G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967 6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.

40
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. 7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO
PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — 8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA
RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA 10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to
ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO,
FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants. 11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
SANCHEZ, J.:
12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, 13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763,
37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these 14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32
premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials,
15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits
from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. 16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants 17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose
18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68
Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Beriño, Gloria Velasco,
Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by Paid up to
Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific 19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.
areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo
Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la 20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40
exhibited none.
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1äwphï1.ñët
23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

P7,580.69

Amt. due from

Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962 the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each
of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08 premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in
February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and
3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36 to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession. 2
4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore
5. Aquilino Barrios indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962,
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz) until they vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court
properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the
amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila
City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled
out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial
judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants
to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E,
aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its
power, to make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants'
remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having
done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because
the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that
the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself
confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside
for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary
School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction.
Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they
have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable
on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this
factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The
city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical
right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs
the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are
wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the
knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a
widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health,
sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for
the law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being flouted.
Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of occupying property
whenever and wherever convenient to their interests — without as much as leave, and
even against the will, of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their
belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of some of
them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented from
recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by
them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is
wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by
means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning.
Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy
of some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these squatters
is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright
encouragement or protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the difference
between right and wrong. To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that
squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in this
aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we look into
the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in
1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these
defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed
since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent
premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on
city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without
permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of
Manila.9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is
our considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry
into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter,
executing leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will
elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit
to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such
permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote
public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected
bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in
this country where there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits,
written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.
 3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises.
They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts
may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary
grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of
defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing
the school building annex is paramount.10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public
nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the
property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the
youth of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct
performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free
public primary instruction".12

Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance
could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without
the aid of the courts.13

4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They
say that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their
position by the averment that notice for them to vacate was only served in September,
1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to
the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their
possession continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-
year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila Court of First Instance
has jurisdiction.14

Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her minor children,
DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and
EMMANUEL JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as
yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take
judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon.
Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now
appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss
filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly
unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same
plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and
successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.
Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership
of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat,
defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants
are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased
Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant
one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this
Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]."1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff
made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis
for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was
nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26,
1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by
counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's
cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has
already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening
Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights, in an order
dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case
involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639
should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has
the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in
abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the same
subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]"2 Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss
when such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention
in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there
was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous
dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who
as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the
rest. There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of the finality of the
decsion in the previous case which would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support
in law. It would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as there had been such
a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do?
Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the
outcome was predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would
sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to
appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the
finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That
was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is
not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus:
"Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case
pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration."3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a
remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of
justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to
which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable
time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has,
ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should
not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to
law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal
system in mind.5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against
plaintiff.
G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965
GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO,
JR., defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Gabriel P. Prieto appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 4280. Since only questions of law are
involved the appeal has been certified to this Court.
In 1948 Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition for
registration of several parcels of land, including Lot No. 2, Plan Psu-106730 (L.R.C. No. 144;
G.L.R.O. No. 1025). After the proper proceedings Original Certificate of Title No. 39 covering said
lot was issued in his name. The same year and in the same Court Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition
for registration of an adjoining parcel of land, described as Lot No. 3, Plan Psu-117522 (L.R.C. No.
173; G.L.R.O. No. 1474). As a result Original Certificate of Title No. 11 was issued in his name.
After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., Original Certificate of Title No. 39 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 was issued in the names of his heirs, the
defendants in this case, namely Meden Jack, Joker, Nonito and Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed Arroyo.
On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition (L.R.C.
No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No. 900) in which they claimed that the technical
description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of their
predecessor did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court,
and was less in area by some 157 square meters. They therefore prayed that said description be
corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act; that their certificate of title be
cancelled and another one issued to them containing the correct technical description. The
petition was filed in the registration record but was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 900.
On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to
"change, upon payment of his fees, the description in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 of Lot
2 in Plan Psu-106730 so as to make it conform to that embodied in the decision of the Court on
March 8, 1950, and to correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners from
'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden Arroyo'.
On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur (in the original registration records of the two lots) a petition to annul the order
of May 23 in Special Proceedings No. 900. At the hearing of the petition on July 12, 1957 neither
he nor his counsel appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day issued an order
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration of that order was
denied on September 5, 1957.
On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present action for annulment
of Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein entered on May 23, 1956. He also prayed
that the 157 square meters allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to
him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff opposed, and
on January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is from the order of dismissal, plaintiff
having failed to secure its reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken.
Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was irregular and illegal
mainly because he was not notified thereof and the same was instituted almost six years after
the issuance of the decree and title sought to be corrected, and hence the order of the court dated
May 23, 1956 for the correction of the technical description in appellees' title is void ab initio.
The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No. 900 but the propriety
of the dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground of res adjudicata. The validity of the said
proceedings was the issue in the first case he filed. But because of his failure and that of his
counsel to attend the hearing the court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Since no
appeal was taken from the order of dismissal it had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
the court not having provided otherwise (Rule 30, Section 3).
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment because the Court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents therein, defendants-appellees here,
as they did not file any opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other
hand, allege that they had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they were served
copies of the petition. This allegation finds support in the record, particularly in the following
statement of appellant in his brief:
This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but was postponed to
January 14, 1957, due to lack of notice to the respondents. Upon motion for
postponements of respondents, now defendants-appellees, the hearing of January 14,
1957 was postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing set for May 16, 1957 was again
postponed upon motion of the respondents to July 12, 1957.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first petition for
annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged
being parts of the records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474,
which were well within the judicial notice and cognizance of the said court.
In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San
Pedro, Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly, if appellant had really
wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper
request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for
postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel
is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and said
order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.

Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both appellant seeks that
the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance is the fact
that in the complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157
square meters of land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. For that area
would necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first petition prospered, the relief asked for
by him being that "the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of
Title No. 332 by incorporating therein only and solely the description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu-
106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and maintaining consequently the description limits
and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner, Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in accordance
with Decree No. 2301 of Land Registration No. 173." The claim for damages as well as for other
additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are not materially different from his prayer
for "such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises" contained in the former one.

There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two cases, the
order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second.

The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or
less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for
the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among
others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge
Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of
her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix
of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b)
the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook
Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing,
the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp.
49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of
Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI
decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-
106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe
and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and
wife without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife
Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy
Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the
Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in
favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the
Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said
property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp.
36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied
by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-
Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and
the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme
Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September
16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition. Herein
petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA
SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS
NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2;
Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and
custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial
and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in
Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the
practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their
children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or
entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the
agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was
set, and invitations were sent out; that the said agreement was complied with;
that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who
are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being
Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in
FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that
the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is
exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the
groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a
go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who
would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-
be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date
as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then
one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case,
the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the
wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would
ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for
her daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties but there
is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the
wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom
as well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign
the document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she
would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the
bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of
the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding
to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons
present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies
helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat;
that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she
and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in
China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in
the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the
whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years and because
they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after
her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife,
and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines
sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went
to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went
back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she
begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back
to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among
the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage
certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or elders of
the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the
effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's
admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI
decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972
where the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of
spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China"
[Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the
following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and
address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's
Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy
Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19,
1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However,
the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law
or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July
30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.]
The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence"
[Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395
(1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2)
the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49
(1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign
country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may
be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher
110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471
(1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as
proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently,
the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove
the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case
of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other
fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
(1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by
the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the
issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice
of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was
celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place
in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being applicable
to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the
testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage,
holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a
foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is
competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that
it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552,
555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known
here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was
celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even
if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in
China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
 (2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five
children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze
Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a
marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter
[Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three
daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one
adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the
laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of
their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one
another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because
of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun
Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children
with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the
benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of
First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children
by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife
and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely
and finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely:
Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born
on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and
Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and
equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal shares
between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego
who shall transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida
Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by
Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation to give to
the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand
Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two
doors of the same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real
estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion
Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates
and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely,
Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child
may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and
the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act
Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard
to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption,
paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation
of spouses, and actions for support;
 (4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, SO ORDERED.
chapters one to three of the civil code;

xxx xxx xxx

and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated
in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their
functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P.
Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360]
hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.

Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502
sec. 91-A last paragraph that:

xxx xxx xxx

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident
in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in
the main case.

xxx xxx xxx

As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.

4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as
an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano,
L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an
administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same
issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de
Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to
prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by
respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack
of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not
submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters
and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot.1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo
Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934,
and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to
Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been
living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property,
which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which
the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The
complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited
from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since
then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between
Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on
three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings,
the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked
by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to
resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving
the same parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921
addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating
that the amount of P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest
since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish
document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo
Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the
transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length.2 The challenged decision also upheld
the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second
case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and
testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of
exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared
that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits
formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the
finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with
Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C"
were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying
them at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said
in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles,3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally
offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to
do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial.4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that
these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits
could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the
plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-
examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was
identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the
exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
 LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo
Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking
judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely
connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b
before the same judge.7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read
into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of
the case then pending.8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with
the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the
case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn
from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These
conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the
case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial
and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice
of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause
because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the
plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends
to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the
complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate
its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who
was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that
before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have
validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate
authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases.1âwphi1 However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known
exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-
interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this
uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence
of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property.9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land
covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a
claim of ownership.10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject
parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30
years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land.11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and
magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay
the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not
much concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had
bought from America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really
that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even
as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the
intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property,
we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were
paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in her own
name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the
owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession
thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid
the realty taxes thereon in her own name.13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the
lot.14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private
persons who acknowledged him as the owner.15 These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with
mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below
and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached
arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and
appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not
been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded,
conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence
submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or
knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained
by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his
claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our
adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary
contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the
complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with
costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, accused-appellant.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR. complainant,
vs.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases under automatic review
by the court, is a complaint1 filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr.,
a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board,
respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by
respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of
said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City.
The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder reproduced, with the alleged
contemptuous statements italicized for ready identification as the particulars equivalent to
the innuendo in a libel charge:
Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double
Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang
pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na
lamang sila sa magiging resulta ng review ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay
Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga
Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung
totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr.
Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng
sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.
Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa
kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy at ang babaing si
Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding "balita" ewan kung
totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni
Taha At kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin
ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa
Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-
apela pa.
xxx xxx xxx
Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng
Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay
madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang
interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming
nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke lang. Pero isang warning din
sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka
mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay
Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade
the administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful,
discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the
integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively
and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before
him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment2 that his article does not intend to
impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was published after
complainant had promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not affect or
influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the Palawan
Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the
comments made therein were made in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression
and of the press; that while the article may contain unfavorable comments about complainant, it
cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the administration of justice;
and that the complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneously
filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court.
Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her Comment3 and Supplemental Comment,4 asserts that
the article is merely in reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the show,
"Magandang Gabi Bayan," last June 18, 1994 wherein the latter defended his decision in Criminal
Cases Nos. 11640-41, entitled "People vs. Godoy;" that the article is no longer sub judice as the
same was published only after complainant had rendered his decision and had already lost
jurisdiction over the case; that the article cannot be considered contemptuous and defamatory
in the absence of a clear and present danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct, or ridicule the administration of justice; that it constitutes a valid exercise of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that a reading of the subject article in its
entirety will show that the same does not constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair
criticism which did not intend to malign nor place him in disrepute in the performance of his
functions; and that respondent Ponce de Leon cannot be held liable for contempt because she did
not have either actual knowledge of, or Personal connection with, the authorship or publication
of the allegedly contemptuous article, since she had just returned from the United States when
the same was published.
On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature, we
are inclined, based on an overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in
the negative. We have read and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully convinced that
what is involved here is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken
out of context. If the statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with contextual care,
there would have been no reason for this contempt proceeding.
In our aforestated evaluation, we were sufficiently persuaded to favorably consider the following
explanation of respondent Ponce de Leon in her Supplemental Comment:
On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that
the same does not constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair
criticism.
The first portion of the article reads:
"Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS
laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya
ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty.
Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang
pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man
isinaisip. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa
DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya
ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear.
Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito
rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station
manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling
MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong
kanyang ginawa."
The foregoing does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with the
public accusations being made by complainant that he is being given death
threats by the family of the accused, Danny Godoy. The article only makes a
justifiable query as to why Complainant does not file the appropriate charges
if his accusations are true.
"Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang
open book maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na
nagli-live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal
na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding ‘balita’ ewan kung
totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay
dinadalaw siya ni Taha At kumakain pa sila sa labas
kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan
kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad
sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na
ang kaso ay naka-apela pa." (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing is merely a report of rumors regarding the accused Danny
Godoy. They are not presented as facts by respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr.
In fact, he even goes to the extent of acknowledging that he himself does not
know if the rumors are true or not.
The subject article then offers the following analysis:
"Malaking epekto ang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa
dalawang tao, kay Danny Godoy at Judge Gacott. Kung
babaliktarin ng Supreme Court and decision ni Gacott,
lalaya si Godoy, si Gacott naman ang masisira, ang kanyang
aspirations na maitaas sa Court of Appeals at eventually
makasama sa mga miyembro ng korte suprema ng bansa.
Kung papaboran naman Gacott ay sigurado na ang
kamatayan ni Godoy, at double pa pero si Gacott maitataas
pa ang puwesto. Tayo naman, hintay lamang tayo ng ano
mang magiging developments ng kaso."
The foregoing is nothing more than a fair analysis. For indeed, if the Honorable
Court affirms the Decision of Complainant, the accused Danny Godoy would
be meted the death sentence. On the other hand, if the decision is reversed,
this may adversely affect the aspirations of Complainant to be promoted to
the Court of Appeals, and eventually to the Honorable Court.
Finally, the subject article reads:
"Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga
mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at
baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil
ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa
Magandang Gabi Bayan, 'Tagilid na raw and mundo.
Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo.'
Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na
mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka
mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death
penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo,
tagilid and laban diyan."
Again, the subject article merely reports what Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr.
allegedly said. But more importantly, the foregoing is merely a reaction not so
much to Complainant's Decision, but to the public statements made by
Complainant in the national television show "Magandang Gabi Bayan."
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which
is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in
question was intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so.
The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and criticism. Besides, it
has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the
degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally and wisely pass
unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a
reproof. It is so that in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another;
and oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment,
therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than a bitter feeling,
which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to
be patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but the momentary outbreak of
disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such, outbreak, and
the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence.5
Prescinding from the foregoing adjudgment, the Court observes that there are two primary
issues presented in this incident which deserve a more extended disquisition, firstly, because of
their importance and frequent involvement in contempt proceedings filed in the courts, and,
secondly, by reason of the fact that there are numerous and variant pronouncements on the
subject of contempt which need to be clarified. The principal issues are (1) whether or not there
can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements or publications; and (2) which court
has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on
appeal. Other cognate and related issues must also be discussed so as to provide judicial guidance
