Labor Law

LABOR RELATIONS FEB 17 ASSIGNMENT
III. Pages 176 to 296 EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR., MA. MELVYN P. ALAMIS, NORMA
P. COLLANTES, and FERNANDO
1. 30% ASSENT OF UNION MEMBERSHIP NOT PEDROSA, petitioners, vs. GIL Y. GAMILLA, RENE LUIS
MANDATORY TO FILE COMPLAINT TADLE, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, MA. LOURDES C. MEDINA,
EDNA B. SANCHEZ, REMEDIOS GARCIA, MAFEL YSRAEL,
ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, ZAIDA GAMILLA, and AURORA DOMINGO,respondents. [G.R.
SALVADOR G. BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE LUMBAN, No. 149763. July 7, 2009.]
FELICITAS F. RAMOS, MIGUEL TEAÑO, JAIME BAUTISTA
and FIDEL ACERO, as Officers of the University of the East
Employees' Association, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR 4. WHAT IS MANDATORY ACTIVITY?
RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET
CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E. DALUPAN, EFREN J. DE AL., petitioners, vs. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Director of
OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR., ELIZABETH ALARCA, the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANGGAGAWA NG
ELVIRA S. MANALO, and RICARDO UY, respondents. [G.R. KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PHILIPPINE LONG
No. 152322. February 15, 2005.] DISTANCE COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C.
ESPINAS, respondents. [G.R. No. 70067. September 15, 1986.]
2. 20% ASSENT OF EMPLOYEES ON REGISTRATION OF AMBROCIO VENGCO, RAMON MOISES, EUGENIA REYES,

INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION/CHARTERING RAFAEL WAGAS and 80 others per attached
BY TRADE UNION CENTER list, petitioners, vs. HON. CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO, in his
capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations and
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION– EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO, respondents. [G.R. No. 74453. May
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS 5, 1989.]
ORGANIZATION (SMCEU–
PTGWO), petitioner, vs. SANMIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS
EMPLOYEES UNION–PAMBANSANG DIWA NG 5. POWER OF UNION TO REPRESENT ITS MEMBERS IN
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEU– LABOR CASES
PDMP), respondent. 1 [G.R. No. 171153. September 12, 2007.]
JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS
LISTED IN ANNEX "A," 1 petitioners-
3. INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE appellants, vs. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL
MANDATORY/PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-
appellants. [G.R. No. 146073. January 13, 2003.]
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152322. February 15, 2005.]
ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADOR G.

BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE LUMBAN, FELICITAS F. RAMOS, MIGUEL
TEAÑO, JAIME BAUTISTA and FIDEL ACERO, as Officers of the
Association petitioners, vs .
University of the East Employees' Association,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E. DALUPAN, EFREN J. DE
OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR., ELIZABETH ALARCA, ELVIRA S.
MANALO, and RICARDO UY, UY respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 rendered by the Court of Appeals,
dated 24 October 2001 and 15 February 2002, respectively.
The Facts
Private respondents Rodel E. Dalupan, Efren J. De Ocampo, Proceso Totto, Jr.,
Elizabeth Alarca, and Elvira S. Manalo are members of the University of the East
Employees' Association (UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a
Memorandum from the UEEA charging them with spreading false rumors and creating
disinformation among the members of the said association. They were given seventy-two
hours from receipt of the Memorandum to submit their Answer. 3
The acts of the respondents allegedly fall under General Assembly Resolution No. 4,
Series of 1979, to wit:
1. Circulating false rumors about the progress of the negotiations for
collective bargaining; cAaDHT
2. Creating distrust or loss of trust and con dence of members in the

Association;
3. Creating dissension among the members;
4. Circulating false rumors about the work of the Association or

sabotaging the same;
5. Withholding from the Association and/or members material

information as to their rightful entitlement to benefits and/or money claims;
6. Acting as a spy against the Association or divulging con dential

matters to persons not entitled thereto;
7. Such other offenses, which may injure or disrupt the functions of

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the Association. 4
Through a collective reply dated 19 September 1997, private respondents denied

the allegations. Thereafter, on 23 September 1997, they sent a letter dated 22 September
1997 to the Chairman and Members of UEEA's Disciplinary Committee, informing them
that the Memorandum of 15 September 1997 was vague and without legal basis,
therefore, no intelligent answer may be made by them. They likewise stated that any
sanction that will be imposed by the committee would be violative of their right to due
process. 5
The Disciplinary Committee issued another Memorandum, dated 24 September
1997, giving the respondents another seventy-two hours from receipt within which to
properly reply, explaining that the collective reply letter and supplemental answer which
were earlier submitted were not responsive to the rst Memorandum. Their failure would
be construed as an admission of the truthfulness and veracity of the charges. 6
On 01 October 1997, the respondents issued a denial for the second time, and
inquired from the Disciplinary Committee as to whether they were being formally charged.
7
On 09 October 1997, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as president of the

association, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, et al., that their membership
in the association has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt
thereof. Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committee's nding of a prima
facie case against them. 8 Respondent Ricardo Uy also received a similar memorandum on
03 November 1997. 9
On 01 December 1997, a complaint 1 0 for illegal suspension, willful and unlawful
violation of UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal to render nancial and other reports,
deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings, illegal holdover of terms and
damages was led by the respondents against herein petitioners Ernesto C. Verceles,
Diosdado F. Trinidad, Salvador G. Blancia, Rosemarie De Lumban, Felicitas Ramos, Miguel
Teaño, Jaime Bautista and Fidel Acero before the Department of Labor and Employment,
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). IHaECA
A few days after the ling of the complaint, i.e., on 10 December 1997, a resolution
11 was passed by UEEA which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the Association has gone thru a most arduous, di cult, and
trying times in working to obtain the best terms and conditions of employment for
its members, specifically for the period 1992 to 1996;
WHEREAS, said di culties are in the form of near strikes, cases with the
Department of Labor and Employment and its agencies, as well as with the
Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the general membership (has) shown exceptional patience and

perseverance and generally (had) demonstrated full trust and con dence in the
Association o cers and accordingly approved the manner and/or actions
undertaken in pursuing said di cult task of arriving at a most bene cial
agreement for the general membership;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that:
xxx xxx xxx
b) the general membership reiterate its loyalty to the Association and

commends the Association o cers for their effort expended in working for the
benefit of the whole membership. cEATSI
APPROVED.
Manila. 10 December 1997.
On 22 November 1999, a decision 1 2 was rendered by Regional Director Maximo B.

Lim, adverse to petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent[s] [are] hereby ordered:
1. to immediately lift suspension imposed upon the complainants;
2. to hold a general membership meeting wherein they (respondents)

make open and available the union's/association's books of accounts and other
documents pertaining to the union funds [and] thereby explain the nancial
status of the union;
3. to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings in

accordance with the union's constitution and by-laws;
4. to immediately hold/conduct an election of o cers in accordance

with the union's constitution and by-laws.
Accordingly, the claims of complainants for damages [are] hereby ordered

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. IaSCTE
However, within ten (10) days upon receipt of this Order, the complainants
are hereby directed to submit a written report whether or not the respondents had
complied with this Order.
The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of

Labor and Employment (BLR-DOLE). During the pendency of this appeal, or on 07 April
2000, an election of o cers was held by the UEEA. The appeal, eventually, was dismissed
for lack of merit in a Resolution 1 3 dated 22 September 2000, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision dated 22 (November) 1999 of Regional Director Maximo B. Lim, DOLE-
NCR, is AFFIRMED.
Meanwhile, Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, was passed by the UEEA, wherein the
members allegedly reiterated their support and approval of the acts and collateral actions
of the officers. 1 4
A Motion for Reconsideration 1 5 was led by the petitioners with the BLR-DOLE, but
was denied in a Resolution 1 6 dated 15 January 2001.
A special civil action for certiorari 1 7 was thereafter led before the Court of
Appeals citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In a
Resolution 1 8 dated 22 February 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
outright for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section
3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A Motion for Reconsideration 1 9 was led
which was granted in a Resolution 2 0 dated 24 April 2001, thus, reinstating the petition. DCcHAa
On 24 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 2 1 dismissing the

petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
A Motion for Reconsideration 2 2 was thereafter led by the petitioners. In a

Resolution 2 3 dated 15 February 2002, the Court of Appeals modi ed its earlier decision.
The decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of this court is MODIFIED. The 22
September 2000 and 15 January 2001 resolutions of the BLR insofar as they
a rmed the part of the 22 November 1999 decision of the Regional Director of
DOLE-NCR ordering the immediate holding of election are HEREBY ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE. All the other aspects of the assailed Resolutions are AFFIRMED.
Not satis ed, the petitioners led a petition for review on certiorari 24 before this
Court.
The Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS' UPHOLDING THE DOLE-NCR AND BLR-DOLE DECISIONS
BASED ONLY ON THE COMPLAINT AND ANSWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO HOLD THE ELECTION OF APRIL 7, 2000 AS INVALID
AND A NULLITY;
AaCcST
3. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO UPHOLD BLR-DOLE'S

FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION WAS ILLEGAL; and
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED NON-HOLDING OF MEETINGS AND
ALLEGED NON-SUBMISSION OF REPORTS ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC, AND WHETHER THE DECISION TO HOLD MEETINGS AND
SUBMIT REPORTS CONTRADICT AND OVERRIDE THE SOVEREIGN
WILL OF THE MAJORITY. 2 5
The Court's Rulings
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
First Issue: was the court a quo correct in upholding the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE
decisions based only on the complaint and answer?
Petitioners contend that the complaint led by the private respondents in DOLE-NCR
was a mere recital of bare, self serving and unsubstantiated allegations. Both parties did
not submit position papers, and the DOLE-NCR resolved the case based only on the
complaint and answer. Also, by failing to submit a reply to the answer, private respondents,
in effect admitted the petitioners' controversion of the charges. 2 6 They further argue that
the private respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and that the requirement
of support by at least 30% of the members of the association for the ling of a complaint
for any violation of the constitution and by-laws and rights and conditions of membership,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I, Department Order No. 9 of DOLE, was not
complied with. 2 7
Private respondents, on the other hand, assert that the records show that despite
their failure to submit their position papers, they nonetheless moved that the case be
resolved by DOLE-NCR based on the complaint, answer and available exhibits or annexes
integrated with the aforesaid pleadings. 2 8 The principle of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies that would warrant the dismissal of the case should not operate
against them because they were deprived of their right to due process when they were
inde nitely suspended without the bene t of a formal charge which is su cient in form
and substance. 2 9 The respondents also point out that the thirty percent (30%) support
requirement pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I, Department Order No. 9, is not
applicable to them because their complaint was primordially predicated on their
suspension while the rest of the causes of action were mere collateral consequences of
the principal cause of action. 3 0
It is worthy to note that the BLR-DOLE, in its Resolution dated 22 September 2000,
underscored the negligence of herein petitioners not only in the submission of their
pleadings but also in attending the hearings called for the purpose. 3 1 Even the Court of
Appeals, in its decision, made this observation, thus: DACaTI
It is apparent, however, that petitioners were to blame for their

predicament. They repeatedly failed to appear in a series of conferences
scheduled by the DOLE-NCR, asked for resetting of hearings, and requested for
extension of time to le its answer. Hence, when they again did not attend a
hearing on a date they themselves asked for, private respondents (complainants
therein) moved for the submission of the case based on their complaint, position
paper and annexes attached thereto.
When DOLE-NCR directed the parties to submit their respective position

papers, petitioners again moved for extension of time to le the same. When
another notice was given to the parties to comply with the directive, petitioners
prayed for another extension of time. (Private respondents, however, reiterated
their earlier motion to have the case resolved based on available pleadings.) After
six (6) months or so, petitioners nally led not their position paper but their
answer. 3 2
The Court of Appeals was justi ed in upholding the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE
decisions based on the complaint and answer. We cannot accept petitioners' line of
reasoning that since no position papers were submitted, no decision may be made by the
adjudicating body. As ruled by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim in his decision, the
complaint and the answer thereto were adopted as the parties' position papers.
Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 3 3
Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention to
technicalities but without sacri cing the fundamental requisites of due process. 3 4 The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 3 5 In this case, it cannot be
said that there was a denial of due process on the part of the petitioners because they
were given all the chances to refute the allegations of the private respondents, and the
delay in the proceedings before the DOLE-NCR was clearly attributable to them.

The argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be
sustained. One of the instances when the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be disregarded is when there is a violation of due process. 3 6 In this case, the
respondents have chronicled from the very beginning that they were inde nitely
suspended without the bene t of a formal charge su cient in form and substance.
Therefore, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot squarely apply to
them.
On the matter concerning the 30% support requirement needed to report violations
of rights and conditions of union membership, as found in the last paragraph of Article 241
of the Labor Code, 3 7 must be strictly observed. We have already made our
pronouncement in the case of Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations 3 8 that the
30% requirement is not mandatory. In this case, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa, 3 9 held in part: DCASIT
The respondent Director's ruling, however, that the assent of 30% of the
union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code, was mandatory
and essential to the filing of a complaint for any violation of rights and conditions
of membership in a labor organization (such as the arbitrary and oppressive
increase of union dues here complained of), cannot be a rmed and will be
reversed. The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states
that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization may be made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all the members
of a union or any member or members specially concerned." The use of the
permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the notion that the assent of
30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the provision
expressly declares that the report may be made, alternatively by "any member or
members specially concerned." And further con rmation that the assent of 30%
of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the
Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code,
which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor
Relations Division in the Regional O ces of the Department of Labor, over " all
inter-union and intra-union con icts, and all disputes, grievances or problems
arising from or affecting labor management relations," making no reference
whatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the o cials mentioned
are given the power to act "on all inter-union and intra-union con icts (1) " upon
request of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their own initiative."
Second Issue: was the election held on 07 April 2000 valid or a nullity?
This issue arose from the fact that the original decision of the DOLE-NCR dated 22
November 1999, ordered petitioners, among other things, to "immediately hold/conduct an
election of o cers . . ." Petitioners, it must be recalled, appealed from the DOLE-NCR
decision to the BLR-DOLE. During the pendency of the appeal, however, an election of
o cers was held on 07 April 2000. Subsequently, the BLR-DOLE a rmed the decision of
the DOLE-NCR, but with the pronouncement that ". . . the supposed election conducted on
(07) April 2000 is null and void and cannot produce legal effects adverse to appellants." 4 0
The petitioners contend that since the election was held on 07 April 2000, and the
original complaint before the DOLE-NCR was led on 01 December 1997, the former could
not have been the subject of the complaint. There was, according to petitioners, reversible
error in the BLR-DOLE's adding to the DOLE-NCR's decision, the nulli cation of the 07 April
2000 election. The BLR–DOLE should have limited itself to a rming, modifying or setting
aside and canceling the provisions of the dispositive portion of the DOLE-NCR's decision
which was subject of the appeal. The election was held because the term of the petitioners
(extended for ve years under Republic Act No. 6715 4 1 ) expired on 07 April 2000. As
amended by Republic Act 6715, paragraph (c) of Article 241 of the Labor Code now reads:
cTACIa
(c) The members shall directly elect their o cers in the local union, as
well as their national o cers in the national union or federation to which they or
their local union is affiliated, by secret ballots at intervals of five (5) years.
It just so happened that the holding of the election coincided with the DOLE-NCR
decision. 4 2
The private respondents, in answer to this, point out that the 07 April 2000 election,
as appearing in the 22 September 2000 Resolution of the BLR-DOLE, was set aside not on
the imsy reason that there was no complaint to invalidate it, but due to the appeal of the
petitioners questioning the BLR-DOLE's order. The appeal effectively suspended the effect
of the DOLE-NCR Regional Director's order for the immediate holding of election of
officers in accordance with the union's constitution and by-laws. 4 3
On this matter, the Court of Appeals made the following observation:
Consequently, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR erred in ordering the
immediate holding of election of o cers of UEEA, and the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR)-Department of Labor and Employment, insofar as it a rmed this
particular order, committed an act amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, despite of this nding, the election of UEEA o cers on 7 April

