EVIDENCE

1. ONG CHIA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended.

On August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted Ong Chia to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending
that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to
state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation
of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been
insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with
the appropriate documentary evidence.

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The state also annexed
income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income
could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a
judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed
to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife.
These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no
marriage license had been required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner
and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit
of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife
in 1953, they had already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to
the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.

Ong Chia's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued,
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because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.

Ong Chia admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and
the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7.

ISSUE: Whether the documents annexed by the State to its appelant’s brief without having been
presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s decision

RULING: YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied. Petitioner
failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that - These rules shall not apply to
land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment
does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on
the basis of the same documents. It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial
compliance” with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.

The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered
is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Ong Chia cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief
he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus: The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization
(SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been
established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization… is 031767 while
the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is
totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal.

2. CECILIA ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents
belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed against her
husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila which rendered a decision declaring
him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s
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Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress.” The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different
nature involving the same documents were admissible as evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible
as evidence.

RULING: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in the proceeding.”

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. YATAR

DOCTRINE: No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented. The kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.

FACTS:
 8.30AM—Kathylyn handed a letter to Yatar. The letter came from Yatar’s wife.
 9:00AM—Judilyn, who was Kathylyn’s first cousin, left the latter alone in the house owned by
Isabel, their grandmother.
 10:00AM—Anita Wania, Kathylyn’s aunt, saw Yatar behind the house. Anita asked him what he
was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his
mother.
 12:30PM— while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw Yatar descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house. She later noticed Yatar, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as Yatar and his
wife used to live in the house where Kathylyn lived.
 1:30PM— Judilyn again saw Yatar when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Yatartold her that he would not be getting
the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were
"reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something
important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went
towards the back of the house of Isabel.
 Later that night, Isabel discovered Kathylyn’s lifeless body sprawled on the floor, her intestines
protruding out of her stomach.
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 The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with
blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
 Yatar was caught, and charged and convicted of the complex crime of Rape with Homicide. He
was sentenced to death, hence the automatic review pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC.
 Yatar argued that the RTC erred in giving much probative weight to the evidence presented by
the prosecution, and that the prosecution had failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING: In view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25
in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED
to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.

Whether the Court wrongly gave probative value to the DNA evidence presented.—No.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellant’s gene type.
 In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests.
 In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to
that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA
match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
 Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the
DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
 Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal
canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to
sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt:
1. Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the
victim, Kathylyn Uba;
2. In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels;
3. Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the
early morning on June 30, 1998;
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 4. Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30,
1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a
dirty white shirt with collar;
5. Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m.,
wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt;
6. Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching;
7. Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the
house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead;
8. The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope;
9. The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding
from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained
pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery;
10.Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
11.The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with
blood;
12.DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are
identical;
13.Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.
 Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is
the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the blood sample taken from Yatar as well as the DNA tests were conducted
in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.—No.
 This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
 We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed
is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from
the accused under duress.
 Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood
and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-
incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine
his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
 It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which
was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Whether the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto
law.—No.
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 This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of
DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under
the Rules of Court.
 Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Whether Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi can be sustained.—Yes.

 The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his
presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed,
undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
 Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two
places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime,
and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely
weakens his alibi.

Whether Yatar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.—Yes.

 Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and
by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed
the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
 The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by
means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman. However, in rape
committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law
spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. The fact that the victim’s
hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis
into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen,
suffices for conviction of rape. The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may
be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.
 In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than
the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his
mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to
the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s
house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.

4. TATING VS. MARCELLA

FACTS: Daniela Tating sold a parcel of land to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Tating.
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela
in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the land was transferred in the name of Nena, who, in
turn, declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due
thereon for several years. The land, however, remained in the possession of Daniela. Eight years
later, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling
the property to Nena and that the true agreement between them was simply to transfer title over
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the land in favor of Nena to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the land to help her defray
her business expenses. She, however, later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgaged the property so she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the property to
be reconveyed to her. Daniela died, leaving her children as heirs. In a letter, Carlos, one of
Daniela’s heirs, informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she
executed and as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares
over the land as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply and subsequent efforts proved futile, which
prompted Carlos to file a complaint against Nena. In her answer, Nena denied that any fraud or
misrepresentation attended the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and prayed for dismissal.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Daniela’s heirs and declared the sale null and void. The
appeal and MR having both denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in nullifying the sale by relying solely on the sworn
statement as its sole and main evidence.

RULING: No. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. It is settled that affidavits
are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already
dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for
purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated.

5. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALAFRANCA

DOCTRINE: An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets

the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

FACTS: A certain Johnny Bolanon was stabbed. The assailant ran away but Bolanon was still able
to walk to the house of his uncle, Rodolfo Estao, in order to seek help. On the way to the hospital,
Bolanon told his uncle that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him. Bolanon was pronounced
dead upon arrival at the hospital. Salafranca was charged, tried, and held guilty of murder. His
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and now comes to the Court for a reversal of the
assailed judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salafranca’s conviction was correct.

RULING: Yes. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: ( a) that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and ( d) that the declaration is
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offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All
the requisites were met herein. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae
and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and ( c) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely,
when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would
bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca
as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general
way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact
and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses
the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.

6. SCC CHEMICALS CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corp. through its chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice
president Pablito Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI). To secure
the payment thereof, Danilo and Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the
loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili but
notwithstanding payment thereof, no payment was made. SIHI filed a civil case for a sum of
money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta and Halili. Due to several
defaults by SCC, the court rendered judgment in favor of SIHI. On appeal, SCC contended that
SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case against it.
SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the
competency of the witness was not established and there was no showing that he had personal
knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the
original copies of the documents were not presented in court. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
judgment in toto.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law when it failed to disallow the
admission in evidence of the testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section 36, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court which provides that “A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.”

RULING: No. Petitioners’ reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a
rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit
of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.
The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is
settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters
testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s
witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of
SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his
testimony were satisfied.

7. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS

ARENAS-BANAL

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to
determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the
Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC
a petition for determination of just compensation. In determining the valuation of the land, the
trial court based the same on the facts established in another case pending before it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production
figures in another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without
conducting a hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties

RULING: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and
“with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier
stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
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“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The RTC failed to observe the
above provisions.

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KULAIS

FACTS: Five Information for kidnapping for ransom and three informations for kidnapping were
filed before the RTC of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais,Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and several John and Jane Does. The
information for kidnapping for ransom set forth identical allegations save for the names of the
victims. The three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims. Of the twelve
accused, only nine were apprehended. The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts
of kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which
offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two
counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of MonicoSaavedra and Calixto Francisco. [May
7, 1991] Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin filed their Joint Notice of Appeal. In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants,
except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appealbecause of their application for amnesty (said motion
granted). Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in
another case, also pending before it, affects the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt byother clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial
and documentary.

RULING: No. The appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit. In the case at bar, appellant Kulais argues
that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in
another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops
that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to
cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the
latter's testimony should not be used against him even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of
the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against
the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based
mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-
examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of
Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of
the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

10
9. LAUREANO VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL).
In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano
was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano
filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and
instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL. Laureano
filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano
is valid pursuant to Singaporean law. The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the
case raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel,
among others. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.

RULING: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not
proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed
valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall
apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all
money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from
the time the cause of action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was
terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence
he is already barred by prescription.

10. MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor. On 28
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
candidacy for municipal mayor.
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American and showing as evidence a
travel record that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on
24 November 2009.

11
COMELEC ruled that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing
his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Arnado argues that section 349 of the immigration and naturalization act of the United States
provides that his execution of an affidavit of renunciation of American citizenship has the effect of
expatriation and thus was divested of all the rights of an American citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnaldo’s argument regarding Section 349 of the immigration act of
United States is applicable in this case.

RULING: The court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof.” Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

11. PEOPLE THE PHILIPPINES VS. BAHARAN

FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was in its usual southbound route, via EDSA Avenue.
According to the bus conductor, two men insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged
and let them in. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue the two
immediately got off the bus and ran. Moments after, they left they felt an explosion and then saw
fire quickly engulfing the bus.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio
station DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Arroyo. Trinidad
gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. The bus conductor identified Baharan and
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the
evening of 14 February. Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were then charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested,
while the other accused remain at-large. Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as they
assert that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to
the conspiracy was insufficient.
 Whether or not the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. That statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible
only when made during the existence of the conspiracy.

RULING:
 Yes, the guilt of the accused was proven as the accused's plea of guilt was not the sole basis
of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. The Court notes that prior to the change
of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt -
one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both
accused during pre-trial), and the other via judicial admission (pre-trial stipulation).

12
 That while it is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against aco-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However,
as the Court ruled that if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.

12. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a complaint against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and
Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected.

Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another
set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were
elected. Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that PCGG had been "illegally
‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI, especially in the election of the members of the
board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI]
annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the court’s control and supervision and prescribed
guidelines. The Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion with only the registered owners, their duly
authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.

On appeal, the PCGG imputed grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter
alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition, the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very Urgent Petition for
Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing ETPI’s
Authorized Capital Stock". The Sandiganbayan granted the holding of the special stockholder’s
meeting prompting Africa’s filing of a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the principle of judicial notice

RULING: The petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and
rested its case"; and that it "had terminated the presentation of its evidence”. In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions, the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist
on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the
resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally
offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this
present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence
and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without
proof because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a
13
court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on
convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione. The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense
with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129
either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial
departments of the Philippines,” or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters
"ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." On the other hand, a party-
litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties
to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it,
is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient
basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.

The issue before the Court does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of
judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice
seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a
genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases as
evidence in the "parent" case or "of the whole family of cases."

First, the supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve
only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the petitioner’s proposition is
obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present
case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity.

Following the logic of the petitioner’s argument would be espousing judicial confusion by
indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is
the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies
upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.

14
13. MONICO LIGTAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine: Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; It is true that trial courts are not
mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.—It is true that trial
courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of
other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. In
declaring that the DARAB’s findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Cornes, et
al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545 (2008).

Facts: Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the
plantation of belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers,
valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas
pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is the one who
cultivated such, he further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that the alleged taking
did not happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta
at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened but
later on when confronted he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner,
being a tenant of 1.5 to two hectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the
land which he himself cultivated.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21,
2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide
tenant of the land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered
as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by
both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of the People of
the Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that “the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of tenancy was not
supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him
and Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness.”

Issue: Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be taken
judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft?

RULING: Yes. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done
without the owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority
to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. No
less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until
proven guilty. “It is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person.”
Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.” Equally
settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with
guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted.”

In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same

15
court and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.

14. JUNIE MALILLIN y LOPEZ v. PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be; The likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where
it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because
it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when
its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level
of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering— without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not —dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature
and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.

FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City,
Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos,
Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. Petitioner was charged with violation of Sec 11, Art 2 of RA
9165 for Illegal Drugs; search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as
well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance. But herein petitioner pleaded not guilty. During hearing proving the flow of the search
and seizure of object; as testified when it is on the process to be delivered to the laboratory by
Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not
she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the
laboratory.

The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by
the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with
Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the
16
police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner’s wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila’s body inside the same
bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was
in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police
officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that
nothing was found on Sheila’s body. Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together
with her children.1Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the
mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift
the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him “sachet of shabu” which
according to him came from a pillow on the bed. The OSG bids to establish that the raiding team
had regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the search.31 It points to petitioner’s
incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two
filled sachets was made in his and Licup’s presence. It likewise notes that petitioner’s bare denial
cannot defeat the positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to
overcome the prima facie existence of animus possidendi.

ISSUE: Whether the accused be convicted notwithstanding the irregularities in the procedure?

RULING: No. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.

The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange.40 In other words, the exhibit’s level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering —without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been
tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory
testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable
that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with. A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of
the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of
proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the
reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown.
17
14. G.R. No. 179029. August 9, 2010
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO

DOCTRINE: “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.
It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case,
the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively negates this presumption.

FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states: “That on or about December 27, 2003 at
about 4:30 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused was
caught during a by bust operation. But he pleaded not guilty, whereas the facts shows that After
having received information that the appellant was selling illegal drugs in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain
Jaim de Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter Almare and SPO1 Domingo Balido—who
were both in Santiago City—and informed them of a planned buy-bust operation, they agreed to
meet at the SSS Building near LMN Hote in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. On their arrival there
Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO Almarez as the poseur buyer.

Thereafter, Captain de Ver introduced PO3 Almarez to the police informant (tipster), and gave him
(PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills (Exhibits “D and “E”) which the latter marked with his initials. The
operation pushed thru, though the defense presented a different version of the events, that
instead to be that one selling, appellant was informed to be an asset by Captain de Vera but he
was later on turned to be the one arrested. He was convicted from RTC to CA, and that his
defense of instigation was found unmeritorious by the CA affirming RTC’s decision.

The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior surveillance on the appellant was
not fatal to the prosecution’s case. It reasoned out that the police are given wide discretion to
select effective means to apprehend dru dealers. A prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary,
especially when the police are already accompanied by their informant. The CA further ruled that
the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It
explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the plasti sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his
initials, and transmitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero conducted a
qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the presence of shabu. According to
the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that the substance seized was the same specimen

18
submitted to the laboratory and presented in court, notwithstanding that this specimen was
turned over to the crime laboratory only after two days.

ISSUE: Whether the accused be convicted due to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by the police?

Held: No. He is therefore acquitted. The prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 , and with the chain of custody requirement of
this Act.

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.
It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case,
the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively negates this
presumption. As we explained in Malillin v. People:

“The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption

disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.”

Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome this constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all
the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant
deserves no less than an acquittal.

16. NARCISO SALAS VS. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

DOCTRINE: A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem claimed that Narciso Salas is the father of her son Christian Paulo
Salas. However, when Matusalem refused the offer of Salas’ family to take the child from her, he
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Hence,
she filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Salas in the RTC of Cabanatuan City. Petitioner
filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described respondent
as a woman of loose morals and denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated
by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the
delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him
in exchange for financial favor.
19
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner
rented testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case
was considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence. The trial court rendered
its decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the CA dismissed petitioner’s
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner?

HELD: Yes. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate,
the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence
of paternity. Also, while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s
paternity. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan
General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to
prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer
that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity. As to
the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words
and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not
qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent concerned. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of
the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not
approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial”.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation
or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006
and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERIC ROSAURO Y BONGCAWIL

DOCTRINE: The essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of

offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

20
FACTS: On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that drugs were being
distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements
led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their
confidential agent.

There, they saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent and in exchange for the one (1)
sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-
peso bill with serial number YZ7 12579. After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their
hiding place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot,
who taped it, marked it with the marking “Exhibit A”, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took
pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory
and a Request for Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to
the Crime laboratory. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and claimed that he was merely a victim of instigation. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on
the merits ensued. Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of
accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction

After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled that
what transpired in the case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant when
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: No. This Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful
prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu,
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material,
therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti.

Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that
the statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.

The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be
established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-
bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit.

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized
item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it “Exhibit A.” Upon reaching the
police station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for
laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and accused-
appellant were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by
SPO2 Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then
forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of
the PNP Crime Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open
court as the same item seized from accused-appellant. Accused-appellant’s guilt having been

21
established, we likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.

18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

DOCTRINE: Failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS: On November 13, 2003, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO
and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that
while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic
dispute with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th
Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab and fired
their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a
police station nearby where he reported the incident. The police officers on duty immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where
they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom,
fired their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they
were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of
dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3
Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38 revolver. Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug. RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case. The Court
of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana found in Calantiao’s possession was inadmissible as
evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because
its custodial chain was broken?

HELD: No. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
"to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed
with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and
the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy
the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it
was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of
22
chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time
the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to
the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no
reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of
the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao
inadmissible in evidence. Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that
the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties,
their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04069.

19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. Y BINAYUG AKA
“JOJIT"

DOCTRINE: Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use
as reference point. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of
the chain of custody that the law requires.

FACTS: In a buy-bust operation conducted in the city of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan P03
Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in exchange
for P1,000. However, P03 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of
shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station, P03
Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPOZ Tamang, who
was also a member of the buy-bust team. P03 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who
put the marking “NET” on the said sachets of shabu. However, P03 Hernandez, another member
of the buy-bust team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust
team, as the one who put the marking “NBT” on the plastic sachets upon the team's return to the
police station. To complicate things even further, P/Slnsp Tulauan, the Forensic Chemist, also
declared before the trial court that the marking “NBT” on the two plastic sachets of shabu were
made by SPos Nelson B. Tamaray, the duty officer who received the specimens at the crime
laboratory on cross-examination, P/Slnsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that SP03
Tamaray had claimed making the marking on the sachets of shabu. Herein, the prosecution is
completely silent as to why P03 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite having immediate custody of
the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the
seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another police officer.

ISSUE: Whether the provisions regarding the Rule on Chain of Custody have been strictly
complied with by the arresting officers.

RULING: No. In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration, and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale
of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
23
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." And in the prosecution of these
offenses, the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs
and other related articles have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the
accused until their presentation as evidence in court. As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn-over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the
marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds glaring
inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The
inconsistent testimonies of P03 Domingo, P03 Hernandez, and P/Slnsp. Tulauan as to who, when,
and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the
two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from
Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a
very early stage.

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as
reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the
accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or
contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the
integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.

20. PEOPLE VS. MERCURY DE LA CRUZ.

DOCTRINES: The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been observed in the absence of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with; the accused has the burden
to prove this.

Failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence, provided such
procedural lapse is satisfactorily explained and justified.

24
FACTS: During the course of a buy-bust operation, the arresting police officers involved testified
that following the consummation of the drug purchase transaction, a commotion erupted when
the accused-appellant resisted and shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion
eventually gave accused-appellant the opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting officers
further alleged that the people who gathered around them were already aggressive prompting
them to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for their safety. In fact, the arresting
officers even had to fire a warning shot and arrest Arthur Tabasa Ortega, the person who
intervened in the arrest of accused-appellant, in order for them to pacify the people around them.
The accused-appellant, who evaded arrest, was arrested only after, by virtue of a warrant of
arrest. She contended that that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was
apprehended but at the police station and that there was no physical inventory made on the
seized item nor was it photographed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is fatal to a
case.

RULING: No. Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provided the exception to the strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution
should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial compliance with
the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item” is sufficient. The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items
seized inadmissible in evidence.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The guilt of the accused will not be affected as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 were not faithfully observed.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the
burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that
public officers properly discharged their duties. In this case, the accused-appellant failed to
present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the
testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, accused-appellant
did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her
defense on denial and alibi.