on the present state of our statutory and case laws thereon.
Before we go into a more intensive analysis of said issues, however, it may be beneficial for
purposes thereof to preliminarily revisit and expound on the nature and implications of a special
civil action for contempt or of any initiatory pleading therefor filed as an incident in the main
case. That exercise will further explain and justify our disposition of the contempt charge herein.
I punishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the
Prefatorial Considerations
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper
punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory
performance of some act or duty required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform.
Due perhaps to this two fold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are
classified as civil or criminal.6 However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting
criminal contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite indistinct. The confusion in
attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts is due to the fact that there are contempts in
which both elements appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil nor
altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it is also possible that the same
act may constitute both a civil and criminal contempt.
A. As to the Nature of the Offense
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect.7 On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party
therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.8
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense
against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice
which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are
punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the
purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is
neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.9
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no
one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended
to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil
contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a defense
in civil contempt. 10
B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised
A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which
the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court’s authority and to
punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to
provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is
civil. A criminal contempt involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power
and dignity of the court; private parties have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for
court has ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before
the court, and the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is
in the nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that
judgment was rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt
proceedings look only to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt proceedings, the
contemnor must be in a position to purge himself. 11
C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought,
or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose
is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. 12
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-
criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are
interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking,
however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act
involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some
of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general,
criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature
of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal
prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded
many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes
governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to
take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. 13
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is,
they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a
person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel
obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one
party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may
still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The
rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions,
ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for
contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where
there has been a violation of a court order in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an
independent action in contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the order.
It has been held, however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in that it
proceeds out of the original case, it is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it
involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of new process. 14
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his
successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal
contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. 15
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed
innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In
proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the
complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more
than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil
contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the
civil "fair preponderance" burden. 16
On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well settled, it can be safely
concluded that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect
contempt, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt.
II
Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of Contempt
Proceedings
A. Effect of Freedom of Speech and Press Guaranties
In the case of In re Sotto, 17 this Court had the opportunity to define the relation between the
courts and the press, quoting there in the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs.
Sullen, 18 thus:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate
and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other.
The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should
cooperate uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the
former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of
legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary in order
to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably
tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted
power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with
the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be
insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing
writings which are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely
invoking the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and the
press must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the spoken
or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the
liberty of speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.
Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the Constitution, are frequently
couched so as to impute responsibility for any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes
recognized that with respect to whether an allegedly scandalous publication or utterance is to be
treated as a contempt, a line must be drawn between those speeches or writings which are
protected by the privilege of free speech and a free press and those which constitute an abuse of
it.
The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the general right of freedom of
speech; persons engaged in the newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right than
that possessed by persons not in that business. 19
B. Different Doctrines or Schools of Thought
In the case of In re Francisco Brillantes, 20 Justice Perfecto explained in his dissenting opinion
that "as to whether contempt may be committed for criticizing a tribunal after the same has
rendered decision or taken final action on a matter which is the subject of criticism, there are two
schools of thought represented, respectively, by what we may call the English doctrine and the
American doctrine, the first for the affirmative and the last one for the negative. The question
now is to determine which of the two doctrines is more conformable to reason and justice and,
therefore, should be, adopted and applied by our tribunals."
1. The English Doctrine
According to Justice Perfecto, the rule in England is that there can be contempt of court even after
the case has been terminated. He then proceeded to ramify:
In England comments upon the court's action in a concluded case, where
libelous or calculated to bring the court into disrepute, were freely punishable
as contempt under the early common law. Distinction between pending and
concluded matters does not seem to have been made. Any comment impairing
the dignity of the court was punishable as contempt regardless of the time at
which made.
xxx xxx xxx
The whole theory of the early common law of contempt is admirably delivered
by Wilmot, J., in King vs. Almon, . . . . The publication there complained of was
a volume containing a diatribe against Lord Mansfield for allowing an
amendment of pleading as of course, and apparently from corrupt motives, in
a concluded case, and further charging him with having introduced a practice
to defeat the efficacy of the writ of habeas corpus. It is there said: "The
arraignment of the justice of the judges is arraigning the King's justice; it is an
impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his judges, and
excites in the mind of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial
determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them; and, whenever
men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal
and most dangerous obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, calls for a more
rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatever — not for
the sake of the judges as private individuals, but because they are the channels
by which the Kings' justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to
be universally thought so, are both absolutely necessary for giving justice that
free, open, and uninterrupted current which it has for many ages found all
over this Kingdom, and which so eminently distinguishes and exalts it above
all nations upon the earth . . . . The constitution has provided very apt and
proper remedies for correcting and rectifying the involuntary mistakes of
judges, and for punishing and removing them for any voluntary perversions
of justice. But, if their authority is to be trampled upon by pamphleteers and
newswriters, and the people are to be told that the power given to the judges
for their protection is prostituted to their destruction, the court may retain its
power some little time; but I am sure it will instantly lose all its authority, and
the power of the court will not long survive the authority of it: Is it possible to
stab that authority more fatally than by charging the court, and more
particularly the chief justice, with having introduced a rule to subvert the
constitutional liberty of the people? A greater scandal could not be published
. . . . It is conceded that an act of violence upon his person when he was making
such an order would be contempt punishable by attachment. Upon what
principle? For striking a judge in walking along the streets would not be a
contempt of the court. The reason, therefore, must be, that he is in the exercise
of his office, and discharging the function of a judge of this court; and, if his
person is under this protection, why should not his character be under the
same protection? It is not for the sake of the individual, but for the sake of the
public, that his person is under such protection; and, in respect of the public,
the imputing of corruption and the perversion of justice to him, in an order
made by him at his chambers, is attended with much more mischievous
consequences than a blow; and therefore the reason of proceeding in this
summary manner applies with equal, if not superior, force, to one case as well
as the other. There is no greater obstruction to the execution of justice from
the striking a judge than from the abusing him, because his order lies open to
be enforced or discharged, whether the judge is struck or abused for making
it.
2. The American Doctrine
In American jurisprudence, the general rule is that defamatory comments on the conduct of a
judge with respect to past cases or matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even
though libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the judge and the court. 21 It has been said that
the power to punish as a contempt a criticism concerning a case made after its termination is
denied under the theory that such a power is not necessary as a safeguard to the proper
functioning of the court as a judicial tribunal. And it has been said that comments, however
stringent, relating to judicial proceedings which are past and ended are not contempt of court
even though they may be a libel against the judge or some other officer of the court. There is even
the view that when a case is finished, the courts and judges are subject to the same criticisms as
other people and that no comment published in connection with a completed case,
however libelous or unjust, is punishable as contempt of court. Thus it is said that the remedies
of a judge who suffers abuse at the hands of the press, not amounting to contempt, are the same
as those available to persons outside the judiciary. 22
To the same effect was the holding in People ex rel. Supreme Court vs. Albertson, 23 where it was
declared that —
The great weight of authority is to the effect that — in so far as proceedings to
punish for contempt are concerned — comment upon the behavior of the
court in cases fully determined in the particular court criticized is unrestricted
under our constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press and free speech,
especially in the absence of a statute of direct application to the contrary. This
view in brief is based upon the theory
that — keeping our constitutional guaranties in mind — libelous publications
which bear upon the proceedings of a court while they are pending may in
some way affect their correct determination, and are properly the subject of
contempt proceedings. On the other hand, such publications or oral
utterances of entirely retrospective bearing come within the sphere of
authorized comment unless they affect a judge personally, when he has his
 remedy in an action of libel or slander, as does any other individual thus
offended. He has the right to bring an action at law before a jury of his peers.
Along similar lines, in Ex Parte Mcleod, 24 the court ruled that:
The right of a court to punish, as for contempts, criticisms of its acts, or even
libels upon its officers, not going to the extent, by improper publications, of
influencing a pending trial, . . . would not only be dangerous to the rights of
the people, but its exercise would drag down the dignity and moral influence
of these tribunals. Such criticism is the right of the citizen, and essential not
only to the proper administration of justice, but to the public tranquility and
contentment. Withdrawing power from courts to summarily interfere with
such exercise of the right of the press and freedom of speech deprives them of
no useful power.
Likewise, the State Supreme Court of Montana in State ex rel. Metcalf vs. District Court, 25 pointed
out that the legal proceeding involved therein was not pending when the alleged libelous article
was published, then referred to the guaranty of freedom of speech and the press, and eventually
held that the publication involved was not punishable as contempt. It declared that so long as the
published criticism does not impede the due administration of the law, it is better to maintain
the guaranty of the Constitution than to undertake to compel respect or punish libel by the
summary process of contempt.
Finally, in holding that persons who had published newspaper articles alleging that a designated
judge had been intentionally partial and corrupt in the trial of certain causes which had been
decided and were not pending when the publication occurred could not be punished as for
contempt the court, in State ex rel. Attorney General vs. Circuit Court, 26 cited a number of cases
supporting the view that libelous newspaper comments upon the acts of a court in actions past
and ended do not constitute contempt. It pointed out that some of such decisions took the
position that to punish such publications would constitute a serious invasion of constitutional
guaranties of free speech and a free press.
It ratiocinated in this manner: "Important as it is that courts should perform their grave public
duties unimpeded and unprejudiced by illegitimate influences, there are other rights guaranteed
to all citizens by our Constitution and form of government, either expressly or impliedly, which
are fully as important, and which must be guarded with an equally zealous care. These rights are
the rights of free speech and of free publication of the citizens' sentiments on all subjects. It seems
clear to us that so extreme a power as to punish for contempt because of libelous publications as
to past litigation, is inconsistent with, and would materially impair, the constitutional rights of
free speech and free press."
However, even under American jurisprudence, as shall hereafter be demonstrated, the aforesaid
rulings are not without exceptions. There is ample authority that, under proper circumstances,
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and liberty of the press do not protect
contemptuous publications relating to court proceedings even though such publications are not
made until after the pendency of the litigation in question.27
3. The Philippine Doctrine
In the Philippine setting, as we have noted, there are conflicting views on this issue which have
to be analyzed and, if possible, reconciled. On that exordial indication, we have digressed into
these aspects of the law on contempt and seized upon this incident in the criminal cases at bar in
order to essay a rapprochement of such views into what we may call the Philippine doctrine.
In the early cases decided by this Court involving contempts through newspaper publications,