2000 cannot acquire a semblance of legality. First, it was conducted pursuant to
the aforesaid (erroneous) order of the Regional Director as manifested by the
petitioners. Second, it was purposely done to pre-empt the resolution of the case
by the BLR and to deprive private respondents their substantial right to participate
in the election. Third, petitioners cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent
position to later on claim that the election of 7 April 2000 was held because it was
already due while previously declaring that it was made in line with the order of
the Regional Director, for this would go against the principle of fair play.
Thus, while the BLR was wrong in a rming the order of the Regional
Director for the immediate holding of election, it was right in nullifying the 7 April
2000 UEEA election of o cers. It was simply improper for the petitioners to
implement the said order which was then one of the subjects of their appeal in the
BLR. To hold otherwise would be to dispossess the BLR of its inherent power to
control the conduct of the proceedings of cases pending before it for resolution.
44
Based on the prevailing facts of this case, we a rm the foregoing ndings of the
court a quo. We cannot hold the election of 07 April 2000 valid as this would make us
condone an iniquitous act. Said election was perceptibly done to hinder any resolution or
decision that would be made by BLR-DOLE. The Regional Director indeed ordered the
immediate holding of an election in its Order dated 22 November 1999. The records show
that the petitioners questioned this order of the Regional Director before the BLR-DOLE by
way of appeal, 4 5 and yet, they conducted the election, allegedly because it was due under
Republic Act No. 6715. Why this was done by the petitioners escapes us. But as rightfully
observed by the BLR-DOLE: SDHAEC

. . . Indeed, it is obvious that the general membership meeting and election
of o cers was done purposely to pre-empt our resolution of this case and, more
importantly, the participation of appellees in the election. This cannot be
tolerated. 4 6
Third Issue: was the indefinite suspension of the private respondents illegal?
We rule in the affirmative.
The petitioners posit the theory that the records do not support the ndings of the
BLR-DOLE that no investigation was conducted making the suspension illegal because of
lack of due process.
It is best to remind the petitioners that this Court, as we have held in a long line of
decisions, is not a trier of facts. 4 7 The instant case is a petition for review on certiorari 4 8
where only questions of law may be raised. The exceptions 4 9 to this rule nd no
application here. This being the case, the ndings of fact of the DOLE-NCR and the BLR-
DOLE as a rmed by the Court of Appeals to the effect that no investigation was
conducted, shall not be disturbed. As properly held by the court a quo:
Petitioners have failed to show that the ndings of facts and conclusions
of law of both the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE were arrived at with grave abuse of
discretion or without substantial evidence. A careful review of the pleadings
before Us reveals that the decision and resolutions of the concerned agencies
were correctly anchored in law and on substantial evidence. 5 0
Fourth Issue: is the non-holding of meetings and non-submission of reports by the

petitioners moot and academic, and whether the decision to hold meetings and submit
reports contradict and override the sovereign will of the majority? cETDIA
We do not believe so.

This issue was precipitated by the Court of Appeals decision a rming the order of
DOLE Regional Director Maximo B. Lim for the petitioners to hold a general membership
meeting wherein they make open and available the union's/association's books of
accounts and other documents pertaining to the union funds, and to regularly conduct
special and general membership meetings in accordance with the union's constitution and
by-laws. 5 1 It is to be recalled that the private respondents, when they led a complaint
before the DOLE-NCR also complained of petitioners' refusal to render nancial and other
reports, and deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings.
Petitioners do not hide the fact that they belatedly submitted their nancial reports
and the minutes of their meetings to the DOLE. The issue of belatedly submitting these
reports, according to the petitioners, had been rendered moot and academic by their
eventual compliance. Besides, this has been the practice of the association. 5 2 Moreover,
the petitioners likewise maintain that the passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10
dated 10 December 1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, following the application
of the principle that the sovereign majority rules, cured any liability that may have been
brought about by their belated actions. 5 3
As found by the Court of Appeals, the nancial statements for the years 1995 up to
1997 were submitted to DOLE-NCR only on 06 February 1998 while that for the year 1998
was submitted only on 16 March 1999. 5 4 The last association's meeting was conducted
on 21 April 1995, and the copy of the minutes thereon was submitted to BLR-DOLE only on
24 February 1998. EATcHD

The passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10 December 1997 and
Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, 5 5 which supposedly cured the lapses committed by the
association's o cers and reiterated the approval of the general membership of the acts
and collateral actions of the association's o cers cannot redeem the petitioners from
their predicament. The obligation to hold meetings and render nancial reports is
mandated by UEEA's constitution and by-laws. This fact was never denied by the
petitioners. Their eventual compliance, as what happened in this case, will not release them
from the obligation to accomplish these things in the future.
Prompt compliance in rendering nancial reports together with the holding of
regular meetings with the submission of the minutes thereon with the BLR-DOLE and
DOLE-NCR will negate any suspicion of dishonesty on the part of UEEA's o cers. This is
not only true with UEEA, but likewise with other unions/associations, as this matter is
imbued with public interest. Undeniably, transparency in the o cial undertakings of union
officers will bolster genuine trade unionism in the country.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals subjects of the instant case, are affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 191-204; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate
Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Mariano C. Del Castillo concurring.
2. Rollo, pp. 205-207.

3. BLR-DOLE Resolution dated 22 September 2000, pp. 1-2; CA Rollo, unnumbered and
page 66.
4. CA Rollo, p. 66.
5. CA Rollo, p. 99.
6. CA Rollo, pp. 100-105.
7. CA Rollo, p. 123.
8. Rollo, p. 193.
9. Rollo, p. 89.
10. CA Rollo, pp. 122-127.
11. CA Rollo, p. 188.
12. Rollo, pp. 50-67.

13. Rollo, pp. 88-92.
14. Rollo, p. 22.
15. Rollo, pp. 93-108.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171153. September 12, 2007.]
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION–PHILIPPINE

TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEU–
PTGWO) petitioner, vs . SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS
PTGWO),
EMPLOYEES UNION–PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG
(SMPPEU–PDMP) respondent. 1
PILIPINO (SMPPEU–PDMP),
DECISION
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioner SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PHILIPPINE
TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEU-PTGWO) prays that
this Court reverse and set aside the (a) Decision 2 dated 9 March 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66200, a rming the Decision 3 dated 19 February 2001 of
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) which upheld the Certi cate of Registration of respondent SAN MIGUEL
PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION–PAMBANSANG DIWA NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEU–PDMP); and (b) the Resolution 4 dated 16
January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the same case, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of
the regular monthly-paid rank and le employees of the three divisions of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel
Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all
o ces and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Laguna.
It had been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years — from 1987 to 1997.
Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter Certi cate No. 112 to respondent on 15 June
1 9 9 9 . 5 In compliance with registration requirements, respondent submitted the
requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose of acquiring legal personality. 6 Upon
submission of its charter certi cate and other documents, respondent was issued
Certi cate of Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999. 7
Thereafter, respondent led with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional O cer in the
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions for certi cation election
to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP. 8 All three petitions were dismissed, on the
ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit. 9
On 17 August 1999, petitioner led with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the
cancellation of respondent's registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate
labor organizations. In its petition, petitioner accused respondent of committing fraud
and falsi cation, and non-compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its
certi cate of registration. It raised allegations that respondent violated Articles 239 (a),
(b) and (c) 1 0 and 234 (c) 1 1 of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that
PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot
directly create a local or chapter. The petition was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-
9908-007-IRD. 1 2
On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order
dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and irregularity in the
submission of documents by respondent. Regional Director Lim further ruled that
respondent is allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he found that
respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered
the cancellation of its certi cate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate
labor organizations. 1 3 Respondent appealed to the BLR. In a Decision dated 19
February 2001, it declared:
As a chartered local union, appellant is not required to submit the number
of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Thus, the revocation
of its registration based on non-compliance with the 20% membership
requirement does not have any basis in the rules.
Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade union center, it is a holder

of Registration Certi cate No. FED-11558-LC issued by the BLR on 14 February
1991, which bestowed upon it the status of a legitimate labor organization with
all the rights and privileges to act as representative of its members for purposes
of collective bargaining agreement. On this basis, PDMP can charter or create a
local, in accordance with the provisions of Department Order No. 9. IEHScT
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of

the Regional Director dated July 14, 2000, canceling the registration of appellant
San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (SMPPEU-PDMP) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant shall hereby remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. 1 4
While the BLR agreed with the ndings of the DOLE Regional Director dismissing
the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly
create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional Director's ruling that the 20%
membership is a requirement for respondent to attain legal personality as a labor
organization. Petitioner thereafter led a Motion for Reconsideration with the BLR. In a
Resolution rendered on 19 June 2001 in BLR-A-C-64-05-9-00 (NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD),
the BLR denied the Motion for Reconsideration and a rmed its Decision dated 19
February 2001. 1 5
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies, petitioner led with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66200. The Court
of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissed the petition and a rmed the
Decision of the BLR, ruling as follows:
In Department Order No. 9, a registered federation or national union may
directly create a local by submitting to the BLR copies of the charter certi cate,
the local's constitution and by-laws, the principal o ce address of the local, and
the names of its o cers and their addresses. Upon complying with the
documentary requirements, the local shall be issued a certi cate and included in
the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The [herein respondent] is an a liate
of a registered federation PDMP, having been issued a charter certi cate. Under
the rules we have reviewed, there is no need for SMPPEU to show a membership
of 20% of the employees of the bargaining unit in order to be recognized as a
legitimate labor union.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision and resolution of the BLR
are AFFIRMED, and the petition is DISMISSED. 1 6 DHECac
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the Court of Appeals

denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision. HAaDcS
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
where petitioner raises the sole issue of: DHaECI
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND NAMES OF
ALL ITS MEMBERS COMPRISING AT LEAST 20% OF THE EMPLOYEES IN
THE BARGAINING UNIT WHERE IT SEEKS TO OPERATE.
The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent as a

legitimate labor organization. aICHEc
Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a list of members

comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit before it may acquire
legitimacy, citing Article 234 (c) of the Labor Code which stipulates that any applicant
labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal
personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate
labor organizations upon issuance of the certi cate of registration based on the
following requirements: aCTHEA
a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
b. The names of its o cers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
c. The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all
the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
d. If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its
annual financial reports; and
e. Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes
of its adoption or rati cation and the list of the members who participated
in it. 1 7 SCDaHc
Petitioner also insists that the 20% requirement for registration of respondent
must be based not on the number of employees of a single division, but in all three
divisions of the company in all the o ces and plants of SMC since they are all part of
one bargaining unit. Petitioner refers to Section 1, Article 1 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), 1 8 quoted hereunder: aEDCAH
ARTICLE 1
SCOPE
Section 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit. The appropriate bargaining unit
covered by this Agreement consists of all regular rank and le employees paid on
the basis of xed salary per month and employed by the COMPANY in its
Corporate Staff Units (CSU), San Miguel Brewing Products (SMBP) and San
Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP) and in different operations existing in the
City of Manila and suburbs, including Metal Closure and Lithography Plant
located at Canlubang, Laguna subject to the provisions of Article XV of this
Agreement provided however, that if during the term of this Agreement, a plant
within the territory covered by this Agreement is transferred outside but within a
radius of fty (50) kilometers from the Rizal Monument, Rizal Park, Metro Manila,
the employees in the transferred plant shall remain in the bargaining unit covered
by this Agreement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner thus maintains that respondent, in any case, failed to meet this 20%
membership requirement since it based its membership on the number of employees
of a single division only, namely, the SMPP. HSDIaC
There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

A legitimate labor organization 1 9 is de ned as "any labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or
local thereof." 2 0 The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict compliance with the
requirements on registration because a legitimate labor organization is entitled to
speci c rights under the Labor Code, 2 1 and are involved in activities directly affecting
matters of public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure
of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous
or y-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor
organization for illegitimate ends. 2 2 Legitimate labor organizations have exclusive
rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which
is the right to be certi ed as the exclusive representative 2 3 of all the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. 2 4 The
acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to le a
petition for certi cation election, rst and foremost, depends on whether or not the
labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization. 2 5 aAHISE
A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered with the BLR as a
"local" or "chapter" of PDMP and was issued Charter Certi cate No. 112 on 15 June
1999. Hence, respondent was directly chartered by PDMP.
The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is
provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, as amended by
Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21 June 1997, and again by Department
Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No.
9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since respondent's petition for
certi cation election was led with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August
1999. 2 6 DSAICa
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the

creation of a chapter or a local. The rst involves the a liation of an independent union
with a federation or national union or industry union. The second, nding application in
the instant petition, involves the direct creation of a local or a chapter through the
process of chartering. 2 7 cEDaTS
A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or

chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional O ce or to the BLR two copies of the
following:
(a) A charter certi cate issued by the federation or national union indicating the
creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's o cers, their addresses, and the principal
office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided, That where the
local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the
federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly. SACTIH
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certi ed under oath by

the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.
2 8 DTEHIA
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly created
by a federation or national union. A duly constituted local or chapter created in
accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal personality from the date of ling of
the complete documents with the BLR. 2 9 The issuance of the certi cate of registration
by the BLR or the DOLE Regional O ce is not the operative act that vests legal
personality upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal
personality is acquired from the ling of the complete documentary requirements
enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI. 3 0 CAIHTE
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by

Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of the Labor Code when it provided for
less stringent requirements for the creation of a chapter or local. This Court disagrees.
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor
organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR: TaCIDS
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or

workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its o cers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all
the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its
annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes
of its adoption or rati cation, and the list of the members who participated
in it. (Italics supplied.)
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an independent

labor organization, association or group of unions or workers.
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently. This
Court, in the landmark case of Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, 3 1 declared that when an unregistered union
becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for
registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for
registration of an independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the
number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article
234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the
same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. 3 2 The intent of the law in
imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation
or national union is to encourage the a liation of a local union with a federation or
national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms
and conditions of labor. 3 3
Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano 3 4 where the validity of
Department Order No. 9 was directly put in issue, this Court was unequivocal in nding
that there is no inconsistency between the Labor Code and Department Order No. 9. IEaHSD
As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certi cate of Registration

through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court nds that the imputations are not
impressed with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare that respondent committed
fraud and misrepresentation remains wanting. This Court had, indeed, on several
occasions, pronounced that registration based on false and fraudulent statements and
documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized,
which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights. 3 5
This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of a
labor organization based on fraud and misrepresentation in securing its certi cate of
registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof
should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence. The records of
the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and
this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative
agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is con ned to speci c matters, are generally accorded not
only great respect but even finality. 3 6
IcHDCS
Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately
created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it is not a legitimate labor
organization, it being a trade union center. TcaAID
Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of

PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line of reasoning attempts to predicate that a
trade union center is not a legitimate labor organization. In the process, the legitimacy
of PDMP is being impugned, albeit indirectly. Secondly, the same contention premises
that a trade union center cannot directly create a local or chapter through the process
of chartering.
Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the legal personality
of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP, cannot be subject to a collateral
attack. The law is very clear on this matter. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as
amended, de nes a legitimate labor organization 3 7 as "any labor organization duly
registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local thereof." 3 8 On the other
hand, a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such
members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and
employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in
accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. 3 9 IDCScA
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed

registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certi cate of
registration. Once a certi cate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality
cannot be subject to collateral attack. 4 0 It may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules. The aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following: DaTISc
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers'

association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the
date of issuance of its certi cate of registration. Such legal personality cannot
thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules. SCEHaD
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration Certi cate
No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14 February 1991. Until the certi cate of registration
of PDMP is cancelled, its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization subsists.
Once a union acquires legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues to be
recognized as such until its certi cate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an
independent action for cancellation. 4 1 It bears to emphasize that what is being directly
challenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization and not
that of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this Court is without jurisdiction to
entertain questions indirectly impugning the legitimacy of PDMP.
Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant to a
legitimate labor organization, 4 2 and continues to be recognized as such until its
certi cate of registration is successfully impugned and thereafter cancelled or revoked
in an independent action for cancellation.
We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local or a
chapter, it being a trade union center. TDcAIH
This Court reverses the nding of the appellate court and BLR on this ground, and
rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter.
After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both statutory
and regulatory, 4 3 we nd no legal justi cation to support the conclusion that a trade
union center is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering.
Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the rst and fundamental duty of this Court,
which is to apply the law. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not
written therein. 4 4 HAIaEc
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was enacted in
1972. Being a legislation on social justice, 4 5 the provisions of the Labor Code and the
Implementing Rules have been subject to several amendments, and they continue to
evolve, considering that labor plays a major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor
Code was rst amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act No.
9481. Incidentally, the term trade union center was never mentioned under Presidential
Decree No. 442, even as it was amended by Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade
union center was rst adopted in the Implementing Rules, under Department Order No.
9. cEaCAH

Culling from its de nition as provided by Department Order No. 9, a trade union
center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the
mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective
bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies,
standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule
III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. 4 6 The same rule provides that the application
for registration of an industry or trade union center shall be supported by the following:
ESTDIA
(a) The list of its member organizations and their respective presidents and, in the
case of an industry union, the industry where the union seeks to operate;
(b) The resolution of membership of each member organization, approved by the

Board of Directors of such union;
(c) The name and principal address of the applicant, the names of its o cers and
their addresses, the minutes of its organizational meeting/s, and the list of
member organizations and their representatives who attended such
meeting/s; and
(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of its rati cation by a
majority of the presidents of the member organizations, provided that
where the rati cation was done simultaneously with the organizational
meeting, it shall be su cient that the fact of rati cation be included in the
minutes of the organizational meeting. 4 7
Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at

least ten locals or chapters or a liates, each of which must be a duly certi ed or
recognized collective bargaining agent; 4 8 a trade union center, on the other hand, is
composed of a group of registered national unions or federations. 4 9 cDAEIH
The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide that "a
duly registered federation or national union" may directly create a local or chapter. The
provision reads: HScCEa
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. — A duly registered

federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting to
the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certi cate issued by the federation or national union

indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's o cers, their addresses, and the
principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided that where the
local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or
national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.ASDCaI
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certi ed under oath by

the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.
5 0 ESTDcC
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is

allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering — a duly registered
federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 de nes a "chartered local" as a
labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired
legal personality through a charter certi cate, issued by a duly registered federation or
national union and reported to the Regional O ce in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-
E of these Rules. 5 1 IHCSTE
Republic Act No. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right
to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As
Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines" lapsed 5 2 into law on
25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007. 5 3 This law further amends the
Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations.
Pertinent amendments read as follows: SCcHIE
SEC. 1. Article 234 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise

known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. — A federation, national

union or industry or trade union center or an independent union shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its o cers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and
the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all

its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees
in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more
years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant

union, minutes of its adoption or rati cation, and the list of the members
who participated in it.
SEC. 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor Code as Article
234-A to read as follows: THAICD
ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a Local Chapter. — A duly

registered federation or national union may directly create a local chapter
by issuing a charter certi cate indicating the establishment of the local
chapter. The chapter shall acquire legal personality only for purposes of
ling a petition for certi cation election from the date it was issued a
charter certificate.
The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights and privileges of a

legitimate labor organization only upon the submission of the following
documents in addition to its charter certificate:
(a) The names of the chapter's o cers, their addresses, and the
principal office of the chapter; and TAacHE
(b) The chapter's constitution and by-laws: Provided, That where the
chapter's constitution and by-laws are the same as that of the federation or
the national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
The additional supporting requirements shall be certi ed under oath

by the secretary or treasurer of the chapter and attested by its president.
(Emphasis ours.) ICTaEH
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but interestingly, the
provision indicating the procedure for chartering or creating a local or chapter, namely
Article 234-A, still makes no mention of a "trade union center." IDaEHC
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment of the
implementing rules, 5 4 there was no mention of a trade union center as being among the
labor organizations allowed to charter. ISaCTE
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are speci ed in a law, contract, or
will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute
speci es one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain
provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. 5 5 Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters. 5 6 Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law could have
so easily and conveniently included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor
organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended
or re ected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. 5 7 The rule is
restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body
would not have made speci c enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to
restrict its meaning and con ne its terms to those expressly mentioned. 5 8 Expressium
facit cessare tacitum. 5 9 What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have been
omitted intentionally. aSTcCE
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules,
the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or local through
chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is without
authority to charter directly. DAEaTS
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the policy of
the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement, 6 0 and thus assure the rights of workers to self-organization. 6 1 The
mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict compliance with the procedural
requirements for registration is not without reason. It has been observed that the
formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union
registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a
convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation
or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness,
which is basic to free unionism. 6 2 As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to
speci c rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public
interest, it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties affected. 6 3
However, as this Court has enunciated in Progressive Development Corporation v.
Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, it is not this Court's function to
augment the requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as previously
discussed, is to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for
local or chapter formation. 6 4
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization,
it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be
created under the more lenient requirements for chartering, but must have complied
with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union,
including the 20% membership requirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 09 March
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 66200 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Certi cate of Registration of San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union–
Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-
PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. The Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) was omitted as public respondent from the title of the
case. In appeals via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the tribunal promulgating the appealed Decision is not impleaded.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guarina III with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon
and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
3. CA rollo, pp. 17-21.

4. Rollo, p. 51.
5. Charter Certificate; CA rollo, p. 45.

6. The following documents were submitted:
a. Charter Certificate
b. Constitution and By-Laws
c. Lists and Addresses of Union Officers
d. Financial Report
e. Organization Meeting and Joint Resolution and Petition for Certification Election
7. Certificate of Creation of Chapter/local; CA rollo, p. 44.

8. On 15 June 1999, within the freedom period of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
respondent filed a Petition for Certification Election covering SMC-SMPP. The three
petitions were consolidated on appeal with an earlier petition for certification election
filed by San Miguel Corporation Employees Union Greater Manila and Canlubang Area
(SMCEU-GMCA) docketed as OS-A-2-17-00.
9. Id. at 18; Section 2 of Rule XI, Book V of the Implementing Rules, as amended by D.O. No. 9
provides that where two or more petitions for certification election involving the same
bargaining unit are filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149763. July 7, 2009.]
EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR., MA. MELVYN P. ALAMIS, NORMA P.

PEDROSA petitioners, vs . GIL Y.
COLLANTES, and FERNANDO PEDROSA,
GAMILLA, RENE LUIS TADLE, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, MA. LOURDES
C. MEDINA, EDNA B. SANCHEZ, REMEDIOS GARCIA, MAFEL YSRAEL,
ZAIDA GAMILLA, and AURORA DOMINGO , respondents.
DECISION
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, are (1) the Decision 2 dated 16 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60657, dismissing petitioners' Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) the Resolution 3 dated 30 August 2001 of the appellate court in the same
case denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
I
FACTS
The Petition at bar arose from the following factual and procedural antecedents.
(1) Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022
At the time when the numerous controversies in the instant case rst came
about, petitioners Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr., Ma. Melvyn P. Alamis, Norma P.
Collantes, and Fernando Pedrosa were among the executive o cers and directors
(collectively called the Mariño Group) of the University of Sto. Tomas Faculty Union
(USTFU), a labor union duly organized and registered under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines and the bargaining representative of the faculty members of the
University of Santo Tomas (UST). 4
Respondents Gil Y. Gamilla, Rene Luis Tadle, Norma S. Calaguas, Ma. Lourdes C.
Medina, Edna B. Sanchez, Remedios Garcia, Mafel Ysrael, Zaida Gamilla, and Aurora
Domingo were UST professors and USTFU members.
The 1986 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between UST and USTFU
expired on 31 May 1988. Thereafter, bargaining negotiations ensued between UST and
the Mariño Group, which represented USTFU. As the parties were not able to reach an
agreement despite their earnest efforts, a bargaining deadlock was declared and
USTFU led a notice of strike. Subsequently, then Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Franklin Drilon assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, which
was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-02-117-89. The DOLE Secretary issued an Order on 19
October 1990, laying the terms and conditions for a new CBA between the UST and
USTFU. In accordance with said Order, the UST and USTFU entered into a CBA in 1991,
which was to be effective for the period of 1 June 1988 to 31 May 1993 (hereinafter
1988-1993 CBA). In keeping with Article 253-A 5 of the Labor Code, as amended, the
economic provisions of the 1988-1993 CBA were subject to renegotiation for the
fourth and fifth years. ICDcEA
Accordingly, on 10 September 1992, UST and USTFU executed a Memorandum

of Agreement (MOA), 6 whereby UST faculty members belonging to the collective
bargaining unit were granted additional economic bene ts for the fourth and fth years
of the 1988-1993 CBA, speci cally, the period from 1 June 1992 up to 31 May 1993.
The relevant portions of the MOA read:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
xxx xxx xxx

1.0. The University hereby grants additional bene ts to Faculty
Members belonging to the collective bargaining unit as de ned in Article I,
Section 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between the parties
herein over and above the bene ts now enjoyed by the said faculty members,
which additional benefits shall amount in the aggregate to P42,000,000.00[.]
P42,000,000.00
2.0. Under this Agreement the University shall grant salary increases, to
wit:
2.1. THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS per lecture unit per month to covered
faculty members retroactive to June 1, 1991;
2.2. Additional THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS per lecture unit per month on
top of the salary increase granted in [paragraph] 2.1 hereof to the said faculty
members effective June 1, 1992;
2.3. In the case of a covered faculty member whose compensation is

computed on a basis other than lecture unit per month, he shall receive salary
increases that are equivalent to those provided in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 hereof,
with the amount of salary increases being arrived at by using the usual method of
computing the said faculty member's basic pay;
3.0. The UNIVERSITY shall likewise restore to the faculty members

the amounts corresponding to the deductions in salary that were taken from the
pay checks in the second half of June, 1989 and in the rst half of July, 1989,
provided that said deductions in salary relate to the union activities that were held
in the aforestated payroll periods, and provided further that the amounts involved
shall be taken from the P42 Million (sic) economic package.
4.0. A portion of the P42,000,000.00 economic package amounting to

P2,000,000.00 shall be used to satisfy all obligations that remained outstanding
and unpaid in the May 17, 1986 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
5.0. Any unspent balance of the aggregate of P42,000,000.00 as of

October 15, 1992, shall, within two weeks, be remitted to the Union[:] CSTDIE
5.1. The unspent balance mentioned in paragraph 5.0 inclusive of

earnings but exclusive of check-offs, shall be used for the salary increases herein
granted up to May 31, 1993, for increases in hospitalization, educational and
retirement benefits, and for other economic benefits.
6.0. The bene ts herein granted constitute the entire and complete
package of economic bene ts granted by the UNIVERSITY to the covered faculty
members for the balance of the term of the existing collective bargaining
agreement.
7.0. It is clearly understood and agreed upon that the
aggregate sum of P42 million is chargeable against the share of the
faculty members in the incremental proceeds of tuition fees collected
collected Provided, however, that he ( sic) commitment of the
and still to be collected;
UNIVERSITY to pay the aggregate sum of P42 million shall subsist even if the
said amount exceeds the proportionate share that may accrue to the faculty
members in the tuition fee increases that the UNIVERSITY may be authorized to
collect in School-Year 1992-1993, and, Provided, nally, that the covered faculty
members shall still be entitled to their proportionate share in any undistributed
portion of the incremental proceeds of the tuition fee increases in School-Year
1992-1993, and incremental proceeds are, by law and pertinent
Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) regulations,
required to be allotted for the payment of salaries, wages, allowances
and other bene ts of teaching and non-teaching personnel for the
UNIVERSITY .
8.0. With this Agreement, the parties confirm that[:]
8.1. the University has complied with the requirements of the law
relative to the release and distribution of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee
increases as these incremental proceeds pertain to the faculty share in the tuition
fee increase collected during the School-Year 1991-1992; and,
8.2. the economic bene ts herein granted constitute the full and
complete nancial obligation of the UNIVERSITY to the members of its faculty for
the period June 1, 1991 to May 31, 1993, pursuant to the provisions of the
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement.
9.0. Subject to the provisions of law, and without reducing the

amounts of salary increases granted under paragraphs 2.0, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3[,] the
UNION shall have the right to a pro-rata lump sum check-off of all sums of
money due and payable to it from the package of economic bene ts granted
under this Agreement, provided that there is an authorization of a majority of the
members of the UNION and provided, further, that the P42 million economic
package herein granted shall not in any way be exceeded. IEAacS
10.0. This Agreement shall be effective for a period of two (2) years,
starting June 1, 1991 and ending on May 31, 1993, provided, however, that if for
any reason no new collective bargaining agreement is entered into at the
expiration date hereof, this Agreement, together with the March 18, 1991
Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall remain in full force and effect until such
time as a new collective bargaining agreement shall have been executed by the
parties.
xxx xxx xxx
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS UST FACULTY UNION

