Memorial - Respondent (Final)

8TH FYLC – RANKA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2018
IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
AT NEW DELHI
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE APPEAL NO. ****/2018
SPECIAL LEAVE APPEAL FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
IN THE MATTERS OF
SURESH AND ORS.....................................................................................................APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN...........................................................................................RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

8th FYLC __ RANKA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETIITION, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................
STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED................................................................................................
1. THAT THE ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL

COURT IS TENABLE IN EYES OF LAW ................................................................................1
1.1 THE ACCUSED PERSON ARE GUILTY OF GANGRAPE AND KIDNAPPING
FOR RANSOM ..........................................................................................................................1
1.1.1 All The Ingredients Of GangRape Are Fulfilled In The Instant Case. .....................2
1.1.2 Accused Person Are Liable Under Kidnapping For Ransom. ...................................4
1.2 THERE WAS CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED
PERSONS ...................................................................................................................................5
1.2.1 All the accused have prior agreement to commit illegal act ......................................6
1.2.2 All the accused conspired together to commit the crime ...........................................7
1.2.3 That recovery completed by investiogating officers supports conspiracy .................8
1.3 THAT MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE IS FORGED........................................8
1.4 ACCUSED PERSON ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 25/27 OF ARMS ACT. ...9
1.5 THAT SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF BRIJESH IS A RELEVENT FACT
UNDER SECTION 8 ...............................................................................................................10
2. WHETHER CONVICTION OF ACCUSSED PEROSNS IS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT
OF ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ....................................................................11
2.1 MEDICAL EVIDENCE CORROBORRATES WITH DIRECT EVIDENCE ......12
2.1.1 Medical report is consistent with evidence of prosecutrix.......................................13
2.1.2 No further corroborration is required. ......................................................................14
2.2 THE CASE IS PROVED BEOYND REASONABLE DOUBT ................................14
2.2.1 Letting gulity escape is not doing justice according to law .....................................15
II
2.2.2 Minor inconsisitencies in prosecution evidence and witness statement cannot

disprove the guilt of the accussed. .........................................................................................16
2.3 SOLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTRIX (PW1) IS WHOLLY RELIABLE ......16
2.4 ELECTRONIC RECORD GENUINELY PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED ................................................................................................................................17
3. WHETHER LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH FINE IMPOSED BY TRIAL COURT IS
JUSTIFIED...................................................................................................................................18
3.1 LIFE IMPRISONMENT WILL ACT AS DETERREENCE ...................................19
3.1.1 Punishment should be proportional with gravity of offence ....................................20
3.2 GRANT OF 50 LAC COMPENSATION IS NON-ARBITRARY ...........................20
3.2.1 Constitutional frame work for victim compensation must be applied in the instant
case...................... ...................................................................................................................23
3.2.2 UN general assembly resolution recognises compensation for victims...................24
III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Adu Ram v. Mukna, (2005) 10 SCC 597...................................................................................... 20

Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1637 .................................................................. 17
Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1637 ................................................................... 15
Anil Sarkar v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3868 (Gau) ................................................................................. 12
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 2013 SC 2454. ....................................... 32
Ashok K. Salame v. State, 2001 CrLJ 1555 (Bom) ...................................................................... 12
B.C. Deva v. State of Karnataka 2007(3) Law Herald (SC) 2309 ................................................ 22
Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharastra, (1971) 3 SCC 432 ................................................ 18
Balbir Singh v. State of U.P, 2009 (1) A.C.R 650 at 655 (All). ................................................... 14
Bantu v. The state of up.,2008 (3) crimes 264(SC) ...................................................................... 14
Basant Raj v. State, 1994 Cr LJ 2137 (Raj). ................................................................................. 21
Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469 ..................................................... 15, 16
Brij Bhushan Sharma vs State Of U.P., 2001 CriLJ 1384 ............................................................ 26
Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 465 ............................................ 32
Chhotanney v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2013 ......................................................... 25
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416................................................................ 33
Damodar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414 ..................................................................... 15
Devender Pal Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2002 SC 1661 ............................................... 16
Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2006 SC 1267 ...................................................... 27
Gade Lakshmi v. State, (2001) 6 SCC 205 ................................................................................... 20
Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2013 SC 3008 .................................................... 26
Gunwantlal v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 1756. ....................................................................... 21
Gunwantlal v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 1756 ......................................................................... 20
Hanuman Prasad v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 1 SCC 50 ............................................................. 13
Hari Ram v. State, AIR 1960 MP 59 ............................................................................................ 23
Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516. .......................................................................... 30
Hra Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257................................................................. 15
Jabar Singh v Dinesh, (2010) 3 SCC 757 ..................................................................................... 19
Jalli v. State, 2001 CrLJ 4606 (MP ............................................................................................... 12
Jayawant v. State, (2001) 10 SCC 109 ......................................................................................... 27
Jheena V. State of M.P., 1986 Cri LJ 1375 (MP). ........................................................................ 24
Johan Tirki v. State of Assam, (2014) 1 Gau. L.R. 346 at p. 350 (Gau.) ..................................... 12
Kamaljit Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR 2004 SC 69 ................................................................... 23
Kamta v. State, AIR 1961 All 438 ................................................................................................ 20
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883 ............................................... 17
Kehar Singh v. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883..................................................................................... 18
Kishan Lai v. State of Raj, 2005(2) Cr LJ 1519 ........................................................................... 22
IV
Krishna Ghosh v. West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 2279 .................................................................... 21

Leenart Schussler v. Director of Enforcement, (1970) 1 SCC 152 .............................................. 16
Lillu @ Rajesh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 1784 ............................................................. 27
Madan Lal v. State, 2008 Cr LJ 2306(Raj) ................................................................................... 12
Mahendra Singh v. State Of West Bengal, 1974 SCC (3) 409 ..................................................... 20
Mange v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1194 ........................................................................... 24
Maru Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147 ........................................................................ 32
Mohado v. State, 1990 Cr LJ 858 ................................................................................................ 20
Mohd Usman Mohd Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1981 SC 1062..................... 16
Mohd. Abdul Razzak Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) DLT 385 ............................................... 30
Morendra v. State, AIR 1951 Cal 140. ......................................................................................... 20
Murari Thakur v state of bihar, (2009) 16 SCC 256. .................................................................... 19
Punjab Singh V. State of Haryana, AIR 1984 SC 1233................................................................ 24
R Venkatakrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 ........................................................................... 16
Rafik Khan Aggar Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 2005(2) Cr LJ 1284 ................................... 22
Rajinder @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 3022 ........................................... 27
Rajoo v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 858. ................................................................ 27
Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 858 ................................................................... 27
Rameshwar v. the State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54. .............................................................. 24
Ramzan v. State, 2010 Cr LJ 2607 (Raj). ..................................................................................... 20
Rattan Singh v. the State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719 ............................................................... 33
Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 84 ...................................................................... 32
Ravinder singh gorakhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584 ........................................................ 19
Ravji v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 2 SCC 175............................................................................. 11
Rissideo Pande v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 334 ....................................................... 14
Sanjay alias Kaka vs. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2001 SC 979 ................................................... 18
Sarwan singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1525. ................................................ 34
Sheikh Zakir v. State, 1983 SCR (2) 312...................................................................................... 22
Shivaji Saheb Rao v. State, AIR 1973 SC 2622 ........................................................................... 25
Shridhar Yeshwant Bhosale v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1380 (Bom). .................................................... 14
Shyam Narain v. The State of Nct of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 2209 ................................................. 31
Shyarna v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 Raj LW 146......................................................................... 23
Som Prakash vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 989 ...................................................................... 28
State (Delhi Administration) v. VC Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382 ................................................. 16
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 .............................. 18
State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392 ......................... 36
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kishanlal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 773 ........................................... 17
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh ,(1993) 2 SCC 622............................................... 24
State of Karnataka v. Raju, 2007 AIR (SC) 3225 ......................................................................... 25
State of M.P. v. Babulal, (2008) 1 SCC 234 ................................................................................. 29
V
State of M.P. v. Bala (2005) 8 SCC 1 ........................................................................................... 29

