Crim Pro Digest

4. People vs. Nitafan, G.R. Nos.
107964-66, (1999)
FACTS:
● Jan. 9, 1992: 3 criminal informations for violation of Sec. 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA No. 265 were
filed against private respondent Imelda Marcos before RTC Pasig (Br. 158-
Pasig)
○ Informations amended prior to arraignment
● Private respondent pleaded not guilty
● After arraignment, Panel of Prosecutors from DOJ and SolGen filed separate
motions for consolidation of 3 informations pending before Br. 158-Pasig
and 21 other cases pending in RTC Manila (Br. 26-Manila)
○ SolGen alleged:
■ Indictable acts under 3 informations form part of and is related to
the transaction complained of in criminal cases in Manila
■ Pasig and Manila cases relate to series of transactions devised
by Pres. Marcos and wife to hide their ill-gotten wealth
○ Br. 158-Pasig: granted motion provided no objection from RTC Manila
judge
○ Br. 26-Manila: 3 informations were re-raffled and re-assigned instead to
Br. 52-Manila presided by Judge Nitafan
■ Re-numbered criminal cases: 92 107942-44
● July 20, 1992: Without private respondent taking any action or filing any motion
to quash informations, respondent judge issued 2 orders
○ 1st order: Show cause why Crim Case 92-107942 should not be
dismissed on the ground that it violates ex post facto law
■ "[O]fficial publications reveals that CB Circular 960 is dated 21
October 1983 and that said regulatory issuance was imperfectly
published in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official Gazette."
■ Date of violation in the information was prior to the date and
complete publication of the Circular charged to have been
violated, the information in this case appears peremptorily
dismissible
○ 2nd order: Show cause why Crim Cases 92-107943-44 should not be
dismissed on the ground that right to double jeopardy was violated
■ 3 cases pending before Br. 26-Manila constitute one continuous
crime
■ To separately prosecute private respondent for a series of
transaction would endow it with the "functional ability of a worm
multiplication or amoeba reproduction"
■ Imelda would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy
● Prosecution complied with twin show cause orders accompanied by motion to
inhibit respondent judge
● August 6, 1992: Respondent judge issued an order denying motion for
consolidation of Pasig and Manila cases
○ Consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of Civpro has no counterpart in
Crimpro
○ Judge Nitafan stated that he is "more studious and discreet, if not more
systematic and methodical," than the prosecution "in the handling of
BATCH 10 - CRIMPRO - #SarilingSikapREM - 1

cases," it would be unfair to just pull out the case when he had already
studied it
● Judge Nitafan dismissed the 3 criminal cases (and other cases before Br. 26-
Manila)
○ August 7, 1992: 8-paged order
■ Crim Case 92-107942 - CB Circular is an ex post facto law
○ August 10, 1992: 17-paged order
■ Crim Cases 107943-44 - Double jeopardy and part of political
vendetta
■ **As to Br. 26-Manila cases, dismissed also because of double
jeopardy also (continuous crime)**
● Prosecution filed 2 separate MRs
○ Sept. 7, 1992: Respondent judge denied in a single order (19 pages)
● Petitioners elevated the case for certiorari
ISSUES/HELD:
1. (Main Issue) W/N accused can still file MTQ? NO, MTQ must be filed at any
time before entering a plea or arraignment.
● GR: No MTQ can be entertained by court after entering a plea or after
arraignment
○ Shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash
● EXC: In the following circumstance (grounds) mentioned in Sec. 8 Rule 117,
which adopts omnibus motion rule
○ Grounds: no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy
● In the present case, private respondent pleaded to the charges without
filing any motion to quash
○ Waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which
she may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or
information pursuant to Sec. 8 of Rule 117
■ Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion
to quash
2. (Main Issue) W/N a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and
subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion
to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the
latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy? NO, right to file MTQ
belongs to accused (Sec. 1 of Rule 117).
● Nothing in the rules authorizes court or judge to motu proprio initiate MTQ if no
such motion was filed by the accused
○ Accused is in the best position to know what ground/s he will base his
objection to the information
○ If judge initiates MTQ, he is pre-judging the case of prosecution and
takes side with accused

● Independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as
respondent judge
○ His show cause orders: orders dismissing the charges and denying the
motions for reconsideration stated
■ In compliance with the orders, prosecution has no choice but to
present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge
■ It cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn the
reasons he relied upon in his different orders without
contradicting himself
○ To allow judge to initiate motion under the guise of a show cause order
would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be
neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well
■ Violative of due process which is a fundamental right of the
accused and prosecution
● Initial act to quash information is lodged with accused and not an authority for
the court to assume is supported by
○ Sec. 2: motion must be signed by "accused" or "his counsel"; court is
proscribed from considering any ground other than those stated in the
motion
○ Sec. 3: states that "the accused" may file a motion
○ Sec. 8: refers to the consequence if "the accused'' do not file such
motion; neither the court nor the judge was mentioned
● Only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a MTQ an
information or complaint are:
○ (1) Grounds stated in the motion
■ There is a proscription on considerations of other grounds than
those specially pleaded in the motion to quash -premised on the
rationale that the right to these defenses are waivable on the
part of the accused
● Waived: deemed to have desired these matters to be
litigated upon in a full-blown trial
○ (2) Ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or
not mentioned in the motion
■ Actually, this should be evident from the face of the information
or complaint to warrant a dismissal
3. (Not IMPT) W/N the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy are
applicable? NO.
● Ex Post Facto Law
○ Every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until
otherwise declared by this court
○ To rule that CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is
unconstitutional
■ Neither private respondent nor SolGen challenges it
■ Cannot pass upon constitutionality unless law directly assailed
● Double Jeopardy1
1 Requisites: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first 20 or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
is a frustration thereof

○ No first jeopardy has yet attached nor any jeopardy terminated (Sec. 7,
Rule 117)2
○ Respondent judge has no other basis on whether private respondent
had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in cases pending
before Br. 26-Manila
■ Assuming there was arraignment, first jeopardy did not attach
because there was no judgment on the merits (not convicted,
acquitted nor dismissed or terminated
2 Attaches when: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea
has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused

5. Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, GR 141336, June 29 2004
FACTS:
● Petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan, Bayani
Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez, Nelson Gabutero, Jose
Genilo, Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali were charged with Violation of
Section 3(e) in relation to Section 3(g) of RA. 3019. Information filed with SB
reads.
● XXX accused xxx, all members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro, and Alfonso V. Umali, Jr., then Provincial Administrator, all of whom
are public officials of the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro, while in the
performance of their official and/or administrative functions, and acting in
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with
private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza, and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M.
Atienza unwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by entering into a grossly
disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds of Oriental
Mindoro in the sum of P2,500,000.00 was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance
the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury.
● Petitioners filed a "Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with the
Ombudsman Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest” followed by a "Motion to Quash" filed by petitioner Valencia
on April 14, 1997. 3
● SB granted motion for reinvestigation and directed the OSP to conduct
reinvestigation
● Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution wherein
Ombudsman and Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil approved
the recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer II Manuel A. Corpuz that the
motion for reinvestigation be denied but that the complaint as against
Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Violeta A. Daquis and Damte A. Manzo be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor
Robert E. Kallos and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo recommended
the dismissal of the complaint against all accused on the ground that their
liability is civil in nature.
● prosecution filed an Amended Information. 6
● Petitioners filed with SB Motion for Leave to File MR of Joint Resolution. Denied
● petitioners learned that in the administrative case against them docketed as
OMB-ADM-1-96-0316, which involved the same subject matter as the criminal
case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after finding that
the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of the
local chief executive. Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan MR of the Order dated June 23, 1999 and/or Motion to Resolve
Motion to Quash Information. SB denied the Motion.
● petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE/HELD: (1)WON SB committed GADALEJ in denying motion to quash

information despite the fact that? Petition lacks merit
1. Respondent ombudsman had already dismissed the administrative case
against the petitioners regarding the same subject matter

2. facts alleged in the information have already become moot and academic and
no longer constitute an offense;
3. No satisfactory reason was given by the respondent Ombudsman in delaying
inordinately (close to three [3] years) the filing of the information against the
petitioners.
The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are: (FOCUSED ON

#1)
1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense
2. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
3. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
4. That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
5. That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
6. That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
7. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
8. That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
9. That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
● Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a
motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion only such
facts as are alleged in the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor,
should be taken into account in the resolution thereof. Matters of defense can
not be produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules
expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former
jeopardy. Otherwise put, facts which constitute the defense of the accused
against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial.
Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not
constitute the offense.
● GR: a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do
not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be
resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. The information need only state the ultimate facts; the
reasons therefor could be proved during the trial
● The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under
this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law.
In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.
BUUUT: inquiry into facts outside the information may be allowed where the
prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof. For a case to fall under the
exception, it is essential that there be no objection from the prosecution. Thus, the
above rule does not apply where the prosecution objected to the presentation of
extraneous facts and even opposed the motion to quash

