Emma Chen

U6388045
POLS1006
Introduction to International Relations: Contemporary Global Issues
Word Count: 1365
Instructor: Michael Zekulin
Introduction

This essay discusses the best approach to a nuclear North Korea, and compares this to the

best approach to a nuclear ambitious Iran. It argues that a diplomatic approach to North

Korea, which considers North Korea’s primary objective of survival, is the best approach for

the US to take. The best policy approach for the US to adopt regarding Iran also comprises of

greater diplomacy and acknowledgement of security interests. This essay argues that the

reason for the US’s divergent approaches toward nuclear North Korea and Iran are the result

of both issues being fundamentally different. Divergent hard power capabilities, as well as

the differing geostrategic locations and attitudes of US allies in both regions, are significant

contributors of the US’s differing approaches. Although the two issues are different,

however, it is recommended that the US approach both states diplomatically.

The Best Approach to North Korea

North Korea’s volatile and fickle behaviour on the international sphere comprises of limited

economic cooperation, overt provocations and the testing of long-range ballistic missiles and

nuclear weaponry.1 North Korea’s behaviour poses a significant threat to regional stability

and US interests in the Asia-Pacific. The volatile aggression of the DPRK’s international

interactions has raised debate over the utility of a negotiation-orientated strategy toward

maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula. However, despite North Korea’s volatility, the

best US approach to a nuclear North Korea is one that utilises diplomacy and considers North

Korean interests.

1Emma, Chanlet-Avery, Mark, E. Manyin, Mary, Beth D. Nikitin, Caitlin, Elizabeth

Campbell, Wil, Mackey, “North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy and Internal
Situation,” Congressional Research Service (Jul 2018): 8.
North Korea’s primary interest is the survival of its regime. Survival is a significant driver of

North Korean nuclear ambitions.2 The US’s interest in projecting its hegemonic power in the

Asia-Pacific, combined with the deployment of its forces near the peninsula and pursuit of

DPRK nuclear disarmament, directly challenge Pyongyang’s security prospects. Despite

conflicting security interests however, it is still feasible and optimal to improve US-DPRK

relations and negotiate a peace arrangement on the peninsula via diplomacy. This is

reinforced by Peter Howard, who argues that the North Korea’s nuclear threat can be

managed diplomatically.3 North Korea has shown itself to be open to negotiate for peace, as

demonstrated by the 2018 US-North Korean Summit.4 A diplomatic solution to the DPRK

issue is possible because Pyongyang’s openness to negotiations is driven by its internal

conditions. Significant factors which have evidently driven the DPRK to engage in talks

include food shortages, aid requests and economic desperation.5 This is reinforced by John

Delury, who argues that Kim Jong-Un’s “real goal is economic development.” 6 The DPRK

leader’s increased emphasis on economic development in 2018 further suggests that

Pyongyang may be deciding to denuclearise. If economic development is indeed a DPRK

priority, it may be possible for the US to achieve a more stable relationship with the DPRK,

as North Korean economic development cannot occur without relief from sanctions and

2
Nicholas D. Anderson. “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position
on the Korean Peninsula,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 6 (2017):
621.
3 Peter, Howard, “Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and US Foreign

Policy.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec 2004): 806.
4
The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of
America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the
Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018.
5
Emma, Chanlet-Avery, Mark, E. Manyin, Mary, Beth D. Nikitin, Caitlin, Elizabeth
Campbell, Wil, Mackey, “North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy and Internal
Situation,” Congressional Research Service (Jul 2018): 9.
6
John, Delury, “Instead of Threatening North Korea, Trump Should Try This,” Washington
Post, April 23, 2017.
isolationism. From this, evidently, cautious negotiation with the DPRK can prove beneficial

to achieving stability on the peninsula.

A hard-line approach which utilises negative reinforcement strategies, such as imposing

crippling economic sanctions, is not recommended. Liang Tuang Nah argues that a tough

approach to North Korea would be counterproductive to stability in the region, as North

Korea has hardened itself against adversarial states.7 A hard-line approach to Pyongyang is

not recommended because, although there is a significant gap between the military

capabilities of the US and DPRK, its development of WMD capabilities largely assist in

offsetting its comparatively deficient conventional forces.8 Pursuit of a hard-line approach

presently would also destroy the careful beginnings of a normalised relationship established

as of 2018. In conclusion, the best US approach to the DPRK is a cautiously diplomatic one

which considers Pyongyang’s foreign policy strategy and interests in security and trade.

The Best Approach to Iran

The US’s Iran policy is hard-line in comparison to its approach to Pyongyang. In 2018, the

US withdrew from its 2015 JCPOA deal with Iran, wherein it agreed to not impose crippling

economic sanctions on Iran, in exchange for Iran’s elimination of medium-enriched uranium

and reduction of low-enriched uranium. Contrary to the current US administration’s

uncooperative approach to Iran, the best Iran strategy for the US also involves diplomacy.