State of Maharastra v. Som Nath Thapa, AIR 1996 SC 1744 ...................................................... 15
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Ors, AIR 1996 SC 1393 ..................................................... 26
State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar AIR 1951 Raj 30 ..................................................................... 22
State of Rajasthan v. Roshan Khan, 2014 Cr.L.J. 1092 at p. 1097(S.C.) ..................................... 12
State of U.P v. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 SC 1998 ............................................................................ 25
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 19992 SC 840. ................................................... 25
State of W.B. v. Orilal jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418 ..................................................................... 26
State vs. Mohd. Afzal And Ors, 107 (2003) DLT 385. ................................................................ 28
Sudhir Shantilal Mishra v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 ......................................................................... 16
Suresh v. State of Haryana, 2015 Cri L J 661 ............................................................................... 34
Suresh v. The state of Haryana, (2015) 2 SCC 227 ...................................................................... 32
Surinder v. State, (1994) 4 SCC 366............................................................................................. 20
The State v. Md. Moinul Haque and Ors., (2001) 21 BLD 465 ................................................... 33
Virendra Kumar Gara Vs. State, 2001 II AD (Delhi) 319 ............................................................ 21
Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 9 .......................................................... 24
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3rd edn., 276 (1940) ............................................................................... 21

Antonio Maria Costa, The Application of the United Nation Standards and Norms in Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, United Nation Office on Drugs and Crimes (2003) Available
at ................................................................................................................................................ 35
Anushree, Right To Compensation Of Victims Of Crime In India: Need For A Comprehensive
Legislation, 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ALLIED ISSUES 35-
56 (2016). .................................................................................................................................. 33
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 595 (2004). ...................................................................................... 27
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between the Presence of Force and
the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1780-1809 (1992) ................................. 14
DR KN CHANDRASEKHARAN PILLAI, R.V. KELKERS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,614, ( 5th ed, 2008,
2012 reprint).............................................................................................................................. 34
DR KRISHNA PAL MALIK, PENOLOGY, VICTIMOLOGY AND CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN
INDIA, 213(2012)....................................................................................................................... 31
GORDON BROWN, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 21 CENTURY: A LIVING
DOCUEMENT IN CHANGING WORLD (2016) ............................................................................... 35
JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIMS RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RECONCEIVING THE
RIGHT OF THIRD PARTIES, 207(2008). ........................................................................................ 33
JUTA, POLICING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 159 (1997). ........................................................................ 35
K.I. VIBHUTE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A HUMAN RIGHT PERSPECTIVE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS IN INDIA (2004). ......................................................................................................... 34
VI
K.I. VIBHUTE, JUSTICE TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH, IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS IN INDIA 373 ( K.I. Vibhute
ed , 2004) .................................................................................................................................. 35
KELLY MCCRACKEN COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO
A REMEDY AND REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005). ........ 36
R. N. CHOUDHARY, ‘EXPERT EVIDENCE (MEDICAL AND NON-MEDICAL)’ (2nd Ed. , Orient
Publishing Co.) 287 (2004). ...................................................................................................... 23
RABINDRA K MOHANTY & SATYAJIT MOHANTY, TEXT BOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY, PENOLOGY AND
VICTIMOLOGY, 441(2012).......................................................................................................... 31
VII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondent has appeared in response to the petition filed by the appellants before this
Honourable Court under article 136 of the Constitution of India. The matter has been listed for
hearing.
VIII
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
1. Miss Gyanwati, aged 20 years, was studying in the Commerce College in Jaipur, B.com
(Final). A close friend of hers, Mr. Suresh, aged 22 years, was studying in the same College,
pursuing M.com. In light of her narrative, on 31.12.2017, after New Year’s Party, three
students intercepted Ms. Gyanwati, namely Suresh, Mahesh and Dinesh of the same college.
The assailants knocked down her scooty, kidnapped her on gun point and took her in a Honda
City, bearing the number “HR 16F 7337” to a place in Jaipur. They went inside a room where
two of the students were waiting already. The victim was taken there and after that all of them
drank Scotch Whisky and stripped the victim naked. She resisted and cried, but she was raped
by five people including Virender, who is a minor.
2. On 01.01.2018 at about 4:00 pm Suresh came with Brijesh who had a good personality. Suresh
made an offer to him for intercourse and he accepted, and after that they raped the victim one
after the other. Resultantly, her uterus was ruptured, she turned unconscious, and ended up
with bruises on the breast and other parts of the body.
3. On 02.01.2018, Mahesh contacted the father of the victim, Manmohan on phone and informed
him that her daughter had been kidnapped and raped. They also added that if he wants his
daughter back, then he will have to come with the specified amount at specified place with 5
lacs else she will be killed and thrown. Her father conceded and on 03.01.2018 he was
contacted again on phone by Brijesh, and was asked to come at 11:00 am at hill side with
money and no arms. Her father reached the same place and was received by Dinesh, was
physically searched by him and after he had handed over the bag and his phone, he was taken
to the place where his daughter was being held. Her father took her home and warned that her
that her videos will be uploaded on the internet if they decided to make a report but they took
the decision to report to the police nevertheless, and see that the culprits are caught and
prosecuted.
4. FIR No. 10 dated 03.01.2018 for the offences under section 376,364, 364A/34 IPC r/w Sections
25/27 of the Arms Act was lodged at Chaksu Police Station and the statements of the victims
was recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. The statements of the victim and her father were recorded with
the facts and events that have been stated above. Shri Sukhbir Singh was appointed as the
IX
investigation officer. While pursuing the investigation, they visited the place where the
incident had been allegedly taken place and found/recovered the following: -
(i) Honda City registered in the name of Villas Chand, father of Brijesh.
(ii) Mobiles of all the accused
(iii) Iron chains, black rope, whisky bottles, cash of Rs 4,80,000/-
(iv) Gun with 20 cartridges
(v) Evidences in support of the victim and her statement
(vi) Matriculation certificate of Virender with the date of birth. The investigating officer
arrested all the accused except Brijesh, who was declared as proclaimed offender. The
arrested accused identified the victim, the recovered above stated articles but denied
the charges.
5. On 04.01.2018 victim was examined by the doctor and the medical report revealed rape and
bodily injury and that the victim would become, from then on, an infertile woman. On
identification parade, the accused were identified by the victim and her father. After the
investigation drill, charge sheet under sections 376, 364A, 465, 471, 120B IPC and Sections
25/27 of the Arms Act was made against all of the accused. The charges were framed against
the accused under the above sections of law to which they pleaded to not be guilty. The accused
person in the course of their statements under section 313 Cr. P.C. stood by their denial of
charges. Prosecution examined 27 witnesses. And 14 witnesses were also examined in defence.
6. Judgement of trial court: The trial court convicted the accused and the co-accused under the
above-mentioned sections of law. All the accused were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for life time and were fined with Rs. 10,000/- each. All the accused were directed to
compensate the victim with an amount of Rs.50 lacs jointly and severally and the state
government was also directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10 lacs to the victim.
7. Verdict of high court: The PWs 24, 25, 26 and 27 have endeavoured to prove by giving the
printed copy of the call details and also has adduced a certificate relatable thereto as required
u/s 65B (4) of the Evidence Act. The verdict of the High Court affirmed what had been
previously upheld by the Trial Court in its verdict, and refused to put aside the verdict of the
Trial Court on acount of the verdict suffering from an infirmity of law, as had been contended
by the accused.
X
8. All the accused persons have filed appeals against the affirmation by the appellate court. they
have challenged constitutional validity of life imprisonment and draconian levy of fine and
compensation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has admitted appeals. Notices have been issued to
the victims, her father, central and state government and all states as to the appeal an in regard
to constitutional validity of the provisions.
XI
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the judgement of conviction passed by the learned trial court is tenable in the eyes of
law?
2. Whether the conviction of an accused person is justified on the basis of oral and documentary
evidence?
3. Whether life imprisonment with fine imposed by the trial court is justified?
XII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THAT THE JUDGEMENT OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL

COURT IS TENABLE IN THE EYES OF LAW
All the accused persons are answerable for confirmed offences in the immdiate case. As the
accused persons have prior settlement to commit forbidden act. There is crininal treachery on
the part of the accused. Matriculation credential is bogus as trial court convicted Virender with
other accused persons. Subsequent behaviour of Brijesh is a relevent fact under section
8.kidnapping the victim on gunpoint establishes the conviction of accused persons under arms
act.
II. CONVICTION OF ACCUSED PERSONS IS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF ORAL AND

