Balkan Entanglements -

Reproducerea integrald sau partiald, multiplicarea prin orice mijloace §i sub once
forma, cum ar fi xeroxarea, scanarea, transpunerea in format electronic sau audio,
Peace of Bucharest
punerea la dispozitia publica, inclusiv prin internet sau prin retele de calculatoare,
stocarea permanentd sau temporara pe dispozitive sau sisteme cu posibilitatea
recuperdrii informatiilor, cu scop comercial sau gratuit, precum §i alte fapte
similare sdvdr§ite fdrd permisiunea scrisd a detindtorului copyrightului reprezintd
o incdlcare a legislatiei cu privire la protectia proprietdtii intelectuale §i se
pedepsesc penal §i/sau civil in conformitate cu legile in vigoare.

Edited by
Matei Gheboianu & Cosmin lonita

ecHturaL imiver^it^pi din Jbucure^

2016
 © ecStura univensMpi din bucure^'
CONTENT
§ o s . P a n d u r i , 90-92, Bucuregti - 050663, R o m a n i a
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Web: www.editura.unibuc.ro

Preface 7

GREAT POWERS A N D THEIR B A L K A N INTERESTS 11

D T P & coperta: Fiorina F L O R I T A
Aleksandra K o l a k o v i c , F r e n c h i n t e l l e c t u a l s o n the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n
interests i n the B a l k a n s (1894-1914) 13

Foto coperta: „Participanti la Conferinta Balcanica de Pace de la Bucuresti B i l j a n a Stojic, F r e n c h d i p l o m a c y t o w a r d R o m a n i a d u r i n g the B a l k a n W a r s

din 18 iulie 1913 ", fotografie a tabloului realizat de G . D . Teodorescu (1912-1913) 31
Sursafoto: M u z e u l N a t i o n a l de Istorie a R o m a n i e i

C o s m i n lonita, R u s s i a ' s b r i n k m a n s h i p i n the B a l k a n W a r s 53

R u d o l f D i n u , R o m a n i a n strategy i n the B a l k a n s before the W o r l d W a r 1 85

Toatd raspunderea de copyright foto revine autoruluL

W A R A T HOME: T H ETWO B A L K A N MILITARY CONFLICTS 109

Descrierea C I P a Bibliotecii Nationale a Romaniei J^drzej P a s z k i e w i c z , P o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of G r e e k i n v o l v e m e n t i n the
Balkan Entanglements - Peace of Bucharest / e d . b y : Matei Gheboianu, F i r s t B a l k a n W a r (1912-1913). h i t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l context I l l
C o s m i n lonita. - Bucure§ti: E d i t u r a Universitatii d i n Bucure§ti, 2016
I S B N 978-606-16-0791-4 B o g d a n Popa, " P e a s a n t - c i t i z e n - s o l d i e r " : B o d y c u l t u r e , w a r , a n d p r e j u d i c e
i n 1913 R o m a n i a 125
I. G h e b o i a n u , Matei (ed.)
II. lonita, C o s m i n (ed.)
Jaroslaw R u b a c h a , T h e B u l g a r i a n m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g the Second
B a l k a n W a r a c c o r d i n g to the P o l i s h d a i l y n e w s p a p e r " C z a s " 139
94(497)

R a d u Stancu, S o c i a l i m p a c t , p r o p a g a n d a a n d etat d ' e s p r i t i n R o m a n i a

d u r i n g the S e c o n d B a l k a n W a r 153
A SHORT TRUCE I N T H EBALKANS: T H EPEACE CONFERENCE
OF BUCHAREST 165
Zoran Bajin, " W e ' l l break y o u r teeth" or the splendors a n d miseries of the
B a l k a n League. M i r o s l a v Spalajkovic at the Peace Conference of Bucharest 167 PREFACE

B o g d a n Catana, I m m e d i a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the B u c h a r e s t Peace T r e a t y of

1913 u p o n the R o m a n i a n - S e r b i a n r e l a t i o n s 191 O n 10 A u g u s t 1913, B u c h a r e s t b e c a m e the spotlight of E u r o p e a n politics.
Since the b e g i n n i n g of a u t u n m 1912, the B a l k a n states h a d b e e n e n g u l f e d into a n
Liljana Gushevska & Natasha Kotlar-Traykova, Aromanians in all-out w a r firstly to e x p e l the O t t o m a n E m p i r e f r o m the area a n d s e c o n d l y to
M a c e d o n i a before a n d d u r i n g the B a l k a n W a r s ( i n d i p l o m a t i c sources)... 201 e n s u r e the biggest territorial g a i n at the e n d of f i g h t i n g . T h e h y b r i d cormection
created i n 1912 b e t w e e n the B a l k a n states m a n a g e d to e n s u r e the first task a n d to
V l a d i m i r Cretulescu, T h e G r e c o - R o m a n i a n C o n f l i c t P e r t a i n i n g to the u n d e r m i n e the second one. D u r i n g less t h a n a year, the b o r d e r s w i t h i n the B a l k a n
A r o m a n i a n Q u e s t i o n , as R e f l e c t e d i n O n e of A p o s t o l M a r g a r i t ' s W r i t i n g s - P e n i n s u l a r e c o r d e d a s t o u n d i n g changes. F o r the first t i m e i n the h i s t o r y of the last
a Discourse-Analytical Approach - 217 f i v e centuries, the C h r i s t i a n states i n the area h a d the c a p a b i l i t y to face their biggest
e n e m y a n d free their co-nationals that w e r e still u n d e r the O t t o m a n y o k e .
Kyrillos Nikolaou, Identity and migration dilemmas: Ottoman Greeks and T h e b e g i n n i n g of the 2 0 * c e n t u r y r e p r e s e n t e d a p e r i o d of t u r m o i l for the
O t t o m a n J e w s , f r o m the B a l k a n s to A m e r i c a (1900-1914) 243 w h o l e of E u r o p e . I n the m i d s t of the debates there w e r e s e v e r a l constant i s s u e s
g e n e r a t e d b y the B a l k a n states as n e w actors o n the stage. T h e d i s p u t e s b e t w e e n
t h e m a n d the d i s p u t e s w i t h their n e i g h b o r s , l e a v i n g a s i d e the c o n t i n u o u s c o n f l i c t
w i t h the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t role i n the a g e n d a of m a n y
E u r o p e a n capitals. I n c r e a s i n g amoxmts of p r e s s u r e w e r e generated by the
unresolved "Southern Slav problem". The Russian Empire, with a new
d i p l o m a c y , d e c i d e d to p l a y a m a j o r role i n the B a l k a n s , b r i n g i n g together
B u l g a r i a a n d S e r b i a for a c o m m o n c a u s e . F o r the A u s t r o - H i m g a r i a n E m p i r e , the
c r e a t i o n of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l state w i t h a S l a v i c p o p u l a t i o n w a s of m a j o r c o n c e r n ,
g e n e r a t i n g s e r i o u s s o c i a l a n d ethnic tensions. T h e O t t o m a n s c o n t i n u e d to see the
B a l k a n s as their o w n t e r r i t o r y , w h i l e the latest c h a n g e s d i s t u r b e d the S u b l i m e
P o r t e because it e n d a n g e r e d b o t h her r e g i o n a l status a n d h e r n a t i o n a l t r a n q u i l i t y .
O v e r a l l , the B a l k a n W a r s b u r s t i n t o the E u r o p e a n a f f a i r s i n o r d e r to s o l v e
the d i f f e r e n t latent i s s u e s a m o n g the c o u n t r i e s f r o m t h i s p a r t of the c o n t i n e n t . B u t
after the w a r against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , the m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s of the B a l k a n
L e a g u e - B u l g a r i a , S e r b i a , G r e e c e a n d M o n t e n e g r o - c r a s h e d into a n r n t e r - a l l i e d
conflict. B u l g a r i a h a d b e e n a c c u s e d of a t t a c k i n g h e r f o r m e r allies b u t the
g o v e r n m e n t s i n B e l g r a d e a n d A t h e n s h a d done little to a v o i d a c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
R o m a n i a ' s e n t r y i n t o the w a r b y c r o s s i n g into B u l g a r i a a n d o c c u p y i n g a stretch of
l a n d at her S o u t h - E a s t e m frontier d e f i n e d the o u t c o m e of the w a r . S a n c t i o n e d b y
the G r e a t P o w e r s , the R o m a n i a n a r m y ' s c a m p a i g n w a s r e g a r d e d as a m i s s i o n to
 g PREFACE PREFACE 9

e n d the conflict. F o r h e r role i n s t o p p i n g the b l o o d - s p i l l i n g i n the B a l k a n s , during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)" bring more evidence regarding the