21. SPOUSES SILOS V. PNB

DOCTRINE: There is no ruling that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence.

FACTS: Spouses Eduardo and Lydia Silos secured a revolving credit line with Philippine National
Bank (PNB) through a real estate mortgage as a security. After two years, their credit line
increased. Spouses Silos then signed a Credit Agreement, which was also amended two years
later, and several Promissory Notes (PN) as regards their Credit Agreements with PNB. The said
loan was initially subjected to a 19.5% interest rate per annum. In the Credit Agreements,
25
Spouses Silos bound themselves to the power of PNB to modify the interest rate depending on
whatever policy that PNB may adopt in the future, without the need of notice upon them. Thus,
the said interest rates played from 16% to as high as 32% per annum. Spouses Silos acceded to
the policy by pre-signing a total of twenty-six (26) PNs leaving the individual applicable interest
rates at hand blank since it would be subject to modification by PNB.

Spouses Silos regularly renewed and made good on their PNs, religiously paid the interests
without objection or fail. However, during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Spouses Silos faltered
when the interest rates soared. Spouses Silos’ 26 th PN became past due, and despite repeated
demands by PNB, they failed to make good on the note. Thus, PNB foreclosed and auctioned the
involved security for the mortgage. Spouses Silos instituted an action to annul the foreclosure sale
on the ground that the succeeding interest rates used in their loan agreements was left to the sole
will of PNB, the same fixed by the latter without their prior consent and thus, void.

PNB argued that the Silos’ claims of signing credit agreements and promissory notes in blank was
never raised in the lower court, and that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial
evidence; Lydia Silos’ testimony in this regard is self-serving, unsupported and uncorroborated,
and for being the lone evidence on this issue. The fact remains that these documents are in
proper form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by Silos – who is an
experienced business person – that she signed questionable loan documents whose provisions for
interest rates were left blank, and yet she continued to pay the interests without protest for a
number of years.

ISSUE: Is PNB’s contention that documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence
correct?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that PNB’s contention that documentary evidence deserves
no consideration because it has already found credible the testimony of Lydia in this respect.
Respondent failed to discredit her; in fact, its witness PNB Kalibo Branch Manager Aspa admitted
that interest rates were fixed solely by its Treasury Department in Manila, which were then simply
communicated to all PNB branches for implementation. If this were the case, then this would
explain why petitioners had to sign the promissory notes in blank, since the imposable interest
rates have yet to be determined and fixed by respondent’s Treasury Department in Manila.

22. MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.

DOCTRINE: Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3)
on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can
be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

FACTS: MCMP Construction and Monark Equipment Construction Corporation agreed to the lease
of heavy equipment by MCMP from Monark thru a Rental Equiptment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Monark delivered five pieces of heavy equipment to MCMP’s project site in Tanay Rizal, evidenced
by Documents Acknowledgment Recipt No. 04667 and 5706, received by MCMP representatives
Jorge and Rose. During trial, Reynaldo, Monark’s representative, testified that there were two
original copies of the contract, one for MCMP and one for Monark; however, Monark’s copy was
lost and despite diligent efforts, cannot be located, hence he presented photocopy of the Contract
26
which he had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of the secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof, since there were no diligent efforts to locate it, but did not produce MCMP’s copy
of the contract despite a directive from the trial court to produce it. After trial, the RTC ruled in
favour of Monark, ordering MCMP to pay the balance of the rental fees inclusive of interest as well
as 25% attorney fees. MCMP appealed to the Court of Appeals when its motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC, but the appeal was also denied, hence it elevated its case
to the Supreme Court, on the issue of whether or not secondary evidence may be presented in
the absence of the original. It argues that the custodian of the original document was not
presented to prove its loss; its loss was not even reported to the police; it was only searched by
Monark for purposes of the instant case.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule.

HELD: No. “Petitioner’s contention is erroneous. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate
requiring the production of the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry,
is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:

“Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. — If the document is
in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.”

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements
before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document
whenever the original copy has been lost:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss
27
and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of
the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and
the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession
of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, “findings
of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.” Hence,
the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino. MCMP, to
note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into.
Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it
to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have
asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and
even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in
accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable
presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that
“evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”

23. WILGEN LOON ET AL. VS. POWER MASTER, INC.ET AL.

DOCTRINE: While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied
documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the
adverse party to present the original documents for inspection.

FACTS: Respondents employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various
PLDT offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims and illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter (LA) partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. Both
parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the NLRC. Six (6) months after filing their notice of appeal,
Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and
computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the
supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’
ATM cards. On the other hand, petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they
asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered
from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six
months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal. The
petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading
until December 18, 2002. Third¸ the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal
bore the petitioners’ forged signatures. NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized
payroll records ruled in favor of respondent. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’
signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. The CA affirmed
the NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence filed 6 months from notice of
appeal are admissible in evidence where there is an allegation of forgery by the adverse party.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is
not required in labor cases, the liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1)
a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should
28
sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Respondents, in this case, failed to
sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents’ photocopied and
computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a
serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the
evidence for purposes of appeal. While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative
value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. It
was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the
petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived
the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not
adducing the originals. Failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

24. THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO

G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

DOCTRINE: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

FACTS: Respondent spouses filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages against the
petitioners. Later on the complaint was amended to an action for recovery. Respondent alleged:
(1) that the disputed property was originally owned by Buenaseda; (2) had long been partitioned
between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila; and (3) that owned 1/3 of the portion of
Perfecto’s share by virtue of a deed of sale executed between them and one of Perfecto’s heir,
Pedro. While in their original answer, petitioner alleged that the subject property had already been
extra-judicially partitioned between the heirs of Vitaliano and Perfecto, they subsequently changed
their position when the complaint was amended. They now claimed that the property was not
partitioned with specific metes and bounds. What is cleared among the heirs is their respective
shares thereof. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA
found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their
presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the certified true copy of cadastral map and the
municipal assessor's records. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioners argued
that the cadastral map, which serves as the basis of the alleged partition, is inadmissible in
violation of the best evidence rule and hearsay rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is inadmissible in evidence on the
ground that it violates the best evidence rule and hearsay rule.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is
a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of
public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or

29
the record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers.

As to the Hearsay Rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries
in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records
made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his
duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

25. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MUPAS

DOCTRINE: Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving
the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under
the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.

FACTS: On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government - through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC)and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)- for the construction and
development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The
DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's
unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules

Paircargo consortium also submitted their competitive proposal to build the NAIA-IPT III

Both AEDC and Paircargo offered to build, however, Paircargo submitted a bid superior to AEDC’s
unsolicited proposal, thus DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO)

PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign corporations
organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO defaulted on its
obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s
payments until June 2003.

Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was
required to submit the original documents to the court, however PIATCO argues that his non-
submission is justified under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous
accounts.

30
ISSUE: w/n the non-submission of original documents is justified

RULING: The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission due to
numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under the rule. However, as a condition
precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a
proper foundation for the admission of the original documents on which the summary is based.
The proponent must prove that the source documents being summarized are also admissible if
presented in court.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under the best
evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be produced in court.

Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented in courts
are authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be admissible
as evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the project.

26. ORTAEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the contract, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing – unless there be fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Two parcels of lands were sold, private respondents received the payments, but failed to
deliver the titles to petitioner, petitioner demanded for the delivery of the titles, but the petitioners
refused, claiming that the first lot is in possession of another person, and the second lot is subject
to petitioners certain conditions. During trial, private respondent Oscar, a former judge, orally
testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such was not incorporated in
deed of sale. Petitioner objected on the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless admitted
them eventually. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parol evidence here in proferred is admissible.

RULING: No, under the general rule in Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms
of the agreement are reduced into writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
no evidence can be admitted other than the content thereof – such that whatever is not found in
the instrument is deemed waived and abandoned by the parties. Here, after examination of the
deed, the court cannot make an inference that the sale was subject to a condition. Thus, the
decision of CA shall be reversed and the case be remanded back to trial court for proper
disposition of the case. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the
contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing – unless there be fraud or
mistake.

27. LAPU-LAPU FOUNDATION AND ELIAS TAN VS CA AND ALLIED BANKING

31
DOCTRINE: Parol evidence is generally admissible to explain the meaning of a written contract, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating unto said contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned in the writing, unless there be fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Elias tan, president of Lapu-Lapu, obtained four loans covered with four promissory notes
from respondent Allied Banking, Obligation became due and the petitioners failed to pay the
same, Allied Banking was constrained to file a case of collection against the respondents, holding
Elise and Lapu-lapu solidarily liable.

However, in the foundation denied incurring the obligation, contending that the loan was
contracted by Tan on his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit, the foundation
maintained that it never authorized tan to co-sign in his capacity as President

Tan, admitted however, that the loans were actually in his personal capacity, and further alleging
that there was an oral agreement between Tan and an employee of allied bank, that the loans
shall be paid from Tan’s dividends on his shares of common stocks from the Foundation, and that
the loans were to be rolled-over every year at an amount including unpaid interest, until such time
it would be actually paid by Tan.

ISSUES: Whether or not the alleged oral agreement between Tan and an employee of allied
bank, is valid and enforceable

HELD: No, the court held that under Sec 9 of Rule 130 of the rules of court that [w]hen the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. That the promissory notes clearly
and explicitly contained maturity dates, that nowhere is it stated therin that they would be
renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner
Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement
could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.

Thus, while parol evidence is generally admissible to explain the meaning of a written contract, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating unto said contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned in the writing, unless there be fraud or mistake.

28. MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ

DOCTRINE: When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted
other than what is contained in the written agreement.

FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths (¾)
and one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan. In
September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her share to Benigna Llamas. When Benigna died, she willed her
share equally to her two sisters, Alejandra and Josefa. Alejandra’s heirs sold their predecessor’s
share to the respondent. Josefa sold her own to the respondent and the petitioner. The
respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject
property. The parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject property and
32
declared it in their name for taxation purposes. In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of
Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion
allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner
had already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title: one, TCT No. 195812 - covering
an area of 3,020 square meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of 1,004 square
meters (or a total of 4,024 square meters). The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of
Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-
square meter portion, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters
identified in the parties’ Agreement. The respondent contested the authenticity of the petitioner’s
documents. Particularly, the Benigna Deed by presenting Benigna’s death certificate. The
respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024
square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent
added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her three-fourths (¾) share in 1969
because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932. In his defense, the petitioner claimed
in signing the Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the parties’ rough estimation, that the
area he actually possessed is only 3,020 square meters contrary to the parties’ real intention - i.e.,
the extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the
petitioner’s titles despite the fact that the assailed Agreement does not contain the true intent of
the parties in accordance to the allegations of the petitioner. –

HELD: No. The petitioner’s argument calls for the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e.,
when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than
what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to
have been waived and abandoned. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of
Court allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the
parties. At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true
intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the
previously executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his
titles. It was the petitioner’s staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit
supposedly to reflect the parties’ true intention. In the present petition, however, the petitioner
made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering
the respondent’s cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of
fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna
Deed, the petitioner’s admission, coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported signature
in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of
the petitioner’s defense. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim that his actual possession determines
the extent of his ownership, it is the parties’ Agreement that defines the extent of their ownership
in the subject property. One of the legal effects of partition, whether by agreement among the co-
owners or by judicial proceeding, is to terminate the co-ownership and, consequently, to make the
previous co-owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted to him. While the CA
correctly nullified the petitioner’s certificates of title, the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of
the entire subject property in the respondent’s favor. The respondent himself admitted that the
3,020- square meter portion covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioner’s just share in the
33
subject property. Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using the same spurious
documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of the respondent
since he is not the rightful owner of the property covered by this title. WHEREFORE, the petition is
partially GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED.
Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to RECONVEY to the respondent the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 195813. Costs against petitioner.

29. SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

FACTS: Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and Kimwa is a construction firm
that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa
entered into a contract where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as
supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in
Toledo City at ₱240.00 per truckload.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after
this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages.

In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an
upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement
articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May
15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses
Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed
differently.

ISSUE: Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.

HELD: Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to
acquire from Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced into writing:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
34
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be
introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be
relevant, tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent
extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.

In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not
been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.

Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed
before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s
failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, Kimwa, through its Answer, also
responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional
case allowing admission of parol evidence.

It is true that petitioners’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as
"mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is
evident that the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement
"entered into on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the parties’ supposed
understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of Kimwa must be hauled by May
15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’
permitted area. The Special Permit’s condition (issued to Paras) that a total of only about 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia Paras from the permitted area
lends credence to the position that the aggregates "allotted" to respondent Kimwa was in
consideration of its corresponding commitment to haul all 40,000 cubic meters. This is so,
especially in light of the Agreement’s own statement that "the said Aggregates is for the exclusive
use of [respondent Kimwa.]"57 By allotting the entire 40,000 cubic meters, petitioner Lucia Paras
bound her entire business to respondent Kimwa. Rational human behavior dictates that she must
have done so with the corresponding assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not
ridiculous, of her to oblige herself to make this allotment without respondent Kimwa’s concomitant
undertaking that it would obtain the entire amount allotted.

Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from
November 14, 1994 lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras’ assertion that, in entering into
the Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so because of respondent
Kimwa's promise that hauling can be completed by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the
Special Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently clear to any party she was
transacting with that she could supply aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that the other
party's hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence, for
otherwise, any contract she would enter into would be negated; any commitment she would make
35
beyond May 15, 1995 would make her guilty of misrepresentation, and any prospective income for
her would be rendered illusory.

30. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM. PASIMIO

DOCTRINE: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be

considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and
their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
the writing.

FACTS: Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, she
alleged having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of
P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both investment placements have matured;
and when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to
oblige. PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to
insist on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been used in payment of her
outstanding loan obligations to the bank. PNB narrated how the set off of sort came about:
Pasimio and her husband took out three "loans against deposit hold-out" from the PNB Sucat
branch, as follows: Three Million One Hundred Thousand Peso (P3,100,000) loan on March 21,
2001; a One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Peso (P1,700,000) loan on April 2, 2001; and a
Thirty-One Thousand One Hundred US Dollar (US$31,1 00) loan on December 7, 2001. During the
trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone
receiving the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain documents which
turned out to be the Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory Notes
and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute and
the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan Documents), she professed not
understanding what they really meant. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents
in blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager and
Customer Relations Officer led her to believe that what she was signing were related to new high-
yielding PNB products. Pasimio would also deny re-lending the loan proceeds to Paolo Sun.

The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had
proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from PNB. As a
corollary, the trial court held that there was no evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan
proceeds to Pasimio. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint
for a sum of money.

HELD: In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's never having received any loan
proceeds, the CA doubtless disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the best
evidence of the transaction embodied therein; also, to prove the existence of the loan, there is no
need to submit a separate receipt to prove that the borrower received the loan proceeds. Indeed,
a promissory note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to
repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has
been held, a person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation
duly assumed by him through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he
reneges on his promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and
deserves instead its sharp repudiation.
36
The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear
and unequivocal manner in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow
the recitals of such instrument, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence is
necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud. Following this doctrine,
Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be
upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.

The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has
not questioned the genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes,
she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot
plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any loan, and receive the value of the
notes or any consideration therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these promissory notes.

But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the
existence of the loan. Here, each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan
application form and disclosure statement, all of which carried Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from
each other, these documents might not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken together,
collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and was
aware of their terms and conditions. Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms,
and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.

Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a
written document, except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a
written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the
existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to
overturn the written agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the
documents embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94079 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Ligaya M. Pasimio's complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0195 before the Regional Trial
Court of Paranaque City, Branch 196 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

31. HEIRS OF SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA

DOCTRINE: The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Just
because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the
fact in dispute.

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents before the
Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court. It alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and
37
actual possessor of the land. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
Francisco Comorposa, being a close family friend of Marcos, approached the late Saezs son,
Adolfo, to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. He occupied a portion of without paying any rental. He
was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are
occupying the premises through petitioner’s tolerance. On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was
made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and
claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor of the
premises. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents. The
Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither is
there error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the
affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self-serving.

HELD: Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses,
insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim
that the failure of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC
amounts to an admission by silence. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to
be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective
testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth
therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

32. TORRES VS. PAGCOR

DOCTRINE: A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the

functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence.

FACTS: Ellery March G. Torres was a slot machine operator supervisor for PAGCOR. Within the
period November 2066 to March 2007, there was a complaint filed before the office of the HR
department of the respondent for the involvement of Torres in the allege padding of the credit
meter reading of the slot machines. The investigation conducted affirmatively proved that Torres
was involved with the said crime. The administrative tribunal adjudge for the dismissal of Torres.
Torres filed a motion for reconsideration for the said judgment through facsimile transmission.
The Administrative tribunal denied such motion, affirmed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and further affirmed by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC erred in ruling that there was no valid letter reconsideration
submitted.

HELD: No. The mode used by the petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery. ”A facsimile is
38
not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by them party and his counsel. It
may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx” (Garvida vs Sales, Jr.) “We, therefore, conclude that the
terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an
original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.” (MCC
Industries Sales Corporation vs Ssangyong Corporation). Petition denied.

33. ANG V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when
a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads: On or about June 5, 2005, in the
Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and
reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a
pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the
latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was
said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. On
August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On
Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision dated January 31,
2008, affirming the RTC decision. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a
text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M.
01-7-01-SC). The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25,
2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in
the case.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. Rustan claims that the obscene
picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should
be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). However, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The objection is
too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection. Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings. In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every
element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

34. PEOPLE VS. ENOJAS

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DOCTRINE: Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions: To be admissible, text messages
are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them.

FACTS: The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police while parked suspiciously in
front of a glass shop. Enojas provided the police with identification that the officers suspected to
be fake. The officers then asked Enojas to accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed.
On the way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. The officer who went into the
store apprehended two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the officer. The other officer got out
of the car upon hearing the gunshots. Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled
the scene. Later, the police searched his abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They
monitored the messages on the phone and communicated with the other suspects, resulting in an
entrapment operation. Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in
2006 before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the conviction. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.

HELD:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that
meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of
the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction
of all the accused.

35. SYHUNLIONG VS. RIVERA

DOCTRINE: In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who
made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at
least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3)
the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.

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FACTS: Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in the
instant case. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF)
while Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation as Accounting Manager
of BANFF, effective on February 3, 2006 and continued working for BANFF until March of the same
year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas).
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining
salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but
the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by
Syhunliong. Hence, on April 6, 2006, Rivera sent libelous text message to one of BANFF's official
cellular phones held by Lumapas. Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th
to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund. On April 16, 2007 pending the
resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel,
and the public prosecutor finds probable cause to indict Rivera the crime of libel.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute the offense of libel?
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the
complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were
privileged communication?