● Here, petitioners are charged with violation of Section 3(e), in relation to 3(g), of
RANo. 3019
The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. 29
elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(g) are:

1. The offender is a public officer;
2. He enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. 30
● All the above elements are averred in information. It sufficiently alleges that
petitioners are public officials discharging official or administrative functions
who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, entered into a grossly
disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with a private person
which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage.
● Petitioners invoke the earlier Resolution of the Ombudsman which
recommended the dismissal of the case against them. There, the Graft
Investigation Officer opined that the contract of loan extended by petitioners to
Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza for the repair, maintenance and operation of the latter's
motor vessel was necessary for the transportation needs of the inhabitants of
the Province of Oriental Mindoro, which had just suffered three successive
typhoons. The loan of provincial funds was supposedly extended by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro under Section 468 of R.A. 7160
(The Local Government Code of 1991), pursuant to the General Welfare
provision embodied in Section 16 thereof,
● However, the Resolution must be established as their defense during the trial. It
was not even offered and admitted as evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It was
merely attached to petitioners' "Supplemental Pleading in Support of Motion to
Quash Information." Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear the approval of
the Ombudsman.
● The fact that Special Prosecutor and Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of case against petitioners is of no moment, especially since they
also signed the Comment filed before this Court wherein they extensively
argued against the instant petition. The continuing objection and opposition of
the prosecution to petitioners' motion to quash the Information removes this
case from the exception to the above-cited rule that in the determination of
whether the facts alleged constitute an offense, only the allegations in the
Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, should be
considered.
● Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative
case against them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss
the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial

evidence. While that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis
of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of
administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand,
the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime
● Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case
against petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office. Indeed, a
reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of office. However, the re-election of
a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability
incurred by him during his previous term of office.
● There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the Information
against petitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against them.
● The ruling in Tatad on inordinate delay does not apply here. In that case, the
delay was exacerbated by the fact that the charges against petitioner were
found to be politically motivated. In the case at bar, there is no indication that
the complaint against petitioners was filed to serve political ends. Neither is the
delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive. On the contrary, what appears is that
the prosecutors exercised extreme care in verifying, evaluating and assessing
the charges against petitioners before making a finding of probable cause.

6. People v. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, (2004)
FACTS:
● Serafin Saballegue was charged with violation of Section 22 (a) in relation to
Sections 19 (b) and 28 (e) of RA No. 8282, or the Social Security Act.
● Serafin is a proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press. The Information charged
him of unlawfully refusing and failing to remit the premiums due for his
employee to the SSS in the amount of Php 6,533.00, representing SSS and EC
premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 and the 3%
penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of Php 11,143.28.00
computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands.
● The Information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo
Tolentino.
● The case was raffled to RTC of Naga City, presided by Judge Zeida Garfin.
● Serafin was then arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the case
was set for pre-trial.
● Three days thereafter, Serafin filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
● The RTC granted the motion, notwithstanding defendant’s plead to the
Information, on the basis of Rule 112, Section 4, which says:
● No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
● The RTC cited that the Information will readily show that it has not complied
with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. Further, the
RTC ruled that questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. For the RTC, the filing of a valid information goes into the
matter of jurisdiction of the court.
● For Prosecutor Tolentino, he argued that him being duly designated to assist
the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS cases by the
Regional State Prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V,
then that authority may be given to other than the City Prosecutor. Further,
Prosecutor Tolentino appended a notation which states that the City/ Provincial
Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the Special Prosecution Team on
SSS cases in Region V is authorized to dispose of the case without the
City/Provincial Prosecutor in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS
Regional Manager as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.
● However, the RTC found that the said notation was not shown in the
Information. That, at most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the
conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases after they
are filed.
● In his Motion for Reconsideration, Prosecutor Tolentino showed as proof of his
authority to file the Information the Letters of Commendation from Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño and Secretary Hernando Perez.
● The RTC denied the MR on the ground of lack of notice of hearing to the other
party.
ISSUES/ HELD:

(1) Whether Prosecutor Tolentino still needs the authorization of the city or
provincial prosecutor in filing the Information? YES.
● On the part of Prosecutor Tolentino, he argues that the approval of the city or
provincial prosecutor is no longer required because:
● The Regional State Prosecutor has directed the city or provincial prosecutor to
inhibit from handling SSS cases;
● Letter of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan to SSS Regional
Director in Naga City;
● Copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A and 2001-033 dated July 14, 1997
and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of State
Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V.
● The SC disagreed with Prosecutor Tolentino.
● The SC then listed the powers of the Regional State Prosecution Office under
Presidential Decree No. 1275:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional
State Prosecutor. — The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the
control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars
and rules and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial
and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities
comprised within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and
city fiscals within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may
be necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate personnel within the
jurisdiction of the regional office.
2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other
prosecuting officers within his region and submit his recommendation
thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof,
submit the appropriate recommendation to the Office of the President:
Provided, that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds
for the filing of charges, he may render a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel
of the region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary
of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon.
● The SC found that the Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the
power of administrative supervision as opposed to having the power of
supervision and control. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct
the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At
most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the
regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable
to say the least.
● On the one hand, the power of administrative supervision is limited to "the
authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations
of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the
submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,

performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification
of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and
pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to
them."
● On the other hand, the power of "supervision and control" which includes
the authority "to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs."
● Prosecutor Tolentino cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those
cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the Secretary
of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No.
1275 is the regional state prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special
prosecutor armed with the authority to file an information without the prior
written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor.
● In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the
Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or
prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the
alleged letter of commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show
that it does not amount to a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In
fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his
authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State
Prosecutor's attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that
all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel. Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan
cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law.
(2) Whether prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing the Information at bar?
YES.
● Under Rule 117, Section 3: The accused may move to quash the complaint or
Information on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(d) that the officer who filed the Information had no authority to do so;
xxx
● The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of
the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over
the case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the
complaint or information. Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction
over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the
information.
● In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the SC held that the information having
been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally

flawed. The SC noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form,
but a defect that could not be cured.
● The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for lack of authority of
the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of
these grounds. The Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver,
namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under
the regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, the SC reiterated the Villa ruling in the
above-cited Romualdez case.
● In sum, the SC held that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary
of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor
for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the
provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-
0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in
the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the
respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

7. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No.172716, (2010)
FACTS:
● Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)
was charged before the MeTC Branch 7, with two separate offenses:
○ (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
○ (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce's
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle.
● Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure.
● Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
○ The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two
cases
● After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 157, in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
○ Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on
17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
○ Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.
○ Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest.
● Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to
maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
● Ruling of RTC:
○ RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising
from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Did the petitioner forfeit his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366? NO
● The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a
pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence.
● The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing

becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings
○ Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable
on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days)
○ the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will
be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted
● Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he
failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records.
Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC's
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC's refusal to defer arraignment
2. Does Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 bar his prosecution
in Criminal Case No. 82366? YES (MAIN)
● Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and
property are material only to determine the penalty
○ Prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same Quasi-Offense
● The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
○ these nine paragraphs in Art 365 are collapsible into four sub-groupings
relating to
■ (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence"
and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);
■ (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9);
■ (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph
5); and
■ (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
○ Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible, " unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act . These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under
the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
● Reason for the ruling:
○ The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof.
○ As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions
● History of Ruling
○ There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken
line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de
Filipinas v. Estipona, decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November
1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless

imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless
operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was
based.
○ At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano
case
■ prevents accused of being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident,because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.
■ Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively
overruled Estipona.
3. Does Article 48 apply to acts penalized under Article 365 of RPC? NO

● Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies
falling under either of two categories:
○ (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and
○ (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
● In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a
felony but "the mental attitude . . . behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in
one or more consequences.
● complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling
under either models — that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses.
● Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.
● Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