R o m a n i a w a s g r a n t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of b e c o m i n g the m e d i a t o r b e t w e e n the evolution of F r e n c h interests and intellectual t h i n k i n g i n this previously

belligerent countries of the Second B a l k a n W a r . The Peace Conference in Ottoman-dominated area. Connected to the French policy, in "Russia's
B u c h a r e s t that c o n c l u d e d the f i g h t i n g o n d i f f e r e n t B a l k a n territories a i m e d to b r i n k m a n s h i p i n the B a l k a n W a r s " , C o s m i n l o n i t a assesses the a i m s a n d the
f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the n e w B a l k a n s y s t e m . B o t h the belligerents a n d the G r e a t o u t c o m e s of the r i s k y f o r e i g n p o l i c y generated i n St. P e t e r s b u r g to w a s h a w a y
P o w e r s h a d a n interest i n e n d i n g the f i g h t i n g , b u t a l l u n d e r s t o o d that the the m e m o r y of the B o s n i a n c r i s i s . T h e last s t u d y of the c h a p t e r belongs to R u d o l f
settlement w a s a m e r e b a n d a g e for a n a r e a w i t h deep w o u n d s . D r n u a n d it offers the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e f r a m e w o r k for R o m a n i a n p o l i c y . T h e article
T h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of the B a l k a n W a r s , i n R o m a n i a e s p e c i a l l y , h a s b e e n n a m e d " T r i p l e A l l i a n c e ' s O u t p o s t o n the D a n u b e . R o m a n i a n Strategy i n the
e n r i c h e d after the f a l l of c o m m u n i s m . A s n u m e r o u s a r c h i v e s b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e to B a l k a n s before the W o r l d W a r I " explains numerous reasons behind the
researchers - b o t h i n the B a l k a n c o u n t r i e s a n d i n the f o r m e r G r e a t P o w e r s - the R o m a n i a n d e c i s i o n s before a n d e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g the t w o B a l k a n conflicts.
e v o l u t i o n of the B a l k a n a r e a i n the y e a r s p r e c e d i n g W o r l d W a r O n e r e c o r d e d a I n the C h a p t e r T w o - W a r at H o m e : T h e T w o B a l k a n m i l i t a r y conflicts - the
m u c h n e e d e d increase of l e v e l of attention. T h e c e n t e n n i a l of the B a l k a n W a r s a u t h o r s p r o v i d e n e w interpretations c o n c e r n i n g the m i l i t a r y conflicts i n the
t r i g g e r e d a w a v e of a c a d e m i c g a t h e r i n g s w i t h s c h o l a r s w h o b r o u g h t into the l i g h t B a l k a n s a n d their effect o n the p o p u l a t i o n s of the P e n i n s u l a . W i t h a g r o w i n g
a large a m o u n t of r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n i n g the t w o conflicts w h i c h took place interest i n E u r o p e for a r m a m e n t s , the B a l k a n W a r s offered n u m e r o u s lessons for
b e t w e e n 1912 a n d 1913. m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s a n d i n f l u e n c e d the interests of p o l i t i c i a n s a n d people a l i k e . I n
T h e collection of s t u d i e s e n t i t l e d Balkan Entanglements - Peace of Bucharest "Strategic considerations of G r e e k i n v o l v e m e n t i n the F i r s t B a l k a n W a r (1912-
represents the joint c o n t r i b u t i o n of s c h o l a r s f r o m b o t h B a l k a n states a n d other 1913). I n t e r n a l a n d international context", J^drzej P a s z k i e w i c z p r o v i d e s a n a n a l y s i s
European countries. This thematic collection represents the result of the o n the role of the g o v e r n m e n t i n A t h e n s to enter the w a r against the O t t o m a n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference o r g a n i z e d i n B u c h a r e s t o n 7 * a n d 8 * N o v e m b e r 2013 as E m p i r e a n d its i m p a c t o n the G r e e k people. A n e w a p p r o a c h c o n c e r n i n g m i l i t a r y
a r e s u l t of cooperation b e t w e e n the F a c u l t y of H i s t o r y of the U n i v e r s i t y of conflicts is o u t l i n e d b y B o g d a n P o p a i n " W a r , B o d y C u l t u r e a n d P r e j u d i c e : T h e
B u c h a r e s t a n d the M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s of R o m a n i a . T h e c o m m e m o r a t i o n P h y s i c a l T r a i n i n g of the R o m a n i a n A r m y i n the S e c o n d B a l k a n W a r " . T h e s t u d y
of the P e a c e of B u c h a r e s t brought together s c h o l a r s f r o m Serbia, P o l a n d , identifies a n d a n a l y z e s details c o n c e r n i n g a r m y p r e p a r a t i o n s before the conflict
R o m a n i a , R e p u b l i c of M a c e d o n i a , Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uruted a n d the soldier's general c o n d i t i o n before the m i l i t a r y encounters. B a s e d o n one of
Kingdom and Bulgaria. the m o s t i m p o r t a n t i n s t r u m e n t s of p u b l i c o p i n i o n - the p r e s s - J a r o s l a w R u b a c h a

F o l l o w i n g the p r o c e e d i n g s that h a d b e e n c a r r i e d o n i n E n g l i s h , this i n " S e c o n d B a l k a n W a r i n the publications of the n e w s p a p e r Czas ( T i m e ) " offers a

p u b l i c a t i o n c o m p r i s e s 13 articles, e a c h w i t h a n abstract a n d k e y w o r d s . T h e n e w interpretation of the P o l i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g the crisis i n the B a l k a n s

a u t h o r s of the s t u d i e s are u n i v e r s i t y p r o f e s s o r s a n d P h D . C a n d i d a t e s , as w e l l as a n d the B u l g a r i a n a r m y . R a d u S t a n c u i n " A brief d e s c r i p t i o n of the social i m p a c t of

s c h o l a r s f r o m r e s e a r c h institutes. B a s e d o n their interests i n r e s e a r c h i n g the the R o m a n i a n m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n i n the second B a l k a n w a r " b r i n g s to l i g h t the

B a l k a n P e n i n s u l a at the b e g i n n i n g of the 20"^ c e n t u r y a n d the i m p o r t a n c e of the s o c i a l i m p a c t of the R o m a n i a n m o b i l i z a t i o n , the conduct of the m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n

B a l k a n s W a r s i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the changes r e c o r d e d i n the a r e a , this collection a n d the outrage triggered b y the outbreak of cholera a m o n g the soldiers, as w e l l as

represents a n i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y outcome, s t r u c t u r e d into T h r e e C h a p t e r s . o n the rest of the society.

T h e F i r s t C h a p t e r - G r e a t P o w e r s a n d their B a l k a n interests - i s d e d i c a t e d C h a p t e r T h r e e of this collection - A short truce i n the B a l k a n s : T h e Peace

to the attitude of the t w o m a j o r a l l i a n c e s i n E u r o p e , T r i p l e A l l i a n c e a n d the T r i p l e
E n t e n t e , r e g a r d i n g the B a l k a n P e n i n s u l a before a n d d u r i n g the conflicts i n 1912-
1913. A m o n g the P o w e r s w i t h a m a j o r interest i n the B a l k a n s , F r a n c e h a d b e e n
isolated s o m e of the t i m e s i n a n a l y z i n g the t w o conflicts. B o t h A l e k s a n d r a
K o l a k o v i c w i t h " F r e n c h i n t e l l e c t u a l s about the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n interests i n the
B a l k a n s ( 1 8 9 4 - 1 9 1 4 ) " a n d B i l j a n a Stojic w i t h " F r e n c h P o l i c y t o w a r d R o m a n i a
C o n f e r e n c e of B u c h a r e s t - i s d e d i c a t e d to the Peace C o n f e r e n c e of B u c h a r e s t a n d
its consequences for the belligerent states, as n u m e r o u s i s s u e s r e m a i n u n s e t t l e d
after the w a r . Z o r a n B a j i n i n " « W e ' l l B r e a k Y o u r T e e t h » or T h e S p l e n d o r s a n d
M i s e r i e s of the B a l k a n L e a g u e : M i r o s l a v S p a l a j k o v i c at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e of
B u c h a r e s t " depicts the Peace C o n f e r e n c e i n B u c h a r e s t t h r o u g h the role of o n e of
the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the belligerent countries. B o g d a n C a t a n a i n " I m m e d i a t e
 ^ PREFACE
consequences of the B u c h a r e s t peace treaty of 1913 u p o n the R o m a n i a n - S e r b i a n
r e l a t i o n s " h i g h l i g h t s the i m p o r t a n c e of the peace settlement for the p o l i t i c a l
relations b e t w e e n t w o n e i g h b o r s that s h a r e d a consistent degree of common
interests.
I n a w o r l d of t u r m o i l , life i n the B a l k a n s d e p e n d e d to a large degree o n
c h a n c e a n d the t w o w a r s i n 1912-1913 d i d n o t m a n a g e to b r i n g the d e s i r e d peace
a n d i m p r o v e the s i t u a t i o n of m i n o r i t i e s . L i l j a n a G u s h e v s k a a n d N a t a s h a K o t l a r -
T r a j k o v a i n " A r o m a n i a n s i n M a c e d o n i a before a n d d u r i n g the B a l k a n W a r s ( i n
D i p l o m a t i c S o u r c e s ) " d e p i c t m a i n l y the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n a n d R u s s i a n p r i m a r y
s o u r c e s c o n c e r n i n g the e t h n o g r a p h i c c o m p o s i t i o n of M a c e d o n i a , f o c u s i n g o n the
A r o m a n i a n n a t i o n a l i t y . V l a d i m i r C r e t u l e s c u i n " T h e G r e e k - R o m a n i a n conflict
p e r t a i n i n g to the A r o m a n i a n q u e s t i o n , as reflected i n the w r i t i n g s of A p o s t o l
M a r g a r i t - a d i s c o u r s e - a n a l y t i c a l a p p r o a c h " d e f i n e s the a c t i v i t y of a defender of
the A r o m a n i a n m i n o r i t y i n the historical Macedonia to preserve cultural
survival. K y r i l l o s N i k o l a o u i n "Migrations and identity dilemmas: Ottoman
G r e e k s a n d O t t o m a n J e w s f r o m the B a l k a n s to the A m e r i c a s 1900-1914" b r i n g s G R E A T POWERS
i n t o l i g h t the relocations of i n d i v i d u a l s a n d f a m i l i e s d u e to the s o c i a l i m p a c t of
the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s i n the B a l k a n area before W o r l d W a r O n e .
A N D T H E I R B A L K A N INTERESTS
T h e e d i t o r s of this collection i n t e n d e d to h i g h l i g h t n e w interpretations of
the i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r of n e w sources, as w e l l as the r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ones
e s t a b l i s h e d a l r e a d y , b a s e d o n the latest r e s e a r c h . T h e s t u d i e s r e u n i t e d i m d e r
Balkan Entanglements - Peace of Bucharest are l a r g e l y b a s e d o n a r c h i v a l s o u r c e s
f r o m n u m e r o u s countries, p u b l i s h e d p r i m a r y sources a n d p r e s s . T h i s v o l u m e i s a
p r o o f that the B a l k a n W a r s a n d the P e a c e of B u c h a r e s t p l a y e d a d e c i s i v e role for
s h a p i n g E u r o p e a n p e r c e p t i o n s i n m a n y f i e l d s at that t i m e . E s t a b l i s h i n g m o r e
means for research, at transnational level, w o u l d consistently enrich our
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the e v e n t s i n 1912-1913 i n the B a l k a n s .