the rule was that contemptuous publications were actionable only if committed with respect to
pending suits. Apparently, the weight of authority then was to the effect that criticism of the
conduct of a judge or a court with regard to matters finally disposed of does not constitute
contempt, even though it may be libelous.
That rule first found application in the case of In re Lozano, et al. 28 and was reiterated in the
subsequent cases of In re Abistado, 29 and People vs. Alarcon, et al, 30 where this Court, speaking
through Justice Malcolm, tersely stated:
The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. . . . (6
R.C.L., pp. 508-515).
It will be noted that the aforequoted conclusion was arrived at after a short discourse presented
by the ponente on the existing divergence of opinions on the matter between the English and
American courts. But the learned justice, notwithstanding his preference for and application of
the American doctrine, nonetheless thereafter made the recommendatory observation that
"(w)ith reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked first of all
that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly. What is best for
the maintenance of the judiciary in the Philippines should be the criterion."
It seems that this view was shared by then Associate Justice Moran when he dissented from the
majority opinion in the aforecited case of People vs. Alarcon, et al., which upheld the doctrine
enunciated in Lozano and Abistado, in this wise: "I know that in the United States, publications
about courts, after the conclusion of a pending case, no matter how perverse or scandalous, are
in many instances brought within the constitutional protection of the liberty of the press. But
while this rule may find justification in that country, considering the American temper and
psychology and the stability of its political institutions, it is doubtful whether here a similar
toleration of gross misuse of liberty of the press would, under our circumstances, result in no
untoward consequences to our structure of democracy yet in the process of healthful
development and growth."
Such perception could have probably impelled Justice Moran to deviate from the then accepted
doctrine, with this rationalization:
 Contempt, by reason of publications relating to courts and to court
proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by
courts. This is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public
confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable
by courts. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the language of
the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influenced of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be
influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court
itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in
them is destroyed.
That dissenting opinion was impliedly adopted in the subsequent case of In re Brillantes, 31 where
the editor of the Manila Guardian was declared in contempt of court for publishing an editorial,
stating that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner, even after the case
involving the validity of said examinations had been terminated. This was followed by In re
Almacen 32 where the Court stated categorically that the rule that bars contempt after a judicial
proceeding has terminated had lost much of its validity, invoking therein the ruling
in Brillantes and quoting with approval the dissenting opinion in Alarcon.
It appears, therefore, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court, the general rule that there
can be no contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain
situations. From the shift in judicial approach in Brillantes to the position announced in Almacen,
it can inevitably be concluded that the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from
a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libelous, depending
on the purpose and effects thereof. In other words, one may still be cited for contempt of court
even after a case has ended, where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its
dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or
bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court.
This qualified distinction is not without justification and, in fact, was also foreshadowed by the
concurring opinion of Justice Briones in Brillantes wherein, after noting the conflicting views on
the amenability of the contemnor during the pendency or after the termination of the judicial
proceeding in the court involved as illustrated by the English and American doctrines thereon,
he advanced the proposition that —
. . . esta distincion no tiene mucha importancia. Lo importante para mi es ver
si la critica lanzada por el recurrido es falsa y esta concebida en terminos tales
que "tiende directamente a degradar la administracion de justicia," . . . es
indiferente si versa sobre un asunto o negociacion totalmente terminada o no;
el desacato existe entonces y debe ser castigado.
. . . Se trata simplemente de la facultad inherente en los tribunales de reprimir
y castigar todo acto que tiende a ambarazarles y obstruirles en su funcion de
administrar justicia, . . . .
The rationale for making a qualification to the rule generally considered as the American
doctrine, which rule as herein qualified we now adopt and refer to as the Philippine doctrine on
this issue, is profoundly and eloquently explicated by Justice Moran in Alarcon, to wit:
It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the
press. But license or abuse of that freedom should not be confused with
freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing
vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the
fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As important as is the
maintenance of a free press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens
is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its administration of justice
and secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence. "The
administration of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The
press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate
to uphold the principles of the Constitution and the laws, from which the
former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction." (U.S. vs. Su
liens, 38 Fed., 2d., 230.) Democracy cannot long endure in a country where
liberty is grossly misused any more than where liberty is illegitimately
abridged.
xxx xxx xxx
If the contemptuous publication made by the respondent herein were
directed to this Court in connection with a case already decided, the effect of
the rule laid down by the majority is to deny this court the power to vindicate
its dignity. The mischievous consequences that will follow from the situation
thus sought to be permitted, are both too obvious and odious to be stated. The
administration of Justice, no matter how righteous, may be identified with all
sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for having lost
their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and
obedience to Law will ultimately be shattered, and, as a consequence, the
utility of the courts will completely disappear.
It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that public
confidence should be a tribute to judicial worth, virtue and intelligence. But
compelling respect to courts is one thing and denying the courts the power to
vindicate themselves when outraged is another. I know of no principle of law
that authorizes with impunity a discontented citizen to unleash, by
newspaper publications, the avalanche of his wrath and venom upon courts
 and judges. If he believes that a judge is corrupt and that justice has
somewhere been perverted, law and order require that he follow the
processes provided by the Constitution and the statutes by instituting the
corresponding proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. As Mr. Justice
Palmer, in speaking of the duty of courts and court officers, has wisely said:
Would it be just to the persons who are called upon to
exercise these powers to compel them to do so, and at the
same time allow them to be maltreated or libeled because
they did so? How would a suitor like a juryman trying his
case who might expect he would be assaulted, beaten, his
property destroyed, or his reputation blasted, in case he
decided against his opponent? Apply the same thing to
judges, or the sheriff, and how long could organized society
hold together? With reference to a judge, if he has acted
corruptly, it is worse than a mere contempt. But it is
apparent it would not be right that the court of which he is
a member should determine this, and consequently the law
has provided a plain and easy method of bringing him to
justice by a petition to Parliament; but, while the law
authorizes this, it does not allow infamous charges to be
made against him by persons, either in the newspapers or
otherwise, with reference to how he has or shall discharge
the duties of his office. It must be apparent to all right
thinking men that, if such were allowed to be indulged in,
it must end in the usefulness of the court itself being
destroyed, however righteous its judges may act. From
what I have said it must not be supposed that I think that
the decisions of the court, or the actions of the judges, or
other persons composing the court, are not to be
discussed; on the contrary, I would allow the freest
criticism of all such acts if done in a fair spirit, only
stopping at what must injure or destroy the court itself and
bring the administration of the law into disrepute, or be an
outrage on the persons whose acts are discussed, or when
such discussion would interfere with the right decision of
the cause before the court.
We do not hesitate to hereby give our imprimatur to the aforequoted opinion which, we fully
believe, conforms to basic dogmatic teachings on judicial and professional conduct requiring
respect for and the giving of due deference to the judicial system and its members — ethical
standards which this Court has, time and again, been trying to inculcate in the minds of every
member of the Bar and the public in general.
4. Cautela on the Balancing of Interests
On the bases of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that a line has to be drawn between those
utterances or writings which are protected by the privileges of free speech and a free press and
those which constitute an abuse thereof, in determining whether an allegedly scurrilous
publication or statement is to be treated as contempt of court. But to find the line where the
permissible right of free speech ends and its reprehensible abuse begins is not always an easy
task. In contempt proceedings, it was held that this line must usually be defined by the courts
themselves, and in such cases its location is to be established with special care and caution. 33
In so doing, it becomes necessary to give the subject that careful examination commensurate with
its importance, mindful that, on the one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be
maintained, while, on the other, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be
preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. If the court is shorn of its power to punish for
contempt in all proper cases, it cannot preserve its authority, so that even without any
constitutional or statutory guaranty this power is inherent in the court. But the Constitution
itself, in the Bill of Rights, guarantees free speech and liberty of the press. Of course, it was never
intended, under the guise of these constitutional guaranties, that the power of the court should
be trenched upon. 34
How to determine whether an act or utterance is covered by the protective mantle of the
constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press or whether it is already outside or an abuse thereof,
is an altogether different matter. We have perforce to draw from tenets in American
jurisprudence, although with discriminating choice, since after all our present doctrines on
contempt vis-a-vis constitutional limitations trace their roots in the main to the lessons laid down
and born of the social and judicial experience in that jurisdiction.
The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives
and for justifiable ends, whether it respects governments individuals; the right freely to publish
whatever the citizen may please and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing,
except in so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character,
may be a public offense, are as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the
standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals. The true liberty of the press is amply
secured by permitting every man to publish his opinion; but it is due to the peace and dignity of
society to inquire into the motives of such publications, and to distinguish between those which
are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those which
are intended merely to delude and defame. To the latter description, it is impossible that any
good government should afford protection and impunity.
The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for
the abuse of this liberty. If he does this by scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be
punished for contempt. In other words, the abuse of the privilege consists principally in not
telling the truth. There is a right to publish the truth, but no right to publish falsehood to the
injury of others with impunity. It, therefore, does not include the right to malign the courts, to
libel and slander and utter the most flagrant and indecent calumnies about the court and its
officers, nor to invade the sanctuaries of the temples. Such practices and such miscreants ought
to be condemned, and the courts would deserve condemnation and abolition if they did not
vigorously and fearlessly punish such offenders. Such practices are an abuse of the liberty of the
press, and if the slander relates to the courts, it concerns the whole public and is consequently
punishable summarily as a criminal contempt. It is therefore the liberty of the press that is
guaranteed, not the licentiousness. It is the right to speak the truth, not the right to bear false
witness against your neighbor. 35
This brings to fore the need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's
decision after the case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is
personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of
contempt. 36
It must be clearly understood and always borne in mind that there is a vast difference between
criticism or fair comment on the one side and defamation on the other. Where defamation
commences, true criticism ends. True criticism differs from defamation in the following
particulars; (1) Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call for public
comment. (2) Criticism never attacks the individual but only his work. In every case the attack is
on a man's acts, or on some thing, and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in
personalities. (3) True criticism never imputes or insinuates dishonorable motives, unless justice
absolutely requires it, and then only on the clearest proofs. (4) The critic never takes advantage
of the occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion
of matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste. 37
Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be restricted
after a case has been finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine
their criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the court, they commit no contempt no
matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass beyond that line and charge that
judicial conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct
was affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy the
confidence of the people in their courts. 38
Moreover, it has been held that criticism of courts after a case is finally disposed of, does not
constitute contempt and, to this effect, a case may be said to be pending so long as there is still
something for the court to do therein. But criticism should be distinguished from insult. A
criticism after a case has been disposed of can no longer influence the court, and on that ground
it does not constitute contempt. On the other hand, an insult hurled to the court, even after a case
is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness
or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated; but to hurl the false charge that the Supreme Court has been
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices would tend necessarily to undermine
the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of its members, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice, and it constitutes contempt. 39
The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair
criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a
contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by
either of these two circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in
other words, to scandalize the court; 40 or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of
freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt proceedings.
On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution
and must be sacredly guarded, but that an abuse thereof is expressly prohibited by that
instrument and must not be permitted to destroy or impair the efficiency of the courts or the
public respect therefor and the confidence therein. 41
Thus, in State vs. Morril, 42 the court said that any citizen has the right to publish the proceedings
and decisions of the court, and if he deems it necessary for the public good, to comment upon
them freely, discuss their correctness, the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and
the fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them; but he has no
right to attempt, by defamatory publications, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence
in it, and dispose the community to disregard and set at naught its orders, judgments and decrees.
Such publications are an abuse of the liberty of the press; and tend to sap the very foundation of
good order and well-being in society by obstructing the course of justice. Courts possess the
power to punish for contempt libelous publications regarding their proceedings, present or past,
upon the ground that they tend to degrade the tribunals, destroy public confidence and respect
