PASIG CITY VS COMELEC

FACTS:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its
mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a
distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation
of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel
the respective plebiscites scheduled. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or
cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.

ISSUE:

WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be
suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.
YES.

RULING:

The boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may
be held.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area
are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,
whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.

The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government
unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.

Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the
proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
 MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA VS MADRONA

FACTS:

A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the
parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga on October 31, 1997. No amicable settlement was
reached. To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed a complaint before the RTC of Ormoc
City.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss. In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC
held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

ISSUE:

WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a municipality and an independent component city. YES.

RULING:

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is Section 118 of the
1991 Local Government Code (LGC). Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between
a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between
two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians
of the local government units involved.

There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. However,
Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No.
179.

Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. It is a city independent of the province.

Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have
general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for
the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not
only original, but also exclusive.
 LOPEZ VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Presidential Decree No. 824 was a response to a felt need for a "central government to establish and
administer program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan
as well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. A public corporation was thus created "to be
known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power
to make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of
property and such other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes." It is administered by a
Commission.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. They rely on this provision: "No
province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

ISSUE:

WON Presidential Decree No. 824 is constitutional. YES.

RULING:

In the Article on Batasang Pambansa it is expressly provided: "The Batasang Pambansa which shall be
composed of not more than 200 Members unless otherwise provided by law, shall include representatives
elected from the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities as may be
declared by or pursuant to law, and districts in Metropolitan Manila, those elected or selected from the
various sectors as may be provided by law, and those chosen by the President from Members of the
Cabinet. Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. The elective representatives shall be apportioned by law among the
provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and the districts of Metropolitan Manila in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, but the provinces with component cities and highly urbanized cities shall have at least one
representative each. The provinces and cities shall have at least the same total number of
representatives as under the 1935 Constitution."

The recognition of the existence to Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed any clearer.

NOTES:

1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975
wherein the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local
governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or
commission form of government," with the terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the
President. It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the corresponding
increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous communities referred to above
has brought into being a large area that calls for development both simultaneous and unified."

2. It cannot be argued that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila,
having manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is
to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government
Code.

3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating
Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President
who was then entrusted with such responsibility.

4. Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where there is express
recognition of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such express constutional
affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls, as earlier noted, for the dismissal of these
petitions, there being no legal justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 824.

5. It is undeniable, therefore, that the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any
constitutional objection. There is, however, a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the
President over the Commission. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission, the
General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of
the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall the power to revoke,
amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the Commission, the General and the
Commissioners."

The presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those
that may be considered national in character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila
Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the
power of the President is confined to general supervision.

MMDA VS BEL-AIR

FACTS:

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked
with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein,
received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the
public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and
to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On
the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do
so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower
courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent
of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

ISSUE:

WON the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers. NO.

RULING:

The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Petitioner herein is a
development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police
power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act
No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA
police power.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of
his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in
local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the
administrative character of the MMDA.

The MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the
MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. The MMDA was created to put some
order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private
subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.
 ABBAS VS COMELEC

FACTS:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao
and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled “An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.”

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the
COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.

One of the provisions impugned by the petitioners is Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which,
among others, states:

... Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided,
however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is
not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing
regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution which provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

ISSUE:

WON Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is constitutional. YES.

RULING:

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the
merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

NOTE:

Under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it.

CHIONGBAN VS ORBOS

FACTS:

Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan,
Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of
Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga.
In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an
autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In
accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.

On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art.
XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,

That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided,
however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October
12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 —(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of
Region X, will become part of Region IX; (2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present
parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will
become part of Region XII; (4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of
Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX; (6) Iligan
City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

ISSUES:

1. WON the power to "merge" administrative regions is executive in character. YES.

2. WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in
which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in
favor of it. YES.
RULING:

1. The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the
initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical
because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional
offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X,
§4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes." The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries
which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as "administrative in nature."

2. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This
means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the
creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces
forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or
merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in
those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

ORDILLO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region." The plebiscite
results showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the
Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city
above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC issued a Resolution stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President stating that CAR only constitutes Ifugao
province. The Congress set up the date of elections for CAR and the CAR assembly and executive board
were subsequently abolished. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region
be composed of more than one constituent unit.
ISSUE:
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region. NO.