The editors
 FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913)1

BILJANA S T O J I C *

Since 1883, Romania was a part of a secret alliance with Austria-Hungary

and Germany. Therefore, France did not consider it an area suitable for
spreading its political influence. Analyses by French diplomats persistently
showed that Romania was a loyal ally of Austria-Hungary and the Triple
Alliance.^ Relying on these analyses, until the First Balkan War, the French
diplomacy was cautious and reserved towards Romania.
At the beginning of the First Balkan War, there were two issues that
particularly worried France: one was the concern that the Ottoman Empire would
defeat small Balkan states and disrupt the existing political balance in the Balkans
and Southeast Europe; while the other was the fear that the Balkan war would
spread to the rest of Europe. The main task of the French diplomacy in autumn 1912
was to localize the war to the Balkans. For France, this meant that it had to keep
away from the war not only its ally Russia but also Austria-Hungary, because these
two countries were the most interested in the Balkan issue. Furthermore, France
strove to keep away from the war the only Balkan country that did not get involved
in the war - Romania. From the French perspective, Romania's potential
involvement in the war against the Ottoman Empire would have been very
hazardous because it could have led to the interference of Austria-Hungary,
Germany and Italy, causing a local war to become a European conflict.
Accordingly, the main task of the French minister in Bucharest, Camille
BlondeP, was to persuade the Romanian government, headed by Titu Maiorescu,

^ T h i s p a p e r i s a p a r t o f t h e project: Europe and the Serbs (1804-1918): Incentives and temptations of the
European Modernism (Ne 177031), u n d e r t h e s u p p o r t of t h e M i n i s t r y f o r E d u c a t i o n , S c i e n c e a n d
T e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t t h e R e p u b l i c of S e r b i a .
* T h e H i s t o r i c a l Institute S A N U , Serbia; e-mail address: biljana.stojic@gmail.com
2 A r c h i v e s d e s M i n i s t e r e d e s a f f a i r e s e t r a n g e r e s ( A M A E ) , N o u v e l l e s s e r i e ( N S ) , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 229,
Ne 2 3 , B u d a p e s t , l e 15 J a n v i e r 1912.
^ Jean C a m i l l e B l o n d e l (1854-1935), w a s a F r e n c h diplomat. H e started diplomatic carrier as an
a t t a c h e i n L o n d o n 1878. S o o n h e w a s t r a n s f e r r e d f i r s t l y i n B e r l i n , t h e n 1882 i n M a d r i d a n d T a n g e r .
 FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
32 BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 33

that it was in Romania's best interest to remain neutral* The task of minister Blondel fate of Romania", which stayed in the shadow of the political and military
was all the easier because Romania was not ready for the war. At the time when the success of other Balkan states. Although the chances to be granted a territorial
Balkan Alliance was being established, between March and October 1912, Romania extension by Austria-Hungary were thwarted, Romania was nevertheless
was invited twice by Bulgaria to join in, but it refused. France believed that Austria- determined to gain an advantage from the ongoing war.
Hungary had influence in the decision-making process in Bucharest. On 10 August Late in October 1912, the government of Titu Maiorescu first revealed
1912, during his visit to Bucharest, Count Leopold Berthold, the Austro-Hungarian their intention to demand the alteration of borders in Dobrogea. Romanian
minister of foreign affairs, advised the ally to remain neutral in case of an armed minister of internal affairs. Take lonescu, told the French minister Blondel that
conflict in the Balkans. He promised that, after the victory of the Ottoman Empire - the Romanian request was justified because the uncontrolled strengthening of
and Austria-Hungary believed that it would be an unquestionable outcome of the Bulgaria and other Balkan states would disrupt the balance and relations among
war - Romania would gain territories that had belonged to defeated Bulgaria.^ When the Balkan states after the dissolution of the Ottoman rule. In his opinion, in
the war started, Romania declared the stride neutralite and proclaimed its order to maintain the balance, it was necessary to meet the national aspirations of
determination to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, as well as the expectation to all Balkan states, including Romania.'
be appropriately awarded for its neutrality.* Also, one of the reasons why Romania Apart from the territorial expansion, Romania put forward another
chose to stay aside from current war in the Balkans was a concern for the status of important demand: the protection of the rights of Aromanians living in
the Aromanian minority in Macedonia and in the other parts of the Ottoman Macedonia and Epirus. Those rights should include the introduction of
Empire. Apart from this mostiy diplomatic question, the Ottoman Empire was not a Aromanian schools, education programs in Romanian, as well as the
establishment of a bishopric under the jurisdiction of the Romanian church and
threat to any vital national interests of the Romanian state. These two countries did
state. France deemed that none of the two demands of the Romanian government
not share common border like Bulgaria and the other Balkan states.^ The Great
could be a critical reason for Romania to get involved in warfare. Therefore,
Powers were very pleased with this "wise" decision of Romania. Their primary
France did not approve the intensive military preparations undertaken by the
assignment called "neutralisation de la Roumanie" was accomplished.
Romanian General Staff since the early November 1912. Maiorescu informed
Despite its own rational decision to stay out of the war, soon after the first
Blondel that the government had prepared instructions for military commanders
victories of the Balkan allies in the battles of Kumanovo and Kirkkilise, Romania
in case of mobilisation. In same time, the Ministry of internal affairs made all
and the rest of Europe realized that the Ottoman Empire was far from victory,
trains available for the transport of troops to the border,
and that Romania was not any closer to the promised territorial extensions.^ As a
The Great Powers planned to discuss Romania's demands and all other
consequence, Romania began to reconsider its decision of not being involved in
problems resulting from the First Balkan War at a Peace conference which they
the Balkan war. Romanian press apprehensively complained over "the poignant
were intensively preparing since the beginning of the conflict. On 12 October, the
French Prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, Raymond Poincare,
H i s f i r s t s e r v i c e a s a n a p p o i n t e d m i n i s t e r w a s i n t h e M e x i c o 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 0 7 . I n 1903 h e b e c o m e s t h e
Officer of the L e g i o n of Honor. Four years later Blondel w a s nominated as the minister
suggested that a conference dealing with all problems resulting from the Balkan
p l e n i p o t e n t i a r y 1 c l a s s i n B u c h a r e s t . I n t h a t d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n B l o n d e l s t a y e d u n t i l 1916. B l o n d e l War should be organized." It was not before December that the conditions
h a d a m a i n r o l e a l o n g w i t h R o m a n i a n P r i m e m i n i s t e r I o n B r a t i a n u i n e n t e r i n g the R o m a n i a i n t h e necessary for such conference were fulfilled; after all Balkan states, except
F i r s t W o r l d W a r o n the s i d e o f F r a n c e a n d t h e T r i p l e E n t a n t e . (Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de Greece, signed the armistice with the Ottoman Empire at (^atalca. It was decided
la Republique frangais pour 1913, t. X X X I , ( P a r i s : B e r g e r - L e v e r a u l t , f e v r i e r 1913), 165.)
that the conference be held in London. The four members of the Balkan Alliance
" Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 (part I),
and the Ottoman Empire, as participants in the conflict, were invited to send
e d i t e d b y S i n a n K u n e r a l p a n d G i i l T o k a y , ( I s t a n b u l : T h e I s i s P r e s s , 2 0 1 2 ) , Ne 470, 2 6 6 - 2 6 7 .
= A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 4 8 , Ne 1 8 1 , S t - P e t e r s b o u r g , le 4 d e c e m b r e 1912; G h e o r g h e Z b u c h e a ,
their delegations to London to negotiate peace conditions. Along with them.
Romania §i rdzboaiele balcanice 1912-1913, pagini de istorie sud-est europeand, (Bucaregti: A l b a r t r o s ,
1999), 68. ' A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 4 1 , Ne 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 , B u c a r e s t le 29 o c t o b r e 1912.
I o n B u l e i , Breve histoire de la Roumanie, t r a n s . I l e a n a C a n t u n i a r i ( B u c a r e s t : M e r o n i a , 2 0 0 6 ) , 130. A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 240, Ne 9 2 - 9 3 , B u c a r e s t , l e 2 3 o c t o b r e 1912.
' A n d r e w R o s s o s , Russia and the Balkans (1909-1914), (Stanford U n i v e r s i t y : m a n u s c r i p t P h D thesis, " R a y m o n d P o i n c a r e , Au service de la France: neuf annees de souvenir, I I , Les Balkans en feu (1912),
1971), 3 2 1 . ( P a r i s : P l o n , 1926), 266; J o h n F . V . K e i g e r , France and the Origins of the First World War, (Basingstoke:
8 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 4 1 , Ne 9, B e l g r a d e le 2 7 o c t o b r e 1912. M a c m i l l a n , 1983), 45.

