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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES


7th JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 123, CEBU CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Plaintiffs

Criminal Case No. 14344


For violation of Section 8 in relation to
Section 11 of RA 6713

---versus---

JOB HUTT,
Accused

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------///

MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS

Job Hutt (“Mr. Hutt”), through counsel, and unto this


Honorable Court, most respectfully files this Motion to Quash and
states that:

Due to the Office of the Ombudsman’s inordinate delay in the


conduct of the preliminary investigation from 2010 to the final
resolution of Mr. Hutt’s motion for reconsideration in 2015, Mr.
Hutt’s rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial, which
are guaranteed by Sections 14(2) and 16 of Article 3 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution no less, have been violated. As a result, Mr.
Hutt has suffered from mental anguish, emotional pain, and
sleepless nights. Thus, this humble counsel respectfully moves to
Quash the Information and to Dismiss the Case based on the
grounds of violation of Mr. Hutt’s constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases, lack of jurisdiction, and double jeopardy.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Councilor Job Hutt is an honorable man and a dedicated


public servant who was first elected as councilor in Brgy. X in 2007.
After serving for three consecutive terms with zeal, integrity, and
moral uprightness, he is now a private citizen. Unfortunately, a
prying and inquisitive citizen filed a complaint before the
Ombudsman in 2010 against the Good Councilor for the alleged
non-filing of his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN) in the years 2008 and 2009. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, the Ombudsman-Visayas graft prosecutor issued a
resolution in 2011 charging Mr. Hutt with a violation of Section 8
in relation to section 11 of RA 6713 for non-filing of his SALN.
Councilor Hutt timely filed a motion for reconsideration to the
Ombudsman-Visayas resolution. Councilor Hutt’s motion for
reconsideration was eventually denied after four long and arduous
years in 2015, after review and approval by the Ombudsman
Central Office. After the untimely and tragic death of his original
counsel, Mr. Hutt has been arraigned where he entered the plea of
not guilty. His case is now at the stage of presentation of third
witness for the prosecution.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Motion to Quash Information and to


Dismiss the Case based on the grounds of speedy disposition
of cases and speedy trial, lack of jurisdiction, and double
jeopardy due to the Ombudsman’s inordinate delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation is tenable?

2. Whether or not the Motion to Quash Information and to


Dismiss the Case based on the grounds of speedy disposition
of cases and speedy trial, lack of jurisdiction, and double
jeopardy be filed even after accused has entered his plea?

ARGUMENTS and DISCUSSIONS

Sections 14(2) and 16 of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine


Constitution provides in no uncertain terms that the Mr. Hutt’s
rights “to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial”1 and “to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,

1 Section 14(2), Article 3, 1987 Constitution

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or administrative bodies”2 are protected. These rights are reiterated
in Rule 115 of the Rules of Court where it states that one the rights
of the accused is the right “To have speedy, impartial and public
trial.”3 As discussed in People v. Sandiganbayan4:

“While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that


a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient5
the right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried6

According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,7 inordinate delay in


resolving a criminal complaint, being violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases,
warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.8”

Verily, it can be said that the rights to speedy disposition of


cases and speedy trial are well entrenched within criminal
procedure. In Martin v. Ver.9, the Supreme Court adopted the
balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to speedy
trial was violated. There are four factors to wit: (1) length of the
delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendants assertion or non-
assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from
the delay.10 None of these elements, however, is either a necessary
or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered
together with other relevant circumstances. These factors have no
talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process.11

2 Section 16, Article 3, 1987 Constitution


3 Section 1(h), Rule 115, Rules of Court
4 People v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 188165, December 11, 2013
5 De la Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478, 485
6 Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298, 307.
7 G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301.
8 Id. at 304
9 No. L-62810, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 745.
10 See Lumanlaw v. Hon. Peralta, Jr., supra, at 410; Yuchenco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.

149802, 150320, 150367, 153207, and 153459, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 1, 124-
125; Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 505; Caballes v. Court of Appeals,supra, at
332; Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 294,
313; People v. Tee, supra, at 544; Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 951; Lopez, Jr. v.
Office of the Ombudsman, supra, at 49-50; Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 654; Blanco
v. Sandiganbayan, 399 Phil. 674, 682 (2000); Sumbang, Jr. v. Gen. Court Martial Pro-Region
6, Iloilo City, supra, at 935; and Dansal v. Hon. Fernandez, Sr., supra, at 906.
11 407 US 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972).

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We start with the length of the delay. In Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,12 the Court ruled that a delay of almost three
years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process
and to the speedy disposition of his case. In People v.
Sandiganbayan,13 the Supreme Court ruled: “There was really no
sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of
more than five years in bringing the charges against the
respondents before the proper court.” Likewise, in Angchangco, Jr.
v. Ombudsman14 and Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,15 the
Supreme Court held that the delay of almost or more than six (6)
years in resolving the criminal charges against the petitioners
therein amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases. Also, in Inocentes
v. People16, the Court stated: “Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7)
years before the informations were filed skews the fairness which
the right to speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain.” The case
at bar has languored on for four years, clearly meeting the requisite
time frame to be considered as unjust delay.