8. People v. Arenas y Bonzo, G.R. No. 213598, (2016)
FACTS:
● The accused was charged with unlawfully selling two (2) heat-sealed plastic
sachets of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu). Accused was also in
possesion (with intent to sell) one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes
chard.
● The evidence established that sometime in July 2010, PSI Llamas of the Sual
Police Station, Pangasinan, started conducting a surveillance of the alleged
illegal drug-selling activities of the accused-appellant. A buy-bust operation was
conducted on the appellant who agreed to deliver the drugs in front of Las
Brisas Subdivision. PO3 Rimando was the designated poseur-buyer.
○ The appellant was described as a woman of about 4 to 5 feet tall and
between 45 to 50 years old.
○ The appellant was arrested after the police officers waited for 5 minutes
at the side of the highway beside the subdivision which was about 150
meters away from their station.
○ Two marked P1000.00 bills were used as the marked money.
○ When the appellant was arrested by PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial, a
routine body search was conducted on the appellant by Rimando. The
marked money and another small plastic sachet she was holding in her
left hand were recovered from her.
● The appellant was then brought to the Sual Police Station.
○ The two plastic sachets were marked as “BJB-1” and “BJB-2”. The other
plastic sachet recovered was marked as “BJB-3”.
○ Rimando prepared and signed a confiscation receipt in the presence of
the barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor, and an ABS-CBN reported.
PO2 Viray took pictures of the seized items, marked money, and the act
of signing the confiscation receipt. The items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Lingayen.
■ The laboratory results conducted by PSI Malojo yielded positive
for shabu and having a weight of 0.08 grams, 0.07 grams, and
0.05 grams, respectively. She identified these items in Court.
● Appellant’s defense:
○ She said that she was grilling barbecue with a certain Mina at a video
bar in front of Jamaica Sual Subdivision. She alleged that after a while,
Mina’s boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived and talked to her. When Llamas
left, Mina asked her to deliver a letter to a certain Renee who owed her
money. Mina called on a tricycle driver who would bring her to Renee.
When she met Renee, she handed the letter and Renee gave her a
sealed envelope. She gave the same to Mina who was drinking beer
with Llamas. She asked permission to go home, but Mina told her to grill
more barbecues. She insisted but Llamas placed his right arm around
her neck and called someone on his cellphone. A police car arrived and
brought her to the police station where she was forced to say something
about shabu that she knew nothing about.
○ Llamas denied knowing Mina and all the incidents that transpired.
● The RTC found the appellant guilty.
● The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Is the appellant guilty of selling illegal drugs? YES.

● The following elements must be proved:
(1) The identities of he buyer and seller;
(2) The object of the sale and the consideration; and
(3) The delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing.
● What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti.
○ Here, Rimando positively identified the appellant. Appellant’s delivery of
the shabu and her receipt of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction. The shabu and marked money
were also presented in Court.
○ Rimando also testified that was able to recover another plastic sachet of
shabu (the one held with her left hand). This was corroborated by PO2
Aficial.
2. Did the Prosecution establish the chain of custody? YES.
● The procedure of handling the seized items, as stated in the facts, sufficiently
complied with the chain of custody rule required by RA 9165.
● The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
also refer to minor details which did not relate to the crimes charged. The
inconsistencies were with regard to the composition of the buy-bust team, in the
identity/description of the accused-appellant, and in the markings on the seized
items. These are collateral matters that are not essential elements of the crime
charged.
○ As regards the source of the information on the description of accused-
appellant which enabled the poseur-buyer to identify her, the same is a
trivial matter. Whether the information came from PSI Llamas or a
confidential informant, the fact remains that a crime was committed in
the presence of the police officers who were members of the buy-
bust team and who had the duty to immediately arrest her after the
consummation of the transaction. The fact also remains that the
description about the seller matched accused-appellant.
○ As regards the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized
items, the same were clearly typographical errors. The transcript of PSI
Malojo’s testimony showed that she identified the markings of the plastic
sachets as “BJB-1”, “NJN-2”, and “BJB-3”. However she later on
clarified that she was actually referring to “BJB-1”, “BJB-2”, and “BJB-3”.
○ As regards the confiscation report bearing the date Aug. 5, 2010 when
the buy-bust happened on Aug. 6, this was cured by the testimony of
Kagawad Gulen that on Aug. 6, 2010, he was called to witness the items
confiscated and was asked to sit beside Rimando when the latter was
preparing the report.
3. Did the RTC err in convicting the appellant under an Information that
charged two offenses? NO. (MAIN ISSUE)

● Although the Information charged two offenses which is a violation of Section
13, Rule 110, nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 states that “when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails
to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense setting
out separately the finding of fact and law in each offense.”
● Appellant’s failure to raise that more than one offense was charged in a Motion
to Quash before she pleaded to the same is deemed a waiver. As appellant
failed to file an MTQ, she can be convicted of the crimes charged in the
Information if proven.
● The Court also finds no merit in the appellant’s claim that she cannot be
convicted of illegal possession of illegal drugs as its possession is absorbed in
the charge of illegal sale. It was established that PO3 Rimando was able to
recover from appellant’s possession another plastic sachet of shabu which was
not the subject of the illegal sale; thus, she could separately charged with illegal
possession for the same.
○ The RTC correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of P500,000.00 for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. The quantity of the dangerous drugs is determinative of the
penalty to be imposed for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
○ We note, however, that the quantity of shabu found to be in appellant's
possession was not indicated in the Information which is important as
the law provides for the graduation of penalties. We cannot just rely on
the quantity established by the prosecution, which the RTC did in
imposing the penalty, without violating appellant's right to be informed of
the accusation against her.
■ The RTC imposed the minimum penalty provided by law since
the quantity recovered from appellant's possession was less
than 5 grams of shabu; however, it could have been different if
the quantity recovered from appellant was more than 5 grams
where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging
from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or even the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00), because in this case, the Court could not
impose the penalty provided by law in view of the non-allegation
of the true quantity in the information.
○ By analogy, in theft cases, where the penalty is graduated according to
the value of the thing stolen, we ruled that when the prosecution failed
to establish the amount of property taken by an independent and
reliable estimate, we may fix the value of the property taken based on
attendant circumstances or impose the minimum penalty.
■ Since it was proved that appellant was in possession of shabu
but the quantity was not specified in the Information, the
corresponding penalty to be imposed on her should be the
minimum penalty corresponding to illegal possession of less than
five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu which is
penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)

day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00).
■ Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period
of the imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period
set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the
maximum period allowed under the law; hence, the imposable
penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

9. Maximo v. Villapando, Jr. [G.R. No. 214925. April 26, 2017.]
FACTS:
● This is a consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under R45 assailing the
Decision on June 13, 2014 and Resolution dated October 16, 2014 of the CA
reversing the Decision of the RTC in denying the MTQ filed by Villapando.
● Villapando is the assignee of Enhanced Electronics and Communications
Services, Inc. of Condominium Unit No. 2821 and parking slot at the Legazpi
Place in Makati City. Petitioners John Labsky P. Maximo (Maximo) and Robert
M. Panganiban (Panganiban) are Directors of ASB Realty Corporation (now, St.
Francis Square Realty Corp.), the developer of the said condominium unit.
● On November 23, 2010, Villapando filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Makati City, a complaint against Maximo and Panganiban and other
directors/officers of ASB Realty Corp. (ASB) for Violation of Sections 17, 20
and 25 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree.
○ Villapando alleged in his complaint that there was failure on the part of
Maximo and Panganiban and the other officers of ASB to comply with
PD No. 957 relative to the registration of contracts to sell and deeds of
sale (Sec. 17), time of completion (Sec. 20) and issuance of title (Sec.
25) with respect to the aforementioned condominium unit.
● The complaint was dismissed by the OCP-Makati in its Resolution on the
ground that prior to the estimated date of completion of the condominium unit,
ASB encountered liquidity problems and instituted a petition for rehabilitation
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which showed good faith
on the part of ASB.
● Maximo instituted a Complaint for Perjury, Incriminating Innocent Person and
Unjust Vexation against Villapando. The complaint was assigned to Assistant
City Prosecutor (ACP) Evangeline Viudez-Canobas.
● Panganiban also led a Complaint for Perjury and Unjust Vexation against
Villapando. The complaint was assigned to ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
○ The common allegation in the complaints of Maximo and
Panganiban was that Villapando committed perjury when the latter
alleged in the complaint he filed against them that they were
officers and directors of ASB at the time the Deed of Sale was
executed between ASB and Enhanced Electronics on February 28,
1997. They claimed that they were not even employees of ASB in
1997 as they were both minors at that time.
● ACP Canobas issued a Resolution (Canobas Resolution) on August 3, 2011
finding probable cause against Villapando for the crime of perjury but dismissed
the complaints for unjust vexation and incriminating innocent person.
● Accordingly, on August 15, 2011, an Information for Perjury was filed against
Villapando before Branch 67 of the METC, Makati City. The Information was
signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
● Meanwhile, on August 31, 2011, Villapando filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Canobas Resolution before the OCP-Makati alleging
that the Information was filed without the prior written authority of the City
Prosecutor. He also stated that violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 are
committed not at the time of the execution of the contract to sell but after the
execution of the contract, and that there is no allegation in his complaint-

