

5.5.6 Conformity assessment


Most of the work in assessing intrinsically safe electrical apparatus is the testing of the
circuit and its components and evaluation of the layout to the requirements of
AS/NZS 60079.11. These include ‘infallible components’ and ‘infallible assemblies’ such
as transformers, current limiting resistors, reactive components with safety shunts and shunt
diode barriers, general requirements for other components, creepage distances and
clearances, plug-in connectors, cells and batteries, earthing, insulation, internal wiring,
layout of apparatus and external wiring, conductor size and mounting of components.
The major tests involved are:
(a) Performance tests
Performance tests are used to check the rating of infallible components. These can be
quite arduous. For example, mains transformers must maintain a safe electrical
isolation between the power supply and the intrinsically safe circuit even if any one
of the output windings is short-circuited and all other output windings are subjected
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to their maximum electrical loading.


(b) Tests for intrinsic safety
These involve the use of a device called the spark-test (break-flash) apparatus.
Certain safety factors and faults are applied to the circuit under test. The spark-test
permits a section of the circuit to make or break within a gas mixture. If the spark is
sufficiently incendive it will ignite the gas mixture. Tests are performed using more
‘severe’ gas mixtures than those representative of the apparatus groups to provide a
margin of safety.

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(c) Temperature-rise test


The maximum surface temperature of any part of the intrinsically safe electrical
apparatus (not associated electrical apparatus) is measured and the temperature class
determined under worst-case fault conditions. For instance all semiconductors can be
assumed to have failed to any resistive value between open and short-circuit without
ever counting as a fault. So the worst-case power available to a circuit can be applied
to the smallest semiconductor package.
While associated electrical apparatus is not usually subject to a maximum surface
temperature limit, because the associated electrical apparatus is usually mounted in
the safe area, care must be taken in selection of the associated electrical apparatus to
ensure that heat generation of allied apparatus in the same cubicle does not cause
temperature conditions that could exceed the certified maximum ambient temperature
of the IS apparatus. Loss of air-conditioning or ventilation in the safe area must be
considered also. Where associated electrical apparatus is installed in the hazardous
area, i.e. a safety barrier in a flameproof enclosure, the temperature classification of
the Ex d enclosure might have to be considered.
(d) Voltage tests
Various voltage tests are carried out as part of the assessment procedure.
5.5.7 Apparatus certification
IS apparatus are divided into three main certification areas as follows:
(a) Self-contained apparatus such as hand held gas monitors, hand held IS radios and IS
remote control apparatus, all of which contain an IS power supply.
(b) Entity concept utilises separate pieces of apparatus having their own
certification/approval, which are connected together by way of a cable from another
supply. This generally requires calculations to match the entity apparatus to the
maximum permitted cable length and in some cases the cable type. An example of the
entity concept is shown in Figure 5.11.
Each item has its own certification/approval and all have to be matched together
including the interconnecting cable characteristics.
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Power Indication IS barrier IS


To
supply unit proximity
240 V
switch
supply (Ex ia)
Ex ia

FIGURE 5.11 TYPICAL IS SYSTEM USING ENTITY CONCEPT

(c) Integrated system: The integrated system is certified/approved as one entire system,
which covers the apparatus in the safe area (associated apparatus), the apparatus in
the hazardous area (intrinsically safe apparatus) and the interconnecting cabling.
An example of an integrated system is shown in Figure 5.12.
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IS phone

IS power IS 1
To supply telephone
supply desk

IS phone

Cabling is part of the


2
certification/approval

To other IS phones

FIGURE 5.12 TYPICAL INTEGRATED IS SYSTEM

The entire phone system comes under one certification/approval and only those phones
certified/approved for that system may be used.
5.5.8 Ex i temperature classification
For both Ex ia and Ex ib apparatus the maximum surface temperature allowable is the value
shown in the compliance plate and in the certification/approval documents. This also
applies under any fault condition.
In most cases the temperature classification for IS apparatus is:
T4 = 135°C
T5 = 100°C
T6 = 85°C
Refer to AS/NZS 60079.11 for temperature classifications.
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5.5.9 Small components


Small components, for example transistors or resistors, whose temperature exceeds that
permitted for the temperature classification, shall be acceptable providing that they conform
with the applicable requirements outlined in AS/NZS 60079.11.
5.5.10 Simple apparatus
As mentioned in AS/NZS 60079.11 the following apparatus shall be considered as simple
apparatus:
(a) Passive components, for example switches, junction boxes, resistors and simple
semiconductor devices.
(b) Sources of stored energy with well-defined parameters, for example capacitors or
inductors, whose values shall be considered when determining the overall safety of
the system.

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(c) Sources of generated energy, for example thermocouples and photocells, which do not
generate more than 1.5 V, 100 mA and 25 mW. Any inductance or capacitance
present in these sources of energy shall be considered as in (b).
Refer to Clauses 7.6 and 7.7 for additional details.
For further/relevant aspects that must always be considered when dealing with simple
apparatus, refer also to the respective clause in AS/NZS 60079.11.
NOTE: Sensors, which utilise catalytic reaction or other electro-chemical mechanisms, are not
normally simple apparatus. Specialist advice on their application should be sought.

5.6 Ex m - ENCAPSULATION
5.6.1 General
The requirements for encapsulated apparatus, Ex m (moulded), are specified in AS 2431,
Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Encapsulated apparatus—Type of
protection m, which defines encapsulation as:
‘Protection of electrical components by enclosure in a resin in such a way that an explosive
atmosphere cannot be ignited during operation by either sparking or overheating which
may occur within the encapsulation.’ That is encapsulation is used to prevent flammable
gases from reaching a potential source of ignition within the encapsulated apparatus. The
surface temperature of the encapsulated apparatus must not exceed the certified temperature
classification.
NOTE: The IEC Standard IEC 60079-18 covering encapsulation is currently under review and it
will replace AS 2431 as soon as this next edition becomes available.
5.6.2 Groups
Encapsulated apparatus may be used in either Groups I or II without any subdivision of
Group II.
5.6.3 Requirements
The encapsulating material must cover all parts to a minimum depth of 3 mm and it must be
capable of withstanding temperature extremes and various solvents. The encapsulating
material is also tested for its electrical strength, water absorption and flammability.
The encapsulating material must possess properties such that it does not flow, crack or turn
to powder. The hazardous atmosphere must not reach the encapsulated components and the
surface temperature determines the T Class of the apparatus.
Encapsulation for ‘Ex m’ must not be confused with ‘potting’. The application of an
encapsulant or potted component to intrinsically safe apparatus is not the same and ‘Ex m’
encapsulated equipment is certified in its own right.
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The method is not often used on its own but is usually combined with other techniques to
solve operational problems. An example would be a Ex m certified ballast in an Ex e
certified fluorescent luminaire.
Repair of Ex m apparatus is not permitted, since it is almost impossible to repair
encapsulated components without damage to the components.

5.7 Ex n - NON-SPARKING
The requirements of non-sparking (sometimes called non-incendive) apparatus are specified
in AS 2380.9, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Explosion-protection
techniques, Part 9: Type of protection n, which defines it as:
‘Type of protection applied to electrical apparatus such that, in normal operation, it is not
capable of igniting a surrounding explosive gas atmosphere and a fault capable of causing
ignition is not likely to occur.’

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The last part of this definition is significant as non-sparking apparatus is only permitted in
Zone 2 areas where the probability of a coincidence of an explosive mixture of gas and a
fault in the apparatus is considered to be acceptably low.
Non-sparking is really a collection of various techniques. AS 2380.9 covers both inherently
non-sparking apparatus and apparatus which in normal operation arcs, sparks or produces
hot surfaces. The latter is required to be protected by one of the following methods:
(a) Enclosed-break device. (Limited to a maximum rating of 660 V and 15 A).
(b) Non-incendive component. (Limited to a maximum rating of 250 V and 15 A).
(c) Hermetically sealed device. (Cannot be opened in normal service, have a free internal
volume not exceeding 100 cm3 , and be provided with external connections, e.g. flying
leads or external terminals).
(d) Energy-limited apparatus and circuits. (Must be assessed as specified in
AS/NZS 60079.11 and, where necessary, tested as specified in AS 2380.9).
(e) Restricted breathing enclosure. (Restricted breathing enclosures are limited to use
with gases and vapours whose restricted breathing factor is less than 20, see Table A1
in AS 2380.9 Appendix A for typical breathing factors; acetylene, hydrogen and
isoprene have restricted breathing factors higher than 20).
NOTE: Restricted-breathing enclosure—is an enclosure sufficiently well sealed to limit the
entry of flammable gas or vapour so that the cumulative concentration within the enclosure
does not exceed the lower explosive limit for the gas or vapour concerned over a period of
time which is long compared with the possible duration of the presence of gas or vapour in
the external atmosphere. It is also assumed that the likelihood of a second release of gas or
vapour so soon after an initial release and contributing to the cumulative gas mixture within
the enclosure, is sufficiently small to be discounted.
Ordinary industrial type apparatus do not meet the requirements for Ex n, (non-sparking
apparatus); only apparatus certified specifically as Ex n, meet such requirements.
The major concerns in the Ex n explosion-protection, like in the increased safety (Ex e), are
the temperature of the hottest part of the assembly, either inside or outside the enclosure as
appropriate to the methods (a) to (e) above, and the prevention of the ingress of dust and
water in quantities that could be harmful to the electrical components inside. For example
an IP rating of not less than IP 54 is required for terminal boxes on Ex n motors.
Figure 5.13 shows a non-sparking light fitting.
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FIGURE 5.13 NON-SPARKING LIGHT FITTING

5.8 Ex o - OIL-IMMERSION
The Australian/New Zealand Standard for the oil-immersion protection technique is
AS/NZS 60079.6, where the technique is defined as follows:
‘A type of protection in which the electrical apparatus or parts of the electrical apparatus
are immersed in a protective liquid in such a way that an explosive atmosphere which may
be above the liquid or outside the enclosure cannot be ignited.’
It was originally conceived for high power apparatus. The presence of oil permits moving
parts such as the contacts of circuit breakers and is helpful in quenching the arcs produced
during operation. The choice of oil is critical as it must not give off toxic or hazardous
fumes, particularly when subjected to heat and arcing conditions.
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Popular oils have silicon-based additives and this is highly detrimental to platinum gas
detection elements. This technique is therefore to be avoided on sites handling
hydrocarbons where gas detection is most common.
Its use in instrumentation is limited to the protection of circuit boards in a PLC.

5.9 Ex p - PRESSURIZED ROOMS OR PRESSURIZED ENCLOSURES


5.9.1 General
The requirements for pressurized enclosures are specified in AS 2380.4, Electrical
apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Explosion-protection techniques Part 4: Pressurized
rooms or pressurized enclosures—Type of protection p.
A pressurized enclosure is defined as:
‘enclosure in which pressurization is used to guard against the ingress of the external
atmosphere’.

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A pressurized room is defined as ‘room or rooms provided with doors, cable ducts, conduits
and similar, containing electrical apparatus and of sufficient size to permit the entry of a
person’.
NOTE: Analyser houses are not covered by AS 2380.4; they are covered by IEC 60079-16.
The type of protection ‘p’ is defined as ‘ a concept of achieving safety by means of—
(a) maintaining the internal pressure of an enclosure for electrical apparatus above that of
the external atmosphere; or
(b) maintaining a sufficient flow of air or inert gas through a room or enclosure in order
to reduce to a safe level any concentration of flammable material within’.
Pressurization is a reasonably popular method of making enclosures or rooms safe for use in
hazardous areas. It has the advantage that commercial apparatus can often be more readily
modified to meet the requirements of AS 2380.4 than other techniques.
For enclosures the protection technique relies on maintaining a continuous pressure from a
supply of uncontaminated air or other non-flammable gas of not less than 50 Pa relative to
the external pressure while apparatus within the enclosure is energized to prevent the entry
of flammable gases or vapours. It also provides for the isolation of the electrical supply or
the use of alarms (depending on the zone) if the pressure drops below 50 Pa.
Irrespective of the zone, if the internal pressure or flow of protective gas falls below the
minimum prescribed value, a signal which is immediately apparent to the operator shall
indicate loss of pressure.
On loss of pressure additional precautions are required typically including de-energization.
Prior to energizing or re-energizing, additional precautions are required including pre-
purging, as detailed in AS 2380.4, for the particular zone of use.
Any doors or covers, which can be opened without the use of tools or keys, must have
warning labels indicating that the doors or covers should not be opened while the apparatus
is energized.
If the enclosure contains electrical apparatus capable of storing electrical energy i.e.
capacitors, inductors or rotating machines, then the stored energy must be dissipated before
the enclosure is opened. Warning labels must be fitted to the enclosure stating the time after
isolation before the enclosure can be opened.
5.9.2 Enclosures having an internal source of flammable gas or vapour
For enclosures that have an internal source of flammable gas or vapour the supply must not
be switched on until measures are taken to ensure that the flammable gas or vapour
containment system (e.g. process sampling lines) does not contain an explosive mixture,
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unless the system is fitted with suitable flame arresters.


If a Zone 1 area is being protected, automatic shut-down is required if the pressurized
system fails. Apparatus, which cannot be disconnected in the event of a failure, is required
to be protected by some other means, e.g. a flameproof enclosure for Zones 1 and 2.
For a Zone 2 location, a hazard is created only if the pressurization medium fails at the
same time that the Zone 2 area, which is normally non-hazardous, becomes hazardous.
Therefore the requirements are somewhat more relaxed and it is not essential that the
electrical supply is disconnected. Visible and audible alarms are required to guard against
continuing operation without pressurization.
5.9.3 Rooms having no internal source of flammable material
5.9.3.1 Rooms located in Zone 1 areas.
For rooms located within Zone 1 areas the atmosphere in the room, which is considered
non-hazardous when pressurized, is classified Zone 1 when pressurization fails.

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If pressurization fails in a room that has electrical apparatus installed that is not suitable for
use in hazardous areas then the following provisions must be in place:
(a) A suitable alarm which can be readily seen or heard (or both) in normal plant
operations must immediately indicate loss of pressurization.
(b) A plant safe operating procedure must be in place so that personnel will immediately
take action to restore pressurization.
(c) An automatic interruption of the power supplies must be made as rapidly as
practicable within a prescribed delay time, which has regard to the safe operation of
the plant.
If the electrical apparatus installed in the room is suitable for Zone 2 then the following
provisions must be made:
(a) A suitable alarm which can be readily seen or heard (or both) in normal plant
operations must immediately indicate loss of pressurization.
(b) A plant safe operating procedure must be in place so that personnel will immediately
take action to restore pressurization.
(c) A system for the programmed disconnection of power supplies must be in place if
pressurization cannot be restored for an extended period or if the concentration of
flammable gas exceeds 25% of the lower explosive limit.
5.9.3.2 Rooms located in Zone 2 areas.
In the absence of pressurization the atmosphere in the room is considered Zone 2.
If the apparatus in the room is not certified for the hazardous area the following provisions
must be made:
(a) A suitable alarm which can be readily seen or heard (or both) in normal plant
operations must immediately indicate loss of pressurization.
(b) A plant safe operating procedure must be in place so that personnel will immediately
take action to restore pressurization.
(c) A system for the programmed disconnection of power supplies must be in place if
pressurization cannot be restored for an extended period or if the concentration of
flammable gas exceeds 25% of the lower explosive limit.
5.9.3.3 Rooms in Zones 20, 21 and 22 (Dusts)
In the absence of pressurization if the apparatus in the room is not certified for the
hazardous area the following provisions must be made:
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(a) A suitable alarm which can be readily seen or heard (or both) in normal plant
operations must immediately indicate loss of pressurization.
(b) A plant safe operating procedure must be in place so that personnel will immediately
take action to restore pressurization.
(c) A system for the automatic disconnection of power supplies must be in place if
pressurization cannot be restored within 30 mins.
5.9.3.4 Major tests
Major tests include a temperature-rise test, a pressure test to check the strength of the
enclosure and an operational test.

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5.10 Ex q -POWDER-FILLING
The Australian/New Zealand Standard for powder-filling apparatus is AS/NZS 60079.5,
where this protection technique is defined as follows:
‘A type of protection in which the parts capable of igniting an explosive atmosphere are
fixed in position and completely surrounded by filling material to prevent the ignition of an
external explosive atmosphere.’
Powder filling type of protection is achieved by the use of quartz or solid glass particles of
between 0.5 and 1 mm sieve size. These are poured around the components in such a way as
to eliminate any voids, usually by special vibration techniques. If an explosive atmosphere
penetrates and ignition takes place due to an arc or hot component surface within the
resulting small free volumes of the filling material, propagation to the outside atmosphere is
prevented by the quenching action of the tortuous paths in the filling material.
The Standard restricts the use of this technique to 16 A, 1000 VA and 1000 V.
This technique is used for the power supply assemblies in electronic ballasts, telephones
and for the protection of capacitors in Ex e luminaries, as well as to protect printed circuit
boards containing electronic components as it is possible to repair the printed circuit board
because the powder or sand can be removed.

5.11 Ex s - SPECIAL PROTECTION


The requirements for special protection are specified in AS 1826, Electrical apparatus for
explosive atmospheres—Special protection—Type of protection s which defines it as:
‘A concept which has been adopted to permit the certification of those types of electrical
apparatus which, by their nature, do not comply with the constructional or other
requirements specified for apparatus with established types of protection, but which
nevertheless can be shown, where necessary by test, to be suitable for use in prescribed
Zones or hazardous areas.’
Ex s apparatus may be certified as suitable for use in Zone 0, if tested appropriately.
Basic requirements and tests are specified in AS 1826 and the Standard also provides for
additional requirements to be specified by the certifying authority.
Special protection permits unusual or hybrid forms of protection to be certified. AS 1826
can also be used to assess and test apparatus, which complies with a recognized overseas
Standard, where there is no equivalent Australian/New Zealand Standard.
NOTE: AS 1826 is under review and will be issued soon as AS/NZS 2380 .8.
An example of the Ex s technique is shown in Figure 5.14.
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In the arrangement shown heated sensors are housed in small volume enclosures, which are
open at one end and covered with a porous metal disc. The disc will permit a flammable gas
mixture into the enclosure. The arrangement does not conform to any of the known
explosion-protection techniques. Nevertheless it can be shown by tests that it is safe for the
duty it is designed for, and, according to the definition of Ex s, can be certified for use in a
hazardous area.

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Encapsulation sealing Also providing mechanical


Gas around hot the wires and cells protection e.g. forming
inactive reference part of Ex d enclosures
element

Either flameproof
protection Ex d

Power
Electronics

Output

OR intrinsically safe
electronics Ex ia or Ex ib

Ex s

Porous metal screen lets Flammable gas (There can be an actual flame
gases in and out but stops burning on active if the gas is above LFL)
flame and heat getting out (catalytic) element
(not Ex d)

FIGURE 5.14 GAS DETECTOR SHOWING Ex s PROTECTION

5.12 Ex v - VENTILATION
Requirements for protection by ventilation are specified in AS 1482, Electrical equipment
for explosive atmospheres—Protection by ventilation—Type of protection v. The Standard is
divided into two sections, Section 1—Ventilation of buildings and rooms—Gas or vapour
dilution and Section 2—Ventilation of electrical power apparatus—Heat dissipation.
While AS 1482, Section 1 is probably the one to find the most application, it is not an
apparatus protection technique.
There are two important definitions in Section 1:
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‘Naturally ventilated area—an area where there are no obstacles to free natural diffusion
of gases or vapours likely to be released in the atmosphere such as—
(a) outdoor situations; or
(b) a building, room or space substantially open, and free from obstruction’.
‘Mechanically ventilated area—an area where uncontaminated air is continuously
introduced in sufficient quantity to prevent formation of an explosive gas-air mixture.’
In both cases the requirement is for sufficient air to be available to dilute the gas in the
area. This should not be confused with the pressurization technique, which excludes the
gas.
AS 1482, Section 1 requires a ventilation test to be carried out for five mins, during which
time the concentration of the flammable gas-air mixture must not exceed 50 percent of the
LFL.

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Where mechanical ventilation is provided precautions against failure of the ventilating


system must be taken. These may include airflow switches, pressure-operated switches, gas
detectors or a combination of protection devices. The protection must give an alarm, and
where circumstances require, isolate any electrical apparatus that is not certified for use in
the hazardous atmosphere that may result from a loss of ventilation.
Gas sensing devices provided for the operation of alarms and electrical tripping must
operate before the flammable concentration of the gas or vapour reaches 50 percent of the
lower flammable limit.
AS 1482, Section 2 defines heat dissipation as:
‘A process of supplying electrical power apparatus with ventilation at sufficient flow to
maintain the temperature of the exposed surface of the electrical apparatus at a safe level.’
The technique is aimed at reducing the temperature of the electrical apparatus to a required
temperature class.
For enclosed electrical apparatus the enclosure pressure must be maintained at a pressure of
not less than 5 mm of water gauge above the surrounding atmosphere while the electrical
apparatus is energized.
Pre-ventilation of the enclosure must be carried out before the electrical apparatus is
energized. This requires at least ten changes of internal atmosphere before the electrical
apparatus is energized.
For self-starting devices, automatic timing devices must be fitted to ensure that at least ten
changes of the initial enclosure atmosphere have occurred before the device is permitted to
start unless it can be proved that the internal atmosphere is non-hazardous.

5.13 Ex h - HERMETIC SEALING


There is no Australian/New Zealand Standard nor IEC Standard for hermetic sealing, and
apparatus marked ‘Ex h’ are no longer permitted to be used in Australia, except where
specifically approved by the relevant authority. However, the technique is mentioned in
AS 1826 and AS 2380.9, both of which define an hermetically sealed device as:
‘A device which is constructed so that the external atmosphere cannot gain access to the
interior and in which the seal is made by fusion, e.g. soldering, brazing, welding or fusion
of glass to metal.’
Hermetic sealing is most commonly used for devices such as reed switches and mercury
switches.

5.14 DIP - DUST IGNITION PROTECTION


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5.14.1 General
The requirements for dust ignition protection (DIP) enclosures are specified in
AS/NZS 61241.1.1, Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust.
A DIP enclosure is sealed against dust and the surface temperature must be maintained
below the cloud or layer ignition temperatures of the dust.
About 70 percent of dusts produced by industrial processes are flammable. Dusts differ
from gases in that energy levels required to cause ignition are higher, typically millijoules
rather than microjoules, and the ignition temperature is generally lower.
DIP design limits the build up of dust on the exterior surfaces of the enclosure by avoiding
flat horizontal surfaces.
Dusts do not disperse with time and ventilation can convert dust layers into dust clouds
rendering the hazardous area more dangerous.

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AS/NZS 61241.3 follows the IEC convention and classifies dust hazardous areas into Zone
20 (continuous release), Zone 21 (primary release) and Zone 22 (secondary release).
A suitably certified DIP enclosure may be used in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas. For further
details refer to AS/NZS 2381.1 and AS/NZS 61241.1.2.
All light fittings, with the exception of fluorescent fittings, must be clearly marked to
indicate the maximum wattage of the lamp that may be used in the fitting without exceeding
the maximum surface temperature of the enclosure.
AS/NZS 61241.1.2 sets out the requirements for the Selection, Installation and Maintenance
of electrical apparatus in combustible dust areas.
There are two different types of practice specified in AS/NZS 61241.1.1 being Practice A
and Practice B both intended to provide an equivalent level of protection against ignition.
Practice A design details are as follows:
(a) Minimum ignition temperatures of a dust layer determined as specified in
AS/NZS 61241.2.1.
(b) Maximum surface temperature measured under dust-free conditions as specified in
AS/NZS 61241.1.1.
(c) Maximum permissible surface temperature for apparatus having dust layers up to a
thickness of 5 mm.
(d) Construction of enclosure meeting the general requirements as specified in
AS/NZS 61241.1.1.
(e) Dust-tightness tested by the method specified in AS 1939 for category 1 and meeting
the requirements of Table 1 of AS/NZS 61241.1.2.
Practice B design details are as follows:
(i) Minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer determined as specified in
AS/NZS 61241.2.1.
(ii) Maximum surface temperatures measured under dust blanket conditions as specified
in AS/NZS 61241.1.1.
(iii) Maximum permissible surface temperature for apparatus having dust layers up to a
thickness of 12.5 mm, calculated as specified in AS/NZS 61241.1.2.
(iv) Construction of enclosure meeting the general requirements specified in
AS/NZS 61241.1.1.
(v) Dust-tightness tested by the heat cycling dust test using the inherent depression of the
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apparatus, as specified in AS/NZS 61241.1.1.


Figures 5.15 to 5.17 illustrate some typical DIP apparatus.
5.14.2 Major tests
As with most of the explosion-protection techniques for gas atmospheres, compliance with
design and construction requirements forms a major part of the DIP Standards.
The most significant tests are the enclosure integrity tests. These include a pressure test
followed by an IP 65 degree of protection test to AS 1939. A temperature-rise test is carried
out to determine the maximum surface temperature. A temperature class, the same as for
other techniques, is assigned as a result of this test. For further details on tests see
AS/NZS 61241.1.1.

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FIGURE 5.15 DIP CONTROL STATION


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FIGURE 5.16 DIP SWITCHED OUTLET

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FIGURE 5.17 DIP ISOLATOR

5.15 MIXED TECHNIQUES


It is quite common for more than one explosion-protection technique to be used on a single
item of apparatus. An example is a flameproof motor with an increased safety terminal box.
In addition, flameproof apparatus is often designed to also meet DIP requirements by
including gaskets in such a way that they do not affect the flamepaths.
Apparatus commonly referred to as Increased Safety (Ex e) is actually a combination of
explosion-protection techniques.
A typical increased safety fluorescent luminaire may incorporate the following explosion-
protection techniques:
(a) Ex e—Increased Safety for the housing.
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(b) Ex m—Encapsulation for the ballast (ballast may be Ex dm).


(c) Ex q—Powder-filling for the capacitor (capacitor may be Ex s).
(d) Ex de—Flameproof, in part, for single pin tube holders.
(e) Ex de—Interlocking isolation switch (when fitted).
(f) Ex e—Increased safety for the terminals.
The explosion-protection designation is therefore Ex emdq, as shown in Figure 5.18.
The use of these mixed techniques is now widely accepted throughout the world, including
Australia and New Zealand.

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Ex e terminal
strip

Ex m ballast Ex q capacitor

Ex de single
pin tube
holders

Ex de lid switch

Lipseal IP 56
rating
Multipoint locking device

FIGURE 5.18 TYPICAL FLUORESCENT LUMINAIRE OF THE INCREASED SAFETY


TYPE (COMBINING SEVERAL EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES)
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CHAP T E R 6 GE NE RAL RE QUI RE ME NT S FOR


E XP LOS I ON- P ROT E CTI ON T E CHNI QUE S
AND RE QUI RE ME NT S OF OT HE R RE LE VANT
S T AND ARDS

6.1 INTRODUCTION
In addition to the Australian/New Zealand Standards for the particular explosion-protection
techniques there are also a number of other relevant Standards which either deal with, or
which specify requirements for particular types of apparatus, using some of the recognized
explosion-protection techniques.
A brief description of each of these is given in this chapter.

6.2 AS 2380.1 AND AS/NZS 60079.0—GENERAL REQUIREMENTS


6.2.1 General
AS 2380.1, Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Explosion-protection
techniques, Part 1: General requirements, was first issued in 1980 as part of a series of
Standards on explosion-protection techniques and was based on EN 50 014.
The third edition of AS 2380.1, published in 1989, is similar to the corresponding
requirements contained in the recently issued AS/NZS 60079.0, Electrical apparatus for
explosive gas atmospheres, Part 0: General requirements.
The following are some of the significant aspects specified in AS 2380.1 and
AS/NZS 60079.0:
(a) Grouping and temperature classification—apparatus groups and temperature classes.
(b) Enclosures of plastics materials—requirements for threaded holes in plastics
enclosures. Design requirements for plastics enclosures are given to avoid the danger
of ignition due to electrostatic discharges.
(c) Light alloy enclosures—restrictions on the use of light alloys.
(d) Fasteners—requirements for fasteners and, in particular, special fasteners, which are
designed to deter unauthorized access to enclosures.
(e) Earthing—requirements for earthing and bonding connections are included.
(f) Rotating electrical machines—specific requirements for rotating electrical machines,
including clearance requirements for external fans.
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(g) Plugs and socket-outlets—interlocking requirements for plugs and socket-outlets.


(h) Marking.
(i) Impact and drop tests—impact tests are required for all apparatus and drop tests are
required for portable apparatus.
(j) Degree of protection tests—provision is made for tests to AS 1939, details of which
are given later in this chapter.
(k) Torque tests—torque tests for bushings and terminal studs.
(l) Temperature-rise tests—temperature testing to determine the temperature class.
(m) Thermal shock test—a thermal shock test, which involves spraying glass parts of
luminaires and windows with water when they are at maximum service temperature.

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(n) Insulation resistance of plastics parts—tests are included for determining the
insulation resistance of plastics parts.
(o) Non-metallic enclosures or parts—resistance to heat, cold, light and for Group 1, also
resistance to chemical agents.
(p) Routine high voltage tests.
6.2.2 Light alloy enclosures
It has been established that, particularly in coal mining applications, the use of aluminium,
magnesium or titanium, or alloys containing these metals, may provide a source of ignition
when subjected to impact by or on rusty steel.
This phenomenon is often called ‘incendive sparking’ and, although not fully understood, a
commonly used explanation is as follows:
When there is an initial impact or rubbing between a light alloy and rusty steel, a smear of
the light alloy is left on the rusty steel. If there is a subsequent impact, the energy from the
impact may generate sufficient heat to initiate a reaction between the alloy and the oxygen
in the rust. This reaction is exothermic, i.e. it gives off heat. The total heat or energy
liberated is greater than that of the impact and there may be sufficient heat or energy to
cause an explosion. In certain circumstances the act of creating the smear and setting off the
reaction may occur with a single blow.
In AS 2380.1:1989 the limitations on percentage of material by mass for alloys used in
construction of external surfaces of the enclosures, are as follows:
(a) For Group I
(i) not more than 6 percent in total of magnesium and titanium together; and
(ii) not more than 15 percent in total of aluminium, magnesium or titanium, singly
or in combination, except as stated above.
(b) For Group II—not more than 6 percent magnesium.
This restriction is also applied to DIP apparatus.
NOTE: AS/NZS 60079.0 allows a total of 7.5% magnesium for Group II.
6.2.3 Marking of explosion-protected apparatus
6.2.3.1 General
Correct marking on explosion-protected apparatus is very important in identifying the
apparatus and defining the hazardous areas in which the apparatus can be safely used.
NOTE: The marking requirements in AS/NZS 60079.0 vary slightly from those listed below.
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6.2.3.2 Information to be marked


The following requirements are specified in AS 2380.1 and apply to most Zone 0, Zone 1
and Zone 2 apparatus.
(a) The name or the registered trademark of the manufacturer. This identifies the source
of the apparatus.
(b) Manufacturer’s type identification. This is normally a model number for the apparatus
and should unambiguously identify the apparatus.

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(c) The symbol ‘Ex’ followed by the letter or letters (in lower case), which indicate the
particular type of explosion-protection. For published Australian/New Zealand
Standards, these are as follows:
d — Flameproof enclosure
e — Increased safety
ia — Intrinsically safe, Category ia
ib — Intrinsically safe, Category ib
m — Encapsulation
n — Non-sparking
o — Oil-immersion
p — Pressurized enclosure
q — Powder filling
s — Special protection
v — Ventilation
For associated electrical apparatus for intrinsically safe systems the letters ‘ia’ or ‘ib’
as appropriate are shown in brackets, i.e. ‘(ia)’ or ‘(ib)’. This means that the
associated apparatus must be mounted in the safe area or in some cases in an
appropriate explosion-protection technique i.e. a safety barrier in a flameproof
enclosure in Zone 1
(d) The symbol for the apparatus group, as follows:
(i) I—for Group I.
(ii) IIA, IIB or IIC—for Group II.
In Australia/New Zealand the letters A, B and C must always be used. Apparatus
certified to IEC or European Standards may use just II. The use of Arabic numerals,
i.e. 1 or 2, is generally deprecated.
(e) The temperature class (T1 to T6) or actual maximum surface temperature and the
ambient temperature if different to 40°C.
The temperature class is not applicable for Group I apparatus or for associated
electrical apparatus used in intrinsically safe systems.
(f) Where applicable, the degree of protection in accordance with AS 1939.
(g) Specified warning labels.
For example, ‘ISOLATE ELSEWHERE BEFORE OPENING ENCLOSURE’.
(h) Any additional marking required by the specific Standard for the type of protection
concerned.
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For example, for Ex s the Zone for which the apparatus is certified must be marked.
(i) Any marking normally required by the Standards of construction of the electrical
apparatus.
(j) If the apparatus has been certified as complying with the requirements of a Standard:
(i) The name or symbol of the certifying authority followed by the certificate
reference.
(ii) Any marking, e.g. a warning about conditions of use, which is prescribed by the
certifying authority.
(iii) Where the certificate includes special conditions for safe use, the letter X after
the certificate reference.
(iv) Where the certificate is issued for an Ex component, the letter U after the
certificate reference.

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Table 6.1 summarizes the above requirements for the more common explosion-protection
techniques covered by Australian/New Zealand Standards.

TABLE 6.1
SUMMARY OF REQUIRED MARKING

Manufacturer’s name or trademark

Manufacturer’s identification/model number

The following symbols:

Temperature Degree of protection†


Apparatus
Explosion- Type of class*
group (or First Second
protection symbol protection (or actual Code
specific gas) numeral Numeral
temperature)
Ex d I T1 IP 1 1
e IIA T2 2 2
ia or (ia) IIB T3 3 3
ib or (ib) IIC T4 4 4
m T5 5 5
n T6 6 6
o 7
p 8
q
s
v
* Not applicable for Group I and associated electrical apparatus used in intrinsically safe
systems.
† Only marked if higher than the minimum standard requirements.

6.2.3.3 Mixed types of explosion-protection


Where different types of explosion-protection are used on different parts of electrical
apparatus, each respective part has to bear the symbol ‘Ex’ and the letter or letters for the
type of protection concerned.
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Where more than one type of protection is used, the letter for the main type of protection
appears first followed by the other letter or letters.
6.2.3.4 Marking of small electrical apparatus
On very small apparatus a reduction in marking may be permitted but the following
information is normally required:
(a) The symbol ‘Ex’ followed by the letter corresponding to the type of protection.
(b) The name or symbol of the certifying authority.
(c) The certificate reference.
(d) The letter ‘X’ where appropriate.