RULING:
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
The Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise,
we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same
small area.
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected
only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies — the
Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region. To contemplate the
situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS COA

FACTS:
E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people.

On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. 220.
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.
XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers
the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio
[secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function
is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to
coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national
and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional
Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs.
7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law.

ISSUES:
1. WON the President, by issuing E.O. No. 220 in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. NO.
2. WON E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
NO.

3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces which compose the CAR. NO.

RULING:
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in
the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides
for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an
elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction
[Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous
regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the
main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5].
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are
they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-
linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development
in the Cordilleras.

2. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate
juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that
are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was
created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered
areas.
3. CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for
the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested
with political autonomy.

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

March 27, 2000 G.R. No. 135962

Facts: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is
the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996.

Actions Filed:
BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing, trial
court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no authority to
order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter
walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

Issues: 1) Whether MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.
2) Whether the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening
of subdivision roads to public traffic.

Held: 1) The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.

2) The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the
powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is
not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists,
respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is
a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine
and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical
clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by
an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public,
without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and
eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses
but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a

complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business
permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor
sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and
giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of
police power, in the grant of business permits

Held: NO. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law. In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City
Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court
of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in
its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent
SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City
Mayor as a valid exercise of police power. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a
municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local
government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police
power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through
the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229,
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early
warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In
compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued
Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well
serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229,
as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by
the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because
[they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning device to
be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and
transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is
unconstitutional

Held: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are
constitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote
public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of
adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter
of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued
in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets
and highways.
 Jejomar C. Binay v. Eufemio domingo
GR No. 92389, 1991-09-11
Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality... approved Resolution No. 60 Burial Assistance
Program. Bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount
of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. The municipal secretary
certified a disbursement fund of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of
the Burial Assistance Program. Resolution No. 60 was referred to Commission on Audit (COA) for its
expected allowance in audit. Respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners
Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent. Petitioner averred that Resolution No. 60 and the
intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power' and 'parens patriae'.

Issue: Whether the Resolution is valid.

Held: YES. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort,
and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It... extends to all the great public needs,
and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened
to deal with conditions which exist so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the... preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation

Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits
of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services as well as human dignity and
respect for human rights

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government
towards social justice.
 Quezon City v. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer
required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial
park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended
for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-
64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police
power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of
property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.

Issue: Whether section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power.

Held: NO. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power. An examination of the
Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance
in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the
power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.

in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
 PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm “engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,” challenges the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the
character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS”.

Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females” that it “does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills”, that it is violative of the
right to travel.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether D.O. No.1 in the nature of a police power measure is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The concept of police power is it is the authority of the State to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” It may be consists of
(1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, and (2) in order to foster the common good.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties “Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s will.” It is subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater number.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the
Court sustains the Government’s efforts.

Petition is dismissed.

Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A Prohibiting the interprovincial transport of carabaos. A case was filed by the
petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After
considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also
upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Whether E.O. 626-A unconstitutional.

Held: YES. The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the
prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process

Ramon Fabie v. City of Manila

G.R. No. L-6583 February 16, 1912

Facts: On September 21, 1909 the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 124, which is an amendment of
section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, enacted June 13, 1908 relating to the
issuance of permits for the erection of buildings. Sec. 107 of the of the said ordinance provides: "That the
building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has
been officially approved."

Ramon Fabie, et al sought to obtain a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house
upon the their property which forms a part of Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa in the City of Manila. Their
application was denied on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not conform to the
requirements of section 107.

The appellees contend that the provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of
the property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these Islands and by
the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due
process of law. The lower court ruled in their favor and declared the ordinance null and void, at least to
the extent of the above-cited provision.

Issue: Whether the Sec. 107 of the amended Ordinance No. 124 is constitutional.

Held: YES. The court held that purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect
and secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of fire and disease.
The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings within the city limits unless they "abut or
face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved," is in
our opinion reasonably necessary to secure the end in view.

There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the ordinance under discussion.
It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of Manila generally and
was not conceived in favor of any class or of particular individuals. Those charged with the public welfare
and safety of the city deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these purposes, and it
cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably necessary to that end it was and is a due and
proper exercise of the police power.

The court opined that that the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the public good, and
that it should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the people is the highest law" (salus populi
suprema est lex).