RULING: There is no merit in the instant petition. Prescription had set in. Well settled rule in
statutory construction that the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes
emanates from the liberality of the State, any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of
the grantee thereof, the accused. As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right
to prosecute and punish the same. In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong
filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was
sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18,
2007, it would not alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period
provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. In relation thereto, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal liability.
Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the
libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas
falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication. The rule on privileged
communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which
the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a
person having a corresponding duty. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of
a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make
the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or
of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and
without malice. Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration
that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she
was speaking in response to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to injure
the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond
that of conveying it to the party concerned.

41
36. MARCOS VS HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO, 700 SCRA

DOCTRINE: As provided in Rules of Evidence, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses, and may only be disqualified if the
witness possesses any disqualifications specified under the rules.

FACTS: Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died, and left behind
several parcels of land including the subject lot located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The
spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia
Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are
the respondents herein. Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot based on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated
May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit
is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting
examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that
Andres, Sr.'s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of
the deed of donation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate.

After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that
the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no
notice was given to them before the examination was conducted.

Thus, PO2 Alvarez's report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and
irrelevant.

ISSUE: WON PO2 Alvarez is disqualified as a witness.

HELD: No. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the
Rules. Respondents' motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not
based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of
the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

42
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. She has the qualifications
of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion
of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an expert
witness. The value of PO2 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if PO2 Alvarez is not
even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.

37. PEOPLE VS GOLIMLIM

FACTS: Evelyn G. Canchela is a mental retardate. When her mother Amparo Hachero left for
Singapore to work, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her sister Jovita Guban and
the latter‘s husband appellant Salvador Golimlim. In August 1996, Jovita left the house to meet
someone, leaving Evelyn with Golimlim. Taking advantage of the situation, Golimlim instructed
Eveln to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he
poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her
vagina. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what Golimlim did to her. Jovita, however, did
not believe her. Lorna Hachero, Evelyn‘s half-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo
instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Quezon City. Dutifully,
Lorna immediately proceeded to Golimlim‘s home and brought Evelyn with her to Manila. A week
after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she
noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor for check-up and ultrasound
examination. The examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her
sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse
with her while holding a knife. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon convicted Golimlim of
the crime of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Was Evelyn disqualified to testify due to her retardation?

RULING: No. The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies, as has
repeatedly been held by the Supreme Court, is accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real
and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. In the present case, no cogent
reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect
to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her
as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth. It can not then be gainsaid that a mental
retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his
or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. Thus, in a long line of cases, the
Supreme Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in
court by the victim who was a mental retardate. And from a meticulous scrutiny of the records of
this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility.

38. ALVAREZ VS. RAMIREZ

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FACTS: Susan Ramirez filled an information for arson against herein petitioner Maximo Alvarez.
According to Susan, herein petitioner tried to burn down her house while she and her sister,
Esperanza Alvarez was still inside the said house. Esperanza Alvarez was the estranged wife of
herein petitioner, Maximo Alvarez. During the trial for the criminal case, complainant presented
Esperanza Alvarez as witness; this prompted the accused Maximo to object, alleging that it is in
violation of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court with respect to marital disqualification. Complainant
Susan Ramirez filed an opposition upon the objection of the accused. The trial court ordered the
testimony of Esperanza to be deleted from the records and that it was in violation of the aforesaid
rule. Complainant filed for a motion for reconsideration, but was subsequently denied, such order
prompted complainant to file a certiorari under Rule 65 upon the CA. The CA set aside the order
of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Was Esperanza’s testimony against her husband admissible in evidence?

RULING: Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or
ascendants. The reasons given for the rule are as follows, to wit:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.

The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. In
the case at bar, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact,
they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and
facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is
no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

39. PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

FACTS: On the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents. Benjamin forged the signature of Victoria in a deed of sale executed by the accused
wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership, making it appear that
Victoria consented to the sale thereof, when in fact she had not. The prosecution called the
complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness,
invoking the marital disqualification rule. The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the
ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband. A

44
motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Was Victoria disqualified from testifying?

RULING: No. It is undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally
lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in
connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security
and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to
apply the martial disqualification rule.

40. RAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: In Dead Man’s Statute, the rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim
against the estate of the deceased person.

FACTS: The petition centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered
by Stock Certificate No. 003, registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the
corporation. The RTC declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner, is the owner of the said shares
of stock. The CA however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the
deceased father of defendant Vicente B. Chuidian, is the owner of the shares of stock. Enrique
Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while
Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to
the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. Petitioner Razon assails the appellate
court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a)
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to
the instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “dead man’s satute” is applicable in this case.

HELD: No. The rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the
deceased person. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the
defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private
respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant
agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually
owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case

45
was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the
estate.

41. SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHUA

DOCTRINE: The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.

FACTS: Respondent Chua alleged that he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane LPG in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly
agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER
under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife,
petitioner Cecilia and his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations of Shellite without
respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting of
Jacinto’s net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Thus, respondent filed a case
against petitioners. Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until
Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between
respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the
testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years
after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or
"Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not
have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented
by petitioners.

HELD: No. The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the
trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this
case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple
reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
46
"assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor
of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

42. BORDALBA VS. CA

DOCTRINE: The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

FACTS: Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a
part of a land owned by her late parents; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an
extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is
occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission. Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion
Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition contending that said application included the 1/3 portion
inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the
Bureau of Lands of Cebu City, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of
the aborted application of her mother.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent, private
respondents filed with the RTC the instant complaint against petitioners praying that he Free
Patent No be declared void. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in
obtaining Free Patent declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. Petitioner
filed the instant petition, contending that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private
respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have
been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies given by the witnesses violated the dead man’s statute.

HELD: No. As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said rule
finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the
mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than
through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to
the witness. Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the
present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other
documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned
testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

43. CHAN VS. CHAN

FACTS: On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Johnny Chan. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family
due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Johnny resisted the action,
claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. He agreed for marriage counseling
but suddenly two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection on their
way to the hospital. Eventually, the marriage relations had gotten worse. During the pre-trial
conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as
47
proof of his forcible confinement. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny
suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.” On August 22, 2006 Josielene motioned for
a subpoena duces tecum to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was
confined. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. RTC sustained the opposition. CA likewise sustained the opposition
reasoning that if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be
left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians
would be kept confidential.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered
by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

RULING: The RTC and CA is correct on denying the motion. SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason
of privileged communication provides:

The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended
to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment
and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to
come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the
latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

Josielene claims that the hospital records are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of
the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but
only the examination of the physician at the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that to allow the
disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records, the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible because it is without the patient’s
consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on
privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

Josielene again argued that since Johnny attached in his answer the Philhealth claim form
covering his confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its
records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party,
48
the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled that such argument is premature as trial in the case had not yet begun.
It cannot be said that Johnny already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence. Johnny was
not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. He attached the
Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.

44. JUDGE LACUROM VS. ATTYS. JACOBA & VELASCO-JACOBA

FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a
civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos. The
MTC of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the
RTC. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. On 29
June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor
of Veneracion.

On July 30, 2001, the plaintiffs’ consuel filed a Motion for reconsideration with request for
inhibition containing the words and phrases; abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial
process, which are in utter disprespect to the court. On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered
Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of
court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
In her Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared
the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively
participate in this case. Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for
whatever mistake committed and agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off
the record.

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. Velasco-

Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba stopped her and said (“Sign this as it is due today, or it might
not be filed on time.”) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind
faith on her husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future. This
pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign
because of his then suspension from the practice of law.

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Atty. Jacoba to
explain why he should not be held in contempt. Atty. Jacoba filed his answer with another Motion
for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against
Velasco-Jacobas’ statements implicating him, Atty. Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the statement of Atty. Velasco-Jacobas’ statement is covered by the Martial
privilege rule.

RULING: Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because
of her husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice
49
of signing each others’ pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According
to Velasco-Jacoba, so implicit is their trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through
the years, she already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other. By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This
violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to
disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001
motion.

We now consider the evidence as regards Atty. Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July
2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the
author of the motion. The Court cannot easily let Atty. Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer
with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes’ account. Instead, Atty.
Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns and fired at
the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Atty. Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
Hence, the statement is not covered due to its implied consent.

45. SAMALA VS. ATTY. VALENCIA

FACTS: On May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala filed a disbarment case against Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for
contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence;
(c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a
reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. After Atty. Valencia’s filed comment, the
Supreme Court, in its Resolution referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. The investigation was conducted by Commissioner
Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda and the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. Commissioner Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation,
the Court found Atty. Valencia guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Valencia violated Section 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties.

RULING: Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, it provides that
a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client. He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent
antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. An attorney owes
loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation
of attorney and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes
an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client’s adversary either in the
50
same case or in a different but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared
for the former client. Further, Under Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, it states
that a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the
facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as
well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. It is
evident that Atty. Valencia’s representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of
interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Thus, Atty. Valencia is guilty of
misconduct suspending him in the practice of law for three years.

46. ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces
tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988"
and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman. [Claim: The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is
manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency
Intelligence Agents" (EIA).] To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it
does not concern a demand by a citizen for information under the freedom of information
guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to
obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-Government. There are
several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the question
whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the
documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to
its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations,
movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the
EIIB." Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum
nor the relevancy or materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending
investigation in the Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the
Government's claim of privilege.

HELD: In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
51
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations. Nor has our attention been
called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their
contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the
"only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the
"purchase of information and payment of rewards."

The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the
documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate
the confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to
account for its funds to the proper authorities. The need for the documents thus outweighs the
claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there might have been compelling
reasons for the claim ofprivilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years
later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose
identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the
covert missions to which they might have been deployed might either have been accomplished or
abandoned.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988
unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and put to
illegal use, remains. Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively
privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their
nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be
sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case
should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the
extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
protection of the documents delivered.

47. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well
as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate
the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the
committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in
the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
52
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the president’s approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with
only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of
the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to
or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be
very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to
inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries
in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore,
while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President
on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
53
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited
as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article
VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary
on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary .When Congress merely seeks to be
informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid
of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

48. ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ONACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in
one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular,
he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) Whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) Whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for
his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464
(advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
54
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate vs. Ermita when they are invited
to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several
jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power
presidential.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the
bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered
a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them
at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he
was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to
answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim
of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or

55
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

49. OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO AND CASIMIRA MATURINGAN VS.

HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO, REPRESENTED BY LAQUINDANUM, PEDRO JR., ASUNCION

DOCTRINE: Judicial Admissions - Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of
the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting
the issues to be tried. As contemplated in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general
rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation
of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.

FACTS: This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which
needed to be proportionally subdivided among heirs. Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors
of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered
parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration 208143 consisting of 240
square meters situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was
survived by his six (6) children. On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)
and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr.
filed a complaint5against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira
Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as
“Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” dated 10 August 1992,6 Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022
(02653)7 and 96-10022 (02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name
of Pedro Sr. In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998,
petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sqm.) owned by
the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. The
issuance of the new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated
and fictitious document denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,” wherein the
petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, respondents
sought to annul the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” as well as the Tax Declarations that
were issued on the basis of such document. On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was
conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as well as identification of
the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 October 2003, the RTC
rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding that they are in pari delicto, whereby
the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. Not convinced, the
respondents appealed the aforequoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising, among
others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of “in pari delicto” in declaring
the validity of the document “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.” In its 31 May 2007
Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the
“Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” dated 5 December 1968 they executed covering the 192
sqm. lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Thus, the CA
went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto
themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the
document entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968 pertains to a
different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is erroneous for the

56
trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.

ISSUE: The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure
of the CA to appreciate the existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring
the propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine.

RULING: Yes. The CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents
during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No.
9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr. The respondent's admissions against
respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. 9534, which was transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr.
Such that, in one of the issues submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included:
“Whether or not the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” is enforceable against the
plaintiffs, thus curing the legal infirmities, if any, of the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” an
issue earlier mentioned. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of
the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting
the issues to be tried. As contemplated in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general
rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation
of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.
While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion Laquindanum,
when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was
acquired by Pedro Jr. Consequently, respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on
which they based their right over the property subject matter thereof. In light of the foregoing,
while both parties acted in violation of the law. Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the
circumvention of the laws as contemplated by the parties in the instant case, we must declare
both contracts as void. Indeed, any circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.

50. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY OR DODO

DOCTRINE: Circumstantial Evidence - Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court,
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

FACTS: That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality
of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, the accused, Rolendo “Lendoy” Gaudiaby had
carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will. That said incident transpired
when Remelyn was left with her younger sister in their house situated in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del
Sur, as their parents gather pigs food at Bulatukan. As Remelyn's mother, Amalia came back
home, she noticed that the former was nowhere to be seen. Thereafter, Amelia tried to locate
57
Remelyn within the vicinity of their neighborhood. As Amelia called for her daugther, she then
heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil-ipiltrees. Amalia rushed
toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their
house. She found Remelyn crying, naked, (walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and
dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private
organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a
whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns private organ. It was later discovered that
Remelyn was raped. Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the
appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn. At this point, the parents the accused told Amalia,
Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of
P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed. Police officers came and brought Amalia,
Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalias statement was taken. On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit
complaint. Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had told her “ Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos” .
(Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony
that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to
the ipil-ipil trees. The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a
barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and
his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. Mik saw appellant
carrying a small girl in his arms. He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia
Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees. The appellant,
ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about
4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections.
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution and by which the trial
court based its decision is sufficient to convict the accused-appellant for the crime of rape beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING: Yes. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based
on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The first circumstantial evidence against
the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March
1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters
from her house. As a neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity
with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim
is nil. The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn
emerged naked from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn
58
was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyns private organ was bleeding and
excreting a white mucus-like substance. The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is
Remelyns statement to her mother that it was appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove
and forced her to do something against her will. There is no question that Remelyn was violated.
After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found
her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal lacerations. From these, the culpability of
the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned circumstances have
been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.

51. CONRADO C. DOLDOL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: An offer of compromise in criminal cases . Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court-
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt. We hold that said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction
with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer
of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he
embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

FACTS: The Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, Conrado C. Doldol was charged with
two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-
2760, following his unlawful use and benefit of the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE PESOS and 54/100 (P1,134,421.54), as
discovered by a team of State Auditors led by State Auditor Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors
Lydia Naoe and Beverly T. Cruz as members following an audit of the cash account of the
accused. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P1,134,421.54.
Consequently, the State Auditors demanded the immediate refund of the said amount, and for
Doldol to submit within 72 hours a written explanation on the said shortage. Doldol failed to
respond and was, thereafter, relieved of his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was directed to transfer
the account to Assistant Municipal Treasurer Loida Cancino. The State Auditors then conducted
another audit of the said account, this time covering the another period. They discovered that
Doldol incurred an added cash shortage of P149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol dated July 27, 1995,
the State Auditors demanded the immediate restitution of the missing fund, and directed him to
submit within 72 hours a written explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol failed
to respond. On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be
conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors.
Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On
September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was
issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as
follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995.
However, he reneged on his promise. Two informations for malversation of public funds were then
filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. Thereafter, he was found
guilty of the crime charge against him. On appeal, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
appealed decision, and, likewise, denied Doldol's motion for reconsideration thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the offer of refund of the missing funds by the accused is an implied admission
59
of his guilt to the crime of malversation of public funds.

RULING: Yes. Following the audit conducted, the State Auditors demanded that the petitioner
immediately produce the missing funds. He was also required to submit within 72 hours a written
explanation why the shortage occurred. However, the petitioner failed to respond to such
demand, and failed to object to the findings and conclusions of the State Auditors.

The petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove that the missing funds were
actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner could have offered in
evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of the cash
advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to
refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or
before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only
P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial
restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of
the missing funds.

With respect to the balance of the missing funds, appellant promised to pay the same in
installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking. Said payment is of no
moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as guided
by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment, particularly when
taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing
funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's
guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

52. LADIANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood all of it.
An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its
substance.

FACTS: The crime committed was Robbery with Homicide. The accused are Antonio Manuel Uy
and Ricky Ladiana. That on or about the 27th day of June 2001, in Pasay City, upon conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away
the following jewelry belonging to Jeepney Shopping Center. In the same evening, appellant and
Ricky went to the house of Eduardo dela Cruz in Antipolo. Ricky told Eduardo that they were in
trouble and asked him to accompany appellant to the house of Panfilo dela Cruz in Zambales.
Ricky told Eduardo that appellant will be staying in Zambales for two to three days. Eduardo
acceded to such request. While waiting for a bus going to Zambales, they drank coffee in a nearby
store. During their conversation, Eduardo asked appellant what happened. Antonio confessed to
Eduardo that he and Ricky entered a place in Pasay City and they killed two persons and seriously
wounded another whom they left fighting for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault
which contained money and that if "he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will
live comfortably”. After a week, Eduardo went to SPO3 Rodrigo Urbina of the PNP Regional Mobile
Patrol Group. Eduardo told SPO3 Urbina what was confessed to him by appellant and that he
brought appellant to Zambales. SPO3 Urbano coordinated with the Pasay City Police Station,
Crime Investigation Division, for appellant's arrest. The joint team of the Regional Mobile Patrol
60
Group, the Pasay City Police Station and the Palauig Police Station arrested appellant in the house
of Panfilo in Zambales. Antonio was frisked and a cross pendant was recovered from his pocket.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession to Eduardo Dela Cruz was sufficient to convict of the
crime.

RULING: Antonio's confession to Eduardo, who is not a police officer, is admissible in evidence.
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. Appellant's admissions are not
covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, because they were not
extracted while he was under custodial investigation. The rule is that any person, otherwise
competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of
what he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in
such case it must be given in its substance.

53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ULIT

DOCTRINE: It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-
examination. The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not
subject to the test which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony,
since the declarant is not present and available for cross-examination.

FACTS: The crimes committed were 2 counts of rape and 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness. The
accused was Feliciano Ulit, the uncle of the victim. When the prosecution offered in evidence the
appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay before the barangay chairman as part of the testimony of
Barangay Tanod Fernando David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the
appellant was not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same.
Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement as part of David’s testimony. The appellants
counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of victim’s sworn statement on the ground that she
was incompetent to give the same because of her mental illness. The trial court admitted the
sworn statement of victim in evidence as part of her testimony.

ISSUE: Whether the Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant Raped the
Victim.

RULING: We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996.
The victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on
clarificatory questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in November
1996.