affidavit that Maximo was part of the "scheme in the execution of the contract to
sell."
● Pending resolution of the aforesaid motion for partial reconsideration, a warrant
of arrest against Villapando was issued by the METC. On October 14, 2011,
Villapando filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging that the person
who filed the Information had no authority to do so. He asserted that the
Information, as well as the Resolution finding probable cause against him,
did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor of Makati, Feliciano Aspi,
which is contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
○ Villapando led a Supplemental Motion to Quash Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Violations of
Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing crimes, hence,
the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense and a
quashal of the same is warranted.
● the METC denied the Motion to Quash. The METC ruled that the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions should be appreciated in
favor of the public prosecutors. It found that the certification by ACP Canobas in
the Information was sufficient stating that the filing of the Information was
with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor constitutes substantial
compliance with the rules. As to the allegation that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the METC held that the elements of the crime of perjury
were sufficiently alleged in the Information.
● Meanwhile, ACP Vermug, Jr. issued a Resolution (Vermug Resolution) finding
probable cause against Villapando for the crime of perjury but dismissed the
complaint for unjust vexation. The Resolution was approved by Senior Assistant
City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida who recommended for the filing of
an Amended Information before the METC to include Panganiban as one of the
complainants. aScITE
○ Thus, on January 19, 2012, the prosecution filed a Motion to Amend
the Information and to Admit Attached Information to include
Panganiban as one of the complainants in the case.
● Villapando filed separate petitions for review of the Canobas Resolution and the
Vermug Resolution before the DOJ. He stated in the petitions the same
allegations in his motions for partial reconsideration. In addition, he contended
that there was even no proof that Maximo and Panganiban were still minors at
the time of the execution of the contract to sell because they did not submit any
birth certificate.
● a Resolution was issued by Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano denying the
petitions for review for failure to append to the petitions proof that a motion to
suspend proceedings has been filed in court. The copies of the resolution and
the complaint affidavit were likewise declared not verified.
● Villapando elevated the case to the RTC of Makati City via a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) assailing the Orders of the METC.
The RTC denied.
● The RTC stated that Villapando should have gone to trial without prejudice to
reiterating his special defenses invoked in his motion. In the event that an
adverse decision is rendered, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal
step. Nonetheless, it found that the presumption of regularity exists in the filing
of the information stating that the filing of the Information was with the prior
authority of the City Prosecutor.

● Villapando filed another petition before the CA and the CA reversed the RTC
decision.
● Villapando moved for a partial reconsideration of the CA Decision. Villapando
argued that the CA did not resolve the second issue he brought before it, that
is, that the facts charged do not constitute an offense..
● On the other hand, Maximo and Panganiban, as the private complainants
moved for reconsideration. CA DENIED BOTH PETITIONS.
ISSUE/HELD:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE

OF RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED UNDER RULE 65 – NO
● In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash led by the

accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused
● Villapando did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial
of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
○ It is also settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is
not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The established rule is that when such an adverse
interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and,
when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law.
○ Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception
rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly
grounded on compelling reasons.
● However, on a number of occasions, the Courts have recognized that in certain
situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. These are the
following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened
and substantial justice; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e)
when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.
○ In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and
the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.
● In the case at bar, the Court finds that there was a compelling reason to justify a
resort to a petition for certiorari against the Order of the METC and RTC as the
METC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash filed
by Villapando.
● Moreover, the petition for certiorari fled by Villapando before the RTC was an
original action whose resulting decision is a final order that completely disposed
of the petition. Cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction must be appealed to the CA. Nonetheless, the Courts have allowed

exceptions for good cause that could warrant the relaxation of the rule as in this
case.
○ As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
● The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary
acts of courts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT DID
NOT COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE HIS FILING OF A PETITION FOR
REVIEW BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE INVOLVING THE SAME
PARTIES, FACTS, ISSUES AND RELIEFS – NO
● The filing of an appeal with the DOJ as well as the ling of the petition with the
CA would not constitute forum shopping for the reason that the finding of the
DOJ would not be binding upon the courts. In other words, even if the DOJ
recommends dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner, such resolution
would merely be advisory, and not binding upon the courts. The DOJ ruling on
the petition for review would not constitute as res judicata on the case at bar,
neither can it conflict with resolution of the court on the propriety of dismissing
the case.
● Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion
in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari.
There can also be forum shopping when a party institutes two or more suits in
different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts
to rule on the same and related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action.
IMPORTANT---THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TWO

INFORMATIONS WERE NOT PROPERLY FILED - NO
● The issue here is the lack of the certification of the City prosecutor because the
information only bears the certification of the ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR. So the core issue is the validity of the amended information.
● Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or
approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be
filed before the courts:
● Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the
investigating prosecutor nds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath
in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized

officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of
the complaint.
● Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of
the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or
to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act
on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
● No complaint or information may be led or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
● Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts

without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized
officers render the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant
to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to, wit:
● Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following grounds:
○ (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
○ (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
○ (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;
○ (d) That the officer who led the information had no authority
to do so;
○ (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
○ (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
○ (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
○ (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
○ (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted
of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
● In the case at bar, Villapando is charged in the Amended Information which was
signed by the ACP.
● Maximo and Panganiban argued that the CA erred in holding that the
information did not comply with the rules because the information already bears
the certification because it was the City Prosecutor who authorized the filing of
the ORIGINAL INFORMATION in court. According to them, there is. A
presumption that prior written authority of the CP was obtained in the filing of
the information.
● In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v.Paqueo,
this Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications uniformly holding

that, despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was
shown that the offcers ling the same in court either lacked the authority to do so
or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those
authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
○ Therefore, there must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or
authority was given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city
prosecutor to approve the filing of the information. We have recognized
this valid delegation of authority in the case of Quisay v. People,
○ In this case, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash
on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate its
authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section
9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b) the
Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the
RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor.
● In the case at bar there was no proof of valid delegation of authority as found by
the CA, so the Courts are constrained not to accord the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions in the ling of the Amended
Information
● the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the
same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
● An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer,
cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because there is a defect in the Information. There is no point in proceeding
under a defective Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.

2. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160619, September 09, 2015
FACTS:
● Jessie B. Castillo was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the
May 1998 elections.
● On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, in relation to the
alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino,
Bacoor, Cavite.
○ According to the Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his
official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his
co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to
operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
● An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed
against Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite.
○ The Office of the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative
charge and imposed the penalty of 1 month and 1 day suspension.
○ On appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Castillo, as to wit:
Xxx [Castillo] did not violate the DENR notice which was
issued way back in 1998 yet, or before his actual
assumption of office. Quite the contrary, while already a
mayor, [Castillo], upon being informed of the notice,
immediately took steps in resolving the municipality's aged-
long garbage problem. True, the solution was a long-term
one, but the end results were just the same, i.e., what was
once a mountainous pile of trash covering a 2-hectare
piece of property has been remarkably reduced and what
was left was a considerable area used as a segregation
and transfer station of garbage prior to their eventual
dumping at the San Mateo landfill.
Doubtless, in finding [Castillo] guilty of simple misconduct

and penalizing him therefor, the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman, in clear abuse of discretion, ignored and did

not take into account the foregoing reports, including no
less the letter of commendation of [DENR] Secretary
Cerilles.
It is thus unfortunate that even as [Castillo] had taken

concrete steps to address a problem that was not of his
own doing or tolerance but merely inherited by him, he was
instead rewarded by an administrative penalty even as the
very government agency (DENR) which issued the Notice
of Violation commended him for his efforts. If this is not a
travesty of justice, then We know not what it is.
● After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion
to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.
○ He argued that the case against him had been decriminalized by Section
37 of Republic Act No. 90038 and invoked the CA decision absolving him
of administrative liability.
● His motion was initially denied by the Sandiganbayan.
● On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense.
○ He claimed that a public officer may only be held liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the
government or any private person.
○ Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury must not only be mentioned
in the Information, its extent must be specified.
○ Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
Castillo asserted that the claim of undue injury must be "specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty."
● The Sandiganbayan 4th Division failed to decide unanimously on the
Supplemental Motion. Thus, a special division (composed of 5 Justices of the
Sandiganbayan) was constituted.
○ Voting 3 to 2, the Special Division, in its challenged Resolution dated
January 9, 2002, granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion:
■ the allegations of the information fail to measure up to the
requirements of the law. While the information charges Castillo
with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019 for "giving
unwarranted benefits to his co-accused Melencio and
Emerenciano Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dumpsite
at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite" and "thereby
causing undue injury to the residents and students in the area
who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and mosquitoes
emanating from the dumpsite", the information failed to quantify
the alleged unwarranted benefits supposedly given by movant to
his co-accused as well as the undue injury caused to the
residents and students of the area affected by the dumpsite.
■ In Alejandro vs. People, the SC ruled that undue injury requires
proof of actual injury or damage. Thus, in Llorente, it was held
that undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a
wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its
existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime.
Undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of
moral certainty.