for their judgments and decrees, so essentially necessary to the good order and well-being of
society, and most effectually obstruct the free course of justice.
Then, in In re Hayes, 43 it was said that publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher
right than others, to bring to public notice the conduct of the courts, provided the publications
are true and fair in spirit. The liberty of the press secures the privilege of discussing in a decent
and temperate manner the decisions and judgments of a court of justice; but the language should
be that of fair and honorable criticism, and should not go to the extent of assigning to any party
or the court false or dishonest motives. There is no law to restrain or punish the freest
expressions of disapprobation that any person may entertain of what is done in or by the courts.
Under the right of freedom of speech and of the press the public has a right to know and discuss
all judicial proceedings, but this does not include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation,
groundless charges of unfairness and stubborn partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair
its efficiency.
Finally, in Weston vs. Commonwealth, 44 it was ruled that the freedom of speech may not be
exercise in such a manner as to destroy respect for the courts, the very institution which is the
guardian of that right. The dignity of the courts and the duty of the citizens to respect them are
necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice. Denigrating the court by libelous attacks
upon judicial conduct in an ended case, as well as one which is pending before it, may seriously
interfere with the administration of justice. While such an attack may not affect the particular
litigation which has been terminated, it may very well affect the course of justice in future
litigation and impair, if not destroy, the judicial efficiency of the court or judge subjected to the
attack.
Anent the second ground, the rule in American jurisprudence is that false and libelous utterances
present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 45 To constitute contempt,
criticism of a past action of the court must pose a clear and present danger to a fair administration
of justice, that is, the publication must have an inherent tendency to influence, intimidate,
impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court's administration of justice. 46 It is not merely a private
wrong against the rights of litigants and judges, but a public wrong, a crime against the State, to
undertake by libel or slander to impair confidence in the judicial functions. 47
Elucidating on the matter, this Court, in Cabansag vs. Fernandez,
et al., 48 held as follows:
. . . The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be ''extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be
prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration
of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be published. Under this rule, the
advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear
and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of
Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the
Supreme Court of the United States said: "Clear and present danger of
substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial
proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high. . . . The possibility of engendering disrespect for
the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a
substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and press." . . .
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for
contempt in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote: "Freedom
of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power
to punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in
question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A
judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that
tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. The vehemence of the
language used in newspaper publications concerning a judge's decision is not
alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt . The fires which it
kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice." . . .
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by
newspaper criticism against the free speech to determine whether such may
constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public
comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible
tendency to influence pending cases." . . .
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. . . .
Although Cabansag involved a contempt committed during the pendency of a case, no compelling
reason exists why the doctrines enunciated therein should not be made applicable to vituperative
publications made after the termination of the case. Whether a case is pending or not, there is
the constant and ever growing need to protect the courts from a substantive evil, such as
invective conduct or utterances which tend to impede or degrade the administration of justice,
or which calumniate the courts and their judges. At any rate, in the case of In re Bozorth, 49it was
there expressly and categorically ruled that the clear and present danger rule equally applies to
publications made after the determination of a case, with the court declaring that a curtailment
of criticism of the conduct of finally concluded litigation, to be justified, must be in terms of some
serious substantive evil which it is designed to avert.
Adverting again to what was further said in State vs. Shepherd, supra, let it here be emphasized
that the protection and safety of life, liberty, property and character, the peace of society, the
proper administration of justice and even the perpetuity of our institutions and form of
government, imperatively demand that everyone — lawyer, layman, citizen, stranger,
newspaperman, friend or foe — shall treat the courts with proper respect and shall not attempt
to degrade them, or impair the respect of the people, or destroy the faith of the people in them.
When the temples of justice become polluted or are not kept pure and clean, the foundations of
free government are undermined, and the institution itself threatened.
III
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings where the Alleged Contumely is Committed
Against a Lower Court while the Case is Pending in the Appellate or Higher Court
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to
do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with
which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt
properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because
of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on
a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given
contempt. 50
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt
rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only
by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; 51 the power to punish for
contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: 52 and in order that a court
may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any
disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would
operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. 53
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the
general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional
trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty. 54
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a
prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case
may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of
fact. 55
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different
courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of
another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and
decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court , and
this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed
after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal effect of
a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal
affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the administration of
justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable by the court which is charged
with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may have made the order. 56 However, the
rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority
that where the contempt does not relate
to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. 57
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts
or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 58
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given
matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the most
common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases
involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a
contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a
contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances. 59
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders
entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which does
not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the
contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act. 60
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where
contempt against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some
appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken is
particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to
upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court. 61
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case,
which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only
in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the
regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent
or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the
proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered. 62
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt
proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. 63
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for
contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to
protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial extent
that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court
than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of
another court. 64
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable
in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done. 65
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the
basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right
to be tried before the court actually contemned. 66
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire
case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court
where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to
affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt
against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved
the same.
IV
Appropriate Remedies where the Alleged Contemptuous Statement is also Claimed to
be Libelous
Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great weight of authority is that in so far as
proceedings to punish for contempt are concerned, critical comment upon the behavior of the
court in cases fully determined by it is unrestricted, under the constitutional guaranties of the
liberty of the press and freedom of speech. Thus, comments, however stringent, which have
relation to judicial proceedings which are past and ended, are not contemptuous of the authority
of the court to which reference is made. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge,
but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the court's authority.
On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is usually the most appropriate and effective
remedy. 67 The force of American public opinion has greatly restrained the courts in the exercise
of the power to punish one as in contempt for making disrespectful or injurious remarks, and it
has been said that the remedy of a judge is the same as that given to a private citizen. 68 In such a
case, therefore. the remedy of a criminal action for libel is available to a judge who has been
derogated in a newspaper publication made after the termination aid a case tried by him, since
such publication can no longer be made subject of contempt proceedings.
The rule, however, is different in instances under the Philippine doctrine earlier discussed
wherein there may still be a contempt of court even after a case has been decided and terminated.
In such case, the offender may be cited for contempt for uttering libelous remarks against the
court or the judge. The availability, however, of the power to punish for contempt does not and
will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after the institution of contempt
proceedings. In other words, the fact that certain contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes an
indictable libel against the judge of the court contemned does not necessarily require him to
bring a libel action, rather than relying on contempt Proceedings. 69
The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also criminal and punishable by indictment. or
other method of criminal prosecution does not prevent the outraged Court from punishing the
contempt. 70 This principle stems from the fundamental doctrine that an act may be punished as
a contempt even though it has been punished as a criminal offense. 71 The defense of having once
been in jeopardy, based on a conviction for the criminal offense, would not lie in bar of the
contempt proceedings, on the proposition that a contempt may be an offense against the dignity
of a court and, at the same time, an offense against the peace and dignity of the people of the
State. 72 But more importantly. adherence to the American doctrine by insisting that a judge
should instead file an action fur libel will definitely give rise to an absurd situation and may even
cause more harm than good.
Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to compel the judge to descend from the plane of his
judicial office to the level of the contemnor, pass over the matter of contempt, and instead attack
him by a civil action to satisfy the judge in damages for a libel, would be a still greater humiliation
of a court. That conduct would be personal; the court is impersonal. In our jurisdiction, the
judicial status is fixed to such a point that our courts and the judges thereof should be protected
from the improper consequences of their discharge of duties so much so that judicial officers
have always been shielded, on the highest considerations of the public good, from being called
for questioning in civil actions for things done in their judicial capacity.
Whenever we subject the established courts of the and to the degradation of private prosecution,
we subdue their independence, and destroy their authority. instead of being venerable before
the public, they become contemptible; and we thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon
everything sacred in society, and to overturn those institutions which have hitherto been deemed
the best guardians of civil liberty. 73
Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an action for libel,
has been assailed as being without rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not
directed to the judge as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ
of the administration of justice. In the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the
judge, as such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to
face his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The
same reasons of public policy which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of his
judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy to confine his time exclusively to the
discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force. 74
V
Whether or not the Same Contemptuous Conduct of a Member of the Bar can be the
Subject of both a Contempt Proceeding and an Administrative Disciplinary Action
With the foregoing discussion of the appropriate remedies available to a judge, we feel that this
issue with respect to proper remedies against an erring member or the Bar should
consequentially be addressed, by way of reiteration, since conflicting and erroneous remedies
are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties.
The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate
and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. 75 A contempt
proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the
other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer
to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official
ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such
office. 76 The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard
the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the
vindictive principle. 77 The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the
Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges,
are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. 78
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not
considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. 79 In the same
manner an attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same
facts leading to conviction. 80 It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why
he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects
and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the
procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. 81
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to
discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the court's
basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial
functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar vs.Sandiganbayan, et al.: 82
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in
cases like that before us here: the Court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both
in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls
into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the
respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority
 over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which
the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is but corollary to the court's exclusive power of
admission to the bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibilities of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling
for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct
warranting application of the contempt power.