We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of
Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her
signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its
value solely from the credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on
the veracity and competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the
information. It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-
61
examination. The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not
subject to the test which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony,
since the declarant is not present and available for cross-examination.

In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional
provision while the accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness
testifying against him. Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the
truth of the contents thereof are hearsay evidence. Such affidavit must be formally offered in
evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court for the
simple reason that the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and accepted.

In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement
which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the
appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-examined by the appellants
counsel and answered the trial courts clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn
statement as part of her testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without
objection on the part of the appellant.

54. PEOPLE VS. SAYABOC

DOCTRINE: The failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation
renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.

FACTS: The crime committed in this case was murder. The trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death; and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. The accused
attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. SPO4
Cagungao was called to to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters
he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought
Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the
latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have a counsel of his
own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a
lawyer. The police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with
Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, okay, he continued the investigation,
during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would stop
questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. That night
Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing
Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and
attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson. The appellant argues that the extrajudicial confession
may not be admitted in evidence against him because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during
the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He
was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not
independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding
court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

62
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession
of accused Sayaboc when it was taken without the assistance of not competent and independent
nor by effective and vigilant counsel.

RULING: Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him, since it was
made after he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights. Jurisprudence provides
that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption,
however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding
an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially
when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced.

The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in
custodial investigations.

Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant
did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform
a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible. The Court likewise ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a
competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo
was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution
witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the
custodial investigation. The Court held, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden
of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.

55. TANENGGEE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary
is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.

FACTS: Five separate Information for Estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
filed against petitioner. After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision dated June
25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged. Petitioner appealed the judgment of
conviction to the CA. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming with
modification the RTC Decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its
September 6, 2007 Resolution. The petitioner admits signing a written statement, however, he
refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same
without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his
rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent,
right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have
been admitted in evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is
just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation. Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
63
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed
to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been
executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein
attest to its voluntariness.

56. MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS Y ILAGAN VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made,

constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane
person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of
a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case.

FACTS: An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner,
Salazar, and Carpon. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
unlawfully deprived Cebuana of cash/money when she took out pawned items and released them
to redeeming pledgors in exchange for redemption payments which she, however, did not
turnover to the pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain. She gravely abused the
confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when she exploited her
exclusive and unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her position entailed a
high degree of confidence reposed by Cebuana as she had been granted daily unsupervised
access to the vault. Also, the petitioner knew the combinations of the branch’s vault and nobody
was allowed to enter the vault without her presence. Without the authority and consent of her
employer, she repeatedly took and appropriated for herself the redemption payments paid for the
pawned items with the aggregate appraised value of ₱414,050.00. The accused submitted pawn
tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective
pledgors. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that
portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

HELD: Yes. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made,
constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane
person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of
a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case. The
language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could
only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative
case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really
commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere
prospect of losing his/her job. The petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully
understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan
came to the Old Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an
administrative sanction.

57. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MERCY SANTOS Y ENTIENZA

64
DOCTRINE: A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows
that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution.

FACTS: Charmaine Mamaril, a kindergarten pupil, was brought to school, the Kaligayahan
Elementary School, in Novaliches, Quezon City by her mother, Raquel Mamaril, at noontime on
March 8, 1993. Raquel left Charmaine in her classroom with her classmates but stayed awhile,
going home only after 12:30 p.m. She would be going back for Charmaine, according to her daily
routine, at 2:00 p.m. When she returned to fetch Charmaine before 2:30 p.m., Charmaine’s
teacher Ms. Grace Lucena, met and asked her if the child had already reached home; Raquel
replied that Charmaine did not know the way home. She then looked for her child in school until
someone informed her that a woman had earlier fetched her daughter. She immediately reported
the matter to the police authorities stationed in Novaliches at around 3:00 p.m. and then to the
National Bureau of Investigations the next day; she also approached radio and television stations
for help. She and her family conducted their own search from then until her daughter was finally
found on March 13, 1993. Raquel recounted how her child was recovered. According to her, a
police sergeant came to her house on March 13, 1993 and asked for her; he told her to contact
Kagawad Aida Bautista of Sto. Domingo. When contacted, Bautista informed her that a child
named Charmaine was with her; Raquel immediately went to Bautista with some identification
papers of Charmaine, and the child was turned over to her after showing the birth certificate. This
occurred on a Saturday. Although Charmaine’s kidnapper was not immediately caught, the matter
did not end with the return of Charmaine to her family’s bosom. Two days later, on Monday,
Bautista telephoned Raquel to tell her that the woman, a certain Mercy Santos, had returned to
her place to claim Charmaine. Raquel wasted no time notifying NBI Agent Roel Jovenir, who, in
turn and with other NBI agents, accompanied by Raquel and her husband, proceeded to Bautista’s
place and arrested Santos. Following the arrest of Santos, the kidnapping was investigated at the
NBI office, where Raquel gave her written statement she admitted the kidnapping; that during the
investigation by question and answer, Atty. Uy would raise objections by cautioning Santos
against answering, in which case the objection and the question objected to were not anymore
typed in the statement; and that photographs were taken of Charmaine and the accused during
the confrontation.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

HELD: No. A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows
that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III
thereof, provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely -- without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false
65
promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind. A
confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order because no
person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime
unless prompted by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold
objectivity of the exclusionary rule. Consequently, the burden of evidence to show that it was
obtained through undue pressure, threat or intimidation shifts to the accused. The trial court erred
in admitting appellants extrajudicial confession without showing that Atty. Gordon Uy was indeed
the competent and independent counsel of appellants own choosing. The Court notes appellants
insistent and persistent disavowals of knowing said Atty. Uy, much less of retaining him as her
counsel of choice. The prosecution, for unexplained reasons, failed to present Uy as a witness to
show his role in the taking of the alleged confession.

58. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFREDO NARDO Y ROSALES

FACTS: Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution presented the
victim as its main witness, while, the defense presented a number of witnesses who testified to
different occasion for which the victim was caught lying.
After the trial, trial court, giving credence to the testimony of the victim, convicted the accused.
On appeal, the accused presented series of letters allegedly written by the victim to the defense
counsel asking said counsel to help her father be acquitted.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies on a
number of occasion.
(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is contrary to
testimony made in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony.

HELD:
(1) The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that:
"Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn,
assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious
as charging one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Furthermore, as a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be
disturbed, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly, jurisprudence
dictates that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman,
more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

(2) An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before
a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings
at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Recantations are frowned upon by the courts because
they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after
the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration.
66
59. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.

FACTS: Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the said
application, Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation to the Bureau of Lands.
Less than 3 months after the application, free patent was issued. Sometime in April 1979, the
heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an investigation for irregularities in the issuance of the
title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special
Investigator, submitted his Report. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not
actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Thereafter,
government instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion
against respondent. Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In reversing the RTC, CA brushed
aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not
conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission of a third person
who was not presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence for being a hearsay.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person — the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may
then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged
admission may be considered as "independently relevant." Thus, because Cartagena took the
witness stand and opened himself to cross- examination, the Investigation Report he had
submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions
of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered
as independently relevant. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on
the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence,
properly admitted by the trial court.

60. ANNA LERIMA PATULA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlocker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa
for failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company
where misappropriated by the accused, submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the
ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the
receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by
Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in
the documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground
that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because
the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
67
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by
another person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence.

HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth
of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her
as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information. The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from
whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to
be examined and cross-examined. Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only
when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross- examination. However, if an
extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant
was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in
character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony
intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e., Misappropriation on the part of the accused through
documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal knowledge, the same is inadmissible
for being a hearsay evidence.

61. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SONNY GATARIN Y CABALLERO ALYAS "JAY-R"
AND EDUARDO QUISAYAS

DOCTRINE: A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.
68
FACTS: On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way
home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion,
Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that
the accused ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing
their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were
running at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer
prompting the policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching
them and when it became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling
the area. There they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely
injured, the policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the
Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He
answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the
appellant herein, while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large. At the Zigzag Hospital,
Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds
caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually caused his death. CA
affirmed RTC decision hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is admissible evidence.

HELD: No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the
declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it
is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived;
and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From
the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on
death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a
dying declaration.

However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

62. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE”

69
DOCTRINE: A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.

FACTS: At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old
grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City.
PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching
television when four (4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open
door of SPO2 Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a
meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could
not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.

PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to
the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3
Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -who
shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who
followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died
due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.

The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and
his companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive identification of the
eyewitnesses to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him
constituted an ante mortemstatement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as
evidence against Palanas. It further opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre's killing as he had
no inkling that the attack would take place, and that he was in no position to mount any feasible
defense.12 The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident premeditation because of the absence of
the following elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; ( b) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and ( c) a sufficient lapse of
time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.

CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification increasing amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2
Borre to F75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

70
ISSUE: Whether Palanas's conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the basis of
Dying declaration And as part of the res gestae.

HELD: Yes. For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four
(4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious of his impending death; ( c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim. On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res
gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: ( a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they
pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number
and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a
fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced
and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems
this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by
an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res
gestae. "Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation
or purpose to manufacture testimony." In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling
occurrence, i. e., him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital,
SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of
SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

63. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE

DOCTRINE: Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or

unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was
at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

71
FACTS: That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating together and helping
one another, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking
liquor with his friends as Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away
using the PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said
Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will. A plea of not guilty having been entered by
Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.2 On the
other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense. On December 10, 1993, the court a quo
rendered judgment5 finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita
Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral suffering." Bernal assails
the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly illusory
testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the application of Declaration against interest is correct and to merit accused
conviction.

RULING: Yes. With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same
was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true."

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.

64. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON AND RENE R. DEZOLLER VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
TEODORA DOMINGO

DOCTRINE: The conditions for the admission of declarations about pedigree under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, are the following: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

General Rule: Where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant—not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate—the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself, but this
requirement does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not

72
merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the
family.

FACTS: The case involves an action for reconveyance filed by petitioners against private
respondent over a parcel of land with a house and apartment and which was originally owned by
the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon
Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners’ father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioner’s father, Hermogenes, died hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute.
Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo. Martin Guerrero died and
subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners filiation to their father and their aunt,
to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora
and Hermogenes; death certificates; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; several joint affidavits executed by third persons; and the marriage certificate of
Martin and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written
offer of these exhibits to which a Comment was filed by herein private respondent.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the ground that
petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in
accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is
self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof
required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the
alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavits certifying to the
date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the
affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family
picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish
filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

RULING: We find for petitioners. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the
effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
73
that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2)
that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was
made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for
analysis is the third element. American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to
when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other
declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde.

The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration
itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that
there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply
where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the
general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part
of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the
reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving
such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an
absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the
decedent’s declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece
and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, where the subject of the
declaration is the declarants own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a
foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is
offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.

Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For
while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on
their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by
reason of private respondents failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they
were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when
an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated
as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

Accordingly, the documents offered in evidence can be deemed to have sufficiently established
the relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule
that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is
required. Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the
fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the
74
surname Dezoller. The petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject
property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

65. FRANCISCO L. JISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MONINA JISON

DOCTRINE: The enumeration contained in the second portion of Rule 130, Section 40, in light of
the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as “family
possessions,” or those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. It is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not
the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish
pedigree.

FACTS: In a complaint filed with the RTC, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to
a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle,
Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child
of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave
her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a
certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her
illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.

In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza
Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early
as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA,
expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO
contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was
barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and
an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to documentary evidence
presented by the private respondent as evidence of filiation considering that the same are
hearsay, self-serving and cannot bind the petitioner under the basic rules of evidence.

RULING: The court finds merit against the probative value of some of MONINA’s documentary
evidence. The various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives allegedly attesting to
MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the
contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-
authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question. As to the admissibility of these
documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further elaboration. Rule 130,
Section 40, provides:

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. - The reputation or tradition existing
in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may
be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
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rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring
supplied)

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in
question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the
section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether the
various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause “and the like” as qualified by the preceding phrase entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in
light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family
possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well
known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation
or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

Plainly then, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, as private documents
not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation, it having been observed that:

The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx Thus matters of pedigree may
be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common
reputation in the community.

Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs
relatives, inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part
of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as
his daughter.

66. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR
MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRAN ALVIR

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. Considering that the statements of
the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible
as evidence given in res gestae.

FACTS: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of
the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
76
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information for murder
was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, with the Regional Trial Court. A
separate information were also filed against them for the attempted murder and another for
frustrated murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible.

RULING: Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in
this case. According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene,
he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since
they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae. As a general rule, "a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony
are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several
exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:

Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.

In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that a declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. x x x

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony. There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating
lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the
bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as
evidence given in res gestae.

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In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human
experience”:

x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of
reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened.
Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all
aspects because different persons have different impressions and recollections of the same
incident. x x x

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different
points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that
the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked. When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become
merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore,
must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

67. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. “BERTING”

GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, AND RICKY VILLARICO

FACTS: On or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 o’clock in the morning at Barangay Bolinsong,
Municipality of Bonifacio, Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with a short
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot
HAIDE CAGATAN at the back penetrating through the neck which caused the instant death of said
victim and that he had no chance to avoid or defend himself from the attack. The RTC accorded
faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution’s witnesses, and disbelieved
their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical improbability for them to be at the
crime scene, for the distances between the crime scene and the places where the accused
allegedly were at the time of the commission of the crime were shown to range from only 100 to
700 meters.17 The RTC found, however, that the Prosecution was not able to prove treachery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in convictine the accused-appellants of murder despite of
failure of the prosecution to prove the identity of the assailant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: The term res gestae refers to “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of
a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act”. In a general way,
res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
78
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an
utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

68. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NORMAN PALARCA Y MERCADO ALIAS “BONG”

FACTS: At the time of the incident, private complainant Concepcion C. Javier, was a 70 year old
widow who personally tended her 24-hour sari-sari store located at 101 Rosal Street, Alido Heights
Subdivision, Bulacan. She was suffering from recurrent insomnia, thus, she regularly took sleeping
pills to ward off her sleeping problem. Twenty-eight year old accused-appellant, single, was then
working as a keyboardist and sequencer of an establishment that produces “minus one” music. He
was a resident of the same subdivision and a frequent buyer at private complainant’s store during
the wee hours of the morning. Suddenly, accused-appellant entered through the kitchen door. He
swiftly darted towards private complainant; shoved her on the forehead and pushed her against
the kitchen counter. When she attempted to run, he grabbed her arm and punched her twice on
the abdomen, causing her to fall to the ground. Though private complainant was reeling from the
physical assault as well as from the effects of the sleeping pill, she felt accused-appellant raise her
duster and remove her underwear. She saw him unzip his pants and pull down his briefs. Then,
accused-appellant forced her legs open and raped her. She felt pain and bled, but she could do
nothing as she was feeling very weak. Moments later, accused-appellant put on his pants and
pointed the blood on the floor to private complainant. After accused-appellant left, private
complainant struggled to get up and wiped the blood on the floor. Then, she proceeded to the
bedroom where one of her daughters, Teresa, was sleeping. Teresa woke up and saw the
bloodied underwear of her mother. Private complainant told her that she was raped by accused-
appellant but failed to give the details as she dozed off to sleep. The following day, May 20, 1998,
private complainant submitted herself for physical examination at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of accused-
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: At any rate, private complainant’s thorough narration of the rape incident on the witness
stand, which remained firm and consistent under exhaustive cross-examination by the defense,
convinces us that she was indeed raped. It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed. It is hard to believe that a 70-year old woman who was not shown to have any
grudge against accused-appellant would concoct a humiliating rape story and spend the remaining
days of her life in sending a man to prison if her motive was not to avenge her honor and have
her ravisher punished. Bolstered by the medical findings showing that private complainant
sustained multiple abrasions on the vaginal wall, as well as bruises on the abdomen and right arm
which confirmed that she was indeed boxed and grabbed by accused- appellant, we see no reason
to doubt her testimony.

69. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA
79
ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA

FACTS: Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipa
Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight
No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25
p.m. The tickets were bought sometime in August 1985. Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that
they went to the check- in counter of the defendant’s Naga branch at least one (1) hour before
the published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure,
but upon checking-in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their
tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila
by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees for breach of contract
of carriage. Defendant disclaims any liability, claiming that the non- accommodation of plaintiffs
on said flight was due to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is averred that even if
defendant is found liable to the plaintiffs such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB
Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with P.D. 589. The trial court rendered judgment
finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in bumping-off the plaintiffs from its
F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to pay the plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga
City to Manila.

HELD: Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove
his affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to
support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is
more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. In the absence of any controverting
evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL’s witnesses
are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private
respondents, exhs. “1”-“4”(with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage
regarding check-in time as well as on the notation „late 4:02‰ stamped on the flight coupon by
the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger
Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. “5” (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and
the private respondents) are entries made in the regular course of business which the private
respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection.

70. RUDY LAO VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.

FACTS: Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was
insured with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc to cover any damages that might be caused
to his goods. While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24,
1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate
No. FBS-917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured
truck and was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be
around P110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the

80
accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less. Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company
for the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the
ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the
insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident.
Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter. He contends
that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the
investigating policeman himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who
was driving the insured vehicle. Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony were
of dubious nature. Both trial and appellate courts noted that the report was made three days after
the accident and did not form part of the official police records.

ISSUE: Whether or not the police blotter is admissible as evidence.

RULING: The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it
was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information. The police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of
official records. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty
especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police
blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence
of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police
blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that
Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v.
Mejia, where we said that entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or
probative value, since the Court there found that the entries in question are sadly wanting in
material particulars.

Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The
person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as
correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the
investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to
him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of
names.

71. MEYNARDO SABILI VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORENCIO LIBREA

FACTS: Petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein
that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010
elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member
representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position
of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4 th District of Batangas includes Lipa
City. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he
and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,
Batangas. Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
81
Grounds for Disqualification, against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC).
Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent
alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise
failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already
been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010
local elections. Private respondents evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) Certificates
regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and Certification (common
exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in previous elections; (3) Certifications regarding
petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents. While for petitioners evidence
shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for
the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3)
Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous
property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum
from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification and
find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary
public, Honrades Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled
to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose

Cooperative, Inc., we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in
official records to be admissible in evidence:(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by
him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to keep
an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay. Regarding the second requisite, we have
explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, that it is the business of a punong
barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third requisite,
the Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to
be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting
the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades Certification on the sole ground that it was
initially not notarized.

72. SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON VS. VICENTE

CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND
VIOLETA C. BINADAS,

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FACTS: Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya)
claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who
were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners
presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente
church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required
by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO).
Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which
should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document,
petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should
be excluded from the requirement of authentication. In their Answer, respondents alleged that
they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as
evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal.
In their Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and
the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto
make it a public document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private
document which tends to prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the
veracity of the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the
local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of
Ligaya on file with said office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the
fact of marriage.

