ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION,

respondents.
G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007
FACT
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea
and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro
forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter conforms
thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent,
again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached
their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and
do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the
original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible
in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the
Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

ISSUE: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence
and admissible as such,

HELD:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data
Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy.
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress
deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The
deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same
meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic
data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with
the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent
approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are
paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that
is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless
environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual
reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition
of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,”
could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent
and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have
different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and
computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
“electronic data message.”
[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under
the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COQUIA

G.R. No. 174466 July 14, 2008

DOCTRINE: It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written
document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that
when the written contract is established as the repository of the parties stipulations, any other evidence
is excluded and the same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict
them. This rule, however, is not without exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties

FACTS Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc. contracted with respondent Editha C. Coquia for the purchase
of one (1) lot of flint cullets at of P4.20 per kilo. However, petitioner to P3.65 per kilo to which
respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under duress. Deliveries were again made by respondent but
petitioner refused to pay for them even at the reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that
the unit price be further reduced to P3.10 per kilo.] Respondent then filed a Complaint] for specific
performance and damages against petitioner seeking payment. Three days after the complaint was
filed, petitioer paid for the flint cullets at the unit price of P3.65 per kilo. RTC ordered petitioner to
accept deliveries and to pay within 10 days at at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo. CA affirmed the
decision but deleted the award of attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit.

ISSUE: (1) whether petitioner may be bound to accept the deliveries of washed cullets from
respondent. (2) what is the unit price applicable.

Central to these issues is the soundness of the appellate courts pronouncement that the purchase
orders in question are contracts of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against
petitioner.

HELD: There is no contract of adhesion.Even the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse
side of the purchase orders do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
raised the failure of the purchase order to express the true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner
entered into a contract with respondent conditioned upon the latters prompt delivery of flint cullets.
Unfortunately, the trial court sustained respondents objection based on the parol evidence rule.
Sifting through the testimony of respondent, SC find that although she was not given definite days
during which she should deliver the flint cullets, she was indeed apprised of petitioners urgent need
for large quantities thereof.

Furthermore, petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its materials
control manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because respondent
assured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for petitioners production requirement. ] These testimonies
give us a more complete picture of the transaction between the parties and allow for a more reasoned
resolution of the issues, without over-reliance on the tenuous application of the rule on contracts of
adhesion.

Coming now to the second purchase order, SC find that Purchase Order No. 106211 had indeed been
superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 as the latter plainly states.Respondent testified that the
deliveries of flint cullets were already covered by the new purchase order which did indicate
the reduced unit price but did not mention the quantity to be delivered.

By acquiescing to the new purchase order which no longer indicated a specific quantity of flint cullets
to be delivered, respondent knew or should be presumed to have known that deliveries made
thereafter were no longer meant to complete the original quantity contracted for under Purchase
Order No. 106211.

Petitioner accepted deliveries under Purchase Order No. 106211 oand paid for these deliveries in
accordance with the terms of the purchase order, i.e., at the contract price of P4.20 per kilo. However,
the original contract between the parties evidenced by Purchase Order No. 106211 was unequivocally
novated by Purchase Order No. 106373, thereby extinguishing the original obligation of petitioner to
accept deliveries from respondent until the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint cullets originally
contracted for is filled. Petitioner, therefore, cannot be compelled to accept more deliveries of flint
cullets from respondent to complete the quantity originally contracted for. By the same token,
petitioner cannot be tied down to the P4.20 per kilo unit price under Purchase Order No. 106211, nor
even to the P3.65 per kilo indicated in Purchase Order No. 106373, the latter contract not having
stated the quantity petitioner is willing to accept delivery of and pay for under that price.

FALLO: The complaint dated filed by Editha C. Coquia against ACI Philippines, Inc. is hereby
DISMISSED.
 SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. AUTOCORP GROUP AND PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 164326 October 17, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994
from respondent Autocorp Group. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice
No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Seaoil issued 12 checks as payment therefor;
however 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped.
Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in the
Regional Trial Court.

Seaoil claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to settle the obligation of one
foreign entity named Uniline Asia, in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International,
Incorporated. The real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu
of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks
issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline. Petitioner Seaoil
in sum alleges that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, thus parol evidence is admissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable in this case.

HELD:
No. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract. The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. The
terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex
200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera.

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ vs. ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO EMERITA
ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO
ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ

DOCTRINE: When the parties admit the contents of written docs but put in issue whether these docs
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized
to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the
parties in order to determine such intent.

Rule 130, Sec 9 specifically provides that Parol Evidence Rule is exclusive only as "between the
parties and their successors-in-interest." The PER may not be invoked where at least one of the
parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written doc in question, and does not base
his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.

FACTS
Espejos were the original registered owners of 2 parcels of agricultural land. Lantap was tenanded
by Nemi, husband of Elenita Espejo while Murong was tenanted by Sulan-at Marquez and Nestor Dela
Cruz.The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.. The
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the
properties and TCTs were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated Jan 14, 1985 was
issued for the Murong property. TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap
property

Espejos bought back 1 of their lots from RBBI. (evidenced by TCT No. T-62096 )The Deed of Sale did
not mention the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the
property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property. However,
respondents never took possession of the Murong property. Nemi continued working on the Lantap
property. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994.

RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez and Dela Cruz.
Both VLTs described the subject as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by
TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property). After the
petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90K to RBBI, the DAR issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to Marquez and Dela Cruz. Both
CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.

Feb 10, 1997, respondents filed a Complaint before the RARAD of Bayombong. The complaint was
based on respondents’ theory that the Murong property was owned by the respondents by virtue
of the 1985 buy-back. RBBI answered that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the
buy-back transaction with Espejos.