34
representatives of the Great Powers who undertook to solve some Balkan issues
were also there; these issues included the status of Albania, Serbia's access to the
Adriatic Sea, the Ottoman national debt, status of the Aegean islands, etc.i^
Although it was not involved in the war, Romania considered that it was
entitled to attend the Peace conference. Austria-Hungary supported the demand
of its ally and suggested to other Great Powers to enable the Romanian delegate
to attend the imminent Conference." During the negotiations among the Great
Powers Count Berchtold was suggested on 6 November to other Powers that
Romania could be a mediator between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan allies.
During consultations with the other Great Powers, Austria-Hungary promised
that it will reconsider the possibility of Serbian extension to the territory of the
Stara Raska, if France and her allies accepted Romanian demands.^* Poincare and
Sir Edward Grey opposed the idea that Romania should take part in the Peace
conference, arguing that the other European states could have demanded the
same status if Romania had been allowed to attend.
Lord Grey's assumption that the other states which had not taken part in
the war could demand attendance at the Peace conference in London soon
proved to be justified. On 14 December, the Spanish Prime miruster Manuel
Garcia Prieto asked the French ambassador to Madrid to confirm reports from
the European press suggesting that the Great Powers would allow Romania to
participate in the London Peace conference. Should the information prove true,
Prieto demanded the same right for Spain, as a Mediterranean power.i^ Being
indecisive regarding this issue, Russia suggested a compromise: a Romanian
delegate was allowed to formally attend the Conference sessions but was not to
be allowed to vote.^*
France offered Romania that its ambassador to London, Paul Cambon,
could represent Romania as well. That suggestion was a part of the instructions
for this French delegate. Despite this offer, Romania was offended by its
treatment by the Great Powers, and decided to look for other solutions. First of
all, Romania decided to appoint the Austro-Hungarian delegate at the Peace
conference, Coimt Albert von Mensdorff, as a representative of Romanian
12 A M A E , P o n d s n o m i n a H f s ( F N ) , P a u l C a m b o n ( P C ) , v o l . 4 6 , Ne 5 4 0 , L o n d r e s , l e 17 d e c e m b r e 1 9 1 2 ;
Documents diplomatiques frangais ( D D F ) , 3« s e r i e ( 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 4 ) , t o m e V , ( P a r i s : I m p r i m e r i e N a t i o n a l e ,
1 9 3 3 ) , NQ 78, 9 4 ; British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 ( B D ) , vol. I X , part II, edited b y
G e o r g e P . G o o c h a n d H a r o l d T e m p e r l e y , ( L o n d o n : H . M . S t a t i o n a r y O f f i c e , 1934), Ne 3 9 1 , 2 9 2 .
" A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 4 9 , Ne 2 5 9 - 2 6 3 , P a r i s , l e 15 d e c e m b r e 1 9 1 2 .
" A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 4 3 , Ne 132, P a r i s , l e 8 n o v e m b r e 1912.
15 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 4 9 , Ne 2 4 2 , M a d r i d , l e 1 4 d e c e m b r e 1 9 1 2 .
A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 249, Ne 15, L o n d r e s , l e 9 d e c e m b r e 1912.
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 35
interests as well. France thought, with this act, Romania proved itself as a loyal
ally of Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance. It proved that the
precociousness of French diplomacy toward Romania was justified. Still, France
was willing to help Romania to achieve its demands in southern part of
Dobrogea, but Minister Poincare unhesitatingly rejected the Romanian
proposition to be awarded with an island in the Aegean Sea. Poincare and France
suspected that Germany could use this island as advantage against France in the
Mediterranean Sea and for establishing a naval base.^^
Also, before the Conference, on 16 December, Romania decided to
temporarily replace its minister to London. Nicolae Mi§u, who had good
relations with the president of the Bulgarian parliament, Stoyan Danev, ever
since his service in Sofia as the minister plenipotentiary of King Carol I , was
appointed as the delegate.!^ Romania apparently hoped that Mi§u and Danev
would discuss the Romanian demands concerning Southern Dobrogea and the
status of Aromanians in Macedonia outside official sessions.
The negotiations between the two representatives were conducted
simultaneously with the official sessions of the Peace conference which started on
17 December, but with a very little progress. At first, Bulgarian delegate Danev
who was not authorized by his goverrmient to offer to Romania any part of
Bulgarian territory in Dobrogea. The Bulgarian government thought that the
question of the cession of the territory was naturally a vital question, while the
demand for territory on the part of Romania was merely prompted by amour propre
and the responsibility of endangering European peace would fall entirely upon the
Romanian government.^' In current negotiations' progress was made on 28
December when Danev took the initiative. He prepared a proposal containing four
points and asked Count Beckendorff to communicate them to Saint Petersburg.
They provided for: 1) church and school autonomy for the Aromanians in
Macedonia; 2) the razing of all forts and fortifications in Southern Dobrogea, and in
the last resort, the cession of the strategic position Medgidia-Tabia; 3) rectification
of the frontier involving the cession of about twenty villages to Romania; 4)
guarantee for the inviolability of Romanian Dobrogea.^"
Prime minister Ivan Geshov and the rest of the Bulgarian government were
not aware of this courageous proposal of Danev. However, Sazonov seemed
17 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 249, Ne 2 5 9 - 2 6 3 , P a r i s , l e 1 5 d e c e m b r e 1 9 1 2 .
1* A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 5 0 , Ne 5 , P a r i s , l e 16 d e c e m b r e 1912; A r h i v e l e N a t i o n a l e a l e R o m a n i e i
( A N R ) , C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r 16/1912, Ne 1 1 - 1 2 , B u c u r e § t i , 26 n o i e m b r i e / 9 d e c e m b r i e 1 9 1 2 .
19 B D , v o l . I X , p a r t I I , Ne 7 6 9 , S o f i a , F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 1 3 .
2" A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 5 3 , M F , P O 8618, Ne 9 8 - 9 9 , P a r i s , l e 10 J a n v i e r 1 9 1 3 ; A N R , C a s a
R e g a l a - I , d o s a r 21/1913, Ne 1 - 1 4 , B u c a r e s t , 2 3 J a n u a r y / 5 F e b r u a r y 1 9 1 3 .

36 BILJANA STOJIC
highly impressed by Danev's four points. They represented a radical departure
from Bulgaria's previous stand and he advised Bucharest to utilize them as basis
for an agreement. On 3 January, Mi§u rejected the four points, because the
Romanian government thought that Bulgaria offered too little. He told Danev that
Romania's minimal territorial demands extended along the line from a point west
of the town of Silistria to the Black Sea, south of Balchik. Also, during this phase of
negotiations Romanian Minister of internal affairs and member of delegation Take
lonescu spread public accusations that Danev had not acted honestly and that he
had broken all engagements and promises that he gave during his visit to
Bucharest in December 1912. Insulted by these baseless and unjust attacks Danev
refused to continue the negotiations. He recommended that Mikhail Madzarov,
Bulgarian Minister to London, as a chief negotiator and began preparations to
return to Sofia. But, the government in Bucharest threatened to occupy the
demanded area, as a warning to Bulgaria to seriously consider Romanian claims.
That persuaded Danev to postpone his departure and to continue the negotiations.
Romanian representative in this dialog, Nicolae Mi§u, described this phase of
negotiations like "Romania was thrown in for bargaining" .^^
Simultaneously with the negotiations in London, Romania continued
military preparations in case the dialogue failed. The rising tensions in the
relations between Romania and Bulgaria were becoming increasingly apparent
both in Romanian and Bulgarian public opinion. During November, some
Bulgarian newspapers were reporting that Romania was secretly supplying the
Ottoman Empire with war equipment and horses. Bulgarian public opinion
believed that this conspiracy on the part of the Romanian and Turkish authorities
was aimed directly against Bulgaria. A n investigation, spurred by these reports,
was undertaken by the French minister Blondel and it revealed that several
shipments of war equipment sent by Austria-Hungary to the Ottoman Empire had
reached the Romanian port of Constanta. The shipments had been delivered at
night, and it had been under ultimate secrecy that the Romanian authorities let the
ships sail to Istanbul. Defending Romania, Blondel highlighted that the Romanian
government had never formally declared neutrality in the First Balkan War.
Accordingly, it had the right to support one of the sides in the conflict. Blondel also
pointed out that the unfavourable circumstance for Romania was the fact its aid to
the Ottoman Empire was indeed harmful to Bulgaria, while the relations between
the two countries were already tense due to Romania's compensation demand
related to Dobrogea. Furthermore, Blondel discovered that since late November
1912 Romania was regularly receiving supplies of war equipment from military
" R o s s o s , Russia and the Balkans, 3 4 3 - 3 5 6 .
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 37
factories in Austria-Hungary, Germany and France. In order not to disturb the
public, the whole operation of arming was conducted secretly.^^
Meanwhile, Bulgaria did not stay inactive and it undertook the same
preparations for a possible war against Romania. Romanian "excessive
demands" regarding Dobrogea generated strong dissent among Bulgarian public
opinion. In a conversation with Paul Cambon in London, Stoyan Danev said that
Bulgarian public opinion was justifiably dissatisfied because the entire Europe
was pressing it to relinquish a part of its legitimate state territory, while at the
same time covering up the fact that Romania had mobilized a part of its troops,
which were lined along the border towards Bulgaria and ready to fight.^^
Despite the war preparations on both sides, negotiations between
Bulgaria and Romania in London were continued. In fact, these unofficial
negotiations between Mi§u and Danev resulted on 29 January 1913 in an
agreement concerning the Aromanian minority which was to find itself within
the borders of Bulgaria as a consequence of its territorial extensions.^* In a
protocol signed by those two delegates, Bulgaria promised the autonomy to
Aromanian schools and churches. They also agreed upon the establishment of a
bishopric under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Church.^s However, the
alteration of state borders demanded by Romania was a far greater problem than
the status of the Aromanian minority.
Soon after the Agreement between Bulgaria and Romania was signed, the
peace negotiations in St James's Palace were compromised because the Ottoman
Empire refused to cede Adrianople to Bulgaria. Instable political situation in the
Ottoman Empire led to a revolutionary protest on 23 January when couple
hundreds of the Young Turks led by Enver Bey forced Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha
to resign and appointed General Mahmud §evket Pasha as the new one. When the
peace negotiations were interrupted early in February 1913, the relations between
Bulgaria and Romania were among the unsettled issues. Bulgaria pleaded for
postponing the negotiations until the end of the war against the Ottoman Empire.
The interruption of the London peace negotiations and the resumption of
hostilities caused immense dissatisfaction in Romania. The Council of ministers
unanimously criticized Maiorescu's policy towards Bulgaria, designating it as
"indecisive and tmconvincing". The Romanian government and public opinion
22 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 247, No 4 3 - 4 4 , B u c a r e s t , l e 26 r\ovembre 1912.
23 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 5 1 , Ne 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 , L o n d r e s , le 2 7 d e c e m b r e 1912.
2« A N R , C a s a C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r 14/1913, Ne 1 - 2 , C o p i e , L o n d r e s , le 16/29 J a n v i e r 1 9 1 3 .
25 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 259, M F , P O 8 6 2 4 , Ne 5 9 - 7 5 , B u c a r e s t , l e 3 m a r s 1913; Tsentralen
D ' r z h a v e n A r k h i v ( T s D A ) , M i n i s t e r s t v o n a v ' s h n i t e r a b o t i i i z p o v e d a n i j a t a ( M V R l ) , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2,
a.e. 1454,1-29, B u c h a r e s t , 22 J u l y 1913.
 FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA

38 BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 39

urged the minister of foreign affairs and other participants in the negotiations to still convinced that problems between these two countries were not so much
undertake more decisive action. Principally, public opinion unanimously pushed dangerous as to be resolved in an armed conflict.^"
the government to let the army invade Dobrogea. Blondel sought to calm down all Having agreed to act as mediators, late in February 1913, the Great Powers
those who advocated the "policy of decisive action" and was very sceptical offered to make the final decision, which would be additional confirmed by
regarding the Great Power's ability to restrain Romania for long from entering into Romania and Bulgaria. Bulgaria accepted the offer promptly, while Romania was
war against Bulgaria.^* hesitant. In order to put pressure on Maiorescu and his government, the Great
Although Bulgaria demanded to delay negotiations with Romania, it was Powers used diplomatic demarches. The first demarche was delivered by the British
clear that the political situation in Romania was rather delicate and the minister in Bucharest, Sir George Barclay. This measure of the British Foreign office
negotiations had to be resumed at all cost through the mediation by the Great was supported by the German minister Julius Freiherr von Waldthausen. Five days
Powers, and primarily Russia. Bulgaria's relenting on the issue of territorial later on 22 February identical demarches were submitted by the rest of the Great
compensation to the Romanian government was preceded by the visit of the Powers.^i On 1 March, the French minister Camille Blondel sent a collective
Bulgarian minister of finance, Teodor Teodorov, to Saint Petersburg. Sergey diplomatic demarche on behalf of the Great Powers. Despite the demarches,
Sazonov assured Teodorov that Russia would stand in defence of Bulgaria in Maiorescu at first refused the mediation of the Great Powers.^^ Maiorescu pointed
case Romania kept on putting forward new demands. Nevertheless, Teodorov's out that a great damage had been made to Romania by the Treaty of Berlin, namely
visit to Russia merely augmented Romania's suspicion towards the newly Article 46, in which it had been decided to hand over the territory of Dobrogea to the
established close collaboration between Russia and Bulgaria. The fear of a new newly established Bulgarian state. This decision was based entirely on conjecture on
wave of Pan-Slavism was revived in Bucharest and all around Romania. the part of the participants in the Berlin Congress who drew the state border without
Romanian public opinion remembered too well that Russia chose to sacrifice consulting Bulgarian and Romanian authorities.
Romanian interests in Bessarabia and Dobrogea for the sake of Bulgaria and Pan- As Maiorescu emphasized in his address, there had been two occasions
Slavic movement 35 years ago, at the Berlin Congress. It seemed apparent that the when Romania had aided Bulgaria in gaining significant territorial acquisitions:
same fate was awaiting Romania once again. Therefore, instead of accepting the in 1877, when the Romanian army had fought together with Russian forces
Medgidia-Tabia territory as the compensation, Maiorescu's government called for
against the Ottoman Empire, thereby helping Bulgaria gain independence; and in
excluding Russia as a mediator in the negotiations between Bulgaria and Romania.
1912, when in a note sent on 8 October, Bulgaria pleaded Romania's neutrality in
Romania threatened an armed solution to the problem in case Russia refused to
the intended war against the Ottoman Empire. According to Maiorescu, in
withdraw from the negotiations. Faced with these threats, Sazonov refreshed
October 1912, Romania had acted in accordance with the desire of Bulgaria and
Maiorescu's memory on the fact that Romania had been first to demand the
its allies.33 Under the jurisdiction of Romania that small territory in Southern
mediation of the Russian Empire, whereas Bulgaria had merely followed its
Dobrogea couldn't become "point d 'attaque" against Bulgaria. Its importance for
example.27 Sazonov's advice failed to tranquUize the Romanian government, which
Romania was strictly defensive. On the other hand, for Bulgarians the fortress
resolutely insisted on excluding Russia from further negotiations. Realizing that it
was necessary to avoid the growth of anti-Russian and anti-Slavic sentiments in Silistria and the territory around it were strategically very important and possible
Romania in order to peacefully resolve the conflict, Bulgaria suggested involving one "point offensif against Romania.^* Blondel promised that, in the process of
or more supervisors, along with Russia.^* Maiorescu's government conceded to this mediation, France would take into consideration the rights and merits of
and on 23 February the suggestion that all of six Great Powers be involved as Romania, thereby persuading Maiorescu to let the Great Powers resolve the
mediators in the negotiations between Romania and Bulgaria was put forward.^' dispute with Bulgaria.^^
Facing a new degradation in Bulgarian-Romanian relations the Great Powers were
» A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 258, M F , P O 8 6 2 3 , Ne 5 1 , P a r i s , le 19 f e v r i e r 1913.

2" A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 256, M i c r o f i l m ( M F ) , P O 8 6 2 1 , Ne 2 3 3 - 2 3 4 , B u c a r e s t , le 7 f e v r i e r 1913. 21 A N R , C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r 16/1912, Ne 2 5 - 2 6 , 2 / 2 2 F e b r u a r y 1913.

27 R o s s o s , Russia and the Balkans, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 . 32 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 259, M F , P O 8624, Ne 5 5 - 5 7 , B u c a r e s t , le 2 m a r s 1913.

28 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2, a.e. 1365,1-173, P e t e r b u r g , 7/19 F e b r u a r y 1913. ^ A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s , 259, M F , P O 8624, Ne 5 9 - 7 5 , B u c a r e s t , le 3 m a r s 1913.

29 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2, a.e. 1 3 6 5 , 1 - 1 9 8 , B u c h a r e s t , 9/21 F e b r u a r y 1913; R o s s o s , Russia and the ^ A N R , C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r 24/1913, Ne 1-16, B u c a r e s t , le 15/28 f e v r i e r 1913.

Balkans, 3 6 2 . 35 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 259, M F , P O 8624, Ne 5 9 - 7 5 , B u c a r e s t , le 3 m a r s 1913.


40
Although Sazonov's original intention was to organize a peace conference
in London, simultaneously with the Conference of Ambassadors, Ivan Geshov
and he agreed to the idea to organize it in Saint Petersburg.^* This decision was
also accepted by the ministers at the London Conference. During the
preparations for the conference to be held in Saint Petersburg, the relations
between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro were verging on war.^^
The Great Powers were preoccupied with their attempt to appease
Austria-Hungary and preparations for a naval demonstration of power to
Montenegro. Therefore, it was convenient for them to let Russia, which did not
take part in the naval manoeuvres, to act as a mediator in the dispute between
Romania and Bulgaria. For the Great Powers, the disagreement between Romania
and Bulgaria was less dangerous then, the Shkoder crisis. Apart from Sazonov, the
representatives of the other five Great Powers accredited in Russia were invited to
take part in the conference.^^ Romania and Bulgaria, as parties in the dispute, were
not invited, not even to formally attend the meetings, which were closed to public.
According to the official procedure, Romanian and Bulgarian ministers to Saint
Petersburg were to present arguments in favour of their state's demands, but the
decision was to be entirely entrusted to the Great Powers. Sazonov appealed the
Bulgarian and Romanian government not to send special delegates in order to
prevent pressure on conference participants or press intrigue.^'
The conference began on 31 March and was concluded on 17 April 1913.
On the first session of the Conference, Ambassadors of Triple Alliance supported
Romania's claim to the line of Silistria-Balchik. At the beginning of the
Conference Sazonov tried to gain some compensation for Bulgaria. He pointed
out that Thessaloniki is proper reward for lost Southern Dobrogea. The Italian
ambassador agreed that Southern Dobrogea should be ceded to Romania in the
interests of the general peace and that it would be right that Bulgaria got
compensation elsewhere. However, the other delegates declined to discuss on the
subject of Thessaloniki, fearkig that could start off a new disagreement between
Bulgaria and Greece, which seemed eager to preserve Thessaloniki under its own
30 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1365,1-229, P e t e r s b u r g , 12/24 F e b r u a r y 1 9 1 3 .
37 E r n s t C h . H e l m r e i c h , The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913),
P r e s s . 1938), 3 0 1 - 3 0 2 .
38 F r a n c e w a s r e p r e s e n t e d b y a m b a s s a d o r T h e o p h i l e D e l c a s s e ; G e r m a n y b y a m b a s s a d o r
Friedrich v o n Pourtales; U n i t e d K i n g d o m b y ambassador Sir Georges Buchanan; A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y
b y a m b a s s a d o r D u g l a s G r a f v o n T h u r n ; a n d , i n t h e n a m e of t h e K i n g d o m of I t a l y M a r q u i s C a r l o t t i
d i R i p a r b e l l a w a s p r e s e n t ( A N R , C a s a R e g a l a - I, d o s a r 2 9 / 1 9 1 3 , No 1 - 2 , C o p i e , S a i n t P e t e r s b o u r g , l e
26 a v r i l / 9 m a i 1913).
39 R o s s o s , Russia and the Balkans, 3 6 3 .
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 41
jurisdiction at any cost.*" To accomplish an arrangement the Great Powers
needed only five sessions, while Bulgaria and Romania had not succeeded
during the several months of intense negotiations.
The treaty, known as the Saint Petersburg Protocol, was signed on 9 May.
It resulted in the alteration of the border at the town of Silistria and an area in a
three-kilometre radius around it. Silistria become a part of Romania and
Bulgarians who wished to leave the armexed area were to be compensated.
Bulgaria was to pull down all fortifications and was forbidden to build new
fortifications along the new border. According to the Saint Petersburg Protocol
one mixed Bulgarian-Romanian commission with experts appointed by the six
Great Powers should have determined the precise direction of the new border
within a period of three months. Also, the ambassadors in Saint Petersburg
agreed that the Danev-Mi§u agreement made in London should become an
integral part of the Protocol.*!
The Great Powers had many reasons to be satisfied with their mediation,
at least until the two delegations returned home. French Ambassador Delcasse
pointed out that the Conference completely fulfilled its task, mostly thanks to
Bulgaria "which submitted a great sacrifice for the sake of peace" .*2 Still, the
Romanian public opinion expressed their dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
French ambassador Delcasse during the conference in Saint Petersburg. He was
expected to support Romania simply because Russia supported it. The Romanian
public opinion believed that ambassador Delcasse should have supported the
Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Sazonov, in order to ensure greater
compensation for Romania in territory of Southern Dobrogea.*^
The Protocol was the most loudly disapproved by the leaders of the
Conservative Party - Petre Carp, and the Liberal Party - Ion Bratianu. The two
politicians led a campaign in the Romanian Parliament against the ratification of
the Saint Petersburg treaty. They believed that Romania could have gained more
than the town of Silistria and a three-kilometre zone around it. According to
Carp and Bratianu, Romania was treated unfairly in the Protocol, with the
exception of the minor border correction at Silistria; in no other place, as far as
the Black Sea was the state border altered in its favour. The opponents to the
(London: Oxford University Protocol highlighted that the correction did not ensure better strategic defence of
the Romanian state border than it had been before the modification. Following
Count
^ B D , v o l . I X , p a r t H , Ne 769, S a i n t P e t e r s b u r g , M a r c h 3 1 , 1 9 1 3 .
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 266, Ng 1 1 , S a i n t - P e t e r s b o u r g , l e 15 a v r i l 1 9 1 3 .
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 6 6 , Ne 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 , S a i n t - P e t e r s b o u r g , l e 18 a v r i l 1913.
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 266, Ns 177, B u c a r e s t , l e 2 0 a v r i l 1 9 1 3 .