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6.2.3.5 Method of marking


Marking is required to be legible, indelible and visible without removing the apparatus from
its fixings.
6.2.3.6 Examples of marking
The following are examples of marking in accordance with AS 2380.1:
(a) Flameproof for Group I:
JIMRO PTY LTD
Type A B 5
Ex d I
(b) Increased safety, temperature class T5, degree of protection IP 65:
BURRA Corporation
Model No GDV
Ex e IIC T5 IP 65
(c) Flameproof for Group IIB, temperature class T3 and certified in Australia under
Certificate No Ex 99997:
KENBY LTD
Type XY1
Ex d IIB T3
AUS Ex 99997
(d) Intrinsic safety, Category ib, for Group IIC, temperature class T6, certified in
Australia under Certificate No Ex 99998 which contains certification conditions:
FERNDO
Type VL
Ex ib IIC T6
AUS Ex 99998 X

6.3 DEGREES OF PROTECTION (IP CODE)


AS 1939, Degrees of protection provided by enclosures for electrical apparatus (IP Code),
specifies a system for classifying the degrees of protection provided against:
(a) Contact with, or approach to live parts and against the contact with moving parts
(other than smooth rotating parts and the like) inside the enclosure, and protection
against the ingress of solid foreign objects.
(b) Harmful effects due to the ingress of water.
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The designation used to indicate these degrees of protection consists of the characteristic
letters IP (for ‘Ingress Protection’) followed by two numerals (‘the characteristic
numerals’). The first numeral indicates the degree of protection described in (a) and the
second numeral the degree of protection described in (b). Where reference is made to only
one numeral the other is replaced with an ‘X’, e.g. IP 3X or IPX3.
The IP Code can be optionally extended by an additional letter A, B, C or D (after the
second numeral) where the protection of persons against access to hazardous parts is higher
than that indicated by the first numeral, or where the first numeral is unspecified.
In addition supplementary letters may also be used following the second characteristic
numeral or the additional letter. These supplementary letters are H, M, S or W. (see
AS 1939 for further information).
NOTE: IP X6 D, Protected against driving rain, has been omitted from the 1990 edition of
AS 1939.

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The classification scheme specified in AS 1939 is recognised internationally and is covered


by IEC 60529, Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code).
Many of the Standards for explosion-protected apparatus call up specific degrees of
protection. For example, AS 2380.6 (increased safety) requires the following degrees of
protection:
(a) Enclosures containing bare live parts . . . IP 54.
(b) Enclosures containing only insulated parts . . . IP 44.
In addition, provision is made in the Standards for a degree of protection claimed by the
manufacturer to be marked on apparatus provided that degree of protection has been
verified during testing. It is fairly common practice for manufacturers who want their
apparatus to be used in the open to seek an IP classification, with IP 65 being the most
common.
Table 6.2 summarizes the degrees of protection for the first and second characteristic
numerals.
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TABLE 6.2
INGRESS PROTECTION (IP) RATING

First numeral
indicates both
Second numeral
protection of persons
indicates protection
against hazardous Description of degree of Description of degree of
of apparatus
parts and protection protection protection
against harmful
of apparatus against
ingress of water
ingress of solid
foreign objects
X Protection unspecified X Protection unspecified
(untested) (untested)
0 Non protected 0 Non protected
1 Protection of the back of the 1 Protection against drops of
hand against accidental water falling vertically
access to hazardous parts,
and protection of apparatus
against objects larger than
50 mm
2 Protection of 12 mm 2 Protection against drops of
diameter fingers against water falling vertically when
access to hazardous parts, the object is tilted by up to
and protection of apparatus 15 from its normal position
against objects larger than (in any direction)
12.5 mm
3 Protection of persons 3 Protection against spraying
holding tools or wires (larger water at up to 60 from the
than 2.5 mm diameter), and vertical.
protection of apparatus
against objects larger than
2.5 mm (e.g. ball bearings)
4 Protection of persons 4 Protection against splashing
holding small tools or wires and spraying water from all
(larger than 1 mm diameter), practicable directions
and protection of apparatus
against objects larger than
1 mm (e.g. ball bearings)
5 Protection against entry of 5 Protection against a low
dust in sufficient quantity to pressure jet water from all
interfere with satisfactory practicable directions
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operation of apparatus
6 Complete protection against 6 Protection against heavy seas
entry of dust or a strong jet of water from
all practicable directions
7 Protection against temporary
immersion
8 Protection again submersion
(tests subject to agreement but
no less severe than second
numeral 7)

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6.4 CABLE GLANDS


6.4.1 General
Any electrical apparatus, other than battery-powered apparatus, which is used in a
hazardous area must have an external supply feeder cable or cables connected to it in order
to operate.
For most types of protection it is not acceptable for cables to be taken through unsealed
holes in the wall of an enclosure and cables in conduits or cables and cable glands must be
used. The basic purpose of the cable gland is to provide a seal where the cable passes
through the wall of the enclosure, although it may also have to meet some other
requirements.
The principles used for supply cables may be applied to interconnecting cables passing
from one enclosure to another on a common assembly. The assembly may incorporate
several types of explosion-protected apparatus and the proviso is that the integrity of each
type of explosion-protection technique must not be impaired.
AS 1828, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Cable glands, specifies the
requirements for cable glands to be used on explosion-protected apparatus, which require
certification for the apparatus and cable glands. AS 1828 recognises two types of glands,
those using sealing bushes and those using compound for sealing.
NOTES:
1 AS/NZS 60079.0 also contains a clause titled ‘Cable and conduit entries’ and a normative
appendix titled ‘Ex cable entries’.
2 The appropriate timing for the withdrawal of AS 1828 is currently being considered by
Committee EL/14, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous Areas.
6.4.2 Main features of a cable gland
Figure 6.1 is a stylised representation of the main features of a typical cable gland and
Figure 6.2 shows an example of a common cable gland.
The main features of a gland are as follows:
(a) It must provide sealing between the gland itself and the cable. The most common
arrangement is the use of one or more sealing bushes of elastomeric material. A more
recent innovation involves the use of compound sealing. These glands are sometimes
referred to as ‘barrier glands’.
(b) The connection arrangement of the gland to the enclosure must preserve the type of
protection of the enclosure. Usually this involves the use of a threaded joint, which is
generally suitable for most types of protection. It may, however, require
supplementary sealing measures, such as silicon sealant or PTFE tape, if an air-tight
or water-tight seal is needed. Some glands used on flameproof enclosures use spigot
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joints instead of threaded joints.


(c) Additional requirements are necessary to cater for the type of cable to be terminated,
e.g. provision must be made to terminate the armour on armoured cable.

Gland nuts
Gland body
Sealing

FIGURE 6.1 TYPICAL CABLE GLAND FEATURES

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FIGURE 6.2 CABLE GLAND

6.4.3 Major tests


The following are the major tests specified in AS 1828:
(a) Torque test—the assembled gland is tightened to a specified proof torque. The gland
is then dismantled and the gland and cable checked for damage.
(b) Tension force tests—two glands are assembled on either end of a cable, placed in a
tensile testing machine and then subjected to a specified tension force. The glands are
not allowed to slip by more than 10 percent of the diameter of the cable.
(c) Mechanical pressure test—the gland is assembled on a steel mandrel and subjected to
water at 1 MPa for two mins, during which time it must not leak.
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(d) Impact test—an impact test is carried out in accordance with AS 2380.1.
NOTE: The specific Clause and Appendix on cable entries, in AS/NZS 60079.0, also include the
required tests for certification of such entries.

6.5 ELECTRICALLY HEATED OVENS


AS 1681, Electrically heated ovens in which flammable volatiles occur—Type 1 ovens,
specifies requirements for a type of electrically heated oven within which flammable or
explosive atmospheres may occur. The Standard was last issued in 1974 and is now under
review, with publication expected in the near future (early 2001).
The protection technique is ventilation of the oven and the provision of automatic shutdown
if the ventilation fails.

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6.6 BATTERY OPERATED VEHICLES


AS 1915, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Battery operated vehicles,
specifies requirements for battery operated vehicles which incorporate a storage battery and
which are designed for use in explosive gas atmospheres. Probably its most common
application is forklift trucks.
The Standard requires that individual items of apparatus used in such vehicles must comply
with the relevant Australian/New Zealand Standard for an appropriate type of protection. It
also specifies requirements for batteries and battery containers, plug and socket connectors,
electrical protection (including bonding, overload protection and leakage-to-frame
protection), cabling, wheels and tyres (which must be antistatic), and brakes.
NOTE: This Standard is currently being reviewed by Committee EL/14, since recent
developments in battery technology have produced new types of batteries which can no longer be
certified against the requirements outlined in the Standard.

6.7 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS OF DISPENSING APPARATUS


The requirements for dispensing apparatus are contained in AS 2229, Electrical apparatus
for explosive atmospheres—Electrical systems of dispensing apparatus, which is published
in two parts:
(a) Part 1: Flammable liquid dispensing apparatus. This part covers the common petrol
pump and provides for all apparatus to be explosion-protected, except where located
above a vapour barrier. It also specifies requirements for the dispenser housing,
internal wiring, terminal enclosures, earthing and bonding.
The Standard recognizes two types of vapour barrier, an impervious barrier and an air
barrier.
(b) Part 2: Liquefied petroleum gas dispensing apparatus. There is no provision for a
vapour barrier and the pump motor must not be fitted within the apparatus. Safety
devices are required to avoid possible excessive leakage of LP gas. These include a
self-sealing nozzle, which limits loss to 15 mL, breakaway couplings, internal control
valves, hose protection, overspeed trip and pump control.
NOTE: This Standard is now under review and it will be published in four (4) Parts covering:
(i) General requirements
(ii) Flammable liquids
(iii) Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
(iv) Compressed natural gas (CNG)

6.8 ELECTROSTATIC PAINT AND POWDER SPRAY GUNS


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AS 2268, Electrostatic paint and powder spray guns, specifies requirements for the
construction and testing of hand-held and hand-operated electrostatic paint and powder
spray guns and associated apparatus, which may give off flammable gases or vapours or
spray powders which are liable to cause a dust explosion. The Standard essentially requires
that the apparatus comply with the following:
(a) It must be dust-tight and therefore is required to pass an IP 6X test to AS 1939.
(b) It must be designed in such a way that it cannot build up a static charge.
(c) The available energy must be limited. This is tested using a modified version of the
intrinsic safety spark-test apparatus.
(d) It must be rugged. Tests for impact, drop and cable anchorage are specified.
(e) The danger of electric shock must be minimized.
NOTE: This Standard is also to be reviewed in the near future, by Committee EL/14.

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6.9 GAS DETECTION INSTRUMENTS


For comprehensive information on gas detectors refer to Chapter 14.
Perhaps no instrument has such a chance to create a dangerous situation as a gas detection
instrument. Not only does it provide a source of ignition when not properly protected, but if
it does not give the correct reading, it may lead a user into thinking that an area is safe, i.e.
free of gas. The user may then take some action, which could cause an explosion.
Gas and vapour detectors are special instruments and require special consideration both as
to construction and use. The relevant Standards as detailed in Chapter 14 must be adhered
to.

6.10 UNDERGROUND COAL MINING


In addition to the protection technique Standards, there are various Australian/New Zealand
Standards specifically for underground coal mining. They cover cables and their connecting
devices, earth-fault protection and current limiting apparatus, distribution and control
boxes, substations and mining machines and the maintenance and overhaul of electrical
apparatus.
A list of Standards relevant for underground coal mining is included in Appendix B.
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CHAP T E R 7 CE RTI FI CAT I ON AND


AP P ROV AL OF AP P AR AT US

7.1 INTRODUCTION
The terms ‘certification’ and ‘approval’ are often interchangeable. However, for equipment
used in hazardous areas (Ex equipment) they have very specific meanings, as follows:
(a) Certification
Certification is a tool, used internationally, as a means of verifying compliance with
defined specifications, usually published Standards. An international definition for
certification exists in ISO/IEC Guide 2: ‘procedure by which a third party gives
written assurance that a product, process or service conforms to specified
requirements’.
There are various forms and types of certification systems but the more common and
therefore more accepted form is ‘Third Party Certification’ (independent certification,
in accordance with the relevant ISO/IEC Guides and Standards prepared by the
ISO/CASCO (ISO Committee on Conformity Assessment).
Applications of certification include—
(i) Management Systems Certification (e.g. Quality Management and
Environmental Management Systems).
(ii) Product Certification.
(iii) Personnel Certification.
Product Certification is used in most countries as the industry accepted, and
sometimes regulatory requirement, means of demonstrating compliance of Ex
equipment with National and International Standards. Such product certification
schemes include requirements for—
(A) type testing of representative samples;
(B) assessment of the manufactured quality plans; and
(C) ongoing surveillance assessment of the manufacturer.
While product certification is gaining wider international acceptance, one needs to be
mindful that there may be a number of other issues to consider, other than whether a
product is certified or not. The following are examples of some of these, but the list is
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not exhaustive:
(1) To what Standard and edition of the Standard is the product certified?
(2) Is the certifying body and system used acceptable? (e.g. is the certifying body
accredited to international guides.)
(3) Is the certification current? (Suggest checking with the certificate issuing
body.)
(4) Is the model/type offered for sale, clearly identified on the certificate?
(5) Does the Standard for which the product is certified satisfy all requirements for
installation and use?
The last point is extremely important as, due to specific circumstances, there may be
additional requirements that are not fully covered by the Standard (e.g. a flameproof
motor may be certified but not suitable for installation outdoors; in this case an IP
rating needs to be specified by the customer).
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(b) Approval
Approval may be regarded as a means of granting official consent or sanction by a
Governing body to an appropriate Act or Regulation.
One major difference between Certification and Approval is that while a Standard,
such as an Australian Standard, can be used as the basis for which approval is
granted, certification on the other hand can only be granted where all clauses of a
defined Standard, or specification, have been complied with.
In other words, products or services can be approved without meeting all the
requirements of Standards, whereas certification can not.
Also, most certification schemes encompass ongoing surveillance, or periodic audits,
as a means of verifying continued compliance, whereas approval schemes do not.
However some authorities, such as electrical, may carry out random market
surveillance, looking for products that may not have been approved and may be
unsafe.

7.2 CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL OF Ex EQUIPMENT IN AUSTRALIA AND


NEW ZEALAND
7.2.1 General
While both Certification and Approval are used for new Ex equipment their applications are
entirely different.
In Australia and New Zealand, the use of Ex equipment is segregated into two separate
areas:
(a) Equipment for use in coal mines regulated via the various State Coal Mining Acts.
(b) Equipment for use in areas other than coal mines covered by AS/NZS 3000 (The
Wiring Rules).
Approved schemes for Ex mining equipment, intended for use in coal mines, is increasingly
relying on compliance with Standards.
The non-coal mining Ex industry (Group II) use the Standards framework via the
Australian/New Zealand Wiring Rules, AS/NZS 3000 which refers to AS/NZS 2381.1.
Clause 2.6 of AS/NZS 2381.1:1999 requires compliance with Australian/New Zealand or
IEC Standards and proof of compliance by way of a certificate of conformity issued
under—
(i) the Australian National Certification Scheme (AUS Ex Scheme); or
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(ii) the International IECEx Scheme.


Alternatively, other means that provide an equivalent degree of safety and are acceptable to
the relevant regulatory body.
The Australian National Ex Certification Scheme (AUS Ex Scheme) is overseen by the
Standards Australia Policy Committee, P/8 and by its delegation is administered by Quality
Assurance Services (QAS), a wholly owned subsidiary of Standards Australia. This scheme
is a Third Party type scheme and as such provides independent verification that Ex products
comply with the relevant Standard(s).
It is anticipated that, as governing bodies gain confidence in the certification process, they
can gradually move away from formal approval processes to deem that a product is
approved if it has been certified under an appropriate certification scheme, to a particular
Standard.

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The Australian Ex Scheme has proven to be an effective and useful tool for industry. This
situation is only made possible through the active participation of all industry sectors, i.e.
manufacturers, equipment users, electrical regulators, testing and certification bodies, in the
complete process of developing suitable Australian and Joint Australian/New Zealand
Standards through to the setting of policy for the Australian Ex Scheme.
7.2.2 The Australian National Certification Scheme—‘AUS Ex’
7.2.2.1 Background
There are various authorities in Australia and New Zealand concerned with the safety of
electrical installations in hazardous areas. These include the electrical regulatory
authorities, departments of mines, departments of labour and industry and the insurance
industry.
The needs of these bodies for appropriate Standards are catered for through their
membership of committees such as Standards Australia Committee EL/14, which prepares
Standards that take into account the special conditions and risks which exist in hazardous
areas. However, some 40 years ago there was seen to be a need for these authorities to
participate in a national certification scheme.
Consequently and during the early 1960s Standards Australia set up an approvals type
scheme for Ex equipment, referred to in later years as the P/3 scheme which operated under
the direction of the Standards Australia P/3 committee. Committee P/3, Certification of
Explosion-Protection Electrical Equipment, was the Standards Australia Committee
responsible for considering applications for certification and for authorizing the issue of
Certificates of Compliance or Statements of Opinion. It also advised regulatory authorities
and industry on matters relating to the application of Australian Standards to electrical
equipment for use in hazardous areas.
The P/3 committee comprised representatives from State Electrical and Mining regulatory
authorities.
Under this scheme the committee met every two months to consider applications using test
reports and in most instances samples to arrive at a decision. During the early 1990s the
process of lodging an application with Standards Australia, then submitting a sample to the
testing station, was streamlined and replaced with the system we have today.
7.2.2.2 Current system
The AUS Ex Scheme provides proof of compliance with Standards specifying design,
construction and testing requirements.
The AUS Ex Scheme is operated by the Standards Australia Policy Committee, P/8 and
administered by Quality Assurance Services (QAS) in accordance with MP 69; contact
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details for QAS are as follows:


Quality Assurance Services (QAS) Pty Limited
286 Sussex Street
Sydney N.S.W. 2000
Phones: 02 8206 6962
1800 242 661
Facsimile: 02 8206 6061
Website: www.qas.com.au
E-mail: customerservice@qas.com.au
The Scheme is accepted throughout Australia and New Zealand by Electrical and Mining
Regulatory Bodies as well as the Insurance Council of Australia for demonstrating
compliance with Standards.

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Under the ‘AUS Ex’ Scheme (Australian National Certification Scheme—’AUS Ex’),
Ex equipment can be tested by any of the three Australian laboratories, listed below:

(a) TestSafe Australia (formerly LOSC)


919 Londonderry Road
Londonderry N.S.W. 2753
PO Box 592
Richmond N.S.W. 2753
Phone: 02 4724 4900
Facsimile: 02 4724 4999
Website: www.workcover.nsw.gov.au
E-mail: testsafe@workcover.nsw.gov.au

(b) SIMTARS (The Safety In Mines Testing And Research Station)


2 Smith Street
Redbank Qld 4301
PO Box 467
Goodna Qld 4300
Phone: 07 3810 6370
Facsimile: 07 3810 6366
Website: www.dme.qld.gov.au/simtars/index.htm
E-mail: drturner@dme.qld.gov.au

(c) International Testing and Certification Services (ITACS)


4-6 Second Street
Bowden SA 5007
PO Box 300
Hindmarsh SA 5007
Phone: 08 8346 8680
Facsimile: 08 8346 7072
Website: www.ozemail.com.au/~itacs/
E-mail: itacs@itacslab.com
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Currently both TestSafe Australia and SIMTARS operate under an agency arrangement with
QAS to accept applications and issue certificates, thereby providing a ‘one stop shop’
approach to certification.
Alternatively applications can be made directly to QAS or ITACS.

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Products certified under this Scheme are marked to indicate compliance. The following is
an example of the information apart from manufacturer, model number and electrical
ratings, that should be marked:
Parameter Example
Certificate number: AUS Ex 999
Type of protection: Ex d
Equipment group: I, IIA, IIB or IIC
Temperature class: T4
Hazardous area: Zone 1
Degree of protection (IP rating): IP 65
NOTE: The degree of protection is only required when it is of an IP rating higher than the
Standard specifies.

In some instances the letter ‘X’ or ‘U’ is added to the certificate number; for example:
AUS Ex 999X
‘X’ This is used to indicate that there are conditions that have been applied to the
certificate to ensure safe use.
While the installation of Ex equipment should not be attempted until the installer is in
possession of copies of the area classification, installation Standards, certification
documents and other information relevant to the installation, it is certainly more
critical to be in possession of certification documents for equipment bearing an ‘X’
after the certificate number. This may require that the Ex equipment be installed in a
certain manner to ensure that the integrity of the explosion-protection technique is
maintained.
‘U’ This is used to identify a part that is certified as a component. It is not used as a
stand-alone product but can form part of a total assembly without further testing when
the assembly is assessed for certification. Specific instructions as to its use are given
in the Component Certificate. ‘U’ is never used when ‘X’ appears against the
Certificate Number.
One important point to note is the validity date of Ex certificates, as these certificates have
a 10 year life. The validity date is displayed clearly on Page 1 of the certificate.
The Scheme provides for a national database with internet access from the QAS home page
www.qas.com.au and provides industry with a ready reference list of certificates issued.
The information on the database is updated on a regular basis.
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7.2.2.3 Future system and integration with the IECEx Scheme


The AUS Ex Scheme has served the Australian industry well over the past 30 years but
Australia’s participation in the new international IECEx Scheme means that a stocktake of
the AUS Ex Scheme is now required to ensure that this Scheme continues to cater to the
needs of industry. Therefore, a review of the operational procedures is currently underway
with the aim of accommodating Australia’s participation in IECEx Scheme, as well as
aligning with the international practice for Conformity Assessment.
Another major reason for the review is the initiation of the publication as AS/NZS of all the
relevant IEC Standards in the field of Hazardous Areas/Explosive Atmospheres. This
created the need to incorporate all these adopted Standards in the AUS Ex Scheme as shown
in AS/NZS 2381.1.
To date the AUS Ex Scheme has been operating as an ISO Type 1 (Type Test) scheme.

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Changing commercial and industrial conditions due to takeovers and different distribution
outlets, where more than one Certificate may be issued for the same product, highlight the
limitations of Type Test Certification. Identification of the ‘manufacturer’ becomes
important and this has led some overseas approval and certification agencies to include
assessment of manufacturers’ Product Quality Planning as a mandatory requirement of Ex
Certification.
Assessment, testing and certification of hazardous area electrical equipment under the
IECEx Scheme is now accepted by Australia and New Zealand. This has resulted in a
revision of the AUS Ex Scheme, for the inclusion of Manufacturers Product Quality
Planning as a mandatory requirement and is expected to take effect early in 2001. This will
enable manufacturers to be prepared for the IECEx Scheme.

7.3 THE IECEx SCHEME


7.3.1 Background
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established in 1906, prepares
international Standards for the electrotechnology field. In addition to the preparation of
international Standards, the IEC facilitates the operation of Conformity Assessment
Schemes for electrical safety/ CB Scheme, Explosion-Protected Electrical Equipment
IECEx Scheme and IEC Q Scheme for electronic components.
IEC conformity assessment schemes are managed by the Scheme Management Committees
who report to the IEC Conformity Assessment Board.
During 1991 the IEC conducted a survey of participating countries regarding National
Approval and Certification of Ex equipment, posing the following question:
Does your country support the development of an IEC international certification
scheme for Ex equipment?
In response 17 countries including Australia, supported the concept.
Following this survey an IEC Working Group was formed comprising members of
12 countries, including Australia.
This Working Group, WG Ex was charged with developing the rules and procedures of a
conformity assessment scheme to verify compliance of Ex equipment with IEC Standards
prepared by IEC Technical Committee TC 31, Electrical Apparatus for Explosive
Atmospheres.
Australia has participated actively in the IECEE WG Ex—the Working Group that prepared
the initial publication IECEE 04, Rules and Procedures of the Scheme of the IECEE for
Certification of Standards for Electrical Equipment for Explosive Atmospheres—IECEx
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Scheme, published in March 1995, and in the preparation of the new publications
IECEx 01, Basic Rules of the IECEx Scheme and IECEx 02, Rules of Procedure of the
IECEx Scheme, finally published in October 1999.
Australia was a foundation Member of the IECEx Scheme and sent delegates to all the
Ex Scheme annual meetings to continue its active participation in this worldwide Scheme.
For further information and updates visit the IECEx Scheme website at www.iecex.com.
7.3.2 Objective
The objective of the IECEx Scheme is to facilitate international trade in electrical
equipment intended for use in explosive atmospheres (Ex equipment) in the following
ways—
(a) reduced testing and certification costs to manufacturer;
(b) reduced time to market;

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(c) international confidence in the product assessment process; and


(d) one international database listing.
The IECEx Scheme provides the means for manufacturers of Ex equipment to obtain
certificates of conformity that will be accepted at national level in all participating
countries. A certificate of conformity may be obtained from any certification body accepted
into the Scheme. The certificate will attest that the equipment design conforms to the
relevant IEC Standards and that the product is manufactured under a quality plan assessed
by an ACB (Accepted Certification Body). Manufacturers holding certificates of conformity
may affix the IECEx Mark of Conformity to equipment that they have verified complies
with the certified design.
The final objective of the IECEx Scheme is worldwide acceptance of one Standard, one
certificate and one mark.
7.3.3 Operation
The Rules and Procedures governing the Scheme are detailed in IEC Publications IECEx 01
and 02.
The Scheme has a two path approach with two objectives in mind—
(a) to accommodate the needs and concerns of today and the immediate future, through a
well defined and practical transitional period; and
(b) to provide a path to the ultimate aim of using one international certificate and mark
accepted by all participating countries.
An application for a country to participate in the IECEx Scheme is made on a Standard by
Standard basis by the National Member Body of the IEC Scheme for that country. The
application is made to the Secretary of the Ex Management Committee. Certification bodies
and testing laboratories wishing to be accepted into the IECEx Scheme can only apply
through the country where they reside.
Certification bodies and testing laboratories are accepted into the IECEx Scheme after
satisfactory examination of their competence by assessors. These are selected to engender
confidence in the Scheme by the regulatory authority, the user, the manufacturer and the
certification body interests. Competence is judged by reference to ISO/IEC Guides 25, 65
and IECEx Technical Guidance Documents.
For the IECEx Scheme to achieve its long term objective, every national Standard for which
application is made by participating countries will need to be identical to the corresponding
IEC Standard, and the IECEx Certificates of Conformity issued by all accepted certification
bodies will need to be recognized in all participating countries as equivalent to their own
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national certification.
7.3.4 Participation
The Scheme provides for two levels of participation: Full participation and participation at
a transitional level.
7.3.4.1 Full participation
Participation at this level provides for the issuing of an IECEx Certificate of Conformity as
well as a licence to use the IECEx Mark.
As mentioned earlier, this scheme provides an internationally recognized means of proving
product compliance with the relevant IEC Standard. An IEC Certificate of Conformity can
only be issued against an IEC Standard.
Therefore IECEx Certificates of Conformity cannot cover national differences. In this
context national differences are the differences or deviations between a national and an IEC
Standard.
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To ensure integrity and equity in the scheme are maintained, strict obligations on a
country’s participation at this level are part of the rules, viz—
(a) the corresponding national Standard must be identical to the IEC Standard for which
participation is sought; and
(b) the IECEx Certificate of Conformity must be given equal treatment to the country’s
national certification.
The rules and procedures provide for disciplinary action for breach of (a) or (b) above or
any other rules of the scheme. The ultimate penalty is expulsion from the scheme and IEC.
7.3.4.2 Participation at a transitional level
Right now the range of differing national Ex Standards means that large scale participation
at the full level is some time away.
To cater for today’s needs there is provision for participation at an intermediate or
transitional level for those countries—
(a) whose National Standards are not yet identical to IEC; or
(b) which do not yet accept IECEx Certificates of Conformity as equal to their own
national certification.
Participation at the transitional level provides for the mutual acceptance of assessment and
test reports for the purpose of issuing national certification, similar to the current IECEE-
CB Scheme.
Under this arrangement, a test and assessment report issued by Country A would be
accepted by Country B with Country B issuing its own national certification, based on the
report issued by Country A.
Assessment and test reports issued under this arrangement may also cover the testing and
assessment of national differences.
Again there are strict obligations for countries participating at this level, viz—
(a) the National Standard must be reasonably in agreement with the relevant
IEC Standard, with national differences being nominated to IEC. Only one set of
differences will be allowed for each country; and
(b) IECEx assessment and test reports must be accepted for the purpose of issuing
national certification.
As participation at this level is a transitionary measure, the period for participation, at this
level, needs to be determined prior to joining the scheme, and may be different for each
Standard.
If at the end of the transitional period the objectives have not been achieved, the
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Ex Management Committee will review the position with the member body of the IECEx.
If, at the time of the review, there is no prospect of the objectives being achieved quickly,
the country of the member body of the IECEx will withdraw from the Scheme.
7.3.5 Current member countries
Currently (July 2000) there are twenty countries participating in this Scheme. Their names
are as follows:
Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
At this stage, interest in the Scheme has been expressed by some other countries such as
U.S.A., Malaysia, Japan and Brazil.
For contact details of approved ACBs (Accepted Certification Body) refer to the IECEx
internet website www.iecex.com.

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7.3.6 Australia and New Zealand positions


Assessment, testing and certification of Ex equipment, under the IECEx Scheme, is now
accepted in both Australia and New Zealand in the following ways:
(a) Regarding IECEx Certificates of Conformity, AS/NZS 2381.1 permits products
carrying IECEx Certification to be used in hazardous areas without any further
Ex testing or assessment.
(b) Ex products covered by an IECEx Assessment and Testing Report (ATR) can obtain
an AUS Ex Certificate of Conformity via a fast track route. In this situation products
will not be subjected to repeat testing or assessment.
Obtaining AUS Ex Certification via an IECEx ATR issued within the IECEx Scheme,
provides Ex manufacturers and industry with significant benefits such as:
(i) one set of tests and assessments accepted by all participating countries,
(ii) significantly reduced testing costs,
(iii) significantly reduced times for certification,
(iv) greater flexibility of choice by users,
(v) faster access to markets.
The IECEx Scheme provides Australian and New Zealand manufacturers with a vehicle for
the acceptance of Ex products in other participating countries.
Australian and New Zealand manufacturers in possession of an IECEx ATR, can use this
report for the purpose of gaining National Ex Certification by an ACB from any of the
participating countries. In this sense the IECEx ATR serves as the products ‘passport’ to
world markets.
At this stage the participating organizations in Australia are:
ACBs Ex TLs (Ex Testing Laboratories)
QAS ITACS
SIMTARS SIMTARS
TestSafe Australia TestSafe Australia
NOTE: Contact details are shown in 7.2.2.2.

7.4 OVERSEAS TESTING AND CERTIFICATION, OUTSIDE THE IECEx Scheme


A question often asked is whether or not apparatus tested and certified overseas are
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acceptable for use in Australia or New Zealand.


Section 7.2 covers the certification schemes acceptable for Australia and New Zealand and
the acceptance of certification outside these schemes is subject to approval by the relevant
regulatory authorities providing that an equivalent degree of safety is achieved (as stated in
AS/NZS 2381.1). The regulatory authority may require independent assessment of the
overseas certification and such assessment may involve ‘check testing’ by a local testing
station.
In the case of apparatus certified in Europe or to IEC requirements there will be few
significant differences with Australian Standard requirements. In particular, apparatus
certified to the CENELEC Standards, which are very similar to the Australian Standards,
could be used with some confidence.
CENELEC certification is characterized by the use of the symbol ‘EEx’ instead of ‘Ex’ as
used in Australia. In most other respects, marking and application of techniques are similar
to Australia except in some instances, e.g. where the symbol II is used instead of IIC.
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Users of overseas-certified apparatus are advised to request that the certificate is supported
by all the relevant certification documents, drawings and test reports. In this way, proper
identification of the apparatus supplied can be made with the apparatus which was
originally type tested. This also allows for repairs to be carried out in compliance with the
certification conditions, otherwise the only alternative may be to return the damaged
apparatus to the manufacturer.
The extent to which overseas testing is accepted will depend on:
(a) How well the Standard used aligns with the appropriate Australian/New Zealand
Standard(s). European Standards are very similar; whereas US Standards, in
particular for flameproof (explosion-proof) apparatus, can be quite different.
(b) How the test report details the actual testing conducted and the results achieved.
(c) Knowledge and recognition of the particular Testing Station/Certifying Body.
A list of the overseas Testing Stations and Certifying Bodies involved in hazardous areas is
given in Appendix D.

7.5 APPROVED MINING EQUIPMENT


7.5.1 General
There is an increased use of the AUS Ex Scheme for the approval of Group I apparatus for
use in coal mines. As noted earlier, certification has generally not been sufficient for the
apparatus to be used in a coal mine, it must also be ‘approved’. In the past many of the
qualifications to meet this have been the prerogative of each State concerned. However,
with increasing specification of Group I requirements in Australian/New Zealand Standards,
it is likely that these qualifications will eventually disappear.
While underground coal mining exists in several states, the majority of Australia’s coal
mining industry is in New South Wales and Queensland.
7.5.2 New South Wales Approval
In N.S.W., electrical apparatus for use in hazardous areas in underground coal mines is
approved by the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines, Department of Mineral Resources (Mine
Safety and Environment Division).
There are no specific requirements for approval of electrical apparatus used in hazardous
areas in above ground installations of coal mines. However electrical installations in
general must conform to AS/NZS 3000. Electrical apparatus for use in these areas should be
certified as complying with a recognized Standard. Applications for approval should be
made using the appropriate application form.
Copies of application forms and a booklet on how to make the application titled Applicant’s
Guide to Obtaining an Approval from the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines, New South Wales,
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Australia are available from—


Chief Inspector of Coal Mines
N.S.W. Department of Mineral Resources
Mine Safety and Environment Division
Minerals and Energy House
29-57 Christie Street
St Leonards, N.S.W. 2065
PO Box 536
St Leonards, N.S.W. 1590
Attention: Approvals Review Committee
Phone: (02) 9901 8888
Facsimile: (02) 9901 8777
Website: www.minerals.nsw.gov.au

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In general, apparatus is required to comply with the appropriate Australian Standard, but
the Chief Inspector has the authority to relax these requirements or specify additional
requirements.
Currently there is no published list of approved apparatus.
7.5.3 Queensland approval
In Queensland, electrical equipment used in explosion risk zones (hazardous areas) must be
certified by a nationally accredited testing station as explosion-protected equipment suitable
for use in an underground coal mine. The nationally accredited testing stations are: TestSafe
Australia in New South Wales and SIMTARS in Queensland.
7.5.4 Other Australian States/Territories
7.5.4.1 South Australia
In South Australia, electrical equipment for use in mines must satisfy the requirements of
the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (S.A.), the Occupational Health,
Safety and Welfare Regulations 1995 (S.A.). In addition electrical equipment forming part
of an electrical installation must comply with the Electricity Act 1996 and the Electricity
(General) Regulations 1997.
Under the Electricity (General) Regulations 1997, any work on an electrical installation or
proposed electrical installation, which is work of any kind referred to in AS/NZS 3000 (or
other Australian Standards called up by AS/NZS 3000) must be carried out and the
installation must be examined and tested in accordance with AS/NZS 3000 (and other
Australian Standards called up by AS/NZS 3000), to assure that the installation complies
with the technical and safety requirements under these regulations.
Under AS/NZS 3000:2000 Wiring Rules (Clause 7.9.3 Electrical equipment and
Clause 7.9.3.1 Selection) electrical equipment selected for use in hazardous areas shall
comply with the appropriate requirements specified in the various parts of the AS 2381
Series. This includes the certification of electrical equipment for use in hazardous areas.
7.5.4.2 Tasmania
Certification of flammable area electrical apparatus to Australian or equivalent Standards is
accepted by Workplace Standards Tasmania, as regulatory authority for underground coal
mines. There is no system of regulatory approval. The Tasmanian coal industry is small and
the coal measures are considered to have low gas risk, similar to the Western coal measures
of New South Wales. Where a question of apparatus suitability arises, reference is usually
made to the Queensland or New South Wales coal mines inspectorates for their views.
The Tasmanian Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 is strongly focussed on the
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employer’s duty of care.