■ The information also failed to specify and quantify the
unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas. Whereas the
Ombudsman's resolution finding prima facie evidence against
the herein accused made mention of the amount of Php250 to
Php300 allegedly collected from each garbage truck from
companies and factories allowed to dump garbage at the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite, the same was not alleged in the
information which charged Castillo with having given
unwarranted benefits to his co-accused.
● The Special Division also denied the MR subsequently filed by the People.
● Hence, this petition.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. [MAIN ISSUE] Was the outright quashal of the Information proper? NO
● The Sandiganbayan allowed the quashal of the Information due to the
prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of benefits
granted by Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the
point of moral certainty" the undue injury caused to the people of Molino.
● Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Information was defective on
the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense, outright
quashal of the Information is not the proper course of action.
● Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It
provides -
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an

offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
● When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of
an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must
deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended
Information.
● Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge
facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment.
● In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the
defect through an amendment.
○ This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the
defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based
on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings,
are avoided.
● More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process
underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the
State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's
refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where

such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and
again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's
right to due process.
● Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the
Sandiganbayan should have first ordered its amendment and not its
quashal. Doing so would have saved the parties from resorting to an appeal to
this Court and this case from remaining in the docket of the Sandiganbayan for
a long period.
2. Was the Information sufficient? YES.

● The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally
informed of the facts and the acts constituting the offense charged.
● Where insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can file a motion to have the
Information against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his plea.
● A motion to quash challenges the efficacy of an Information and compels the
court to determine whether the Information suffices to require an accused to
endure the rigors of a trial.
● Where the Information is insufficient and thus cannot be the basis of any valid
conviction, the court must drop the case immediately and save an accused
from the anxiety and convenience of a useless trial.
● A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the
Information whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.
● The question that must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient
to establish the elements of the crime charged without considering matters
aliunde.
○ In proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters:
■ (1) what must be alleged in a valid Information;
■ (2) what the elements of the crime charged are; and
■ (3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated in the
Information.
● 2 important purposes underlying the rule on sufficiency of complaint or
information (Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan):
○ (1) it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
○ (2) it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
○ Thus, this Court held that the true test in ascertaining the validity and
sufficiency of an Information is "whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."
● Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the elements
of which are as follows:
○ The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions;
○ He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
○ That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
● The Information filed against Castillo and his co-accused is sufficient.

○ The Information specifically alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor,
Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal
operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury of the
residents and students in the area who had to endure the ill-effects of
the dumpsite's operation.
● For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need not
state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit
granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue
injury caused.
○ Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense
and not the finer details of why and how the crime was committed.
● As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted
by Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply
with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being
residents and students were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal
operation.
○ The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso
amount actually received by the Arciagas as a consequence of the
illegal operation of the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of
damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence
best raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information.
For purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged, the
allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue injury
under the Information suffices.
● The rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one
considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the
accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence.
○ It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso
amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury
- to the point of moral certainty, no less — at this stage of the criminal
proceedings.
3. Was the application of Llorente ruling proper? NO

● While the SC held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty", the validity and
sufficiency of the Information was not an issue in Llorente.
● The import of the ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established
by the prosecution during the trial and not when the Information is filed.
● Nowhere in Llorente did the SC require that undue injury be specified,
quantified and proved to the point of moral certainty at the time of the filing of
the Information.
○ Such an interpretation would effectively require the prosecution to
include all the relevant evidence in the Information and to present such
evidence of undue injury even prior to arraignment.
● Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan's interpretation of Llorente, the accused
would be required to face (and even rebut) the evidence as soon as the
Information is filed and even before he pleads. This runs counter to the function

of a motion to quash as a remedy afforded an accused before he proceeds to
trial.
● Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as
a tool for an accused to understand the crime for which he is being charged as
it requires that the Information already contain a long and detailed list of other
matters not necessary in informing the accused of the charge.
○ It will also be prejudicial to the prosecution who will then be forced to
present evidence even before the trial proper. This interpretation cannot
be countenanced.
3. People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014
FACTS:
● Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, Dionisio R. Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test
was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine
samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to
drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical
Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and
out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples tested positive.
● After confirmatory tests doneby the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division,

those twenty-one (21) urine samples, which included that of herein
respondents, yielded positive results confirming the result of the initial
screen test. Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged with
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165)
under identical Informations,3 which read as follows:
● The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice,

accuses AQUILINO ANDRADE for Violation of Section 15, Article II of
R.A. 9165, committed as follows:
● That on or about June 30, 2003, in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any manner
introduced into the physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug in
violation of the aforecited law.

● All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their
arraignment on June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial
and trial on August 11, 2006.5
● On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to

Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165 alleging Under RA 9165,
the offense of Violation of Section 15 thereof is committed by a person
apprehended or arrested for using dangerous drug, and who is found to
be positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory test, to
wit:
xxxx
7. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested

for using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165,
which would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the proper
information in court. In fact, the accused were merely called to the
Maximum Security Conference Hall in the morning of June 30, 2003 and
with seventeen (17) other inmates made to undergo drug testing,
pursuant to the directive of then Sr. Usec. Santiago. It was only after
they were found positive for dangerous drugs that the information for
Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed against each of them.
8. Section 36, Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons

subject to mandatory and random drug tests, who if found positive after
such drug test shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15. x x x
xxxx
National penitentiary inmates or inmates of the Bureau of Corrections

are not included in the enumeration. Thus, even if the accused have
been found positive in the mandatory or random drug test conducted by
BUCOR, they cannot be held liable under Section 15.
9. Assuming for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that the
accused were apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or
for violating the provisions of RA 9165 which led to the June 30, 2003
screen test, or that the accused are subject to mandatory or random
drug testing, the drug test would be invalid absent a showing that the
same was conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
apprehension or arrest of the offender through a confirmatory test within
fifteen (15) days receipt of the result in accordance with the provisions
of Section 38, Article II of RA 9165 x x x.
xxxx
10. In the case, the accused were not informed of the results of the
screening test, thus depriving them of the right to challenge the same
through a confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day
period after receipt of the positive result.

● The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled
hearing date for pre-trial and trial, issued an Order9 granting
respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.
● The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's
Order,
Issue/Held: whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of

respondents' motion and eventually dismissing the case based on lack of
probable cause.
● The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss,"

which is, that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an
offense, is actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to
Quash in Section 3 (a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
● It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after

they have been arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion
may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to
raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a
waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court provides:
● Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. -

The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule.
● However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the

exceptions provided under the above-provision, the timeliness of the
filing is inconsequential. The mistake lies inthe RTC's dismissal of the
case.
● The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the
cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised by
respondents
● Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly

states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground
other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents claim in
their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do not
constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the
RTC judge.

● The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been
only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the
arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence"17 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable
cause exists.18
● In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to the

determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination
of probable cause was done without orin excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.24 In this
particular case, by proceeding with the arraignment of respondents,
there was already an admittance that there is probable cause. Thus, the
RTC should not have ruled on whether or not there is probable cause to
hold respondents liable for the crime committed since its duty is limited
only to the determination of whether the material averments in the
complaint or information are sufficient to hold respondents for
trial.1âwphi1 In fact, in their motion, respondents claimed that the facts
alleged in the Informations do not constitute an offense.
● Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should
have denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present
its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by
respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the
Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the
amendment of the Information without dismissing the case.
● Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly

states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not
constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment,
● The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the

amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment.25
● If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to

quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an
amended information.26 Generally, the fact that the allegations in the
information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by
amendment.27 Corollary to this rule, the court should give the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.28 In the present
case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations.
● The CA ronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature without

giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence or, to at
least, amend the Informations.

4. Romualdez vs. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006.
FACTS:
● Petitioner claims:
○ (IMPT) OMB gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing
of 24 informations against him for violation of Sec. 7 of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
■ Cannot revive the cases previously dismissed by SB in its
Feb. 10, 2004 Resolution
○ Defense of prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal
■ May dismiss criminal cases before SB and RTC
○ No necessity of presentation of evidence before the court a quo
● OMB argues:
○ Dismissal of criminal cases does not mean petitioner was exempt
from criminal prosecution
○ New informations may be filed by OMB
■ Find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation (PI)
○ Filing of the complaint with PCGG in 1987 and information with SB in
1989 interrupted the prescriptive period
○ Absence of petitioner from Philippines from 1986-2000 interrupted
period based on Art. 91 of RPC
● PCGG avers:
○ 1987 Constitution and Ombudsman Act of 1989, the OMB need not wait
for a new complaint with a new docket number for it conduct PI on the
alleged offenses
○ The issue as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines;
■ RPC: negative (does not run)
■ RA 3019 and RA 33263: silent
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in

Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity? NO.
● PI conducted by the OMB is a valid proceeding despite the previous
dismissal by the SB in its Minute Resolution (Feb. 10, 2004):
○ People v. Romualdez:
■ Informations may be quashed because the officer who filed the
same had no authority to do so
● The dismissal by SB (Feb. 10) was effected pursuant to Romualdez v. SB:
○ Facts: Petitioner assailed SB Order (June 8, 2000), which denied his
MTQ, terminated PI conducted by Prosecutor Lucero and set his
arraignment
○ Informations were filed by an unauthorized party
■ Defect cannot be cured by conducting another PI
■ Invalid information is no information at all and cannot be basis for
criminal proceedings
3 Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run