BY: BY:
(signed) (signed)
FR. TERESO M. CAMPILLO, JR., O.P. ATTY. EDUARDO J.
Treasurer MARINO, JR.
President
Attested by[:]
(signed)
REV. FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, O.P. (Emphasis ours.)
On 12 September 1992, the majority of USTFU members signed individual

instruments of rati cation, 7 which purportedly signi ed their consent to the economic
benefits granted under the MOA. Said instruments uniformly recited:
RATIFICATION OF THE UST-USTFU MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED
SEPTEMBER 10, 1992 GRANTING A PACKAGE OF THE P42 MILLION FACULTY
BENEFITS WITH PROVISION FOR CHECK-OFF.
September 12, 1992

Date
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I, the undersigned UST faculty member, aware that the law requires
rati cation and that without rati cation by majority of all faculty members
belonging to the collective bargaining unit, the Memorandum of Agreement
between the University of Santo Tomas and the UST Faculty Union (or USTFU)
dated September 10, 1992 may be questioned and all the faculty bene ts granted
therein may be cancelled, do hereby ratify the said agreement.
agreement
Under the Agreement, the University shall pay P42 million over a period of
two (2) years from June 1, 1991 up to May 31, 1992. ITDSAE
In consideration of the efforts of the UST Faculty Union as the faculty

members' sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative in obtaining the
said P42 million package of economic bene ts, a check-off of ten percent
thereof covering union dues, and special assessment for Labor
Education Fund and attorney's fees from USTFU members and agency
fee from non-members for the period of the Agreement is hereby authorized to
be made in one lump sum effective immediately, provided that two per cent ( sic)
shall be for [the] administration of the Agreement and the balance of eight per
cent (sic) shall be for attorney's fees to be donated, as pledged by the USTFU
lawyer to the Philippine Foundation for the Advancement of the Teaching
Profession, Inc. whose principal purpose is the advancement of the teaching
profession and teacher's welfare, and provided further that the deductions shall
not be taken from my individual monthly salary but from the total package of P42
million due under the Agreement.
_________________________
Signature of Faculty Member (Emphasis ours.)
USTFU, through its President, petitioner Atty. Mariño, wrote a letter 8 dated 1
October 1992 to the UST Treasurer requesting the release to the union of the sum of
P4.2 million, which was 10% of the P42 million economic bene ts package granted by
the MOA to faculty members belonging to the collective bargaining unit. The P4.2
million was sought by USTFU in consideration of its efforts in obtaining the said P42
million economic bene ts package. UST remitted the sum of P4.2 million to USTFU on
9 October 1992. 9
After deducting from the P42 million economic bene ts package the P4.2 million
check-off to USTFU, the amounts owed to UST, and the salary increases and bonuses of
the covered faculty members, a net amount of P6,389,145.04 remained. The remaining
amount was distributed to the faculty members on 18 November 1994.
On 15 December 1994, respondents 1 0 led with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-National
Capital Region (NCR), a Complaint for the expulsion of the Mariño Group as USTFU
o cers and directors, which was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022 . 1 1
Respondents alleged in their Complaint that the Mariño Group violated the rights and
conditions of membership in USTFU, particularly by: 1) investing the unspent balance of
the P42 million economic bene ts package given by UST without prior approval of the
general membership; 2) simultaneously holding elections viva voce; 3) ratifying the CBA
involving the P42 million economic bene ts package; and 4) approving the
attorney's/agency fees worth P4.2 million in the form of check-off. Respondents prayed
that the Mariño Group be declared jointly and severally liable for refunding all collected
attorney's/agency fees from individual members of USTFU and the collective
bargaining unit; and that, after due hearing, the Mariño group be expelled as USTFU
officers and directors. SCHIac

On 16 December 1994, UST and USTFU, represented by the Mariño Group,
entered into a new CBA, effective 1 June 1993 to 31 May 1998 (1993-1998 CBA). This
new CBA was registered with the DOLE on 20 February 1995.
Respondents 1 2 led with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, on 18 October 1995,
another Complaint against the Mariño Group for violation of the rights and conditions
of union membership, which was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028 . 1 3
The Complaint primarily sought to invalidate certain provisions of the 1993-1998 CBA
negotiated by the Mariño Group for USTFU and the registration of said CBA with the
DOLE.
On 24 September 1996, petitioner Norma Collantes, as USTFU Secretary-General,
posted notices in some faculty rooms at UST, informing the union members of a
general assembly to be held on 5 October 1996. Part of the agenda for said date was
the election of new USTFU o cers. The following day, 25 September 1996,
respondents wrote a letter 1 4 to the USTFU Committee on Elections, urging the latter to
re-schedule the elections to ensure a free, clean, honest, and orderly election and to
afford the union members the time to prepare themselves for the same. The USTFU
Committee on Elections failed to act positively on respondents' letter, and neither did
they adopt and promulgate the rules and regulations for the conduct of the scheduled
election.
Thus, on 1 October 1996, respondents 1 5 led with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR,
an Urgent Ex-Parte Petition/Complaint, which was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-
9610-001 . 1 6 Respondents alleged in their Petition/Complaint that the general
membership meeting called by the USTFU Board of Directors on 5 October 1996, the
agenda of which included the election of union o cers, was in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of USTFU. Respondents prayed that the
DOLE supervise the conduct of the USTFU elections, and that they be awarded
attorney's fees.
On 4 October 1996, the Med-Arbiter DOLE-NCR, issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining the holding of the USTFU elections scheduled the next day.
Also on 4 October 1996, the UST Secretary General headed a general faculty
assembly attended by USTFU members, as well as USTFU non-members, but who were
members of the collective bargaining unit. During said assembly, respondents were
among the elected o cers of USTFU (collectively referred to as the Gamilla Group).
Petitioners led with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, a Petition seeking injunctive reliefs
and the nulli cation of the results of the 4 October 1994 election. The Petition was
docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 . ITCHSa
In a Decision dated 11 February 1997 in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016, the Med-

Arbiter DOLE-NCR, nulli ed the election of the Gamilla Group as USTFU o cers on 4
October 1996 for having been conducted in violation of the Constitution and By-Laws
of the union. This ruling of the Med-Arbiter was a rmed on appeal by the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) in a Resolution issued on 15 August 1997. Respondents were,
thus, prompted to le a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
131235 .
While G.R. No. 131235 was pending, the term of o ce of the Gamilla Group as
USTFU o cers expired on 4 October 1999. The Gamilla Group then scheduled the next
election of USTFU officers on 14 January 2000.
On 16 November 1999, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 131235,
a rming the BLR Resolution dated 15 August 1997 which ruled that the purported
election of USTFU o cers held on 4 October 1996 was void for violating the
Constitution and By-Laws of the union. 1 7
On 15 November 1996, respondents 1 8 filed before the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, a
fourth Complaint/Petition against the Mariño Group, as well as the Philippine
Foundation for the Advancement of the Teaching Profession, Inc., Security Bank
Corporation, and Bank of the Philippine Islands, which was docketed as Case No.
NCR-OD-M-9611-009 . 1 9 Respondents claimed in their latest Complaint/Petition that
they were the legitimate USTFU o cers, having been elected on 4 October 1996. They
prayed for an order directing the Mariño Group to cease and desist from using the
name of USTFU and from performing acts for and on behalf of the USTFU and the rest
of the members of the collective bargaining unit.THIAaD
DOLE Department Order No. 9 took effect on 21 June 1997, amending the Rules
Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, as amended. Thereunder, jurisdiction over the
complaints for any violation of the union constitution and by-laws and the conditions of
union membership was vested in the Regional Director of the DOLE. 2 0 Pursuant to said
Department Order, all four Petitions/Complaints led by respondents against the
Mariño Group, particularly, Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022, Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-
028, Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9611-009 were
consolidated and indorsed to the Office of the Regional Director of the DOLE-NCR.
On 27 May 1999, the DOLE-NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision 2 1 in the
consolidated cases in respondents' favor.
In Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028, the DOLE-
NCR Regional Director adjudged the Mariño Group, as the executive o cers of USTFU,
guilty of violating the provisions of the USTFU Constitution and By-laws by failing to
collect union dues and to conduct a general assembly every three months. The DOLE-
NCR Regional Director also ruled that the Mariño Group violated Article 241 (c) 2 2 and
(l) 2 3 of the Labor Code when they did not submit a list of union o cers to the DOLE;
when they did not submit/provide DOLE and the USTFU members with copies of the
audited nancial statements of the union; and when they invested in a bank, without
prior consent of USTFU members, the sum of P9,766,570.01, which formed part of the
P42 million economic benefits package.
Additionally, the DOLE-NCR Regional Director declared that the check-off of P4.2
million collected by the Mariño Group, as negotiation fees, was invalid. According to the
MOA executed on 10 September 1992 by UST and USTFU, the P42 million economic
bene ts package was chargeable against the share of the faculty members in the
incremental proceeds of tuition fees collected and still to be collected. Under Republic
Act No. 6728, 2 4 70% of the tuition fee increases should be allotted to academic and
non-academic personnel. Given that the records were silent as to how much of the P42
million economic bene ts package was obtained through negotiations and how much
was from the statutory allotment of 70% of the tuition fee increases, the DOLE-NCR
Regional Director held that the entire amount was within the statutory allotment, which
could not be the subject of negotiation and, thus, could not be burdened by negotiation
fees.
The DOLE-NCR Regional Director further found that the principal subject of Case
No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 (i.e., violation by the Mariño Group of the provisions on
election of o cers in the Labor Code and the USTFU Constitution and By-Laws) had
been superseded by the central event in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9611-009 (i.e., the
subsequent election of another set of USTFU o cers consisting of the Gamilla Group).
While there were two sets of USTFU o cers vying for legitimacy, the eventual ruling of
the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, for the expulsion of the Mariño Group from their
positions as USTFU officers, practically extinguished Case No. NCR-OD-M-9611-009. EacHSA
The decretal portion of the 27 May 1999 Decision of the DOLE-NCR Regional
Director reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Expelling [the Mariño Group] from their positions as o cers of

USTFU, and hereby order them under pain of contempt, to cease and desist from
performing acts as such officers;
b) Ordering [the Mariño Group] to jointly and severally refund to USTFU

the amount of P4.2 M checked-off as attorney's fees from the P42 M economic
package;
c) Ordering [the Mariño Group] to account for:
c.1. P2.0 M paid to USTFU in satisfaction of the remaining obligation

of the University under the 1986 CBA;
c.2. P7.0 M as consideration of the Compromise Agreement entered

into by USTFU involving certain labor cases;
c.3. Interest/earnings of the P9,766,570.01 balance of the P42 M

invested/deposited by [the Mariño Group] with the PCI Capital
Corporation.
d) Ordering conduct of election of Union o cers under the supervision

of this Department. 2 5
Petitioners interposed an appeal 2 6 before the BLR, which was docketed as BLR-
A-TR-52-25-10-99 .
In the meantime, the election of USTFU o cers was held as scheduled on 14
January 2000, 2 7 in which the Gamilla Group claimed victory. 2 8 On 3 March 2000, the
Gamilla group, as the new USTFU o cers, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
29with the UST, which provided for the economic bene ts to be granted to the faculty
members of the UST for the years 1999-2001. Said Agreement was rati ed by the
USTFU members on 9 March 2000.
On the same day, 9 March 2000, the BLR promulgated its Decision 3 0 in BLR-A-
TR-52-25-10-99, the fallo of which provides:
WHEREFORE,
WHEREFORE the appeal is GRANTED IN PART . Accordingly, the
decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that appellant USTFU
o cers are hereby ordered to return to the general membership the amount of
P4.2 million they have collected by way of attorney's fees.
Let the entire records of this case be remanded to the Regional O ce of

origin for the immediate conduct of election of o cers of USTFU. The election
shall be held under the control and supervision of the Regional O ce, in
accordance with Section 1 (b), Rule XV of Department Order No. 9, unless the
parties mutually agree to a different procedure consistent with ensuring integrity
and fairness in the electoral exercise.
TSEHcA
The BLR found no basis for the order of the DOLE-NCR Regional Director to the
Mariño Group to account for the amounts of P2 million and P7 million supposedly paid
by UST to USTFU. The BLR clari ed that UST paid USTFU a lump sum of P7 million. The
P2 million of this lump sum was the payment by UST of its outstanding obligations to
USTFU under the 1986 CBA. This amount was subsequently donated by USTFU
members to the Philippine Foundation for the Advancement of the Teaching
Profession, Inc. The remaining P5 million of the lump sum was the consideration for the
settlement of an illegal dismissal case between UST and the Mariño Group. Hence, the
P5 million legally belonged to the Mariño Group, and there was no need to make it
account for the same. As to the interest earnings of the sum of P9,766,570.01 that was
invested by the Mariño Group in a bank, the BLR ruled that the same was included in the
amount of P6,389,145.04 that was distributed to the faculty members on 18 November
1994.
The BLR, however, agreed in the nding of the DOLE-NCR Regional Director that
the P42 million economic bene ts package was sourced from the faculty members'
share in the tuition fee increases under Republic Act No. 6728. Under said law, 70% of
tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances, and other
bene ts of teaching and non-teaching personnel. As was held in the decision 3 1 and
subsequent resolution 3 2 of the Supreme Court in Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople,
the law has already provided for the minimum percentage of tuition fee increases to be
allotted for teachers and other school personnel. This allotment is mandatory and
cannot be diminished, although it may be increased by collective bargaining. It follows
that only the amount beyond that mandated by law shall be subject to negotiation fees
and attorney's fees for the simple reason that it was only this amount that the school
employees had to bargain for.
The BLR further reasoned that the P4.2 million collected by the Mariño Group
was in the nature of attorney's fees or negotiation fees and, therefore, fell under the
general prohibition against such fees in Article 222 (b) 3 3 of the Labor Code, as
amended. Also, the exception to charging against union funds was not applicable
because the P42 million economic bene ts package under the 10 September 1992
MOA was not union fund, as the same was intended not for the union coffers, but for
the members of the entire bargaining unit. The fact that the P4.2 million check-off was
approved by the majority of USTFU members was immaterial in view of the clear
command of Article 222 (b) that any contract, agreement, or arrangement of any sort,
contrary to the prohibition contained therein, shall be null and void.
Lastly, as to the alleged failure of the Mariño Group to perform some of its
duties, the BLR held that the change of USTFU o cers can best be decided, not by
outright expulsion, but by the general membership through the actual conduct of
elections.
Petitioners' Motion for Partial Reconsideration 3 4 of the foregoing Decision was
denied by the BLR in a Resolution 3 5 dated 13 June 2000.
Aggrieved once again, petitioners led with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari 3 6 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 60657 . In a Resolution dated 26 September 2000, the Court of Appeals directed
respondents to le their Comment; and, in order not to render moot and academic the
issues in the Petition, enjoined respondents and all those acting for and on their behalf
from enforcing, implementing, and effecting the BLR Decision dated 9 March 2000. IcDCaT
On 16 March 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
60657, favoring respondents.
According to the Court of Appeals, the BLR did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in ruling that the P42 million
economic bene ts package was merely the share of the faculty members in the tuition
fee increases pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728. The appellate court explained:
It is too plain to see that the 60% of the proceeds is to be allocated
specifically for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and all
other employees of the school concerned. Under Section 5(2) of Republic Act
6728, the amount had been increased to 70% of the tuition fee increases which
was speci cally allocated to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and
other bene ts of teaching and non-teaching personnel of the school[,] except
administrators who are principal stockholders of the school and to cover
increases as provided for in the collective bargaining agreements existing or in
force at the time the law became effective[.]
xxx xxx xxx
It is too plain to see, too, that under the "Memorandum of Agreement"