With this rounding out of the subordinate and principal issues in resolving the incident, we feel
that the guidelines we have laid down will provide assertive references for the lower courts in
disciplinary matters arising before them. Coming back to the incident fore resolution, arising as
a spin-off from the criminal cases at bar, we reiterate what we have declared at the outset,
absolving judge for the reasons therein stated.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the complaint for indirect contempt against herein
respondents Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P. Ponce de Leon is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000 1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REFUNDABLE
REVENUE,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a
total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the
apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of
a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.
On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount
The Case of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax
Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision 2 of the liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent
lack of merit.3 Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads as The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the
follows: ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its corporate Annual
Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet
WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner's claim for refund is hereby credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00
DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit.4 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax
liability.
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution5 denying reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied
by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994.6
The Facts
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.7
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing
petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989.
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items are
reflected: It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to
its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax
Income P1,017,931,831.00 Return that the said amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00 year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00) grant the claim for refund. . . .
Taxable Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Less:
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00 Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as
in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi
 juris against the person or entity claiming the exemption. In other words, the
burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund.8
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of
P112,491.90, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year
1989.9
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus
entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code which
states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund or (2) to
credit said amount for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax
Return that it would apply the said amount as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990.
Subsequently, petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the
amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was
forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its
1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the
following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and
the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its
1990 Return, which would have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit.
Hence, the CA concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are
binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is
premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice certain
relevant facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such
exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount
as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner's
accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a
certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's vice-president, stating that the amount of
P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically credited/offset against any succeeding
quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also
presented were the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In fact, it
presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR
could have easily disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment return shows whether a
corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return
clearly showed that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have
applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an opposition
to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein, the CA
did not pass upon that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the
trial.1âwphi1 The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that
proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." 13 The
paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly
presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering undisputed
facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner
could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well
as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court committed a
reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination
of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 But there can be
no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality, the
Return submitted before the CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is
that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the
tax credit could be applied. Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to
withhold the tax refund which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was not the final adjustment Return, but petitioner's first two quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This
allegation is wrong. An examination of the records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return
was attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for
1990 mentioned by respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the
CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents' specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its
Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17 Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered
to refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in 1989. No
CTA Case No. 4897 costs.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision SO ORDERED.
rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990.
In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . .
." 18 Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge." 20