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Medical report and the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is consistent and reliable. The
prosecution evidences proves the case beoynd reasonable doubt. Electronic record genuinely
prove the guilt of the accused.
III. THAT LIFE IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED WITH FINE IMPOSED BY TRIAL COURT
IS JUSTIFIED
Letting gulity escape is not doing justice according to law.keeping this view, incarcenation for life
is totally legitimate and justified. Seeing the mental trauma and physical wounds faced by the
prosecutrix, the trial court has given 50 lakh as a compensation rightly. Award of punishment is
proportional to the barbaric and brutal gangrape done by the accused perosns and they deserves
harsh punishment seeing the nature of the crime and non-possibility of reformation. Right to
compensation is also recognised by United general assembly.
XIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1.THAT THE ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL COURT

IS TENABLE IN EYES OF LAW
1. It is humbly submitted before this Honorable Court that the decision of HC to dismiss the
appeals against order of conviction by the trial court is justifiable. Firstly, the accused persons Shri
Suresh, Shri Mahesh, Shri Dinesh, Shri Gyanesh, Shri Virender and Shri Brijesh are guilty of offences
charged under section 364A, 376D, 465, 468, 471 of IPC & Section 25/27of Arms Act read with section
120B of IPC. All the evidences adduced in the instant case clearly prove the guilt of all the accused
persons and hence, they should be convicted. As to prove each & every charges alleged, respondent
will deal with all the charges separately.
2. The Supreme Court has held in the said case that it is the nature and gravity of the crime
but not the criminal, which are germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in a criminal
trial. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime
which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to
which the criminal and the victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be
irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the
crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and should
"respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal".1
1.1 THE ACCUSED PERSON ARE GUILTY OF GANGRAPE AND KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
3. It is humbly submitted before the honorable bench that to prove a charge of gang rape, the
prosecution need not to prove that all the persons comprising the group did actually commit the
offense of rape. Even if one person in the group commits rape, all the persons of the group shall
be equally liable and would be deemed to have committed gang rape. However, the only exception
to this absolute rule is that the group of persons must act in furtherance of their common intention,
i.e., it must be shown and proved that they had acted in furtherance of their common intention to
commit rape on the woman.2 Further, it is contended that all the accused person have the common
intention to commit rape and the essentials of gang rape are fulfilled. The allegation was that the
1
Ravji v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 2 SCC 175.
2
Johan Tirki v. State of Assam, (2014) 1 Gau. L.R. 346 at 350 (Gau.).
1
appellant-accused persons lifted prosecutrix took her to millet field and committed rape on her.
Her testimony that when was holding her the other was committing rape was found reliable and
trustworthy. It was held that offense under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code was proved
as eye witnesses and the medical report had corroborated her statement.3
4. As per the medical evidence, four persons had committed rape on the prosecutrix. Where there
is more than one person acting in furtherance of their common intention of committing rape on
a victim, it is not necessary that the prosecution should adduce clinching proof of a completed
act of rape by each one of the Accused on the victim.4
5. The accused persons had made a severe sexual assault turn by turn when the prosecutrix was
alone in the house. Their conviction under section 376 was held proper.5 In this case, evidence of
prosecutrix was corroborated by the medical evidence and injuries on the private part of the victim
were found severe. Hence they deserve no leniency in a sentence.
6. The prosecutrix testified that the accused took her to the field and raped her turn by turn and her
evidence was corroborated by medical evidence. The conviction of the accused and sentence of
10 years R.I. with a fine of Rs. 10000/- was held proper.6 In an instant case the accused could
furnish no explanation as to why they remained at the house of the prosecutrix for four hours on
the date of the incident. The guilt of the accused undoubtedly was proved and conviction was
upheld.7
7.In the light of the authorities cited, the case of the prosecution that all the five accused named
Suresh, Mahesh, Dinesh, Gyanesh and Virendra, forcefully naked the prosecutrix and they all
raped her. Even Suresh and Brijesh acting in furtherance of common intention raped the
prosecutrix and the same being supported by Medical Report and some bodily injury to the
prosecutrix, thus all the accused persons are guilty of the alleged offenses.
1.1.1 All The Ingredients Of GangRape Are Fulfilled In The Instant Case.
8.Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons, each of the persons must be
deemed to have committed gang rape, when it is committed, by one or more from the group, in
furtherance of their common intention. The offense of gang rape embodies the principle of joint
3
Madan Lal v. State, 2008 Cr LJ 2306 (Raj).
4
State of Rajasthan v. Roshan Khan, 2014 Cr.L.J. 1092 at 1097 (S.C.)
5
Ashok K. Salame v. State, 2001 CrLJ 1555 (Bom).
6
Jalli v. State, 2001 CrLJ 4606 (MP).
7
Anil Sarkar v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3868 (Gau).
2
liability. The essence of the joint liability is the existence of common intention. Common intention
pre-supposes prior concert or meeting of minds of all the persons constituting the group.8
9. Pradeep Kumar v. Union Administrator, Chandigarh,9 the Supreme Court has stressed that the
prosecution is required to prove to bring the offense of rape as gang rape that:
a) there was a group of persons that decided to act in concert with the common intention to
commit rape on the victim,
b) more than one person from the group, in furtherance of the common intention , has acted
or participated in concert in the commission of rape with pre-arranged plan and
c) one or more persons (not necessarily everyone) of the group, in pursuance of the common
intention, has actually committed the offence of rape. Every one of the group is deemed to
have committed the rape. The essence of the liability is the existence of common intention.
10. That the accused persons have kidnapped the prosecutrix and all the five accused persons
acting in furtherance of common intention forcefully raped her. That Suresh on same day asked
Brijesh to establish sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix and the same being accepted by
Brijesh, they both raped the prosecutrix one after the other, which clearly establish their act in
furtherance of common intention and are guilty of the offense of Gang-rape under Sec. 376D of
IPC.
11. That the cruel and heinous act committed by the accused persons on prosecutrix, she had
become unconscious and her uterus was ruptured and she would not be able to give birth to child
thereafter. That such heinous act committed by accused persons on prosecutrix as a consequence
violated the basic human right i.e Right to live with Human Dignity and Social Life.
12. That the prosecutrix has to face the social stigma after this incident throughout her life that
she won’t be able to give birth to a child and live a healthy social Life.
13. “The offense of rape in its simplest term is the ravishment of a woman, without her consent,
by force, fear or fraud or as the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will.”10
Offense of rape is a crime against basic human rights. It violates article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
8
Hanuman Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 1 SCC 507.
9
Pradeep Kumar v. Union Administrator, Chandigarh, (2006) 10 SCC 608.
10
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between the Presence of Force and the Absence of
Consent, 92 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1780-1809 (1992).
3
14. Supreme Court upheld the view that common intention may develop on the spur of the
moment. However, in such cases, the court held, there has to be cogent material to arrive at the
find to hold all the accused vicariously liable for the criminal acts by invoking S.34 of the IPC.11
1.1.2 Accused Person Are Liable Under Kidnapping For Ransom.
15. The offense under section 364A of the IPC is punishable with death or imprisonment for
life and imposition of a fine is also mandatory. No discretion has been given to the courts to
reduce the sentence of imprisonment. Therefore, the high court also cannot reduce the sentence
of imprisonment awarded by the trial court.12
16. The sentence in case of Ransom: the only option given to the court is to award punishment
of death or life imprisonment in a case where offense u/s. 364A of IPC is proved. There is no
option, and no power is given to the court to award lesser punishment. Therefore request of the
accused to award lesser punishment was not accepted.13
17. That the accused persons after committing rape on prosecutrix, has made a demand for the
handsome amount for Ransom of Rs.5,00,000/- (IN WORDS Rupees FIVE LAC ONLY) and
intimated the prosecutrix as well as her father that if the ransom amount is not paid, then she
would be killed and her body will be thrown in the pond.
18. That the father of prosecutrix Mr. Manmohan, under the threat of life to her daughter
borrowed five lac rupees from Gyanchand and has paid to the accused persons. That the
Investigating agency has recovered the cash of Rs. 4,80,000/- and other items and the same was
identified by the accused persons.
19. That the same is corroborated by the testimony of lenders i.e. PW-14, as he identified the
some of the packets of the currency through the initials and names as labeled by him.
20. That the act of the accused persons following up the demand of ransom under the threat of
her elimination leaves no manner of doubt that they had resorted to extracting a handsome amount
of Ransom through abduction. That the facts are clear and establish the guilt of the accused
persons beyond any reasonable doubt.
11
Rissideo Pande v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 334.
12
Balbir Singh v. State of U.P, 2009 (1) A.C.R 650 at 655 (All).
13
Shridhar Yeshwant Bhosale v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1380 (Bom).
4
1.2 THERE WAS CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED PERSONS
21. Conspiracy is a substantive offense, “The offense of criminal conspiracy exists in the very
agreement between to more persons to commit a criminal offense, irrespective of the further
consider whether or not the offense has actually been committed or to break law.”14 And during
its subsistence, whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts, he would be
guilty.15 Since direct evidence is generally difficult to adduce in cases involving conspiracy
charge.16 To constitute a conspiracy, meetings of minds of two more persons for doing an illegal
act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the
conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one
of the conspirators take an active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial acts.
22. When the ultimate offense consists of a chain of actions, it is not necessary for the
prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had
the knowledge of what the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use. 17 It is
also not necessary that each conspirator to either know all the details of the scheme or participate
at every stage of the conspired act.18
23. It’s not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of formation of the
criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about
the object, which the objector set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and about the
manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of
inference.19 Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence become