7.5.4.3 Victoria
At the time that this handbook was published, there were no operational underground coal
mines in Victoria.
The mining legislation applicable to mines in Victoria is the Mineral Resources
Development Act (1990). The Mineral Resources (Health and Safety) Regulations 1991 and
the Mineral Resources (Health and Safety in Large Open-cut Mines) Regulations 1995 are
regulations made under the Act.
These Regulations impose general requirements for ‘duty of care’ on employers. Employers
must provide safe plant, safe systems of work and ensure employees are competent to carry
out required tasks.

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Electrical installations must comply with Australian Standards. Further, these Regulations
impose requirements for the design, installation, maintenance and periodic inspection of
mine electrical installations.
Further information may be obtained from the Department of Natural Resources and
Environment. Enquires may be forwarded to:
Chief Mining Inspector
Department of Natural Resources and Environment
PO Box 3100
Bendigo Delivery Centre
Victoria 3554
Phone: (03) 5444 6689
Facsimile: (03) 5444 6698
7.5.4.4 Western Australia
Western Australia has a long history of non-gassy underground coal mines which have not
warranted or required regulatory approval of electrical equipment used below ground. At
the time that this handbook was published there were no underground coal mines in that
State.
The mining legislation applicable to both coal and metalliferous mines in Western Australia
is the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 and the Mines Safety and Inspection
Regulations 1995. The MSI Act imposes ‘General Duty of Care’ provisions on employers
and manufacturers to provide safe plant and safe systems of work such that employees are
not exposed to hazards, so far as is reasonably practicable. The MSI Regulations require
that the design, construction and testing of any electrical equipment installed or used in an
area delineated as a ‘hazardous area’ be certified as being in accordance with Australian
Standard AS 2380 or an equivalent Standard from another country, that has been approved
in writing by the State mining engineer.
It follows that electrical equipment certified as complying with AS 2380 does not require
regulatory approval, and equipment certified as complying with an equivalent overseas
Standard requires the State Mining Engineer’s approval. Demonstrating that an overseas
Standard is equivalent to AS 2380 is the responsibility of those seeking to use or install the
equipment.
Further reference to the respective legislative provisions is recommended and enquiries may
be forwarded to the Department’s Mining Operations Division—Electrical Engineer at :
Department of Minerals and Energy
Mineral House
100 Plain Street
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East Perth, W.A. 6004


Phone: 08 9222 3546
Facsimile: 08 9222 3441
Email: d.brown@dme.wa.gov.au
7.5.5 New Zealand
Electrical equipment used in the ‘hazardous areas’ of gassy coal mines in New Zealand is
controlled through the Health and Safety in Employment (Mining-Underground)
Regulations 1999, issued pursuant to Section 21 of the Health and Safety in Employment
Act 1992. These Regulations contain general and specific provisions applying to mining
operations and have provisions relating to the certification of electrical equipment used in
the hazardous areas of gassy coal mines.

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The effect of the Regulations is to require that electrical equipment used, or taken into, a
restricted zone of a gassy mine—
(a) meets the essential requirements of European Council Directive 94/9/EC or Directive
82/130/EEC; and
(b) has a certificate of conformity or a certificate of inspection showing compliance with
all the applicable harmonized European standards; and
(c) in respect of which every condition specified on the certificate and by the
manufacturer has been complied with.
or
(d) has received a certificate of conformity from a testing station accredited by Standards
Australia, showing that the equipment complies with Australian Standard AS 2380 for
Group I electrical equipment for use in mines susceptible to methane; and
(e) in respect of which every condition specified on the certificate of conformity and by
the manufacturer has been complied with.
These provisions apply to all equipment except electric safety lamps which are required
to—
(i) comply with European Community Standard EN 50033, as shown by a
certificate of conformity from an approved certification body of the European
Community; and
(ii) comply with all the conditions specified by the certificate of conformity and by
the manufacturer.
The provisions of this Legislation are administered jointly by the Department of Labour,
Occupational Safety and Health and the Ministry of Economic Development—Energy
Safety Service.

7.6 EXEMPTION FROM CERTIFICATION


Simple apparatus is regarded as a low energy device (see AS 2380.1 and AS 2380.7) whose
parameters never exceed the following values:
1.2 V, 0.1 A, 20 µJ or 25 mW (AS/NZS 60079.11 accepts 1.5 volts).
It does not normally need certification but where single apparatus forms part of an assembly
containing other electrical circuits, the whole must be certified.

7.7 PERSONAL EQUIPMENT


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Items of personal equipment which are battery-operated (e.g. hearing aids, miniature
transistor radios, key-ring torches, calculators, watches, pagers, cellular phones and remote
control car keys) are sometimes carried by personnel and might be taken, inadvertently, into
a hazardous area. These items can constitute a potential source of ignition and should not be
taken into a hazardous area unless—
(a) they have been approved for this purpose; or
(b) they are verified as complying with the appropriate explosion-protection techniques;
or
(c) a permit guaranteeing the absence of an explosive atmosphere has been issued; or
(d) they are considered as low energy devices or simple apparatus as defined in
AS 2380.1 and AS/NZS 60079.11 respectively.

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CHAP T E R 8 SE LE CT I ON OF AP P AR AT US

8.1 GENERAL
Once the hazardous area has been fully classified, the appropriate electrical apparatus can
be selected for installation in the hazardous area.
No one method of explosion-protection is ideal. The selection of electrical apparatus for
hazardous areas will depend on the nature of the hazardous area. It is a case of selecting the
technique best suited to economically and safely solve the particular application in the
Zone.
Where possible all electrical apparatus that does not have to be in the hazardous area should
be located in the safe area. This leaves the selection of appropriate explosion-protected
electrical apparatus to a minimum.
8.1.1 Gases and/or vapours
In general, the selection of electrical apparatus for use in Zone 0, 1 and 2 requires the
following information to be considered:
(a) The classification of the area, i.e. the Zone.
(b) The temperature class or ignition temperature of the gas or vapour involved, or the
lowest value of ignition temperature if more than one flammable material could be
present.
(c) Where applicable, the Group or the characteristics of the gas or vapour involved in
relation to—
(i) igniting current or minimum ignition energy for installations of intrinsically
safe apparatus; or
(ii) safe gap data in the case of installations for flameproof enclosures.
(d) Other considerations such as protection from mechanical damage, the relevant
ambient temperature, the use of aluminium or light alloys in the construction of the
apparatus, toxic risks, non-electrical ignition sources, the control of static electricity,
the protection against lightning strikes, the possibility of electromagnetic radiation
being generated in or around the installation, radiation from optical apparatus that
may be in use and cathodic protection must be taken into account in the apparatus
selection process.
(e) Motors supplied at varying frequency and voltages require special consideration.
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Reference to the certification documents is essential.


8.1.2 Dusts
The selection of appropriate electrical apparatus for use in Zone 20, 21 and 22 requires the
following information to be considered:
(a) The classification of the area, i.e. the Zone.
(b) The layer ignition temperature of the combustible dust, fibre or flying involved or the
lowest layer ignition temperature if more than one combustible material might be
present.
(c) The cloud ignition temperature of the combustible dust, fibre or flying involved or the
lowest value of cloud ignition temperature if more than one combustible material
might be present.

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(d) Where applicable, the minimum cloud ignition energy of the dust, fibre or flying
involved or the lowest minimum ignition energy if more than one combustible
material might be present.
(e) Other considerations such as protection from mechanical damage, the relevant
ambient temperature, the use of aluminium or light alloys in the construction of the
apparatus, toxic risks, non-electrical ignition sources, the control of static electricity,
the protection against lightning strikes, the possibility of electromagnetic radiation
being generated in or around the installation, radiation from optical apparatus that
may be in use and cathodic protection must be taken into account in the apparatus
selection process.
(f) Motors supplied at varying frequency and voltages require special consideration.
Reference to the certification documents is essential.
(g) Heating apparatus requires special consideration.
8.1.3 Ambient temperatures
Particular attention should be paid to the ambient temperature in which the apparatus is
designed to operate as most apparatus is designed for an ambient temperature of −20°C to
+40°C. However, in some parts of Australia and New Zealand the ambient temperatures are
outside this range. Therefore apparatus may need to be selected, installed and maintained to
take into account these higher or lower ambient temperatures.

8.2 APPARATUS FOR GASES


8.2.1 General
AS/NZS 2381.1, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Selection, installation
and maintenance: Part 1—General requirements, defines by Zones the apparatus that may
be used in a hazardous gas area.
Three major requirements are specified for apparatus to be used in Zones 0, 1 and 2 areas:
(a) The apparatus must comply with an appropriate explosion-protection technique for
the Zone in which it is to be used (Zone and Ex classification).
(b) It must meet the group requirements for the hazardous material(s) in which it is to be
used (Group I or Group IIA, IIB or IIC).
(c) It must have an appropriate maximum surface temperature or temperature class for
the hazardous material (T classification).
8.2.2 Explosion-protection techniques suitable for gases/vapours
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Table 8.1 summarizes the explosion-protection techniques appropriate for the various Zones
and the applicable Standards.

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TABLE 8.1
EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES FOR
ELECTRICAL APPARATUS IN ZONES 0, 1 AND 2 AREAS
Description of explosion- Applicable Standards and Remarks
protection technique designated symbol
Zone 0
Intrinsically safe AS 2380.7
IEC 60079.11
Ex ia
Special protection AS 1826 In accordance with the
Ex s requirements for Zone 0
Zone 1*
Intrinsically safe AS 2380.7
IEC 60079.11
Ex ib
Special protection AS 1826 In accordance with the
Ex s requirements for Zone 1
Flameproof enclosure AS 2380.2
IEC 60079.1
Ex d
Encapsulated AS 2431
IEC 60079.18
Ex m
Pressurized rooms or pressurized AS 2380.4 In accordance with the
enclosure IEC 60079.2 requirements for Zone 1
Ex p
Increased safety AS 2380.6
IEC 60079.7
Ex e
Ventilation AS 1482 In accordance with the
Ex v requirements for Zone 1
Powder filling AS/NZS 60079.5 and
IEC 60079.5
Ex q
Oil-immersion AS/NZS 60079.6 and
IEC 60079.6
Ex o
Zone 2 †
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Special protection AS 1826 In accordance with the


Ex s requirements for Zone 2
Non-sparking AS 2380.9
IEC 60079.15
Ex n
Ventilation AS 1482 In accordance with the
Ex v requirements for Zone 2
Pressurized rooms or pressurized AS 2380.4 In accordance with the
enclosures IEC 60079.2 requirements for Zone 2
Ex p
* Equipment suitable for use in Zone 0 can also be used in Zone 1 and Zone 2
† Equipment suitable for use in Zone 0 or Zone 1 can also be used in Zone 2.

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NOTES TO TABLE 8.1:


3 IEC Standards 60079.0, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 20 have already been published as Joint AS/NZS Standards;
it is planned that the whole IEC 60079 series will be gradually published as Joint Standards (AS/NZS).
4 IEC is carrying out the revision of the current editions of the following Standards:
60079-1 Flameproof ‘d’
60079-2 Presurization ‘p’
60079-7 Increased safety ‘e’
60079-15 Non-sparking ‘n’
60079-18 Encapsulation ‘m’
5 Committee EL/14 has agreed to adopt all the upcoming new editions, when available, except
60079-15 ‘n’, which will not yet be suitable to be adopted by Australia/New Zealand.

8.2.2.1 Zone 0
For Zone 0 areas the options are limited, as apparatus must be either Ex ia or Ex s. However
the use of Ex s can provide some possibilities.
While Ex s apparatus can be used in Zone 0, there are no specified requirements that would
automatically make the apparatus suitable for such use. It is generally dependent on the
manufacturer or user to demonstrate its suitability. For example, some low powered
apparatus complying with Ex m (encapsulation) has been certified ‘Zone 0 Ex s’.
Another approach, which has been considered overseas, is that of duplicated techniques for
use in Zone 0, e.g. a pressurized flameproof enclosure (Ex pd). This might make it possible
to use higher-powered apparatus that would not normally be permitted in a Zone 0 area.
However, it would not allow for one of the biggest advantages of using intrinsically safe
apparatus, which is that maintenance can be carried out ‘live’ without the need to ‘gas free’
the area.
NOTE: IEC is now developing a Standard for apparatus suitable for Zone 0.
8.2.2.2 Zone 1
Zone 1 areas represent the most common applications and provide a much larger range of
options. The two techniques for gas atmospheres, which have dominated the scene in
Australia and New Zealand, are:
(a) Ex d (flameproof)—particularly where power levels are reasonably high.
(b) Ex i (intrinsic safety)—because of its nature such apparatus must be restricted to low
power applications.
Pressurized (in accordance with the requirements for Zone 1) and ventilation techniques
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can also be used but they tend to be for a particular installation and apparatus is only
infrequently submitted for certification.
Ex e (increased safety) has emerged as a popular technique, in particular for luminaires and
motors. It has a distinct advantage over flameproof apparatus in that it is generally cheaper.
Ex m, encapsulated apparatus, has been used for many years for items such as solenoids.
Ex s is acceptable provided it is in accordance with the requirements for Zone 1 (or 0).
Certified Ex q (powder filling) and Ex o (oil-immersion) apparatus are included in the
acceptable techniques for Zone 1 areas.
8.2.2.3 Zone 2
For Zone 2 areas, Ex s, Ex v (ventilation), and Ex p (pressurized rooms and enclosures) can
be used, when in accordance with the requirements for this Zone.

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Ex n (Non-sparking) is permitted only in Zone 2 areas and is the most common technique
for such areas. Typical apparatus include luminaires and motors for high-powered
apparatus. For low-power applications, apparatus that are intrinsically safe when used with
barriers can often be used as Ex n without the barriers, but, the apparatus must be certified
for use in Zone 2.
8.2.2.4 Zones and Divisions for gas/vapour hazardous areas
The Zones in a gas/vapour hazardous area are defined according to Table 8.2.

TABLE 8.2
ZONES FOR GAS/VAPOUR HAZARDOUS AREAS
Zone 0 Zone in which an explosive gas/air mixture is continually present or present for
long periods
Zone 1 Zone in which a gas/air mixture is likely to occur in normal operation
Zone 2 Zone in which a gas/air mixture is not likely to occur in normal operation, and if it
does occur it will only exist for a short time

The Zones represent the probability of a gas/vapour mixture being present which may
become ignition capable. Zone 0 represents the highest probability of a gas/vapour mixture
occurring.
Until recently the American system has been different from the IEC system of Zone 0, 1
and 2. It now accepts classifications in either form, as set in Table 8.3.

TABLE 8.3
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AUSTRALIAN/IEC ZONES AND
THE AMERICAN CLASSIFICATIONS

Classification of hazardous areas

Explosive
Continuous Intermittent Abnormal
atmosphere
Australia Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2
IEC
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U.S.A.
U.S.A. Division 1 Division 2

NOTES:
1 U.S.A. adopted the IEC gas grouping in 1997 as an alternative to their original Division 1 and Division
2 classification.
2 Classification of Zones in coal mines differs in description to above ground Group II areas but they are
essentially Zone 0 and Zone 1, from the viewpoint of selection and use of electrical equipment near to
the working face. The equipment used in the intake air is of the ‘safe area type’. All underground
equipment, other than Ex ia apparatus, is subject to supply interruption in the event of failure of the
ventilation.

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Classification based on Division 1 and Division 2 is not accepted in Australia and New
Zealand. For this reason, extreme care must be taken when selecting electrical apparatus
certified under the American system, to ensure that it is suitable for the Zone in which it is
to be installed. Careful scrutiny of all the certification documentation is required, before
such apparatus is installed in a hazardous area.
The overlap created by the American Division 1 into Zones 0 and 1 is resolved by reference
to the American gas grouping and the reference or representative gases against which the
U.S.A. Groups are aligned. When these are known, the U.S.A. system can be translated into
the IEC/Australian system of hazardous Zones (see Table 8.5).
8.2.3 Group requirements
As mentioned before, apparatus are grouped as follows:
(a) Group I—Electrical apparatus for mines susceptible to methane;
(b) Group II—Electrical apparatus for all places with explosive atmospheres (not
including oxygen-enriched atmospheres) other than mines susceptible to methane.
The group of the apparatus and the flammable materials must be compatible. For example,
only IIC apparatus can be installed in a hydrogen atmosphere, which is a gas belonging to
the IIC group. Such apparatus could also be used in a group IIA gas atmosphere.
Flameproof electrical apparatus marked Group IIC (hydrogen), are not automatically
suitable for acetylene atmospheres. The certification documents must be checked to ensure
that a particular apparatus is suitable for use in an acetylene atmosphere.
Table 8.4 summarizes this situation.

TABLE 8.4
APPARATUS AND GAS GROUPS

Group of gas I IIA IIB IIC


Allowable group of apparatus I IIA IIB IIC
IIB IIC
IIC

While Group II apparatus are not automatically acceptable in Group I, in practice methane
is a less incendive gas. Apparatus that meet Group II requirements are generally satisfactory
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for Group I provided they can meet the specific design requirements such as restriction on
light alloys and more arduous impact tests and are certified/approved for use in a Group I
gas atmosphere.
Table 8.5 compares the grouping system used in Australia/New Zealand with those of other
countries.

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TABLE 8.5
COMPARISON OF GROUPING OF ELECTRICAL APPARATUS IN
AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Germany U.S.A.
Australia/ IEC and (VDE 0171) (National Representative
UK (BS 4683)
New Zealand CENELEC Japan Electrical gases
(RIIS-TR-TR-79-1) Code)
IIA II IIA II IIA 1 D Propane
IIB IIB IIB 2 C Ethylene
IIC IIC IIC 3n 3a B Hydrogen
None 3b None Carbon
disulphide
IIC* 3c A Acetylene
* Additional requirements apply to acetylene (see AS 2380.2).

8.2.4 Temperature considerations


Major considerations for both Groups I and II are as follows:
(a) Group II
Electrical apparatus must be selected so that their maximum surface temperature will
not exceed the ignition temperature of any gas or vapour that may be present.
This is done by ensuring that the maximum surface temperature of the apparatus, as
represented by the temperature class, does not exceed the ignition temperature of the
gas or vapour as specified in Table 8.6.
Often the gas or vapour is also allocated a temperature class and the temperature class
of the apparatus must be equal to, or better than, the temperature class of the gas or
vapour. For example, apparatus with temperature class T4 may be used in gases or
vapours with temperature classes T4, T3, T2 or T1.

TABLE 8.6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEMPERATURE CLASS,
SURFACE TEMPERATURE AND IGNITION TEMPERATURE

Maximum surface Minimum ignition


Temperature class of
temperature of electrical temperature of gas or
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electrical apparatus
apparatus °C vapour, °C
T1 450 450
T2 300 300
T3 200 200
T4 135 135
T5 100 100
T6 85 85
NOTES:
1 A reference ambient temperature of 40°C is normally assumed when apparatus is designed
to operate within one of the temperature classes indicated in the Table. Where the reference
temperature is outside the range –20°C to +40°C, the value is required to be marked on the
apparatus (see AS 2380.1).
2 Ignition temperatures of flammable liquids, gases and volatile solids are given in
AS/NZS 60079-20.

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When applying temperature classes it is important to recognize that they are based on
a reference ambient of 40°C, unless the apparatus is otherwise marked.
If the ambient temperature exceeds 40°C, it will usually be necessary to downgrade
the temperature class of the apparatus. For example, if the ambient does not exceed
55°C (an additional 15°C), then it would be reasonable to choose the next temperature
class, e.g. T3 instead of T4. However, if the actual surface temperature is known from
the certified test report, it may be possible to remain within the original temperature
class.
Where there are other restrictions on temperature, such as for increased safety motors
and motors supplied from a variable voltage, variable frequency supply, these would
also need to be taken into account. In such cases it would normally be necessary for
apparatus to be recertified for the higher ambient temperature.
If the ambient temperature is likely to fall below –20°C, then the type of protection
may be invalidated unless the apparatus has been specifically certified for the lower
temperature.
Most countries now use the temperature class system for classifying the maximum
surface temperature of apparatus. Some earlier systems required a differential
between the maximum surface temperature and the ignition temperature, effectively
lowering the allowable maximum surface temperature. This was the basis of the ‘G’
temperature classification scheme, which was used in Germany and is still used in
Japan. In the U.S.A. some of the temperature classes have been subdivided.
Table 8.7 compares the different temperature classification systems.

TABLE 8.7
TEMPERATURE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

Australia/New Zealand,
Japan (RIIS-TR-79-1) U.S.A. (NEC 1984)
IEC and CENELEC
Minimum ignition
Maximum Maximum Maximum temperature
surface surface surface
Class Class Class °C
temperature temperature temperature
C C C
T1 450 G1 360 T1A 450 450
T2 300 G2 240 T2 300 300
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T2A 280 280


T2B 260 260
T2C 230 230
T2D 215 215
T3 200 G3 160 T3 200 200
T3A 180 180
T3B 165 165
T3C 160 160
T4 135 G4 110 T4 135 135
T4A 120 120
T5 100 G5 80 T5 100 100
T6 85 G6 70 T6 85 85

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(b) Group I
For coal mining (Group I), the gas and dust hazards are well defined. As discussed in
Chapter 4, only two temperature limits are specified—
(i) 150°C where the coal dust can form a layer; and
(ii) for internal surfaces, 450°C where that risk is avoided.
These temperature limits relate to the apparatus and not the installation. Avoidance of a
layer of coal dust would normally require that internal components are protected by some
means such as an enclosure complying with IP 5X to AS 1939.
Compliance with the above temperature limits is established at the time of testing and
approval of the apparatus and there is no decision required when considering the
installation.

8.3 APPARATUS FOR DUSTS


8.3.1 General
The relevant Standard for the selection of apparatus for Zones 20, 21 and 22 is
AS/NZS 61241.1.2 Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust.
Part 1.2: Electrical apparatus protected by enclosures and surface temperature limitation—
Selection, installation and maintenance.
8.3.2 Explosion-protection techniques suitable for dust hazardous areas
Four types of explosion-protection techniques are recognised in AS/NZS 2381.1, as being
suitable for use in dust areas. These are:
(a) Dust ignition protection enclosures (DIP) apparatus complying with
AS/NZS 61241.1.1. Apparatus previously certified to AS 2236 under the ‘AUS Ex
Scheme’ is considered equivalent to category A21 of AS/NZS 61241.1.1 and is
acceptable for use in Zones 21 and 22.
(b) Encapsulated apparatus (Ex m) complying with AS 2431 or IEC 60079-18 provided
that the apparatus is installed in accordance with AS/NZS 2381.1.
(c) Intrinsically safe apparatus (Ex i) complying with AS 2380.7 or IEC 60079.11,
provided that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) The apparatus complies with either Ex ia or Ex ib.
(ii) The apparatus is IIC.
(iii) The minimum dust cloud ignition energy to which the apparatus will be
exposed is higher than 1 mJ.
NOTE: The value ‘1 mJ’ will be reviewed in due course, to align with the value to be
adopted by IEC.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

(iv) Associated safe area apparatus is not installed in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas
unless protected by an appropriate protection technique.
NOTE: Associated safe area apparatus is identified by the inclusion of brackets in the
marking, e.g. Ex (ia), Ex (ib), (Ex ia), (Ex ib)
(v) The apparatus is either encapsulated or protected by an enclosure complying
with at least the degree of protection IP 5X given in AS 1939.
(vi) The apparatus is installed in accordance with the requirements of AS 2381.7
(d) Pressurized rooms or enclosures (Ex p) complying with the requirements for dust
hazardous areas, specified in AS 2380.4.
Apparatus intended for use in Zone 20 shall be verified by the manufacturers as suitable for
use in Zone 20, with particular reference to the layer depth and all the characteristics of the
material(s) being used.
NOTE: Because the most common method is to use DIP enclosures, most or all installations in
Zone 20, 21 and 22, areas are often, but incorrectly, referred to as DIP installations.

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Most dusts have a higher ignition energy than gases, millijoules rather than microjoules,
and so the energy levels associated with intrinsically safe apparatus have a considerable
level of safety. Common dusts such as wheatflour, paper, rice, wheat, wood, sucrose,
aspirin, coal and rubber all have a minimum cloud ignition energy much higher than 1 mJ.
Table 8.8 summarizes the types of protection that may be used in Zones 20, 21 and 22
areas.
The Australian/New Zealand Standard for pressurized apparatus for use in Zones 20, 21 and
22 areas is AS 2380.4.
NOTE: IEC is currently preparing a Standard for pressurization applicable to Zones 20, 21 and
22.

TABLE 8.8
SELECTION TABLE FOR ACCEPTABLE PROTECTION TECHNIQUES FOR
DUST HAZARDOUS AREAS

Designator
Type of protection technique Remark
symbol

Zone 20*
Dust-ignition protection enclosures DIP A20 Only if certified to AS/NZS 61241.1.1 as A20
DIP B20 or B20.
Encapsulation Ex m Only if specifically certified for Zone 20 use.
Intrinsically safe Ex i Only if specifically certified for Zone 20 use.
Pressurization Ex p Only if specifically certified for Zone 20 use.
Zone 21†
Dust-ignition protection enclosures DIP A21 Only if certified to AS/NZS 61241.1.1 as A21
DIP B21 or B21, or if certified DIP to AS 2236.
DIP
NOTE: DIP equipment previously certified to
the superseded AS 2236 is considered
to be equivalent to equipment of
Category A21.
Encapsulation Ex m
Intrinsically safe Ex i Only if equipment is—
(a) Ex ia or Ex ib, and equipment group is
IIC; and
(b) if the minimum dust cloud ignition
energy of the dust is greater than 1 mJ;
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

and
(c) if the equipment is either encapsulated or
protected to at least IP 5X.
Pressurization Ex p Only if complying with the dust requirements
of AS 2380.4.
Zone 22‡
Dust-ignition protection enclosures DIP A22 Only if certified to AS/NZS 61241.1.1 as A22
DIP B22 or B22§.
* Equipment suitable for use in Zone 20 shall be verified with the manufacturers as suitable for Zone 20,
with particular reference to the layer depth. The exact requirements need to be developed by the
Standards Committee.
† Equipment suitable for use in Zone 20 can be used in Zone 21.
‡ Equipment suitable for use in Zone 21 can also be used in Zone 22.
§ DIP A22 and B22 can only be used when the dust is non-conductive.

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The characteristics of some common industrial dusts are shown below in Table 8.9.

TABLE 8.9
CHARACTERISTICS OF SOME COMMON INDUSTRIAL DUSTS

Minimum spark energy


Ignition temperature of Minimum explosive
required for ignition of
Type of dust dust cloud concentration
cloud
(°C) (mJ) (g/m3 )
Milled aluminium 550 15 35
Coal 610 60 45
Grain dust 430 30 45
Sugar 350 30 30
Rice 440 50 49
Wood flour 430 20 35

8.3.3 Temperature classification


8.3.3.1 General
Zone 20, 21 and 22 (dust) apparatus are assigned a temperature class similar to that for
apparatus designed for Zone 0, 1 and 2 (gas) areas.
The maximum surface temperature permitted for apparatus operating in either Zone 21 or
Zone 22 is determined by the deduction of a safety margin from the minimum ignition
temperature of the dust concerned, when tested in accordance with the methods specified in
AS/NZS 61241.2.1 for both dust clouds and layers up to a thickness of 5 mm or 12.5 mm.
Dust layers exhibit two properties as layer thickness increases, a reduction in minimum
ignition temperature and an increase in thermal insulation.
A 5 mm layer thickness is used to determine the layer ignition temperature of dusts. As
layer thickness increases, there will be an increase in thermal insulation and a reduction in
the ignition temperature. Where there is a possibility that dust layers in excess of 5 mm may
form, the maximum permissible surface temperature of the apparatus must be reduced in
accordance with the guidelines given in AS/NZS 61241.1.2.
NOTE: AS/NZS 61241.1.2 contains a figure showing the variation of these parameters.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

TABLE 8.10
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEMPERATURE CLASS, SURFACE
TEMPERATURE, AND CLOUD OR LAYER IGNITION TEMPERATURE

Temperature class of electrical Maximum surface temperature Minimum cloud or layer ignition
apparatus of electrical apparatus, °C temperature of dust, °C
T1 450 525
T2 300 375
T3 200 275
T4 135 210
T5 100 175
T6 85 160

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8.3.3.2 Selection according to temperature


8.3.3.2.1 Temperature limitations for Zone 21 and Zone 22
8.3.3.2.1.1 General
The maximum surface temperature permitted for apparatus operating in either Zone 21 or
Zone 22 is determined by the deduction of a safety margin from the minimum ignition
temperature of the dust concerned when tested in accordance with the methods specified in
AS/NZS 61241.2.1 for both dust clouds and layers up to a thickness of 5 mm or 12.5 mm.
Dust layers exhibit two properties as layer thickness increases, there is a reduction in
minimum ignition temperature and an increase in thermal insulation.
8.3.3.2.1.2 Temperature limitations because of the presence of dust clouds
The maximum surface temperature of the apparatus shall not exceed two-thirds of the
minimum ignition temperature in degrees Celsius of the dust/air mixture concerned:
T max = 2/3 T C1
Where T C1 is the minimum ignition temperature of the cloud of dust.
8.3.3.2.1.3 Temperature limitations of Practice A apparatus for dust layers up to a
thickness of 5 mm
The maximum surface temperature of the apparatus when tested in the dust-free test method
set out in AS/NZS 61241.1.1 shall not exceed a value of 75 K (75°C) below the minimum
ignition temperature for a 5mm layer thickness of the dust concerned:
T max = T 5 mm −75 K (75°C)
where T 5 mm is the minimum ignition temperature of a 5 mm layer of dust.
NOTE: Where there is a possibility that dust layers in excess of 5 mm may be formed on
Practice A apparatus, the maximum permissible surface temperature shall be reduced. See
AS/NZS 61241.1.2 and AS/NZS 61241.2.1 for guidance.
8.3.3.2.1.4 Temperature limitations of Practice B apparatus for dust layers up to 12.5 mm
thickness
The maximum surface temperature of the apparatus shall not exceed a value of 25 K (25°C)
below the minimum ignition temperature of the 12.5 mm layer thickness of the dust
concerned when the apparatus is tested to the dust blanket test method set out in
AS/NZS 61241.1.1:
T max = T 12.5 mm −25 K (25°C)
Where T 12.5 mm is the ignition temperature of a 12.5 mm layer of dust.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

NOTE: The T max calculated for both Practice A and Practice B are considered to offer equivalent
safety.
8.3.3.2.2 Temperature limitations for Zone 20
Reference must be made to the AS/NZS 61241 series of Standards for guidance on the
temperature limitations for electrical apparatus in Zone 20.

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8.3.3.3 Ambient temperature considerations


The temperature classification system assumes an ambient temperature of 40°C unless the
apparatus is otherwise marked.
Where apparatus is installed in an area where the ambient temperature is likely to exceed
40°C (e.g. apparatus exposed to the heating effects of direct sun exposure may reach
surface temperatures around 60°C - 70°C (or even higher if black) in remote areas of
Australia) or where the apparatus is subjected to heating from external sources (e.g. solar
energy, electric heater, boiler) appropriate safeguards shall be taken to ensure that the
apparatus is suitable for safe operation at the higher ambient temperature and that the
higher ambient temperature is taken into account when determining the temperature
limitations.
The properties of the enclosure should be taken into account when considering higher
ambient temperatures.

8.4 APPARATUS ABOVE A HAZARDOUS AREA


8.4.1 General
In addition to specifying what may be located in a hazardous area, AS/NZS 2381.1 also
specifies requirements for apparatus located above such areas.
8.4.2 Above Zone 0 and Zone 20 areas
Only apparatus suitable for use in a Zone 0 or Zone 20 area is permitted above a Zone 0 or
Zone 20 area, unless the apparatus is suitably segregated from the hazard to prevent any
ignition sources falling into the hazardous area.
8.4.3 Above Zone 1, 2, 21 and 22 areas
Apparatus located less than 3.5 m above a Zone 1, Zone 2, Zone 21 or a Zone 22 area must
be either totally enclosed or provided with suitable guards or screens to prevent any ignition
sources falling into the hazardous area. This includes—
(a) fuses that may produce arcs, sparks or hot particles;
(b) switches that may produce arcs, sparks or hot particles;
(c) motors or generators that have sliding contacts or brushes;
(d) heaters, heating elements or other apparatus that may produce arcs, sparks or hot
particles;
(e) ballasts, capacitors and starting switches for all types of discharge luminaires; and
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

(f) all lamps, including fluorescent lamps.


Low-pressure sodium vapour discharge lamps cannot be installed either in or above a
hazardous area.
There is sufficient free sodium in these lamps that, if they are dropped and the sodium
comes into contact with water, the resultant chemical reaction can produce enough energy
to cause an explosion.
High-pressure sodium vapour discharge lamps contain very little free sodium.
High intensity sodium vapour discharge lamps may be installed above a hazardous area
provided that the lamp is installed in a totally enclosed fitting; or, suitable guards or
screens are provided to prevent any ignition sources falling into the hazardous area.

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8.5 APPARATUS NOT PERMITTED


The following apparatus, as per AS/NZS 2381.1, shall not be installed in either a hazardous
gas or dust area:
(a) Battery chargers with their control equipment and batteries being charged, unless
such equipment is suitable for the hazardous area.
(b) Low-pressure sodium vapour discharge lamps.
Transformers containing a liquid dielectric having a flashpoint less than 250°C, and similar
apparatus, shall not be installed in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas. Such apparatus may be
segregated from the hazardous area by an enclosure, provided that any door or other
opening between the enclosure and the hazardous area is arranged so that hazardous dust,
fibres and flyings cannot enter the chamber in quantities sufficient to produce an explosive
concentration or constitute a hazard.

8.6 SELECTION OF REPAIRED OR EXISTING EQUIPMENT


When it is intended that existing apparatus, or repaired apparatus, are to be installed in a
hazardous area, the requirements of AS/NZS 2381.1 are to be applied as appropriate and the
procedure set out in Figure 8.1 shall be followed.
NOTE: The flow chart shown in this figure is identical with the one in AS/NZS 2381.1:1999.