RULING: Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom
its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her
mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its
execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is
illiterate. While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now
argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still
has no merit.

Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that:

1) is more than 30 years old;
2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.

The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years
old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration. The marriage contract however
does not meet the second requirement. Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if
they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is
proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case
are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly
and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.

73. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, LEONARDO

QUISUMBIN AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION.
83
DOCTRINE: Statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein.

FACTS: On 27 January 1999, the Court granted a petition and orders the public respondent are
set aside. The parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the
terms and conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors orders of
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement
fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of
the legal personality of the Meralco retirement fund. It was noted that the respondent labor union,
MERALCO Employees and Workers Association’s request for increases in benefits including salaries
and wages were based on the Asia Capital report.

ISSUE: Whether information published in the Asia report can be relied and can be received as
evidence.

HELD: No. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides: "Commercial lists and the like. -
Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth
of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." Under the afore-quoted
rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by
them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere
newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which
carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen
generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented
that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is
generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these
reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not
admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere
analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report
in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.

74. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE

DOCTRINE: A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that
an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is
guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the
commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a
basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused
to confront the witnesses against him.

FACTS: The accused Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with large scale illegal recruitment by the
complainants in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and
Rosamar del Rosario. Ortiz-Miyake was convicted by the RTC of Paranaque by a complaint by
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Elenita Marasigan alone for the charge of estafa. The RTC of Makati convicted Ortiz-Miyake. The
decision therein of the RTC stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as
those in the illegal recruitment cases before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusion
established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction
in the cases before it.

ISSUE: Whether the court adopt the finding of facts of a previous decision of another court.

HELD: No. The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be
merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court
of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction
was based on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque where appellant was
found guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario. It is argued that the Makati
court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Paranaque court to show
that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal
recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person, particularly,
Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and
not of such offense in large scale. He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the
facts in the decision of the Paraaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent
conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to
confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He
cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
x x x (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with
due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in
another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.x x x

It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following
provision of Rule 130:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation.
Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second,
to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or
produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous
testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay
rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice
orderly and expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts
stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of
confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of
absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous
decisions or judgments. In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by
85
complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered,
admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in
large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment, while
admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It
may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in
lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is
hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would
constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. As earlier
stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Paranaque
court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial
court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely
on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision
sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the
decision is based.

75. HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., ET. AL.

DOCTRINE: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's
right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness.
It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a
prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of
his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

FACTS: That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the
following manner, to wit: all said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as
machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB
Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles,
Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its
peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company
Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused
well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA
BANK CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to said
HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 more or less.

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution's complaining
witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13, 2005,
the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by
reason of ill health.

ISSUE: Whether oral deposition may be taken outside court for criminal cases.
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HELD: No. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is
Covered under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial
and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as
the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of

witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in
the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos explicitly states that –

"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil
cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a
foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear
mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken
may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than
the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the
motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise: The condition of the
private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule
87
119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the
language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony
at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the
judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule
permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the
import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that - While we
recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its
case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.

76. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE AND ALFREDO
(FREDDIE) NULLA Y IBANEZ

DOCTRINE: The rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness.

FACTS: That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a soil digger (bareta) and with intent
to kill one Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said soildigger (bareta) the said Wilfredo
Atendido y Dohenog, hitting the latter on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical
injuries which directly caused his death. During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not
guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large; the case against him was archived.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution’s version was testified to by the victim’s wife and
daughter, in succession. On that fateful day, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited
by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel,
Wilfredo’s daughter, an adolescent at the time, was underneath the house (silong in the
vernacular) of a neighbor, three (3) meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his
companions were ostensibly in merrymaking. Rachel saw her father step away from the group to
urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and
hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully
covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of
Wilfredo’s chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head.
Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her
mother running out of their house and crying for help. On that same auspicious date, 29 August
2004, Rowena, Wilfredo’s wife and Rachel’s mother, was inside their house taking care of their
youngest daughter. She heard a commotion coming from the neighboring house, about eight (8)
steps away, so she rushed in that direction. Once outside their house, she saw Wilfredo prostrate
on the ground covered with blood on his face and forehead. Upon reaching Wilfredo, Rowena saw
88
accused Jesus, standing one meter away from Wilfredo, holding an iron bar. Edwin and Alfredo
stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt. Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran away while Edwin
went home. Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However, Wilfredo did not
reach the hospital alive and was pronounced dead on arrival. Expectedly, the defense mainly of
Edwin and Alfredo, proffered an altogether different version of the events. The two accused-
appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being
at the scene of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred. The defense,
accused-appellants herein, tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was
a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely
read, and did not know how to tell time. The Trial Court found hereby accused guilty and the
Court of Appeals did not deviate from the RTC’s ruling and affirmed its finding of guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Lower Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony
of Rachel?

HELD: No. The Court held that Rachel’s testimony cannot be taken lightly simply because she was
a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is
no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the
incident truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even
buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the
party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability
of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of
education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and
convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

77. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALVIN ESUGON Y AVILA

DOCTRINE: Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

FACTS: That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines,
the above-named accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of
force and violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed
weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which
directly caused her death. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night
of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the
ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab
her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at
the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the
appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the
hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the
one who stabbed his mother.
89
On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He
likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light. Upon
being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was
stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined
the ground floor through the stairway. Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He
narrated that he and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they
have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann,
7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in
their sala, with their baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3
meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them.
Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" He turned on the light
and saw that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see
anybody, he returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood
on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the
hospital where she eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the
wake and burial.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his wife
since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant.
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when
they were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help.
She saw that there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital,
she noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside
and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then
Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since
there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter
their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said
that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant
and said " siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to
the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim. PO1 Fabela also
testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the
hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and
positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their
money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station. In turn, the appellant denied the
accusation.

The RTC pronounced the Accused- appellant guilty of the crime. The appellant argued that the
RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with
homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could
only be the product of his imagination. However, The Court of Appeals sustain such decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year
old?

HELD: Yes, The Court states that the qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to
relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:

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Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the
rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for
religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law are not grounds for disqualification. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole
reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were
treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M.
No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency.
Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will
the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

78. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO,
AND JANUARIO DOSDOS

DOCTRINE: An expert witness is “one who belongs to the profession or calling which the subject
matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he
proposes to express an opinion”.

FACTS: At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then
aboard his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City,
when he heard a couple of gunshots. He looked around and saw a man running unsteadily
towards the intersection of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmea Boulevard). The man
was shouting Tabang, tabang! (Help! Help!). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red Jiffy make a U-turn near the
gate of the city central school that nearly ran over the man shouting for help. The man turned
back and staggered towards the direction of Bacalso Avenue and Urgello Private Road, but after a
few meters on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.

Meanwhile, the Jiffy followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a tall, thin man alighted. The
man fired several shots at the prostrate figure. He boarded the Jiffy which sped away towards
Leon Kilat Street. Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights on the victim.
In the meantime, PO3 Alexander Rustela was at a vulcanizing shop near the intersection of
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Bacalso Avenue and Leon Kilat Street, when he heard gunshots coming from the north. He ran
towards where the gunshots came and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, the Jiffy with
three persons on board sped past him and made an abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat Street. Rustela
immediately radioed for assistance. Minutes later, patrol car No. 201 with PO2 Herbert Ramos on
board arrived. Rustela boarded the car and they followed the Jiffy, while broadcasting an alarm to
police headquarters and other mobile patrol cars. On nearby Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana
and PO2 Romeo Abellana were cruising aboard patrol car No. 208, when they heard a radio
message that the suspects in the shooting incident were aboard a Jiffy. As they turned left at Leon
Kilat Street, they saw the Jiffy heading towards Carbon Market. They pursued the Jiffy which
stopped in front of the Don Bosco Building near BBRC, when police car No. 205, with PO Eugenio
Badrinas and PO2 Gerald Cue aboard, blocked the Jiffys path. Cue fired a warning shot and three
persons alighted.

The driver was appellant Astellero, whom Cue had recognized and seen before at the BBRC.
Abrigana and Cue approached the trio who stood a meter away from the Jiffy. SPO1 Abrigana
frisked Abriol and seized from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with serial number PO8485 with six
(6) empty shells in its cylinder. Under Abriols seat, the police also found a .45 caliber pistol
bearing serial number PGO 13506 with nine (9) live rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber
pistol with serial number 52469 loaded with five (5) unfired bullets. While the patrol cars were
chasing the Jiffy, another police team proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm. This
team from Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the victim to the Cebu City
Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a
homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet
away from the victim’s body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain, and
submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics testing. Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr.,
Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory autopsied the victim’s body. He found that the cause
of the victim’s death was cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to
multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head. Dr. Diola recovered a .38 caliber slug from the
corpse, which he later submitted for ballistics examination.

SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported the following:
1. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-1 to JA-3 possesses similar individual characteristics markings
with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 with SN: PGO13506;
2. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-4 and E-69-6 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: 52469;
3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked JA-5 possesses similar individual characteristics markings with
test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: PGO13506;
4. Fired cartridge cases marked E-45-1 to E-45-6 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;
5. Fired bullets marked as JA-6 and LD possesses similar individual characteristic markings with
the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445.

The following day, appellants underwent a paraffin test. The hands of appellants were found
positive for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test on the firearms showed that the three
handguns were also positive. Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP
Region 7 Crime Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms had been fired, and that
appellants had fired the guns within a period of seventy-two (72) hours prior to the examination.
The widow and relatives of the victim testified on the possible motive behind the killing. They
claimed the victim, a confessed drug user, may have been rubbed out on the orders of Navales for
failure to remit P31,000 as proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. After failing to deliver the
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drug money to Navales, for whom he was repeatedly pushing drugs, the victim went into hiding,
but later returned to Cebu City because he missed his family.

Appellants deny the accusations. Appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel
Caser, the prosecutions ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such
ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not
conversant with the required references concerning ballistics, particularly books on the subject by
foreign authorities. (3) He could not scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet. Since
P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion
that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of
the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Casers failure to take the necessary photographs
to support his findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not P/Inspector Lemuel Caser can qualify as an expert witness?

HELD: Yes, an expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject
matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he
proposes to express an opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the
following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with
the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is
based.

The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms.
Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is
satisfied (with) Casers examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope. Casers
conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of
the fired cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at
the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his victim, he
releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel
deeply imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone.
These marking might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And
they are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger.

P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the

Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert
witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert
witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support
his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the
evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively
found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

79. BAUTISTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The case stems from a Deed of Absolute sale over a parcel of land by the deceased
owner to his niece. A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale was filed, alleging
that the signatures therein were forged. The Petitioner presented expert witnesses in support of

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his claim - (1) Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service (2) Chief of the Fingerprint
Division of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service

ISSUE: Is the testimony of the expert witnesses conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly
executed and notarized deed of absolute sale?

RULING: In another case, examination of questioned handwriting, even with the aid of experts
and science, is, at best, inconclusive. No evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence
indicative of vitiated consent was presented other than the respondent’s self-serving allegations.
The Deed of Absolute Sale is valid.

80. AVELINO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Renato Sosas, an employee of Bobby Avelino overheard the group composed of Toto
Mata, Nato, Domeng Bakukang, Bobot Tuwad, Boy Muslim, Angkol, Charlie, Sonny Muslim and
Mon and Bobby Avelino where said Avelino uttered "Papatayin is Chairman", Bobot Tuwad asked
"Sino pong chairman?", Avelino responded "Sino pa, Ninong Chairman Gener". Alfredo
Manalansang, while on his way to Tondo in a tricycle, gave way to a jeep owned by the barangay
driven by Generoso Hispano (the victim). A man emerged and blocked the jeep. Manalansang
heard gunshots and saw Hispano's lifeless body and saw 3 men who drove away using the same
jeep. The jeep, on its way towards Divisoria, was blocked by a white car which prompted the
companion of appellant to shout "tabi-tabi". Mary Ann Canada saw appellant, wearing a green
hacket and a bonnet, she readily recognized the appellant as she was familiar with the face of teh
appellant having seen him driving the jeep of the Hispano several times before. The jeep was
reovered in front of a house in binondo manila with gun shells scattered on the floor. RTC: Avelino
- Guilty, murder qualified by treachery. Farouk Musa, Benjamin Elbona, Renato Menses - Acquitted
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt. Avelino raised in his appeal the fact of inconsistency
between the statements of Manlangsang and the findings of the Medio-legal and SOCO PSI
Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman and the CA not giving credence to the latter.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in not appreciating the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI?

RULING: No. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that
requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for
the petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
Slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative
value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the
very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the
testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies
therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the
integrity of a prosecution witness. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman
by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Canada, must stand.

81. PEOPLE VS. DURANAN

FACTS: The accused allegedly raped AAA (25 years old) on two occasions, taking advantage of
her feeblemindedness. BBB, AAA's mother, took her for examination in Camp Crame headed by

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Dr. Rosalina Cosidon. The accused raises the defense of alibi that the victim is not competent to
testify in court due to her mental deficiency

ISSUE: Was the psychological evalutation of an expert witness required in this case?

RULING: No, the mother's testimony was enough through a series of questions propounded to
her. The mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her mother, the trial
courts observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior and her intelligence. Although the
complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what the accused had done
to her and to answer the quetions of both the prosecutor and defense counsel.

82. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RAFAEL DIOPITA Y GUZMAN

DOCTRINE: The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Indeed, religiosity is not always
an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to
rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved
on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond
any peradventure of doubt.

FACTS: Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, on her way home from work, a man appeared
from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die.
[2]
The man then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the
plants were a meter high and far apart. Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who
turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he proceeded to divest her of her
belongings. Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge
of Dominga. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic
calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. He then warned
Dominga not to tell anyone and that should he hear that she told anybody about the incident he
would shoot her to death. Then he dressed up and left, walking casually to the opposite direction
of the subdivision before disappearing in the darkness. Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put
on her clothes and walked away in the direction of her house. Finding it locked, she asked help
from her neighbors who called the police.

Thereafter, Dominga was brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen
Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr. Floranne
Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical Center who found her "positive for spermatocytes." Dominga
gave a description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. Acting on that information, PO3
dela Cruz went to the scene of the crime to investigate and there he recovered a colored
white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since the victim earlier disclosed that the suspect headed north
after committing the crime, he proceeded to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses
about fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team was
called and they rounded up all the residents therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the
description of the suspect were invited to the police station for questioning, including the
accused.

The police invited Dominga to identify the suspect at the police station. Thereat, Dominga saw the
four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at accused-appellant. The police then had him
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try on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him. Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were
released. The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that
between 8:30 to 12:00 oclock in the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan
and fellow Jehovahs Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan
for an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan. Accused-appellant also claimed
that during those hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan
corroborated his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their
faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s defense of good moral character as a ministerial servant of
their faith make him innocent

HELD: No. We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime
charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no
guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity
is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the
impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more
than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.
Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court to
give credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs
Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts
at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once more, and with
approval, the pertinent portion of the trial court’s ruling on this point.

x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which
the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the
respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best,
self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be
concocted and fabricated (underscoring supplied). x x x

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently
performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not
reflected in the records.[25] Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the
highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that would affect the result of the case. [26] There is no compelling reason in the present case to
depart from this rule.

83. FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY VS. ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, A.K.A. ROBERT
MAR G. CHAN

DOCTRINE: Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden;
and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or
96
simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.10 In its first concept, it is the duty to
establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law
demands in the case at which the issue arises. 11 In its other concept, it is the duty of producing
evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima
facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party
as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the
affirmative of the issue.

FACTS: Civil Case was filed by petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) in the RTC, 3 to
recover from Chan the principal sum of ₱770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the
amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s Current Account No. 5012-00340-3 with the use of
Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06
a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had used Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 to withdraw funds totalling
₱967,000.00 from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila. FEBTC
added that at the time of the ATM withdrawal transactions, there was an error in its computer
system known as "system bug" whose nature had allowed Chan to successfully withdraw funds in
excess of his current credit balance of ₱198,511.70; and that Chan had taken advantage of the
system bug to do the withdrawal transactions. n his part, Chan denied liability. Although admitting
his physical possession of Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 on May 4 and May 5, 1992, he denied
making the ATM withdrawals totalling ₱967,000.00, and instead insisted that he had been actually
home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible "inside job" as the cause of the
supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTC’s had
admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as
information available to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human
being like him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. He contested
the debiting of his account, stating that the debiting had affected his business and had caused
him to suffer great humiliation after the dishonor of his sufficiently-funded checks by FEBTC.

The records show that FEBTC discovered the system bug only after its routine reconciliation of the
ATM-MEGALINK transactions on May 7, 1992; that it immediately adopted remedial and corrective
measures to protect its interest in order to avoid incurring further damage as well as to prevent a
recurrence of the incident; that one of the measures it adopted pursuant to its ATM Service
Agreement with Chan was to program its computer system to repossess his ATM card; that his
ATM card was repossessed at the Ermita Branch of FEBTC when he again attempted to withdraw
at the ATM facility there; that the ATM facility retained his ATM card until its recovery by the
bank; and that FEBTC conducted an in-depth investigation and a time-and-motion study of the
withdrawals in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan can be held liable.

HELD: No. Although there was no question that Chan had the physical possession of Far East
Card No. 05-01120-5-0 at the time of the withdrawals, the exclusive possession of the card alone
did not suffice to preponderantly establish that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he
had caused the withdrawals to be made. In his answer, he denied using the card to withdraw
funds from his account on the dates in question, and averred that the withdrawals had been an
"inside job." His denial effectively traversed FEBTC’s claim of his direct and personal liability for
the withdrawals, that it would lose the case unless it competently and sufficiently established that
he had personally made the withdrawals himself, or that he had caused the withdrawals. In other
words, it carried the burden of proof.

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Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the
risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the
duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the
production burden or the burden of evidence. In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the
truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the
case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the
beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case.
Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of
the issue.The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere
allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. 13 Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is
given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of
investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the
respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is
on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would
exculpate him from liability. Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own
evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to
preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that
he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn
from the ATM account. We remind that as a banking institution, FEBTC had the duty and
responsibility to ensure the safety of the funds it held in trust for its depositors. It could not avoid
the duty or evade the responsibility because it alone should bear the price for the fraud resulting
from the system bug on account of its exclusive control of its computer system.

84. BAAN RURAL BANK INC. VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MR. AND MRS. RAMON
TARNATE

DOCTRINE: When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an
obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.

Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will
be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.[7]

FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots. On March 21, 1976,
the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein petitioner]. On June 11, 1976,
with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon
Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and
the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a
public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13,
1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16,
1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration
of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On
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September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the
redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the
ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the
redemption on the ground that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of
the lots. Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the
foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid
notice and demand upon them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the
foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October
16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year redemption period. The bank opposed the redemption,
contending that the private respondents had no right to redeem the lots because they were not
the real parties in interest; that at the time they offered to redeem on September 23, 1981, the
right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979; that there was no need of personal notice to them
because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the posting of notice of sale at three public places of
the municipality where the properties are located was required.

ISSUE: What was the period of redemption: two years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the
contract, or one year as fixed by law?

HELD: When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its
contents.[5] For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the
certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period
especially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on
the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as
consent.[6] By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they
had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is
estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had
already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by
his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so
that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc.,[8] where the court held that the one year period of redemption provided
in Act No. 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it
bears noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption period. Thus,
the concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into conventional
redemption. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the
sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in the
Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to the extension made by the
sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank can not after the lapse of two years insist that
the redemption period was one year only.

Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a
property. The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the
solicitousness of the law in giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to recover
his lost property. Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence,
meticulousness and mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the Certificate
of Sale it could have easily discovered that the period was extended one year beyond the usual

99
period for redemption. Banks, being greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise
a degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary
business firm.

85. ALCARAZ VS. TANGGA-AN

DOCTRINE: The petitioners after recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract of lease on the ground that the
respondents lost ownership of the house, having created a conclusive presumption by their own
declaration that the said contract exists.

FACTS: Tangga-an (respondents) leased a residential bldg. to petitioner (Alcaraz) limited to the
use of said house for a monthly rental of 4k starting 1991 for five years. They agreed however,
that the rental did not include the lot on which the rented house was constructed because the
same was owned by the NHA. By 1994 petitioners were in arrears in the amount of 48k. Despite
demand by the respondents to vacate and pay petitioner refused to comply. Respondents were
thereafter compelled to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners. The petitioners
on the other hand answered that the ownership of the lot was transferred from the NHA to Virgilio
and that this change in ownership resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between
them and respondents, freeing them from the obligation to pay rent. The MTC ruled that the
petitioners were liable for the payment of rent and ordered them to vacate. The RTC upheld the
municipal trial courts decision in ordering the ejectment of the petitioner spouses from the house
they were renting for lack of evidence showing that the lease was modified. The CA affirmed
lower court decision reasoning that the claim of ownership is not a ground to suspend the
ejectment proceeding. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners able to substantiate their claim that the contract was
rescinded.

HELD: No, they were not able to prove their claim. After examining the records, the Court found
out that all the petitioner spouses presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the certificate
of title over the lot. No other document was ever shown evidencing cession of the subject house
in Virgilio’s favor. Therefore Virgilio’s title could not be used to prove ownership over the house
built on said lot as it carried no reference at all to the house. A building by itself is a real or
immovable property distinct from the land on which it is constructed and therefore can be a
separate subject of contracts. Furthermore, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of
Virginia, they were the rightful owners of the subject house. They presented a tax declaration in
the name of their trustees, co-respondent Hermes Tangga-an and his wife, which tax declaration
sufficiently evidences their co-ownership and acquisition of title following the death of the
decedent Virginia. Thus, the petitioners are not excused from paying rent. The ruling of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed.

86. UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO VS. BSP

DOCTRINE: Courts have created a presumption that corporate acts are valid if on their face, the
acts were within the corporation’s powers or purposes and that contracts entered into by
corporations in the exercise of their incidental powers are not ultra vires. However, this should not
be interpreted to mean that such presumption applies to all cases, even when the act in question
100
is on its face beyond the corporation's power to do or when the evidence contradicts the
presumption.

FACTS: Guillermo Torres (G) who chaired the board of Trustees of University of Mindanao (UM)
and previously operated a thrift bank First Iligan Savings & Loan Associations (FISLAI) requested
and was granted by BSP an emergency credit of 1.9M for FISLAI. As mortgage for said loan UM
through its vice president for finance Saturnino petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate
mortgage (REM) over UM’s property in Cagayan de Oro in favor of Banko Sentral (BSP). BSP
extended to FISLAI another loan in the amount of Php600k over which a REM was executed over
UMs properties in Iligan City. Thereafter FISLAI became subject of a merger and became
Mindanao Savings and Loan Association (MSLAI). G died. Thereafter BSP sent a demand letter for
payment of the loan. UM denied receiving any loan and thereafter filed two complaints for
nullification and cancellation of mortgage, one with RTC Cagayan de Oro and the other with RTC
Iligan City. The RTC of CDO decided in favor of UM declaring the REM involving properties in CDO
be cancelled reasoning that there was no board resolution giving Saturnino authority to execute
the mortgage on behalf of UM and upon Aurora de Leon’s testimony that there was no board
resolution and that she signed the certificate only upon G’s orders. The RTC of iligan City also
rendered a similar decision to which BSP appealed. The CA reversed the decision of the two trial
courts and upheld the right to foreclose of BSP reasoning that there is a presumption of regularity
in the decisions of corporations absent any sign of fraud. That this presumption is proved by the
certificate executed by aurora de leon as secretary, which had clothed saturnino with apparent
authority to execute the mortgage and that BSP relied in good faith on the said certificate. UM
therefore is estopped from denying saturnino’s authority.

ISSUE: Was the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra vires.

HELD: Yes, it was ultra vires because a corporation may exercise only powers given by law and
as provided in its charter. Securing loans from third persons is not among the purposes for which
petitioner UM was established. As an educational institution, it is limited to developing human
capital through formal instruction. It is not a corporation engaged in the business of securing
loans of others The Court ruled that The RTC decision of November 23, 2001 and December 7,
2001 are reinstated.

87. ROSAROSO VS. SORIA

DOCTRINE: Self-serving testimony, such as that of Lourdes, to which the Appellate Court based
its decision, is not enough to overthrow a disputable presumption. What is needed is clear and
convincing evidence as required by law to despute said presumption. As such the presumption
that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.

FACTS: Spouses Luis rosaroso and Honorata duazo acquired several real properties in Cebu
including the subject properties. They had 9 children who later on became the parties to this case
over the parcels of land left by Luis when he died. A complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents was filed by Luis (petitioner) against her daughter Lucila and Meridian Realty Corp
(respondents) because of the Lucila’s fraudulent execution of an SPA and subsequent selling of
the subject properties to Meridian notwithstanding the fact that Luis had already sold the same to
Antonio, Angelica and Cleofe (Lucia’s siblings). The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners sustaining the
validity of the first sale and declaring that the SPA is null and void and ordering respondents to
pay damages while dismissing the crossclaim by meridian. The CA however decided that the first

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sale to petitioners was void for failure of petitioners to prove that there was consideration for the
sale of the land. The CA relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay Luis and
with respect to the second sale it was declared valid because the document was notarized and as
such enjoyed the presumption of regularity. Petitioner argues that the second deed of sale was
null and void because Luis could not have validly transferred the ownership of the subject
properties to Meridian, he being no longer the owner after selling them to his children. No less
than Atty. William Boco, the lawyer who notarized the first deed of sale, appeared and testified in
court that the said deed was the one he notarized and that Luis and his second wife, Lourdes,
signed the same before him. He also identified the signatures of the subscribing witnesses. 24 Thus,
they invoke the finding of the RTC. Petitioners also assert that Meridian was a buyer in bad faith
because when its representative visited the site, she did not make the necessary inquiries. The
fact that there were already houses on the said lots should have put Meridian on its guard and, for
said reason, should have made inquiries as to who owned those houses and what their rights
were over the same.

ISSUE: Which of the two deed of sale is valid.

HELD: The first Deed of Sale was valid. In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said
presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration,
they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in
procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court. The decision of RTC Cebu City is reinstated.

88. HEIRS OF TRAZONA VS. HEIRS OF CANADA

DOCTRINE: It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their
due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant.

FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Cipriano), who owned an untitled parcel of land
located in Minglanilla, Cebu. The land was purchased from the government. Since then, Cipriano
had taken possession of the land, cultivated it and diligently paid taxes thereon. Dionisio bought
the adjacent parcel of land. It was later found that he had encroached on a small portion of
Cipriano’s lot. He was then summoned by Cipriano for a confrontation before the barangay.
Dionisio offered to buy the encroached portion, but Cipriano refused the offer. Later on, Cipriano
gave Dionisio permission to temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands. No
action for ejectment was filed against Dionisio during the lifetime of Cipriano, who eventually died.
The latter’s son Hermogenes, one of the petitioners herein who had cultivated the lot since.
Dionisio also eventually died.

The controversy arose when petitioners tried to secure a copy of the tax declaration of the
property. To their surprise, they were informed that the tax declaration had been cancelled and, in
lieu thereof, a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Dionisio. Apparently, respondents
had caused the issuance of the new tax declaration by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale
supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. As conciliation proved to be futile,
petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale,
cancellation of tax declaration, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and payment of
attorney’s fees. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery.
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Respondents, in their Answer, alleged that the assailed deed was a genuine document. RTC ruled
in favor of the petitioners while CA reversed the decision in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners were not able to overturn the presumption of regularity of the
assailed deed.

RULING: Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards
their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity,
this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and
convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.

First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had
been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second, the RTC did not just rely on
expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. Third, the existence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953 brings into question the regularity of the assailed deed. This
deed was never disputed by respondents at any stage of the proceedings, and was in fact
admitted by them in their Comments. Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes
thereon since the time he acquired it from the government, and even after its purported sale to
Dionisio, until his death.

Petitioners continued paying the taxes thereon even after Cipriano had died. Respondents started
paying taxes on the property only after Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued in Dionisio’s name
in 1997. It would be absurd for petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.

89. UY VS. LACSAMANA

DOCTRINE: There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held
that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to
plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were
legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show
that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.

FACTS: Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose
Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful
husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they
were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed
by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of their
marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and
consent. Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject
real properties using her paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and attempted
to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not
consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise,
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they were unable to secure a marriage contract. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with
Counterclaim dated claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied
on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject property. Uy died and is
two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in
the case. Rosca and respondent Jose Lacsamana also died. Meanwhile Spouses Lacsamana sold
the property to Corazon Buena (Buena). Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were
substituted by Buena as respondent in this case. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

RULING: Yes. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by
Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption
established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by
other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held
that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage,
as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from
his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage
allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant
evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted
showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant
Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage
was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently
overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the
burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became
necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally
married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the
Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting
married.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless
there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was
able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption
that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The
house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the
same even without Uy's consent.

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WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and
Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

90. DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this,
case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same
Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and
delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof
is offered, will prevail.

FACTS: An Information for estafa was filed by Leticia S. Arcilla (Leticia) against Dolores Diaz
(Dolores) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the
proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on
consignment basis from respondent. Leticia alleged that she is a businesswoman engaged in the
business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the
condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month
after they were entrusted. She averred that she entrusted merchandise worth P35,300.00 to
Dolores as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter. However, petitioner was
only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and
ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods. In her defense,
petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She
clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs)
from respondent on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank
sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last
transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled. However, she denied having
received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent on February 20, 1996. RTC acquitted
petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of
P32,000.00. CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to establish by
preponderance of evidence her transaction with petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit
the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to
respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which having been substantiated by the
acknowledgment receipt. To this, the CA rejected petitioner's attempt to discredit the said receipt
which she denied executing on the ground that she was only made to sign blank documents,
finding that even if petitioner was indeed made to sign such blank documents, such was merely a
safety precaution employed by respondent in the event the former reneges on her obligation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be held civilly liable.

RULING: Yes. At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of the credible evidence," is
required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts
established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.

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Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust
receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve
after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled
that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence."

On the contrary, espondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the
transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise
worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold.
This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20,
1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from
respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to
return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.

In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing
himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is
equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence
to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will
prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions.
Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her
claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that
evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the
evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

91. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN
MIGUEL

DOCTRINE: The non-presentation of victim on the witness stand cannot be considered as

suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or
cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

FACTS: Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, among others, were charged with rape in
an amended information. The facts indicated that the accused broke into the house of the victim
(Rowena), poked a knife at its inhabitants (Nimfa), and committed the act. Before they left, they
warned the sisters not to report the incident or else, they will kill them. Despite the threats, the
inhabitants reported the incident to the police. However, based on the police blotter, it was only
Padrigone who raped Rowena. The medical examination reported that Rowena was suffering from
Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition, that the mental disorder was not hereditary because before
the incident took place, she did not exhibit any unusual behavior. It concluded that the mental
illness was strongly related to a traumatic experience. The trial court held Padrigone guilty of the
crime of rape. Padrigone appealed, contending that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the witness (Nimfa), and
that the witness’ reaction after the rape of her sister was unnatural, especially since she slept

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thereafter and even reported for work the following day. Also, throughout the trial, it was Nimfa
who stood at the witness stand, and not Rowena.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was suppression of evidence in this case, considering that the
victim (Rowena) did not take the witness stand.

HELD: No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as
suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or
cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression
of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the
prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness
stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition
and thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was
not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact
witnessed the violation committed on her sister. Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the basis of Rowena’s statement as recorded in the police blotter. His conviction
was based on the trial court’s findings of facts and assessment of the witness’s credibility. Well-
settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter
best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath, all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness
honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the
case. Besides, in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the
ages of twelve to sixteen, we have consistently held that the victims version of what transpired
deserves credence, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to
lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, exposed them to. This is not to say that an
uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept
under control. Nonetheless, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was
ravished and her honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would be instinctive on her part
to protect her honor and obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon her. Not to be
overlooked is the complainant’s willingness to face police investigators and to submit to a physical
examination which are eloquent and sufficient affirmations of the truth of her charge.

92. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which
imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very
nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to
produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to
his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a

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party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his
failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.

FACTS: Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered his property for sale to
private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the
mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property.
Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP,
went to the METROBANK to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage.
METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00.
The deed of sale and the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were
eventually executed and signed. Twelve days later, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK and paid
P116,416.71, for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This
notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the
subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to
file an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. In answer to
the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent GTP
involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate
mortgage upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with
respondent GTP, and by the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also
secured by the subject property. RTC ruled in favor of GTP. CA reversed the decision of RTC. In a
motion for reconsideration filed before CA, Metrobank failed to bring before the court the current
statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be
released. METROBANK's counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of respondent GTP and Mr.
Chia appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel to file a memorandum in lieu of oral
arguments in support of its motion for reconsideration, to which a reply memorandum from
Metrobank was filed. Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on
hand and seriously considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by the
subject property. It ruled that the debts and loans of Chia contracted with METROBANk could not
be adjudged as part of the mortage debt. It held that, "The stipulation in subject Deeds of
Mortgage that mortgagors' debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security
became inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee the mortgaged property with the
knowledge of the mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4, 1980, it was obvious that whatever
additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same was not chargeable to and collectible
from plaintiff-appellee. It is then decisively clear that Metrobank is without any valid cause or
ground not to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question, despite full payment of the mortgage
debt assumed by appellee."

ISSUE: Whether or not METROBANK's failure to bring before CA the current statement evidencing
the alleged "other unliquidated past due loans" is tantamout to suppression of evidence.

HELD: Yes. Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of
Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at
the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, lost for petitioner
METROBANK to defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. It is a well-settled rule that
when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has
it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made
against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption
arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his
adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact,
if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive
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that the fact does not exist. Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to
establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by
the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as
admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. The ordinary rule is that one who has
knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court
puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have
shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party. Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission
to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot
now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to petitioner
METROBANK that it did not avail.

93. FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND

MAUREEN A. BIEN VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONERS

DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must
fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.

FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of
Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center
Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N'
Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program). It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall
identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program
for an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a
separate limit may be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be
subsequently disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall
purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not
available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official
receipts and other documents. In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT
Program, wrote petitioner Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter to
purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy
or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the DOH. Several years after the
enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for
the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. Petitioner Delos Santos (Delos
Santos), who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.
The fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable”
irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a)
VSMMC was made an “unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds”; (b) the
VSMMC management was completely “blinded” as its participation involved merely “a routinary
ministerial duty” in issuing the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery
receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and complete; and (c) the detection of the
falsification and forgeries “could not be attained even in the exercise of the highest degree or
form of diligence” as the VSMMC personnel were not handwriting experts.

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CoA's review however found several irregularities, including fictitious patients and falsified
prescriptions. Also, it alleged that the prescriptions allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy and
already paid by VSMMC from the PDFA were falsified. Examination of the records and interviews
with the personnel involved showed that the purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program
were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for the mere
preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified. Subsequently, the Special
Audit Team disallowed a sum of money for the payment of drugs and medicines with falsified
prescription and documents, and held Delos Santos, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily
liable therefor. Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals before the CoA which were
denied, maintaining their solidary liability. By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that
VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and,
thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of
the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of the TNT
Program were attended by malice or bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of VSMMC may be held solidarily liable, on the ground that
VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds, and thus, was in good faith.

HELD: No. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must
fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. SC found that the petitioners herein have
equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and
regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor
the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the
patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there
been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been
exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and
unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for
failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco
always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at
the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of
the indigent-beneficiaries, be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and
undermanned section of the hospital.” In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’
argument that the practices of the TNT Office were already pre-existing when she assumed her
post and that she found no reason to change the same remains highly untenable. Records clearly
reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of
VSMMC, she was informed of the irregularities. Hence, having known this significant information,
she should have probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent
measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with giving oral
instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed
prescriptions pads. The falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after that
Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then, too much
damage had already been done. All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as detailed in the
assailed CoA issuances reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge
their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular
disbursements from Cuenco’s PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 10473 and
10574 of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on
Settlement of Accounts, as prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld.
Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s PDAF and the resulting detriment to the
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public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected
and even rendered illusory.

94. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HADJI SOCOR CANDIDIA

DOCTRINE: Presumptions; Official Duty; In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary
suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers;

SAME; SAME; SAME; Minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification
of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented
a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld.