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that
a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before
this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or
nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely
that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.

To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had
really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it
did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the
fact appearing therein — that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it
refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioner's other documentary exhibits.

In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's case. It is
merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989
refund to pay its taxes for 1990.

Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that
petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules
of procedure; it may have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should not compel
the Court to disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and
that it could not have applied the amount claimed as tax credits.

Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms,
however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it
and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its
taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same
standard against itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by
its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.
G.R. No. L-8200 March 17, 1914
LEONARD LUCIDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GELASIO CALUPITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
TRENT, J.:
In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the plaintiff, Lucido, were
regularly sold at an execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the text day
transferred a one-half interest in the property of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document
was executed and signed by all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein
it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights had
obligation pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan for the amount of the purchase
price together with 1 per cent per month interest thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687
Mexican dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest. It will be observed that
the computation of the transfer price is in accordance with section 465 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. On the same day Lucido and Calupitan executed the following document:
I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered this statement to
Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to witness that his lands, which appear in the instrument I hold
from the deputy sheriff and for which he has accepted money from me, I have ceded to
him all the irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase all said lands from me
(not only he irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the five-lamp chandelier, a lamp
stand, two wall tables, and a marble table; no coconut tree on said irrigated land is
included. Apart from this, our real agreement is to permit three (3) whole year to
elapse, reckoned from the date of this instrument, which has been drawn up n duplicate,
before he may redeem or repurchase them from me.
The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to conventional
redemption set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code. The present action not having been
instituted until February 17, 1910, the fur the question arose as to whether the redemption
period had expired, which the lower court decided in the negative. The lower court further found
as a fact that Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the redemption price to the
defendant, who refused it, and that this offer was a sufficient compliance with article 1518 of the
Civil Code. The decision of the lower court was that the property in question should be returned
to the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed, and all three of the above rulings of
the court are assigned as errors.
1. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court upon the
first question, if the document executed by the execution purchasers and the parties to this action
stood alone. In that document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the
execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and obligations are
defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the property sold, subject only to
the right of redemption on the part of the judgment debtor or a redemptioner, within one year
from the date of the sale. (Secs. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of the transaction
between the parties, however, the intervention of Lucido in the transfer would be wholly
unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as an interested party is at least some indication
that the parties intended something more or different by the document in question than a simple
assignment of the rights and obligations of the execution purchasers to a third person.
Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the agreement entered
into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In this document it is distinctly stipulated
that the right to redeem the property is preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration
of three years. The right to repurchase must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right to
conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original
answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its
admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who
was the time acting as his own attorney.
Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were not in harmony
on the point, says:
Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were based on the
theory that most of the allegations were merely pleader's matter -- fiction stated by
counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern tendency is to reject this view
and to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as
admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case.
But some of the authorities still hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there
should be some proof that he has authorized it.
On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the
original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have
no effect, unless formally offered in evidence.
In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right
to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he furnished $20
Mexican of the account necessary to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. It
therefore appears beyond dispute that the redemption of the property from the execution
purchasers was made by the plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant
Calupitan, who took possession of the major portion of the land as his security for its redemption.
The ruling of the lower court the transaction between Lucido and Calupitan was one of purchase
and sale with the right to redeem was therefore correct.
2. By the terms of his agreement with Calupitan the plaintiff could not exercise his right to redeem
the property within three years from March 30, 1903; and the lower court arrived at the date
upon which the right to redeem expired by computing five years from March 30, 1906, on the
ground that there was no express agreement as to how long the right to repurchase, once
available, should continue. Counsel for the appellant admits in his brief that the complaint was
filed forty-three days before the expiration of this period. In accordance with our decision
in Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), we hold that this ruling of the court was
correct.
3. The court held that the plaintiff had actually tendered the redemption price to the defendant
Calupitan. After an examination of the evidence of record as to this finding of fact, we concur
therein. We discussed the legal sufficiency of such tender in the above-cited case of Rosales vs.
Reyes and Ordoveza, and held that it was sufficient. This assignment of error must therefore be
held to be unfounded.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants Calupitan and
Dorado to deliver the possession of the land in question to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff's
depositing with the clerk of the court the sum of P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner above
set forth. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellants Calupitan and Dorado.