Start here. The equipment is marked. From the information within


Can you establish that the Does the equipment have the documentation can you
equipment you wish to YES documentation to support the YES establish that the equipment
choose has a protection marking? is unmodified and is still in a
technique permitted in a condition that will meet the
hazardous area through original certification?
equipment marked with or
without documentation?
YES
NO
NO

Are you able to verify that the


Standard to which the
Equipment does not meet NO equipment was certified was
requirement criteria and not changed for safety
should be passed through a reasons?
workshop accredited to
AS/NZS 3800
YES
NO
NO
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Prepare documentation on
how your decision was made
Has the equipment been
as to the equipment’s
repaired/overhauled YES
suitability; then carry out
successfully?
selection process for the
area in which you intend to
install in accordance with
Section 2 of AS/NZS 3800
NO
YES

The equipment is not


marked. It shall not be used Equipment accepted for
in a hazardous area. Discard equipment. installation under Section 3
of AS/NZS 3800

FIGURE 8.1 FLOW CHART PROCEDURE FOR SELECTION OF REPAIRED OR


EXISTING ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR USE IN A HAZARDOUS AREA

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CHAP T E R 9 I NST ALL AT I ON OF


E XP LOS I ON- P ROT E CTI ON AP P AR AT US AND
S YS T E MS

9.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally the Wiring Rules have contained a hazardous area Section outlining the basic
requirements for electrical installations in hazardous areas, with reference to other
Standards and Codes of Practice for other specific requirements and information.
In addition to the requirements specified in the hazardous area Section, installations in
hazardous areas must comply with other Sections of AS/NZS 3000 as applicable.
The current edition of AS/NZS 3000:2000, The Wiring Rules—Section 7.9 requires that the
selection and installation of electrical apparatus be such as to ensure their safe use in areas
where flammable materials are generated, prepared, processed, handled, stored or otherwise
used, and which are therefore potentially hazardous. The installation of electrical apparatus
shall be carried out in a manner that does not reduce the protection afforded by the
electrical apparatus design.

9.2 GENERAL INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS


AS/NZS 3000 requires that electrical apparatus selected, installed and maintained in a
hazardous area comply with AS/NZS 3000 and the applicable parts of the AS/(NZS) 2381
series of Standards.
The AS(/NZS) 2381 series in turn call up a number of other applicable AS(/NZS)
Standards. This means that:
(a) The apparatus selected for use in hazardous areas must comply with the appropriate
requirements specified in AS/NZS 2381.1.
(b) The apparatus must be installed in accordance with the requirements of AS/NZS 2381.1
for all Zones (0, 1, 2 and 20, 21, 22) and also AS/NZS 61241.1.2 for Zones 20, 21 and
22.
Examples of some of the relevant features that should be addressed during installation are
as follows:
Access: The installation should be designed, and the apparatus and materials installed, with
a view to ensuring ease of access for inspection and maintenance.
Electrical rating: Electrical apparatus and materials must be installed, used and maintained
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

for use only within their electrical ratings. Such ratings include power, voltage, current
frequency, duty and temperature.
Earthing: The metal parts of electrical apparatus including ELV apparatus, installed in
hazardous areas, must be earthed in accordance with AS/NZS 3000 and any additional
requirements of AS/NZS 2381.1.
Enclosure and termination of earthing conductors: In general (note there are exceptions)
any earthing conductor must be enclosed with its associated live conductors and be
terminated in an enclosure, which maintains the appropriate type of explosion-protection.
Earthing of spare conductors: With the exception of Ex i apparatus all spare conductors
must be earthed on at least at one end of the circuit. The earthing of spare cores of Ex i
installations must be in accordance with AS 2381.7.

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Equipotential bonding: To avoid sparking between metallic parts of structures, potential


equalization is always required for Zones 0, 1, 20 and 21 installations and may be necessary
for installations in Zones 2 and 22.
Bonding of metallic enclosures, conduits, sheaths and armour: Electrical continuity
between metallic enclosures and conduits, or armour, or cable sheaths and armour, or across
any joints in the conduit or armour, or cable sheaths and armour, shall be ensured by the
integrity of the joint itself. If external bonding is necessary, it shall be connected directly
across the joint to avoid the risk of introducing a path of high surge impedance.

9.3 PROTECTION AND ISOLATION OF ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS


AS/NZS 2381.1 sets down the specific requirements for the safe protection of circuits and
systems so that all circuits and apparatus in hazardous areas are provided with a means of
speedy disconnection in the event of an overload, internal short-circuit or earth fault.
Consideration must be given to the following:
(a) Location of protection and control devices—Unless otherwise protected with an
appropriate type of explosion-protection technique all protection and control
apparatus must be located in the non-hazardous area.
(b) Auto-re-closing—Short-circuit and earth-fault protective devices shall not
automatically re-close under fault conditions.
(c) Phase failure—Precautions must be taken to prevent the operation of a three-phase
motor on the loss of a phase.
(d) Electrical isolation—To allow work to be carried out safely, suitable means of
isolation (e.g. isolators, fuses and links) shall be provided for each circuit or groups
of circuits, including all live conductors and the neutral.
All isolators must be suitably labelled immediately adjacent to each means of
isolation.
Each isolator shall be capable of being effectively locked in the OFF position. If
locking cannot be achieved effective procedures must be in place to prevent the
restoration of supply to apparatus whilst the risk of exposing unprotected live
conductors to an explosive atmosphere continues.
(e) Emergency switch-off—Where required, emergency switching for the switching off of
electrical supplies to the hazardous area must be located outside the hazardous area.
(f) Telecommunications circuits—must comply with the requirements of AS/NZS 2381.1
and any requirements of the relevant telecommunications Standards.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

(g) Avoidance of damage—Cable systems must be installed, so far as practicable, to


prevent them being exposed to mechanical damage, to corrosion or chemical
influences such as solvents and to the effects of heat, UV radiation and vibration.
(h) Passage and collection of flammables—Where trunking, ducts, pipes or trenches are
used to accommodate cables, precautions must be taken to prevent the flammable
liquids, gases and vapours or dusts being transferred from one area to another. The
precautions may include sand filling of trenches or adequate ventilation. Trunking,
ducts and pipes may need to be sealed.
Conduits must be sealed to prevent the ‘piping’ of flammable material to other areas.
(i) Circuits traversing a hazardous area—must comply with the requirements of
AS/NZS 2381.1 for the particular hazardous area traversed by the circuit.

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(j) Surge protection—Circuits supplied from overhead lines used for either power supply
or telecommunications circuits must be terminated outside the hazardous area and be
fitted at or near the terminal pole with an effective surge protective device.
(k) Unused entries—must be closed with a blanking element that maintains the integrity
of the explosion-protection technique of the enclosure and can only be removed by
the use of tools.
(l) Jointing of cables—Where practicable cables run in a hazardous area should be
continuous.
(m) Apparatus circuit identification—All circuits in a hazardous area should be clearly
identified with permanent labels.
(n) The use of aluminium conductors in flameproof enclosures—The use of aluminium
conductors in flameproof enclosures shall be avoided in those cases where a fault
leading to potentially severe arcing involving the conductors might occur in the
vicinity of a plain flanged joint. Adequate protection may be afforded by suitable
conductor and terminal insulation to prevent the occurrence of faults or by the use of
enclosures with spigot or threaded joints.

9.4 COMPONENTS OF AN INSTALLATION


As illustrated in Figure 9.1, the three major components of an electrical installation in a
hazardous area are:
(a) The electrical apparatus.
(b) The electrical cable and its protection.
(c) The entry arrangement for the cable to the apparatus enclosure.

MIMS can be used as a


seal against ‘piping’

Volume and placement of


equipment must conform to
certification/approval
documents
Entry glands complying with
AS 1828 must provide effective
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Conduit seal to prevent seal. The use of thread sealing


‘piping’ of gases tape (PTFE tape) may be
necessary

When using conduit


Cabling will not
minimum number of allow ‘piping’ of
threads engaged as gases
well as the use of
thread sealing tape
(PTFE tape) may be Cable must be insulated to prevent
required conductor contact and production of
spark

FIGURE 9.1 TYPICAL MAJOR COMPONENTS OF AN ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION

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As discussed in Chapter 8, the electrical apparatus must comply with an appropriate


explosion-protection technique.
The wiring system must avoid —
(a) the use or possibility of exposed conductors;
(b) propagating an explosion; and
(c) ‘piping’ flammable material to other areas.
As the cable may also be a source of ignition (unless it is part of an intrinsically safe
circuit), it must be designed and installed to give equivalent protection to that afforded by
the apparatus it is supplying. The cable must be insulated so that a spark or arc cannot occur
through inadvertent contact and it must also be protected. Depending on the application,
this may be by means of a sheath, armouring, conduit, or as a feature of construction
(MIMS cable).
WARNING: Where MIMS cables are used in Ex e applications, care should be
taken to use certified cable termination kits complying with AS 2380.6. The ‘safe
area’ termination kit may not comply.

9.5 WIRING SYSTEMS


Wiring systems specifically excluded in a hazardous area are bare conductors, open wiring,
earth sheath return (ESR) wiring systems not insulated to the equivalent of double
insulation, bus-way systems, aerial wiring systems, single wire earth return systems, low
and extra-low voltage track systems and ‘easy tear’ cables, except where such cables are
installed in conduit according to Table 3.1 of AS/NZS 2381.1 (this Table is reproduced
below, as Table 9.1).
Wiring systems specifically excluded above a hazardous area are bare conductors, open
wiring, aerial wiring systems and low and extra-low voltage track systems
Wiring systems which are permitted to be used are shown in Table 9.1. Other forms of
wiring methods may be acceptable subject to the approval of the relevant authority.
The entry arrangement of the cable into the enclosure is important because it must preserve
the explosion-protection technique for the enclosure. This is usually done by using cable
glands complying with AS 1828 (see Chapter 6) or requiring a minimum length of thread
engagement on conduits or pipes. When using conduits, it may also be necessary to improve
the sealing of the conduit joint, in particular for DIP and Ex e apparatus, by a thread sealant
such as PTFE tape.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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TABLE 9.1
WIRING SYSTEM IN HAZARDOUS AREAS

(Not applicable to coal mining areas)

Zones 20,
Type of wiring system Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2
21 and 22
Intrinsically safe systems in accordance with P P P P
AS 2381.7
Cables in metallic conduit and fittings complying P P P P
with AS/NZS 2053.1 and AS/NZS 2053.7 and the
appropriate protection technique for the area in
which they are to be installed
Served MIMS See Note * P P P
Thermoplastic, thermosetting or elastomeric P P
sheathed unarmoured
Thermoplastic, thermosetting or elastomeric See Note * P P P
sheathed with armouring or braiding designed for
mechanical protection
Cables in rigid and corrugated, non-metallic P P
conduit, minimum light duty, complying with
AS/NZS 2053.1, AS/NZS 2053.2 and
AS/NZS 2053.5
Metal sheathed, served and armoured See Note * P P P
Flexible cords and cables in accordance with See Note * P P P
Clause 3.11.1 of AS/NZS 2381.1
Metal sheathed, served and unarmoured P
Flexible steel conduit with non-metallic serving to P
AS/NZS 2053.1 and AS/NZS 2053.8
Flexible steel conduit with non-metallic serving to P P
AS/NZS 2053.1 and AS/NZS 2053.8 and fittings
complying with AS/NZS 61241.1.1
Flexible conduit assemblies complying with the P P
relevant requirements of AS 2380.2
Trunking, ducts, pipes or trenches installed to P P
meet the requirements of Clause 3.8.5 of
AS/NZS 2381.1
P denotes permitted use
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

* This wiring system may be installed in a Zone 0 area, if provided with additional protection to counter the
harmful environmental effects detailed in Clause 3.8.4 of AS/NZS 2381.1

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The explosion-protection techniques and their associated installation Standards are listed in
Table 9.2.
As stated earlier, the cabling system should not propagate an explosion nor provide a means
for gas to be ‘piped’ into another area. Cable systems using glands generally meet these
requirements without special consideration.
Systems using conduits or pipes require the use of special seals, examples of which are
illustrated in Figure 9.2.

TABLE 9.2
EXPLOSION-PROTECTION TECHNIQUES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED
INSTALLATION STANDARD

Description of the protection technique Relevant Australian/New Zealand installation


Standards
General requirements AS/NZS 2381.1
Flameproof apparatus, Ex d AS 2381.2
Pressurized rooms or enclosures, Ex p AS 2380.4
Increased safety, Ex e AS 2381.6
Intrinsically safe, Ex i AS 2381.7
Special protection, Ex s AS 1076.8*
Non-sparking, Ex n AS 1076.7*
Apparatus in combustible dust areas AS/NZS 61241.1.2
Ventilation, Ex v AS 1482
Encapsulation Ex m As per manufacturer’s instructions
Powder filling Ex q As per manufacturer’s instructions
Oil-immersion Ex o As per manufacturer’s instructions
* Under revision to become AS/NZS 2381.8 (‘s’) and AS/NZS 2381.9 (‘n’) respectively.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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Sealing
compound

Packing fibre

FIGURE 9.2 CONDUIT SEALS

9.6 INSTALLATIONS IN ZONE 0 AREAS


Apparatus in Zone 0 areas is generally ‘Ex ia’ to AS 2380.7 or AS/NZS 60079.11, which
must be installed in accordance with AS 2381.7. More details on intrinsically safe
installations are given later in this chapter.
For other installations in Zone 0 areas, the major requirements specified in AS/NZS 2381.1
relate to the use of cable and conduit systems.

9.7 INSTALLATIONS IN ZONE 1 AND ZONE 2 AREAS


The major requirements for Zone 1 and Zone 2 areas are set out in AS/NZS 2381.1.

9.8 INTRINSICALLY SAFE ELECTRICAL APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS


Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Requirements for installation of intrinsically safe electrical apparatus and systems are
specified in AS 2381.7, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Selection,
installation and maintenance—Part 7: Intrinsic safety i.
9.8.1 Major requirements
The following are some of the major installation requirements:
(a) The cross-sectional area of the cables and the current, which they have to carry, will
affect the surface temperature of the cable and whether they are suitable for the
temperature class required.
(b) Cable insulation has to meet certain requirements and in particular must be able to
pass a 500 V a.c. voltage test.
(c) When a cable screen is used it must be earthed at the same point as the circuit
protective earth, to minimize the risk of earth loop faults.

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(d) Where an intrinsically safe circuit is laid together with a non-intrinsically safe circuit,
to minimize the risk of invasion, there are very specific requirements outlined in
AS 2381.7.
(e) Although risks due to induction are very low it is necessary to avoid running
intrinsically safe cables adjacent to and in parallel with high current carrying single
core conductors.
(f) Intrinsically safe and non-intrinsically safe circuits are not permitted in the same
multicore cables.
(g) Multiple intrinsically safe circuits in multicore cables are subject to specific
requirements laid down in AS 2380.7 or AS/NZS 60079.11.
(h) Specified creepage and clearance distances in junction boxes must be maintained.
Non-IS and IS circuit terminals must have at least 50 mm creepage and clearance
distance. On the other hand the creepage and clearance between different IS circuit
terminals must be at least 6 mm and the creepage and clearance between IS terminals
and earth must be at least 3 mm.
NOTE: Apparatus certified to overseas Standards may require 4 mm creepage and clearance
between IS terminal and earth.
(i) The prospective fault current of any supply to which an intrinsically safe circuit is
connected must not exceed 4 kA.
(j) When earth connections are necessary to preserve the integrity of an intrinsically safe
system (e.g. a diode safety barrier earth, transformer screen or barrier relay frame
earth) such connections should be made to a high integrity earth so that the
impedance from the main power system earth point is less than 1 ohm.
(k) Shunt diode safety barriers for mains apparatus must be fed from a suitably fused,
double wound transformer.
NOTE: Switch mode power supplies on their own may not comply and require special
consideration.
(l) Shunt diode safety barriers must be mounted on a substantial earthed copper busbar
and be protected by a degree of protection not inferior to IP 20 to AS 1939.
(m) Barrier devices must be installed in a non-hazardous area unless protected by an
appropriate form of protection, for example Ex d if in Zone 1 or Ex n if in Zone 2.
They may not be mounted in Zone 0.
(n) Enclosures should be clearly labelled as carrying IS circuits.
(o) Glanding should adequately support the cables and maintain the weatherproof rating
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of the enclosure.
(p) Cables for IS circuits should be clearly marked or coloured light blue.
NOTE:Check the installation documentation.
When installing intrinsically safe systems it is important that the maximum external
parameters are not exceeded. There is a limit to the capacitance, inductance, and inductance
to resistance (L/R) ratio that can be connected to the terminals of associated electrical
apparatus. Normally these limits are specified in the certification documentation and may
also be marked on the apparatus.
Inductance and capacitance may be introduced by both cables and connected apparatus.
When a total system has been certified, i.e. both associated apparatus and connected
apparatus, the limitation specified may only apply to the cable. If the cable type is also
specified, then the certificate may just place a restriction on the cable length.

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The cable capacitance is dependent on the dielectric used and the manufacturer usually
supplies the cable capacitance figures. The inductance of the cable is dependent on the
physical size properties of the conductors and the manufacturer usually supplies the cable
inductance figures. The resistance of the cable is a function of the conductor properties.
In general the cable parameter limitations are as follows:
Capacitance: Limit determined by the voltage Energy = ½CV2 Joules
Inductance: Limit determined by current Energy = ½LI 2 Joules
Resistance: Does not affect safety; only the operational aspects.
The L/R ratio is based on the premise that as the length of cable increases the resistance
increases thus limiting the current that can flow through the inductance of the cable thus
limiting the energy that the cable can store. The energy stored by the cable inductance will
be zero when there is no inductance and will also be zero when the cable resistance is at
infinity because no current can flow. The cable stored energy will be at its maximum when
the cable resistance is at its lowest and the cable inductance is at its highest proportion.
Therefore the maximum energy storage value can be calculated and expressed as a ratio of
inductance to resistance, the L/R ratio. This ratio is often quoted but seldom justified.
9.8.2 Segregation of IS and Non-IS cables
Power cables are usually segregated from IS signal or instrument cables to reduce the risk
of noise induction in the signal or instrument loops. Where the risk of ‘invasion’ of the
power system cabling to the IS system cabling is possible then adequate segregation of the
cables must be undertaken.
Figure 9.3 shows typical segregation techniques.

Segregation distance
Partitioned

Separate
trays
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Segregation is not Armouring


required if the cables
are mechanically
protected

Back
to
back

Normal practice

FIGURE 9.3 TYPICAL CABLE SEGREGATION TECHNIQUES

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9.9 FLAMEPROOF ELECTRICAL APPARATUS


Requirements for installation of flameproof electrical apparatus and systems are specified
in AS 2381.2, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Selection, installation and
maintenance—Part 2: Flameproof enclosure d.
Examples of relevant requirements are as follows:
(a) Clearance from objects: To maintain the characteristics of a flameproof enclosure,
clearance of at least 40 mm must be maintained between solid objects such as
steelwork, walls, guards, piping and the edges of flanged joints or openings of the
flameproof enclosure. The ‘obstacle effect’ lowers the rate of pressure and heat
dissipation and may permit re-ignition of the explosive mixture, as shown in
Figure 9.4.

Obstacle

Clearance
lower than
40 mm

FIGURE 9.4 EFFECTS OF AN OBSTACLE TOO CLOSE TO THE FLAMEPATH

(b) Weather protection: Gaskets and seals must not be used as a means of
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weatherproofing the flame path of a flameproof enclosure unless they have been
certified as an integral part of the enclosure.
(c) Corrosion protection: When reassembling flameproof enclosures, all joints must be
thoroughly cleaned and lightly smeared with a suitable grease in accordance with the
flameproof enclosure manufacturer’s recommendation, to prevent corrosion and assist
weatherproofing. Flammable oils and greases must not be used as they may ignite
under explosion conditions (joints must not be treated with substances that harden in
use, as they may impair the efficient operation of the flameproof enclosure).
(d) Use of tape: To protect flanges of flameproof enclosures against corrosion, non-
hardening tape may be used around a joint edge for apparatus used with Group IIA
gases. The tape must be suitable for use and applied in accordance with the
flameproof enclosure supplier’s recommendations. If the tape is removed for any
reason, new tape must be applied if required. Unless permitted by the certification
documentation, tapes must not be used for Groups IIB and IIC gases.

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(e) Additional holes: Additional holes cannot be made in the enclosure unless it is
permitted on the certification documentation. Where permitted additional holes
should be inserted under controlled workshop conditions.
(f) Adding apparatus to an Ex d enclosure: Apparatus cannot be added to an Ex d
enclosure unless it is permitted on the certification documentation.
(g) Cables entries into flameproof enclosures: The cable entry into flameproof
enclosures must maintain the integrity of the type of protection and prevent
propagation of flame down the cable through to the external hazardous area and
prevent migration of flammable liquid or vapour down the cable cores to a non-
hazardous area. Methods for the entry of thermoplastic or elastometric insulated
cables into flameproof enclosures are outlined in AS 2381.2.
(h) Conduit entries into flameproof enclosures: Conduits entering flameproof
enclosures must be sealed with a conduit seal to prevent explosions travelling along
the conduit (see Figure 9.2).
(i) Pressure piling: If two Ex d enclosures are joined by a nipple or conduit without a
seal an explosion in one of the enclosures will allow the gas in the second enclosure
to be pre-compressed before the explosion flame front in the first enclosure reaches
the second enclosure and ignites the gas in the second enclosure. This is called
‘pressure piling’ (See Figure 5.5). The effect of pressure piling is to increase the gas
pressure in the second enclosure from atmospheric pressure (which is the pressure
that the enclosure was initially tested at) to ten to twenty times atmospheric pressure
and the resultant explosion of the pre-compressed gas causes a rise in pressure many
times this amount. This pressure could destroy the enclosure. Pressure piling can also
be created in other ways, such as, by fitting additional apparatus in to the enclosure or
by space splitting caused by the insertion of barriers into the enclosure.

9.10 INCREASED SAFETY ELECTRICAL APPARATUS


Requirements for installation of Increased Safety electrical apparatus and systems are
specified in AS 2381.6, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Selection,
installation and maintenance—Part 6: Increased safety e. Examples of relevant
requirements are as follows:
(a) Maximum power dissipation: Terminal and junction boxes are allocated a
permissible maximum dissipating power to ensure that the limiting temperatures are
not exceeded in service. The maximum power dissipation permitted for a terminal or
junction box will be shown on the terminal or junction box itself or on the
certification documentation.
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(b) Selection of cables: When selecting cables for connection within Ex e enclosures, the
current ratings specified in the certification documentation must be used. This may
require larger conductors than would otherwise be required from selection
considerations for the external cables.
(c) Certified components: Terminal and junction boxes may be fitted with any number
of certified components up to the maximum permitted by the permissible maximum
dissipated power.
NOTE: See the certification documentation for the maximum number of certified components
allowed in an enclosure.
(d) Looming of conductors: Conductors must not be bunched in numbers that can
produce excessive temperature. (it is recommended that, where each conductor carries
its rated current, the bunch should not exceed six conductors). Some overseas
certified apparatus may not permit looming of conductors at all. The certification
documents must be checked before cable installation and termination commences.

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(e) IP rating: Cable glands must maintain the IP rating of the enclosure.
(f) Additional holes: Additional holes may be permitted by the manufacturer. Check the
certification documentation.
(g) Electrical protection: Electrical protection apparatus must be selected to ensure that
the limiting temperature (T rating) of any component is not exceeded in service. An
increased safety motor should not, under starting, running or stalled (locked rotor)
conditions, exceed the critical limiting temperatures. This temperature is:
(i) that which will ignite any explosive gas/air mixtures in the area concerned; and
(ii) that which will reduce significantly the thermal stability of the materials used in
the motor.
The critical limiting temperature will occur during a stall from the hot condition and
is controlled by ensuring that the motor is switched off either by temperature
detectors in the winding or by external current-dependent time lag protective devices
before this temperature is exceeded. The motor must be switched off within a
specified time known as the tE time. (See AS 2380.6 and AS 2381.6 for further
information regarding time tE).
(h) Conduits: The conduit entry must maintain the IP rating of the enclosure. Conduits
seals may be required if dust or water could enter the enclosure via the internal bore
of the conduit.
(i) Conductor terminations: The method of connection of the conductors to the
apparatus terminals must be in accordance with the certification documents and
tightened according to the manufacturer’s recommended torque settings The number
of conductors permitted to be connected to each terminal is set out in the certification
documentation or according to AS 2381.6. Typical Ex e cable terminations are shown
in Figure 9.5.
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Slotted
Slotted
term inal
term inal
Special post
post
cable lug
Pressure
tool Pressure
tool

Special cable lug C onductor


constrained constrained
and prevented and prevented
from turning from turning

Locknut M oulded ridges for S pring


anti-turning provision washer
and add ed cre epage
S addle cla mp
restra ined from
turning

Conductor in ‘U’
aroun d the terminal
post Crim ped lug
restra ined from
turning

Spring or
shakeproof
Feed through terminal washer
Saddle type
pressure plate

Conductor in ‘U’ around


the terminal screw

Terminal lug

FIGURE 9.5 TYPICAL Ex e TERMINATIONS

9.11 INSTALLATIONS IN ZONE 20, 21 AND 22 AREAS


Apparatus in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas must be installed in accordance with
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AS/NZS 61241.1.2, Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust
Part 1.2: Electrical apparatus protected by enclosures and surface temperature limitation—
Selection, installation and maintenance.
The major requirements in this Standard are:
(a) The apparatus must meet the requirements for Zone 20 or 21 or 22 areas (see
Chapter 8).
(b) Wiring systems in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas must maintain the integrity of the
explosion-protection technique and special consideration should be given to the
ingress of dust and water, corrosion, vibration and rodent attack.
Bare conductors, open wiring, earth sheath return (ESR) wiring systems that are not
insulated to the equivalent of double insulation, bus-ways, single wire earth return
systems, low and extra-low voltage track systems, ‘easy tear cables’ and aerial wiring
systems are not permitted in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas.
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(c) Intrinsically safe circuits must be installed in accordance with AS 2381.7. For all
other techniques, the cable systems that can be used are shown in Table 9.1.
(d) Cable runs should be arranged so that they collect the minimum amount of dust and
are accessible for cleaning. If layers of dust are liable to form on cables and impair
free air circulation, consideration should be given to de-rating the cables, especially if
low ignition temperature dusts are present.
(e) Flexible steel conduit with non-metallic serving and fittings complying with
AS/NZS 61241.1.1, rigid PVC and corrugated non-metallic conduit, minimum light
duty or screwed metallic conduit can be used in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas, provided
that the conduit and fittings comply with AS/NZS 2053.1, AS/NZS 2053.2,
AS/NZS 2053.5, AS/NZS 2053.7, AS/NZS 2053.8 and AS/NZS 61241.1.1.
(f) All inspection type fittings, such as inspection elbows, inspection tees and junction
boxes must comply with AS/NZS 61241.1.1, and the conduit must be provided with
some facility, (e.g. a self-clearing drip plug), to allow draining of any condensate.
(g) Flexible connections must be one of the types specified in Table 9.4 as appropriate,
except for flexible cords or cables, which are an integral part of electrical apparatus
where the apparatus, including the cable, complies with the appropriate Standard for
the type of explosion-protection concerned.

TABLE 9.4
FLEXIBLE CONNECTIONS IN HAZARDOUS AREAS

Type

Ordinary-duty Sheathed, metallic and Application


Heavy-duty sheathed
sheathed screened overall
P P3 Hand-held or portable
appliances and
luminaires 1,4
P P P3 Fixed apparatus 2

1,5
P P Other apparatus

P denotes permitted use


1
Restricted to flexible cables having a conductor cross-sectional area of not less than 1.5 mm2.
2
Subject to the restrictions of Clause 3.11.1.2 of AS/NZS 2381.1.
3
Where a screened flexible cable is subject to continuous flexing, a composite type screen should
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be used.
4
Where the flexible cable is subjected to mechanical injury, further protection shall be provided.
5
Additional cable protection is required. Refer to Clause 3.8.4 of AS/NZS 2381.1.

(h) Fixing and supports are required to protect the installation and to prevent the
accumulation of dust between the wiring system and the surface to which it is
attached.
(i) Socket outlets must not accept three-pin plugs complying with Figure 2.1 of
AS/NZS 3112. Automatic isolation must be provided by an interlocking switch,
which prevents the plug from being inserted or withdrawn with the switch in the ‘ON’
position. Provision must also be made to restrict the entry of dust into the socket
outlet.

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(j) Except for intrinsically safe systems, all apparatus and circuits in a Zone 20, 21, and
22 area must be provided with means to ensure quick disconnection in the event of
over-current, internal short-circuit or earth-fault conditions. In addition, each item of
apparatus and each sub-circuit must be provided with a means of complete circuit
isolation, including the neutral.
(k) Unless provided with inherent over-temperature protection, motors must be protected
to ensure that the marked temperature rating (temperature classification) is not
exceeded. A recommended arrangement is the use of a system which sets off an
audible alarm when 80 percent of the temperature limit is reached, and disconnects
the motor when the actual limit is reached.
(l) An important aspect of AS/NZS 61241.1.2 is Appendix C, General Considerations,
which deals with some of the many other aspects which can affect plant safety, such
as housekeeping, vibration, and ignition sources.

9.12 SPECIFIC OCCUPANCIES


The installation of apparatus and wiring systems in the examples of occupancies included in
AS/NZS 2430.3.2 to AS/NZS 2430.3.9 must be in accordance with the requirements
specified in Section 7.9 of AS/NZS 3000 and the applicable requirements outlined in the
AS/(NZS) 2381 series of Standards.
Certain types of apparatus and wiring systems which are commonly associated with these
specific occupancies, but not necessarily located within the designated hazardous area, are
permitted subject to specific requirements. For example, sealing fittings must be provided
in conduits and pipes enclosing underground wiring, which passes beneath the defined
hazardous area in a petrol or LP gas service station.

9.13 VERIFICATION DOSSIER


A ‘Verification Dossier’ is defined in AS/NZS 2381.1 as ‘a set of documents showing the
compliance of electrical apparatus and installations’.
To ensure that any installation complies with the appropriate certification documents, with
the relevant Standards and any other requirements specific to the plant on which installation
takes place a ‘Verification Dossier’ must be prepared and used to ensure that the apparatus
and installation techniques used are appropriate for the areas in which they are installed.
All information necessary for the correct installation of the apparatus must be available for
the installation personnel. The manufacturer must provide instruction manuals, certification
documents and drawings that provide sufficiently detailed information to allow an
assessment of the apparatus for the area in which it is to be operated.
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In addition all personnel undertaking the installation work must have a combination of
knowledge and skills to effectively, efficiently and safely carry out the installation work.
Supervisors must also be adequately trained.
In general the following documentation would be found in a ‘Verification Dossier’:
(a) Area classification documents.
(b) Instructions for the erection and connection.
(c) Copies of all apparatus certificates including any addendums for approved
modifications.
(d) Details of any uncertified apparatus including manufacturers name, its type number
and the justification for its use.
(e) Documents for electrical apparatus with special conditions attached to use. Suffix X
and the methods used to meet the special requirements.

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(f) Descriptive systems documents for the explosion-protection systems installed on the
plant.
(g) The approximate location of each piece of electrical apparatus and the approximate
routing of its associated cables.
(h) The Temperature Class applicable to all flammable material, which may be present.
(i) Manufacturer’s/qualified person’s declaration as to the fitness for purpose of the
apparatus/installation.
In addition, the following reports, test results and inspections must be filed in the
‘Verification Dossier’:
(i) All test results, maintenance operations reports and any defects found and
actions taken to correct the defects, and inspection reports for any testing or
inspection required by the Standards or regulatory authorities.
(ii) All reports from apparatus modifications, overhauls or repairs.
(iii) Any ‘authorized modifications’ to the plant installation or apparatus and the
justification for the modifications.
(iv) Any change of area classification and the justification for the area classification
change.
The ‘Verification Dossier’ is a living Dossier and is used for maintenance purposes and for
the recording of test results, inspections, apparatus overhauls, repairs and modifications and
changes to area classifications. It must be kept up to date.
The Standards cannot, and do not, dictate the quality of the documentation to be recorded in
the ‘Verification Dossier’. In the same way the Standards cannot specify what training and
supervision is necessary. The implications are that the owner/occupier of the plant carries
the responsibility to decide what documents must be filed and what training and level of
supervision is required for a particular plant. What the owner/occupier must be able to
show, by documentary proof, is that he/she has taken all reasonable practicable precautions
to operate the plant in a safe manner.

9.14 PRE-COMMISSIONING INSPECTION AND TESTING


The purpose of the pre-commissioning tests is to ensure that the plant has been installed in
compliance with the certification documentation and the appropriate Standards.
The results of these tests and inspections must be recorded in the Verification Dossier.
The personnel carrying out the testing and inspections must be suitably qualified and
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experienced, having undergone training and appropriate continuing education/training on a


regular basis.
Specific units of competency, covering installation, inspection and testing of apparatus in
hazardous areas, are included in the series AS/NZS 4761.
The pre-commissioning inspections and testing are detailed inspections and testing.
As a minimum, the following tests should be carried out as a part of the pre-commissioning
inspection:
(a) Insulation resistance.
(b) Earth impedance.
(c) Earth and continuity resistance including any special earthing in accordance with the
Standards.
(d) Settings and operation of all protective devices.

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Where possible CRO displays and readings should be recorded to assist in fault finding
during normal plant operations.
Insulation resistance tests should not be made in such a way that the safety of the devices
and insulation used in low energy apparatus and circuits are subject to damage by excess
voltages.
In hazardous areas, use of the testing methods prescribed in AS/NZS 3000 for normal
installations may be inadvisable in view of the risk introduced by the test apparatus, unless
the apparatus can be made safe.
Before any intrinsically safe meter or insulation tester (megger) is used in a hazardous
area installation, the certification documentation for the instrument must be read to
determine the limits of use of the instrument. The reason for this precaution is
outlined in the following example.
The inadvertent use of a 500-volt insulation tester to test the insulation of a cable in the
hazardous area could lead to an explosion as illustrated below.
The typical capacitance of pairs of a 7/0.3 mm (0.5 mm2) PVC screened cable with 0.3 mm
radial thickness is 0.145 µF/km. The minimum energy to ignite a hydrogen/air mixture is
19 µJ.
Since E= ½ CV2
Then the maximum cable capacitance that would cause an ignition is given by,
2E
C=
V2
2 × 19 × 10 −6
=
500 2
= 0.152 F
0.145 × 10 −6
The cable has a capacitance of = 0.145 F/m
1000
Hence the maximum cable length that could safely be tested using a 500-volt insulation
tester is 1.0483 metres.
(THAT IS APPROXIMATELY 1 METRE ONLY.)
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CHAP T E R 1 0 MAI NT E NANCE AND


I NS P E CTI ONS

10.1 INTRODUCTION
Maintenance is an important aspect in the use of electrical apparatus in hazardous areas.
Maintenance is defined in AS/NZS 2381.1 as ‘a combination of any actions carried out to
retain an item in, or restore it to, conditions in which it is able to meet the requirements of
the relevant specification and perform its required functions’.
NOTE: See Chapter 12 for the definitions of ‘overhaul and repair’.
No matter how much thought and effort has gone into the classification of an area and the
selection and installation of apparatus, poor maintenance can invalidate it in a moment.
One such example would be a typical flameproof enclosure with a bolted-on cover.
Although it may seem obvious to replace all the bolts, this is not always done. One missing
bolt can compromise the enclosure protection and put the whole site at risk.
It is important that close attention is given to the maintenance of electrical apparatus in
hazardous areas.
Users should keep a detailed record of the location and conditions of use of all apparatus.
This record should include a log of any faults, together with details of maintenance and
repair, the date of any work carried out and the name and address of the repairer.