42
the example of political parties, Romanian public opinion divided into
supporters and opponents of the Saint Petersburg treaty. Despite the boiling
political situation in Romania, the French minister Blondel continued to be a
"conciliator and a voice of conscience" for Maiorecu and his government. He was
strongly convinced that France still might influence and change Romanian
political orientation which would lead to its separation from the Triple Alliance.^
The French minister to Sofia, Andre de Panafieu, deemed the dispute and
the negotiations in Saint Petersburg pointless. What particularly worried
Panafieu was the attitude of Romania, whose acts he considered "diplomatically
unreasonable". The French minister to Sofia emphasized that two solutions were
offered to Romania by negotiators in Saint Petersburg but, in his opinion, it chose
"the worse solution - the one flattering to its vanity rather than serving the true
interests of the state". Panafieu did not accuse the government headed by the
Prime minister Maiorescu of irrationally obeying public opinion, nevertheless he
rather believed that Maiorescu merely used public opinion to strengthen his
authority and the authority of his party. According to Panafieu, the domination
over Silistria had never had a strategic character, no matter how eagerly Romania
strove to present it as such, but was rather a product of the "Romanian amour
propre and the pride hurt by the decision made 35 years ago". If Romania had
accepted the other offer and had incorporated into its territory the coastal area of
the Black Sea offered by Bulgaria already in February, it would have gained an
economically more developed region, while the port of Mangalia could been
transformed into a strong military base on the Sea.
Panafieu was not any less critical to Bulgaria and its part in crisis over
Silistria. According to him, the town Silistria was not strategically important to
any state. He believed that the Protocol of Saint Petersburg was untenable
because Bulgarians considered it as a "national disaster", while the Romanian
public opinion and opposition parties believed that Romania deserved better
compensation than that granted by the agreement. Panafieu was convinced that
in a couple years Bulgaria would try to regain the lost territory by war and in
that moment the European states would regret their decisions made in Saint
Petersburg.^5 May 1913, Romania and Bulgaria were much closer to the war
than any time before and disputes within the Balkan alliance that surfaced after
the Treaty of London had been signed additionally fuelled the war euphoria.
Despite the heavy criticism from the public, Maiorescu and his
government decided to propose to the Parliament to ratify the Saint Petersburg
Protocol. On the session of 28 May, the Romanian parliament ratified the
** A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 269, Na 2 3 - 2 4 , B u c a r e s t , l e 12 m a i 1913.
"5 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 266, Na 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 , S o p h i a , l e 20 a v r i l 1913.
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 43
agreement from Saint Petersburg. A day after, the Protocol was ratified the
Senate with a majority of 77 votes. Even after this promising first step, the Great
Powers were still concerned over the fate of the Bulgarian-Romanian relations.
After the signing of the Protocol, the Great Powers planned that in a period of
three months both sides would ratify the Protocol and that the commission
would establish now border. In the end of May this plan seemed unrealistic
because Romania spent one whole month to ratify the agreement.*^
According to the Saint Petersburg Protocol, after the ratification of the
treaty, Romania and Bulgaria were to establish three commissions with the task
of precisely tracing the new border. On 9 June, Blondel informed his Ministry
that Romania had delivered the list of representatives in these commissions.*^
The implementation of the Protocol was thwarted by the outbreak of the Second
Balkan War, initiated by the attack of the Bulgarian army on Serbian and Greek
positions along the Bregalnica River in the night between 29 and 30 June 1913.
War suporters in Bulgaria declared that "Bulgaria demanded of Serbia the
execution of the treaty of 1912; of Greece, recognition of the right of nationalities;
of Romania, to respect her territory".** In Bulgarian perspective this attack seems
like the only rightful choice for defending its national claims.
Since the signing of the London Treaty on 30 May, Europe was convinced
that the dissolution of the Balkan Alliance was inevitable, while a conflict
between Serbia and Bulgaria was a matter of days. Minister Blondel believed that
Romania would mobilize all of its military forces at the first hint of war.*' On 26
June, the Romanian minister to Saint Petersburg, Constantin Nanu, told to
Delcasse that in case of war, Romania would protect its interests. He also said
that Romania would not make the same mistake as eight months before, when it
had remained a silent spectator and, due to its passivity, had failed to get a
proper reward. Even Carp, who was known as the most fervent supporter of
Romania's alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, was stressing in his
statements made in June 1913 that "Romania had to change the course of its
foreign policy" .^^
In the period between two Balkan wars, Romania did not want to enter
into an alliance with Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria in order not to lose the
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 270, Na 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , B u c a r e s t , le 2 8 m a i 1913; A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s .
270, Na 135, B u c a r e s t , l e 29 m a i 1913; A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 270, Ne 227, P a r i s , le 3 1 m a i 1 9 1 3 .
*7 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 7 1 , Na 186, B u c a r e s t , le 9 j u i n 1913.
M i r \ i s t r y o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . The Bulgarian question and the Balkan states, ( S o f i a : State P r i n t i n g P r e s s ,
1919), 6.
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 7 1 , Na 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 , B u c a r e s t , le 10 j u i n 1913.
5° A M A E , P A 211, Papiers Delcasse, A m b a s s a d e de Saint-Petersbourg, v o l . 20, Na 128, Saint-
P e t e r s b o u r g , le 26 j u i n 1913.