7
Liang Tuang, Nah, "Explaining North Korean Nuclear Weapons Motivations:
Constructivism, Liberalism, and Realism," North Korean Review 9, no. 1 (2013): 61.
8
James Clapper, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2015.
Coercion will prove dangerous and counterproductive, as for an amicable resolution to the

issue, both Iran and the US must consider each other’s interests.9 Although rhetoric has

differed across administrations, the coercive aspects of current and past US administrations

toward Iran have not proven successful. For example, President Obama’s application of

severe economic sanctions prohibiting Iranian oil trade did not show tangible successes in

disarming Iran of its nuclear program or decreasing tensions.10 The limits of non-diplomatic

approaches are further reinforced by the negative results yielded from the Trump

administration’s diehard withdrawal from the JCPOA. US withdrawal from the deal adds a

new element of uncertainty in the Middle East, breaches the trust of regional US allies and

simultaneously sends a counterproductive message to North Korea. US non-engagement of

Iran also damages its hegemonic international image. The JCPOA deal was a point of

multilateral convergence between involved states, and the US’s withdrawal serves to

reinforce US isolationism and the yielding of its hegemony to rising global powers such as

China. The best approach for the US is to reopen diplomatic communication with Iran and

pursue stability via acknowledgement of its interests.

The Differences Between North Korea and Iran

There are similarities between the intentions of North Korea and Iran, primarily as both states

harbour nuclear ambitions and appear aggressive and volatile in the international sphere.

These similarities were highlighted in Bush’s well-known “axis of evil” speech in 2002,

9
Aftab, Alam, “Sanctioning Iran: Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” India Quarterly Vol. 67
Issue, 1 (2011): 3.
10
Paik, Seunghoon, “Taming the Evil: US Non-Proliferation Coercive Diplomacy and the
Counter-Strategies of Iran and North Korea after the Cold War,” (Ph. D, University of
Durham, 2017) 1.
wherein both states were described as posing a “grave and growing danger” to US security.11

Despite similarities however, both issues are ultimately different, and these differences have

been reflected via the US’s significantly divergent approach to both states. Whilst the US has

taken a hard-line approach to containing Iran, diplomacy has comprised a much more

significant portion of its approach to North Korea. There are two reasons for these differing

approaches.

The first reason for the US’s more co-operative approach to North Korea is because

Pyongyang’s hard power capabilities are significantly larger than that of Tehran. Its air force

and navy can possess sizeable fleets. The disparity in conventional military forces of both

states are further amplified when geography is considered. Seoul, a primary Asian US ally, is

located within the firing range of North Korean artillery forces. Japan, the US’s fourth largest

trading partner,12 is also vulnerable to DPRK attack. This contrasts from the geographic

location of Saudi Arabian, Iraqi and Israeli allied populations being comparatively farther

from Iranian forces.

A second difference between North Korea and Iran is the difference in attitudes toward

diplomatic normalisation of US allies in both regions. Regarding North Korea, major allies

such as South Korea and Japan have indicated interests in US-North Korean rapprochement

and the diffusion of tensions with North Korea. Reunification has been a core South Korean

objective since the 1945 border division and Japan’s interests in diffusing tensions primarily

stem from concerns about proximity to a nuclear-armed rogue state. Contrarily, Israel and

Saudi Arabia were firmly opposed to the 2015 JCPOA deal. Israel’s opposition is rooted from

11 Peter, Howard, “Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and US Foreign
Policy,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec 2004): 806.
12
United States Census Bureau, US Top Trading Partners- August 2018 (2018).
the fact that its regional nuclear monopoly would be challenged if Iran could retain its WMD

knowledge and uranium enrichment capacity as a result of the JCPOA. Saudi Arabia’s

opposition stem from uncertainty about erosion of its regional standing if Iran does not give

up its nuclear enrichment capabilities.13 Although there are differences between both states,

ultimately, the US should take a diplomatic approach to both, as a hard-line approach will

yield negative results.

Conclusion

This essay discusses the best approach for the US to take regarding a nuclear North Korea

and compares it to the best approach toward Iran. It argues that the best US approaches

regarding both states should be that of cautious diplomacy and negotiation, with

consideration of core DPRK and Iranian security interests. This essay argues that divergent

hard power capabilities and geostrategic alliances in both regions are primary drivers of

Washington’s contrasting approaches to Pyongyang and Tehran. Despite fundamental

differences however, it is recommended that the US pursues stability via diplomacy and

negotiation-orientated strategies toward both states.

13
Mohammed, Ayoob, The Strategist, “What’s the Difference Between North Korea and
Iran?” (blog), posted 14 Jun 2018, accessed 22 Jun 2018,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/whats-the-difference-between-north-korea-and-iran/
Bibliography

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