OIC-RARAD Decision: Ruled in favor of Nemi. RARAD ruled that the VLTs (Murong property) has a
mere typographical error. RARAD declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the
Lantap property. DARAB ruled that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong
property (based on RBBI claim). CA held that DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap
property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong property. The title numbers indicated
in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof.
Using the BER, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of
the land which was the object of the sale. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject
thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error.

ISSUES
1. WON the Best Evidence Rule is applicable in this case. (NO).

2. WON the admitted contents of these docs adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties.

HELD
1. NO. CA held that the Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the
property. Petitioners argue that the CA erred in using the BER to determine the subject of the
Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the
case is not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not
adequately expressed in their contracts. Peaches. CA erred in its application of the BER. There
is no room for the application of the BER because there is no dispute regarding the contents of
the docs.

2. Petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually
intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836). Respondents contend
that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true
intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to "Barangay Murong" was a
typographical error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising
from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of
the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the
instruments. The Parol Evidence Rule (PER) excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a
party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or
instrument.

Respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are
strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Sec 9 specifically provides that PER is exclusive
only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The PER may not be invoked
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written doc
in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument. The instant case falls under the exceptions to the PER, as provided in the 2nd par of
Rule 130, Sec 9. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement. The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto. Guidance is provided by the Civil Code involving the
interpretation of contracts: Art 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the
words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over
the former. Art 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Rule 130, Sec 13: For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which
it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown,
so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

ROMEO I. SUERTE-FELIPE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170974, March 03, 2008, 571 Phil. 170
FACTS

Suerte-Felipe, after a heated argument with Ariate, shot the latter using his.45 caliber firearm.
Petitioner was accompanied by PO3 Edison Madriago and PO3 Eduardo Jimeno whoa re both armed
with .38 caliber revolvers. Ariate was declared dead on arrival at the Pasay City General Hospital.
Edgardo Ariate, another son of Godofredo, identified the body and requested an autopsy examination.
Dr. Ludovino J. Lagat, Jr. conducted the autopsy, which showed that Godofredo sustained three
gunshot wounds which caused his death. RTC and CA found Suerte-Felipe guilty of the of HOMICIDE.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Suerte-Felipe claims that a most sedulous
reading of Dr. Lagat's testimony engenders reasonable doubt since it shows that he himself was
uncertain and incompetent to prove that the body he autopsied was that of Godofredo Ariate. He
allegedly admitted that he had no personal knowledge of who signed the Request for Autops and the
Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, and that no relative of Godofredo was around to identify
the body during autopsy. Petitioner further argues that the following facts on record engender
reasonable doubt that it was Godofredo Ariate's body that was autopsied:

1. Dr. Lagat testified that apart from him, only the embalmer was around during the autopsy.
But there was no showing whatsoever that the said embalmer knew Godofredo Ariate
personally;

2. The prosecution rested its case without presenting any representative of the funeral parlor
and/or any friend or relative of Godofredo Ariate, including Godofredo's son, William Ariate,
to properly identify on the said Request for Autopsy and Certificate of Identification of Dead
Body.

ISSUE: Whether or noy the autopsied body was that of Godofredo Ariate.

HELD:

SC found no reason to depart form the findings of CA. According to the Court of Appeals, the records
clearly show that the body autopsied and referred to in the autopsy report of Dr. Ludovino Lagat of
the NBI was no other than that of Godofredo Ariate. The body submitted for autopsy was identified
by Godofredo's son, Edgardo. Pictures of Godofredo's body, taken by Armando Mancera during the
autopsy, likewise establish the identity of the victim. Moreover, the entries found in the assailed
Autopsy Report should be deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, as there had been
no proof of any intent on the part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the identity of the victim's body.

DOCTRINE: The presentation in evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, the latter
being a public record made in the performance of a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the
National Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule 132, Sections 19 and 23 of the Rules of Court.

There was no indication of any impropriety or irregularity committed by the medico-legal officer in
this case with respect to the autopsy on the body of the late Godofredo Ariate. Dr. Lagat's duty was
to perform the autopsy and not to obsessively investigate the authenticity of the signature appearing
on all requests presented to him. Thus, Dr. Lagat, as a medico-legal officer, enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duties.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO
G.R. No. 215009 January 23, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS

Galeno filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle
Cadastre before the RTC. She alleged therein that she is one of the co-owners of the subject property
by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated July 6, 1962. The survey and subdivision of the subject property was
duly approved by DENR. Respondent further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the
subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land
area of the subject property as appearing in the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while
the Certification issued by the DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management
Services, shows an area of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject
property in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners. RTC
granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to substantiate the allegations in her
petition to warrant a correction of the area of the subject property. Republic of the Philippines ,
through the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the adjoining owners had not been
notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional requirement. RTC denied the motion. CA
affirmed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No.
46417.

HELD:
YES. A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent before the court a
quo shows that the former failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of
the area of the subject property. Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following
documents: (a) the Certification issued by a certain Acevedo, Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical
Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Services of the
DENR in Iloilo City, which states that "the true and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle
Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;" (b) the technical description of Lot No. 2285; and (c) the
approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258. On the strength of these pieces of evidence, respondent
sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records of the DENR.
Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the correction
prayed for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public
officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.

The testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent's
documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value
and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered
only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima
facieevidence of the facts stated therein.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole witness and attorney-
in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did
not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government
agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed
no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, it
should be borne in mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value
unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule," which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's documentary evidence
may have been admitted due to the opposing party's lack of objection, it does not, however, mean
that they should be accorded any probative weight. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay
testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking
that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for it has no probative value.hanroblesvirtuallawl