We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing: "That the building shall abut or face
upon a public street or alley which has been officially approved," is valid, and that the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed, without special condemnation of costs

LEVY D. MACASIANO, vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO

FACTS: The respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.
Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque,
Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the
municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2 authorizing and regulating the use of certain city
and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market
and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent
municipality subject to certain conditions.

The municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer
to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and/or vending areas.

Respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with
the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently,
market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

Petitioner ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in
Baclaran. He wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea
market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.

Respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition
and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction.

Trial court: issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 and enjoining petitioner from
enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.

ISSUE: WON an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the
lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. NO
HELD: In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea market
on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in force during the time the said
ordinance was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local Government
Code, in connection with established principles embodied in the Civil Code an property and settled
jurisprudence on the matter.

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code
states:

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are
local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to
close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code.

However, the legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close roads and other
similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already
established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has
no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by
toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be
subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community.
Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public
health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the
inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting
towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMIGIO B. CHAN

FACTS: The accused Remigio B. Chan, as manager of the Capitol Theatre, a first class cinematograph
was charged and sentenced in the municipal court to pay a fine for having sold to the public tickets in
excess of seating capacity of said cinematograph. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila
and interposed that the information be dismissed on the ground that said ordinance is unconstitutional
and void for being discriminatory. The fiscal appealed.

In the demurrer interposed by counsel for the accused, it is alleged that the discrimination in the
ordinance is very obvious inasmuch as there is no reasonable or natural basis for the imposition of a
burden on first run theatres and the exemption therefrom of those which are not thus classified.

ISSUE: WON a municipal ordinance which prohibits the sale by first run cinematographs of tickets in
excess of their seating capacity, is discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional. NO

HELD: It seems that this reasoning of the defense refutes itself. If it is admitted that the restriction on the
sale of tickets is imposed on first run cinematographs only and that those cinematographs which are not
so classified are exempted therefrom, then there can be no discrimination.

In the first place, it must be noted that there can be no doubt that the City of Manila exercises police
power by delegation and that in the exercise of that power, it is authorized to enact ordinances for the
regulation of the operation of theatres and cinematographs.

Sec 1 of Ordinance No. 2347 provides that all first run theatres or cinematographs should register their
seating capacity with the City Treasurer, and in section 2 it prohibits the sale of tickets in said theatres or
cinematographs in excess of their registered seating capacity.

Before the approval of Ordinance No. 2347, Ordinance No. 2188, was in force, section 1 of which divides
cinematographs into three different classes; first, second and third. The first class includes those located
on certain and specified streets like Rosario, Escolta, etc., which exhibit films for the first time; those
belonging to the second class are those which, not being located on said streets, also exhibit films for the
first time, and those which, being located on said streets, regularly show films for the second time or
which have the exclusive right to show second-hand films; and the third class comprehends all those
which are not included in the first and second classes.

The films which are shown for the first time attract a large attendance, and the theatre or cinematograph,
whether it is first or second class, presenting shows for the first time, would be suffocatingly overcrowded
if the number of tickets were not limited. This is the reason for the prohibition of the sale of tickets in
excess of the seating capacity. The prohibition applies with equal force wherever the same reason exists,
that is, to first and second class theatres which show films for the first time.

Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification
on a reasonable basis, and to made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The trues governing
classification are briefly as follows: The classification must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional law, 2d ed., page 343.)
 EDRO P. ARONG vs. MIGUEL RAFFIÑAN
FACTS: This appeal stems from a decision rendered in two cases which were jointly tried by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. In one Pedro P. Arong, as owner of Liberty Theater operated in the City of Cebu,
impleaded the mayor and treasurer of said city to recover the sum of P11,021.22 paid under protest as
license fee collected under Ordinance No. 43, series of 1947, on the ground that said ordinances are
illegal and oppressive and were enacted in violation of the City Charter (Case No. R-728). In the other,
John D. Young and six other owners and operators of theaters in the city likewise impleaded the same
city officials to recover the amounts they had paid under protest which were collected as license fees
under the same ordinances on the same ground that they are illegal and ultra vires and were enacted in
violation of the City Charter (Case No. R-1113).
Defendants alleged that the amounts collected from the Plaintiffs are not taxes but license fees and so
the enactment of the aforesaid ordinances comes within the power granted to the City of Cebu by its
charter and are not ultra vires. They further averred that the amounts collected were merely for regulation
and not for revenue and if the amounts are little excessive the excess was merely incidental which cannot
invalidate the ordinances.
The court rendered decision declaring the two ordinances valid and absolving the Defendants from the
complaint. From this decision the Plaintiffs have appealed.