relevant in determining complicity of the accused. The existence conspiracy and its objects have
to be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the accused.20
24. That the accused persons have cordially acted in furtherance to the criminal conspiracy and
the same is corroborated by the testimony of the prosecutrix which establishes the stage-wise
development following her abduction till her release and the same has remained unshaken
14
Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469.
15
Damodar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414.
16
Hra Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257.
17
State of Maharastra v. Som Nath Thapa, AIR 1996 SC 1744.
18
Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1637.
19
Devender Pal Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2002 SC 1661.
20
State (Delhi Administration) v. VC Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382.
5
substantially by her cross-examination and recovery of the alleged items from the place of
incident.
1.2.1 All the accused have prior agreement to commit an illegal act.
25. ‘Agreement’ is the rock bottom of the criminal conspiracy. ‘Agreement’ is the sine qua
non for constituting the offense of criminal conspiracy. Its essence is the unlawful combination.
It evolves unity of object or purpose, rather than physical unity neither entertaining an evil wish21
nor mere coincidence of blemish intentions among persons makes them parties to an agreement22
A mere thought of the criminal character.23 Or discussion to commit a crime.24 Does not per se
constitute an agreement? It is complete when the combination is framed to commit an offense. It
is immaterial whether anything has been done in pursuance of the unlawful agreement.25
26. While considering the nature of proof required to prove conspiracy, it is not necessary for
the prosecution to prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done an illegal
act; the agreement could be proved by necessary implication.26
27. It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to end of
the conspiracy some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first
entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot
but be treated as conspirators.27 “Every conspirator is liable for all the acts of the co-conspirators
if they are towards attaining the goals of the conspiracy, even if some of them had not actively
participated in the commission of the offenses.”28
28. That the chain of facts establishing the act to the criminal conspiracy is:
 The prosecutrix was abducted by Suresh, Mahesh and Dinesh and
 then the prosecutrix was raped by all the accused including Gyanesh and Virendra,
 the Brijesh and Suresh cordially again raped the prosecutrix,
 demand for the amount of ransom by Mahesh and Brijesh on the telephone, and
 the father of the prosecutrix met to Dinesh
21
State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253.
22
Leenart Schussler v. Director of Enforcement, (1970) 1 SCC 152 .
23
R Venkatakrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737.
24
Sudhir Shantilal Mishra v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1.
25
Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469.
26
Mohd Usman Mohd Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1981 SC 1062.
27
Supra note 22
28
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kishanlal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 773.
6
 the amount for ransom has been collected by Mahesh and released the prosecutrix under threat
if they would make any report, her video would be flashed out on social media and she will
be killed.
In the light of the authorities cited, the accused persons are guilty for the offense under Sec.
120B of IPC.
1.2.2 All the accused conspired together to commit the crime.
29. It is, however, essential that the offense of conspiracy requires some kind of physical
manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual
meeting of two persons is necessary, nor is it necessary to prove the actual words of
communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts or sharing the unlawful design may
be sufficient.29 “A conspiracy is not broken into several conspiracies when a new member joins
the conspiracy and different individuals perform different acts. It is a continuous offense. It
continues from the time of agreement to the times of its termination.”30
30. Conspiracy is a continuing offense and it continues to subsist and committed, whenever
one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts. So long as its performance continues, it is a
continuing offense until it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity.31
31. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, covering the principle of agency,32 lays down
the conditions for assessing the evidence of co-conspirators sufficient to prove conspiracy as
against other conspirators. For this, however, three ingredients need to be covered:
a) There should be prima facie evidence regarding the involvement of two or more people
in forming an agreement
b) If the above condition is fulfilled, then anything said, done or written by any one of them
in reference to the common intention33 will be evidence against the others; and
c) Anything said, done or written by the conspirator after34 the common intention was formed
by any of them would be admissible35
29
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883.
30
Supra note 22.
31
Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1637.
32
Supra note 22.
33
Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharastra, (1971) 3 SCC 432.
34
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600.
35
Kehar Singh v. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883.
7
32. That the evidence as to transmission of thoughts and sharing the common intention to do an
illegal act can be inferred from the acts of the accused persons from the point of abduction to
her release. That the accused persons shared the common intention to abduct, rape the
prosecutrix and to demand ransom amount putting the life of prosecutrix under threat.
1.2.3 That recovery completed by investigating officers supports the conspiracy.
33. It is humbly submitted before the honorable bench that Recovery made by investigating officer
proves the articles used in the commision of the offense of conspiracy. Although Recovery is
not supported by any independent witness does not mean that it is irrelevant. In support of the
said contention, The honorable Supreme Court held That no independent witnesses were
associated with recovery (discovery) under Section 27, Evidence Act is not sufficient to create
doubt regarding the truth of the prosecution version.36
1.3 THAT MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE IS FORGED.
34. It is humbly submitted before the honorable bench that Trial court prima facie discarded
the evidence of matriculation certificate of Virender and punished him with other accused
persons. It is reasonably presumed that Virender was major at the time of the commission of a
crime and now at this appellate stage this issue cannot be raised. In support of the contention, the
apex court in a landmark case held that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the juvenile
justice (care and protection of children) Act, 2000 as amended by the amendment of 2006. we are
of the opinion that this point cannot be raised at this stage because neither was it taken before the
trial court nor before the high court. even otherwise, we do not find any merit in the said
contention. the question of the age of the appellant-accused is a question of fact on which
evidence, cross-examination, etc. is required and, therefore, it cannot be allowed to be taken up
at this late stage. hence, we reject this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. In
these circumstances, we find no merit in this appeal and hence it is dismissed. 37
35. This court has once held that, “in case of a dispute with regard to the age of the person
who is alleged to have committed the offense, the court has to appreciate the evidence having
36
Sanjay alias Kaka vs. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2001 SC 979.
37
Murari Thakur v state of bihar, (2009) 16 SCC 256.
8
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and it will be the duty of the court to accord the
benefit to a juvenile, provided he is found to be a juvenile and not to give the same benefit to a
person who, in fact, is not a juvenile and cause injustice to the victim.”38
36. The trial court, as we have discussed, has given good reasons for discarding the evidence
adduced by respondent 1 in support of his claim that he was a juvenile at the time of commission
of the alleged offense and there was no scope to hold that the order of the trial court was either
illegal or improper and the high court should not have substituted its own finding for that of the
trial court on the age of respondent 1 at the time of commission of the alleged offense by re-
appreciating the evidence.in the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order
dated 18-8-2006 of the high court in sb criminal revision petition no. 166 of 2006 and remit the
matter to the trial court for the trial of respondent 1 in accordance with law treating him not to be
a juvenile at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.39
37. That the matriculation certificate as to the question of the age of Virender is forged so as
to gain the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act. That the objection as to such question of fact has
not been raised at the earliest, nor before the Hon’ble High Court, now such objection cannot be
allowed to be taken up at a late stage. Thus the act of the accused persons committed forgery and
used forged Matriculation certificate as Genuine, are guilty under section 465, 468 & 471 of IPC.
1.4 ACCUSED PERSON ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 25/27 OF ARMS ACT.
38. It is humbly submitted before the honorable bench that accused Suresh, Dinesh and Mahesh
used Gun For kidnapping the victim and the recovery made by investigating officer also concludes
that they are possessing a gun wrongfully and used the same in the commission of the offense. In
the evidence on the record, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the existence of the arms in
the almirah was without the appellant’s knowledge or that his possession of the arms was
unconscious. Though undoubtedly the possession was without a proper license. His conviction
under section 25(1)(a) of the ArmsAct,1959 is fully justified.40
39. Fire worthy ammunition etc. were recovered from the possession of the accused. Arrest
memo and recovery memo were proved by an independent witness. Held that conviction under
38
Ravinder singh gorakhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584.
39
Jabar Singh v Dinesh, (2010) 3 SCC 757.
40
Mahendra Singh v. State Of West Bengal, 1974 SCC (3) 409.
9
Section 3/25 of the Arms Act of the accused from whose possession those ammunitions were
recovered was proper. 41
40. Recovery of crime article is an important piece of evidence42 Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing
an appropriate sentence.43
41. Ammunitions, which are Live cartridge.44 Punishment for certain offenses‘ possession’
‘possession’ does not mean physical or actual possession only but includes constructive
possession.45A person may be held guilty if he is in joint possession.46 “Possession is an offense
when it is with intention or consciousness or knowledge.”47 Where there was the recovery of an
unlicensed country-made pistol and life cartridges from the accused conviction on the basis of
evidence of police officials is not illegal.48 The Section 27 of the Arms Act, which includes the
punishment for using arms Possession can be constructive.49 Unlawful possession is different
from the intention to use the same for an unlawful purpose.50
42. That the recovery of Gun with 20 cartridges from the place of incident is a reliable piece
of evidence. That the gun, in joint possession of all the accused persons, was used for the unlawful
purpose that is to abduct the prosecutrix. That all the accused persons have committed a series of
illegal act sharing prior agreement. Thus all the accused persons are liable to be punished for the
offenses under 25/27 of Arms Act.
1.5 THAT SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF BRIJESH IS A RELEVANT FACT UNDER SECTION 8 OF

INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT.
43. In it was held that the accused absconded immediately after the incident and such conduct
of the accused absconding from the incident is a strong factor to prove his guilt and the question
41
Ramzan v. State, 2010 Cr LJ 2607 (Raj).
42
Gade Lakshmi v. State, (2001) 6 SCC 205.
43
Adu Ram v. Mukna, (2005) 10 SCC 597.
44
Surinder v. State, (1994) 4 SCC 366.
45
Gunwantlal v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 1756.
46
Kamta v. State, AIR 1961 All 438.
47
Morendra v. State, AIR 1951 Cal 140.
48
Mohado v. State, 1990 Cr LJ 858.
49
Gunwantlal v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 1756.
50
Basant Raj v. State, 1994 Cr LJ 2137 (Raj).
10
of recovery of the weapon or otherwise would not affect the prosecution case and accused is liable
for conviction.51
44. The fact that the accused is trying to flee from justice or abscond is also relevant as an
inculpatory fact.52Flight from justice and its analogous conduct have always been deemed
indicative of a consciousness of guilt. It is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s
flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, the assumption of a false name, and
related conduct are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.53
45. That the Brijesh absconded to flee from Justice and must be tried together with other
accused persons guiding under section 223(a) of CrPC, “person accused of the same offense
committed to course of the same transaction may be charged jointly”. Absconding after the
incident is a relevant fact under section 8 of IEA.
2. WHETHER CONVICTION OF ACCUSED PERSONS IS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF

ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
46. In a rape case conviction of the accused can be based solely on the evidence of the
prosecutrix if her evidence is “worthy of credence” the Rule of Corroboration is not Rule of Law,
but only Rule of Prudence. It is advisable but it is not compulsory in the eye of law because then
no formula or procedure of any type of which could tell that what kind of evidence should or
would not be corroborated or what kind of single evidence for conviction of the accused for
evidence of victim entitling to great weight and care as decided in the various judgment of Rape
Case.54
47. The statement made by a raped girl to another person immediately after the rape is
admissible in evidence as corroborative evidence as held in Sheikh Zakir Case.55 It is a cardinal
rule in the law of evidence that the best available evidence should be brought before the court.
48. The statement of the mother of the child victim consisting of what had been narrated to her
by her daughter shortly after the incident amounts to corroboration, and what weight should be
attached to the evidence is entirely a different matter as held in Rameshwar Case.56
51
Virendra Kumar Gara Vs. State, 2001 II AD (Delhi) 319.
52
Krishna Ghosh v. West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 2279.
53
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3rd edn., 276 (1940).
54
Rameshwar Kalyan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54.
55
Sheikh Zakir v. State, 1983 SCR (2) 312
56
State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar AIR 1951 Raj 30.
11
49. No injury on external masks of her body it does not mean that rape was not committed.57
In Kishan Lai Case58 the victim age was 14/16 years it was held that injury to hymen not necessary
because shape and texture of the hymen is variable, sometimes this variation permits penetration
without injury or increased elasticity, sometimes the hymen may be more firm less elastic and
gets stretched and lacerated earlier. It relatively less forceful penetration which may not give rise
in injuries ordinarily possible with a peaceful attempt.
50. In another case, it was held that if the medical report does not disclose any evidence of
sexual intercourse, yet even in the absence of any corroboration of medical evidence, the oral
testimony of the prosecutrix, which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy
has to be accepted.59
51. That coming to the case in hand Medical Report is corroborated by the testimony of
prosecutrix, which is credible enough to establish the guilt of the accused persons. That the
narration of the whole incident by Mr. Manmohan to his wife Mohini, who cross-checked the
prosecutrix is also credible and admissible so as to corroboration.
2.1 MEDICAL EVIDENCE CORROBORRATES WITH DIRECT EVIDENCE
52. Medical examination of the victim always plays the very important role in case of the rape.
As there is usually no eye-witness of the act, and the accused and victim used to say in their
interest only, the medical evidence is one of the ways which help to find out the true fact. Medical
Examination of the victim had always been a mandatory requirement. 60The evidence of the girl
and her father supported by medical evidence may be found to be sufficient to establish the
offense.61 That the testimony of prosecutrix corroborated with the medical report, various bodily
injuries, rupture of uterus, and bruises on breast and other parts of the body is sufficient enough
to establish the offense.
53. The corroboration which can be drawn inference by the medical evidence from the internal
and external injuries present on the body of the victim and the accused, seminal stains on the
57
Rafik Khan Aggar Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 2005(2) Cr LJ 1284.
58
Kishan Lai v. State of Raj, 2005(2) Cr LJ 1519.
59
B.C. Deva v. State of Karnataka 2007(3) Law Herald (SC) 2309
60
Section 53 of The Code of Criminal Procedure.
61
Hari Ram v. State, AIR 1960 MP 59
12
clothes, private parts of the victim coupled with the opinion of medical expert that there is a
penetration of penis or any object can establish the testimony of the victim.62
2.1.1 Medical report is consistent with evidence of prosecutrix.
54. Where the eyewitnesses account is found credible and trustworthy, medical evidence
pointing out to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Eye-witnesses account
would require careful independent assessment and evaluation for their creditability which should
not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence as the sole
touchstone for the test of such credibility.63
55. In Kamaljit Singh V. State of Punjab,64 It has been stated in this case that where sufficient
materials had been produced to prove the presence of the accused as well as eye-witness at place
and time of occurrence. The fact that some or more records, which could have been produced, but
not shown, to be deliberately withheld could not by itself cast any shadow of doubt on veracity
of the prosecution version. It was held that minor variations between medical evidence and ocular
evidence were not relevant.
56. Sometimes, the eyewitness and the medical evidence may not be exactly of similar opinion,
but ultimately both the evidences may lead to the same story. In such a case, both the evidences
will not lead to any contradiction. In Jheena v. State of M. P.,65 eye-witnesses were deposing that
the injuries on deceased were caused with heavy sticks and sabbal, but according to post-mortem
report, injuries on head of deceased were five lacerated wounds, which was the result of fracture
of parietal bones and right mandible. It was held that the injuries on the head were sufficient to
cause death, therefore conviction was proper.
57. In Punjab Singh V. State of Haryana,66 it was stated that if the direct evidence is satisfactory
and reliable, in case of inconsistency between the medical evidence and direct evidence, the
medical evidence cannot override the direct evidence.
62
Shyarna v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 Raj LW 146.
63
R. N. CHOUDHARY, ‘EXPERT EVIDENCE (MEDICAL AND NON-MEDICAL)’ (2nd Ed. , Orient Publishing Co.) 287
(2004).
64
Kamaljit Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR 2004 SC 69.
65
Jheena V. State of M.P., 1986 Cri LJ 1375 (MP).
66
Punjab Singh V. State of Haryana, AIR 1984 SC 1233
13
58. As stated in the Mange v. State of Haryana,67 a Court cannot discard the direct evidence of
credible and unimpeachable witnesses deposing to facts observed with their own eyes, merely on
the opinion of medical witnesses.
2.1.2 No further corroboration is required.
59. The Supreme Court has held: “Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that
the statement of the prosecutrix if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no
corroboration”. That the testimony of prosecutrix of the whole incident is further corroborated by
the recovery of alleged items from the place of incident, bodily injuries to the prosecutrix, bruises
on the breast are worthy of credence and sufficient enough to establish the prosecution case.
60. The apex court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to
corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has
to be weighed and not counted. A conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix if her evidence inspires confidence and there is the absence of circumstances which
militate against her veracity.68
61. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya
Pradesh,69 placing reliance on the earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. the State of Rajasthan70.It
was held in another case that “It needs no emphasis that the physical scar may heal up, but the
mental scar will always remain. When a woman is ravished, what is inflicted is not a merely
physical injury but the deep sense of some deathless shame. An accused cannot cling to a fossil
formula and insist on corroborative evidence, even if taken as a whole, the case spoken to by the
victim strikes a judicial mind as probable. Judicial response to human rights cannot be blunted by
legal jugglery.”71
2.2 THE CASE IS PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
62. It is humbly submitted before this Honorable Court that present case is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The general rule is that a party who desires to move the court must prove all
67
Mange v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1194
68
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh ,(1993) 2 SCC 622
69
Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 9.
70
Rameshwar v. the State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54.
71
State of Karnataka v. Raju, 2007 AIR (SC) 3225.
14
facts necessary for that purpose72but it is subject to the exception that he will not be required
to prove such facts as are necessarily within the knowledge of another party.73 In the present
case the burden of proving that the accused had not committed the offense of Gangrape,
kidnapping for ransom & forgery lies on the accused.
63. The prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the
accused.74Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish.75“A judge does not
preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also
presides to see that a guilty man, does not escape. Both are public duties.”76It is to be
remembered that miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than
from the conviction of the innocent.77
64. A reasonable doubt must not be an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt
based upon reason & common sense arising out of the evidence of the case. 78In the above-
mentioned facts, it is clearly stated that the crime was committed by the accused persons & not
by any other person. It is clearly establishing the chain of circumstantial evidence. There is no
doubt in this as to “may have committed or has committed”79 the prosecution has established
this by legal, reliable & unimpeachable evidence for a conviction to be sustained. Also, in the
present case, there is no two views are possible.
2.2.1 Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law.
65. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or
lingering suspicions and thereby destroy a social defense. Justice cannot be made sterile on the
plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty
escape is not justice, according to law.80
72
Section 101 of IEA, 1872.
73
Section 106 IEA, 1872.
74
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 19992 SC 840.
75
Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1978 SC 1091.
76
State of U.P v. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 SC 1998.
77
Shivaji Saheb Rao v. State, AIR 1973 SC 2622.
78
Chhotanney v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2013.
79
Brij Bhushan Sharma vs State Of U.P., 2001 CriLJ 1384.
80
State of W.B. v. Orilal jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418.
15
2.2.2 Minor inconsistencies in prosecution evidence and witness statement cannot disprove the
guilt of the accused.
66. Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty bound
to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an
otherwise reliable prosecution case. 81
2.3 SOLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTRIX (PW1) IS WHOLLY RELIABLE
67. the statement made by the victim under sec 161 of Cr.P.C. had not only outlined the whole
incident, but also her version under sec 164 of Crpc and at the trial are adequate to protect the
web of the development commencing from her forcible abduction and gangrape till her release.
68. it is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Bench that the only eyewitness to the actual
act of rape and abduction is the victim herself, who has suffered mental and physical abuse.
So, the evidence of PW-1 as a whole, in our estimate is truthful having regard to the details
provided with accompanying clarity and conviction.
69. The evidence of a girl `or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, should not
be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion. Her evidence is entitled to great weight even
without corroboration. A victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice of crime82 and is a victim
of another man’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain
amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice.83 Her statement has to be
evaluated on par with that of an injured witness in cases of physical violence. 84 In fact, the
testimony of a rape victim stands on a higher pedestal than that of an injured witness for the
reason that an injured witness suffers only physical injuries, whereas the prosecutrix suffers
Psychologically and emotional too.85 Sexual assault causes greatest distress and humiliation to
her. Ordinarily, no injured witness tells a lie or implicates a person falsely.86 Refusal to act on
the testimony of the victim of the sexual assault in the absence of corroboration, as a rule, is
81
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Ors, AIR 1996 SC 1393
82
Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2013 SC 3008.
83
Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2006 SC 1267.
84
Rajoo v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 858.
85
Lillu @ Rajesh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 1784.
86
Rajinder @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 3022.
16
adding to the insult to injury.87 That the testimony of prosecutrix, disclosing the identity of the
accused persons, description of the place where she was kept and raped by all the accused
persons, leading to the recovery of items from the place of incident is solely credible enough
to establish the prosecution case.
70. The witness who identified the accused saw the latter for a few minutes only. But if his
evidence is cogent, consistent and without motive, it cannot be rejected.88
2.4 ELECTRONIC RECORD GENUINELY PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
71. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the evidence is “something that tends to prove or
disprove the existence of an alleged fact.”89Electronic evidence, for the purpose of this paper,
may simply be defined as a piece of evidence generated by some mechanical or electronic
processes. It inculcate but not restricted to e-mails, text documents, spreadsheets, images,
graphics, database files, deleted files, data back-ups, located on floppy disks, zip disks, hard
drives, tape drives, CD-ROMs, PDAs, cellular phones, microfilms, pen recorders and faxes
etc( as mentioned in table 1 below).
72. the Supreme Court has rightly observed that “in our technological age nothing more primitive
can be conceived of than denying discoveries and nothing cruder can retard forensic efficiency
than swearing by traditional oral evidence only thereby discouraging the liberal use of
scientific aids to prove guilt.”90
73. while appreciating the reliance placed by the prosecution upon the call records, observed that
'computer generated electronic records is evidence, admissible at a trial if proved in the manner
specified by Section 65B of the Evidence Act.91
74. A brief background of the Evidence Act and the underlying principles of evidence will help
the reader to understand and appreciate the real purport and implications of the decision of
Supreme Court in its true spirit and the manner in which digital records can be adduced as
evidence in Indian courts.92
87
Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 858
88
Jayawant v. State, (2001) 10 SCC 109
89
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 595 (2004).
90
Som Prakash vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 989.
91
Rakesh Kumar and Ors. V State, (Criminal Appeal No. 19/2007 decided on 27.08.2009)
92
Manisha T. Karia and Tejas D. Karia, ‘India’ in STEPHEN MASON, ed, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (3rd eds., LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2012).
17
75. The Supreme Court held that “Technological advancement like facsimile, Internet, e-mail, etc.
were in swift progress even before the Bill for the Amendment Act was discussed by
Parliament. So when Parliament contemplated notice in writing to be given we cannot overlook
the fact that Parliament was aware of modern devices and equipment already in vogue.” In
State vs. Mohd. Afzal And Ors93 the court held that Computer generated electronic records is
evidence, admissible at a trial if proved in the manner specified by Section 65B of the Evidence
Act.
76. That the accused persons have demanded the amount of ransom through a phone call to father
of the prosecutrix putting the life of the prosecutrix under the threat of elimination. That the
call was made Mahesh and then by Brijesh. That Manmohan on meeting with accused persons
has handed over his mobile to Mahesh.
77. Coming to the credibility of Electronic call record, the printed copy of the computer generated
Electronic call record produced before the Hon’ble Court, was kept in usual ordinary course
of Business and stored in hard disc of Company server and the same has been supported by the
testimony of PW- 24, 25, 26, & 27 and also adduced a certificate under section 65B(4) of
Indian Evidence Act, which is essential for admissibility of Electronic record.
3. WHETHER LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH FINE IMPOSED BY TRIAL COURT IS