44
freedom of choice in case of war.^i On 22 June, King Carol informed the Serbian
minister to Romania, Mihailo Ristic, about his final decision regarding Romania'
stance in case of war between Serbia and Bulgaria, Romania would mobilize
armed forces and wait. If Serbia won, Romania would hail its victory with
satisfaction, but if there were a threat that Bulgaria could triumph, in a decisive
moment, Romania would interfere in war to support Serbia.^^
In June, minister Blondel spoke with Maiorescu and King Carol on several
occasions. He had the latest information which enabled him to closely observe
every change in Romanian policy. During one of those conversations, Maiorescu
told Blondel that in case that Romania decided to enter the war against Bulgaria "it
would only secure the line Tutrakan-Balchik and it would stop there". Blondel
wanted to get a confirmation of this statement from King Carol, but he gave a
vague answer and told Blondel „that the second part of Maiorescu's statement was
exaggerated". He and Romanian government could not make a promise of any
kind in advance. If Romania joined the warfare, it would fight until got its
guarantees from Bulgaria that its demands in Dobrogea would be fulfilled. Also
King Carol indicated the possibility that Romania would spread its area of
operations, because he could not allow "that Serbia be overrun by Bulgaria".^3
On 3 July, King Carol and Romanian General Staff ordered the army
mobilization.54 The Romanian government explained this action to the Great
Powers as a "confirmation of its territorial integrity" and "securing its strategic
position towards B u l g a r i a " . T h e very same day when mobilization was ordered
in Romania, Danev contacted Serbian and Greek Prime ministers Nikola Pasic
and Eleftherios Venizelos, suggesting that the three of them should command a
cease-fire to their troops. Venizelos responded that he would order a cease-fire
only after the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops to the positions held before the
attack on the Bregalnica.^^ While Romanian troops were being mobilized,
Austria-Hungary advised the authorities in Sofia to conclude a treaty with
Romania at any cost in order to prevent a possible fight on the third side.^^
Subsequently, on 9 July, the Romanian minister to Sofia, Prince Dimitrie
Ghica, informed the Bulgarian government that together with the embassy staff
51 A N R , C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r 3 6 / 1 9 1 3 , Ns 1 - 7 , B u c a r e s t , l e 2 0 j u i n 1 9 1 3 .
52 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903-1914 (1903-1914),
V a s a T s f i l o v i c ( B e o g r a d : S r p s k e a k a d e m i j a n a u k a i u m e t n o s t i , 1 9 8 1 ) , V I - 2 , NQ 5 6 5 , 5 9 7 - 5 9 8 .
53 A N R , C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r 3 6 / 1 9 1 3 , Ne 1 - 7 , B u c a r e s t , l e 2 0 j u i n 1 9 1 3 .
51 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 274, Ne 8 8 , B u c a r e s t , l e 3 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 .
55 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 7 4 , Ne 1 3 5 - 1 3 7 , B u c a r e s t , l e 4 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 ; A N R , C a s a R e g a l a - 1 , d o s a r
3 8 / 1 9 1 3 , Ne 1 , B u c a r e s t , l e 3/16 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 .
A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 274, Ne 8 9 , S a i n t P e t e r s b o u r g , l e 3 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 .
57 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1371,1-233, B e r l i n , 2 4 J u n e / 5 J u l y 1 9 1 3 .
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 45
he would leave Sofia as soon as possible, in accordance with the instructions
received from his government. Prince Ghica also notified the Bulgarian Ministry
of foreign affairs that he entrusted to the Italian embassy the care for the
Romanian population in Bulgaria, the embassy's residence and archives.^* I n
response to this note, Danev informed minister Ghica that the Bulgarian
government was going to place at his disposal a special train that would
transport the Prince and the Romanian embassy staff from Sofia to Ruse on
Danube at 7.30 A M on 10 July.^'
Before leaving Sofia, Prince Ghica officially delivered to Bulgaria the
declaration of war stating that the Romanian government considered itself to be in a
state of war against Bulgaria beginning with 10 July."^" The citizens of Bucharest
fervently greeted the government's decision to enter a war against Bulgaria. Street
gatherings were spontaneously organized and citizens carried banners with slogans
such as "Down with Bulgaria" and "Down with tyrannical Austria-Hungary" .^^
Corresponding on Romanian war declaration the Bulgarian General Staff declared
that Bulgaria would not resist the Romanian army, which took the control over the
entire area along the right bank of the Danube by 17 July.^^
The French minister of foreign affairs Stephen Pichon was unpleasantly
surprised by Romania entering in war. Nevertheless, he believed that Romania
wanted to secure the territory gained by the Protocol of Saint Petersburg and,
possibly, war reparations.^ France was convinced that the situation was still
under European control and it chose not to directly involve itself, but to carefully
observe the development of the political situation in the Balkans through its
diplomatic representatives in the Balkan capitals.
As opposed to the First Balkan War, when the Balkan states demanded
the mediation of the Great Powers, in the Second Balkan War, the warring sides
wished to reach the peace alone. In contrast to the situation in November and
December 1912, when all of the six Great Powers had competed for the prestige
of hosting a peace conference under their own auspices, in July 1913, that sort of
enthusiasm was entirely gone.** On 17 July, during the sessions of the
Ambassador Conference in London, Russian delegate Count Alexander von
Benckendorff suggested to his colleges that the final Peace Conference should be
priredio D u s a n Lukac, urednik 58 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1371,1-302, S o f i a , 2 7 J u n e / 9 J u l y 1 9 1 3 .
59 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1371,1-314, S o f i a , 2 7 J u n e / 9 J u l y 1 9 1 3 .
« T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1371,1-306, S o f i a , 2 8 J u n e / 1 0 J u l y 1 9 1 3 .
«i T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1 3 7 1 , 1 - 1 5 1 , S o f i a , 2 0 J u n e / 2 J u l y 1 9 1 3 .
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 7 6 , Ne 8, S o p h i a , l e 1 1 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 ; A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 7 7 , Ne
78, B u c a r e s t , l e 17 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 .
" T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2 , a.e. 1371,1-328, P a r i s , 2 8 J u n e / 1 1 J u l y 1 9 1 3 .
" A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 7 7 , Ne 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , L o n d r e s , l e 19 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 .

46
held in Paris. The task of this Conference would be to resolve only the problems
raised from the Second Balkan War. On the other hand, Pichon proposed that the
Ambassador Conference in London should extend its jurisdiction to the issues
from the Second Balkan War.*^ In reality that was not possible because the
Ambassadors in London were still struggling with the problems of the First
Balkan War, which were too severe and complex to be resolved even after six
months. In that situation, the Great Powers agreed that it would be quite
imreasonable to add new problems to so many unsolved ones.
On 17 July, all belligerent parties accepted the proposal of the Serbian
Prime minister, Nikola Pasic, to send their delegates to Nis in order to negotiate a
cease-fire.** Instead of the minister of finance Teodorov, who was suggested by
Sazonov and Delcasse, Bulgaria sent to Nis General Paprikov and Sava Ivanchev.
The two of them were escorted to the venue of negotiations by the Russian
military attache Romanovski, who immediately returned to Sofia.*^ This fact
clearly shows that Russia was involved as a mediator between Bulgaria and its
opponents. During the negotiations in Nis, General Paprikov stayed in constant
telephone contact with the Russian minister to Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig.
Hartwig offered to be mediator between Bulgaria, on the one side, and Serbia,
Romania and Greece, on the other, in order to help reach a consensus on the
cease-fire.** Despite Hartwig's efforts, on 26 July, General Paprikov complained
that the negotiations, which were going on for five days, failed to yield any
result. He suspected that Bulgaria was trapped into negotiations in Nis, while its
adversaries continued to gain and strengthen positions in the battlefield.*^ The
only result of the six-day negotiations was a cease-fire, offered as a compromise
by Serbia, Greece and Romania.^" The delegates at the Nis negotiations accepted
the invitation of the Romanian government to organize the final peace conference
in the Romanian capital. The Great Powers approved the proposal to hold a
peace conference in Bucharest, provided the presence of their representatives.^^
The only one unsatisfied with this "imruly" decision of the Balkan states
was Austria-Himgary, which turned the blade of discontent towards Theophile
Delcasse, the French ambassador to Russia. The Austro-Hungarian public
opinion accused Delcasse of "diplomatic intrigues" which managed to challenge
« A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 277, Ne 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , L o n d r e s , l e 19 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 .
«• A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 277, N2 9 2 , S a i n t - P e t e r s b o u r g , le 17 j u i l l e t 1913.
o^ D D F , 3^ s e r i e , t. V I I , Na 4 2 8 , S o p h i a , le 20 j u i l l e t 1 9 1 3 , 4 6 3 .
08 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2, a.e. 1373,1-308, N i s h , 13/26 J u l y 1913.
0" T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2, a.e. 1373,1-309, N i s h , 13/26 J u l y 1913.
7" T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2, a.e. 1373,1-325, N i s h , 13/26 J u l y 1913.
71 D D F , 3= s e r i e , t. V I I , Ne 424, R o m e , l e 20 j u i l l e t 1913, 4 5 9 .
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 47
the decades-long balance between Austria and Russia in the Balkans in no more
than three months of his office as the minister to Russia. According to the
Viennese press, Delcasse succeeded in turning the entire Balkans against
Austria-Hungary, including the latter's ally - Romania.^^
For the Serbian delegation headed by the Nikola Pasic, the trip to
Bucharest was strenuous, because they needed to travel by ship to Tumu Severin
and from there by road to Bucharest.''^ Montenegro sent General Janko Vukotic as
its delegate to the Peace Conference. The Bulgarian delegation was numerous
and was led by General Paprikov and Major Ivan Fichev.^* The Greek
representative was Dimitros Panas, minister in Bucharest, but in the last moment
the Prime minister Venizelos declared that he would join the delegation.^^
Conference started on 30 July 1913.^*
As the French delegate, Blondel stood aside in the negotiations, in
accordance with the instructions of the Quai d'Orsay. A complete change in the
French diplomatic policy towards Romania was apparent during the Second
Balkan War. As long as Romania acted in accordance with the proclaimed "strict
neutrality", France approved its demands put forward during the First Balkan
War.'''' French diplomats referred to Romania as the "epitome of political
sobriety". As soon as Romania got involved in warfare, France's sympathy for
Romania vanished. This is confirmed by a confidential note sent to Minister
Pichon by the Bulgarian minister to Paris, Stanchov. In this note, minister
Stanchov pleaded France to support Bulgaria at the Bucharest conference. He
also stressed that it would be imjust to decide on the fate of the Bulgarians solely
based on what happened in the latest war. Having adopted Stanchov's opinion,
Pichon sent a telegram to the other Great Powers in which he reminded them
that the purpose of the Bucharest conference was not to decide simply on the fate
of Bulgaria but also on the political balance in the Balkans. He underlined that
the creation of a "Greater Greece or a Greater Serbia would irreversibly disturb
that balance". According to Pichon, if European powers sincerely wished to
restore a lasting peace in the Balkans and re-establish an alliance of the Balkan
states, this wouldn't be possible "with a politically humiliated and territorially
mutilated Bulgaria" .^^
72 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 277, Ne 112, B u d a p e s t , le 17 j u i l l e t 1913.
73 A r h i v S r b i j e ( A S ) , M i n i s t a r s t v o i n o s t r a n i h d e l a - P o l i t i c k o o d e l j e n j e ( M I D - P O ) , r o l n a 4 1 1 , Ne 4 - 1 0 .
71 T s D A , M V R I , f. 1 7 6 K , o p . 2, a.e. 1454,1-30, S o f i a , 12 J u l y 1913.
75 D D F , 3= s e r i e , t. V I I , Na 4 7 3 , B u c a r e s t , le 26 j u i l l e t 1913, 514.
70 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 279, Na 166, B u c a r e s t , le 28 j u i l l e t 1913.
77 D D F , 3'= s e r i e , t. V I I , Ne 503, P a r i s , le 3 1 j u i l l e t 1913, 5 4 3 - 5 4 5 .
78 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 280, Ne 9 9 - 1 0 3 , P a r i s , le 4 a o i i t 1913.