10.2 USE OF GAS DETECTORS


When servicing, maintaining and testing electrical apparatus in hazardous areas, there has
to be some means of guaranteeing that no flammable gas or vapour is present. Where a
handheld or portable gas detector is used for this purpose, attention is drawn to the need for
a proper understanding of the correct use and limitations of gas detectors. See Chapter 14
for comprehensive information on this matter.

10.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONS CARRYING OUT INSPECTIONS AND


MAINTENANCE
The inspection and maintenance of installations must be carried out only by competent
personnel whose training has included instruction on the various types of protection and
installation practices, relevant rules and regulations and on the general principles of area
classification.
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Appropriate continuing education/training must be given to such personnel on a regular


basis.
Specific units of competency, covering maintenance and inspection of apparatus in
hazardous areas, are included in the series AS/NZS 4761.

10.4 RELEVANT STANDARDS


A number of Australian/New Zealand Standards cover the maintenance of electrical
apparatus for hazardous areas.
The objective of these Standards is to provide guidance to users, workshops and relevant
regulatory authorities concerned with the maintenance, overhaul and repair of electrical
apparatus that is used in hazardous areas. Such guidance is to ensure safety through
restoration in conformance with the certification or approval documents and associated ‘Ex’
Standards.

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AS 2290, Electrical apparatus for coal mines, is the relevant Standard for Group I (coal
mining) applications. The Standard is currently published in two parts, Part 1: Maintenance
of electrical apparatus for hazardous areas and Part 3: Maintenance of gas detecting and
monitoring apparatus.
Part 1 sets out requirements for the maintenance of apparatus for hazardous areas in use in
and around underground coal mines.
Part 3 sets out general requirements and schedules for the regular inspection, calibration
and testing of gas detecting and monitoring apparatus which is used in and around
underground coal mines.
The original Part 2 of this series has been replaced by AS/NZS 3800:1997 Australian/New
Zealand Standard—Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Overhaul and repair.
NOTE: See Chapter 12 for further and comprehensive details on overhaul and repair.
The AS(/NZS) 2381 series, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres—Selection,
installation and maintenance, contains both general maintenance requirements for Group I
and Group II apparatus and specific requirements for the various types of explosion-
protection.
Commonsense advice on the approach to maintenance is contained in both the AS 2290
series and AS 2381 series. They also make use of checklists to ensure that controlled
maintenance is performed.

10.5 STATUTORY REGULATIONS


Apparatus and installations where hazardous areas exist are required to comply with the
applicable regulations of New Zealand or the applicable Australian State or Territory. It
should be borne in mind that an installation can come under the jurisdiction of several
authorities with different areas of responsibility, e.g. mining, electrical safety, handling and
transport of flammable materials and occupational health and safety.
The installation and maintenance requirements contained in AS(/NZS) 2381 series are
supplementary and not alternative to any regulations, which may apply to installations in
hazardous areas.

10.6 CURRENT STANDARDS


The current Standards are always used for new installations and for substantial changes to
existing installations.
Maintenance is always done to the current Standards irrespective of the age and date of the
installation.
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10.7 IMPORTANT MAINTENANCE ASPECTS


10.7.1 General
No unauthorized modification should be made to any apparatus installed in a hazardous
area. It is very easy to invalidate a protection technique without any apparent lack of
performance of the apparatus. Further, if the apparatus has been approved or certified, then
the approval or modification will be invalidated by any unauthorized modification.
An example of an unauthorized modification to a flameproof motor would be the
interchange of terminal box covers between one manufacturer’s certified motor to a
different manufacturer’s certified motor. Even though the terminal box cover may fit
correctly and the flame path gaps meet the certification documentation specifications the
hybrid motor has not been tested in this condition and the certification is voided by this
action.

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The drilling of an additional hole in a flameproof enclosure will void the certification
unless it is permitted in the certification documents and carried out by a competent person.
The adding of additional apparatus to a flameproof enclosure or an increased safety
enclosure will void the certification unless it is permitted in the certification documents.
Regular inspections of electrical installations in hazardous areas are essential to ensure that
the apparatus and cabling will still meet the necessary requirements for safety. Specific
requirements will depend on the type of protection. The following checks should be carried
out as a matter of course, no matter what the protection technique:
(a) The suitability of the apparatus for use in a hazardous area.
(b) The apparatus markings are legible and comply with the certification documents.
(c) The circuits are correctly identified.
(d) All stopping plugs and bolts are in position.
(e) There is no damage to the apparatus or cabling.
(f) Guards are correctly fitted.
(g) Cable glands are all tight.
(h) All stopper boxes are filled and not leaking.
(i) All seals are satisfactory.
(j) The electrical protection is correct.
(k) Electrical connections are tight.
(l) Earthing is satisfactory.
(m) There is no corrosion.
(n) Lamp and fuse ratings are correct.
(o) Motors and/or fans are not rubbing against any object or housing.
(p) Ex i barriers are suitable for the hazardous area.
10.7.2 Specific maintenance aspects
10.7.2.1 Stopping plugs and bolts
Stopping plugs are used to blank holes in an enclosure. The most common example is for
blanking unused conduit or gland entries. Nearly all explosion-protection techniques rely on
maintaining the integrity of the enclosure. With some, such as Ex e, a hole will merely
degrade the technique. However, with others, of which Ex d is a prime example, a hole will
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completely invalidate the protection.


The omission of bolts or other fasteners may have equally catastrophic results. Even where
the design requirements of the technique do not allow bolts to enter the enclosure, their
omission may mean that the joint in which they are used is not kept sufficiently tight.
10.7.2.2 Damage
Almost all apparatus is exposed to the risk of damage during its life. As part of its design
requirements, explosion-protected apparatus must be able to withstand a certain amount of
rough handling. However, it is not feasible to design all apparatus to meet all possible
damage that might occur.

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Regular checks must be carried out to ensure that any damage has not invalidated the
technique for which the apparatus was designed. Damage that should be particularly looked
for would include the breakage of any lamp glasses or inspection windows, damage that
would compromise the integrity of an enclosure and any damage that may lead to frictional
sparking, e.g. between motor fans and their cowlings.
Cabling should be carefully checked, particularly where exposed, to ensure there is no
damage to its protection (conduit, armouring or sheath) or its insulation that might lead to
the possibility of an arc or spark.
10.7.2.3 Guards
Guards required to protect apparatus should be checked to make sure they are in position
and correctly fitted.
10.7.2.4 Cable glands
Where cable glands are fitted, their tightness of fit in the enclosure and, even more
importantly, the fit of the cable in the gland should be checked periodically. The seal of the
gland on the cable is fundamental to its performance. If there is any movement or other
effect, which leads to the seal becoming loose, then it will no longer perform satisfactorily.
Of the most common techniques, the most critical would be where glands are used with
flameproof enclosures.
10.7.2.5 Stopper boxes
Stopper boxes can only perform their function if they remain filled with a
certified/approved compound that will prevent the passage of gas or an explosion. They
should be checked occasionally to make sure they remain filled, particularly if there is any
sign of leakage.
10.7.2.6 Seals and gaskets
Seals and gaskets used to maintain the integrity of an enclosure should be checked
periodically to ensure they have not been damaged. If damage has occurred, they should be
replaced.
When maintenance has been carried out on apparatus containing seals, the seals should be
checked for damage and replaced if defective.
10.7.2.7 Electrical protection
It is most important that the electrical protection is correctly rated and functional.
Explosion-protected techniques only remain valid if the apparatus is operating under normal
conditions or, for Zone 1 apparatus and Zones 20, 21 and 22 apparatus, under recognised
overloads. For example, if Ex d switchgear were subjected to a large fault current that
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melted copper conductors in the enclosure, the molten copper could be expelled through the
flanges and cause an explosion.
A critical application of electrical protection occurs with Ex e (increased safety) motors.
These rely on the use of current-dependent protective devices that are selected so that not
only is the rated current controlled, but also the stalled motor will be disconnected within a
specified time (time tE ). The time delay devices have to keep to the specified values of time
delay within ±20 percent.
10.7.2.8 Electrical connections
Electrical connections must be kept tight. While this may simply be regarded as good
engineering practice for something like Ex d apparatus, for Ex e (increased safety) and Ex n
(non-sparking) the protection techniques depend on there being no spark at the connections.

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10.7.2.9 Earthing
Earthing systems may provide various functions in an installation. They may be provided as
part of a normal electrical supply earth. Additional earths may be provided as equipotential
bonding conductors or one earth system may be used to serve both purposes.
In intrinsically safe systems it may be necessary to ensure that the systems remain safe
under all conditions, e.g. where shunt diode safety barriers are used.
Whatever the reason, it is imperative that earthing systems are maintained. Connections
should be checked for tightness as poor connections could lead to high resistance or arcing
under fault conditions.
Where the earth is a fundamental part of an intrinsically safe system its impedance should
be maintained below 1 ohm and checks should be made to ensure that there are no spurious
earths on the system that could affect the protection.
Earthing and equipotential bonding: The earthing and potential equalisation bonding must
be maintained in a good condition in the hazardous areas.
10.7.2.10 Environmental conditions
Electrical apparatus in a hazardous area can be adversely affected by the environmental
conditions in which it is used. Some of the key elements are corrosion, ambient
temperature, ultraviolet radiation, ingress of water, accumulation of dust or sand,
mechanical effects and chemical attack.
The corrosion of metal, or the influence of chemicals (particularly solvents) on plastic or
elastometric components, can affect the type and degree of protection of the apparatus. If
the enclosure or component is severely corroded, the part must be replaced. Plastic
enclosures might exhibit surface cracking which can affect the integrity of the enclosure.
Metallic enclosures of apparatus must be treated with an appropriate protective coating as a
precaution against corrosion. The frequency and nature of such treatment must be
determined by the environmental conditions.
All parts of an installation must be kept clean and free from the accumulation of dust and
deleterious substances that could cause excessive rise in temperature.
Care should be taken to ensure that the weather protection of the apparatus is maintained.
Damaged gaskets must be replaced.
Anti-condensation devices, such as breathing, draining or heating elements must be checked
to ensure correct operation.
If the apparatus is subject to vibration, special care must be taken to ensure that bolts and
cables entries remain tight. The certification documentation will list the approved methods
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of maintaining bolt and cable entry tightness.


The environment in which explosion-protected apparatus is required to work can be
particularly hostile. This may be due to weather conditions or the hazardous material for
which the apparatus has been required.
Apparatus subject to such conditions should be regularly checked to ensure that corrosion,
which might invalidate the type of protection, has not occurred. In particular, the faces of
flanged flameproof joints in Ex d enclosures should be checked to ensure that there is no
corrosion that would render the joints ineffective.
Gaskets should not be introduced to protect such joints unless there is evidence, such as
certification, to show that the apparatus is still in compliance with the Standard when they
are used.

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Where greases are used on flanges these should be of the non-setting type and should be
approved or certified for the purpose. The wrong type of grease can lead to hot particles
being expelled from the flanges, causing an explosion.
Tape should not be used on the outside of flameproof joints of enclosures installed in
Group IIB or IIC areas as it can prevent effective operation of the joints.
10.7.3 Relevant aspects for inspections
10.7.3.1 Flameproof enclosures
Some relevant aspects of flameproof enclosure inspections are listed below:
(a) Check all flame paths for damage or corrosion. The flame paths are not simply the
flanged or spigot joints but may be cylindrical gaps along a motor shaft or spindle, a
threaded joint, or a labyrinth type joint. Examples of typical flame paths are shown in
AS 2380.2.
NOTE: The Standards cannot be used to relax the flame path gap dimensions. If the
certification documents call for a smaller flame path gap dimension than that allowed in the
Standard then the certification documentation gap dimensions must be adhered to.
(b) Enclosures/glass/metal seals: All enclosures and glasses are required to be complete
and undamaged. Where the cement between glass and metal has been partly corroded
by environmental conditions re-cementing must not be attempted. The cement is part
of the enclosure and a complete replacement assembly should be used.
(c) Breathing and draining devices: Must be certified and appropriate to the type of
apparatus.
(d) No obstacles near flanged joints: External obstacles that are not an integral part of the
apparatus can have an effect on the performance of the flame path properties under
fault conditions. There must not be any external obstacle within 40 mm of a flanged
joint or within 40 mm of a spindle or shaft-joint.
(e) Check that no additional apparatus has been added to the enclosure unless specified
on the certification documentation. The fitting of additional components or barriers
can cause pressure piling.
10.7.3.2 Increased safety and non-sparking
Some relevant aspects of increased safety and non-sparking inspections are listed below:
(a) All unused cores must be terminated in certified terminals.
(b) The IP rating must be maintained. The most common cause of the IP rating being
compromised is the failure to fit a soft washer to cable glands. All gaskets must be in
good condition. The certification documentation may require gaskets to be replaced
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when an enclosure is opened for maintenance or repairs.


(c) Lamp diameter and wattage are correct for the fitting. AS 2380.6 requires that
fluorescent lamps be of the cold starting type with single-pin caps. However some
manufacturers are incorporating a dual-pin connection with a protection classification
of Ex s. This means that any dual pin tube can be fitted to these lights. It is imperative
that the wattage and tube diameter are checked against the certification documents.
(d) Terminations are tightened in accordance with the manufacturers recommended
torque settings.
(e) The correct terminal lug has been used.
(f) No more than six conductors have been loomed together. The certification documents
must be checked to determine if looming of the conductors is permitted.

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(g) It is strongly recommended that only one conductor is terminated in a terminal. More
than one conductor to a terminal could cause uneven pressure on the connection
giving rise to ‘hot spots’.
(h) Terminals are of an approved type as set out in the certification documents.
(i) The T class is correct for the hazardous area.
(j) No signs of overheated insulation.
10.7.3.3 Intrinsically safe
Some relevant aspects of intrinsically safe inspections are listed below:
(a) Apparatus group and temperature class must be suitable for the hazardous area.
(b) The associated apparatus and the field apparatus supplied from the associated
apparatus must meet the requirements of the certification documentation.
(c) The interface must be certified.
(d) The installation must comply with the system documentation and the manufacturer’s
recommendations.
(e) The power supplies for barriers must meet the system documentation and the
manufacturer’s recommendations.
(f) Apparatus marked (Ex ia), (Ex ib), Ex (ia) or Ex (ib) must be mounted in the safe
area.
(g) The safe area apparatus must be fed from a suitably fused double wound transformer
at a voltage not greater than 250 Vs. The supply circuit prospective fault current must
not be more than 4,000 amperes.
(h) The barrier earth conductor resistance must not be more than one ohm.
(i) Multi core cables must meet the requirements of AS 2381.7.
(j) Cable screens should be earthed at one point only.
(k) IS cables should be segregated from power cables.
(l) The creepage and clearance distances must be maintained.
(m) IS and non-IS circuits must be segregated by at least 50 mm at terminations etc.
(n) Junction boxes must be weatherproof and clearly labelled.
(o) Where Ex e circuits are installed in the same enclosure as the IS circuits suitable
barriers or other protection must be maintained to prevent invasion.
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(p) Under type of protection, the certification must identify the apparatus as Ex ia or
Ex ib and list the precise model number, the critical input parameters (i.e. maximum
input voltage [Ui], maximum input current [I i], maximum internal capacitance [Ci]
and maximum internal inductance [Li ]. For associated apparatus it must list the
maximum output voltage [Uo ], the maximum output current [Io], the maximum
external capacitance [C o] and the maximum inductance to resistance ratio [L/R].
(q) The location of interfaces should be permanently marked to show the correct type of
replacement barrier in each position.
Figure 10.1 indicates how the certified interface is located and connected.

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Safe Area Hazardous Area

Cables
Uncertified safe Certified Junction Field
area apparatus interface box apparatus

FIGURE 10.1 CERTIFIED INTERFACE

10.7.3.4 Pressurization
Some relevant aspects of pressurized inspections are listed below:
(a) To keep the integrity of ducting/piping/enclosures all piping or ducting passing
through hazardous areas should be above atmospheric pressure to prevent the ingress
of the surrounding atmosphere.
(b) The inlet and outlet points should be checked to ensure that they are sufficiently
remote to prevent recycling of the purging medium.
(c) All ducting, piping and enclosures should be complete and undamaged.
(d) Checks should be made to ensure that the source of air or inert gas is at all times free
from all traces of flammable contaminant. Check if the air or inert gas needs drying
or cleaning.
(e) Checks must be made to ensure that a minimum pressure of 25 Pascals (Pa) is
maintained in pressurized rooms.
(f) Checks must be made to ensure that a minimum pressure of 50 Pa, or greater, is
maintained in all pressurized enclosures. The pressure must not exceed a value which
can distort or damage the enclosure. The maximum value of pressure permitted for
the enclosure should be stated in the certification documents.
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(g) All pressure and flow indicators, gas detector alarms and interlocks must operate in
accordance with their designed set points and circuit function.
(h) Check that the pre-energization purge period is adequate.
(i) Check that there is no accumulation of dust or dirt in Zone 20, 21 and 22 areas.
10.7.4 Grades and types of inspection
An inspection is defined as ‘an action comprising careful scrutiny of an item carried out
either without dismantling or with the partial dismantling as required, supplemented by
means such as measurements, in order to arrive at a reliable conclusion as to the condition
of an item’.

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The different grades of inspection are as follows:


(a) Visual inspection—an inspection which identifies, without the use of access apparatus
or tools, those defects, such as missing bolts, which will be apparent to the eye.
(b) Close inspection—an inspection which encompasses those aspects covered by a visual
inspection and, in addition, identifies those defects, such as loose bolts, which will be
apparent only by the use of access apparatus, such as steps (where necessary) and
tools. Close inspections do not normally require the enclosure to be opened or the
apparatus to be de-energized.
(c) Detailed inspection—an inspection which encompasses those aspects covered by a
close inspection and, in addition, identifies those defects, such as loose terminations,
which will only be apparent by opening the enclosure, and using (where necessary)
tools and test apparatus.
The different types of inspection are as follows:
(i) Initial inspection—an inspection of all electrical apparatus, systems and installations
before they are bought into service.
(ii) Periodic inspection—an inspection of all electrical apparatus, systems and
installations carried out on a routine basis.
A working group of IEC is preparing a document on continuous supervision as an
alternative to periodic inspections.
(iii) Sample inspection—an inspection of a proportion of the electrical apparatus, systems
and installations.
NOTE: Sample inspections are inspections of a proportion of the installed apparatus. They
may be detailed, close or visual. The size and composition of all samples should be
determined having regard to the purpose of the inspection. The results of all sample
inspections must be recorded in the Verification Dossier. Sample inspections should not be
expected to reveal faults of a random nature, e.g. loose connections, but should be used to
monitor the effects of environmental conditions, vibration, inherent design weakness and the
like.
The inspections procedures are for the preservation of the integrity of the explosion-
protected electrical apparatus and must be considered as additional to any inspection and
testing required for other reasons. All inspections must be carried out by competent
persons. The persons having legal ownership of the installation must nominate a competent
person to carry out or supervise regular inspections.
Regular inspection procedures must be established to minimize the risk of explosion-
protected electrical apparatus acting as a source of ignition.
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All inspection reports must be added to the verification dossier.


Before plant or apparatus is brought into service, it must be given an initial inspection to
ensure—
(a) the suitability for the hazardous area in which it is installed;
(b) that the plant and apparatus comply with the relevant documentation; and
(c) that no obvious damage has occurred during installation.
The initial inspection is a ‘detailed inspection’ as set out in the AS(/NZS) 2381 series of
Standards.
Inspection schedules for the various types of explosion-protection techniques are set out in
the AS(/NZS) 2381 series of Standards.

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All apparatus, systems and installations should be subjected to periodic inspections to


ensure that they are being maintained in a satisfactory condition for continued use.
The interval between inspections should not exceed 4 years without seeking expert advice.
The grade of inspection and the interval between periodic inspections should be determined
taking account of the type of apparatus, manufacturer’s guidelines if any, factors governing
its deterioration, the Zone of use and the results of previous inspections.
In extremely adverse conditions, such as corrosive or other destructive atmospheres, a high
risk of mechanical damage or vibration, or continuous operations, the interval between
periodic inspections may be as low as three months, but should not normally exceed
12 months.
The results of all periodic inspections must be recorded in the Verification Dossier.
The justification for the intervals between periodic inspections should be recorded in the
Verification Dossier.
Figure 10.2 indicates the procedures to be adopted in determining the frequency of
inspections.
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FIGURE 10.2 TYPICAL PROCEDURES UNDERTAKEN TO ESTABLISH


PERIODIC INSPECTIONS INTERVALS

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10.8 RECOMMENDATIONS
10.8.1 General
These recommendations are general in nature and apply to all types of explosion-protection
techniques.
Detailed recommendations for specific types of explosion-protection techniques are
described in the AS(/NZS) 2381 series of Standards.
The general condition of all apparatus shall be noted during inspections and appropriate
remedial measures taken where necessary. Care must be taken to maintain the integrity of
the type of explosion-protection provided for the apparatus. This might necessitate
consultation with the manufacturer. Replacement parts must be in accordance with the
certification documents.
All modifications to apparatus must be carried out in accordance with AS/NZS 3800.
A typical maintenance checklist is shown in Table 10.2.

TABLE 10.2
MAINTENANCE CHECK LIST
Pre-maintenance Necessary documents available
All records have been examined
Test gear is available and is satisfactory to use in hazardous areas
Prepare an isolation procedure if a detailed inspection is to be carried out
Permission to enter or work has been granted
The area is safe to enter
Any necessary precautions have been taken
Maintenance All reconnections have been made
Equipment is functional
Malfunctions have been reported
Installation conforms to drawings or documentation or both
Any modifications have been approved
Area classification is still valid
General check in accordance with the applicable Inspection Schedule Table
Post maintenance Documentation is completed and filed
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Inspection report is complete


Company or operator requirements have been satisfied

10.8.2 Maintenance of flexible cables


Flexible cables, flexible conduits and their terminations are particularly prone to damage. It
is important that they be inspected at regular intervals and be replaced if found to be
damaged or defective.
10.8.3 Withdrawal from service
If it is necessary for maintenance purposes to withdraw apparatus from service, the exposed
conductors shall be—
(a) correctly terminated in an appropriate enclosure; or

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(b) isolated from all sources of power supply and insulated; or


(c) isolated from all sources of power supply and earthed.
If the apparatus is to be permanently withdrawn from service, the associated wiring, which
shall be isolated from all sources of power supply, shall be removed, or correctly terminated
in an appropriate enclosure.
10.8.4 Fastenings and tools
Where the apparatus requires special bolts or fastenings or tools, these items shall be
available and shall be used.
Care must be taken to avoid the generation of static electricity during the cleaning of non-
conductive electrical apparatus.
10.8.5 Conditions of use
Special conditions for safe use apply to any type of certified explosion-protected apparatus
where the certificate number has a suffix marking of ‘X’. The certification documents must
be studied to ascertain the conditions of use.
10.8.6 Movable apparatus and its connections
Precautions must be taken to ensure that movable electrical apparatus (portable,
transportable and hand-held) is used only in areas appropriate to its type of protection, gas
group and temperature class.
NOTE: Ordinary industrial movable apparatus, welding apparatus, etc should not be used in a
hazardous area unless its use is undertaken under a controlled procedure and the specific location
has been assessed to ensure that there is no hazardous atmosphere present.
10.8.7 Overhaul and repair
All overhaul and repair of explosion-protected electrical apparatus must comply with the
requirements of AS/NZS 3800.
10.8.8 Records
The person, dates of all inspections, tests and maintenance and the details of any defects
found must be recorded in the Verification Dossier.
10.8.9 Defects found
Where defects are found in the installation or apparatus and the defects cannot be repaired
by the maintenance personnel they must immediately be reported to the plant supervisor
before the power supply is restored.
10.8.10 The maintenance of intrinsically safe apparatus
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For IS apparatus to remain safe in operation it must be maintained exactly as it was


designed and certified. The changing or removal of a single resistor, capacitor or diode
which is intended to discharge induced energies in the circuit, or limit energies available
from the apparatus may not affect the operation of the apparatus but it will render the
apparatus unsafe and the continued use of the apparatus could lead to an explosion.
A loose screw or a damaged part can affect the inductance of a circuit and render the IS
apparatus unsafe.
The addition of a second piece of apparatus to an existing IS loop may destroy its intrinsic
safety.
The alteration of any clearance distance, removal of any solid insulation, the removal or
alteration of any printed circuit board spacers or mountings may render the IS certification
void.

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There is no field test available to determine if a piece of apparatus or a circuit has been
maintained as intrinsically safe.
The only safeguard is to ensure that the apparatus or system conforms exactly
with the specifications set out in the certification documents.
If there is any doubt regarding the intrinsic safety of a piece of apparatus or circuit remove
the apparatus from service immediately.
If any part of an intrinsically safe apparatus is defective, the apparatus must be considered
unsafe. The defective part may be replaced but only where permitted in the certification
documentation.
ATTENTION: NEVER IMPROVISE WITH INTRINSICALLY SAFE APPARATUS.
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CHAP T E R 11 TE ST I NG AND FAULT


FI NDI NG

11.1 GENERAL
Testing of circuits incorporating explosion-protected electrical apparatus and systems
requires careful consideration of the selection and use of the test apparatus available for
testing. The incorrect selection and/or use of test apparatus could introduce an ignition
source either in the test apparatus itself or in the circuit under test and thereby render the
area ignition capable.
The basic rule to observe when testing in a hazardous area is that no testing can be carried
out on the explosion-protected electrical apparatus or the associated circuits which have
been opened or exposed unless the system power supply has been isolated (other than IS
systems) and the area has been confirmed to be free of any explosive atmosphere. The
testing shall only be done under a ‘work permit system’ that has been duly authorized by a
responsible person. Such a system might be ‘Hot Work Clearances’ or a ‘Clearance to
Work’ for IS circuits.
Intrinsically safe circuits and apparatus may be serviced and maintained in a hazardous area
provided the correct testing regime is followed which maintains the integrity of the IS
certification of the circuit.
All testing must be carried out by a competent person. A competent person is defined in
AS/NZS 2381.1 as ‘a person who can demonstrate a combination of knowledge and skills to
effectively, efficiently and safely carry out activities in hazardous areas’.
NOTE: Specific units of competency covering testing of apparatus and installations in hazardous
areas are included in the series AS/NZS 4761.
The use of test apparatus must be under the continuous supervision of the person
performing the test.

11.2 TESTING INTRINSICALLY SAFE SYSTEMS


A common misconception is that intrinsically safe circuits can be worked on live without
any possibility of an ignition risk.
The testing and certification of IS systems and components takes into account short-circuit
and open-circuit conditions and faults conditions with ‘countable fault’. This testing and
certification covers the normal actions encountered in the maintenance and replacement of
the field apparatus.
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However the introduction of other apparatus such as ammeters, voltmeters, current and
voltage sources and insulation testers into the IS circuit could cause the circuit and
apparatus safety factors to be exceeded and render the area ignition capable.
The user of such test apparatus must be aware of the manufacturer’s limits of use and the
applicable hazardous area Standards and regulations that govern the appropriate procedure
for testing.
Care must be taken to ensure that the circuit is correctly reconnected after testing.
A common test procedure in instrument systems is to insert an ammeter in series with one
leg of the explosion-protected system loop to adjust or calibrate, or zero variable signals
against known process values.
Ammeters are available for this testing procedure which are classified IS, but they are only
IS if used in accordance with the special conditions set out in the certification
documentation for the meter.
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Such meters would not generally be IS if used as a stand-alone instrument for measuring
current in a non-IS system. The certification documentation would normally require such
instruments to be used in series with the energy limitation barrier of the circuit under test.
Voltmeters have similar problems and must be used only in accordance with the special
conditions set out in the certification documentation.
Milliamp sinks such as a 4-20 mA source and millivolt power sources such as a
thermocouple millivolt simulator must be checked against the certification documentation
to ensure compatibility with the loop IS barrier, entity parameters and cable parameters, if
used to calibrate an explosion-protected system loop from within the safe or hazardous
areas.
Insulation resistances testers must be used only in accordance with the certification
documentation special conditions and then with extreme care.
If a spare pair in a multi-core cable is being tested, extreme care has to be taken to ensure
that there is no possible chance of invasion into another circuit, which could cause
apparatus damage and possible ignition sources.

11.3 TESTING OF EXPLOSION-PROTECTED ELECTRICAL APPARATUS OTHER


THAN INTRINSICALLY SAFE APPARATUS
The testing of explosion-protected apparatus other than IS requires consideration of the
installation and explosion-protection apparatus Standards applicable to the apparatus.
The certification conditions for the installation must be maintained during the testing
procedure. In most instances the use of test apparatus in the hazardous area, or in the safe
area where there is a possibility of energy entering the hazardous area, requires a gas and
dust free area.
The preparation for testing must consider all possible faults in the hazardous area to ensure
that the testing does not in itself create an ignition source or damage the field apparatus.

11.4 TESTS IN THE SAFE AREA


Tests of parameters such as voltage and current can be performed in the safe area with non-
certified apparatus provided that the explosion-protected systems are unopened and intact
and the installed apparatus parameters for voltage/current/temperature are not exceeded. A
condition of these tests would be to ensure that energy limiting barriers are not bridged by
the test instruments.

11.5 PORTABLE APPARATUS


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Portable apparatus used on the plant must be assessed by a competent person to determine
that the portable apparatus is suitable for use in the area intended. The competent person
must carry out such tests as are required to ensure the portable apparatus is suitable for use
in the area intended.
Because of its portability the portable apparatus must be certified for the most severe
classification for a particular plant or site.
In many instances the portable apparatus is manufactured overseas and supplied locally by
an agent. The apparatus is certified in the overseas country of manufacture by certification
bodies such as FM (America), CSA (Canada), PTB (Germany), or EECS (formerly
BASEEFA) (British).
A common mistake is to accept this Certificate of Conformity without thorough
investigation. The apparatus must be both suitable for, and certified for, use in a particular
area.

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The starting point is for the agent to provide an English language version of the Certificate
of Conformity. This will give the name of the testing authority, type of apparatus, the
Temperature Classification, Apparatus Group and any special conditions of use.
These special conditions of use could include—
(a) use only battery type XXXX;
(b) use only in a leather carrying case;
(c) can only be charged in a safe area with charger type YYY; or
(d) use only detector head type ZZZ.
Only when all the information is available can an assessment be made about its suitability
for the area proposed.
An example of such suitability for a particular above ground plant could arise in the
following situation. A supplier states that an instrument is approved for use in an
underground coal-mine and is certified as being Ex ia (intrinsically safe). It is proposed to
use the instrument in an above ground hazardous area. On checking the certification
documentation it is found that the instrument has been certified for methane gas only and
has not been certified as suitable for ethylene, or hydrogen common gases that will be
encountered in the plant in this example.
The instrument may be suitable but it has not been tested for these gases and therefore the
apparatus is unacceptable for use with these gas groups.

11.6 FAULT FINDING


The process of fault finding involves the gathering of all the facts about the symptoms
experienced and then carrying out a systematic check of the circuit and apparatus to locate
the fault. Most of the trouble-shooting can be carried out in the safe area by using
ohmmeters with the circuit de-energized, but on occasions it will necessary to re-energize
the system to carry out final checks. However, extreme care must be taken before re-
energizing of any system. The actual fault must be known and repaired.
Circumstances could exist where a cable on a cable ladder has shorted due to some external
damage and blown its supply fuse. If only a visual check is made of the field apparatus and
no damage noted, replacing the fuse and energizing the system could cause an electrical arc
at the fault with sufficient energy to ignite a potentially explosive atmosphere. An
insulation check of the cable using an Intrinsically Safe Continuity Meter would have
revealed the problem.
It is difficult to itemize fault finding procedures for every potential problem but training
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should be held for each person responsible for maintenance in each plant to ensure a
systematic, safe approach on each occasion.

11.7 TYPICAL USES AND RESTRICTIONS OF USE OF TEST APPARATUS


Examples of the use/restriction of use of test equipment in hazardous area circuits are
shown in Figures 11.1 (a) to (h).

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Meter

Electro-pneumatic Control
positioner valve
Junction
Safety barrier box
I/P

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

SPECIFICATIONS:

Apparatus Voltage Current


Safety barrier/device Maximum output voltage 28 V d.c. Maximum output current 93 mA
Electro/pneumatic positioner Maximum input voltage 32 V d.c. Maximum input current 100 mA
Test meter (IS certified with Maximum input voltage 32 V d.c. Maximum input current 215 mA
conditions of use)

NOTE: Internal capacitance and inductance is zero.

ASSESSMENT:

Maximum output from barrier is 28 V d.c and 93 mA.

Maximum parameters allowed into meter is 32 V d.c. and 215 mA.

CONCLUSION:

Since the meter is capable of safely withstanding the power output from the barrier, the meter is
satisfactory for use in this test procedure.

FIGURE 11.1(A) MEASUREMENT OF LOOP CURRENT

(Tester in safe area)


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Electro-pneumatic Control
positioner valve
Junction
Safety barrier box
I/P

Meter
Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

SPECIFICATIONS:

Apparatus Voltage Current


Safety barrier/device Maximum output voltage 28 V d.c. Maximum output current 93 mA
Electro/pneumatic positioner Maximum input voltage 32 V d.c. Maximum input current 100 mA
Test meter (IS certified with Maximum input voltage 32 V d.c. Maximum input current 215 mA
conditions of use)

NOTE: Internal capacitance and inductance is zero.

ASSESSMENT:

Maximum output voltage from barrier is 28 V d.c.

Maximum allowed voltage into meter is 32 V d.c.

Maximum current output from the barrier is 93 mA.

Maximum allowed current into meter is 215 mA.

CONCLUSION:

Since the meter is capable of safely withstanding the power output from the barrier the meter is
satisfactory for use in this test procedure.
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FIGURE 11.1(B) MEASUREMENT OF VOLTAGE

(Tester in hazardous area)

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Electro-pneumatic Control
positioner valve

I/P

Source

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

SPECIFICATIONS:

Apparatus Voltage Current


Electro/pneumatic positioner Maximum input voltage 32 V d.c. Maximum input current 100 mA
(I/P)
IS Power source Maximum output voltage 21 V d.c. Maximum output current 122 mA
(maximum capacitive load = 250 nF)
(maximum inductive load = 23 mH)

ASSESSMENT:

Maximum output voltage from the IS source is 21 V d.c.

Maximum input voltage to the I/P is 32 V d.c.

Therefore the source voltage is satisfactory.

However,

Maximum output current from the IS source is 122 mA.

Maximum input current to the I/P is 100 mA.

The output current of the IS source (122 mA) exceeds the maximum input current of the I/P (100 mA) and
therefore this IS power source is unsatisfactory.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

CONCLUSION:

A source with a maximum current output less than 100 mA is required to conduct this test.

FIGURE 11.1(C) POWER SOURCE CONTROLLING A STROKING CONTROL VALVE

(Tester in hazardous area)

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Safety Junction
barrier box
Tx

Disconnected

Current sink

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

SPECIFICATIONS:

Apparatus Voltage Current


Safety barrier Maximum output voltage 28 V d.c. Maximum output current 93 mA
Current sink (under IS certified Maximum input voltage 30 V d.c. Maximum input current 215 mA
conditions)

ASSESSMENT:

Maximum output voltage from the safety barrier is 28 V d.c.

Maximum input voltage to the current sink is 30 V d.c.

Therefore the safety barrier voltage is satisfactory.