FACTS: While performing her duty as a female frisker at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I,
Marilyn Trayvilla, a Non-Uniformed Personnel of PNP, frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry
at the departure area and noticed something unusual and thick in the area of her buttocks. Upon
inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin but unconvinced with Cadidia’s
explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani Bagsican brought the accused to the
comfort room, asked Candidia to remove her underwear and found two sachets of shabu. Cadidia
denied that the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an
unidentified person to bring the same. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their
supervisor SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang turned the items over to the Intelligence and
Investigation Office of the 2nd Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), which was then turned
over to SPO4 Villaceran of NAIA-DITG. SP03 Appang placed his initials on the confiscated items at
the PDEA Office located at the NAIA. The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the
NAIA-DITG to Forensic Chemist Reyes of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination. In open court, Trayvilla identified the two sachets containing shabu previously
marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3." She also identified the signature placed by her co-employee,
Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as the picture of the sanitary napkin used by the
accused to conceal the bags of shabu. An Information was filed against Candidia for violation of
the Anti-Dangerous Drugs Act where the testimony of Trayvilla was corroborated by Bagsican &
Appang. The RTC found Canidia guilty of the offense charged. At the CA, on appeal, respondent
Candidia pointed to an inconsistency in the testimony of the witnesses as to who among them
instructed the accused-appellant to bring out the contents of her underwear. Another
contradiction pressed on by the defense was the recollection of Bagsican that when she and
Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping, in contrast
with statement of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort room,
they immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the conflicting testimonies given by the witnesses should not be given credit and
should result in the acquittal of the accused

RULING: No, the testimonies of the witnesses should be given credit and should result in the
conviction of the accused.

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of
the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the

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contrary. Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, minor
inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and
believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’
testimonies corroborate one another on material details surrounding the commission of the crime.

In the case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the
crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled
the accused. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in
her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted
Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the
accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when they
found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused
on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could
they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on
circumstances surrounding the apprehension.

95. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JESUS EDUALINO

DOCTRINE: Presumptions; A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with
human nature and the course of things.

FACTS: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape in an information filed by complainant
AAA. The complainant’s version of fact states that she was invited to drink one bottle of beer by
then a drunk Edualino. When she was semi-conscious, she was dragged in a place where the rape
was consummated. The accused arguments rely on alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1) that
there was foreplay and orgasm that occurred in the alleged consummation and that according to
the defense bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition of a consensual intercourse 2)
that the character of the complainant is of ill-refute on the basis that no responsible and decent
pregnant married woman, would be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less
would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer 3) that the complainant merely
concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was
using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she previously tried
to seduce accused-appellant while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.

ISSUE: Whether the constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been

overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: Yes, the constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been

overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that the crime committed
by accused-appellant is rape. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony
of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with
human nature and the course of things. On whether the acts of accused-appellant constitute rape,
the victim’s testimony was sufficiently clear to show that the carnal knowledge was without her
consent and with force and intimidation. The testimony of the victim is supported by the findings
in the medical certificate which shows that the injuries suffered by the victim are consistent with
the charges of rape. On accused-appellant's contention that the presence of force and intimidation

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was not proven, the Court has consistently ruled that force and intimidation should be viewed in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.
Lastly, Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an
attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The SC ruled that
it failed to understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances
averred by accused-appellant.

96. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE

DOCTRINE: Presentation of Evidence; Order of presentation of evidence; the cross-examination

of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The trial court is not
bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is
not cross-examined by the other party.

FACTS: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own 13-
year-old daughter, and was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. The trial court gave
credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the young
complainant. In the proceeding for automatic review, one of the errors assigned by the accused is
that the RTC gravely erred in not giving credence of his defense of alibi and denial when he was
adjudged guilty even though the prosecution did not cross examine him and did not allow him to
present any rebuttal evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the
prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and allow him to present any rebuttal evidence

RULING: No, testimony of appellant cannot acquire added strength merely because the
prosecution did not cross-examine him. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the
party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or
accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the
witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other
evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the
perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the
testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the
other party. The evidently candid and straightforward testimony of the victim should be more than
enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by appellant.

97. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PEREZ

DOCTRINE: Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; Leading Questions; General Rule;
Exceptions.—As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for
exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to
state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth
out of their reluctant lips.

FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez,
guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca (Mayia for brevity), and imposing on appellant the death
penalty. Antecedent facts shows that on January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco,
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Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia was walking along Sulok on her way to
her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant approached her. Appellant introduced himself as
Johnny and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. Appellant then
proceeded to lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayias panty. He then
inserted his penis inside Mayias vagina. After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his
pants and ran away. Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly
irregular. Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing
an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant
stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named
Johnny and did not give any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he
was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails
that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the RTC gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the appellant has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: No. Appellant’s contention is untenable. As a rule, leading questions are not
allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as
it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading
questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial
court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and
unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As explained in People v. Rodito
Dagamo:

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to
the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination
of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.

Mayia’s simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her
accusation was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in
numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

98. PEOPLE VS. CASTILLANO, SR.

DOCTRINE: Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be
impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present
testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and
thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a
chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and
state the circumstances under which they were made.

If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of
the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the
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other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the
right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due
notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible.
This process of cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is
called in the practice of the American courts “laying a predicate” for the introduction of
contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon
cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

It bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses
do not necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and
calibrated in their entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages. And then
again, minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof
which do not relate to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their
differences in impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors.

FACTS: Diosdado Volante, a farmer, his wife Luz, and their four children lived in their farmland
located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur. About 200
meters away from Diosdados farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano, Sr. He tasked his
son, Jaime Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to reside there. Jaime,
Sr., his wife Concepcion, their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other children lived at their family
residence in Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur, approximately three kilometers away from their
farmhouse in Sitio Danawan. Sometime in the early part of June 1996, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun
indiscriminately. At around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Their
children were already fast asleep. Diosdado was tired after a day’s work of spraying chemicals at
the rice field. He reclined on a bamboo bench near the main door of their house. Suddenly, Luz
heard voices near their house. She saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and his two sons, Jaime Jr.
and Ronald, on their way to the house. All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdados
house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her baby daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the
rear door. She was about five meters away from her husband when the Castillanos barged inside
their house and ganged up on Diosdado. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took
turns in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed Diosdado on the right side of his breast, right thigh
and on the back. He also struck him with a one-meter long pipe. Not satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his
gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. On December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. The
trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime on reasonable doubt. The trial court gave no
credence to Ronald’s claim that he acted in self-defense. Now appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He asserts
that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent with her testimony
during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement before the
police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the
physical evidence on record. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the
credibility of the testimony of Luz, the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via
her testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn
statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn
statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in
evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony
during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was
not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by
Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
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 How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times
and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements,
and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

Issue: WON, the Prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt on
the ground that the testimony of the witnesses must be impeached because of inconsistencies.

Held: No. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a
witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior
statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the
predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness
being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the
apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they
were made This Court held in People v. Escosura: that the statements of a witness prior to her
present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was
directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said
inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and
truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination.

In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any
discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the
said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her
present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said
transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

99. PEOPLE VS. PLASENCIA

DOCTRINES: The focus of this appeal is clearly one of credibility. The initial assessment on the
testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard
notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one who personally may
have heard the testimony. The reliance on the transcript of stenographic notes should not, for
that reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge. The continuity of the court and the
efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation from the service of the judge presiding it
or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague who presided at the trial.

A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or
recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly written or recorded; but in such casethe writing or record must be produced
and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness
upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with
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caution.” (Italics supplied.) Allowing a witness to refer to her notesrests on the sound discretion of
the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness
herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

FACTS: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of
robbery with homicide in an information, dated 20 December 1984. Antecedent facts shows that
at around ten o'clock in the morning of 29 November 1984, Herminio Mansueto, wearing a blue
and white striped t-shirt, maong pants, Seiko 5 stop watch and a pandan hat, left on his bicycle
for Barangay Patao, Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00 cash which he would use to
purchase hogs from a certain "Ruby." In Patao, Francisca Espina, also known in the locality as
Pansing and whose house was just across the street from the respective residences of the three
accused, saw at the roadside Herminio Mansueto and Roberto Descartin alias "Ruby" engaged in
conversation. Pansing approached them and asked Mansueto if he would be interested in buying
two of her pigs for P1,400.00. Mansueto said "yes" and promised that he would be right back.

Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito Descartin and his brother-
in-law Rene were also seen going to the place. After some time, Pansing noticed Joelito take
Mansueto's bicycle. Believing that Mansueto was already preparing to leave and in her desire to
catch up with him, Pansing promptly walked towards the piggery which was around 100 meters
away from her house. She could see Mansueto leaning on the pigsty with Ruby on his right side
and Antonio Plasencia alias "Tonying" on his left; behind was Joelito. 2 Midway, she was halted on
her tracks; she suddenly saw Antonio stab Mansueto. The latter staggered towards Ruby who
himself then delivered another stab blow. Mansueto fell on his back. Joelito started hitting
Mansueto on the forehead while Rene held Mansueto's legs. 3 Except for a coconut tree and some
ipil-ipil trees around the area, nothing obstructed Pansing's line of vision. Pansing rushed back
home. The image of Antonio waving the weapon and the thought that she might herself be killed
kept her from revealing to anyone what she saw.

The following day, in Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, where Mansueto resided, his daughter Rosalinda
reported to Francisca Tayo, the barangay captain, that her father had not returned home. Tayo
proceeded to Putian, which was in Mansueto's itinerary, and then to Ruby's piggery in Patao,
where a youngster, who turned out to be Ruby's son, innocently informed her that Mansueto's
bicycle was taken by Joelito. The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi.
It convicted the three accused of murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code), instead of robbery with homicide, explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the
information in its generic sense. Finding conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the killing was
qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior strength with the latter, however, being
absorbed by the former.

ISSUE: Whether or not, that the testimony of Francisca Espina who at times be seen reading
some notes be not given worth.

HELD: No.The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether
proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum . — A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at
the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded ; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party,
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 who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence . So,
also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction
when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (Emphasis supplied.)

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this
case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that
she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

100. ROSELLA D. CANQUE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SOCOR CONSTR UCTION
CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of
the following conditions: 1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or
unable to testify; 2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; 3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were
made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral or religious; and 5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.

FACTS: Rosario Canque is a contractor doing business under the na me RDC Construction.
Canque had contracts with the go vernment and in relation to the projects, she entered into tw o
contracts with Socor Construction Corporation for supplying as well as ap plying certain materials
in the construction sites. When Soc or Construction billed Canque, it amo unted to a total of
P299,717.75 which included interest. Canque refused to pay the amount, c laiming that Socor
Construction failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in m etric tons of the
items an d the acceptance thereof of the government. This led to a complaint b eing filed with
RTC of Cebu for recovery the amount stated. During trial, Socor Construction pres ented its Vice
President, Sofia Sanchez and its bookkeeper Dolores Aday while Canque’s evi dence consisted only
of her own testimony. The trial court ruled in favor of Socor Construct ion, ordering Canque to pay
the amount. The CA affirmed. Canque contests the ad missibility of the said Book of Collectible
Accounts (Exhibit K). On its part, Socor Construction said that that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitte d under Rule 132, Section 10 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Books of Collectible Accounts referred into by the private respondent
in refreshing the memory of the witness is admissible in evidence.

HELD: No. It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another
purpose. Private respondent’s counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of
petitioner’s indebtedness. He said:

Exhibit “K,” your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of
the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of Two hundred
ninety - nin e thousand seven hundred seventeen pesos and seventy - five centavos
(P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the accumulated interest of three percent (3%) monthly
compounded such that as of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by
the pl aintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand four hundred thirty - five pesos and seventy - two
centavos (P616,435.72); This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a

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memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, i t is the
nature of the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered. Be that as it may,
considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As explained in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: Under the above provision (Rule 132, s.10), the memorandum
used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted
as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of
refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his
testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is
not admissible as corroborative evidence.

It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared
wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open - court declaration
with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in
dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priory laid down. What is more, even
where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such
evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and
fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or
otherwise from the admission of such evidence. As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made
based on personal knowledge, they could only corro borate Dolores Aday’s testimony that she
made the entries as she received the bills.

101. YASUO IWASAWA, PETITION ER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA
GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY

DOCTRINE: There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all
public documents. As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in
evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred
when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the
records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are
said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein
remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married
before." Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to
the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed.
Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about
it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their
marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the d
eclaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage
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is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. During trial, aside from his testimony, petitione r also offered the following pieces of
documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to
prove the fact of marriage between the parties on Nov ember 28, 2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked
as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as E xhibits "C" and "C - 1" to
prove the fact of the latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the
office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove t hat private respondent
in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June
20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.

The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admi tted the
authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre - trial. RTC rendered
the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s
prior existing valid marriage to another man. It he ld that while petitioner offered the certificate of
marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said
marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal
knowledge of privat e respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a
complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the
latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO cer tification is
likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authen ticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.

RULING: Yes. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all
public documents. As provided in the Civil Code:

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authentici ty and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated the rein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. As correctly pointed out
by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concre tely establish the nullity of the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared
NULL and VOID.

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102. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. VS. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (NOW CHARTIS
PHILIPPINE S INSURANCE, INC.

DOCTRINE: Remedial Law; Evidence; Public Documents; Private Documents; The nature of
documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.—The nature of
documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the
Rules: SEC. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,
Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document
have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered
as genuine.

FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (Universal Motors) 219
packages contai ning 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2 model, without
engine, tires and batteries, on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The
shipment, which had a declared value of US$81,368 or P29,400,000, was insured with P hilam
against all risks under Marine Policy No. 708 - 8006717 - 4. The carrying vessel arrived at the port
of Manila on April 20, 1995, and when the shipment was unloaded by the staff of ATI, it was
found that the package marked as 03 - 245 - 42K/1 was in bad orde r. The Turn Over Survey of
Bad Order Cargoes dated April 21, 1995 identified two packages, labeled 03 - 245 - 42K/1 and
03/237/7CK/2, as being dented and broken. Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in
the amount of P643,963.84 against Westwind, A TI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc.
When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was
compensated in the sum of P633,957.15 by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a
Subrogation Receipt dated November 15, 1 995 in favor of Philam. On January 18, 1996, Philam,
as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint for damages against Westwind, ATI and R.F.
Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. On September 24,
1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay
Philam, jointly and severally, the sum of P633,957.15 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum,
P158,989.28 by way of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. On appeal, the CA a ffirmed
with modification the ruling of the RTC. All the parties moved for reconsideration, but their
motions were denied in a Resolution dated January 11, 2008. Thus, they each filed a petition for
review on certiorari which were consolidated together by this Court considering that all three
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petitions assail the same CA decision and resolution and involve the same parties.

ISSUE: Whether the Marine Certificate No. 708 - 8006717 - 4 and the Subrogation Receipt are
private documents.

HELD: Yes. The nature of docu ments as either public or private determines how the documents
may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, are self - authenticating and require no further authentication in order t
o be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person
legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is pro ved or set forth. Lacking the
official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a
private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of
the Rules:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
a. when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules;
b. when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically
denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the
document h ave been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708 - 8006717 - 4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their bus
iness. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document
obtains in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam withou t
being properly authenticated.

103. ALUDOS VS. SUERTE

DOCTRINE: Rule 132, Section 34. Offer of Evidence- the Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the offer must be specified.

FACTS: Deceased Petitioner acquired from the City Government to occupy two stalls as evidenced
by a permit. Petitioner entered into an agreement with Respondent to transfer over the rights of
the two stalls as evidenced by an acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document. Before full
payment of the agreement Petitioner backed out of the agreement and opted to return the money
paid by Respondent. Respondent protested the return of his money and insisted on the
continuation and enforcement of his agreement with Petitioner. When the latter refused,
Respondent filed an action against the other. The RTC ruled against Respondent as the Petitioner
was a mere lessee of the two stalls and has no authority to transfer the lease without the consent
of the City Gov’t. Petitioner appealed the case to the C.A. which ruled that the Motion was denied
after finding that Petitioner’s lawyer misrepresented the governing lease contract between
Petitioner and the City Gov’t. The contract was never offered in evidence before the RTC and
could not be considered pursuant to the ruled of evidence.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in not considering the lease contract as evidence.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court.
The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of the fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the Court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight. What was formally offered was the 1969 permit, which
only stated that the Petitioner was permitted to occupy a stall and nothing else. In other words no
evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all improvements in the
market stalls shall be owned by the City. Gov’t.

104. WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS. FRANCIA ET. AL.

DOCTRINE: Rule 132, Section 34. Offer of Evidence- the Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the offer must be specified.

FACTS: They former failed to collect upon maturity and their investment were rolled over for
which confirmation advices were issued by Petitioner indicating Pearl Bank as the actual borrower
of the funds invested. Failing again to collect Respondents filed a complaint for collection of sum
of money arising from their investments against Petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner did not
object on or comment to the evidence offered by Respondent and filed a Motion to postpone the
hearings 3 days before the scheduled hearing for presentation of Petitioner which was denied. The
RTC considered Petitioner to have waived its right to present evidence and held that Petitioner
was solely liable to Respondent and dismissed the case against Pearl Bank. Petitioner appealed
the case to the C.A. but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the C.A. was correct in not admitting the documents attached to
Petitioner’s pleadings.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. It appeared that Petitioner was given ample
opportunity to file its comment and objection to the formal offer of evidence of Respondent but it
chose not to file any. All documents attached by Petitioner to its pleadings before the C.A. cannot
be given weight or evidentiary value for the reason that as correctly observed by the C.A. these
documents were not formally offered as evidence in Court. To consider them now would deny the
other parties the right to examine and rebut them. In accordance with Rule 132, Section 34 of the
Rules of Court.

105. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP. VS. CIR

DOCTRINE: The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded
by the court. If a party's offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or
request that it be attached to form part of the records of the case. If the excluded evidence is
oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender
of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually

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rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded
evidence.

FACTS: Petitioner is the manufacturer and producer of its cigarette brands and prior to 1997 were
subject to ad valorem tax. However on Jan. 1, 1997 R.A. 8240 took effect and caused a shift from
ad valorem tax to specific tax. As a result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were
subjected to specific tax. Petitioner later on filed a claim for tax credit or refund under Sec. 229 of
the NIRC for illegally collected specific taxes. After trial on the merits the Court ruled that it was
contrary to law and that there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund. Petitioner
elevated the case to the CTA but the latter found no cause to reverse the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant or grant the Petitioner’s claim for
tax refund.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The denial of Petitioners claim for tax refund in this
case is based on the ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and
amount thereof. As a result, Petitioner seeks the Court to re-examine the probative value of its
evidence and determine whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly
overpaid. This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law can be raised in a
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of the SC. to analyze or weight
all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The Court’s jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing only the errors of the law that may have been committed by the lower
court. The resolution of the factual issues is the function of the lower court whose findings on
these matters are received with respect. A question of law which the Court may pass upon must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

106. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELFIN CALISO

FACTS: The accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old
and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent. The records show that AAA died in the
river and that the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to
smothering;

The lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm
when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy. The lone witness narrated that
the whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because he always had his back
turned towards her; that she nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical
features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior
to the incident; that he interviewed Amegable who identified the killer by his physical features and
clothing (short pants); that based on such information, he traced Caliso as AAA’s killer; and that
Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of the killing of AAA.
The RTC and CA found Caliso guilty of Murder.