JUSTIFIED
78. It is humbly submitted before the honorable bench that in light of perusal and record of all
evidence, it is conclusive that they have not only committed offense gangrape and kidnapping
for ransom but also committed forgery in furtherance of criminal conspiracy so it is prima facie
reasonable to punish all the accused person for imprisonment for life which is totally valid
and constitutional.
79. That the life of the victim is ruined due to permanent disablement of her uterus and it would
not be justifiable if the criminals will remain unpunished. It is true that reformation as a theory
of punishment is in fashion but under the guise of applying such theory, the courts cannot
forget their theory, the courts cannot forget their duty to the society and to the victim. The court
93
State vs. Mohd. Afzal And Ors, 107 (2003) DLT 385.
18
has to consider the plight of the victim in a case involving rape and the social stigma that may
follow the victim to the grave and which in most cases, practically ruins all prospects of a
normal life for the victim. Could a court afford to forget these aspects while imposing a
punishment on the aggressor?94
80. The social impact of the crime, particularly where it relates to the offenses against women,
cannot be lost sight of and per se requires exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude of the
imposition of meager sentence or too sympathetic view may be counterproductive in the long
run and against social interest which needs to be cared for, protected and strengthened by a
string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.95 The social impact of the crime,
particularly where it relates to the offenses against women, cannot be lost sight of and per se
requires exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude of the imposition of meager sentence or too
sympathetic view may be counterproductive in the long run and against social interest which
needs to be cared for, protected and strengthened by a string of deterrence inbuilt in the
sentencing system.96
3.1 LIFE IMPRISONMENT WILL ACT AS DETERRENCE
81. It is humbly submitted before the honorable bench that All the accused have not only
committed a crime against an individual but also against society so they must be given
maximum punishment. where four persons who were guests of the neighbor, raped a woman
which led to her death. In this case, the Supreme Court held, “it is unfortunate but a hard fact
that all these accused have committed a heinous and inhumane crime for the satisfaction of
their lust but it cannot be held with certainty that this case falls in the rarest of rare cases.” The
top court had commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. While comparing the Bano
case with others, the court observed that there was no repetition of crime and the accused were
not history-sheeters or hard-core criminals97
94
State of M.P. v. Bala (2005) 8 SCC 1¶ 17.
95
State of M.P. v. Babulal, (2008) 1 SCC 234.
96
Id.
97
Mohd. Abdul Razzak Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) DLT 385, 2003 (71) DRJ 178,
19
3.1.1 Punishment should be proportional with the gravity of the offence
82. It Is humbly submitted the manner in which the accused persons have committed the offense
of gangrape in a very brutal manner so the imposition of imprisonment for life is totally
justified in proportion to the gravity and nature of the offence. Likewise, stressing upon the
principle of proportionality in sentencing in this Court stressed that special reasons must be
assigned for taking a lenient view and undue sympathy for the accused is not justified. It was
equally important to keep in mind rights of the victim as well as society at large and the
corrective theory on the one hand and deterrence principle, on the other hand, should be
adopted on the basis of factual matrix. The following paragraphs from the said judgment under
the caption "sentencing policy" need to be referred to:98
83. “The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence imposed on an offender should
reflect the crime he has committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offense.
This Court has repeatedly stressed on the central role of proportionality in the sentencing of
offenders in numerous cases”99
84. the Hon'ble apex court while dealing with the imposition of sentence on a rape convict
observed that “the fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based on the principle that
the accused must realize that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in his life
but also a concavity in the social fabric. the purpose of just punishment is designed so that
individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the collective do not suffer time and
again for such crimes.” this observation sounds that the Hon'ble supreme court has
been moving towards crime control model of criminal justice and retributive theory
of punishment, at least in the cases of the crimes committed against women.100.
3.2 GRANT OF 50 LAC COMPENSATION IS NON-ARBITRARY
85. The evolution of the concept can be traced where Manu in Chapter VIII, Verse 287 clearly
says that: "If a limb is injured, a wound is caused or blood flows, the assailant shall be made
to pay the expense of the cure or the whole."He further in Verse 288 says that: "He who
damages the goods of another, be it intentionally or unintentionally, shall give to the owner a
98
Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516.
99
Id.
100
Shyam Narain v. The State of Nct of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 2209.
20
kind of fine equal to damage."In S. S. Ahluwalia vs. UOI101, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
in expanded meaning attributed to Article 21 of the Constitution, where the State fails to protect
the life of the people, it could not escape the liability to pay compensation to the victims.
86. In the instant case, although the compensation provided by trial court is ultra vires to Rajasthan
victim compensation scheme but there are some central compensation schemes also which
talks about the compensation and a harmonious approach must be applied to see the condition
of victim, huge expanses in treatment of uterus rupture, mental trauma, and stigma of sexual
assault in society.
87. That when there is a conflict between special provision and a general provision, special
provision will always prevail. That section 357A of Cr.P.C. is the special legislation and the
central compensation scheme like CWCS is also special legislation so both must be construed
harmoniously in the instant case seeing the veracity and nature of the offense compensation of
50 lakh for the restoration of life of the victim is just and proper.
88. The legal definition of victim includes a person who has suffered direct or threatened physical,
emotional or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime; or in the case of the
victim being an institutional entity, any of the harms by an individual or authorized
representative of another entity.102
89. We all know that the recent judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad
vs. State of Maharastra103 & Suresh Vs. The state of Haryana,104 has cast a duty on every Court
to consider the case of grant of compensation. On the other hand in the recent case of Chairman,
the Supreme Court ordered the payment of Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation to a Bangladeshi
national who was repeatedly raped by Railway employees.105
90. It is a weakness of our jurisprudence that the victims of the crime, and the distress of the
dependants of the prisoner, do not attract the attention of the law. Indeed, victim reparation is
still the vanishing point of our criminal law. “This is a deficiency in the system which must be
rectified by the Legislature. We can only draw attention in this matter.”106
101
(2001) 4 SCC 452
102
DR KRISHNA PAL MALIK, PENOLOGY, VICTIMOLOGY AND CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA, 213(2012),
see also RABINDRA K MOHANTY & SATYAJIT MOHANTY, TEXT BOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY, PENOLOGY AND
VICTIMOLOGY, 441(2012).
103
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 2013 SC 2454.
104
Suresh v. The state of Haryana, (2015) 2 SCC 227.
105
Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 465.
106
Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 84.
21
91. Victim’s rights in India came into the focus of researchers only by late 1970’s studies.107
Initiatives by the University of Madras108 in early 1980’s culminated in the foundation of
Indian society of victimology,109 which drafted a Bill on victim assistance in 1996. Apart from
various recommendations of law commissions110. An important approach with respect to
victim’s right to compensation is recommendations of Malimath committee on reforms of the
criminal justice system in 2003. The committee recommended for a holistic “justice” to victims
of crime by allowing them, as a matter of right, in criminal proceedings as well to seek
compensation for the loss or injury.111
92. the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India,112 stressing the importance of
victim’s right to compensation; “A victim of crime cannot be a ‘forgotten man’ in the criminal
justice system. It is he who has suffered the most. His family is ruined particularly in the case
of death and another bodily injury. This is apart from factors like loss of reputation,
humiliation, etc. An honor which is lost or life which is snuffed out cannot be recompensed
but then monetary compensation will at least provide some solace.” Thus it can be stated that
object of granting compensation to the victim is to alleviate the sufferings of the victim, to
make the loss easier to bear for the victim and his family, re-humanize victims and restore their
dignity.113 It also has its object to encourage the victim to report the crime and cooperate with
the criminal justice system.
93. Fair trial rights of the accused are given predominance in the Criminal justice administration
in the country and hence the victims do not get their due attention. This situation was
highlighted even by the apex court in Rattan Singh v. the State of Punjab,114 wherein it was
observed that “It is a weakness of our jurisprudence that victims of crime and the distress of
the dependents of the victim do not attract the attention of the law. In fact, the victim reparation
is still the vanishing point of our criminal law. This is the deficiency in the system, which must
be rectified by the legislature.”
107
Kumaravelu Chockalingam, Measures For Crime Victims In The Indian Criminal Justice System Avaiable at
www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS.../No81_11VE_Chockalingam.pdf.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Forty first , onefifty fourth and one fifty fifth Law Commission
111
Malimath commitiie report
112
Maru Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147
113
JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIMS RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RECONCEIVING THE RIGHT OF THIRD
PARTIES, 207(2008).
114
Rattan Singh v. the State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719.
22
94. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh has interestingly observed that "victims of rape should be
compensated by giving them half of the property of the rapist as compensation in order to
rehabilitate them in the society. If not adopting this liberal reasoning, we should at least be in
a position to provide substantial compensation to the victims.115 In the case of D.K. Basu v.
State of West Bengal,116 the Supreme Court held that monetary compensation for redressal by
the court is useful. It is perhaps the only effective remedy to ‘apply balm to the wounds’ of the
family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family.
3.2.1 Constitutional framework for victim compensation must be applied in the instant case.
95. Art. 40 of the Constitution of India, which provide for equal justice is inclusive of victims
rights to compensation. “Article 41 inter alia states that state shall make effective provisions
for “securing public assistance in the “cases of disablement” and in the “case of undeserved
want”.
96. The expressions disablement and other cases of undeserved want could be surely interpreted
to include victims of crime and hence is a state is obliged to provide public assistance to victims
by way of monetary compensation apart from guaranteeing other rights to them.117 The Cr.P.C.
defines victim and provides for compensation to the victim of crime. Section 357 of Cr.P.C. is
the most important provision which provides for the grant of compensation to the victims of
crime. This provision combines the procedures of both criminal and civil process as it would
be just and necessary so as to save time and money in seeking remedies in two different
courts.118
97. As per the Criminal procedure code Amendment Act, 2008, Section 357 A of Cr.P.C.119 was
inserted which specifically recognized victims right to compensation. The said provision deals
with the victim compensation scheme. The provision stipulates that every state government in
consultation with the Central govt shall prepare a scheme for providing funds for the purpose
115
The State v. Md. Moinul Haque and Ors., (2001) 21 BLD 465.
116
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416.
117
Anushree, Right To Compensation Of Victims Of Crime In India: Need For A Comprehensive Legislation, 2
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ALLIED ISSUES 35-56 (2016).
118
DR KN CHANDRASEKHARAN PILLAI, R.V. KELKERS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,614, ( 5th ed, 2008, 2012 reprint).
119
This provision was inserted on the basis of 152nd and 156th report of the recommendations of Law commission in
1994 and 1996 respectively.
23
of compensation to the victim of a crime or his dependants who require rehabilitation and who
have suffered loss or injury due to the crime.120
98. Malimath Committee has also made recommendations with respect to the right of the victim.
Apart from making many salutary recommendations121. for rights of victims, the committee
made a strong recommendation for separate legislation by parliament for victim compensation
which should provide for victim compensation fund. While awarding compensation court should
first determine whether it is a fit case for awarding the same. 122 The object of this provision is to
reassure the victim that he is not a forgotten party in the criminal justice system.
99. Thus the word “may” used in Sec 357 of Cr.P.C. must be read as “shall”.123A landmark
decision in victim compensation under Sec 357A of Cr.P.C. came very recently the Supreme
Court awarded an interim compensation under Sec 357 A and directed the state to pay a number
of Rs 10 lakhs to the family of the victims who had been abducted and murdered.124
3.2.2 UN general assembly resolution recognizes compensation for victims.
100. As per UN Declaration of Basic principles of justice for victims, 1985 Victim is defined as
“persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental
injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental
rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within the
member states, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power.125
101. Right to compensation is recognized in UDHR and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.126 Considering victim as the key player in the criminal justice process, UN
general assembly passed The UN Declaration on the Basic principles of justice for victims of
crime and abuse of power in 1985.127 The Declaration lays down basic standards for the fair
treatment of victims, consideration of their views in the criminal justice process, restitution
120
Sec 357 A (1) of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
121
K.I. VIBHUTE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A HUMAN RIGHT PERSPECTIVE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS IN INDIA
(2004).
122
Sarwan singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1525.
123
Supra note 114.
124
Suresh v. State of Haryana, 2015 Cri L J 661
125
Principle A.1.
126
GORDON BROWN, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 21 CENTURY: A LIVING DOCUEMENT IN
CHANGING WORLD (2016).
127
K.I. VIBHUTE, JUSTICE TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH, IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS IN INDIA 373 ( K.I. Vibhute ed , 2004)
24
and compensation.128 The declaration defines crime prevention as a victim’s rights issue and
guarantees victims access to justice and fair treatment, right to information, assistance, and
access to informal dispute resolution methods.129 The UN Convention against Transnational
organize Crime, The standard minimum rules for noncustodial measures130and the Vienna
declaration on crime and justice.131Thus it can be concluded that the recent efforts of the UN
are in line with giving emphasis to victim’s rights including the right to compensation.
102. When compensation is not fully available from the offender or other sources, States should
endeavor to provide financial compensation to132:
a) Victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical or mental
health as a result of serious crimes;
b) The family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or become physically or
mentally incapacitated as a result of such victimization.133
103. The establishment, strengthening, and expansion of national funds for compensation to
victims should be encouraged. Where appropriate, other funds may also be established for this
purpose, including in those cases where the State of which the victim is a national is not in a
position to compensate the victim for the harm.134
104. The UN General Assembly passed another resolution which deals with the rights of victims
of international crimes and human rights violations.135 These Principles were quoted with
approval by this Court in the following words:136 “In recent years the right to reparation for
victims of a violation of human rights is gaining ground. United Nations Commission of Human
Rights has circulated draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for
Victims of Violation of Human Rights
128
JUTA, POLICING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 159 (1997).
129
Supra note 24 at p31
130
Antonio Maria Costa, The Application of the United Nation Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, United Nation Office on Drugs and Crimes (2003) Available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/standards%20&%20norms.pdf
131
Supra note 24 at p32.
132
A/RES/40/34.
133
Article 12, ‘Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Abuse of Power 1985, A/RES/40/34.
134
Article 13, ‘Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Abuse of Power, A/RES/40/34,
A/RES/40/34.
135
KELLY MCCRACKEN COMMENTARY ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND
REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005).
136
State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392.
25
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced,
it is most humbly prayed before this Honorable Court that it may be pleased to declare:
1. THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HIGH COURT IS TENABLE IN THE
EYES OF THE LAW, AND SHOULD BE UPHELD IN THIS COURT.
2. THAT THE COMPENSATION BEING AWARDED TO THE VICTIM IS JUSTIFIED IN THE EYES OF THE
LAW, AND SHOULD NOT BE DENIED TO THE VICTIM.
And pass any other order that it deems fit in the lightb of justice, equity and good conscience.
XIV