4. The defendants Oreta and Bueno have no interest in the subject matter of this action. it appears
that the defendant Dorado purchased the land from his codefendant Calupitan subsequent to the
tender of the redemption price to the latter by the plaintiff. It does not appear that the property
was ever registered by any one, nor was the document of sale with the right to repurchase
registered by either Calupitan or Lucido. No evidence of the purchase of the land from Calupitan
by Dorado is of record with the exception of the oral testimony although it may be taken as
established that such a sale actually took place, since all the parties interested agree on this point.
Dorado himself testified that he purchased the property with the knowledge that Calupitan had
purchased the property from Lucido subject to the right of redemption and insists that he
purchased with the knowledge and consent of Lucido. Lucido denies that he was aware of the
sale of Dorado until after it had taken place. Upon this state on facts, it is clear that the following
provisions of article 1510 of the Civil Code are applicable:

The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose right arises that of the
vendee, even though in the second contract no mention should have been made of the
conventional redemption; without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law
with regard to third persons.

The provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons are clearly not applicable to
Dorado. (Manresa, vol., 10, p. 317.)

5. The lower court ordered the redelivery of the land to the plaintiff upon his payment to
Calupitan of P1,600, plus the costs entailed in the execution of the document of repurchase. The
amount paid to the purchaser at the execution sale for the redemption of the property was
$1,720.74 Mexican. Of this amount the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan the
balance of $1,600.74 Mexican. No amount is fixed in the document of purchase and sale above set
forth, but the amount borrowed from Calupitan to redeem the land from the execution sale being
thus clearly established no objection can be or is made to the plaintiff's paying this amount. In
ordering the payment of this amount to the defendant the lower court failed to reduce it to
Philippine currency. On this appeal plaintiff alleges that this amount in Mexican currency exceeds
the amount he actually owes to the defendant by about P100, but that rather than spend the time
and incur the expense attendant to new trial for the purpose of determining the equivalent of his
amount in Philippine currency he is agreeable to pay the defendant P1,600.74 Philippine
currency, as the redemption price of the property. In view of this offer and in case it is accepted
by the defendant it will be unnecessary to go through formality of a new trial for the purpose of
ascertaining the amount of the fact that it is claimed that Calupitan has sold the land in question
to his codefendant, Macario Dorado, and it not clearly appearing to whom the plaintiff should pay
the P1.600.74, we think this amount should be turned over to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Laguna to be held by him until it is determined in the proper manner
who is the owner of this amount, Calupitan for Dorado.
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO
NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO,
BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA
NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the judgment
rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled
"Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and CA-
G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et
al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition
for New Trial, be set aside; and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7,
1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents over
Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an
area of approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804
issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the
Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this
union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely:
Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto),
Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together
with Vicente Santillan, are the private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the
cases while Vicente died on June 4, 1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts,
without progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without
benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to
Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of
Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres
were named as father and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu",
(Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while
her father's name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived with and was reared by her
parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father,
passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily
by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot.
The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13,
1910, the Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate
No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments
of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price.
Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as
a water tender at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on
December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a
notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of
petitioner, for the sum of P300.00.3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and
asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based
thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of
Margarita Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register
of Deeds of Cavite on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with
the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of
Lot No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand. For
her part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the
daughters of Margarita Torres. The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter
appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court
of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot
was conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their
legitimated child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively
to Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be
dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958
with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating
to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-
third (1/3) portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed.
Pending its resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete
destruction of the records of the two cases, which, however, were later partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order granting
reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof
reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
 (1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to
Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate
children and heirs of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan
is already dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by
proper instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In
fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion of
the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible.
In case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall
appoint three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her
parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each
other. There was no legal impediment for them to marry It has also been
established that Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and
reared by her parents until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also
shows that Macaria Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also
the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her father is Leon Arvisu
and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents
were married on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated daughter of on
Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the
judgment sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to
Macaria Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate
children and heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already
dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness,
however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the lot
where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case
the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint
three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and
Margarita Torres, the former not having been legally acknowledged before or
after the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants
in their brief, the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by
her parents until they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C")
shows that she was given the family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her
the status of an acknowledged natural child.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter,
children shall be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage only when
they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration
thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgement
of a natural child must be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public
document. Article 131 then prescribed the form in which the
acknowledgment of a natural child should be made. The certificate of baptism
of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth referred to in
Article 131. This article of the old Civil Code 'requires that unless the
acknowledgement is made in a will or other public document, it must be made
in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register (Samson vs.
Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In
support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of
spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres,10 reading in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of
majority age, and residents of the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite,
P.I., after being duly sworn to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of
wedlock on the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was
legitimized by our subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married
without dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after
that of her mother's at the time she was baptized as per record on file in the
Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her
father's family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper
remedy be made for the change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as
desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th
day of March 1930.
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES
Signed in the prsence of:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista
x----------------------------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant
Leon Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of
going over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula
certificate being exempt on account of her sex.
Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO
Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930.
Not. Reg. No. 56
P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the same
was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal belongings
of private respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have
attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and
contended that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during
the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of Justices
Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration
and New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial
should be granted in respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five
was then formed, composed of Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego,
Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself).
In a minute resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied
both reconsideration and new trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two assignments of
error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is
not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has
overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente
Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that
Macaria A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother
and sisters with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal
heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a consequence
thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in
adjudicating the entire share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property
solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis
supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account
of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her
parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc.
will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still
necessary, which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents,
subject to certain exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in
the Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and
nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December
20, 1931. (Emphasis supplied).
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in
the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of
acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121
of the same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document
was the equivalent of the consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article
133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon petitioner the status of a legitimated
child of her parents, and would entitle her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document she should
be chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement was not
newly discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly
discovered evidence, which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise
of due diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse
party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.

We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate
Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read: Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres,
who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded
as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint
no longer forms part of the record. 13
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new
trial, and depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective participation of
the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which
would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility
of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore
there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to
offer it in evidence. 14

It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4),
denied the legitimacy of petitioner.

The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:

Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petition for new trial, knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly
erroneous in view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence
on the part of the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before
it was offered as it was found from the personal belongings of Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party, after his death.

It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of
justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5,
1930 is established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such
vital considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document