ISSUE: WON the ordinances merely fix a license fee for purposes of regulation. NO

HELD: The pertinent provisions are embodied in section 17 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 58, which we
quote:
“SEC. 17. General powers and duties of the Board. — Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject
to the conditions and limitation thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
(1) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: Hawkers, peddlers, hucksters,
not including hucksters or peddler who sell only native vegetables, fruits, or foods, personally
carried by the hucksters or peddlers….. theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public
exhibitions, circuses, and all other performances and places of amusements, and the keeping,
preparation and sale of meat, poultry, fish, game, butter, cheese, lard, vegetable, bread, and
other provisions.
It should be noted that with regard to the business of theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs,
and other places of amusements, the power that the charter gives to the City of Cebu is merely “to
regulate and fix the amount of the license fees.” It does not include the power to tax as is the case with
regard to other businesses and occupations. This can be clearly seen from a cursory reading of the law.
When it desires to grant the power to tax it expressly so provides, otherwise it merely employs the words
“to regulate” or “fix the license fees.”
Indeed, it cannot be pretended that the fees exacted the ordinance in question are merely for regulation
for under Ordinance No. 25, series of 1946, of the City of Cebu, the theaters and other places of
entertainment within its limits are already charged the corresponding license fees for their Operation
depending upon their classification. Thus, for a first class theater or cinematograph an annual fee of P500
is charged and for those belonging to the second class an annual fee of P300. It is therefore evident that
under its charter the City of Cebu does not have the power to enact the ordinances in question and,
therefore, are ultra vires
Are the Plaintiffs entitled to recover the fees they had paid under said ordinances? NO
They are prevented from recovering them it appearing that these fees are paid not by the Plaintiffs but by
the public. If anybody has the right to claim them, it is those who paid them.
Wherefore, we hereby modify the decision of the lower court in the sense that, while the ordinances in
question are ultra vires, Plaintiffs cannot collect the fees they had paid thereunder and, therefore, this
case should be dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

ORTIGAS & Co. Ltd vs FEATI BANK & TRUST Co.

FACTS: Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favor of Emma Chavez,
upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the
lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles No. 101509 and 101511.

Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5,
1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could
also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued
contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in
Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and
industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favor of Feati.

Issue: (1) WON Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power; YES

(2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by
defendant-appellee. YES

HELD:

1. The validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below.
when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the trial
court was whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which
declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in
question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-
appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32 empowers a Municipal
Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the
law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution
No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
"regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists
"(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and
later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute,
since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. 35

The exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian
Relations, et al., 40 when We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the
individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.

The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate
response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of
the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power

It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee
as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution
No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said
resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be
enforced.

VELASCO VS VILLEGAS

FACTS: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of
Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila,
which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts to
a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

Ordinance 4964 states that "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the
business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or
in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator
of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person."

ISSUE: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police
power. NO

HELD: The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-
appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No.
3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such,
it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.” As it was then, so it has continued
to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.cralawn

DELA CRUZ VS PARAS

FACTS: Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners
contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to
due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was
in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal
or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of
Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power
to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as
to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit.
The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid. NO

HELD: It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power
but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would
result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night
club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix
the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

Under the Local Governmentt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of
an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. Herein what was
involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit.

BALACUIT VS CFI AGUSAN DEL NORTE

FACTS: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No. 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing
any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling admission tickets to any
movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be
charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit, et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and
constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favor of the respondents hence the petition
for review. Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being
oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 640 prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to children 7-12 years old at
full price is constitutional. NO.