○ Upheld petitioner's MTQ
■ Information filed by unauthorized party, hence, void
● Sec. 6, Rule 117 of ROC is pertinent and applicable
○ GR: Order sustaining MTQ does not preclude filing of another
information for a crime constituting same facts
○ EXC: MTQ on ground of extinction of criminal liability and double
jeopardy
● Cudia v. CA
○ There must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in
the former prosecution
■ If insufficient (defective in form or substance) that conviction
could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent
of the accused cannot be pleaded
○ Fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar in petitioner's subsequent prosecution
● PI conducted by the OMB in the instant cases was not a violation of
petitioner's right to be informed of the charges against him
○ No moment that cases investigated by OMB bore same docket numbers
■ Docket numbers were merely for reference and an internal
matter designed for efficient record keeping
○ OMB conducted PI pursuant to Romualdez v. SB when Court declared
that:
■ SB commited GAD when it abruptly terminated the
reinvestigation by Prosec. Lucero
■ Right to PI is a substantive right
■ Petitioner's right was violated when PI was conducted by an
officer without jurisdiction over said cases
2. W/N the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already
prescribed.YES, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods were not
interrupted by any event (i.e. petitioner’s absence from the Philippines) from the
time they began to run on May 8, 1987
(Only IMPT part in this issue) Preliminary issue: whether this Court may validly take
cognizance of and resolve the issue considering that as we have said in the assailed
Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against
the petitioner" and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the
merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed." YES.
● Rule 117 of ROC
○ Accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, move to quash the
complaint and information on the ground that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished
■ Ground includes defense of prescription (Art. 89 of RPC
enumerates this as one of the grounds that extinguishes criminal
liability)
■ Even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case,
the accused can very well invoke prescription
Back to Main Issue (#2)

● Domingo v. SB4
● Petitioner is charged with violations of Sec. 7 of RA 3019 for failure to file his
SALN:
○ 1967-1985 - tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
○ 1963-1966 - tenure as Technical Assistant in the DFA
● Sec. 11 of RA 3019 provides that all offenses punishable shall prescribe in 15
years
○ People v. Pacificador:
■ Prior to amendment of Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by BP 195 (approved
on March 16, 1982), previous prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under the said statute was only 10 years
■ Amendment to 15-year prescriptive period cannot apply (no
retroactive effect because not favorable to accused)
■ Crime prescribed 10 years from Jan. 1976
○ In present case, offenses allegedly committed by petitioner:
■ From 1962 up to March 15, 1982, shall prescribe in 10 years
■ From March 16, 1982 - 1995, shall prescribe in 15 years
● As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act. NO.
33265, which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by
and penalized under special laws
○ Silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the Philippines
bars the running of the prescriptive period
■ It did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the
explicit mandate of Article 91
● The filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 and filing of the informations
with the SB, in which the OMB directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, did
not bar the prescriptive period
○ Section 2 of Act No. 3326: prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
■ In this case, no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner
to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods
○ Only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that
which is led or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate
body or office
■ In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the
wrong body, the PCGG, so it could not interrupt the running of
prescriptive period
4 (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to
run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted
5 SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy

5. OSCAR Z. BENARES vs. JOSEPHINE LIM, GR No. 173421, December 14,
2006
FACTS:
● Beñares was accused of estafa arising from 2 contracts of sale executed in
1976 where he sold two lands to respondent.
● After respondent fully paid and after deed of absolute sale was issued,
petitioner mortgaged lands to the BPI.
● When respondent demanded delivery, petitioner failed to comply
● Respondent filed estafa case
● After prosecution presented last witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer
its evidence but prosecution did not make any formal offer
● petitioner filed motion praying prosecution's submission of formal offer be
deemed waived and case be dismissed for lack of evidence.
● Despite receipt of notice, respondent and counsel failed to attend hearing on
motion
MeTC’s 1st order: gave prosecution another 15 days to formally offer evidence which
petitioner opposed.
February 27, 2002: MeTC issued Order granting motion to dismiss for failure of
prosecution to prosecute case. Failed to make formal offer of evidence despite the 15
day extension.
○ Order for extension dated jan 28, 2002
○ Notice received on Feb 7, 2002
Respondent filed MR for dismissal and prayed for admission of Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits
● claims she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked
during trial.
● Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy.
METC: granted and set aside previous order dismissing case and reinstated case i
● Formal Offer admitted and accused is given 15 days from receipt of Order to
filed Comment or Opposition
● MR denied, thus, petition for certiorarti with RTC.
RTC: Granted petition for certiorari.

● Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute "had the effect of an
acquittal" which is "a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged."
● MR denied
Petition for certiorari with CA. Claims no failure to prosecute and no double
jeopardy.
CA: reversed RTC's Resolution.

● no double jeopardy because the order dismissing the case for failure to
prosecute had not become final and executory due to the timely MR
● right to speedy trial was not violated
● ordered MeTC to set the case for further trial.
● MR denied

(1) Issue/Held: whether the MeTC's Order dismissing the case for failure to
prosecute amounted to an acquittal giving petitioner the right to invoke double
jeopardy. NO
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
1. 6 months' delay by to formally 1. petitioner delayed the

offer is vexatious, capricious and proceedings when he questioned
oppressive; finding of probable before DOJ,
2. that the documents could not be CA and the SC, which were all
found is untrue; denied;
3. under ROC, failure to comply with 2. delay in the filing of a formal offer
a court order without justifiable of evidence is justified because
reason may cause dismissal of the records were missing.
case, which shall have the effect 3. even without documentary
of an adjudication on the merits evidence, testimonial evidence
unless otherwise stated by the were presented
court. 4. No double jeopardy because the
case was dismissed with his
express consent.
Section 7, Rule 117. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an

accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Double jeopardy attaches only

1. upon a valid indictment,
2. before a competent court,
3. after arraignment,
4. when a valid plea has been entered
5. when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
● 1st 4 elements are present.
LAST ELEMENT: there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that
petitioner's guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of
the case was based on failure to prosecute.
GR: A dismissal with express consent or upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy, except in two instances,
EXCEPTION

1. dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence
2. case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
Petitioner’s right to speedy trial is not violated.

● The failure to file formal offer of evidence is not vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive.
● There was justifiable reason for prosecution's failure to formally offer its
evidence
● As correctly ruled by CA: Prosecution failed twice to file the formal offer of
evidence
○ Once due to fault of MeTC judge who expressly admitted in his order
that the documentary exhibits necessary for the formal offer of evidence
were lost in his office.
○ only one unjustified delay in the filing of formal offer of evidence, which
cannot be described as vexatious, capricious or oppressive.
○ no showing of deliberate intent by petitioner to cause delay in the
proceedings resulting to serious and great prejudice affecting the
substantial rights of the accused
● delay is not a mere mathematical computation of time involved. Each case must
be decided upon the facts peculiar to it.
Following facts must be considered and balanced

1. length of the delay
2. reasons for such delay
3. assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
4. prejudice caused by the delay.
● totality of circumstances excuses the delay

● petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated, thus he cannot invoke his
right against double jeopardy.
Reliance in People v. Cloribe is misplaced

● in said case, trial commenced almost 4 years from the date of filing of the
complaint. Delay cannot be a be ignored or disregarded by any fair standard.
IaDTES
Also cannot rely on doctrine that when judge dismisses case for failure to prosecute,
termination amounts to an acquittal as the prosecution will fail to prove the case
when the time therefor comes.
1. Here, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner. Even without
documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be proven.
2. petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of
respondent's documentary evidence, thus the prosecution need not even
present documents in view of admission. prosecution has enough evidence
left for the trial court's determination of his guilt.
● TC erred when it dismissed case without giving prosecution a right to be heard,

in violation of due process.
● failure to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even
without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its
case through the testimonies of its witnesses.

● when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely
corrected itself.