Maximum output current from the safety barrier is 93 mA.

Maximum input current to the current sink is 215 mA.

CONCLUSION:

The current sink is satisfactory for use.

FIGURE 11.1(D) CURRENT LOOP CONTROLLER—TRANSMITTER SIMULATION (SINK)

(Tester in the hazardous area)


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Temperature
transmitter

Decade box
(Passive device –
no IS Certificate
required)

Source

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

SPECIFICATIONS:

Apparatus Voltage Current


Transmitter Maximum input voltage 30 V d.c. Maximum input current 100 mA
Test source Maximum output voltage 30 V d.c. Maximum output current 50 mA

ASSESSMENT:

Maximum output voltage from the IS source is 30 V d.c.

Maximum input voltage to the transmitter 30 V d.c.

Therefore the source voltage is satisfactory.

Maximum output current from the IS source is 50 mA.

Maximum input current to the transmitter is 100 mA.

CONCLUSION:

The test source is satisfactory for this test.


NOTE: Cable parameters are negligible and not considered in this assessment because the test
source is connected at the field device (the transmitter) and the interconnecting cables are
disconnected.
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FIGURE 11.1(E) IS CERTIFIED SOURCE—TRANSMITTER CALIBRATION

(Tester in the hazardous area)

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Current
source

Cable
2
200m x 0.5mm

Junction
box
Transmitter

Tx

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

SPECIFICATIONS:

Apparatus Voltage Current Capacitance Inductance


Transmitter Maximum input Maximum input
voltage 30 V d.c. current 100 mA
Current Source A Maximum output Maximum output Maximum external Maximum external
voltage 21 V d.c. current 122 mA capacitance 250 nF inductance 23 mH
Current Source B Maximum output Maximum output Maximum external Maximum external
voltage 17.5 V d.c. current 75 mA capacitance 0.4 µF inductance 6.5 mH
Cable 48 nF 220 µH

NOTE: Two different current sources (current source A and current source B) are under consideration in this example.

ASSESSMENT:

Current source A is unsatisfactory for this test because the output current (122 mA) exceeds the maximum
input current of the transmitter (100 mA).

Current source B is satisfactory for this test as its current output is less than the transmitter input current.

FIGURE 11.1(F) CURRENT SOURCE – TRANSMITTER CALIBRATION

(Tester in the safe area)


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Junction Wires disconnected


Wires disconnected box from terminals
from terminals

Tx

Transmitter
Screen

IS continuity
tester

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE:These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

PROCEDURE:
USING CONTINUITY TESTER (OHMMETER)
NOTE: There are various methods which can be used for continuity checking. This example is
provided to define where the test meter is to be located at the hazardous area end.
• Disconnect wires at transmitter and supply ends.

METER READINGS:

• When meter reads zero ohms – conductor is identified.

• Confirm the meter does not read zero when connected to any other
conductor in the same cable.

• Reading will be the conductor resistance (which will vary depending


on conductor cross-sectional area and length).

AT FIELD END:

• Connect one lead of the meter to junction box isolated earth bar or
other known earth.

• Connect other lead to conductor to be tested.

AT OTHER END:
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Connect one conductor at a time, to an earth terminal.

FIGURE 11.1(G) CONTINUITY TESTS

(Tester in hazardous area)

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Junction
box Wires disconnected
Wires disconnected from terminals
from terminals

Tx

Transmitter
Screen Gas test at
this box IS meter
Gas test at this
transmission location

Safe area Hazardous area

NOTE: These tests will usually require work permits (clearance to work).

PROCEDURE:

• Disconnect cables at transmitter and supply ends.

• Carry out continuity checks first, to identify correct conductors.


NOTE: Monitor gas levels at junction box, at transmitter and for the entire length of the cable
run immediately before testing.
CONDUCTORS TO EARTH (SCREEN):

• Connect one side of IR tester to a known good earth.

• Connect the other side to conductor under test (or screen)

• Energize IR tester – 500 V

• Reading should be >1 megaohm

CONDUCTORS TO EACH OTHER:

• Connect IR tester to each conductor at transmitter.

• Energize IR tester – 500 V

• Reading should be > 1 megaohm

CHECK:

• Check in safe area, that conductors are discharged.


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FIGURE 11.1(H) INSULATION RESISTANCE (I.R.) TESTS

(Tester in hazardous area)

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CHAP T E R 12 OVE RHAUL AND RE P AI R

12.1 GENERAL
This Chapter gives a brief overview of some relevant aspects of overhaul and repair of
Ex equipment.
Overhaul and repair are defined in AS/NZS 2381.1 as—
(a) ‘Overhaul—action to restore to a fully serviceable condition equipment which has
been in use or in storage for a period of time but is not faulty.
(b) Repair—action to restore faulty equipment to its fully serviceable condition, in
compliance with the relevant Standard.’
AS/NZS 3800 defines ‘Overhaul procedure as—procedure during which equipment is
dismantled into individual parts to examine each component and to repair/replace it if
necessary. The equipment is reassembled and then tested in accordance with the relevant
requirements of AS/NZS 3800.’
AS/NZS 3800 details the methods of examination, overhaul, repair and testing required to
ensure safety and compliance with the relevant types of explosion protection. Guidelines
are also laid down for the practices to be adopted in the workshop to carry out the work and
provide traceability of the work done to the satisfaction of the user and the regulatory
authorities.
The scope of AS/NZS 3800 includes the overhaul and repair of flameproof enclosures
(Ex d), intrinsic safety (Ex i), increased safety (Ex e), pressurized enclosures (Ex p), non-
sparking (Ex n) and dust ignition protection (DIP). It also sets out the requirements for
overhaul and repair workshops.
While the construction Standards for electrical apparatus in explosive atmospheres are
designed to ensure an acceptable level of safety, it is only by ensuring that the apparatus is
maintained and overhauled to meet the requirements of particular Standards that the
integrity of the apparatus can be maintained.
AS/NZS 3800 specifies that the work must be performed by the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) or by Workshops that are accredited/certified for that purpose, and
recommends that only Competent Persons carry out or supervise the carrying out of such
work. AS/NZS 3800 also requires repair and overhaul workshops to have independent
assessment of their capabilities (See Chapter 13).
NOTES:
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1 The responsibilities of competent persons are listed in Chapter 13.


2 Specific Units of Competency covering overhaul and repair of Ex equipment are included in
the EEHA Competency Standards Series AS/NZS 4761.

12.2 OVERHAULS
Prior to any repairs, modifications or overhauls, certification and approval documentation
must be obtained to identify the type of protection used e.g. Ex d, Ex e etc, and the
appropriate installation and maintenance requirements to ensure that following repair,
overhaul or modification, such apparatus is safe and fit for the purpose it was intended for.
Reference must be made to the certification and approval documentation for all repairs,
overhauls or modifications.

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Where the certification documentation is not available from the original apparatus
manufacturer, supplier, end user or relevant regulatory authority but there is sufficient
information available to identify the type of protection and Standard to which the apparatus
was manufactured, the apparatus may only be repaired or overhauled under the supervision
of a competent person, working in an accredited/certified Workshop, using the guidelines
detailed in AS/NZS 3800.
Where modifications are made or there is insufficient information available to identify the
apparatus, this shall be brought in line with the current applicable Standard. Proof of
compliance with the current Standard shall be demonstrated by a certificate of conformity
or other means acceptable to the regulatory authority.

12.3 TRACEABILITY/MARKING
All overhauled and repaired explosion-protected electrical apparatus must be marked on the
main part of the assembly, in a visible place, to ensure traceability.
The marking must be legible and durable, taking into account the effects on it from the
surrounding environment when installed.

12.4 MINIMUM MARKING


The marking must include as a minimum—
(a) The ‘R’ symbol.
(b) The Workshop accreditation/certification number.
(c) The overhaul report number.
The form of marking is shown below.
The marking shall be as follows:

Workshop accreditation/Certification number: .....................................

R
Overhaul report number:......................................................................

Additional information such as overhaul Workshop name, serial number and date may be
included, depending upon space available, and at the option of the Workshop.
NOTE: The repair symbol ‘R’ is in addition to any other marking plate and does not replace
apparatus marking.
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12.5 SUBSEQUENT OVERHAULS


In the event of subsequent overhauls/repairs, the earlier traceability plate may be removed,
with all its details being recorded on the overhaul certificate.

12.6 OVERHAUL CERTIFICATE


The overhaul certificate number should enable the user to identify from the certificate the
last place of overhaul and all relevant details concerning repairs and where these were
carried out.

12.7 SCOPE OF WORK


In general a responsible person appointed by the end user should assess the repair or
overhaul required and agree and specify in writing all details of the work to be performed
after consultation with the Repairer.

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12.8 REPAIR OR REPLACE


Figure 12.1 gives guidance on whether to repair or replace explosion-protected electrical
apparatus. This is particularly relevant for apparatus where little, or none, of the required
documentation can be obtained.
NOTE: See AS/NZS 3800 for full details/requirements.
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FIGURE 12.1 PROCEDURAL FLOW CHART FOR DECISION TO REPAIR OR REPLACE


Ex EQUIPMENT

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12.9 REPAIR WORK NOT AFFECTING THE EXPLOSION-PROTECTION


INTEGRITY
In some cases it may be possible for repair work not affecting the explosion-protection
integrity to be carried out without using an accredited/certified Workshop.
Examples may include:
(a) renewal of worn contacts on switchgear and control gear provided it is in compliance
with the certification documentation.
(b) replacement of electrical components within the enclosure e.g. relays, contactors and
control units provided they are in compliance with the certification documentation.
(c) Replacement of carbon brushes and brush-holders provided they are in compliance
with the certification documentation.
(d) Adjustment of instruments and control devices. This does not include protection
settings on overload relays.
(e) Replacement of seals where permitted in the certification documentation.
When performing the work a detailed knowledge of the characteristics of the explosion-
protection technique is required so that on re-assembly no changes have been made which
would jeopardise the integrity of the explosion-protection technique.
As an example, for flameproof enclosures the gaps of the enclosures should be checked for
damage and conformity to the specified dimensions. This implies a knowledge of the
specified gap dimensions from the certification documentation.
Any finishing work necessary on gap surfaces must be limited to light cleaning and
polishing to remove corrosive residues or dirt and grease. In the event that more severe
damage is noted the condition of the enclosure must be reported to a responsible person
prior to the enclosure being energized.
NOTE: See AS/NZS 3800 for full details/requirements.
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CHAP T E R 1 3 CE RTI FI E D / ACCRE DI T E D


WO R KS HOP S

13.1 GENERAL
This chapter gives only a brief overview of some relevant aspects relating to
Certified/Accredited Workshops. AS/NZS 3800 is the Standard that sets out the
requirements to be met by Workshops to become Certified/Accredited Workshops.

13.2 THE ACCREDITED/CERTIFIED WORKSHOP


An accredited/certified Workshop is one which has been verified to be in accordance with
AS/NZS 3800 for the purposes of carrying out modifications, overhauls and repairs, parts
replacement and tests to explosion-protected electrical apparatus.

13.3 TYPES OF WORKSHOPS


13.3.1 General
Workshops shall only carry out work on the type of protection for which they have been
accredited/certified as competent.
13.3.2 Intrinsically safe apparatus
It is a requirement of AS/NZS 3800 that intrinsically safe apparatus shall be repaired,
overhauled, tested or modified only by the apparatus manufacturer and certification holder,
or, at a Workshop that has been accredited/certified as competent to overhaul specifically
nominated intrinsically safe apparatus and can evidence all documentation necessary to be
able to perform the repairs, while ensuring that the intrinsically safe properties are not
impaired.

13.4 PERSONNEL
Every Workshop shall have a minimum of one person verified as competent in the area of
explosion-protection in which they are engaged. That person shall be directly associated
with the final testing of the relevant explosion-protected electrical apparatus.
For this purpose a competent person is a person who has been verified as competent in the
repair, overhaul and design (if relevant) in the relevant field of explosion-protected
electrical apparatus. That person shall have adequate knowledge and expertise to ensure
compliance with the requirements of AS/NZS 3800, and with other Standards relevant to
the particular type of explosion-protected electrical apparatus.
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NOTE: Specific Units of Competency covering the required competencies for Competent Persons
are included in the EEHA Competency Standards Series AS/NZS 4761.

13.5 FACILITIES
13.5.1 General
The Workshop shall have adequate facilities for carrying out all functions necessary to
ensure that the apparatus passing through the Workshop complies with the relevant
Standards and any certification documents.
A Workshop may subcontract work to an outside facility, provided that the Workshop is
responsible for the assessment and compliance with the Standards and certification
documents.

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13.5.2 Quality management


Workshops shall be certified to AS/NZS ISO 9001 or AS/NZS ISO 9002, as appropriate, by
a third party accredited by JAS-ANZ.
Each Workshop that is involved in design of modifications shall employ at least one person
whose competency in the design of explosion-protected electrical apparatus has been
verified.
13.5.3 Verification of Workshop capabilities
Workshops involved in the repair, overhaul and/or modification of explosion-protected
electrical apparatus shall have their capabilities for compliance with AS/NZS 3800
independently verified.
Means of verification include—
(a) Inspection Workshop Accreditation Program (e.g. NATA/IANZ); and
(b) Certified Workshop Scheme (e.g. QAS).

13.6 EXAMPLE OF A VERIFICATION SCHEME PROGRAM FOR WORKSHOP


CAPABILITIES
13.6.1 General
The example outlined in this Section is the Scheme mentioned in Clause 13.5.3(b).
The ‘Registered Workshop Scheme’ is operated as an Industry Sector scheme under the
QAS/ISO Type 5 Product Certification System, known as Standards Mark Product
Certification. It is accepted in both the ISO and IEC that the definition of Product includes
service. Therefore, it is the repair and overhaul service offered by Workshops that is the
product under assessment.
13.6.2 Operations covered
It is the complete service provided by the Workshop that is covered under the
QAS Registered Workshop Scheme, including—
(a) receiving Ex apparatus for repair and overhaul;
(b) the gathering of certification and approval documentation (including drawings);
(c) processes associated with repair, including machining, rewinding etc;
(d) inspection and testing before, during and after repair and overhaul;
(e) record keeping;
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(f) training;
(g) maintenance of a quality management system certified to ISO 9001/2; and
(h) QAS assessment of persons nominated as Competent Persons by the Workshop.
Every Workshop must have a quality plan for each Ex product type and technique that it
intends to repair, overhaul and/or modify as set out in AS/NZS 3800.
13.6.3 Design control
The Workshop shall develop a process plan to establish verification of the Repair/Overhaul
processes to the requirements of AS/NZS 3800.
In particular, prior to any changes to Workshop practices, processes or materials the
Workshop shall assess such changes for ongoing compliance with AS/NZS 3800 and advise
QAS where such changes may impact on compliance with AS/NZS 3800.

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13.6.4 Assessment process


The assessment of the Workshop for compliance with AS/NZS 3800 covers—
(a) Compliance with AS/NZS 3800
The Workshop’s procedures and processes shall be assessed by QAS for compliance with
the requirements of AS/NZS 3800. This shall include assessment of the Workshop’s
inspection and test plans for compliance with AS/NZS 3800 and verification that such
inspection and test plans clearly define the method for defining the pass/fail criteria.
(b) Use of subcontractors
QAS shall assess the method of control the Workshop maintains over any subcontractor
used to perform part of the repair and overhaul process. The Workshop agrees to arrange for
QAS to visit any subcontractor that QAS warrants especially where the subcontractor(s)
perform critical processes.
(c) Competency of Competent Persons
QAS shall undertake an assessment of all persons nominated as Competent Persons by the
Workshop, prior to the issuing of a Certificate of Registration. In addition to the
competence required by AS/NZS 3800, Competent Persons shall demonstrate to QAS—
(i) a working knowledge of the various Ex Standards, including installation
Standards;
(ii) a working knowledge of the Australian and Overseas Ex Certification Schemes
and related certification documentation;
(iii) a determination of the point at which Ex apparatus cannot be repaired and
released as Ex apparatus;
(iv) an understanding of the various test and inspection methods and apparatus and
their limitations; and
(v) an understanding of instrument calibration and traceability of measurements.
Persons assessed by QAS as being Competent Persons shall be identified on the Workshop
Registration Certificate.

13.7 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT PERSONS


Competent persons should be responsible for—
(a) the identification of apparatus submitted for repair or overhaul;
(b) the identification of correct approval/certification documents for apparatus under
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repair or overhaul;
(c) the verification/evaluation of the results of repairs and overhauls of explosion-
protected electrical apparatus belonging to the explosion-protection techniques in
which they have been verified as competent; and
(d) issuing and authorization of documentation, certifying compliance with the relevant
procedures, certification documentation and Standards for repair and overhaul work.
Where applicable, competent persons should be also responsible for—
(i) the design and development of modifications to explosion-protected electrical
apparatus;
(ii) carrying out engineering assessments of such modifications for certification
purposes;
(iii) issuing and authorizing statements of compliance for such assessments; and

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(iv) the preparation of supplementary certification documentation for subsequent


review and authorization by either a certified testing station or the relevant
regulatory authority, or their representative, as appropriate.

13.8 RECORDS
Results of the service and tests provided shall be recorded on the relevant Examination
Report. As a minimum, the record must include the information required on the
Examination Report for the particular type of explosion-protected electrical apparatus as set
out in the appendices of AS/NZS 3800.

13.9 MARKING
The marking for repair and overhaul of explosion-protected electrical apparatus, to ensure
traceability, shall be in accordance with AS/NZS 3800 Appendix E (see also Chapter 12).

13.10 CONDITIONS FOR APPARATUS RELEASE


The explosion-protected electrical apparatus shall be released from the Workshop’s
premises when the Competent Personnel (as defined in AS/NZS 3800) are assured that all
the required activities have been undertaken and the Examination Report indicates
satisfactory results of inspections and tests.
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CHAP T E R 14 GAS DE TE CT ORS

14.1 INTRODUCTION
From industry comment it seems apparent that in recent years over 90 percent of users of
gas or vapour detection instruments have been misusing them in some way. This applies
even, and in practice particularly, to the simplest portable combustible gas detectors.
The misuse of a gas detector can not only produce erroneous readings but also endanger the
lives of everyone in the vicinity.
This misuse is caused by the assumption in most peoples’ minds that because such
instruments look somewhat like electrical test instruments they are simple to use and their
readout is as unequivocal. Both assumptions are wrong. While gas detectors have
individual features, most misuse is not due to some peculiarity of the gas detector, but
ignorance of the physics and chemistry of the environment in which it and its operator
are working.
Put simply, the physics and chemistry of the world in which we live and work impose
conditions on gases and vapours. These conditions apply not only to those gases and
vapours we are trying to detect, but also to those we are not. Small environmental changes,
normally ignored, can modify conditions so that either the gas or vapour detection
instrument either does not work correctly, or it works in such a way as to invalidate a
previous valid gas test.
Unlike the instructions for an electric toaster, which most people can take or leave, the
instrument instruction book is vital to explain the design of the instrument and how it is
affected by the environment. If a gas or vapour detection instrument does not have an
instruction manual which sets out the dos and do nots, or, better still, gives some reasons to
explain the dos and do nots, then the instrument is of a poor quality. As such it should not
be used as it probably does not comply with AS/NZS 61779 Electrical apparatus for the
detection and measurement of flammable gases series of Standards (which have been
adopted from the IEC 61779 series of Standards), or its forerunner AS 2275 Part 1.
Most of this Chapter is equally concerned with fixed gas detection continuously protecting
plant and personnel around it, and with portable gas detectors used by personnel for local
temporary protection. However, since the latter application is prone to most misuse, it has
been given greatest emphasis.
One misuse that occurs too frequently is the hiring or loaning of portable gas or vapour
detectors to inexperienced personnel without the relevant instruction manuals and either
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current gas calibration certificates or the appropriate gas calibration test kits. Duty of care
of the hirer / lender as well as the user requires these.
This Chapter starts with some basic physical and chemical facts that relate to the
atmosphere and the gases and vapours that are in it and which may require detection. It goes
on to discuss the explosion-protection techniques applicable to the construction of gas
detectors, and the specific Standards relating to their construction, handbooks and
performance. This in turn leads to the general knowledge that the user requires and needs to
apply, together with the details that the Standards require to be in an instrument’s
handbook.
The toxicity of most flammable vapours and some gases is described and discussed,
together with the limitations of oxygen deficiency as a safety criterion. These aspects are
not covered well in other documents.

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Finally the Chapter deals with the practical application of gas and vapour detectors,
particularly with relation to the physical and chemical aspects covered earlier, followed by
a few supplementary notes.

14.2 WHAT IS THE MAKE-UP OF THE ATMOSPHERE AROUND US?


The atmosphere is made up of gases, vapours (of liquids), mists, (liquids), dusts (solids)
and very fine fumes. The naturally occurring gases and their percentages by volume are
given in Table 14.1.

TABLE 14.1
GASES NATURALLY OCCURRING IN THE ATMOSPHERE

PERCENTAGE BY VOLUME (%V/V) IN


GAS
FRESH DRY AIR
Nitrogen 78.08%
Oxygen 20.95%
Argon 0.93%
Carbon Dioxide 0.037%
Neon 0.0018%
Helium 0.0005%
Methane 0.0002%
Krypton 0.0001%
Hydrogen + Oxides of nitrogen + Xenon + Carbon 0.0002%
Monoxide, etc, in a total of

These percentages are relatively constant around the world and for at least 50 km above sea
level.
The other naturally occurring components of the atmosphere are:
Vapours: The principal component is water vapour, which can vary from around 0.004%v/v
at the South Pole to approximately 7%v/v in the tropics. Other vapours such as scents and
odours are practically zero.
Mists: Mists are mainly water as spray, mist, fog, drizzle, rain, hail and snow. Other mists
are negligible.
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Dusts: Dusts are made up of salt in the form of dried sea spray, dust storms, pollen, bacteria
and ash.
Fumes: consist of smoke from bushfires, and volcanic fumes.
If the atmosphere composition changes significantly then a hazard to life forms can happen
due to oxygen deficiency, toxicity or flammable/explosive properties.
Significant changes can occur to the atmosphere with one or more of the following (mostly
human) vectors:
(a) High local concentrations of animal or vegetable life such as cities, forests and
workplaces.
(b) High local amounts of volatile chemicals such as petroleum, solvents, cleaning
agents, paints and adhesives, tobacco smoke, heating gas, sewer gas, bulk chemicals
and exhausts.

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(c) Confined spaces with lack of free access to fresh air, such as cities with high
buildings and narrow streets, underground mines, underground car parks, shops,
workplaces, transport, homes, auditoriums, club rooms, stores, manholes and tunnels.
(d) Accidents due to carelessness, ineptitude, stupidity and ignorance, or the actions of
non-human beings.
An example will demonstrate the possibilities of a simple mistake that could cause a
disaster. A small size LPG cylinder or a jerry can that is 10% full of petroleum stored in a
fairly well sealed garage has the explosive potential of an aircraft bomb. Similar potential
exists for a serious incident if an explosive mixture is allowed to settle into a manhole or
confined space.

14.3 SOME COMMON PROPERTIES OF GASES AND VAPOURS


All gases and vapours will fully mix with all others over time and some gases and vapours
will then react chemically.
Once mixed they will stay mixed unless a component is removed chemically or, in the case
of vapour, by condensation (condensation of vapour can be due to increased pressure and/or
falling temperature).
All vapours except water are toxic. At best, gases (except air or oxygen) are asphyxiants
and many are toxic.
If flammable, all gases and vapours will have an LFL and a UFL. The LFL and UFL are
experimentally determined. They cannot be predicted with any accuracy.
Some common gases or vapours LFL and UFL are shown in Table 14.2.

TABLE 14.2
PARAMETERS OF COMMON GASES OR VAPOURS

UFL to LFL
Gas or vapour LFL% v/v UFL% v/v Apparatus group
ratio
Acetylene 2.3 100.0 43.49 IIC
Carbon Monoxide 10.9 74.0 6.79 IIB
Ethylene 2.3 36.0 15.65 IIB
Hydrogen 4.0 77.0 19.25 IIC
Methane 4.4 17.0 3.86 I
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Petrol 1.2 8.0 6.67 IIA


Propane 1.7 10.9 6.41 IIA
n-Pentane 1.4 7.8 5.57 IIA
Toluene 1.1 7.8 7.09 IIA

From this table it can be seen that the gases with the higher ratios of UFL to LFL are those
that are more reactive, more explosively dangerous and more easily ignited. Generally they
are those requiring the more severely designed explosion-protected apparatus. It is also the
case that they are less prone to sensitivity loss on an instrument with a partially ‘poisoned’
catalytic filament.

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When an alarm is set at, say, 20% of the LFL (usually written 20% LFL) of a particular gas,
it means that the alarm will operate at a concentration of 20% of the LFL concentration for
that gas or vapour. For example, if an alarm was set to operate at ‘20% LFL of hydrogen’
then the alarm would sound at 20% of 4% v/v (the LFL of hydrogen), which is 0.8% v/v of
hydrogen in the atmosphere.

14.4 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GASES AND VAPOURS


The major differences between gases and vapours are outlined below.
14.4.1 Gases
Gases are fairly easy to understand. Substances that are always gaseous under normal
temperatures and pressures will follow the GAS LAWS and behave predictably. Gases may
be pure, or any mixture, unless they react chemically.
Examples of pure gases are oxygen, nitrogen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen
sulphide, hydrogen cyanide, sulphur dioxide and chlorine, hydrogen, methane, acetylene,
ethylene, propane, and butane. Examples of mixed gases are natural gas, LPG and air.
Gases can have a density that is lighter than air, such as hydrogen and methane. They can
have approximately the same density as air, such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide,
hydrogen cyanide, ethane, ethylene and acetylene; or they can have a density heavier than
air such as chlorine, carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, LPG, propane, propylene and butane.
Gases such as ammonia, hydrogen sulphide, hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, sulphur dioxide,
nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide are highly toxic. Carbon dioxide, propane, butane and
LPG are mildly toxic. Most other gases are only asphyxiants, (just replacing some of the
air) such as nitrogen, argon, helium, hydrogen, methane, acetylene, ethylene, ethane and
natural gas. Some of these gases are flammable.
Monitoring up to the LFL for natural gas, hydrogen, methane, acetylene, ethylene, ethane,
propane, LPG and butane is relatively simple.
One problem in monitoring the LFL of gases is possible water condensation in instruments
that have been brought from an air-conditioned office and used elsewhere on a hot day.
Basically, simple training will suffice for a normal person.
14.4.2 Vapours
Vapours are more difficult to understand. Substances where liquid can coexist at normal or
slightly abnormal temperatures and pressures will have vapours, which behave differently
to gases. Below the boiling point of the liquid, the concentration of vapour in the
atmosphere must be less than 100% v/v.
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Flammable liquids have flashpoints, which essentially are the temperatures at which their
vapours can reach their LFL concentrations in air (provided that they are not continuously
removed by air currents).
Examples of vapours are those of all the solvents (e.g. methylated spirits, MEK, acetone,
thinners, turpentine, and water), and all liquid fuels (e.g. petrol, kerosene, distillate and fuel
oil).
Methanol vapour has a density equal to air, while water vapour is less dense than air. All
the others, including methylated spirits, are heavier than air. Most vapours are very much
heavier than air.
All vapours (including non-flammable ones), except water, are toxic at some level. All
flammable vapours are toxic at levels well below LFL. Most vapours are of toxic concern
well below 2% of LFL, and so may not be detectable with a combustible gas detector at
levels where they are already a toxic problem. Additional precautions are needed.

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There are major problems if liquid is (or may be) present, particularly if temperatures can
increase. If the temperature increases, then the saturated vapour pressure (i.e. maximum
concentration of vapour) will increase by a multiplying factor of between 1.5 and 2.1 for
every 10°C rise in temperature.
Vapours may partially condense out with a fall in temperature and/or compression. This is a
problem in trying to make compressed calibration gases at 50% LFL using hydrocarbons
higher than pentane (or, for lower concentrations, hexane).
Some major problems arise in vapour testing due to the possible condensation of the sample
itself in the detector or its accessories.
NOTE: Considering the above, where vapours are likely to be found, additional training in the use
of gas detectors is required.

14.5 APPLICABLE STANDARDS FOR EXPLOSION-PROTECTION AND OTHER


REQUIREMENTS OF GAS AND VAPOUR DETECTORS
Since gas and vapour detectors are used in ordinary commercial operations, plant
maintenance and for servicing explosion-protected apparatus in hazardous areas, the gas or
vapour detector itself could be a possible ignition source.
The main purpose of combustible gas and vapour detectors is to detect possibly explosive
gas mixtures. It follows then that when used in such an atmosphere the gas and vapour
detector must comply with a certified explosion technique or techniques suitable for that
hazardous area. As such, primarily they must be designed to comply with the protection
Standards described elsewhere in this publication.
Permanently mounted gas or vapour detectors will normally have protection such as Ex d,
Ex ia or Ex ib. Portable and hand held gas or vapour detectors will be battery-powered, and
normally have protection Ex ia or Ex ib, as the principal explosion-protection technique.
However, since most types of combustible gas or vapour detectors have either a heated
filament or pelement (in the case of the detector technique known as catalytic combustion),
or some type of bulb or globe (in the case of infra-red detectors), the sensor itself may be
certified as Ex d, Ex m or Ex s.
Apart from the basic constructional Standards for these explosion-protection techniques,
there are specific Standards relating to combustible gas and vapour detectors.
Gas or vapour detection instruments manufactured before 2000 should have been
manufactured to AS 2275 or an equivalent Standard. Part 1 of AS 2275 related to the
design, including the operational handbook, of combustible gas or vapour detectors. Part 2
of this Standard related to their performance, but was never fully implemented. This series
of Standards was superseded in 2000 by the AS/NZS 61779 series of 6 Parts, which are
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identical to the respective IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) Standards. The


first five Parts relate to the construction, instruction manual and performance of
combustible gas or vapour detectors, permanently installed and portable types, and whether
they are intended for use in coal mines (Group I) or normal above ground industry
applications (Group II).
Part 6 is essentially a Code of Practice and is strongly recommended as additional reading.
The full list of the AS/NZS 61779 series is:
AS/NZS
61779 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of flammable gases
61779.1 Part 1: General requirements and test methods
61779.2 Part 2: Performance requirements for Group I apparatus indicating a volume
fraction up to 5% methane in air

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61779.3 Part 3: Performance requirements for Group I apparatus indicating a volume


fraction up to 100% methane in air
61779.4 Part 4: Performance requirements for Group II apparatus indicating a volume
fraction up to 100% lower explosive limit
61779.5 Part 5: Performance requirements for Group II apparatus indicating a volume
fraction up to 100% gas
61779.6 Part 6: Guide for the selection, installation, use and maintenance of apparatus
for the detection and measurement of flammable gases

14.6 APPARATUS MARKING


If encountering a new type of gas or vapour detector for the first time, it is worth seeing if
has been certified in Australia/New Zealand, or whether additional assurance is required as
to its explosion-protection.
If there are any doubts about the certification or the fitness for purpose of the instrument it
should not be used in a hazardous area.
All apparatus and protective systems should be marked legibly and indelibly with the
following requirements:
(a) Certification marking.
(b) Designation of series or type.
(c) Serial number, if any.
(d) Specific marking describing the types of explosive protection.
NOTE: In the case of very small items certain exceptions may be made; and only the name and
address of the manufacturer might be marked.
Fixed Group II apparatus with remote sensors should carry a label, on each sensor,
indicating the calibration gas.
Where the apparatus incorporates flame-arresting devices complying with Clause 3.5 of
AS/NZS 61779.1, the marking should include the symbol ‘s’ in accordance with
Clause 27.2(d) of AS/NZS 60079.0 (identical with IEC 60079-0).

14.7 GAS AND VAPOUR DETECTORS TESTED IN AUSTRALIA PRIOR TO 2000


Although AS 2275 Part 2 related to the performance of combustible gas and vapour
detectors, no instrument in Australia was ever fully tested to the Standard. However many
instruments intended for use in coal mines were tested to some of the requirements of the
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Standard, by the N.S.W. Department of Mineral Resources Chemical Laboratory as part of


the Approval Scheme for coal mines.
Some instruments have claimed or appeared to claim certification to AS 2275 in its entirety
or specifically to AS 2275 Part 2. Such claims are not correct and instruments in this
category should be treated with caution.
Additionally, AS 2275 never applied to oxygen or toxic gas sensors which nowadays
frequently are found in the same portable instrument as a combustible sensor.

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14.8 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE USE OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS AND


VAPOUR INSTRUMENTS
In this section, where the text is in italics, it is quoting from the forewords of AS 2275
Parts 1 and 2, and should be taken very seriously. Some explanation has been added in
normal print. Similar advice is found in AS/NZS 61779 Parts 1 and 6, but is rather more
spread out. Most misuse of combustible gas and vapour detectors occurs when these
principles are not observed.
Many of the remarks apply to other forms of gas detection, e.g. oxygen deficiency and toxic
gas monitors.
Therefore, both from an informative Standard point of view and the general requirements of
duty of care, both at common law and statute law, the following should be adhered to:
‘Each unit must be provided with a comprehensive set of installation and operating
instructions to permit the user to properly install , operate and adjust the apparatus, and
to properly acquaint him or her with the capabilities and limitations of the apparatus.’
This means it is assumed that ordinary workplace experience is not enough to apply gas
detectors, to install permanent gas detectors, or use permanent or portable instruments.
Training on the instrumentation, using the handbook, is required.
‘Instrument capability alone cannot ensure that the use of these instruments will properly
safeguard areas or locations where combustible gases or vapours may be or are present.
The level of safety obtained depends heavily not only upon the user having full knowledge
of the limitations of the instrument, but also upon proper selection for the particular
situation, proper installation and especially upon frequent periodic maintenance and
adjustment.’ It depends on the user getting it right.
To properly safeguard any particular area, ‘the user must also have a basic knowledge of
gas/vapour properties and phenomena (how gases and vapours propagate, whether the
gases are heavier or lighter than air etc)..’ (Hence the earlier sections on gas and vapour
physics) ‘… and the conditions which may prevail in the areas being protected (direction
and velocity of gas movement, humidity and temperature variations, presence of
particulates or detrimental contaminates, ease of gaining access for periodic maintenance
and adjustment etc).’ Knowledge of the particular plant or area is required. Sections 14.10
onwards help to put the physics and chemistry of earlier sections into the workplace
situation.
‘It is stressed that the final and long-term effectiveness of any combustible gas detection
apparatus depends heavily upon the user who must be responsible for its proper
application, installation, proper use and regular maintenance.’ The instrument cannot
work any better than the user is letting it work.
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Some very specific points are given below:


‘Where an instrument is calibrated for one particular flammable gas or vapour, account
should be taken of the fact that the instrument calibration may not be accurate for other
gases and vapours.
NOTE: An instrument calibrated for hexane may be inaccurate for other vapours of a homologous
series (e.g. butane, octane, which are straight chain paraffins ) and will be inaccurate for
vapours of other types of compound (e.g. alcohols, ketones and gases such as acetylene,
hydrogen)’.
In specific cases (e.g. coal mines) the instruments can be calibrated in terms of the LFL of
the gas they are going to encounter (in this case methane) but if they encounter some other
gas or vapour (e.g. petrol) they will respond but usually not correctly.
General-purpose instruments will usually be calibrated so that the most commonly
encountered substances will give a reasonable reading.