between UST and the Union, . . ., the P42,000,000.00 economic package granted
by the UST to the Union was in compliance with the mandates of the law and
pertinent Department of Education, Culture and Sports regulation (sic) required to
be allotted following the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other
benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel of the University[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Whether or not UST implemented the mandate of Republic Act 6728

voluntarily or through the efforts and prodding of the Union does not and cannot
change or alter a whit the nature of the economic package or the purpose or
purposes of the allocation of the said amount. For, if we acquiesced to and
sustained Petitioners' stance, we will thereby be leaving the compliance by the
private educational institutions of the mandate of Republic Act 6728 at the will,
mercy, whims and caprices of the Union and the private educational institution.
This cannot and should not come to pass.

With our foregoing ndings and disquisitions, We thus agree with the [BLR]
that the aforesaid amount of P42,000,000.00 should not answer for any
attorney's fees claimed by the Petitioners. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, [Section 5 of Rule X of] the CBL of the Union provides that:
Section 5. Special assessments or other extraordinary fees such as for

payment of attorney's fees shall be made only upon such a resolution duly
ratified by the general membership by secret balloting. . . . .
STaHIC
Also, Article 241(n) 3 7 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that no

special assessment shall be levied upon the members of the union unless
authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general
membership meeting duly called for the purpose[.]
xxx xxx xxx
In "ABS-CBN Supervisors-Employees Union Members versus ABS-CBN

Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 489", our Supreme Court declared that
Article 241(n) of the Labor Code, as amended, speaks of three (3) requisites, to
wit: (1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all members at the
general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary's record of the
minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check-off duly
signed by the employee concerned.
Contrary to the provisions of Articles 222(b) and 241(n) of the Labor Code,
as amended, and Section 5, Rule X of [the] CBL of the Union, no resolution rati ed
by the general membership of [the] USTFU through secret balloting which
embodied the award of attorney's fees was submitted. Instead, the Petitioners
submitted copies of the form for the rati cation of the MOA and the check-off for
attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
The aforementioned "rati cation with check-off" form embodied the: (a)
rati cation of the MOA; (b) check-off of union dues; and (c) check-off of a special
assessment, i.e., attorney's fees and labor education fund. . . . . Patently, the CBL
was not complied with.
Worse, the check-off for union dues and attorney's fees were included in
the rati cation of the MOA. The members were thus placed in a situation where,
upon rati cation of the MOA, not only the check-off of union dues and special
assessment for labor education fund but also the payment of attorney's fees were
(sic) authorized. 3 8
In like manner, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the BLR in ordering the
conduct of elections under the control and supervision of the DOLE-NCR. Said the
appellate court:
We agree with the Petitioners that the elections of o cers of the Union,
before the Decision of the [BLR], had been unfettered by any intervention of the
DOLE. However, We agree with the Decision of the [BLR] for two (2) speci c
reasons, namely: (a) the parties are given an opportunity to rst agree on a
different procedure to ensure the integrity and fairness of the electoral exercise,
before the DOLE, may supervise the election[.] SCaDAE
xxx xxx xxx
Under Article IX of the CBL, the Board of O cers of the Union shall create a
Committee on Elections, Comelec for brevity, composed of a chairman and two
(2) members appointed by the Board of Officers[.]
xxx xxx xxx
It, however, appears that the term of o ce of the Petitioners had already
expired in September of 1996. In fact, an election of o cers was scheduled on
October 6, 1996. However, on October 4, 1996, [respondents] and the members of
the faculty of UST, both union member and non-union member, elected
[respondents] as the new o cers of the USTFU. The same was, however, ( sic)
nulli ed by the Supreme Court, on November 16, 1999. However, as the term of
o ce of the [respondents] had expired, on October 4, 1999, there is nothing to
nullify anymore. By virtue of an election, held on January 14, 2000, the
[respondents] were elected as the new o cers of the Union, which election was
not contested by the Petitioners or any other group in the union.
xxx xxx xxx
We are thus faced with a situation where one set of o cers claim to be the
legitimate and incumbent o cers of the Union, pursuant to the CBL of the Union,
and another set of o cers who claim to have been elected by the members of the
faculty of the Union thru an election alleged to have been supervised by the DOLE
which situation partakes of and is akin to the nature of an intra-union dispute[.] . .
..
Undeniably, the CBL gives the Board of O cers the right to create and
appoint members of the Comelec. However, the CBL has no application to a
situation where there are two (2) sets of o cers, one set claiming to be the
legitimate incumbent o cers holding over to their positions who have not
exercised their powers and functions therefor and another claiming to have been
elected in an election supervised by the DOLE and, at the same time, exercising
the powers and functions appended to their positions. In such a case, the BLR,
which has jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute, can validly order the
immediate conduct of election of o cers, otherwise, internecine disputes and
blame-throwing will derail an orderly and fair election. Indeed, Section 1(b), [Rule
XV], Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, as
amended, by Department Order No. 09, Series of 1997, 3 9 provides that, in the
absence of any agreement among the members or any provision in the
constitution and by-laws of the labor organization, in an election ordered by the
Regional Director, the chairman of the committee shall be a representative of the
Labor Relations Division of the Regional Office[.] 4 0
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals decreed:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING , the Petition is denied due
course and is hereby DISMISSED . 4 1
Petitioners moved for reconsideration 4 2 of the Decision dated 16 March 2001

of the Court of Appeals, but it was denied by the said court in its Resolution 4 3 dated 30
August 2001. ASTDCH
Petitioners elevated the case to this Court via the instant Petition, invoking the
following assignment of errors:
I.

SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT UPHELD
THE APPLICATION BY THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6728 TO THE P42
MILLION CBA PACKAGE OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS OBTAINED BY THE UST
FACULTY UNION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS.
II.
SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISALLOWED THE LUMP-SUM CHECK-OFF AMOUNTING TO P4.2 MILLION BY
RULING THAT THE P42 MILLION CBA ECONOMIC PACKAGE OBTAINED BY THE
UST FACULTY UNION WAS MERELY AN ALLOCATION OF THE SEVENTY PER
CENT (70%) OF THE TUITION INCREASES AUTHORIZED BY LAW AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS.
III.
SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE PROVISIONS ON ELECTION OF UNION OFFICERS IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE UST FACULTY UNION AND INSTEAD
UPHELD THE DIRECTIVE OF THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS TO CONDUCT THE ELECTION OF UNION OFFICERS UNDER
THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT.
Essentially, in order to arrive at a nal disposition of the instant case, this Court is
tasked to determine the following: (1) the nature of the P42 million economic bene ts
package granted by UST to USTFU; (2) the legality of the 10% check-off collected by the
Mariño Group from the P42 million economic bene ts package; and (3) the validity of
the BLR order for USTFU to conduct election of union o cers under the control and
supervision of the DOLE-NCR Regional Director. ETDAaC
II
RULING
(1) The P42 million economic benefits package
Petitioners argue that the P42 million economic bene ts package granted to the
covered faculty members were additional bene ts, which resulted from a long and
arduous process of negotiations between the Mariño Group and UST. The BLR and the
Court of Appeals were in error for considering the said amount as purely sourced from
the allocation by UST of 70% percent of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee
increases, in accordance with Republic Act No. 6728. Said law was improperly applied
as a general law that decrees the allocation by all private schools of 70% of their tuition
fee increases to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other bene ts of their
teaching & non-teaching personnel. It is clear from the title of the law itself that it only
covers government assistance to students and teachers in private education. Section 5
of Republic Act No. 6728 unequivocally limits the scope of the law to tuition fee
supplements and subsidies extended by the Government to students in private high
schools. Thus, the petitioners maintain that Republic Act No. 6728 has no application to
the MOA executed on 10 September 1992 between UST and USTFU, through the efforts
of the Mariño Group.
The Court disagrees with petitioners' stance. TCEaDI
The provisions of Republic Act No. 6728 were not arbitrarily applied by the DOLE-
NCR Regional Director, the BLR, or the Court of Appeals to the P42 million economic
bene ts package granted by UST to USTFU, considering that the parties themselves
stipulated in Section 7 of the MOA they signed on 10 September 1992 that:
7.0. It is clearly understood and agreed upon that the
aggregate sum of P42 million is chargeable against the share of the
faculty members in the incremental proceeds of tuition fees collected
collected Provided, however, that he ( sic) commitment of the
and still to be collected[;]
UNIVERSITY to pay the aggregate sum of P42 million shall subsist even if the
said amount exceeds the proportionate share that may accrue to the faculty
members in the tuition fee increases that the UNIVERSITY may be authorized to
collect in School-Year 1992-1993, and, Provided, nally, that the covered faculty
members shall still be entitled to their proportionate share in any undistributed
portion of the incremental proceeds of the tuition fee increases in School-Year
1992-1993, and which incremental proceeds are, by law and pertinent
Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) regulations,
required to be allotted for the payment of salaries, wages, allowances
and other bene ts of teaching and non-teaching personnel for the
UNIVERSITY . 4 4 (Emphases supplied.)
The "law" in the aforequoted Section 7 of the MOA can only refer to Republic Act
No. 6728, otherwise known as the "Government Assistance to Students and Teachers
in Private Education Act". Republic Act No. 6728 was enacted in view of the declared
policy of the State, in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution, to promote and
make quality education accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of
the State of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions in
the educational system and the invaluable contribution that the private schools have
made and will make to education. 4 5 The said statute primarily grants various forms of
nancial aid to private educational institutions such as tuition fee supplements,
assistance funds, and scholarship grants. 4 6
One such form of nancial aid is provided under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
6728, which states:
SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplement for Student in Private High School. —
(1) Financial assistance for tuition for students in private high schools
shall be provided by the government through a voucher system in the following
manner: CHDTEA
(a) For students enrolled in schools charging less than one thousand
ve hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in tuition and other fees during school year
1988-89 or such amount in subsequent years as may be determined from time to
time by the State Assistance Council: The Government shall provide them
with a voucher equal to two hundred ninety pesos P290.00: P290.00 Provided,
That the student pays in the 1989-1990 school year, tuition and other fees equal
to the tuition and other fees paid during the preceding academic year: Provided,
further, That the Government shall reimburse the vouchers from the schools
concerned within sixty (60) days from the close of the registration period:
Provided, furthermore, That the student's family resides in the same city or
province in which the high school is located unless the student has been enrolled
in that school during the previous academic year.
(b) For students enrolled in schools charging above one thousand ve
hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in tuition and other fees during the school year
1988-1989 or such amount in subsequent years as may be determined from time
to time by the State Assistance Council, no assistance for tuition fees shall
Government Provided, however, That the schools
be granted by the Government:
concerned may raise their tuition fee subject to Section 10 hereof.
(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b)
shall be granted and tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be
increased, on the condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount
subsidized, allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall
go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other bene ts of
teaching and non-teaching personnel except administrators who are
principal stockholders of the school, and may be used to cover increases as
provided for in the collective bargaining agreements existing or in force
at the time when this Act is approved and made effective:effective Provided, That
government subsidies are not used directly for salaries of teachers of nonsecular
subjects. At least twenty percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or
modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and
similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation. For this purpose,
schools shall maintain a separate record of accounts for all assistance received
from the government, any tuition fee increase, and the detailed disposition and
use thereof, which record shall be made available for periodic inspection as may
be determined by the State Assistance Council, during business hours, by the
faculty, the non-teaching personnel, students of the school concerned, and
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and other concerned government
agencies. (Emphases ours.) TEDHaA
Although Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6728 does speak of government

assistance to students in private high schools, it is not limited to the same. Contrary to
petitioners' puerile claim, Section 5 likewise grants an unmistakable authority to private
high schools to increase their tuition fees, subject to the condition that seventy (70%)
percent of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of the salaries, wages,
allowances, and other bene ts of their teaching and non-teaching personnel. The said
allocation may also be used to cover increases in the salaries, wages, allowances, and
other bene ts of school employees as provided for in the CBAs existing or in force at
the time when Republic Act No. 6728 was approved and made effective.
Contrary to petitioners' argument, the right of private schools to increase their
tuition fee — with their corresponding obligation to allocate 70% of said increase to the
payment of the salaries, wages, allowances, and other bene ts of their employees — is
not limited to private high schools. Section 9 4 7 of Republic Act No. 6728, on "Further
Assistance to Students in Private Colleges and Universities", is crystal clear in providing
that:
d) Government assistance and tuition increases as described in this
Section shall be governed by the same conditions as provided under Section 5
(2).
Indeed, a private educational institution under Republic Act No. 6728 still has the
discretion on the disposition of 70% of the tuition fee increase. It enjoys the privilege of
determining how much increase in salaries to grant and the kind and amount of
allowances and other bene ts to give. The only precondition is that 70% percent of the
incremental tuition fee increase goes to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances
and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel. 4 8
In this case, UST and USTFU stipulated in their 10 September 1992 MOA that the
P42 million economic bene ts package granted by UST to the members of the
collective bargaining unit represented by USTFU, was chargeable against the 70%
allotment from the proceeds of the tuition fee increases collected and still to be
collected by UST. As observed by the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, and a rmed by
both the BLR and the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that any portion of the P42
million economic bene ts package was derived from sources other than the 70%
allotment from tuition fee increases of UST.
Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, it can be conclusively presumed that
the entire P42 million economic bene ts package extended to USTFU came from the
70% allotment from tuition fee increases of UST. Preceding from this presumption, any
deduction from the P42 million economic bene ts package, such as the P4.2 million
claimed by the Mariño Group as attorney's/agency fees, should not be allowed,
because it would ultimately result in the reduction of the statutorily mandated 70%
allotment from the tuition fee increases of UST.
The other reasons for disallowing the P4.2 million attorney's/agency fees
collected by the Mariño Group from the P42 million economic bene ts package are
discussed in the immediately succeeding paragraphs. EIAScH
(2) The P4.2 Million Check-off

Petitioners contend that the P4.2 million check-off, from the P42 million
economic bene ts package, was lawfully made since the requirements of Article 222
(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, were complied with by the Mariño Group. The
individual paychecks of the covered faculty employees were not reduced and the P4.2
million deducted from the P42 million economic bene ts package became union funds,
which were then used to pay attorney's fees, negotiation fees, and similar charges
arising from the CBA. In addition, the P4.2 million constituted a special assessment
upon the USTFU members, the requirements for which were properly observed. The
special assessment was authorized in writing by the general membership of USTFU
during a meeting in which it was included as an item in the agenda. Petitioners fault the
Court of Appeals for disregarding the authorization of the special assessment by
USTFU members. There is no law that prohibits the insertion of a written authorization
for the special assessment in the same instrument for the rati cation of the 10
September 1992 MOA. Neither is there a law prescribing a particular form that needs to
be accomplished for the authorization of the special assessment. The faculty members
who signed the rati cation of the MOA, which included the authorization for the special
assessment, have high educational attainment, and there is ample reason to believe
that they a xed their signatures thereto with full comprehension of what they were
doing.
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The pertinent legal provisions on a check-off are found in Articles 222 (b) and
241 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code, as amended.