6. People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009
FACTS:
● The crime involved here arose from three separate but related contracts
between the PNP and the Beltra Industries for the purchase and delivery of
Caliber .45 Thompson Brand Pistols.
● The first contract covered a total amount of P52M, the second covered P29M,
the third covered P23M. The purchase orders were signed by Director General
Nazareno and Director Nartatez, while the corresponding checks were signed
by Director Custodio (collectively, the accused).
● There were allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounding the
procurement. This then lead President Ramos to form a tri-agency investigating
committee composed of lawyers from the PNP Inspector General’s office, the
National Police Commission, and the Office of the President. This committee
found, however, no overpricing nor any collusion on the part of the police
officers.
● The Commission on Audit for its part formed a special audit team, which found
that the contracts were overpriced by at least P45M.
● The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an Information against the accused
for a violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.
● For the prosecution, the members of the special audit team testified and
compared the purchases of pistols by the PNP with those made by the AFP.
● For the defense, the contracts entered into by the AFP cannot be a basis of
comparison because the AFP made the purchases under a foreign military
assistance program extended by the U.S. pursuant to defense treaties. Thus,
for the PNP, they had to directly purchase the pistols from commercial sales
which was 2 to 3 times more expensive than purchases from the foreign military
assistance program. The defense also presented members of the tri-agency
committee.
● The Sandiganbayan acquitted the accused. It concluded that the AFP prices did
not offer sufficient basis for comparison to be able to establish firmly the alleged
overpricing in the purchase of the subject firearms by the PNP. The
Sandiganbayan based this conclusion on the testimonies of the respondents’
witnesses whose competence on the matters they testified on was never
questioned or disputed by the prosecution.
● The Sandiganbayan further observed that the audit team followed a flawed
procedure in reaching its overpricing conclusion. The audit team merely relied
on the AFP Supply Issuance and did not conduct any actual canvass of the gun
prices. Thus, to the Sandiganbayan, the comparison made between the PNP
price and the AFP quoted cost was substantially deficient under the prevailing
rules that indispensably required an actual canvass done on different and
identified suppliers to show exactly the variances in the prices of similar articles
to firm up, for evidentiary purposes and to a reliable degree of certainty, a
finding of overpricing. The requirement of actual canvass, according to the
Sandiganbayan, was settled law as applied by this Court in Arriola v.
Commission on Audit.
● The People filed a petition under Rule 45 to assail the acquittal of the accused.
● the respondents object to the petition mainly because the review sought
violates their constitutional right against double jeopardy. They assert that the
petition is essentially an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or a review of
alleged errors in judgment that throws the case wide open, placing the

respondents in danger of being punished twice for the same offense. They also
posit that a judgment of acquittal can only be challenged through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether the acquittal of the accused can be assailed through Rule 45? NO.
● Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, reads:
○ SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
● Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A
first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
● A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also
immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing
the accused in double jeopardy.
● The absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from
appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions
of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
● An instance when the State can challenge a judgment of acquittal is pursuant to
the exercise of our judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," as implemented through
the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such
instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done
in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the
judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
● Applying all these principles, the present Rule 45 petition must necessarily fail.
Even under our most liberal reading, we cannot treat the petition as a Rule 65
petition, as it raises no jurisdictional error that can invalidate a verdict of
acquittal.

● We have consistently ruled that a Rule 65 certiorari does not involve the
correction of errors of judgment:
● Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment.
● Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact – a
mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy.
● In this case, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the nature of the case is not
disputed, nor was its jurisdiction over the respondents ever brought into
question. Neither does the petition substantively and effectively impute any
error based on the Sandiganbayan’s grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. In other words, the petition, styled as a Rule 45 petition, is not
even one that we can liberally treat as a Rule 65 certiorari petition that may
permit a review of a verdict of acquittal.

7. Pacoy vs. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, (2007)
FACTS:
● On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against
petitioner committed as follows:
○ on or about the 18th day of March 2002,
○ in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines
○ the said accused (SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY) with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer
2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon
2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.
○ With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in
disregard of his rank.
● On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel
de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide
● on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued
another Order
○ directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to
Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance
● Prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and
instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of
the Information.
○ accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim's name from "Escuita" to "Escueta”
● On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial,
petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder.
○ Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case.
○ As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended information for
Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty
● Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending
the Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy
○ Denied: Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended
before trial commenced and did not terminate the same;
○ Filed MR: GRANTED
■ In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge
found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic
mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Was the amendment of Information after petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge in the Information for Homicide proper? YES

● In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to
Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution
● While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information
shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the
opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word
"Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder."
● There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or
in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
● The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as
those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not
at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta
without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in
the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.
2. Was the petitioner placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge
from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide? NO
● double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:
○ (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
■ jeopardy attaches only:
■ (a) after a valid indictment;
■ (b) before a competent court;
■ (c) after arraignment;
■ (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
■ (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
○ (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
○ (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
● It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of
the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
● Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a
bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
● The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same
upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court:
○ If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
○ Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the
same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information

○ In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter
● Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal
of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that
was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word
"Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide
case.
● A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent
judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that
double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a
generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim
to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original
Information for Homicide.
○ The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner
was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

8. People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, (2007)
● The informations against the private respondent as one of the accused in two
cases for homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 43, read:
Criminal Case No. R-725
The undersigned accuses RAMON GALICIA, ROBERTO

[U]RETA, JOJO MANITO, NESTOR VICENTE, JUN BANANG
and MERL[I]N VICENTE of the crime of homicide committed as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of August, 1995, at 10:00 o’clock
in the evening, more or less, in the Barangay of San Antonio,
Municipality of Mansalay, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one THELMO ABENIR thereby inflicting upon the latter stab
wounds on the different parts of his body resultant therewith
caused his death shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Case No. R-726
The undersigned accuses "JUN" BANANG, JOJO MANITO

RAMON GALICIA, [R]OBERTO [U]RETA, NESTOR VICENTE
and MERL[I]N VICENTE of the crime of homicide committed as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of August, 1995, at 10:00 o’clock
in the evening, more or less, in the Barangay of San Antonio,
Municipality of Mansalay, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one RAMON ABENIR thereby inflicting upon the latter stab
wounds on the different parts of his body resultant therewith
caused his death shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

● All the accused entered pleas of not guilty and thereafter a joint trial ensued.
● The following is the prosecution’s version of the incident (as summed up by the
OSG):
○ At about 10:00 p.m. on August 16, 1995, Ramon Abenir (Ramon) arrived
at the house of his parents. Once inside, Ramon shouted "Lumabas
kayo Kapitan, Barangay Tanod."
○ Someone who was later identified as Brgy. Captain Ramon Galicia
(Galicia) retorted, "Ramon, lumabas ka diyan, labas, babarilin kita."

Thereafter, Galicia fired two shots, destroyed the perimeter fence, broke
the kitchen door and entered the house.
■ A fight ensued between Ramon and Galicia. Galicia pulled
Ramon towards the bed where the spouses Thelmo and Dolores
(Ramon’s parents) were seated. Dolores saw Roberto Ureta, a
companion of Galicia, stab Ramon. According to Dolores, her
husband and she were only an arm’s length away and they
witnessed what happened.
○ Another companion of Galicia, namely Vicente "Jun" Banang, Jr., also
entered the house and then dragged Thelmo towards the back of the
house. Ureta joined Banang in the assault on Thelmo, and banged
Thelmo’s head against the wall of the house. And then, uttering
"Kunsintidor sa iyong anak," Ureta stabbed Thelmo.
○ At about the same time, Audie Abenir, the brother of Ramon, testified
that he was about ten meters away from their parents’ house. He also
heard his brother, Ramon, shouting, "Mga tanod, Kapitan, lumabas
kayo." Thereafter, according to Audie, he saw Galicia arrived with some
men. He saw Galicia fired shots and call out, "Ramon, lumabas ka,
babarilin kita."
■ Suddenly, he heard a commotion from his parents’ kitchen and
heard his mother saying, "[Roding], tulungan mo kami, pinasok
kami nina Kapitan." From his children’s room, he witnessed his
brother Ramon and Galicia fighting. He also saw Ureta in the
kitchen. He sought help, and with the responding policemen,
they went to his parents’ house where he saw his brother
Ramon, lying near the front door with a chest wound, and his
father, Thelmo, clutching his intestines that were protruding from
an open wound as he sat by Ramon’s head. Maning rushed
Ramon and Thelmo to the hospital.
○ Thelmo’s son and Ramon’s brother, Felipe, testified that while attending
to his father in the hospital, his father told him, "Ping, may sasabihin ako
sa iyo, iyong pakatandaan at huwag mong kalilimutan." Felipe got a pen
and paper and wrote the names enumerated by his father as those who
entered their house – "Kap. Galicia, Berting Ureta, Jun Banang, Nestor
Vicente, Merlin Vicente, Jojo Manito." A few minutes later, Thelmo died.
○ Dr. Moises Serdoncillo, medico-legal officer of the Calapan Provincial
Hospital, unsuccessfully operated on both Ramon and Thelmo; both
father and son died.
■ The medical certificate showed that Ramon sustained a stab
wound which penetrated the middle portion of his abdomen. The
cause of Ramon’s death was loss of blood and infection.
According to the medical certificate, Thelmo died of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to myocardial infarction secondary to
stab wound.
● The defense’s version of the incident was culled mainly from the testimonies of
accused Galicia, Jojo Manito and Merlin Vicente, as follows:
○ Galicia testified that at around 8:45 p.m. on August 16, 1995, while he
was in his sister Benedicta’s house, he saw Ramon in front of the
Barangay Hall located about five meters from Benedicta’s house.
Ramon was shouting, "Kapitan, mga Barangay Tanod, lumabas kayo
riyan. Kayo’y aking papatayin!" Galicia approached Ramon and told him