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For instance, a combustible gas or vapour instrument using catalytic combustion may have
a calibrated range corresponding from 0 to 100% of the LFL of pentane (C5H12 ). Most
petroleum products may have sensitivities within ±25% of this, but its actual range on
methane would be around 0 to 45% to 0 to 60% of LFL, and on other substances would be
other values, usually lower. Response data to common gases and vapours, relative to the
Standard calibration method, is usually given. It will vary between different types of
instrument.
Most combustible gas sensors in common use are of the catalytic combustion type. They
will respond to essentially all combustible gases and vapours and are relatively simple and
inexpensive. A summary of their operating characteristics is found in Section 14.16.
Infra-red sensors are becoming more popular for combustible gas detection, but cannot
respond to hydrogen.
‘The instrument should be re-calibrated at regular intervals, e.g. weekly or, under certain
circumstances, on each occasion the instrument is used.’
So there is a need for a means for checking its reliability and sensitivity. This is usually
done using a test gas or calibration gas applied in a specified way. The correct
test/calibration apparatus for one type of instrument may not be appropriate to another type,
and some training will be needed.
What are the ‘certain circumstances’ mentioned above? The usual reason is ‘poisoning’.
Catalytic combustion sensors will lose sensitivity (become ‘poisoned’) if exposed to leaded
petrol, silicones (e.g. in polishes, adhesives, specialised greases, and certain common
pharmaceuticals, particularly stomach medicines), acid vapours, certain specialised
hydraulic fluids, fire retardants, etc.
This loss of sensitivity due to ‘poisoning’ usually happens more rapidly with respect to
methane than to other substances, so methane is generally used as a test gas to detect this at
an early stage. Methane is also frequently used as the calibration gas, even if the sensitivity
is actually adjusted to an artificial value so that the actual instrument range is more
appropriate to its use, e.g. to what it would be if calibrated on pentane.
There is a wide range of tolerance to ‘poisons’, depending on sensor type and manufacturer,
but ‘poisoning’ can happen to all of them given time. Where it is suspected that the
instrument has come into contact with the vapours of known filament ‘poisons’, an
additional calibration or response check should be performed before the instrument is used
again. Preferably a check should also be carried out after a set of such readings to check
that an area is gas free, in order to validate the readings.
If it is known that ‘poisons’ are present (e.g. having to use a combustible gas detector
where there are traces of leaded petrol vapour), then a check on test gas should be taken
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after each reading.


Traces of these ‘poisons’ are everywhere. Some work permanently by putting solid coatings
on the sensor catalyst, effectively destroying it; the major example being silicones. Some
only have a temporary effect, particularly if the ‘poisoning’ is found at an early stage. For
instance the effects of small doses of leaded petrol or acid vapours can be sometimes
‘cured’ by several hours of operation, and, more particularly, if a test gas is applied for a
prolonged period, as this will operate the filament at a higher temperature. Note that
recovery may be quick if concentrations of gas between 100% – 200% LFL are used, but
sensor life will be shortened.
Sensors for oxygen and for toxic gases, frequently found in combined instruments, will lose
sensitivity with time, with use, and particularly with misuse. They also need periodic
checking and re-calibration.
Another of the ‘certain circumstances’ above, would be if the gas detector is only used
infrequently. In such cases it should then always be checked before being used.

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14.9 THE INSTRUMENT INSTRUCTION MANUAL


AS/NZS 61779.1:2000 (IEC 61779.1:1998) states ‘each apparatus shall be provided with
an instruction manual that includes the following information:
(a) Complete instructions, drawings and diagrams for safe and proper operation,
installation and servicing of the apparatus;
(b) Operating instructions and adjustment procedures;
(c) Recommendations for initial checking and calibration of the apparatus on a routine
basis, including instructions for the use of the field calibration kit, if provided (See
also AS/NZS 61799.6).
(d) Details of operational limitations including, where applicable, the following:
(i) gases for which the apparatus is suitable and the relative sensitivities of the
instrument to these gases,
(ii) information that describes the sensitivities to other gases to which the
apparatus is responsive,
(iii) temperature limits,
(iv) humidity range,
(v) supply voltage limits,
(vi) relevant characteristics and construction details of required interconnecting
cables,
(vii) battery life,
(viii) pressure limits,
(ix) sample flow rate,
(x) warm-up time,
(xi) stabilization time;
(e) Details of storage life and limitations for the apparatus, replacement parts and
accessories, including, where applicable, the following:
(i) temperature,
(ii) humidity,
(iii) time,
(iv) pressure;
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(f) Bases used for converting test and calibration gas concentrations from % LFL to
%volume fraction;
(g) Information on the adverse effects of poisons and interfering gases or substances and
oxygen-enriched or deficient atmospheres on the proper performance (and, in the
case of oxygen-enriched atmospheres, on electrical safety) of the apparatus;
(h) For aspirated apparatus, indication of the minimum and maximum flow rates and
pressure; also tubing type, maximum length and size for proper operation;
(i) For aspirated apparatus, instructions for ensuring that the sample lines are intact
and that proper flow is established;
(j) Statements of the nature and significance of all alarms and fault signals, the duration
of such alarms and signals (if time-limited or non-latching), and any provisions that
may be made for silencing or resetting such alarms and signals, as applicable;

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(k) Details of any method for the determination of the possible sources of a malfunction
and any corrective procedures (i.e. trouble-shooting procedures);
(l) A statement that alarm devices, outputs or contacts are of the non-latching types,
where applicable;
(m) For battery-operated apparatus, installation and maintenance instructions for the
batteries.
NOTE: This should include the battery type which can, and cannot, be used.
(n) A recommended replacement parts list;
(o) Where optional accessories (e.g. collecting cones, weather-protecting devices) are
supplied, the manufacturer shall list such accessories and state their effects on the
instrument characteristics (including response time and sensitivity), and provide
means for their identification (e.g. part numbers included in the manual);
(p) Details of certification and marking, and any special conditions of service;
(q) Storage life and recommended storage conditions for replacement parts and
accessories, where critical;
(r) Where the special nature of the apparatus (such as non-linear response) requires
additional instructions or special information that are alternative to, or in addition
to, the requirements of 3.3 and 3.4 (a) to (q), the instructions or information shall be
provided.’
WARNING: The superseded AS 2275 Part 1 had a similar list and this shows that
there has to be a reason for all this which is—‘The use of the instruction manual is
fundamental and indispensable’.

14.10 SUMMARY OF VARIATIONS TO VAPOUR HAZARDS, DUE TO


TEMPERATURE CHANGES AND OTHER FACTORS.
If a liquid is (or can be) present, the concentration of vapour can more than double for
every 10°C rise in temperature. This means that a 30°C rise could lead to up to 10 times the
concentration.
Therefore more frequent gas testing is needed in the morning and early afternoon than at
other times.
If there is a high flashpoint flammable liquid around, the vapour may not be detectable if
the ambient temperature is well below the flashpoint. If the ambient is 60 degrees C below
the flashpoint, the vapour can only reach between 1 and 8% of LFL as maximum, and then
only slowly, close to the liquid, and if the vapour is not being blown away.
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But if the temperature rises, and particularly in an enclosed area, this can change
dramatically.
Gas detectors will only detect the gases or vapours present. They will not detect condensed
liquids caused by the instrument or a sample line being markedly colder than the
atmosphere being sampled.
If an instrument or its sampling line gets contaminated by condensed vapour because it was
too cold, or worse still gets contaminated by drawing up the flammable liquid, the
instrument will give spurious (possibly dangerous) readings until such contamination is
removed. Section 14.17 provides further details.
Most vapours are considerably heavier than air. A vapour leak in reasonably still air, or in a
pit, may only be detectable within a few millimetres of the floor but nonetheless could be
dangerous.

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The vapours of most flammable substances are toxic at levels well below their LFL or even
the detection limit of a normal combustible gas detector. Some exceptions include
hydrogen, methane, acetylene, ethylene, LPG (propane, butane). For instance, if a
combustible gas detector gives a reading of 1% or 2% of LFL on petrol vapour, it is already
getting close to maximum permissible exposure limits for petrol.
WARNING: When dealing with ‘entry in confined spaces’ Clauses 14.10 to 14.15
(inclusive) should be taken into consideration.

14.11 SOME COMMON TERMS USED WITH TOXIC GASES AND VAPOURS
14.11.1 Maximum allowable concentration
Maximum Allowable Concentration (MAC, MAK ) is a European term, which is not applied
in Australia and New Zealand.
In the U.S.A., Threshold Limit Values (TLV) are used by the ACGIH and published by
them in a booklet. The values in this booklet are reprinted in Australia (where they are
known as PEL, Permissible Exposure Level instead of TLV) and in New Zealand (where
they are known as WES, Workplace Exposure Standards).
In the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand TLV, PEL and WES are all subdivided as
follows:
(a) Time Weighted Average (TWA): The maximum level averaged over 40 hours per
week, 50 weeks per year, at which an industrial worker will suffer no short or long
term effects or impairment.
(b) Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL): The maximum level, averaged over 15 mins, at a
maximum of 4 times per day, with the measurement periods well spaced, at which an
industrial worker will suffer no impairment. It is applied to some common substances
e.g. carbon dioxide (CO 2 ).
NOTE: It is imperfectly understood by many people that TWA and STEL are averages: The
concentration could be twice the value for half the time periods stipulated, provided it was
zero for the rest of the time. But concentrations more than twice these values, for however
short a period, are regarded as ‘bad practice’.
(c) Ceiling Limit (C): The limit not to be exceeded. It only applies to a few substances
such as cyanide.
An acronym not directly linked to TLV, PEL, or WES which is mentioned in Respirator
Standards (e.g. AS/NZS 1715) is IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health. It
represents the maximum concentration of gas from which, in the event of a respirator
failure, the ‘average’ person could escape within 30 min without a respirator and without
experiencing any effects on their ability to escape the area or irreversible health effects.
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14.11.2 Concentration units


The more common concentration units are—
(a) Percent by volume: % volume, % vol, or v/v. This is simply the actual concentration,
as a percentage, of a gas in a given mixture under specified conditions of temperature
and pressure. For example, there is 20.9% by volume of oxygen in the atmosphere.
This is essentially identical to Molar percent (%m/m, % molar), which may be found
in some modern and more scientific literature. Values of LFL (previously LEL) and
UFL (previously UEL) are quoted in these units.
(b) Parts per million: ppm. This is how many parts by volume (or molar) of a given
substance there are in 1,000,000 parts of the mixture. Parts per million is usually used
to indicate acceptable exposure levels of toxic substances. For example, 10 ppm is the
TWA of hydrogen sulphide while 500 ppm is the TWA of acetone.

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(c) Grammes (or milligrammes) per cubic metre: g/m3, mg/m3. They need a chemist to
work them out for gases and vapours. Fortunately in the TLV and derived books they
have already been worked out in ppm. However these units are the only practical
method for measuring toxic solids.
14.11.3 Instrument response time
T-90: The time taken for a gas detector to indicate 90% of the gas it is exposed to, i.e. if a
gas detector was immediately exposed to 100 ppm of gas, the time taken for the gas
detector to read 90 ppm is expressed as the instrument’s T90. Obviously the lower the T90
the faster the instrument, but this does not necessarily mean it is better if, for instance, the
higher response speed is obtained at the expense of precision or repeatability.

TABLE 14.3
RELATIONSHIP OF TLV (PEL, WES) TO LFL

LFL
Gas or vapour TLV (ppm) TLV as % of LFL
(% v/v)
Acetylene C 2H 2 2.3 Asphyxiant (>100)
Acetone (CH3) 2CO 2.5 500 (TWA) [or 750 (STEL)] 2 [or 3]
Benzene C6 H 6 1.2 0.5 (TWA) [or 750 (STEL)] 0.004
Butane C4H10 1.4 800 (TWA) 5.7
Carbon Monoxide CO 10.9 25 (TWA) 0.023
Ethanol CH3 CH 2OH 3.1 1000 (TWA) 3.23
Ethylene C2H 4 2.3 Asphyxiant (>100)
Hydrogen H 2 4.0 Asphyxiant (>100)
Hydrogen Cyanide HCN 5.4 4.7 (TWA) [peak limitation] 0.0087
Hydrogen Sulphide H2S 4.0 10 (TWA) [or 15 (STEL)] 0.025 [or 0.0375]

LPG (≅ 1.6) 1,000 (TWA) ≅ 6.25


Methane CH4 4.4 Asphyxiant (>100)
Methanol CH3OH 5.5 200 (TWA) [or 250 (STEL)] 0.36 [or 0.45]
n-Pentane C5H 12 1.4 600 (TWA) 4.29
Petrol 1.2 300 (TWA)[or 500 (STEL)] 2.5 [or 4.2]
Propane C3 H8 1.7 2500 (TWA) 14.7
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Toluene C7 H8 1.1 50 (TWA) 0.45


NOTES:
1 100% of LFL will not necessarily read 100 on a gas or vapour detector meter unless it is
specifically calibrated on that gas or vapour. 50% LFL of another substance could typically read
from 25% to 100% on a general purpose combustible gas and vapour detector, so do not take the
numbers in the last column as actual instrument readings. They are indicative only.
2 It must be remembered that the HUMAN NOSE is very unreliable in detecting toxic gas or vapour
and cannot be relied upon for detection and safety. You must take all precautions when working in
a hazardous area.
3 LFL data from AS/NZS 60079.20:2000. Also contained in AS/NZS 61779.6:2000.
4 TLV data from ACGIH 1999 TLVs and BEIs—Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances
and Physical Agents, Biological Exposure Indices—ISBN 1-882417-32-1.

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14.12 SAFETY WHEN USING A GAS DETECTOR IN A HAZARDOUS AREA


When about to work in a hazardous area it is necessary to specifically check on the
potential toxicity of the atmosphere with the plant Safety Officer, Industrial Hygienist, or
equivalent.
As will be seen later in the next section, a closely related matter, which should also be
checked with this person, particularly if confined spaces are involved, is the likely origin of
any oxygen deficiency.
A gas detector on its own may not be sufficient protection if toxic substances are likely to
be present. In some instances an appropriate respirator and /or other devices may be needed
as well.
Switch on the gas detector, allow it to warm up as necessary, and perform any fresh air
checks in a safe area but as close as practicable to the ambient conditions in the area to be
monitored.
When entering the potentially hazardous area frequently observe the readings on the
detector, you could be entering an already dangerous situation and you may need all the
warning you can get.
A gas detector will only give a reading for the location where the reading is being taken, or
the location of the end of the sampling line if a sampling line is being used. A hazardous
atmosphere may be building up a few metres from the sampling point. Therefore many gas
tests must be done all around the intended area of work to ensure that no pockets of
hazardous gas or vapour are present in the work area.
If vapours are likely to be present, do some of the tests a few millimetres from the floor.
This might detect a small problem (e.g. a minor liquid leak) at an early stage. Include ALL
nearby low spots.
The readings are only valid for the time they are taken. Circumstances change. Frequent
readings are recommended, particularly if liquids could be involved and the temperature is
rising.
Where a wide range of gases and vapours could be encountered in the work area there will
be a range of potential sensitivities. A low ‘alarm point’ or ‘action point’ will therefore be
required.
If there is a chance of sensor ‘poisons’ (such as silicones, leaded petrol, acids, etc) being
around, the sensitivity of a catalytic combustion instrument must be checked at frequent
intervals.
If a combustible gas or vapour detector instrument is also equipped with high sensitivity
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sensors for specific toxic gases it should be realized that they may only detect specific
gases. They will not usually detect other toxic materials.
In well-defined cases a specific combination of sensors can be fitted to such a multi-gas
instrument. For instance for oil refineries and sewerage applications a normal configuration
is combustibles and oxygen plus toxic sensors for carbon monoxide and hydrogen sulphide.
Instruments for coal mines may have sensors for methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide and
oxides of nitrogen.
NOTE: ALL OF THE PRECAUTIONS TAKEN ABOVE ARE USELESS IF THE
INSTRUMENT IS NOT WORKING PROPERLY AND/OR THE OPERATOR DOES NOT
KNOW HOW TO USE THE INSTRUMENT.

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14.13 OXYGEN DEFICIENCY.


As just mentioned, oxygen deficiency detectors are frequently incorporated with
combustible gas or vapour detectors, with or without toxic sensors as well. Such oxygen
detectors are essential for work in confined spaces.
Some varieties of oxygen sensors respond to changes in pressure, and so need checking in
fresh air, and possibly adjusting, each time they are used and/or if there is a change of
altitude.
What is not commonly appreciated is that if an operator is relying on an instrument to
detect a combustible gas or vapour and a deficiency of oxygen, it is still necessary to know
what could be causing an oxygen deficiency if it is detected.
Consider the following example:
The concentration of oxygen in dry air is about 20.9% v/v (i.e. by volume)
The Standard oxygen deficiency alarm setting is 19.5% v/v
This can be expressed in different ways such as—
(a) a 1.4% v/v deficiency; or
(b) 93% of the original dry air concentration; or
(c) a deficiency of 7% of concentration
Questions arising: Is it always safe to rely on this alarm on its own, without additional
precautions? Is an alarm at 19.5% v/v for oxygen deficiency safe for personnel in its own
right?
The answer is: not always! It will all depend on the physical/chemical mechanism that
caused the oxygen deficiency. The oxygen deficiency itself, or the detector, is usually not
the problem!
Some of the mechanisms that may cause oxygen deficiency, and their consequences, are
given below.
(a) Consider a chemical reaction with solid products.
The main examples are rusting or corrosion. Oxygen has simply been subtracted from
the air. This is equivalent to being in a synthetic atmosphere or working at altitude.
At 19.5% v/v oxygen there would be no short-term or long-term affects on a ‘normal
person’. In physiological terms, it is equivalent to an altitude change of about 650
metres. So in this case an alarm at 19.5% is perfectly safe.
At the top of Mt Kosciusko, the altitude is somewhat above 2000 metres. The oxygen
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

content is still 20.95% v/v, but its partial pressure (which is what actually matters)
would be equivalent to about 16% v/v oxygen at normal sea level pressure. Since it is
safe for ‘normal people’ at the top of the mountain even concentrations as low as
16% v/v oxygen near sea level may be no problem.
(b) Consider a chemical reaction with gaseous products.
(i) For example, respiration or clean combustion. The 1.4% reduction in oxygen
content needed to set off the alarm would be accompanied by an increase in
carbon dioxide level of about 0.8%, which is fairly safe, and there would be no
short-term or long-term effects on a ‘normal person’.
It should be realized that similar processes can involve life forms other than
humans or other visible animals. There are well documented cases where entry
into confined spaces could have been (and has been) lethal because of microbial
activity. In wet, slimy pits, some types of microbes will reduce the oxygen and
replace it with carbon dioxide in exactly the same way as human respiration. In
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these cases the oxygen alarm will be equally effective. However, certain
anaerobic processes (e.g. beer making or wine making, deep sludge etc.)
produce carbon dioxide without using much oxygen and therefore would come
in the class of (c) (iv) (below), which is much more marginal.
(ii) If however the oxygen deficiency was caused by dirty combustion involving
wood, paper, coal, oil, etc, then even after the smoke had settled, the
atmosphere would remain toxic due to carbon monoxide.
(iii) If the combustion had involved P.V.C., polyurethane etc the atmosphere would
be very toxic due to combustion products such as hydrogen chloride and
hydrogen cyanide.
(c) Consider the partial displacement of air by another gas or vapour
The 1.4% v/v oxygen deficiency needed to cause the alarm would require 7% v/v of
the other gas.
The question regarding the safety will therefore depend on the gas or vapour causing
the displacement and several possible causes are:
(i) If the cause of the oxygen deficiency is one of the inert gases such as nitrogen,
argon, helium or neon, (or water vapour) an addition of 7% v/v of the inert gas
to the atmosphere is perfectly safe.
(ii) If the gas causing the oxygen deficiency is hydrogen, methane (natural gas),
ethane, or propane (LPG) the atmosphere would be safe to breathe for a short
period but would be above the LFL, and therefore explosive. But if there was a
combustible gas detector as well as the oxygen detector, it should have given an
alarm well before this situation occurred.
(iii) If the gas causing the oxygen deficiency is acetylene, ethylene, cyclopropane or
butane, the atmosphere would be marginal for persons working in the area, but
also would be above the LFL. If there was a combustibles sensor as well,
however, the same comment applies.
(iv) If the gas causing the oxygen deficiency is carbon dioxide or some of the freons
the atmosphere would be marginal. Persons could only stay conscious in such
an atmosphere for a few seconds.
(v) 7% of any other gas or vapour causing that amount of oxygen deficiency would
render the atmosphere potentially and rapidly fatal.

14.14 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS WHEN USING A HIRED, BORROWED, OR


OTHERWISE UNFAMILIAR GAS OR VAPOUR DETECTOR
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Before using a hired or borrowed detector it is imperative, in cases where the user is not
familiar with that specific type, that the handbook be supplied with the detector and read
before using the detector.
Either the calibration kit must be supplied with the detector and the detector calibrated
appropriately for the atmosphere in which it is to be used prior to use, or the detector should
be supplied with a certificate of calibration dated no more than a few days previously.
If you do use another company’s gas detector (or for that matter any gas detector) you
should ask yourself some key questions:
(a) Is it in working order?
(b) What is its calibration state (when was it last calibrated or response-checked)?
(c) Has a handbook been supplied with the detector or are you trained on it?

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(d) Is there a calibration kit available or a response-check kit?


(e) Is the kit the one recommended by the manufacturer (e.g. is it mentioned in the
handbook)?
(f) Can some one check the calibration or at least do a response check before it is used?
If the answer to these questions is ‘No’ or ‘They don’t know’, do not use the detector.

14.15 THE ‘READ AND RUN’ CONCEPT FOR INEXPERIENCED OPERATORS


In earlier sections it has been stated that all flammable substances, apart from a few of the
lighter gases, are toxic at much lower concentrations than the amount necessary to form an
explosive mixture.
Also oxygen deficiency may be due to the presence of toxic amounts of some other
substance.
You should not rely on automatic alarms alone when testing for flammable (explosive)
substances, and/or testing for oxygen deficiency. They are usually set some way along the
scale.
If you can detect small changes in readings, by observing the readout and before the alarm
levels are reached, you are increasing the safety margins.
Without extensive training (such as happens in coal mining), the user should not be put in a
position to be testing where significant amounts of gases or vapours are actually expected.
Even with a working gas detector, a technician working in a hazardous atmosphere, either
on the normal business of the plant or specifically working on a piece of explosion-
protected apparatus, may not be fully familiar with gas surveying or the toxic nature of the
environment. In such cases the advice to the operator is to use the ‘Read and Run’ concept.
Under this concept the basic operating technique is as follows:
(a) Observe the readings in a clear atmosphere, but otherwise under as close as possible
to the conditions that are going to be encountered at the point where the sampling will
take place, particularly with regard to atmospheric temperature and humidity. Altitude
is also important: A change of 100 metres in altitude can change an oxygen reading.
(b) Adjust the instrument to its proper fresh air readings. Or, if you are not allowed to (or
otherwise cannot) do this, write down the fresh air readings obtained.
(c) On going to the area where the tests are required, if there is any change from the fresh
air combustible gas or oxygen readings of more than 1 digit (on a digital meter), or ½
a division (on an analogue meter), this is a ‘positive reading’.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

(d) If you get such a positive reading get out, that is ‘READ AND RUN’.
(e) Then inform the responsible person, who may then carry out a proper survey by
experienced personnel, taking proper precautions.

14.16 THE CATALYTIC COMBUSTION DETECTION TECHNIQUE


This is a summary of the general characteristics of the most common principle used in
hand-held combustible gas detectors, which measure up to 100% of the LFL. It is also
widely used in permanently mounted combustible gas detectors and is known as ‘Catalytic
Combustion’.
The fuel (combustible gas or vapour being measured) and oxygen (from the air) react on a
hot catalyst (in the form of a filament or pelleted filament (‘pelement’ or ‘pellistor’) to give
additional heat, plus products of combustion. The temperature rise is measured by change in
electrical resistance.

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The relevant features and limitations of this technique are as follows:


(a) The principle will work on all combustible gases and vapours.
(b) There must be at least 10% v/v of oxygen for the detector to work correctly. Normal
air has just under 21% by volume (v/v).
(c) Different gases and vapours will have different sensitivities. High safety factors must
be used for all general-purpose instruments.
(d) Concentrations above LFL can give anomalous readings (partly because of inadequate
oxygen). Special precautions must be taken.
(e) The technique is not suitable for low range instruments. Most instruments are ranged
0-100% of the LFL for a nominal gas. Toxicity will generally occur well below this
limit.
(f) The instrument uses up the fuel (i.e. the combustible gas or vapour) so the instrument
must be continually aspirated with fresh sample or must use a diffusion method.
(g) The products of combustion must leave the catalytic surface or the catalyst will
become ‘poisoned’. If this happens it will lose sensitivity and will ultimately ‘die’.
(h) There will be no problems measuring atmospheres of hydrogen, hydrocarbons and
normal solvents, as the products are carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and water
vapour, which are all gaseous.
(i) However, with silicones, such as in polishes, greases, certain paints, stomach
medicines or breast implants, they will react to make silica, SiO2. This is a solid with
a very high melting point; basically sand or glass. This leaves a coating on the
catalyst, effectively ‘poisoning’ the catalyst.
(j) The lead compounds in ‘leaded petrol’ also leave a solid product, which will also
‘poison’ general purpose catalytic sensors. Some instruments have a high temperature
filament, which will work in low concentrations of lead compounds, since they slowly
evaporate at these high temperatures. However the higher temperatures inevitably
lead to shorter sensor life.
(k) Because of the insidious nature of ‘poisoning’ such sensors need frequent calibration,
or frequent response checks at least.
(l) ‘Poisoning’ happens with respect to methane more rapidly than with respect to other
compounds. Therefore general-purpose instruments should have their response
routinely checked with methane test gas as this will reveal possible problems at an
early stage. This should be done irrespective of actual or nominal calibration.
(m) Relative response data between different compounds should be treated with caution.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

They refer to new sensors. Different types of instruments will have different response
data.

14.17 CONTAMINATION OF GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS BY LIQUIDS


If a sample line, or a filter, or any part of an instrument upstream of the sensor is contaminated by
liquid, either by direct contact or by condensation from the air, the following will occur:
(a) Any amount of the vapour of the liquid contaminant in the air sample (from zero
upwards) will now have a negligible effect.
(b) The temperature of the liquid inside the system will determine the vapour
concentration the sensor sees.
(c) If the sample has more vapour than the temperature of the instrument or any sampling
accessories allows, some vapour will condense. If it has any amount less, from zero
upwards, some will evaporate.

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If the liquid is the substance to be measured, then the contaminated instrument will respond
to the net amount of vapour, which will hardly change irrespective of what is in the sampled
air. The instrument is now useless. It is even dangerous if this signal is accidentally
zeroed out.
A similar (but lesser) effect will be found with vapours of substances similar to the liquid
contaminant. The reading will be reduced. They will dissolve in the liquid and change it
gradually. This would include petrol vapour in kerosene or distillate liquid.
So, once it has happened, the instrument is utterly useless until decontaminated. This will
be extremely dangerous unless the operator appreciates the problem.
A related problem may occur if the manufacturer’s special sample tubing is replaced by
tubing of a different material. Many elastomers such as rubber have a powerful affinity for
the higher hydrocarbons and solvents. With these, the effect is similar to condensation but
happens at much lower temperatures: once it has happened, this may result in incorrect zero
adjustments and unstable readings, even when none of the vapour is present. This can lead
to concerns as to the stability of a perfectly good gas detector, particularly if operating with
high sensitivity, low ppm ranges.
It can take a lot of purging to remove liquid and decontaminate an instrument. Obviously
small amounts of condensed vapour would be less of a problem.
As a rough guide to the problem of liquid contamination the following should be
considered:
(i) 1 mL of a fairly volatile hydrocarbon (e.g. octane, xylene) can evaporate to make 14
litres of 10% of LFL vapour.
(ii) The hand pump of an simple hand aspirated combustible gas detector is about 50 mL
capacity.
(iii) That makes 280 pumping actions, say ¼ to ½ an hour of hard work.
(iv) Distillate would evaporate (very roughly) 100 times slower; to decontaminate by hand
pumping would take days or even weeks !!
WARNING: Do not let an instrument get contaminated by liquid. If you do, your
duty of care is to arrange for it to be decontaminated and not to let anyone use the
instrument until it has been decontaminated.

14.18 SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT FLASHPOINT AND TEMPERATURE


Petrol has a flashpoint of −40°C (or lower) so why do car petrol tanks usually not explode
in a rear end collision, assuming there is sufficient ignition energy released by the crash
(and there usually will be)?
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

As stated earlier, the vapour pressure rises by a multiplying factor of between 1.5 and 2.1
times for every 10°C rise in temperature. At flashpoint the vapour present is approximately
100% of the LFL and this will increase with temperature as can be seen from Table 14.5
below (which assumes the flashpoint is −40°C).

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TABLE 14.5
VARIATION OF CONCENTRATION WITH INCREASE IN TEMPERATURE

% v/v if a multiplying % v/v if a multiplying


Liquid temperature °C
factor of 1.5 is used factor of 2.1 is used
−40 (Flashpoint) 1.2 (=100% of LFL) 1.2 (=100% of LFL)
−30 1.8 2.52
−20 2.7 5.29
−10 4.05 11.12
0 6.1 23.33
10 9.11 48.99

Considering that the UFL of petrol is around 8.0%, from Table 14.5 it can be seen that this
will be exceeded somewhere between −18°C and +6°C (or less if the flashpoint was less
than −40°C).
At temperatures higher than the temperature at which UFL is reached, the concentration
will be above the UFL, hence there can be no explosion in the tank.
The reverse situation will occur when the temperature is lower than the flashpoint
temperature. Consider this scenario:
There is a spill of helicopter jet fuel (flashpoint 65°C) at an airport on a relatively
cold winter’s morning where the ambient temperature is about 5°C. A responsible
person takes a reading just above the spill on the downwind side and reports that there
is only approximately 3% of the LFL present in the atmosphere. Is the reading
correct? What will happen as the day warms up if the spill is not cleaned up
immediately? The results are set out in Table 14.6.

TABLE 14.6
VARIATION OF CONCENTRATION WITH A DECREASE IN TEMPERATURE

% LFL if a multiplying % LFL if a multiplying


Liquid temperature °C
factor of 1.5 is used factor of 2.1 is used
65 (Flashpoint) (=100% of LFL) (=100% of LFL)
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55 67 47.6
45 44.4 22.7
35 29.7 10.8
25 19.8 5.14
15 13.2 2.45
5 8.8 1.17

CONCLUSION:
From Table 14.6 it can be seen that we would expect the maximum possible concentration
to be between 1.17% and 8.8% of the LFL while the tarmac or ambient temperature was at
5°C; so a reading of 3 is perfectly understandable. As the day warms up the percentage of
the LFL will rise and there could be a potentially hazardous situation (particularly toxic)
arising, if no action is taken to clean up the area.
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14.19 SOME INSTALLATION ‘DOs’ AND ‘DO NOTs’ OF PERMANENT GAS


DETECTION
In general, permanently-installed gas detectors, particularly if they are intended to give
early warning of outbursts, should be located in accordance with the principles already
given and summarized below.
14.19.1 Recommended locations
Near the top of any enclosed space, if the hazardous gas is lighter than air, such as
hydrogen and methane.
Near the lowest points if they are detecting heavier than air gases or any vapours.
At or near breathing level if monitoring toxic gases, particularly those with a density
similar to air such as carbon monoxide (CO) or hydrogen sulphide (H2S).
Downwind of potential leakage sources if there is a permanent air current, and so on.
These general remarks also apply to the sample points, where drawing of sample through
tubes forms part of the system.
14.19.2 Common problems
The gas detection system can be defeated and even rendered useless if the sensors (or
sample points) are mistreated or located without thought.
Some fairly-frequently encountered problems include:
(a) Painting over the sintered metal screens which are supposed to prevent explosion or
flame transmission from the sensors, but are supposed to permit the gas to freely
diffuse in. Obviously paint will block a sensor from the atmosphere it is supposed to
monitor, rendering it completely useless—Nonetheless it frequently happens!
(b) Letting the screens get blocked with accumulated sticky rubbish, with a similar effect.
This should be picked up if the sensors are regularly inspected and calibrated—
Nonetheless sensors coated and blocked with a layer looking like masonite, and
composed of dried vegetable oil and seed husk have been seen!
(c) Locating combustibles sensors near a known source of sensor ‘poisons’.
(d) Locating sensors or sample points where access for servicing and calibration is either
impossible, is going to become impossible (because of additions to the area), or is
impracticable. This frequently happens with sensors for methane or natural gas
installed near the ceiling. Where such situations are likely to occur, means for getting
the operator into a suitable and safe position must be provided. These could include
catwalks, fixed ladders, or easily movable steps which are kept nearby.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

(e) Locating sensors or sample points, for heavy gases or vapours in particular, low
down, where they are going to get hosed during cleaning operations or otherwise
sprayed. Sensor protection is a specialised subject, and many manufacturers provide it
for their equipment. Excessive or unauthorized sensor protection may restrict access
of the atmosphere to the sensor, slowing the response down, and in extreme cases
reducing the response Standard protection WILL NOT usually protect against the full
blast of a hose.
(f) Locating sensors or sample points, for heavy gases or vapours in particular, low
down, where they are likely to get hit by moving machinery such as fork-lift trucks,
or fallen over. They need additional, highly visible, mechanical protection.
(g) Locating sensors (e.g. so low) so that the manufacturer’s calibration kit cannot be
used.
(h) Locating sensors where they are exposed to rain, without some proper rain protection.

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(i) Locating sensors where they could be exposed to the full force of the midday sun (the
sensor temperature may get to over 60 °C). This may be above its explosion-protection
rating. Also if intermittently exposed to the sun, the temperature could change very
rapidly, and this could lead to spurious signals. Overhead protection 10 to 30 cm
above the sensor is strongly recommended; this can be combined with rain protection.
(j) Where the system has sample extraction from a hot or humid sample point, if the
sample line has a low and/or cooler spot, water (or in some cases sample) might
condense there. If there is a dip, it can fill with water and block the line.
(k) Where the system has sample extraction from a dirty sample point (e.g. mists,
particulates such as dust) failure to have adequate filtration at the sample point, and
failure to make such filtration easily serviceable will lead to rapid loss of accuracy
and efficiency.