48
As opposed to Blondel, the other representatives of the Great Powers did
not act merely as observers at the Conference but tended to overtly take sides.
According to Blondel, Austria-Hungary's minister to Bucharest, Prince Karl Emil
Fiirstenberg, took the lead in plotting and intrigue. He overtly advocated against
Serbia and Greece, encouraging Romania and Bulgaria to reconcile and establish
better neighbour relations under the patronage of Austria-Hungary and the
Triple Alliance. Not even the Russian minister to Bucharest Shebeko acted as an
indifferent observer in the peace negotiations; on the contrary, he used every
opportunity to interfere in the protection of Bulgaria. The French minister
Blondel advised him that it was not prudent to support Bulgaria so openly
because Russia could lose the confidence of Serbia and Montenegro. Shebeko in
turn assured Blondel that Serbia's confidence in Russia was so steady that the
Russian protection policy towards Bulgaria could by no means challenge it. He
stressed that according to the instructions of minister Sazonov, Russia's primary
task was to retain the confidence of Bulgaria; therefore, it was unacceptable both
for him and Russia to deny full support to Bulgaria at the Conference.^^
Blondel noticed that all delegates of the Balkan states, with the exception
of Bulgaria, sincerely desired to conclude a definitive treaty that would finally
ensure peace throughout the Balkan Peninsula. The Bulgarians hoped that the
Bucharest Conference would end in failure, after which the Great Powers would
interfere and organize a European congress - similar to the Berlin Congress of
1878, more favorable for Bulgaria and its national interests.*"
Owing to Maiorescu's masterly negotiations, which were highly praised
in Blondel's reports, the text of the peace treaty was completed by 7 August.
Only Greece refused to sign it until all of its demands were met. It was not
Venizelos who insisted on these demands but King Constantine I , who had made
a very precise proposal regarding territorial borders and refused to depart from
it. Venizelos did not deny the opinion he had held previously on the subject of
Cavalla. He always admitted that the port of Cavalla was not necessary to Greece
and that it was indispensable to Bulgaria, but he declared, notwithstanding, that
he would not sign the peace without Cavalla, being tied by the categorical orders
of King Constantine.*! The stubbornness of Greece's sovereign put Venizelos in
an awkward situation. He was pressured by other delegates not to armul the
treaty merely because of several kilometres of territory. Despite the King's
instructions, after a meeting with Blondel and other representatives of the Great
79 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 8 3 - 2 8 7 , B u c a r e s t , le 3 1 j u i l l e t 1913.
80 D D F , 3'^ s e r i e , t. V H , Ne 5 0 3 , P a r i s , le 3 1 j u i l l e t 1913, 5 4 3 - 5 4 5 .
81 The Bulgarian question and the Balkan states, 72.
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 49
Powers, Veruzelos promised to sign the peace treaty.*^ In fact, the great help to
Venizelos was an intervention by the Emperor of Germany Wilhelm I I who
telegraphed strongly in favor of King Constantine in the matter of Cavalla.*^
France also expressed its sympathy toward Greece regarding this issue through
some of the most influential newspapers. The final text of the peace treaty was
signed by the all delegates on 10 August, and they all agreed to exchange the
ratified treaties to 25 August.**
Immediately after the peace treaty had been signed by all delegates, the
Romanian King Carol informed the Emperor Wilhelm I I that the peace had been
concluded among the belligerent parties, placing this peace, symbolically, under
the patronage of the German Kaiser. The Emperor congratulated King Carol on
concluding the treaty and, having accepted the offered patronage, he put an end
to speculations coming from Vienna that the Bucharest Treaty would be revised
by European powers. Paul Cambon's comment on Berlin's positive reaction was:
"Germany loves success! Its sympathy will always go to the victorious ones". The
Berlin press was also full of praise for Romania, glorifying its role in the
conclusion of the Treaty. Apart from Romania, the Berlin press also praised
Greece. The most widely read Berlin newspapers featured articles on sympathy
towards Greece and the traditional philo-hellenic sentiments among the German
nation. In honor of the two victorious parties at the Bucharest conference.
Emperor Wilhelm 11 awarded the King of Greece Constantine I and the
Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Titu Maiorescu, with the Grand Cross of the
Order of the Red Eagle.*^
France was also satisfied with the outcome of the Bucharest Conference
and its own role in concluding the peace treaty. The only Balkan state that
remained discontented with France's attitude and acts during the Second Balkan
War and the negotiations in Bucharest was Bulgaria. Bulgarian public opinion
was convinced that the French press had held the most critical attitude towards
82 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 280, Ne 2 3 0 - 2 3 2 , B u c a r e s t , le 7 a o u t 1913.
83 T h e E m p e r o r of G e r m a n y d i d n o t c o n c e a l t h e f a c t t h a t h e o b t a i n e d C a v a l l a for G r e e c e ; a n d at a
p s y c h o l o g i c a l m o m e n t , h e d e m a n d e d for t h i s s e r v i c e a p r o o f of g r a t i t u d e o n t h e p a r t o f King
C o n s t a n t i n e . O n the 4 A u g u s t 1914 t h e E m p e r o r i n v i t e d the T h e o t o k i s , t h e m i n i s t e r of G r e e c e i n
B e r l i n . W i l h e l m I I w a n t e d t h e m i n i s t e r to s e n d a t e l e g r a m to K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e a n d a s k h i m a s for
t h a n k s to the s u p p o r t d u r i n g P e a c e c o n f e r e n c e i n B u c h a r e s t of h i s I m p e r i a l M a j e s t y that G r e e c e
r e t a i n e d d e f i n i t e l y C a v a l l a to m o b i l i s e t h e G r e e k a r m y o n t h e s i d e of G e r m a n y . {The Bulgarian
question and the Balkan states, 7 2 - 7 3 . )
81 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 8 1 , Ne 19, P a r i s , l e 10 a o u t 1913.
85 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 8 1 , Ne 2 5 , B e r l i n , le 10 a o u t 1913; A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 8 1 , Ne
1 0 5 - 1 0 6 , B u c a r e s t , le 1 1 a o u t 1913.

50
Bulgaria ever since the beginning of the Second Balkan War and such an attitude
was later adopted by other European newspapers. Panafieu's opinion was that
the favoritism of the French press towards Serbia, Greece and Romania would be
harmful for the relations between France and Bulgaria in future.**
On the other hand, French discontent with Romania was short-termed
because the Romanian involvement in the Second Balkan War soon turned out to
be directed against Austria-Hungary, which, though a Romanian ally, was
overtly inclined to Bulgaria. During the war, in Bucharest, slogans against
Austria-Hungary could be seen as often as those against Bulgaria. Vienna's
insisting that the treaty signed in Bucharest should be revised further deepened
the gap between Romania and Austria-Hungary. The Romanian press did not
cease to criticize Austria-Hungary after the peace treaty had been signed on 10
August. Romania reproached Austria-Hungary for being more supportive of
Bulgaria than of its ally, Romania, ever since the beginning of the First Balkan
War and particularly during the Second Balkan War. In many Romanian
newspapers it could be read that "Vienna's attempt to revise the Bucharest
Treaty was the last in the series of mistakes made by Austria-Hungary in 1912
and 1913 due to which it irreversibly lost its political and economic influence in
all Balkan states, including Romania."*^
Despite the fact that during the Second Balkan War the Balkan alliance
was broken, in a new alliance, the position once held by Bulgaria was now
assumed by Romania, which was regarded by the French as "a warrant of peace
and balance of power in the Balkans". The balance of power in the Balkans after
the two Balkan wars was favorable for France and its allies, because the new
Balkan Alliance was economically entirely dependent on France and its monetary
market, while politically it was orientated towards Russia. Also, the
disagreements within the Triple Alliance were advantageous for France and
Russia. They were a positive sign that Romania was not a part of the Central
Powers Alliance and that it was possible for the Entente Powers to recruit it into
their pact. A n alliance with Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, the foundations of
which were laid during the peace negotiations in Bucharest, was a step towards
strengthening these relations.
80 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 283, Ne 2 3 - 2 7 , S o p h i a , l e 22 a o u t 1913.
87 A M A E , N S , T u r q u i e , d o s s . 2 8 1 , Ne 100, B u c a r e s t , le 1 1 a o u t 1913.
FRENCH DIPLOMACY TOWARD ROMANIA
BILJANA STOJIC D U R I N G T H E B A L K A N W A R S (1912-1913) 51
Abstract: The First Balkan War began in October 1912 and was fought by
Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire. The goal
of the war was to expel the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans. Although it was a
Balkan state, Romania did not take part in the war. Nevertheless, it observed
carefully the development of the conflict. Romania's standing outside of the
conflict was appreciated by the Great Powers and among them especially by
France. Because of the political maturity that it showed, Romania was an
important part of the French foreign policy toward Balkans during 1912 and
1913. The main task of the French policy during the First Balkan War was to
ensure that the conflict remains local and that Romania does not enter the war.
This paper analyses the French policy toward Romania and the Balkans in 1912
and 1913 on the basis of the reports of the French diplomats in Bucharest, Sofia,
Saint Petersburg, etc. The special attention would be given to the Romanian
demands that were considered at the London Conference and during the
negotiations with Bulgaria conducted in the spring of 1913 in Sankt Petersburg.
Moreover, the Romanian participation in the Second Balkan War and its role in
the establishing of peace at the Conference in Bucharest will be considered
according to French diplomatic reports.
Keywords: France, Romania, Bulgaria, Balkan Wars, Camille Blondel, Titu
Maiorescu.