Article 222 (b) states:
(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind
arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective
agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union:
Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against unions funds in
an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or
arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.
Article 241 (n) reads:

(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied
upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written
resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly
called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record the minutes
of the meeting including the list of all members present, the votes cast, the
purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment
or fees. The record shall be attested to by the president.
HCTEDa
And Article 241 (o) provides:

(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessments, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees
may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual
written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should
specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, prohibits the payment of
attorney's fees only when it is effected through forced contributions from the
employees from their own funds as distinguished from union funds. 4 9 Hence, the
general rule is that attorney's fees, negotiation fees, and other similar charges may only
be collected from union funds, not from the amounts that pertain to individual union
members. As an exception to the general rule, special assessments or other
extraordinary fees may be levied upon or checked off from any amount due an
employee for as long as there is proper authorization by the employee.
A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement with the
Union, recognized as the proper bargaining representative, or on prior authorization
from the employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and
remits them directly to the Union. Its desirability in a labor organization is quite evident.
The Union is assured thereby of continuous funding. As this Court has acknowledged,
the system of check-off is primarily for the bene t of the Union and, only indirectly, for
the individual employees. 5 0
The Court nds that, in the instant case, the P42 million economic bene ts
package granted by UST did not constitute union funds from whence the P4.2 million
could have been validly deducted as attorney's fees. The P42 million economic bene ts
package was not intended for the USTFU coffers, but for all the members of the
bargaining unit USTFU represented, whether members or non-members of the union. A
close reading of the terms of the MOA reveals that after the satisfaction of the
outstanding obligations of UST under the 1986 CBA, the balance of the P42 million was
to be distributed to the covered faculty members of the collective bargaining unit in the
form of salary increases, returns on paycheck deductions; and increases in
hospitalization, educational, and retirement bene ts, and other economic bene ts. The
deduction of the P4.2 million, as alleged attorney's/agency fees, from the P42 million
economic bene ts package effectively decreased the share from said package
accruing to each member of the collective bargaining unit.
Petitioners' line of argument — that the amount of P4.2 million became union
funds after its deduction from the P42 million economic bene ts package and, thus,
could already be used to pay attorney's fees, negotiation fees, or similar charges from
the CBA — is absurd. Petitioners' reasoning is evidently awed since the attorney's fees
may only be paid from union funds; yet the amount to be used in paying for the same
does not become union funds until it is actually deducted as attorney's fees from the
bene ts awarded to the employees. It is just a roundabout argument. What the law
requires is that the funds be already deemed union funds even before the attorney's
fees are deducted or paid therefrom; it does not become union funds after the
deduction or payment. To rule otherwise will also render the general prohibition stated
in Article 222 (b) nugatory, because all that the union needs to do is to deduct from the
total bene ts awarded to the employees the amount intended for attorney's fees and,
thus, "convert" the latter to union funds, which could then be used to pay for the said
attorney's fees. DcICEa
The Court further determines that the requisites for a valid levy and check-off of
special assessments, laid down by Article 241 (n) and (o), respectively, of the Labor
Code, as amended, have not been complied with in the case at bar. To recall, these
requisites are: (1) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the union
members at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (2)
secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written
authorization for check-off duly signed by the employee concerned. 5 1
Additionally, Section 5, Rule X of the USTFU Constitution and By-Laws mandates
that:
Section 5. Special assessments or other extraordinary fees such as for
payment of attorney's fees shall be made only upon a resolution duly rati ed by
the general membership by secret balloting.
In an attempt to comply with the foregoing requirements, the Mariño Group

caused the majority of the general membership of USTFU to individually sign a
document, which embodied the rati cation of the MOA between UST and USTFU, dated
10 September 1992, as well as the authorization for the check-off of P4.2 million, from
the P42 million economic bene ts package, as payment for attorney's fees. As held by
the Court of Appeals, however, the said documents constitute unsatisfactory
compliance with the requisites set forth in the Labor Code, as amended, and in the
USTFU Constitution and By-Laws, even though individually signed by a majority of
USTFU members.
The inclusion of the authorization for a check-off of union dues and special
assessments for the Labor Education Fund and attorney's fees, in the same document
for the rati cation of the 10 September 1992 MOA granting the P42 million economic
bene ts package, necessarily vitiated the consent of USTFU members. For sure, it is
fairly reasonable to assume that no individual member of USTFU would casually turn
down the substantial and lucrative award of P42 million in economic bene ts under the
MOA. However, there was no way for any individual union member to separate his or her
consent to the rati cation of the MOA from his or her authorization of the check-off of
union dues and special assessments. As it were, the rati cation of the MOA carried
with it the automatic authorization of the check-off of union dues and special
assessments in favor of the union. Such a situation militated against the legitimacy of
the authorization for the P4.2 million check-off by a majority of USTFU membership.
Although the law does not prescribe a particular form for the written authorization for
the levy or check-off of special assessments, the authorization must, at the very least,
embody the genuine consent of the union member.
The failure of the Mariño Group to strictly comply with the requirements set forth
by the Labor Code, as amended, and the USTFU Constitution and By-Laws, invalidates
the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of
the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union
members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in
accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No
shortcuts are allowed. 5 2 cHaICD
Viewed in this light, the Court does not hesitate to declare as illegal the check-off
of P4.2 million, from the P42 million economic bene ts package, for union dues and
special assessments for the Labor Education Fund and attorney's fees. Said amount
rightfully belongs to and should be returned by petitioners to the intended bene ciaries
thereof, i.e., members of the collective bargaining unit, whether or not members of
USTFU. This directive is without prejudice to the right of petitioners to seek
reimbursement from the other USTFU o cers and directors, who were part of the
Mariño Group, and who were equally responsible for the illegal check-off of the
aforesaid amount.
(3) Election of new officers
Having been overtaken by subsequent events, the Court need no longer pass
upon the issue of the validity of the order of BLR for USTFU to conduct its long overdue
election of union o cers, under the control and supervision of the DOLE-NCR Regional
Director.
The BLR issued such an order since USTFU then had two groups, namely, the
Mariño Group and the Gamilla Group, each claiming to be the legitimate o cers of
USTFU.
The DOLE-NCR Regional Director, in his Decision dated 27 May 1999, decreed
that the Mariño Group be expelled from their positions as USTFU o cers. But then, the
BLR, in its Decision promulgated on 9 March 2000, declared that the change of o cers
could best be decided, not by expulsion, but by the general membership of the union
through the conduct of election, under the control and supervision of the DOLE-NCR
Regional Director. In its assailed Decision dated 16 March 2001, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the BLR judgment in its ruling that the conduct of an election, under the
control and supervision of the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, is necessary to settle the
question of who, as between the o cers of the Mariño Group and of the Gamilla Group,
are the legitimate officers of the USTFU. DTEIaC
The Court points out, however, that neither the Decision of the BLR nor of the
Court of Appeals took into account the fact that an election of USTFU o cers was
already conducted on 14 January 2000, which was won by the Gamilla Group. There is
nothing in the records to show that the said election was contested or made the
subject of litigation. The Gamilla Group had exercised their powers as USTFU o cers
during their elected term. Since the term of union o cers under the USTFU Constitution
and By-Laws was only for three years, then the term of the Gamilla Group already
expired in 2003. It is already beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, in the present
Petition, to still look into the subsequent elections of union officers held after 2003.

The election of the Gamilla Group as union o cers in 2000 should have already
been recognized by the BLR and the Court of Appeals. The order for USTFU to conduct
another election was only a super uity. The issue of who between the o cers of the
Mariño Group and of the Gamilla Group are the legitimate USTFU o cers has been
rendered moot by the succeeding events in the case.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is hereby DENIED.
DENIED The Decision dated 16 March 2001 and the
Resolution dated 30 August 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60657, are
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS . Petitioners are hereby ORDERED to
reimburse, jointly and severally, to the faculty members of the University of Sto. Tomas,
belonging to the collective bargaining unit, the amount of P4.2 million checked-off as
union dues and special assessments for the Labor Education Fund and attorney's fees,
with legal interest of 6% per annum from 15 December 1994, until the nality of this
decision. The order for the conduct of election for the o cers of the University of Sto.
Tomas Faculty Union, under the control and supervision of the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region, is hereby DELETED.
DELETED No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, * Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ. concur.
Footnotes
*Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Associate Justice Eduardo M. Peralta per Raffle dated 1 July 2009.
1.Rollo, pp. 14-68.
2.Penned by the then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. with Associate Justices Renato C.
Dacudao and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring; rollo, pp. 69-92.
3.Rollo, p. 93.
4.As alleged by herein respondents in their complaints before the Med-Arbiter and admitted by
herein petitioners in their responsive pleadings, the following were the then Executive
Officers and Directors of the USTFU:
EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR. - President
MA. MELVYN P. ALAMIS - Executive Vice-President
MYRNA P. HILARIO - Internal Vice-President
URBANO F. AGALABIA - External Vice-President
- Vice-President For Labor Education And
LILY B. MATIAS
Research
ANTHONY D. CURA - Vice-President For Grievance And Complaints
NORMA P. COLLANTES - Secretary-General
PORFIRIO JOSE B. GUICO - Treasurer
ZENAIDA C. BURGOS - Public Relations Officer
MILAGROSA G. NINO - Auditor
RENE V. SISON - Sergeant-At-Arms
RONALDO G. ASUNCION - Director
ROSY ATIENZA - Director
NOEL FIEDACAN - Director
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 70067. September 15, 1986.]
CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. CRESENCIANO B.

TRAJANO, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU),
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C.
ESPINAS respondents.
ESPINAS,
Dante A. Carandang for petitioners.

Jose C. Espinas for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION, LABOR CODE; RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS

OF MEMBERSHIP; CHECK-OFF MAY NOT BE AFFECTED WITHOUT INDIVIDUAL
WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION. — The provisions of Arts. 222(b) and 240 (c) of the Labor
Code and Section 13, Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code are
clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effected without
individual written authorizations duly signed by the employees speci cally stating the
amount, purpose and bene ciary of the deduction. The required individual
authorizations in this case are wanting. Infact, petitioner employees are vigorously
objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed
that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees, down by law. Article 222(b) does
not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its
prohibition. The cardinal principle should be borne in mind that employees are
protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without
their knowledge and consent. (Pacific Banking Corp. vs. Clave, 128 SCRA 112 [1984])
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BENEFITS FORMING PART OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT; NOT THE "MANDATORY ACTIVITY" CONTEMPLATED IN THE CODE. —
Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the bene ts awarded to PLDT
employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations although placed
already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the "mandatory activity" under the
Code which dispenses with individual written authorizations for check-offs,
notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA J :
MELENCIO-HERRERA, p
Petitioner employees of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company

(PLDT) and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union, now the
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (simply referred to hereinafter as the
Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's fees amounting to P1 M,
more or less, of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas (hereinafter referred to as
"Respondent Counsel") from the monetary bene ts awarded to PLDT employees in a
deadlocked collective bargaining agreement negotiations between the PLDT and the
Union.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
Respondent Counsel has been the legal counsel of respondent Union since 1964.
For his services, he was hired on a case to case contingent fee basis. On September 7,
1983, he received a letter from the Union President reading:
"The Free Telephone Workers Union once again request you to appear as counsel
in the on going labor dispute at PLDT. In consideration of your services therein,
the union binds itself to compensate you for your fees and expenses therein on a
contingent basis. The amount shall be 10% of any improvement, with retroactive
effect, of the PLDT's last offer to the deadlock in CBA negotiations which we
know will result in a compulsory arbitration. A supporting board resolution will
later confirm the letter." 1
PLDT's "last offer" referred to on the wage increases was: P230 for the rst year
of the proposed CBA; P100 for the second year; and P90 for the third year. 2
On September 9, 1983, the Minister of Labor and Employment assumed
jurisdiction over all unresolved issues in the bargaining deadlock between PLDT and the
Union and proceeded to resolve the same by compulsory arbitration.
On October 23, 1983, the Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage
increases of P330/month effective November 9, 1982; P155/month effective
November 9, 1983, and P155/month effective November 9, 1984, in addition to the
Christmas bonus of 1-1/2 month pay per employee effective December, 1983, and
other fringe bene ts. As will be noted, there were improvements obtained from PLDT's
"last offer." cdrep
On October 29, 1983, the Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution
requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal services extended to
the Union by Respondent Counsel.
On November 2, 1983, petitioners initially numbering 600 and nally 5,258, led a
letter-complaint before the MOLE through their authorized representative, petitioner
Carlos Galvadores, assailing the imposition of P130.00 (later corrected P155.00) per
employee as attorney's fees of respondent counsel. Annexed to the complaint were the
written statements of the employee authorizing Galvadores to act for and in their
behalf. Petitioners took the position that the attorney's fees of respondent counsel
were not only unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and
that the deductions cannot be given legal effect by a mere Board resolution but needs
the ratification by the general membership of the Union.
Respondents Union and Counsel, on the other hand, proferred the argument that
the attorney's fees being exacted pertained to his services during compulsory
arbitration proceedings and cannot be considered as negotiation fees or attorney's
fees within the context of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that contrary to
petitioners' claim that Respondent Counsel surfaced only as lawyer of the Union when
the employees themselves engaged in mass action to force a solution to the deadlock
in their negotiations, he appeared continuously from September 8, 1983 until the
decision in the case was rendered on October 23, 1983. Petitioners proposed a
solution offering to pay P10.00 per employee, but Respondent Counsel refused.
In the meantime, on November 4, 1983, PLDT led notice that assessment had
been withheld from the differential pay due petitioners but that the same would not be
turned over to the Union without prior MOLE authority so as not to involve management
in the intra-union disagreement.
On February 13, 1984, the Minister of Labor referred the dispute to the Bureau of
Labor Relations for being intra-union in nature. Several hearings were held by that
Bureau.
On March 22, 1984, the Union led a Manifestation to the effect that about 6,067
members of the Union rati ed the October 29, 1983 resolution of the legislative council
in a plebiscite called for that purpose. On the basis thereof, Respondent Counsel moved
for the payment of his legal fees under the September 7, 1983 contract.
Petitioners questioned the plebiscite on the ground that question No. 2, which
reads: prcd
"Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to be