14.20 SUMMARY
The important components of a permanent or portable gas detection system are:
(a) The Handbook, plus training on it.
(b) The trained operator/user/installer with a basic knowledge of the limitations of the
instrument.
NOTE: These limitations will be largely due to the physics and chemistry pertaining to the
location, circumstances and type of instrument: at the very least an operator should be trained
to ‘READ and RUN’ when using a portable instrument, and should know the significance of
an alarm for permanently installed apparatus.
(c) Accessories approved by the manufacturer (as applicable to the installation or use).
(d) The manufacturer’s Calibration Kit, or at least the Response Check Kit, and its
frequent use.
(e) Spare fresh batteries or the approved charger/power supply for portable detectors.
(f) Consumable spares (particularly if operating in remote locations).
and the gas detector, correctly chosen for the application, and which is of no use
without (a) to (f)!
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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APPENDIX A
RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY BODIES

A1 AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Accreditation and Registration Council (ARC)


Department of Education and Community Services
5th Floor
Allara House
40 Allara Street
Canberra ACT 2600
PO Box 985
Civic Square ACT 2608
Phone: (02) 6205 7055
Fascimile: (02) 6205 7045
Website: www.act.gov.au

ACT Building Electrical and Plumbing Control


Department of Urban Services
PO Box 1908
Canberra ACT 2601
Phone: (02) 6207 6360
Fascimile: (02) 6207 7750
Website: www.act.gov.au
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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NEW SOUTH WALES

Department of Fair Trading


1 Fitzwilliam Street
Parramatta N.S.W. 2150
PO Box 972
Parramatta N.S.W. 2124
Phone: (02) 9895 0706
Facsimile: (02) 9895 0423
Website: www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au

National Utilities and Electrotechnology Industries Training Advisory Board


(NUEITAB)
Suite 1301
66 King Street
Sydney N.S.W. 2000
PO Box Q284
Queen Victoria Building
Sydney N.S.W. 2000
Phone: (02) 9290 2533
Facsimile: (02) 9290 2544
Website: www.nueitab.com.au

Department of Mineral Resources


Minerals and Energy House
29-57 Christie Street
St Leonards N.S.W. 2065
PO Box 536
St Leonards N.S.W. 1590
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Phone: (02) 9901 8888


Facsimile: (02) 9901 8777
Website: www.minerals.nsw.gov.au

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TestSafe Australia (formerly LOSC)


WorkCover N.S.W.
919 Londonderry Road
Londonderry N.S.W. 2753
PO Box 592
Richmond N.S.W. 2753
Phone: (02) 4724 4900
Facsimile: (02) 4724 4999
Website: www.workcover.nsw.gov.au

Vocational Education Training Accreditation Board (VETAB)


Department of Education and Training
Locked Bag 21
Darlinghurst N.S.W. 2010
Phone: (02) 9244 5335
Facsimile: (02) 9244 5344
Website: www.det.nsw.edu.au

WorkCover N.S.W.
400 Kent Street
Sydney N.S.W. 2000
GPO Box 5364
Sydney N.S.W. 2001
Phone: (02) 9370 5000
Facsimile: (02) 9370 5999
Website: www.workcover.nsw.gov.au
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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NORTHERN TERRITORY

Chief Electrical Inspector


Power and Water Authority
PO Box 37471
Winnellie NT 0821
Phone: (08) 8999 5024
Facsimile: (08) 8999 6650
Website: www.nt.gov.au

Northern Territory Employment and Training Authority


1st Floor
Harbour View Plaza
8 McMinn Street
Darwin NT 0800
GPO Box 2925
Darwin NT 0801
Phone: (08) 8999 4396
Facsimile: (08) 8999 4300
Website: www.nt.gov.au/nteta/
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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QUEENSLAND

Electrical Safety Coordinator


Electrical Safety Office
Safety and Health Division
Department of Mines and Energy
QMEC Building
61 Mary Street
Brisbane QLD 4000
GPO Box 194
Brisbane GPO 4001 QLD
Phone: (07) 3237 0265
Facsimile: (07) 3237 0229
Website: www.dme.qld.gov.au

Safety in Mines Testing and Research Station (SIMTARS)


Department of Mines and Energy
2 Smith Street
Redbank QLD 4301
PO Box 467
Goodna QLD 4300
Phone: (07) 3810 6333
Facsimile: (07) 3810 6366
Website: www.dme.qld.gov.au/simtars/

Senior Electrical Inspector


Mines Inspectorate
Safety and Health Division
Department of Mines and Energy
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QMEC Building
61 Mary Street
Brisbane QLD 4000
GPO Box 194
Brisbane GPO 4001 QLD
Phone: (07) 3237 1105
Facsimile: (07) 3237 1242
Website: www.dme.qld.gov.au/safety/mines

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Training Division
Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations
Neville Bonner Building
Block B, 75 William Street
Brisbane QLD 4000
Locked Mail Bag 527
GPO Brisbane QLD 4001
Phone: (07) 3247 1315
Facsimile: (07) 3247 5433
Website: www.detir.qld.gov.au

Workcover Queensland
Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations
Neville Bonner Building
Block B, 75 William Street
Brisbane QLD 4000
GPO Box 09
Brisbane QLD 4001
Phone: (07) 3235 9500
Facsimile: (07) 3235 9640
Website: www.workcover.qld.gov.au
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Mineral Resources
Department of Mines and Energy
101 Grenfell Street
Adelaide SA 5000
Phone: (08) 8463 3032
Facsimile: (08) 8463 3031
Website: www.mines.sa.gov.au

Technical Standards and Safety Officer


Office of Energy Policy
30 Wakefield Street
Adelaide SA 5000
Phone: (08) 8226 5791
Facsimile: (08) 8226 5931
Website: www.pir.sa.gov.au
Training Recognition Branch
Department of Education, Training and Employment
GPO Box 2352
Adelaide SA 5001
Phone: (08) 8226 3398
Facsimile: (08) 8226 1736
Website: www.tafe.sa.edu.au/vet_div

Workcover Corporation
100 Waymouth Street
Adelaide SA 5000
GPO Box 2268
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Adelaide SA 5001
Phone: (08) 8233 2222
Facsimile: (08) 8233 2466
Website: www.workcover.com

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TASMANIA

Chief Electrical Inspector


Electricity Standards and Safety Unit
Workplace Standards Tasmania
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources
30 Gordons Hill Road
Rosny Park TAS 7018
PO Box 56
Rosny Park TAS 7018
Phone: (03) 6233 3879
Facsimile (03) 6233 8338
Website: www.dier.tas.gov.au

Mineral Resources Tasmania


Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources
30 Gordons Hill Road
Rosny Park TAS 7018
PO Box 56
Rosny Park TAS 7018
Phone: (03) 6233 8333
Facsimile: (03) 6233 8338
Website: www.mrt.tas.gov.au

Tasmanian Accreditation and Recognition Committee (TAREC)


Department of Education
99 Bathurst Street
Hobart TAS 7000
GPO Box 301
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Hobart TAS 7001


Phone: (03) 6233 7264
Facsimile: (03) 6233 4684
Website: www.doe.tased.edu.au

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Tasmanian State Training Authority (TASTA)


Department of Education
99 Bathurst Street
Hobart TAS 7000
GPO Box 301
Hobart TAS 7001
Phone: (03) 6233 4623
Facsimile: (03) 6234 4358
Website: www.dvet.tas.gov.au
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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VICTORIA

Australian National Training Authority (ANTA)


Level 5
321 Exhibition Street
Melbourne VIC 3000
Phone: (03) 9630 9800
Facsimile: (03) 9630 9888
Website: www.anta.gov.au

Manager Installation Safety and Licensing


Office of the Chief Electrical Inspector
Level 3, Building 2,
4 Riverside Quay
South Bank VIC 3006
PO Box 262, Collins Street West
Melbourne VIC 3007
Phone: (03) 9203 9700
Facsimile: (03) 9686 2197
Website: www.ocei.vic.gov.au

Office of Training and Further Education


Department of Education
2 Treasury Place
East Melbourne VIC 3002
GPO Box 4367
Melbourne VIC 3001
Phone: (03) 9637 2622
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Facsimile: (03) 9637 2470


Website: www.otfe.vic.gov.au

Victorian Workcover Authority


Level 24
222 Exhibition Street
Melbourne VIC 3000
Phone: (03) 9641 1555
Facsimile: (03) 9641 1222
Website: www.workcover.vic.gov.au

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WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Chief Electrical Inspector


Technical and Safety Division
Office of Energy
20 Southport Street
Leederville WA 6007
Phone: (08) 9422 5200
Facsimile: (08) 9422 5222
Website: www.energy.wa.gov.au

Department of Minerals and Energy


Mineral House
100 Plain Street
East Perth WA 6004
Phone: (08) 9222 3333
Facsimile: (08) 9222 3430
Website: www.dme.wa.gov.au

Department of Training
Level 2
151 Royal Street
East Perth WA 6004
Phone: (08) 9235 6222
Facsimile: (08) 9235 6224
Website: www.training.wa.gov.au

Workcover WA
2 Bedbrook Place
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Shenton Park WA 6008


Phone: (08) 9388 5555
Facsimile: (08) 93885550
Website: www.workcover.wa.gov.au

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A2 NEW ZEALAND

Operations Manager
Energy Safety Service
Ministry of Consumer Affairs
33 Bowen Street
PO Box 1473
Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: +64 4 472 0030
Facsimile: +64 4 460 1365
Website: www.ess.med.govt.nz

Electrotechnology Industry Training Organization (ETITO)


Level 2
650 Great South Road
Penrose
PO Box 24469, Royal Oak
Auckland, New Zealand
Phone: +64 9 525 2590
Facsimile: +64 9 525 2591
Website: www.etito.co.nz

Environmental Risk Management Authority New Zealand (ERMANZ)


Level 1, BP House
20 Custom House Quay
PO Box 131
Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: +64 4 473 8426
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

Facsimile: +64 4 473 8433


Website: www.ermanz.govt.nz

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Ministry for the Environment


Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Project
The Grand Annexe Building
84 Boulcott Street
PO Box 10-362
Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: 64 4 917 7400
Facsimile: +64 4 917 7523
Website: www.mfe.govt.nz

New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA)


79 Taranaki Street
PO Box 160
Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: +64 4 802 3000
Facsimile: +64 4 802 3112
Website: www.nzqa.govt.nz

Occupational Safety and Health Service (OSH)


Department of Labour
Unisys House
52 The Terrace
PO Box 3705
Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: +64 4 915 4444
Facsimile: +64 4 499 0891
Website: www.dol.gov.nz
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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APPENDIX B
AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND JOINT STANDARDS (AS/NZS)

B1 EXPLOSION-PROTECTION STANDARDS
AS
1076 Code of practice for selection, installation and maintenance of electrical
apparatus and associated equipment for use in explosive atmospheres (other
than coal mining applications)
1076.7 Part 7: Apparatus with type of protection ‘n’—Non sparking
1076.8 Part 8: Apparatus with type of protection ‘s’—Special protection
1482 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Protection by ventilation—
Type of protection v
1681 Electrically heated ovens in which flammable volatiles occur—Type 1 ovens
1826 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Special protection—Type
of protection s
1828 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Cable glands
1915 Electrical equipment for explosive gas atmospheres—Battery operated
vehicles
2229 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Electrical systems of
dispensing equipment
2229.1 Part 1: Flammable liquid dispensing equipment
2229.2 Part 2: Liquefied petroleum gas dispensing equipment
2268 Electrostatic paint and powder spray guns for explosive atmospheres
2380 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Explosion-protection
techniques
2380.1 Part 1: General requirements
2380.2 Part 2: Flameproof enclosure d
2380.4 Part 4: Pressurized rooms or pressurized enclosures
2380.6 Part 6: Increased safety
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

2380.7 Part 7: Intrinsic safety i


2380.9 Part 9: Type of protection n—Non-sparking
2381 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Selection, installation and
maintenance
2381.2 Part 2: Flameproof enclosure d
2381.6 Part 6: Increased safety e
2381.7 Part 7: Intrinsic safety i
2431 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Encapsulated apparatus—
Type of protection m

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NZS
5425 CNG compressor and refuelling stations
6109 Electrical systems of dispensing apparatus for explosive atmospheres
6109.1 Part 1: Flammable liquids dispensing apparatus
6109.2 Part 2: Liquefied petroleum dispensing apparatus
AS/NZS
2381 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Selection, installation and
maintenance
2381.1 Part 1: General requirements
3800 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Overhaul and repair
4114 Spray painting booths
4114.1 Part 1: Design, construction and testing
4114.2 Part 2: Selection, installation and maintenance
60079 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres
60079.0 Part 0: General requirements
60079.4 Part 4: Method of test for ignition temperature
60079.5 Part 5: Power filling ‘q’
60079.6 Part 6: Oil-immersion ‘o’
60079.11 Part 11: Intrinsic safety ‘i’
60079.12 Part 12: Classification of mixtures of gases or vapours with air according
to their maximum experimental safe gaps and minimum igniting
currents
60079.20 Part 20: Data for flammable gases and vapours, relating to the use of
electrical apparatus
61241 Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust
61241.1.1 Part 1.1: Electrical apparatus protected by enclosures and surface
temperature limitation—Specification for apparatus
61241.1.2 Part 1.2: Electrical apparatus protected by enclosures and surface
temperature limitation—Selection, installation and maintenance
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

61241.2.1 Part 2.1: Test methods—Methods for determining the minimum ignition
temperatures of dust
61241.2.2 Part 2.2: Test methods—Method for determining the electrical resistivity
of dust in layers
61241.2.3 Part 2.3: Test methods—Method for determining minimum ignition
energy of dust/air mixtures
61241.3 Part 3: Classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may be
present
61779 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of flammable gases
61779.1 Part 1: General requirements and test methods
61779.2 Part 2: Performance requirements for group I apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 5% methane in air

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61779.3 Part 3: Performance requirements for group I apparatus indicating a


volume fraction up to 100% methane in air
61779.4 Part 4: Performance requirements for group II apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 100% lower explosive limit
61779.5 Part 5: Performance requirements for group II apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 100% gas
61779.6 Part 6: Guide for the selection, installation, use and maintenance of
apparatus for the detection and measurement of flammable gases

B2 COAL MINING STANDARDS


AS
1039 Electrical equipment in coal mines—Explosion-protected distribution and
control boxes for voltages up to 3300 V a.c.
1147 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Insulating materials
1147.1 Part 1: Materials for insulating power conducting components
1299 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Flameproof restrained plugs and
receptacles
1300 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Bolted flameproof cable coupling
devices
1740 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Transformer substations for use
underground
2081 Electrical equipment for coal and shale mines—Electrical protection devices
2081.1 Part 1: General requirements
2081.2 Part 2: Earth-continuity monitoring devices
2081.3 Part 3: Earth-leakage protection devices for use on systems
incorporating earth-fault current limiters
2081.4 Part 4: Lockout earth-fault protection devices
2081.5 Part 5: Earth-fault current limiters
2290 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Maintenance and overhaul
2290.1 Part 1: Maintenance of electrical equipment for hazardous areas
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

2290.3 Part 3: Maintenance of gas detecting and monitoring equipment


2595 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Electrical requirements for
underground mining machines and accessories
2595.1 Part 1: Equipment for use in hazardous areas
2989 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Specific requirements for high voltage
circuit-breakers and disconnectors
3573 Electrical equipment for coal mines—Glossary of terms

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AS/NZS
1802 Electric cables—Reeling and trailing—For underground coal mining
purposes
1972 Electric cables—Underground coal mines—Other than reeling and trailing
3800 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres—Overhaul and repair
4240 Remote controls for mining equipment
61779 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of flammable gases
61779.1 Part 1: General requirements and test methods
61779.2 Part 2: Performance requirements for group I apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 5% methane in air
61779.3 Part 3: Performance requirements for group I apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 100% methane in air

B3 OTHER RELEVANT STANDARDS


AS
1216 Class labels for dangerous goods
1375 Industrial fuel-fired appliances (known as the SAA Industrial Fuel-fired
Appliance Code)
1596 LP gas—Storage and handling
1678 Emergency procedures guide—Transport
1768 Lightning protection (NZS 1768, IEC 61024-1)
1939 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures for electrical equipment (IP
Code)
1940 The storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids
2030 The verification, filling, inspection, testing and maintenance of cylinders for
the storage and transportation of compressed gases
2030 Supp.1 Foreign gas cylinder specifications
2030.1 Part 1: Cylinders for compressed gases other than acetylene
2030.2 Part 2: Cylinder for dissolved acetylene
2030.4 Part 4: Welded cylinders—Insulated
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

2430 Classification of hazardous areas


2430.1 Part 1: Explosive gas atmospheres
2809 Road tank vehicles for dangerous goods
2809.1 Part 1: General requirements
2809.2 Part 2: Tankers for flammable liquids
2809.3 Part 3: Tankers for compressed liquefiable gases
2809.4 Part 4: Tankers for toxic and corrosive cargoes
2809.5 Part 5: Tankers for bitumen-based products
2809.6 Part 6: Tankers for cryogenic liquids
4484 Industrial, medical and refrigerant compressed gas cylinder identification

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NZS
6101 Classification of hazardous areas
6101.1 Part 1: Flammable gas and vapour atmospheres
AS/NZS
1020 The control of undesirable static electricity
1425 LP Gas fuel systems for vehicle engines
1596 Storage and handling of LP Gas
2430 Classification of hazardous areas
2430.3 Part 3: Examples of area classification
2430.3.1 Part 3.1: General
2430.3.2 Part 3.2: Vehicle workshops, vehicle parking, fuel dispensing stations and
aircraft hangers
2430.3.3 Part 3.3: Flammable liquids
2430.3.4 Part 3.4: Flammable gases
2430.3.5 Part 3.5: Refineries and major processing plants
2430.3.6 Part 3.6: Laboratories including fume cupboards and flammable medical
agents
2430.3.7 Part 3.7: Landfill gas, sewage treatment and sewage pumping plants
2430.3.8 Part 3.8: Surface coatings and adhesives
2430.3.9 Part 3.9: Miscellaneous
3000 Electrical installations (known as the Australian/New Zealand Wiring Rules)
4761 Competencies for working with electrical equipment for hazardous areas
(EEHA)
4761.1 Part 1: Units of competency
4761.2 Part 2: Requirements for a structured program to develop competency
4761.3 Part 3: Modules supporting training
4761.4 Part 4: Assessing competency
MP
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

69 Explosion-protected electrical equipment—Certification scheme—Policy

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APPENDIX C
RELEVANT OVERSEAS STANDARDS

C1 INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION


IEC
60050 (426) International Electrotechnical Vocabulary
Chapter 426: Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres
60079 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres
60079-0 Part 0: General requirements
60079-1 Part 1: Construction and verification test of flameproof enclosures of
electrical apparatus
60079-1A First supplement:
Appendix D—Method of test for ascertainment of maximum
experimental safe gap
60079-2 Part 2: Electrical apparatus—Type of protection ‘p’ (TR)
60079-4 Part 4: Method of test for ignition temperature
60079-4A First supplement
60079-5 Part 5: Powder filling ‘q’
60079-6 Part 6: Oil-immersion ‘o’
60079-7 Part 7: Increased safety ‘e’
60079-10 Part 10: Classification of hazardous areas
60079-11 Part 11: Intrinsic safety ‘i’
60079-12 Part 12: Classification of mixtures of gases or vapours with air according
to their maximum experimental safe gaps and minimum igniting
currents (TR)
60079-13 Part 13: Construction and use of rooms or buildings protected by
pressurization
60079-14 Part 14: Electrical installations in hazardous areas (other than mines)
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

60079-15 Part 15: Electrical apparatus with type of protection ‘n’


60079-16 Part 16: Artificial ventilation for the protection of analyzer(s) houses
(TR)
60079-17 Part 17: Inspection and maintenance of electrical installations in
hazardous areas (other than mines)
60079-19 Part 19: Repair and overhaul for apparatus used in explosive atmospheres
(other than mines or explosives)
60079-20 Part 20: Data for flammable gases and vapours, relating to the use of
electrical apparatus (TR)
60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code)

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61241 Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust


61241-1-1 Part 1-1: Electrical apparatus protected by enclosures and surface
temperature limitation—Specification for apparatus
61241-1-2 Part 1-2: Electrical apparatus protected by enclosures and surface
temperature limitation—Selection, installation and maintenance
61241-2-1 Part 2-1: Test methods—Section 1: Methods for determining the minimum
ignition temperatures of dust
61241-2-2 Part 2-2: Test methods—Section 2: Method for determining the electrical
resistivity of dust in layers (TR2)
61241-2-3 Part 2-3: Test methods—Section 3: Method for determining minimum
ignition energy of dust/air mixtures
61241-3 Part 3: Classification of areas where combustible dust are or may be
present
61779 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of flammable gases
61779-1 Part 1: General requirements and test methods
61779-2 Part 2: Performance requirements for group I apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 5% methane in air
61779-3 Part 3: Performance requirements for group I apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 100% methane in air
61779-4 Part 4: Performance requirements for group II apparatus indicating up to
100% lower explosive limit
61779-5 Part 5: Performance requirements for group II apparatus indicating a
volume fraction up to 100% gas
61779-6 Part 6: Guide for the selection, installation, use and maintenance of
apparatus for the detection and measurement of flammable gases

C2 BRITISH STANDARDS
BS
229 Flameproof enclosures of electrical apparatus (Obsolescent)
787 Specification for mining type flameproof gate-end boxes
787.1 Part 1: Gate-end boxes for direct-on-line motor starting (for use on
three-phase a.c. circuits up to 650 V)
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

787.2 Part 2: Gate-end boxes with air-break circuit breakers (for use on three-
phase a.c. circuits up to 650 V)
787.3 Part 3: Gate-end boxes with lighting transformers
787.4 Part 4: Gate-end boxes for drilling machines (for use on three-phase a.c.
circuits up to 650 V)
1090 Specification for flameproof hand-held electric drilling machines primarily
for use in mines
3101 Specification for control and interlock circuits primarily associated with
flameproof restrained plugs and sockets for use in coal mines
3905 Specification for 3.8/6.6 kV, 300 A bolted flameproof cable couplers and
adaptors, for use in coal mines
4137 Superseded by BS EN 60029-14.
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4533 Luminaires Section 102.51 Particular requirements. Luminaires with type of


protection N
4683 Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres (IEC 60079-1 Eqv)
4683.2 Part 2: The construction and testing of flameproof enclosures of
electrical apparatus
4727 Glossary of electrotechnical, power, telecommunications, electronics,
lighting and colour terms (IEC 60050 (426) Idt)
5000 Rotating electrical machines of particular types for particular applications
5000.16 Part 16: Rotating electrical machines with type of protection ‘N’
5000.17 Part 17: Machines with flameproof enclosure
5067 Specification for flameproof transformers for use in mines
5125 50 A flameproof restrained and bolted plugs and sockets for use in coal
mines
5126 Mining-type flameproof supply and control units for use on systems up to
1100 V
5126.1 Part 1: Specification for direct on-line motor starters
5126.2 Part 2: Specification for circuit breaker units
5126.3 Part 3: Specification for air-cooled lighting transformer units
5126.4 Part 4: Specification for air-cooled transformers to power drilling
machinery
5345
5345.1 Parts 1 and 3 Superseded by BS EN 60079-14
to 8:
5345.2 Part 2: Superseded by BS EN 60079-10
5501 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres
5501.1 Part 1: General requirements (BS EN 50014)
5501.2 Part 2: Oil-immersion ‘o’ (BS EN 50015)
5501.4 Part 4: Powder filling ‘q’ (BS EN 50017)
5501.5 Part 5: Flameproof enclosure ‘d’ (BS EN 50018)
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

5501.6 Part 6: Increased safety ‘e’ (BS EN 50019)


5501.7 Part 7: Intrinsic safety ‘i’ (BS EN 50020)
5501.8 Part 8: Encapsulation ‘m’ (BS EN 50028)
5501.9 Part 9: Specification for intrinsically safe electrical systems ‘i’
(BS EN 50039)
5620 Specification for 200 A flameproof restrained and bolted plugs and sockets
for use in coal mines
5908 Code of practice for fire precautions in the chemical and allied industries
6182 Intrinsically safe power supplies for use in coal mines
6182.1 Part 1: Specification for d.c. power supplies
6182.2 Part 2: Specification for a.c. power supplies

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6182.3 Part 3: Specification for rechargeable battery units


6467 Electrical apparatus with protection by enclosure for use in the presence of
combustible dusts
6467.1 Part 1: Specification for apparatus
6467.2 Part 2: Guide to selection, installation and maintenance
6656 Guide to prevention of inadvertent ignition of flammable atmospheres by
radio-frequency radiation
6680 Specification for flameproof equipment for diesel engines for use in coal
mines and other mines susceptible to firedamp
6704 Code of practice for selection, installation and maintenance of intrinsically
safe electrical equipment in coal mines
6708 Flexible cables for use at mines and quarries
6742 Electrostatic painting and finishing equipment using flammable materials
6742.1 Part 1: Specification for hand-held spray guns and associated apparatus
(EN 50050)
6742.2 Part 2: Specification for selection, installation and use of hand-held
paint spray guns (energy limit of 0,24 mJ) and associated
apparatus (EN 50053: Part 1)
6742.3 Part 3: Specification for selection, installation and use of hand-held
powder paint spray guns (energy limit of 5 mJ) and their
associated apparatus (EN 50053: Part 2)
6742.4 Part 4: Specification for selection, installation and use of hand-held
flock paint spray guns (energy limit of 0,24 mJ or 5 mJ) and their
associated apparatus (EN 50053: Part 3)
6941 Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres with type of protection ‘n’
(BS EN 50021)
7019 Specification for fully screened 400 A bolted flameproof cable couplers and
adaptors for use on systems up to and including 6.6 kV, primarily for use in
mines
7117 Metering pumps and dispensers to be installed at filling stations and used to
dispense liquid fuel
7117.1 Part 1: Specification for construction
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

7202 Specification for non-incendive low voltage control/interlock and low


voltage earth fault monitoring circuits for use in mines
7430 Code of Practice for earthing
BS EN
50014 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. General
requirements
50015 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Oil-immersion ‘o’
50017 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Powder filling ‘q’
50018 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Flameproof
enclosure ‘d’

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50019 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Increased safety


‘e’
50020 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Intrinsic safety ‘i’
50021 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Type of
protection ‘n’
50028 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Encapsulation ‘m’
50039 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres. Intrinsically safe
electrical systems ‘i’
60079-10 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Classification of
hazardous areas
60079-14 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Electrical installations in
hazardous areas (other than mines)
60079-17 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Inspection and
maintenance of electrical installations in hazardous areas (other than mines)
BS IEC
60079-19 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Repair and overhaul for
apparatus used in explosive atmospheres (other than mines or explosives)
PD
60079-14 Guide to application of BS EN 60079-14

C3 CENELEC STANDARDS
EN
50014 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—General
requirements
50015 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Oil-
immersion ‘o’
50016 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Pressurized
apparatus ‘p’
50017 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Powder filling
‘q’
50018 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Flameproof
enclosure ‘d’
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

50019 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Increased safety


‘e’
50020 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Intrinsic
safety ‘i’
50028 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—
Encapsulation ‘m’
50033 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Caplights for
mines susceptible to firedamp
50039 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Intrinsically safe
electrical systems ‘i’
50050 Electrical apparatus for potentially explosive atmospheres—Electrostatic
hand-held spraying equipment
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50053 Requirements for the selection, installation and use of electrostatic spraying
equipment for flammable materials
50053.1 Part 1: Hand-held electrostatic paint spray guns with an energy limit of
0.24 mJ and their associated apparatus (only the paragraphs
dealing with the construction of apparatus)
50053.2 Part 2: Hand-held electrostatic paint spray guns with an energy limit of
5mJ and their associated apparatus (only the paragraphs dealing
with the construction of apparatus)
50053.3 Part 3: Hand-held electrostatic flock spray guns with an energy limit of
0.24 mJ or 5 mJ and their associated apparatus (only the
paragraphs dealing with the construction of apparatus)
50054 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of combustible gases.
General requirements and test methods
50055 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of combustible gases.
Performance requirements for Group I apparatus indicating up to 5% (M)
methane in air
50056 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of combustible gases.
Performance requirements for Group I apparatus indicating up to 100% (M)
methane in air
50057 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of combustible gases.
Performance requirements for Group II apparatus indicating up to 100%
lower explosive limit
50058 Electrical apparatus for the detection and measurement of combustible gases.
Performance requirements for Group II apparatus indicating up to 100% (M)
gas
50176 Automatic electrostatic spraying installations, for flammable liquid spraying
material
50177 Automatic electrostatic spraying installations for flammable coating powder
60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code) (IEC 60529)
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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APPENDIX D
TESTING STATIONS, CERTIFYING AUTHORITIES AND STANDARDS
BODIES
AFNOR
L’ Association Française de Normalisation.
French national Standards authority.

ANSI
American National Standards Institute.
One of the Standards bodies in USA.

ASTM
American Society for Testing and Materials
This society has played a major role in developing test methods Standards.

BKI-Ex
Hungarian Approval Service for Ex-proof Electrical Equipment.
Hungarian national testing and certifying authority.

BSI
British Standards Institution.
UK national Standards authority.

BVS
Westfalische Berggeerkschaftskasse Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke.
German testing and certifying authority for coal mining.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

CC Ex
China Certification Centre for Electrical Equipment for Explosive Atmospheres.
Chinese certification body for Ex equipment (equipment for explosive atmospheres).

CEN
European Committee for Standardization
European body responsible for the Standardization in all sectors except electrical
(responsibility of CENELEC) and most of the information and communication technologies
(which are largely the responsibility of ETSI).

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CENELEC
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization.
This committee produces harmonized Standards for its member countries.

CESI
Centro Electtrotecnico Sperimentale Italiano.
Italian national testing and certifying authority.

CM Ex C
China National Quality Supervision and Test Centre for Explosion-proof and Safety
Products for Coal Mines.
Chinese testing station for Ex equipment for coal mines.

CQST Ex
China National Quality Supervision and Test Centre for Explosion-protected Electrical
Products.
Chinese testing station for Ex equipment.

CSA International
Canadian Standards Association.
Canadian national Standards, testing and certifying authority.

DEMKO
Danmarks Elektrise Materialkontrol.
Denmark’s national testing, electrical approvals and certifying authority.

DIN
Deutsches Institut für Normung.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

German Institute for Standardization.

DMT
Deutsche Montan Technologie GmbH
DMT Company for Research and Testing-Certification Body.
German testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres (known as
‘ATEX equipment’ in Europe).

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EECS (formerly BASEEFA)


Electrical Equipment Certification Service
British certification body for equipment for explosive atmospheres

FM
Factory Mutual Research Corporation.
One of the two main approval authorities in the U.S.A. (the other is UL). FM will test
equipment to Australian Standards.

IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission.
International body with responsibility for electrotechnical Standardization. Its committee
TC 31 is responsible for writing the Standards for explosion-protection techniques.

INERIS
Institut National de L’environment Idustriel et des Risques.
French testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.

INSEMEX PETROSANI
Romanian national testing and certifying body.

ISA
Instrument Society of America.
Concerned with instrumentation generally, this society has had a major influence on US
intrinsic safety Standards and is involved with current IEC intrinsic safety work.

ISO
International Organization for Standardization.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

International body with responsibility for Standardization in all fields except electrical and
electronic engineering Standards, which are the responsibility of IEC.

ISSeP
Institut scientifique de service public
Belgian testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.

ITACS
International Testing and Certification Services.
One of the Australian testing stations for Ex equipment.

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JSA/JSI
The ‘Japan Standards Association’ publishes all the Japan Industry Standards (JIS), which
are prepared by the Japan Industry Standards Committee (JISC).

KOSHA (formerly KISCO)


Korean Occupational Safety and Health Agency.
Korean national testing and certifying authority.

LCIE
Laboratoire Central des Industries Electriques.
French national testing and certifying authority for above-ground industries.

LOM
Laboratorio Oficial Jose Maria Madariaga
Spanish testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.

NEMKO
Norges Elektriske Materielkontrol.
Norwegian national certifying authority.

NEPSI
National Supervision and Inspection Centre for Explosion-protection and Safety of
Instruments.
Chinese testing station for Ex equipment.

NV KEMA
Netherlands’ testing station for equipment for explosive atmospheres.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

NFPA
National Fire Protection Association.
This US authority publishes the National Electrical Code which includes requirements for
hazardous areas.

PTB
Physikalish-Technische Bundesanstalt.
German testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.

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SABS
South African Bureau of Standards.
South Africa’s national Standards authority.

SAI
Standards Australia International.
Australian national Standards authority.

SANZ
Standards Association of New Zealand.
New Zealand’s national Standards Authority.

SEV
Schweizerischen Elektrotechnischen Vereins (Swiss Electrotechnical Association)
Swiss national certifying authority.

SIMTARS
Safety in Mines Testing and Research Station.
Part of the Department of Mines and Energy, Queensland, SIMTARS tests equipment for
both coal mining and above-ground industries.

SIQ
Slovenian Institute of Quality and Metrology.
Slovenian national testing and certifying authority.

SIRA
SIRA Certification Services (SCS)
British certification body for equipment for explosive atmospheres.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

SP
(Sveriges Provnings och Forskningsinstitut)
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute.
Swedish national certifying authority.

TÜV
Techmischer Uberwachungsuerein.
German testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.

COPYRIGHT
219 HB 13—2000

TÜV-A or
TÜV Österreich
Austrian testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.
UL
Underwriters Laboratories Inc.
One of two main approval authorities in the U.S.A. (the other is FM). UL will test
equipment to Australian Standards.
VTT
Technical Research Centre of Finland
Finland’s testing station that certifies equipment for explosive atmospheres.
Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

COPYRIGHT
Electrical 8/25/00 4:26 PM Page 1

Operating locations
Head Office
New South Wales
286 Sussex Street (corner of Bathurst Street) HB 13—2000
Sydney NSW 2000
GPO Box 5420 Sydney NSW 2001
Phone: 02 8206 6000
Facsimile: 02 8206 6001
Website: www.standards.com.au
Sales Agencies
Ta s m a n i a
10 Barrack Street
Hobart TAS 7000
Phone: 03 6224 2380
Facsimile: 03 6224 4185
Website: www.standards.com.au
Victoria
19-25 Raglan Street
Electrical
South Melbourne VIC 3205
Phone: 03 9693 3000
Facsimile: 03 9696 1319
equipment
Website: www.standards.com.au
N o r t h e r n Te r r i t o r y
191 Stuart Highway
for
hazardous areas
Parap NT 0820
Phone: 08 8981 9666
Facsimile: 08 8941 0275
Website: www.standards.com.au
Queensland
232 St Pauls Terrace
Fortitude Valley QLD 4006
Phone: 07 3216 1355
Facsimile: 07 3216 0277
Website: www.standards.com.au
Newcastle
475 Hunter Street
Newcastle NSW 2300
Phone: 02 4925 0499
Facsimile: 02 4927 8721
Website: www.standards.com.au
A u s t r a l i a n C a p i t a l Te r r i t o r y
Gallery Level, The Boulevard
City Walk Canberra ACT 2601
Phone: 02 6249 8990
Facsimile: 02 6249 8989
Website: www.standards.com.au
South Australia
63 Greenhill Road
Wayville SA 5034
Phone: 08 8373 4140
Facsimile: 08 8373 4124
Website: www.standards.com.au
Western Australia
165 Adelaide Terrace
East Perth WA 6004
Phone: 08 9221 6700
Facsimile: 08 9221 6194
Website: www.standards.com.au

Manufacturing + Engineering

ISBN 0 7337 3587 8

Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001


Accessed by TRANSFIELD WORLEY on 30 Oct 2001

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