to go home. Ramon relented. Ramon rushed upstairs, straight to the
window and started throwing stones, hitting Galicia in the knee.
According to Galicia, as he walked away, he heard the continued shouts
of Thelmo and his wife calling their sons, Audie and Felix, to help. He
tried to ignore Thelmo’s wife calling, but when he heard Ramon
shouting, "Kapitan, huwag kang umalis. Ikaw ay aking papatayin," he
turned towards the kitchen of the house.
○ He was by the broken fence and about two meters from the door of the
kitchen when he told Ramon, "Tukayo, huwag kang lumaban. Maraming
tao dito, baka ka madisgrasiya." But, Ramon suddenly came out of the
kitchen and struck him with a scythe. He parried the blow with both
hands and they grappled for the scythe. The scythe hit him in his arms
and body. Suddenly, Ramon fell and his head hit the doorknob of the
kitchen door. They continued grappling and Galicia was hit in the nape.
○ Accused Jojo Manito, a barangay tanod who heard the call, approached
the protagonists. He said that as he entered, Galicia was crouching,
holding Ramon’s hands. Ramon, still holding on to the scythe, was lying
underneath Galicia. Manito said he tried to grab the scythe from Ramon
but he was hit on his left hand near the thumb, upper left forearm, and
on his right hand, near the thumb. Manito recalled he had a tear gas
canister in his pocket and told Galicia about it. After instructing Galicia to
cover his face with a towel, Manito sprayed tear gas on Ramon, making
Ramon dizzy. Galicia and Manito left. At the gate, they met accused
Merlin Vicente, who was about to enter the yard. As Galicia told Merlin
that they were on their way to get police assistance, someone told them
that Ureta had already called the police. Merlin helped Galicia board a
tricycle. Galicia with Manito and Banang went to the Medicare Clinic.
Manito said that before they left, he noticed several persons enter the
house to assist Ramon. He said he did not see accused Ureta and
Nestor Vicente during the incident.
○ Accused Nestor Vicente interposed the defense of alibi, saying he was
out fishing with Robert Alunsagay and Abelio* Villanueva from 5:00 p.m.
until 10:00 p.m. on August 16, 1995. Later, they sold their catch to
Carmen Magadia whose house was about half a kilometer from the
Abenirs. Magadia and Villanueva testified to support Nestor’s alibi.
○ Merlin Vicente testified that he was in his house which is about forty
meters from the house of the Abenirs, at around 10:00 p.m. on August
16, 1995. As he rushed to the Abenirs’ house, he heard shouts of
"Tabang kayo mga kapitbahay." On the way, he said he met a certain
Norma Cunanan. When they reached Thelmo’s house, he saw a
bloodied Galicia, aided by Manito, on the way out of the compound. He
helped Manito guide Galicia towards a tricycle. He also testified that he
did not see Ureta nor Thelmo all the time that he was at the gate.
○ Dr. Domingo Asis corroborated the testimony of Galicia. He said he
treated Galicia at around 9:30 p.m. on August 16, 1995. He described
the eleven incised wounds Galicia sustained. He also said that the
injuries sustained by Galicia could have been inflicted while grappling for
possession of a sharp bladed instrument like a scythe. He added that he
treated a companion of Galicia whose name he could not recall.
● Accused Ureta and Banang jumped bail during trial and were tried in absentia.

● On August 19, 1999, the RTC rendered a joint decision. The accused (Galicia y
Manresa and Ureta y Ortega) were held guilty by the RTC. The rest of the
accused in Criminal Case No. R-726 namely Joseph a.k.a. as Jojo Manito y
Galicia, Nestor Vicente y Gervacio, Vicente "Jun" Banang, Jr. y Buncag and
Merlin Vicente y Buncag are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and the
bail bonds posted by them are hereby ordered discharged. The bail bond
posted by the accused Ramon Galicia y Manresa is cancelled. An alias warrant
of arrest was issued against accused Roberto [U]reta y Ortega who has jumped
bail during the trial of the case.
● Upon the other hand, in Criminal Case No. R-725, the court pronounced
judgment as follows: Banang y Buncag and Ureta y Ortega were found guilty of
Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling without any mitigating
circumstance. Galicia y Manresa, Manito y Galicia, Vicente y Gervacio, and
Vicente y Buncag were acquitted.
● Galicia appealed his conviction for the death of Ramon.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in acquitting Galicia?
● Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:6

● Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:7
● As we have previously held in People v. Serrano, Sr.: A verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in
the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The
finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to
wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also
serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal,
6 Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
7 Sec. 7. – Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction.
And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.
● This is not to say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is
without exceptions.
○ There are two recognized exceptions: (1) Where there has been
deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or
(2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.
○ In this case, the exceptions do not exist.
● The records show that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient
occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during
the appeal. The State represented by the prosecution had not been deprived of
a fair opportunity to prove its case.
● Second, has there been a grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals?8
● In its decision, the Court of Appeals, said that it overturned Galicia’s conviction
because the trial court held that Galicia was in no way involved in Thelmo’s
death, and only Ureta and Banang conspired to kill Thelmo. The Court of
Appeals explained that the finding of the trial court, now final, should be upheld
and applied to Galicia insofar as the death of Ramon was concerned. The Court
of Appeals went on to say that the deaths of Ramon and Thelmo happened on
the same occasion, in the same place and involved the same participants; that
there was a continuous unbroken chain of events which meant that the act and
intention of each participant could not be split into segments/phases such that
there was conspiracy as to one aspect but none in the other aspect. It also held
that there is no such thing as partial conspiracy.
● The Court of Appeals also observed that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses lacked credibility and were filled with inconsistencies.
○ Among them, (1) Dolores and Audie both claimed that Galicia was
armed with a gun and fired two consecutive shots, but surprisingly, the
latter did not use his gun when he fought with Ramon. (2) Ureta stabbed
Ramon, yet, Galicia did not finish off Ramon by shooting him. (3) After
Ramon was stabbed, Dolores claimed that all the accused ganged up
on her son, and yet, she could not specifically say who kicked, boxed or
strangled Ramon. (4) Dolores categorically testified that Ureta stabbed
Ramon twice even pointing out that the first stab was at the right
shoulder and the second at the left chest, but, the medical certificate
showed that Ramon sustained only one wound. Lastly, (5) Dolores said
that when Galicia fired his gun, he and his companions were already
inside their house, yet, Audie told the court he heard two shots before
the group of Galicia arrived. The Court of Appeals observed that Ureta
was seemingly on a rampage, stabbing Ramon first and then Thelmo. It
noted that Ureta did not even see what happened to Galicia who was
still locked in a fight with Ramon.
8 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.

● The Court of Appeals concluded that the RTC based its decision on the
weakness of the defense evidence, rather than on the strength of the
prosecution’s. It went on to say,
● Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s finding that the conspiracy
between Ureta and Galicia was strengthened by the former’s decision to jump
bail and go into hiding, for being contrary to the doctrine of res inter alios acta.
According to the Court of Appeals, this conclusion of the court a quo partakes
more of wild conjectures and speculations which have no probative value
whatsoever since there was no evidence that the escape of Ureta was with the
knowledge, much less consent of Galicia.
● In our considered view, the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Appeals
cannot by any measure be characterized as capricious, whimsical nor arbitrary,
to constitute grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65.
● We note that while the OSG alleges grave abuse of discretion as the core of its
petition, the issues it raises concern errors of judgment, not errors of
jurisdiction, which is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an
appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, and prevailing jurisprudence. Conformably then, we need not embark
upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised by the OSG, as these
are not within the realm of the present petition.

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4. People vs. Nitafan, G.R. Nos.

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ISSUE/HELD: (1)WON SB committed GADALEJ in denying motion to quash

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The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are: (FOCUSED ON

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elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(g) are:

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3. Does Article 48 apply to acts penalized under Article 365 of RPC? NO

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1. Is the appellant guilty of selling illegal drugs? YES.

2. Did the Prosecution establish the chain of custody? YES.

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THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE

● In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash led by the

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IMPORTANT---THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TWO

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● Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts

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Doubtless, in finding [Castillo] guilty of simple misconduct

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It is thus unfortunate that even as [Castillo] had taken

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If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an

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2. Was the Information sufficient? YES.

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3. Was the application of Llorente ruling proper? NO

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3. People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014

● After confirmatory tests doneby the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division,

● The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice,

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● On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to

7. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested

8. Section 36, Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons

National penitentiary inmates or inmates of the Bureau of Corrections

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Issue/Held: whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of

● The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss,"

● It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after

● Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. -

● However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the

● Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly

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● In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to the