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8TH FYLC – RANKA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2018

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE APPEAL NO. ****/2018

SURESH AND ORS.....................................................................................................APPELLANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1. THAT THE ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL

2.2.2 Minor inconsisitencies in prosecution evidence and witness statement cannot

Adu Ram v. Mukna, (2005) 10 SCC 597...................................................................................... 20

Krishna Ghosh v. West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 2279 .................................................................... 21

State of M.P. v. Bala (2005) 8 SCC 1 ........................................................................................... 29

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3rd edn., 276 (1940) ............................................................................... 21

I. THAT THE JUDGEMENT OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL

II. CONVICTION OF ACCUSED PERSONS IS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF ORAL AND

1.THAT THE ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL COURT

1.1.2 Accused Person Are Liable Under Kidnapping For Ransom.

1.2.2 All the accused conspired together to commit the crime.

1.2.3 That recovery completed by investigating officers supports the conspiracy.

1.3 THAT MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE IS FORGED.

1.5 THAT SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF BRIJESH IS A RELEVANT FACT UNDER SECTION 8 OF

2. WHETHER CONVICTION OF ACCUSED PERSONS IS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF

2.1 MEDICAL EVIDENCE CORROBORRATES WITH DIRECT EVIDENCE

2.1.1 Medical report is consistent with evidence of prosecutrix.

2.1.2 No further corroboration is required.

2.2 THE CASE IS PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

2.2.1 Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law.

2.3 SOLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTRIX (PW1) IS WHOLLY RELIABLE

2.4 ELECTRONIC RECORD GENUINELY PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED

3. WHETHER LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH FINE IMPOSED BY TRIAL COURT IS

3.1 LIFE IMPRISONMENT WILL ACT AS DETERRENCE

3.1.1 Punishment should be proportional with the gravity of the offence

3.2 GRANT OF 50 LAC COMPENSATION IS NON-ARBITRARY

3.2.2 UN general assembly resolution recognizes compensation for victims.

EYES OF THE LAW, AND SHOULD BE UPHELD IN THIS COURT.

LAW, AND SHOULD NOT BE DENIED TO THE VICTIM.

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