ISSUE: Whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA was positive and
reliable.

HELD: No. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must
be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not
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to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the
crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt.

Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her
barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously
assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction
hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as
the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he
is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted. The constitutional presumption
of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the
accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the
evidence for the Prosecution.

The decision is REVERSED and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of
murder.

107. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA

FACTS: AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines to her sick
grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience
store. Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his
pocket. Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his
parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live. Upon entering the house, appellant
dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing machine. Appellant then started to
smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy.
This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own
clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused countered that he
offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter refused, insisting that she wanted to live with
appellant because she was fed up with her mother, who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.
The lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Forcible
Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: Yes. The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created
reasonable doubt. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon
the prosecution. The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be
received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary
of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an
alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and who’s conduct during and after the rape is
open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
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humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind
that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution
has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the
charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or
intimidation. AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight (8) days – in the same house where
appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called
appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellant’s family
could have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were
really true." Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8)
days in a house where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor nephews and
nieces live.

108. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSENDO DELGADO ALIAS "NONGNONG",

FACTS: The accused, with the use of a deadly bladed weapon, with intent to kill and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and wound one
Santos Zamora's, who, as a result thereof, sustained wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused the death of said Santos Zamora's. The facts to which the trial court gave
credence in its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are based on the narration of the lone
eyewitness, Rogelio Zamora's, supported by the postmortem examination report and the
testimonies of Leonardo de Ballon and Aurora Zamora's. The appellant while admitting the
stabbing, however, claims self-defense. In these errors, the appellant questions the trial court's
appreciation of the testimony of Rogelio Zamora’s as against his own testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not lower court erred in giving full credit to the testimony of the lone witness
Rogelio Zamora.

HELD: Yes. A person who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the presence of the necessary justifying circumstance for having admitted wounding or
killing his adversary, and he is criminally liable unless he is able to satisfy the Court that he acted
in legitimate self-defense. For there to be legitimate self-defense, there must be three requisites
as provided in paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) unlawful
aggression (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The appellant contends that
the victim was the unlawful aggressor. This contention is negated by the physical evidence. If
indeed, the appellant and the victim were in the positions described by the appellant, it would
have been impossible for him to inflict the back stab wound described in the post-mortem report.
In the case at bar, the testimony of Rogelio Zamoras is not as patently absurd as contended by
the appellant. It was natural for Santos Zamoras, after he had stabbed Clemente, to realize the
gravity of his act, sit on the concrete pavement, place one hand over the other, and press his
head (obviously the forehead) on top of the two hands. The appellant states that it was abnormal
for the eyewitness to deduce from the act that Santos Zamoras was going to sleep. We do not
think so. The attribution of sleepiness instead of remorse, reflection, or fear indicates naivete and
guilelessness. The guilt of the accused having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

109. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. HON.

FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR.

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DOCTRINE: In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence"
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of an offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August
23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. Petitioner Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
part, private respondent filed, in the same case, a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk." On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent
judge allowing private respondent to post bail. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail since there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

HELD: No. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested
on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial
court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our
extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
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standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in
civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent
the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes
of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."

110. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO

DOCTRINE: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and

convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

FACTS: Alfonso Fontanilla was charged of murder for allegedly strucking Olias in the head with a
piece of wood called Bellang causing the latter fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him
again in the head with a piece of stone. As a result, the victim died. Fontanilla claimed self-
defense alleging that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his
house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the
stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him
with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, hadalso kicked him
with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defendhimself by picking up a stone which
he had hit the victim’s head. The RTC in rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense noted that he
did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not
receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered,
having been immediately released from the hospital; that Fontanilla’s failure to give any
statement at the time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is self-defense in the instant case.

HELD: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, however,
Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once
an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on
the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the
author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he
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established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by
relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak,
would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s
head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

111. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA

DOCTRINE: In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the
evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., defined
"preponderance of evidence" in the following manner: "Preponderance of evidence" is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to
be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC against
Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB
alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch
manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks in the total amount of
P10,782,150.00. On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint
to implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s
alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Manager’s
checks to 34, in the total amount of P11, 937,150.00. The RTC granted this motion. Since
Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an
Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos, he is a reputable
businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was
one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting
cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of
Balmaceda’s money. The RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the
complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos
colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that there is no evidence to hold that respondent
Ramos acted in complicity with respondent Balcameda.

HELD: No. From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond
question that Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager of PCIB’s Sta.
Cruz, Manila branch, was able to apply for and obtain Manager’s checks drawn against the bank
account of one of PCIB’s clients. The unsettled question is whether Ramos, who received a
portion of the money that Balmaceda took from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of
this money to the Bank. PCIB insists that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ramos
colluded with Balmaceda in the scheme to fraudulently secure Manager’s checks and to
misappropriate their proceeds. Since Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any
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participation in Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA
to exonerate Ramos from any liability. PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of
evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s
scheme to defraud the Bank. On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used
Ramos’ name as a payee when he filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But,
as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of
the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s
fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB
never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to
Ramos’ participation that would justify his separate treatment from the others. Also, while
Ramos is Balmaceda’s brother-in-law, their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render
Ramos liable, absent concrete proof of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme.
Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own when he
applied for the Manager’s checks against the bank account of one of PCIB’s clients, as well as
when he encashed the fraudulently acquired Manager’s checks.

112. DELA LLANA VS. BIONG

FACTS: Dra. Dela Llana was involved in a car accident, wherein she suffered minor wounds. After
two months, she began to feel pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. She was diagnosed
a whiplash injury and underwent an operation on her spine and neck. She demanded from Biong
compensation for her injuries but the latter refused to pay.

On trial, Dra. Dela Llana, a surgeon, presented herself as ordinary witness. No other physician was
presented. She also showed pictures of collusion as well as copy of medical certificate. The RTC
ruled in favor of Dra. Dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of the whiplash injury was the
accident. CA reversed the RTC ruling for failure to establish a reasonable connection between the
accident and the whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accident is the proximate cause of Dra. Dela Llana's whiplash injury.

HELD: No. Dra. Dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The
pictures only demonstrate the impact of the collusion. The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was not admitted in evidence. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not
been submitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. The
medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay.

The doctor who has personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate was not
presented to testify in court. Dra. Dela Llana's opinion that the driver's negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value because even though she was a physician, she testified as
an ordinary witness, not an expert witness.

114. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES

FACTS: Reyes and Pealoza, employees of LTO-Camiguin, were alleged to be illegally exacted
money from Acero, an applicant for a driver's license. Pealoza submitted a counter affidavit
pointing Reyes as the main culprit. Affidavits of witnesses were also submitted in evidence in
support of Pealoza's claim. Reyes, without receiving copy of those affidavits, submitted its counter
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affidavit to the complaint filed by Acero. The Ombudsman, there being substantial evidence, finds
Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and meted a penalty of dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct was sufficiently proven by substantial
evidence.

HELD: No. One of the principles of due process is that the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and disclosed to parties
affected. In the instant case, petitioner rendered its decision on the basis of evidence that were
not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that
imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also
rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.

115. XAVIER C. RAMOS VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. AND/OR ALFONSO L.
SALCEDO, JR.

DOCTRINE: The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial
evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in
cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."

FACTS: Ramos was a former Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division of
BPI Family. During his tenure, a client named Trezita B. Acosta entered into and obtained several
auto and real estate loans from BPI Family which were duly approved and promptly paid. Acosta
later purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family for the purchase of a Toyota Prado
vehicle which had remained unpaid. As it turned out, she did not authorize nor personally apply
for the subject loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent. The amount of losses suffered by BPI
Family was divided between Ramos’ benefits, which accrued upon his retirement, and his three
(3) other subordinates. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed
a complaint against BPI Family before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Ramos’ complaint,
which was later reversed by the NLRC. In a petition filed before the CA, BPI Family was held
concurrently negligent with Ramos; hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it found the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits to be illegal and
unreasonable.

RULING: In labor disputes, the NLRC’s findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence as held in the case of
Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., citing Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya &
Co.:

As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is
limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as

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 an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of
the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence.

The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of
labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence.

The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion."

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s
retirement benefits was improper on two (2) grounds:

First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its
imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests
upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. Second, as similarly observed by the
NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice when he issued the PO and ATD without
prior approval from the bank’s Credit Services Department.

116. JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS S. LUCAS

DOCTRINE: A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading. The requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed
in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.

FACTS: Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC Branch 72
of Valenzuela City. His mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao to work in a
prominent nightspot in Manila, where she had an intimate relationship with his alleged father,
Jesus S. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in the petitioner’s Certificate of Live
Birth, but Elsie later told petitioner that his father is the respondent.

Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two
(2) years. When their relationship ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer of support and
decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.The RTC dismissed
the case since the petitioner failed to establish the four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defense,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. In
a petitioner for certiorari, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC; hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it essentially ruled that DNA testing can only be
ordered after the petitioner establishes prima facie proof of filiation

RULING: The Court held the petition meritorious. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are
four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has
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been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. A
prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under the Constitution,
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a
prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a
finding of probable cause. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to
protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.

117. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. AMELIO TRIA AND JOHN DOE

DOCTRINE: Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the accused.

FACTS: Amelio C. Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB, assigned at theMetropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-MWSS). MWSS opened a current account with
PNB-MWSS, which was intended as a depository for a loan from ADB to fund a contract. After
sometime, said account became dormant. PNB-MWSS later received a letter-request from MWSS
instructing the deduction of PhP 5,200,000 (plus charges) from said current account and the
issuance of the corresponding managers check in the same amount payable to a certain Atty.
Rodrigo A. Reyes, who was later found to be fraudulent. After verification processes were
conducted, the transaction was effected. Aside from the missing pertinent documents, it was later
realized that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the managers check payable to Atty. Reyes.
PNB conducted its own investigation and found Tria liable for qualified theft. The City Prosecutor
of Quezon City dismissed the charge of qualified theft against Tria, which was later affirmed by
the DOJ Secretary and the CA; hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that probable cause against Tria and Atty. Reyes
was not established since the employees of PNB made the encashment after their own
independent verification of the subject manager’s check

RULING: The Court held the petition meritorious. It must be emphasized at the outset that what
is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable cause to
believe that he is guilty of the crime charged. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to
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be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. The acts
of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more than
sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John
Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant
case the existence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft.

118. RUBEN DEL CASTILLO AKA “BOY CASTILLO” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the
same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to immediately disembark
from the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it.

The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in
the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they
will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed
that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and
exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the
place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods. In the presence
of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del
Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran
for cover.

His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay
tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed
transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of
the charge against him in the Information. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA,
but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. Petitioner insists that there
was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the
police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to support the search warrant

RULING: Yes, there was probable cause. The SC held that, “This Court finds no merit on the
first argument of petitioner. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
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(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less
than evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid
formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the
issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial
basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in
the present case, a substantial basis exists.

119. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA Y CABILLO AND

FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ A.K.A. LANDO CALAGUAS

FACTS: About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house. Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife,
were out of the house at that time. Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard
voices saying, We will kill her, kill her now and another voice saying, Not yet! Hiding under her
blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, We only need money, we only need money. Thereafter,
AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as accused Dick
Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias Al Camara,
and Fernando Fernandez alias Lando Calaguas. One of the intruders approached her and told her
not to move. Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run
but to her surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later
recognized as Dick Taedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Taedo, Why Kuya? Taedo replied,
Somebody will die. After a brief commotion, appellant alias Lando Calaguas asked the group
saying, What shall we do now? They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her
outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a
vehicle. The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA
saw Cita Taedo there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away. Later, alias
Fred returned telling the group, Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets in his body,
and the one left is for this girl. When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant
alias Lando Calaguas and Fred boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later
proceeded towards San Miguel Tarlac. The RTC found Aacused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
(alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principal, of the crime of Murder of Abad. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
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petition. Lando and Al, through the PAO, alleged that the prosecution failed to prove their guil of
the murder beyond reasonable doubt, considering that there are no direct eyewitnesess to the
said crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder.

RULING: Yes. The SC held that. “The trial court found that although there was no direct
eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay
San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
SCircumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented
by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that
the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower
court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence. The testimony of AAA had clearly
established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio
were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
several persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and
heard the latter uttering somebody will die;
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad
Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto
Taedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy.
San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by
Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with
her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): Make a decision
now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl.

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter Usapan
natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our
way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23,
2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando,
Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and
brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were
buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil,
shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil
concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates

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that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull,
and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.

In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, t he prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the
Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly
shot and buried.

120. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO, ELMER
DEOCAMPO AND EDWIN DEOCAMPO

FACTS: Melanio and Lucena Alolod adopted accused Maritess and took her into their home
in Barangay Poblacion, Lebak, Sultan Kudarat. Maritess had two children with her lover,
Efren Deocampo, who was never allowed to set foot on her parent’s house since they loathed
him. In May 1998, the old couple, Melanio and Lucena, suddenly went missing. Neighbors and
relatives testified last seeing the old couple on May 27, 1998. A neighbor, Magdalena Ato,
recalled that the two were in good health. In fact, Melanio even went to market early in the day.
At around 8:30 that evening, as he was making his rounds, a security guard at Salaman Institute,
Demetrio Nebit, saw two men standing near the fence that separated the school from the Alolod
house. On seeing Nebit, the two hurried into a nearby toilet but the security guard followed and
told them to come out. Nebit identified one of the two to be Efren Deocampo, a former classmate,
and his brother Edwin. At about 2:00 a.m. on the following day, May 28, Victor Ato, Magdalenas
husband, awakened to strange sounds coming from the Alolod house just five to six meters away.
Victor heard a woman sobbing and what sounded like a pig being butchered. He looked out
through the window but, seeing no one, he just went back to bed. When Victor woke up at 5:30
a.m., he saw Efren at the kitchen of the Alolod house. Later that day, Magdalena had the chance
to ask Maritess about the sounds coming from their house during the night. Maritess explained
that Melanio was ill and she was having a difficult time giving him medicine. Maritess added that
her parents had left for Cotabato City early that morning.

Meantime, on inspection that morning, the school security guard noticed that the cyclone wire of
the fence where he saw Efren and Edwin standing the night before had been cut. He reported the
incident to the school principal. Annaliza Relles, the grandniece of the Alolods, noticed the
absence of the old couple when she came over that morning to cook for them. Only Maritess and
her two children were there. Maritess told Annaliza that her parents had left for a vacation.
Annaliza tried to use one of the toilets in the house but it was padlocked. Maritess told her to just
use the other toilet. On May 29 Generita Caspillo, Maritess relative and close friend, stayed at the
Alolod residence to keep them company because according to Maritess, her father suffered a
stroke and had to be brought to Cotabato for medical treatment. While Generita was there, she
noticed a pile of red soil near the well at the garden. On May 30 Annaliza and Generita saw Efrens
younger brothers Edwin and Elmer at the Alolod residence. The next day, during their town
fiesta, friends and relatives came by to visit the old couple but Maritess told them that they had
gone to Davao City and would not return until August 16 or 17.

By June the couple’s grandchildren who would stay at their house for school began arriving. They
observed the frequent presence of the Deocampo brothers in the house. Sometime in August,
Generita and her mother, Lucenas sister, came to pay a visit. They saw Efren wearing Melanios
wristwatch. Maritess insisted that her parents were still in Davao for medical check-up. In August,
Maritess and her children, together with the Deocampo brothers, left the Alolod house to live at
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Sitio Gila-gila, Barangay Kuya, South Upi, Maguindanao. When the Alolod spouses did not return
to their home, their relatives started looking for them. They found out that the missing couple did
not go to either Davao or Cotabato or to their relatives in Iloilo. Their clothes and other personal
effects were still in the house. The last entry on the recovered diary of Melanio was on May 27.
Suspecting that something was amiss, the couple’s relatives, Francisco Estaris and Joel Relles,
searched the house for clues. They even dug up elevated and depressed soil formation around
the place but for naught.

Finally, on October 9, 1998 Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco
found the place unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the
house said that it was Maritess and Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco
dug up the suspected spot. There they found the decomposing bodies of Melanio and
Lucena. Based on the post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire; Lucena was
stabbed. RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of Lucena and Melanio, with Efren and
Edwin as principals and Maritess and Elmer as accessories. While the case was on appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) granted the request of Maritess and Elmer to withdraw their appeals,
leaving only those of Efren and Edwin for its consideration. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Efren and Edwin appealed to this Court. Edwin, however, on a letter to the Office of the Solicitor
General dated December 7, 2008, manifested his intention to withdraw his appeal. The Court
granted Edwin’s withdrawal, leaving Efren as the sole accused-appellant in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that accused Efren was
responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence

RULING: No. The SC held that, “The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the
commission of the crime provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion:
the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. Here, those circumstances
abound.

1. Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved
his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that
house.
2. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998.
3. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the
night of May 27 or early morning of May 28.
4. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing
on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. They even tried to conceal
themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had
been cut.
5. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what
seemed like the butchering of a pig.
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6. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.
7. From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the
old mans watch.
8. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to
Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were of course
buried in the garden.
9. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the
house.
10.The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.

The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not
encourage belief. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the
couple’s house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of
that house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not physically
impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi,
Maguindao was merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.”

121. EDUARDO CELEDONIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain
Adriano Marquez (Marquez) witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De
Guzman (De Guzman) while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No
one was left in the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and
Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of
the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedomo be investigated for
possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez. Later, a follow-up
operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque ( PO1 Roque) and SPO2 Adrian Sugui ( SPO2
Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the
area for the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez
pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, " Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police
immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he
did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery
against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him,
"Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its
compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such
as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others. PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the
same were stolen, to which the latter answered, " Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was
informed of his constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police station.
RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force upon
things. Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals ( CA), arguing that
the RTC erred in convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court's
ruling that the petitioner's guilt was proven based on circumstantial evidence.

RULING: No. The SC held that, “Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the
only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
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The lack of direct evidence does not ipso factobar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As
long as the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant's participation in the crime through
credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he
committed the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the
circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable
conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The CA opined that: xxx As correctly pointed out
by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of private
complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their
houses and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one was inside
complainant's house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised
husband; two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night were
found in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by
the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her stolen
property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and
claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In
short, the accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole
possession. Xxx. We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence
factually and legally tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose
have been proved through the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, POi Rommel Roque and
Carmencita de Guzman. The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery.
In fact, Celedonio himself acknowledged that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, although
weak, ambiguous and inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was
committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in his possession;
and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.”

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