HELD: Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. To invoke the exercise the police power, it must be for
the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and adoptive means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance.
This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the
validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper
evidence.37 The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.38

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could
assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been
fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of
citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising
police power, be upheld as valid.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB)
order of compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Sta. Rosa was the registered owner of two parcels of land in Cabuyao, Laguna.
According to them, these lands are watersheds which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the
Canlubang community and that 90 light industries are located in that area. They were alleging
respondents usurped its rights over their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land
provides water to the residents, respondents sought an easement of a right of a way to and from
Barangay Casile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against respondents.
Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to acquire private rights in land without the willing
consent of its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society. The said land was inspected by the
Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities concerned, they decided
that the said land must be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioners filed an objection on the
ground that: The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with
slopes 18% and above. (which falls under the exception in compulsory acquisition of CARP) The
occupants of the land were illegal settlers or (squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as
beneficiaries. Another issue raised by the petitioners was that the DAR failed to follow the due process
because instead of paying just compensation, a trust account was made in favor of the petitioners.

ISSUES: 1. WON DAR’s payment of just compensation was in accordance with the procedural
requirement. NO
2. WON the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the
CARP. NO

HELD:

1.The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent
domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation
of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just
compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash
or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.

2. Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. Watersheds generally are outside the
commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple.At
the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the property
as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning
Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a
Resolution[26] voiding the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that
the land is now classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its
police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal
legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.[27]
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform [28] we held that lands classified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution
to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and
survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area. [29]
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a watershed or part of the protected area
for watershed purposes. Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be
interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In
the case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the
land was allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that
may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot
ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes.
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the
introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent
infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped,
it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed
degredation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it.

It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for
ecological and environmental considerations, among others. Although the 88 families who are the
proposed CARP beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation be taken as
one should also consider the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will
not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes.

The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area be allocated for the
affected farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates be mandated to protect and maintain the area in
question as a permanent watershed reserved.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented
proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of
CARL. (R. A. No. 6657, Section 10) Hence, the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the
compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court
directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.

G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998, 298 SCRA 678

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON vs. HON. RENATO C.

CORONA

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of
this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a
number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.

FACTS: This pertains to the 2 separate motions for reconsideration filed by respondents and the
applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of the SC’s April 24, 1998 Decision nullifying the so-called
"win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-
C-6424, and denying the applicants' Motion For Leave To Intervene. In the past decision, the SC struck
down as void the act of the Office of the President (OP) in reopening the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-
6424 through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution which substantially modified its
March 29, 1996 Decision that had long become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the resolution is valid? YES

HELD: It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in
their field are binding and conclusive on the Court,iii considering that the Office of the President is
presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.

The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous adage of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should have more in law." Our affirmation
of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of the
impoverished of society will be benefited by the agro-economical development of the disputed land which
the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. To our mind, the
OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, not just of the few. This is
clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners.

2nd ISSUE: WON the applicants' motion for intervention must be granted

HELD: NO.

Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or collectively the land they
till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, and in the case of other
farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to receive a just share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent portion
of the aforecited constitutional provision mandates:

"Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. x
x x" (Emphasis supplied)

Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under the agrarian reform program the
equitable distribution of the land is a right given to landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the
land they till, while the other or seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the
land.iii Being merely seasonal farmerworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for intervention
must necessarily fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the subject land.

3rd ISSUE: Whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

HELD: Local Government Units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision
was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the
province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and
Development Corporations, and all others who should be benefited by the said decision. The issue here
is not a question of technicality but that of substance and merit. Whether the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, the March 29, 1996
OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed the issue. Converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. Procedural lapses in
the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes cannot be allowed
to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of
their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is clear and affords no
room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local governments units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities.

NOTE(ito ruling sa past cases): But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as
"substantial," namely: (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3)
whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to become
beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to
reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, to our mind, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has
thoroughly and properly disposed of the aforementioned issues. We quote the pertinent portions of the
said Decision:

To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial

would open great opportunities for employment and bring real development in the area
 towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand,
distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are
none) does not guarantee such benefits.

"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true
that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the
property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion
thereof. the land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for
several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine-Packing Corporation.

"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered
by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1,
1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under
Section 8 R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of
compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte
Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional
Office and the land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to desist from pursuing
any activity or activities covering petitioner's land.

"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has
already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as
follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 100 hectares in
the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they
have not received 'just compensation' up to this time.

"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries
to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.

