Table of Contents

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner, vs. JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent. ............................................................................. 1

LEONILO ANTONIO - versus - MARIE IVONNE F. REYES G.R. No. 155800 ....................................................... 6
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent. ................................... 10

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents. .................................................................................................................................................... 12
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, vs MYRNA F. MARABLE G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011 .............................. 13

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner, vs. JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court’s ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition."2

Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under
Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he shouldered
his sister’s schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income
from her "Botica" and store.11

Justo lived the life of a bachelor.

The entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there.
However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the
Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. It was alleged that he
disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.
She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation
resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased
daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It
found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at
the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no
need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC
observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.33

On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It
ruled that Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:

The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her
case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her
allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.35

The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:

first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 (disbarment) are conclusive on the
present case;

second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is necessary;

third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

The decision on AC No. 5333 is insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Even if Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family
home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest
the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that
while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future.36

disbarment case because of appellee’s falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, by
themselves, do not conclusively establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The existence of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an
inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations
as required under Article 36.37

One’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa.41 The
yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be
conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

II

Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the
Guidelines set forth therein states:

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
.Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition."

Republic v. Dagdag44 , "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified
and sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist
or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.

New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of
expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete
facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said
incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their adoption.

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
However, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

The wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to
remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the
psychological condition of Justo.

III

The last issue left for this Court’s consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in
question.

In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36

The Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main
grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which
includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children,
and abandonment of the family. The court found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue.

There is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part.
The totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.

There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced
only in the latter years. Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s "defects" are incurable or
grave.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55, acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage.

In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he
could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a
manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this
Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
LEONILO ANTONIO - versus - MARIE IVONNE F. REYES G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. [8]

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, [9] to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10] and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys
parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.[11]

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in
fact, no such incident occurred.[12]

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the
group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect[14] but petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.[15]

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the number one moneymaker in the
commercial industry worth P2 million.[16] Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who
wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. [17] He likewise realized
that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not
known in or connected with Blackgold.[18]
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear
that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she
acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.[19] She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.[20]

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for
good in November 1991.[21]
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. ArnulfoV.Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of
person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was
abnormal or pathological.
They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations.[23]

The lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. [36] The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties. National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a
lack of due discretion.[38] Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was
upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.

The court through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[65]

Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.[70]

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:[71]

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
 There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely
primarily on that precedent

The Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.[75] Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the
interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of
this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.[76]

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.[78] This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.[79] Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

With the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been
shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc.
She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love,
trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying
is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.[87]

Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
 It is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.[88] Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention
of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable
feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites
on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have
a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.

Respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of
petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the
staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in
his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high
position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw
objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological
incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she
perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is
permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond
the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and
loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.

The root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It
appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is – a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as
a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).

This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and
set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself.40

husband is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s
obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of
support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. However, these inadequacies of petitioner
Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and
their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if
any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I
wanted to have a child at that particular point."52

Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself
to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted
by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.54

The report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the
inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-
laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering,
admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the
Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two
children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her
two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation
of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage.[8]
Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.

The trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The
authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances,
like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, vs MYRNA F. MARABLE G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011

The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on
the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The facts:

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites and a church
wedding followed. However, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common
occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their
quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile
misconduct.

Petitioner filed a petition[4] for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life. He alleged that his misery and
loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report[5] of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a
clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is
suffering from Antisocial Personality Disorder, characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that
petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and
that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.

Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable
nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of
social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence

as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and
incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers.This
insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his
marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the
psychological incapacity.[7]

The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's
psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the
marriage. Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social
Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant
person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[15] the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court
can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. The report did not clearly specify the
actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity.

The spouses frequent marital squabbles[17] and differences in handling finances and managing their business
affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological
incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. The records would show that the
petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his
family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder
tantamount to psychological incapacity.

He became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological
disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not
shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. Petitioners marital
infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations.

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.[18] It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent is valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is
insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.