withdrawn from PECCI and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBA
negotiation fund together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that was collected
and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU, as our counterpart of the seed money to start
the housing program as agreed by the PLDT management and our union panel
and included in the award of the MOLE?"
was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute regarding the
deduction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees.
On February 18, 1985, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of merit reasoning that "the outcome of the
plebiscite negates any further question on the right of the union counsel to collect the
amount of P115 from each of the employees involved."
It is this Decision that is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground that the
individual written authorization of all the employees must rst be obtained before any
assessment can be made against the monetary bene ts awarded to them pursuant to
Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that assuming that Respondent Counsel is
entitled to attorney's fees, the same should be taken from Union funds.
In their Comment, respondents Union and Counsel argue that compulsory
arbitration is a "mandatory activity" and an exception to Article 242 (o) of the Labor
Code, and that the Union members approved the questioned deduction in the plebiscite
of January, 1984, under the condition that P1 M of the same would be made available
for the Union's housing project.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with petitioners that the issue
presented is squarely covered by Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D.
No. 1691 so that attorney's fees, if legally payable, can only be charged against Union
funds.
The Court resolved to give due course.
Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:
"Article 222. Appearance and Fees.
xxx xxx xxx

"(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising
from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective
bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the
contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against
union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract,
agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void."
While Article 242 of the same Code reads:

"Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. — The
following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment,
attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked
off "from any amount due an employee without individual written authorization
duly signed by the employee. The authorization should speci cally state the
amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction."
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that deductions
from wages of the employees may only be made by the employer in cases authorized
by law, including deductions for insurance premiums advanced by the employer on
behalf of the employees as well as union dues where the right to check-off is authorized
in writing by the individual employee himself. 3
The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may
be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employees
speci cally stating the amount, purpose and bene ciary of the deduction. The required
individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are
vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit,
assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees. prcd
Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the bene ts awarded to

PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations although
placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the "mandatory activity" under
the Code which dispenses with individual written authorizations for check-offs,
notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid
down by law. Besides, Article 222 (b) does not except a CBA, later placed under
compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should
be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that
diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent. 4
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed Decision of February 18, 1985 rendered by
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, is hereby SET ASIDE. The
attorney's fees herein involved may be charged against Union funds pursuant to Article
222(b) of the Labor Code, as may be agreed upon between them.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., no part.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74453. May 5, 1989.]
AMBROCIO VENGCO, RAMON MOISES, EUGENIA REYES, RAFAEL

WAGAS and 80 others per attached list , petitioners, vs. HON.
CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations and EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO , respondents.
Jose T. Maghari for petitioners.

Benjamin C. Sebastian for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR UNIONS; ATTORNEY'S

FEES MAY NOT BE DEDUCTED OR CHECKED OFF WITHOUT WORKER'S WRITTEN
CONSENT, EXCEPT FOR MANDATORY ACTIVITY; MANDATORY ACTIVITY, DEFINED. —
It is very clear from Art. 241 of the Labor Code that attorney's fees may not be
deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written
consent except for mandatory activities under the Code. A mandatory activity has been
de ned as a judicial process of settling dispute laid down by the law. (Carlos P.
Galvadores, et al. vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
et al., G.R. No. L-70067, September 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 138).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR IS NOT A MANDATORY ACTIVITY. — The
amicable settlement entered into by the management and the union — whereby the
company will pay to the union members the sum of P150,000.00 for their claims arising
from the unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and other bene ts — can
not be considered as a mandatory activity under the Code. It is true that the union led
a claim for emergency cost of living allowance and other bene ts before the Ministry of
Labor. But this case never reached its conclusion in view of the parties' agreement.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRITTEN CONSENT IS DISPENSED WITH IN JUDICIAL OR
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECOVERY OF WAGES. — Book III, Rule VIII,
Section II of the Implementing Rules cited by Timbungco which dispenses with the
required written authorization from the employees concerned does not apply in this
case. This provision envisions a situation where there is a judicial or administrative
proceedings for recovery of wages. Upon termination of the proceedings, the law
allows a deduction for attorney's fees of 10% from the total amount due to a winning
party.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION THEREOF JUSTIFIES LAWYER'S EXPULSION FROM
UNION PRESIDENCY. — Considering the violations of Timbungco, (i.e. deducting
attorney's fees from the workers' fringe bene ts) there can be no question that he
should bear the consequences of his acts. We nd that the penalty of expulsion from
the union presidency imposed upon Timbungco is justified.
5. ID.; EMERGENCY COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCE, EXCLUDED FROM
SALARIES OR WAGES. — In the herein case, the fringe bene ts received by the union
members consist of back payments of their unpaid emergency cost of living
allowances which are totally distinct from their wages. Allowances are bene ts over
and above the basic salaries of the employees (University of Pangasinan Faculty Union
vs. University of Pangasinan, G.R. No. L-63122, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 691). We
have held that such allowances are excluded from the concept of salaries or wages
(Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) vs. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, December 18, 1987, 156
SCRA 629).
DECISION
MEDIALDEA J :
MEDIALDEA, p
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul: (1) the Order of respondent
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated May 23, 1983 in BLR Case No. A-0179-
82 entitled "Ambrocio Vengco, et al. vs. Emmanuel Timbungco" setting aside the
decision dated December 29, 1982; and (2) the Order dated April 2, 1986 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated May 23, 1983.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in the latter part of 1981, the Management of the Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Anglo-American Tobacco
Corporation. (FOI-TAF) entered into a compromise agreement whereby the company
will pay to the union members the sum of P150,000.00 for their claims arising from the
unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and other bene ts which were the
subject of their compliant before the Ministry of Labor. Respondent Emmanuel
Timbungco (Timbungco, for short) who is the union president received the money
which was paid in installments. Thereafter, he distributed the amount among the union
members. Petitioners Ambrocio Vengco, Ramon Moises, Rafael Wagas and 80 others
(Vengco, et al., for short) who are union members noted that Timbungco was not
authorized by the union workers to get the money; and that ten percent (10%) of the
P150,000.00 had been deducted to pay for attorney's fees without their written
authorization in violation of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code. So, they demanded from
Timbungco an accounting of how the P150,000.00 was distributed to the members.
Timbungco did not give in to their demand. Thus Vengco, et al. led a complaint with
the Ministry of Labor praying for: "(1) the expulsion of Emmanuel Timbungco as
president of the union for violation of (the) union constitution and by-laws and the
rights and conditions of union members under the Labor Code; (2) an order to require
Timbungco to render an accounting of how the P150,000.00 was distributed; and (3)
an order to require private respondent to publish in the bulletin board the list of the
members and the corresponding amount they each received from the P150,000.00."
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 150, Rollo).
In his answer with counterclaim, Timbungco alleged among others, that he was
authorized by a resolution signed by the majority of the union members to receive and
distribute the P150,000.00 among the workers; that the computation of the bene ts
was based on the payroll of the company; that the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees
was in relation to the claim of the local union for payment of emergency cost of living
allowance before the Ministry of Labor which is totally distinct and separate from the
negotiation of the CBA; and that the ten percent (10%) deduction was in accordance
with Section II, Rule No. VIII, Book No. III of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Labor Code and therefore, no authorization from the union members is required.
On July 19, 1982, Med-Arbiter Willie B. Rodriguez issued an Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. (p. 33, Rollo)
Vengco, et al. appealed the aforesaid order to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On December 29, 1982, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
Cresenciano B. Trajano (Trajano, for short) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby granted and the
Med-Arbiter's Order dated 19 July 1982 hereby set aside. Accordingly, respondent
Emmanuel Timbungco is hereby ordered to render a full accounting of the One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) he received from the management
of Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation in behalf of the members of the
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo-American Tobacco
Corporation (FOITAF) and to publish in the union's bulletin board the list of all
recipient union members and the respective amounts they have received, within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Further, respondent is hereby expelled as
president of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Anglo American Tobacco
Corporation (FOITAF). Lastly, the counterclaim interposed by the respondent's
counsel, Atty. Benjamin Sebastian is hereby ordered dismissed.
So decided." (p. 50, Rollo.)
Timbungco led a motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted decision while

Vengco, et al. filed their opposition to the said motion.
On May 23, 1983, O cer-in-Charge Victoriano R. Calaycay issued an Order which
held, thus:
"Wherefore, premises considered, our resolution dated 29 December 1982 is
hereby set aside. However, an audit examination of the Books of Account of
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation
(FOITAF) is hereby ordered.
SO RESOLVED." (p. 62, Rollo)
Vengco, et al, sought reconsideration of the aforementioned order. They

contended that the examination of the books of accounts of the union is irrelevant
considering that the issue involved in the case does not consist of union funds but back
pay received by the union members from the company. Likewise, they pointed out that
Timbungco did not give the money to the union treasurer and consequently, the amount
was not entered in the records of the union.
On April 2, 1986, Trajano issued an order which a rmed the resolution of May
23, 1983 and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. (p. 58, Rollo)
Hence, the present recourse by Vengco, et al.
The issues raised in this case are as follows:
(1) Whether or not Timbungco is guilty of illegally deducting 10% attorneys'
fees from petitioners' backwages; and
(2) Whether or not Trajano gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in ordering examination of union books instead of a rming his previous
Order expelling Timbungco from the union and ordering him to render an accounting of
P150,000.00 received by him. (p. 151, Rollo)
In the resolution of June 4, 1986, We required the respondents to comment on
the petition.
In his comment, Timbungco reiterates the defenses he raised in his answer to the
complaint led against him before the Med-Arbiter. In addition, he claims that he
already led an accounting report on the P150,000.00 with the Bureau of Labor
Relations which enumerated the names of the workers and the corresponding amounts
they received with their respective signatures opposite their names, the sub-total of the
amount of bene ts received per department and the grand total of the amount
distributed duly certi ed by the Union Treasurer and Secretary and duly noted by
Timbungco as Union President. (p. 73, Rollo) cdrep
The Solicitor General, in his comment, agrees with Vengco, et al. and
recommends that the petition be given due course. (p. 100, Rollo)
Timbungco led a reply to the aforesaid comment of the Solicitor General which
restates the arguments raised in his comment. (p. 121, Rollo)
The petition is meritorious.
Article 241(o) of the Labor Code provides:
"ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. —
The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
"(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may
be checked off from any amount due an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by an employee. The authorization should speci cally
state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
xxx xxx xxx
It is very clear from the above-quoted provision that attorney's fees may not be
deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written
consent except for mandatory activities under the Code. A mandatory activity has been
de ned as a judicial process of settling dispute laid down by the law. (Carlos P.
Galvadores, et al. vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
et al., G.R. No. L-70067, September 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 138). In the instant case, the
amicable settlement entered into by the management and the union can not be
considered as a mandatory activity under the Code. It is true that the union led a claim
for emergency cost of living allowance and other bene ts before the Ministry of Labor.
But this case never reached its conclusion in view of the parties' agreement. It is not
also shown from the records that Atty. Benjamin Sebastian was instrumental in forging
the said agreement on behalf of the union members.
Timbungco maintains that the "Kapasiyahan" gave him the authority to make the
deduction. This contention is unfounded. Contrary to his claim, the undated
"Kapasiyahan" or resolution did not confer upon him the power to deduct 10% of the
P150,000.00 despite the alleged approval of the majority of the union workers. A
reading of the said resolution (p. 75, Rollo) yields the same conclusion arrived at by
Trajano who declared it defective. We quote with approval Trajano's ndings on this
point:
"Further, a cursory examination of the alleged resolution shows that it is quite
defective. Not only that it is not dated but also that, with the exception of the rst
page, the remaining pages were not captioned and did not state the very purpose
for which it was prepared. Thus, the alleged signatories were not properly
apprised thereof. There is, therefore, truth in complainant's contention that they
never authorized, more so, they had no knowledge of the deduction of 10%
attorney's fees until it was actually effected. Consequently, the deduction was not
valid." (p. 45, Rollo)
Moreover, the law is explicit. It requires the individual written authorization of each
employee concerned, to make the deduction of attorney's fees valid.
Likewise, We nd that the other "Kapasiyahan" dated September 18, 1981
submitted by Timbungco belied his claim that he was authorized by the union workers
to receive the sum of P150,000.00 on their behalf. The pertinent portion of the said
"Kapasiyahan" provides:
"3. Na sa dahilang hindi bigla ang pagbabayad sa nasabing "CLAIM" bukod
pa sa marami kaming naghati-hati sa nasabing halaga ipinapasiya naming na
kusang-loob na kunin ang aming bahagi sa aming kapisanan sa unang linggo ng
Disyembre, 1981 at ito'y ipinaalam namin sa Pangulo ng Kapisanan na si
Ginoong Emmanuel Timbungco." (p. 47, Rollo)
The above-quoted statement merely indicated the intention of the workers to get their
claim on the rst week of December, 1981 and to inform Timbungco of their intention.
Clearly, this statement can not be construed to confer upon Timbungco the authority to
receive the fringe bene ts for the workers. Absent such authority, Timbungco should
not have kept the money to himself but should have turned it over to the Union
Treasurer. He, therefore, exceeded his authority as President of the Union. LLjur
Moreover, Book III, Rule VIII, Section II of the Implementing Rules cited by
Timbungco which dispenses with the required written authorization from the
employees concerned does not apply in this case. This provision envisions a situation
where there is a judicial or administrative proceedings for recovery of wages. Upon
termination of the proceedings, the law allows a deduction for attorney's fees of 10%
from the total amount due to a winning party. In the herein case, the fringe bene ts
received by the union members consist of back payments of their unpaid emergency
cost of living allowances which are totally distinct from their wages. Allowances are
bene ts over and above the basic salaries of the employees (University of Pangasinan
Faculty Union vs. University of Pangasinan, G.R. No. L-63122, February 20, 1984, 127
SCRA 691). We have held that such allowances are excluded from the concept of
salaries or wages (Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) vs. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870,
December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 629). In addition, the payment of the fringe bene ts
were effected through an amicable settlement and not in an administrative proceeding.
The submission by Timbungco of an accounting report on the distribution of
P150,000.00 is of no moment in the face of our ndings that the deduction of 10% for
attorney's fees is illegal and void for failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
Considering the aforestated violations of Timbungco, there can be no question
that he should bear the consequences of his acts. We nd that the penalty of expulsion
from the union presidency imposed upon Timbungco is justified. LexLib

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Orders dated May 23, 1983 and April 2,
1986 were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The herein controversy involves the
propriety of the 10% deduction from the fringe bene ts of the union workers which they
received from the management in settlement of their claims. Such issue does not touch
on union dues or funds. Besides, the sum of P150,000.00 was not entered into the
records of the Union since, as earlier stated, the money was not turned over by
Timbungco to the Union Treasurer. Consequently, the said Orders have no basis.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed Orders dated May 23, 1983
of O cer-in-Charge Victoriano R. Calaycay of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and April 2,
1986 of respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the same Bureau are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the latter's decision dated December 29, 1982 is hereby reinstated.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146073. January 13, 2003.]
JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS LISTED IN

ANNEX "A," 1 petitioners-appellants, vs . INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER
TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, APPEALS respondents-appellants.
Gilbert P. Lorenzo for petitioners.