"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property
for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more
simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room
for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government
units autonomy in their affairs including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

SPOUSES SOCRATES PILAPIL and ROSARIO PILAPIL, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

FACTS:The Pilapil Spouses own a 6,598 square meter parcel of land situated in Bahak, Poblacion,
Liloan, Cebu. The land formerly belonged to Marcelo Pilapil, the grandfather of petitioner Socrates Pilapil.
Private respondents (Colomidas), who are residents of Mandaue City, purchased from Esteria vda. de
Ceniza and the heirs of Leoncio Ceniza a parcel of land, also located at Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu.
This parcel of land was found to contain only 6,448 square meters. The Colomidas claim that they had
acquired from Sesenando Longkit a road right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road
right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists all
the way to the said National Road. The Colomidas "tried to improve the road of "camino vecinal", for the
convenience of the public," but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with "bodily harm from making
said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. The Colomidas filed
against the Pilapils a petition for injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
and/or prohibitory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. On the other hand, the Pilapils filed
against the Colomidas an action for damages in the MTC Liloan-Compostela, Cebu. The RTC ruled in
favour of the Colomidas. The CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Liloan has a camino vicinal (byroad in English) in sitio Bahak of
barangay Poblacion, and if it does, whether such road traverses the property of the Pilapils of only passes
along its side?

HELD: YES. It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal
is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such a right. Thus,
even if We are to agree with both the trial court and public respondent that Longakit and Pepito were
telling the truth, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal in sitio
Bahak must prevail. It is thus pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since the
same have, for all intents and purposes, become irrelevant.

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces, cities or
municipalities. They are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the same
character. Under the applicable law in this case, the LGC, the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of
the municipality, had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the
provisions of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of
municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use
thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them as provided by
Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I.

A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above
powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare
and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things,
the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal
road. In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban
Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor. By doing so, the said legislative body
determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak.

What invested the zoning map with legal effect was neither the authority of the person who ordered its
preparation nor the authority of the person who actually prepared it, but its approval by the Sangguniang
Bayan. Furthermore, with or without the order of the Mayor or Sangguniang Bayan, Engineer Jordan, as
the then Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, had the authority to prepare the plan and
admit it to the Sangguniang Bayan for approval. Among his functions under the governing law at the time
was to formulate an integrated economic, social, physical and other development objectives and policies
for the consideration and approval of the sangguniang bayan and the municipal mayor, and prepare
municipal comprehensive plans and other development planning document. Thus, even if he had not
been instructed by anyone to prepare the map, he could nevertheless, on his own initiative and by virtue
of his functions, make one. The trial court and public respondent then failed to appreciate the role and
function of a Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator.

As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of
Socrates Pilapil. This is the proposed road leading to the national highway." The Colomidas presented no
rebuttal witness to show that by the approval of the zoning map by the Sangguniang Bayan, they were
effectively deprived of access to the national highway from their property. Of course, they may argue that
the zoning map was prepared for and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan after the filing of their petition
in Civil Case No. R-20732. Be that as it may, this preparation and approval, clearly a supervening event,
was relied upon, introduced in evidence without objection on the part of the Colomidas and evaluated by
the trial court. In short, the latter allowed the issue raised by the supervening event to be tried. There was
nothing procedurally objectionable to this. Such supervening fact, duly proved to be an official act of the
Municipality of Liloan, binds not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas, but also the general public. The
solemn declarations of old people like Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito cannot overturn the
decision of the Municipality of Liloan.

CABRERA v CA

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158, providing as follows:

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of
this province to traffic effective October 31, 1969, and to give to the owners of the properties
traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office
from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties.

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Honorable Provincial Governor be, as he is hereby authorized to
sign for and in behalf of the province of Catanduanes, the pertinent Deed of Exchange and or
other documents pertaining thereto;

Pursuant thereto, Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province of Catanduanes
conveyed to Bagadiong, Alcala, Latorre, Tolentino, Alejandro, Vargas, and Reyes portions of the closed
road in exchange for their own respective properties, on which was subsequently laid a new concrete
road leading to the Capitol Building.
In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner's house was planted to vegetables
in 1977 by Alejandro. Peña, who had bought Vargas's share, also in the same part of the road, converted
it into a piggery farm. Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed a complaint for "Restoration of
Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages."
He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in
its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No.
158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said
road. The judge sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact Resolution No. 158 under
existing law.