For the reasons behind the delay, the Office of the


Ombudsman has neither explained nor tried to explain why it took
four years for them to deny Mr. Hutt’s motion for reconsideration.
This act of gross negligence further gives credence to the Motion to
Quash. As for the defendant’s assertion of his right, though a
Motion to Quash is typically filed before arraignment, however one
exception is when the Motion to Quash is based on lack of
jurisdiction. As stated in Francel v. Sycip,17 the Supreme Court
clarified that: “Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and
to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is
determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses
contained in the answer.” Furthermore, it is stated in Rule 117,
Section 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that:

"Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.-


-The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did

12 G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 70, 82-83.
13 People v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 188165, December 11, 2013
14 335 Phil. 766, 770 (1997).
15 366 Phil. 568, 576-577 (1999).
16 Inocentes v. People, G.R. No. 205963-64, July 27, 2016
17 G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA 424

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not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the
grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided
for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.”18

Since this Motion to Quash is grounded on lack of jurisdiction,


it is clear now that due to being an exception to the rule, Mr. Hutt
has asserted his right at the earliest opportunity.

The final factor in the balancing test is the prejudice caused


to the defendant. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,19 the Supreme
Court stated: “Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the
interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to
protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit
the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” In the
case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman dragged its preliminary
investigation along for four long years. This delay was for a long
enough time that Mr. Hutt’s trusted and original counsel sadly
passed away. In Barker v. Wingo,20 the Supreme Court stated,
“Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility.” The death of a
trusted friend and counsel alone is enough to see that Mr. Hutt has
been prejudiced. That loss, coupled with the long delay of the case,
and the public scrutiny to which Mr. Hutt is and will continue to be
subjected to until his acquittal leaves the fact of his prejudice as
clear as day.

As mentioned earlier, the right to speedy disposition of cases


and the right to speedy trial is protected by the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. In Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,21 the
Supreme Court stated: “the cardinal precept is that where there is
a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the States right to due process
raises a serious jurisdiction issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that

18 Section 8, Rule 117, Rules on Criminal Procedure


19 Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004
20 Barker v. Wingo, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)
21 Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420, Jan. 30, 1971

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right is void for lack of jurisdiction22. Any judgment or decision
rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight
or ignored wherever it exhibits its head23.” It is clear that violations
of the right to speedy disposition of cases and the right to speedy
trial are violations of basic constitutional rights which would then
divest the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When


an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had leaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.24

Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)


before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid
plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.25 However, this rule
admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and
denial of the right to speedy trial.26 Double jeopardy may attach
when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in
violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.27 Since Mr. Hutt’s
right to speedy trial has clearly been violated as explain earlier,
there is no doubt that double jeopardy would attach to this case.

The opposition may argue that the delay in the proceedings is


due to their intense investigations, and that since Mr. Hutt has not
raised these issues at the earlier opportunity, he is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of court. These arguments cannot hold
weight due to the fact that the tactical disadvantages carried by the

22 Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, May 25, 1973 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12,
49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973
23 Id
24 Sec 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court
25 People vs. Nitafan, 302 SCRA 424, 440 (1999).
26 People vs. Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 55 (1994).
27 Commission on Elections vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 501, 507 (1994).

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passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of
the individual.28 In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the
Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan29 illumined:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of


the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases
on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the


defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to
prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.
Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden


of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may
make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden.
The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or
extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor,
nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v.
United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused
despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered
no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than IS
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the


State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different
reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the
prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over
the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the
heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State. x x x (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

28
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013
29
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 917 (2004). (Citations omitted)

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Furthermore, a defendant has no duty to bring himself to
trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that
the trial is consistent with due process.30

As mentioned earlier, since the Motion to Quash the


Information and Dismiss the Case is grounded upon lack of
jurisdiction and double jeopardy, it enjoys the exception to the rule
entrenched in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which
state:

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground


therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion
to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.31

In conclusion, due to the inordinate delay of the Office of the


Ombudsman in resolving and terminating the preliminary
investigation, the prosecution has violated Mr. Hutt’s
constitutional rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial
and the Court has been divested of the jurisdiction over the case.
To re-file said case, the prosecution would leave Mr. Hutt in double
jeopardy.

PRAYER

The Above Premises Considered, Job Hutt respectfully prays


to the Honorable Court to quash the Information and to dismiss the
criminal charge against him.

Job Hutt likewise respectfully prays for other just and


equitable relief.

Cebu City, Philippines, March 26, 2018

DY, LIGUTOM AND ASSOCIATES


EH307, USC Law Building
P. del Rosario St.
Cebu City
Email: dlaa@gmail.com
30
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013
31
Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court

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GAUDENCIO QUINITO A. LIGUTOM IV
Counsel for the Accused
PTR No. 023420; Jan. 5, 2022;
IBP No. 453420; Jan. 19, 2022, Cebu City
Roll of Attorney’s No. 12345
MCLE Compliance No. M-1234567
Tel. No. (032) 273-6420
Mobile No. 09436152420

PHILIP IAN DY
Counsel for the Accused
PTR No. 023420; Jan. 5, 2022;
IBP No. 453420; Jan. 19, 2022, Cebu City
Roll of Attorney’s No. 12345
MCLE Compliance No. M-1234567
Tel. No. (032) 273-6420
Mobile No. 09436152420

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NOTICE OF HEARING

The Clerk of Court


Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 123
Cebu City

Greetings:

Kindly submit the foregoing motion for the consideration


and approval of the Honorable Court immediately upon your
receipt hereof.

ATTY. GAUDENCIO QUINITO A. LIGUTOM IV

EXPLANATION

Undersigned Accused has furnished the private prosecutor a


copy of the foregoing motion though registered mail, and not by
personal delivery, because of distance and time constraint.

ATTY. GAUDENCIO QUINITO A. LIGUTOM IV

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