Jimeno Jalandoni & Cope Law Offices for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners are employees of private respondent International Container Terminal

Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are o cers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers
Union-International Container Terminal Services, Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labor
organization duly registered as a local a liate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers
Union (APCWU). ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees.
This prompted the APCWU-ICTSI to le a notice of strike which included as cause of
action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also [CTSI's use of 365 days as
divisor in the computation of wages, even if the employees' work week consisted only of
ve days as agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The dispute
respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise settlement, while that
respecting the computation of wages was referred to the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently,
APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated, led with the
Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI which was dismissed. Petitioners led with the
Labor Arbiter a Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene, but the same was
denied upon nding that they are already well represented by APCWU. The denial of
petitioners' intervention was a rmed by the NLRC. Petitioners led a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court which referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
dismissed the petition. Hence, this present petition. SaHcAC
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that a labor union is one such party
authorized to represent its members under Article 242 (a) of the Labor Code which
provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of
collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. While a party acting in a representative
capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person
whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do the same except when
there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in good
faith for the protection of all interests represented by him.
Petitioners cite the dismissal of the case led by APCWU, rst by the Labor Arbiter,
and later by the CA. The dismissal of the case does not, however, by itself show the
existence of fraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of APCWU. There must be
clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack of good faith independently of
the dismissal. This petitioners failed to proffer.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR RELATIONS; LABOR

ORGANIZATIONS; RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION; A UNION MAY ACT AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF ITS MEMBERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING;
CASE AT BAR. — A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members
under Article 242(a) of the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the
representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority
includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions
of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative capacity "for and in behalf of its Union
members and other employees similarly situated," the title of the case led by it at the
Labor Arbiter's Office so expressly states.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS; REPRESENTATIVES
AS PARTIES; A PERSON WHOSE INTERESTS ARE ALREADY REPRESENTED WILL NOT BE
PERMITTED TO INTERVENE IN A REPRESENTATIVE ACTION; EXCEPTIONS. — While a
party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in
a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted
to do the same except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the
representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests represented by
him. Petitioners-appellants cite the dismissal of the case led by ICTSI, rst by the Labor
Arbiter, and later by the Court of Appeals. The dismissal of the case does not, however, by
itself show the existence of fraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of
APCWU. There must be clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack of good
faith independently of the dismissal. This, petitioners-appellants failed to proffer.
DECISION
MORALES J :
CARPIO MORALES, p
For consideration is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals a rming that of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
a rmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter denying herein petitioners-appellants'
Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners-appellants Jerry Acedera, et al. are employees of herein private
respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are
o cers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union-International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labor organization duly registered
as a local affiliate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union (APCWU).
When ICTSI started its operations in 1988, it determined the rate of pay of its
employees by using 304 days, the number of days of work of the employees in a year, as
divisor. 2
On September 28, 1990, ICTSI entered into its rst Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) with APCWU with a term of ve years effective until September 28, 1995. 3 The CBA
was renegotiated and thereafter renewed through a second CBA that took effect on
September 29, 1995, effective for another ve years. 4 Both CBAs contained an identically-
worded provision on hours and days of work reading:
Article IX
Regular Hours of Work and Days of Labor
Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be ve (5) days on

any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon
seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special holiday. 5
(Emphasis omitted)
In accordance with the above-quoted provision of the CBA, the employees' work
week was reduced to ve days or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI, however, continued
using the 304-day divisor in computing the wages of the employees. 6
On November 10, 1990, the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board
(RTWPB) in the National Capital Region decreed a P17.00 daily wage increase for all
workers and employees receiving P125.00 per day or lower in the National Capital Region.
7 The then president of APCWU, together with some union members, thus requested the
ICTSI's Human Resource Department/Personnel Manager to compute the actual monthly
increase in the employees' wages by multiplying the RTWPB mandated increase by 365
days and dividing the product by 12 months. 8
Heeding the proposal and following the implementation of the new wage order,
ICTSI stopped using 304 days as divisor and started using 365 days in determining the
daily wage of its employees and other consequential compensation, even if the employees'
work week consisted of only five days as agreed upon in the CBA. 9
In early 1997, ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call
employees. 1 0 This prompted the APCWU-ICTSI to le a notice of strike which included as
cause of action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also ICTSI's use of 365
days as divisor in the computation of wages. 1 1 The dispute respecting the retrenchment
was resolved by a compromise settlement 1 2 while that respecting the computation of
wages was referred to the Labor Arbiter. 1 3
On February 26, 1997, APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees
similarly situated, led with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI which was
dismissed for APCWU's failure to le its position paper. 1 4 Upon the demand of herein
petitioners-appellants, APCWU led a motion to revive the case which was granted.
APCWU thereupon filed its position paper on August 22, 1997. 1 5
On December 8, 1997, petitioners-appellants led with the Labor Arbiter a
Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene. 1 6 In the petition at bar, they justi ed
their move to intervene in this wise:
[S]hould the union succeed in prosecuting the case and in getting a
favorable reward it is actually they that would bene t from the decision. On the
other hand, should the union fail to prove its case, or to prosecute the case
diligently, the individual workers or members of the union would suffer great and
immeasurable loss. . . . [t]hey wanted to insure by their intervention that the case
would thereafter be prosecuted with all due diligence and would not again be
dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the union. 1 7
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring that the correct divisor
in computing the daily wage and other labor standard bene ts of the employees
of respondent ICTSI who are members of complainant Union as well as the other
employees similarly situated is two hundred fty (250) days such that said
respondent is hereby ordered to pay the employees concerned the differentials
representing the underpayment of said salaries and other bene ts reckoned three
(3) years back from February 26, 1997, the date of ling of this complaint or
computed from February 27 1994 until paid, but for purposes of appeal, the
salary differentials are temporarily computed for one year in the amount of Four
Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Forty Pesos (P468,040.00). 1 8
In the same decision, the Labor Arbiter denied petitioners-appellants' Complaint-in-

Intervention with Motion for Intervention upon a nding that they are already well
represented by APCWU. 1 9
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
APCWU's complaint for lack of merit. 2 0 The denial of petitioners-appellants' intervention
was, however, affirmed. 2 1
Unsatis ed with the decision of the NLRC, APCWU led a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals while petitioners-appellants led theirs with this Court which referred
the petition 2 2 to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed APCWU's petition on the following grounds: failure
to allege when its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was led, failure to
attach the necessary appendices to the petition, and failure to le its motion for extension
to file its petition within the reglementary period. 2 3
As for petitioners-appellants' petition for certiorari, it was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in this wise:
It is clear from the records that herein petitioners, claiming to be employees
of respondent ICTSI, are already well represented by its employees union, APCWU,
in the petition before this Court (CA-G.R. SP. No. 53266) although the same has
been dismissed. The present petition is, therefore a super uity that deserves to be
dismissed. Furthermore, only Acedera signed the Certi cate of non-forum
shopping. On this score alone, this petition should likewise be dismissed. We nd
that the same has no merit considering that herein petitioners have not presented
any meritorious argument that would justify the reversal of the Decision of the
NLRC.
Article IX of the CBA provides:
REGULAR HOURS OF WORK AND DAYS OF LABOR

"Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be ve (5)
days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be scheduled by the
COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is
declared a special holiday. "
This provision categorically states the required number of working days an
employee is expected to work for a week. It does not, however, indicate the
manner in which an employee's salary is to be computed. In fact, nothing in the
CBA makes any referral to any divisor which should be the basis for determining
the salary. The NLRC, therefore, correctly ruled that ". . . the absence of any
express or speci c provision in the CBA that 250 days should be used as divisor
altogether makes the position of the Union untenable."
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that herein petitioners themselves requested that 365 days be
used as the divisor in computing their wage increase and later did not raise or
object to the same during the negotiations of the new CBA, they are clearly
estopped to now complain of such computation only because they no longer
bene t from it. Indeed, the 365 divisor for the past seven (7) years has already
become practice and law between the company and its employees. 2 4 (Italics
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the present petition of petitioners-appellants who fault the Court of Appeals
as follows:
I
. . . IN REJECTING THE CBA OF THE PARTIES AS THE SOURCE OF THE DIVISOR

TO DETERMINE THE WORKERS' DAILY RATE TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE
APPLICABLE LANDMARK DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON
THE MATTER.
II
. . . [IN] DISREGARD[ING] APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT

WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE ALREADY IN
ESTOPPEL.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS HAVE NO LEGAL RIGHT

TO INTERVENE IN AND PURSUE THIS CASE AND THAT THEIR INTERVENTION IS
A SUPERFLUITY.
IV
. . . IN HOLDING, ALTHOUGH MERELY AS AN OBITER DICTUM, THAT ONLY

PETITIONER JERRY ACEDERA SIGNED THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING. 2 5
The third assigned error respecting petitioners-appellants' right to intervene shall

first be passed upon, it being determinative of their right to raise the other assigned errors.
Petitioners-appellants anchor their right to intervene on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which reads:
Section 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an o cer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's right may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
They stress that they have complied with the requisites for intervention because (1)
they are the ones who stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of any
judgment that may be rendered in this case, (2) no undue delay or prejudice would result
from their intervention since their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention
was led while the Labor Arbiter was still hearing the case and before any decision thereon
was rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to le a separate case as they would be
guilty of forum shopping because the only forum available for them was the Labor Arbiter.
26
Petitioners-appellants, however, failed to consider, in addition to the rule on

intervention, the rule on representation, thusly:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a duciary
capacity, the bene ciary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by
law or these Rules . . . 2 7 (Italics supplied)
A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article
242(a) of the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the representative of its
members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to
represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That
APCWU acted in a representative capacity "for and in behalf of its Union members and
other employees similarly situated," the title of the case led by it at the Labor Arbiter's
Office so expressly states.
While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted
to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not
be permitted to do the same 2 8 except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or
that the representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests
represented by him. 2 9
Petitioners-appellants cite the dismissal of the case led by ICTSI, rst by the Labor
Arbiter, and later by the Court of Appeals. 3 0 The dismissal of the case does not, however,
by itself show the existence of fraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of
APCWU. There must be clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack of good
faith independently of the dismissal. This, petitioners-appellants failed to proffer.
Petitioners-appellants likewise express their fear that APCWU would not prosecute
the case diligently because of its "sweetheart relationship" with ICTSI. 3 1 There is nothing
on record, however, to support this alleged relationship which allegation surfaces as a
mere afterthought because it was never raised early on. It was raised only in petitioners-
appellants' reply to ICTSI's comment in the petition at bar, the last pleading submitted to
this Court, which was led on June 20, 2001 or more than 42 months after petitioners-
appellants led their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene with the Labor
Arbiter. aTADCE
To reiterate, for a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative

action, fraud or collusion or lack of good faith on the part of the representative must be
proven. It must be based on facts borne on record. Mere assertions, as what petitioners-
appellants proffer, do not suffice.
The foregoing discussion leaves it unnecessary to discuss the other assigned
errors.

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LABOR RELATIONS FEB 17 ASSIGNMENT

2. 20% ASSENT OF EMPLOYEES ON REGISTRATION OF AMBROCIO VENGCO, RAMON MOISES, EUGENIA REYES,

[G.R. No. 152322. February 15, 2005.]

ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADOR G.

2. Creating distrust or loss of trust and con dence of members in the

3. Creating dissension among the members;

4. Circulating false rumors about the work of the Association or

5. Withholding from the Association and/or members material

6. Acting as a spy against the Association or divulging con dential

7. Such other offenses, which may injure or disrupt the functions of

Through a collective reply dated 19 September 1997, private respondents denied

On 09 October 1997, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as president of the

WHEREAS, the general membership (has) shown exceptional patience and

b) the general membership reiterate its loyalty to the Association and

Manila. 10 December 1997.

On 22 November 1999, a decision 1 2 was rendered by Regional Director Maximo B.

1. to immediately lift suspension imposed upon the complainants;

2. to hold a general membership meeting wherein they (respondents)

3. to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings in

4. to immediately hold/conduct an election of o cers in accordance

Accordingly, the claims of complainants for damages [are] hereby ordered

The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of

On 24 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 2 1 dismissing the

A Motion for Reconsideration 2 2 was thereafter led by the petitioners. In a

3. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO UPHOLD BLR-DOLE'S

It is apparent, however, that petitioners were to blame for their

When DOLE-NCR directed the parties to submit their respective position

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Nonetheless, despite of this nding, the election of UEEA o cers on 7 April

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Fourth Issue: is the non-holding of meetings and non-submission of reports by the

We do not believe so.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

2. Rollo, pp. 205-207.

6. CA Rollo, pp. 100-105.

11. CA Rollo, p. 188.

12. Rollo, pp. 50-67.

[G.R. No. 171153. September 12, 2007.]

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION–PHILIPPINE

Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade union center, it is a holder

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of

xxx xxx xxx

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the Court of Appeals

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent as a

Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a list of members

a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the

A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certi ed under oath by

Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by

Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an independent

As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certi cate of Registration

Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed

Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers'

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(b) The resolution of membership of each member organization, approved by the

Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at

Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. — A duly registered

(a) A charter certi cate issued by the federation or national union