Appeal was taken to the respondent court, which found that the road was a public road and not a trail but
just the same also upheld Resolution 158. It held that pursuant to RA 5185, municipal authorities can
close, subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of
the RAC. Although in this case the road was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the
provincial board of Catanduanes, the closure, nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the approving
authority itself. However, while it could do so, the provincial government of Catanduanes could close the
road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of the RAC being very explicit
on this.

1st ISSUE: WON there is a road closure? (petitioner claims that it’s not an order for closure but an
authority to barter or exchange it with private properties)

HELD: The Court cannot understand how the petitioner can seriously argue that there is no order of
closure when it is there in the resolution, in black and white. Resolution 158 clearly says that it is "hereby
resolved to close the old road."

In the case of Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, the Court held the closure of a city street
as within the powers of the city council under the Revised Charter of Cebu City. It sustained the
subsequent sale of the land as being in accordance not only with the charter but also with Article 422 of
the Civil Code, which provides: "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the power of the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets
and withdraw them from public use was also assailed. This Court said: Such power to vacate a street or
alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts,
absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So
the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board, there is no
reason for not applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the
closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the
grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of
provincial roads.

2nd ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to damages?

HELD: NO. The petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred, such as it is, is
the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not a case
where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. The construction of the
new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial judge acutely observed, whatever
inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the
new road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to the pier, has been
giving to the public, plus the fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but
also to the whole province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those benefits, every individual in the
province, including the petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.

[G.R. No. L-44178. August 21, 1987.]

RICARDO CRUZ, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The private respondents instituted a class suit before the CFI Manila in behalf of the vendors
and regular stall holders in Padre Rada Market for annulment with preliminary injunction against the then
Manila Mayor Villegas, petitioner Cruz, and other persons. The complaint prayed, among others, that the
defendant City Mayor’s decision to withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market be declared null and
void.

Petitioner Cruz states that he and his business associates have been the owners and operators of the
Padre Rada Market at Tondo, Manila for more than 25 years. The market was authorized to be operated
as a public market of the City of Manila by virtue of Resolution No. 230. The management of said market
represented by petitioner Cruz wrote Mayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing 3/4 of the
area of the market "from the direct supervision and control of the City Treasurer’s Office effective on June
15, 1970, and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public
market." The respondent-vendors, who were likewise notified of such withdrawal, protested such move.

Mayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal in the light of the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the right of
the operators of the Elcano Market to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating,
among others, that approval for the withdrawal by the City of Manila is not even necessary.

The CFI rendered a decision declaring among others the decision of the mayor to withdraw Padre Rada
Market as a public market as valid. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the lower court’s decision. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals declaring that the Padre Rada Market remains a public market under government supervision
and control and that the private respondent-vendors be maintained in the premises.

ISSUE: WON the City Mayor may validly withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market.

HELD: NO. By the very nature of a market, * its location, opening, operations, and closure must be
regulated by government. It is not a question of the petitioner’s right to run his market as he pleases but
what agency or office should supervise its operations.

The Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of
 Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city’s constant
supervision. The establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislative
powers of the City of Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal
board resolution and approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the
whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board
and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure
of a public market.

Moreover, Sec. 1, III (2) of Republic Act No. 6039, amending the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
provides: "‘City-owned and operated public markets shall not be disposed of, closed . . . or transferred
until all vendors therein shall have been relocated or transferred by the city government at its expenses to
another temporary or new public market.’"

The petitioner alleges otherwise, stating that said provision is not applicable to the Padre Rada Market, it
being a privately-owned and privately-operated public market under the control and supervision of the
City of Manila. The fact that all privately-owned public markets are under government supervision and
control do not make them city-operated public markets. There is no question that the Padre Rada Market
is a public market as it was authorized to operate and it operates as such.

A market is a "public market" when it is dedicated to the service of the general public and is operated
under government control and supervision as a public utility, whether it be owned by the government or
any instrumentality thereof or by any private individual. It is a settled doctrine that a "public market may be
the object of individual ownership or lease, subject to municipal supervision and control." (43 C.J. 394).
Thus, if a market has been permitted to operate under government license for service to the general
public, it is a "public market" whether the building that houses it or the land upon which it is built is of
private or public ownership. The Padre Rada Market is, therefore, a public market which happens to be
privately-owned and privately operated.

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. vs. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Subsequently City Council of Cebu passed a resolution authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land
through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest
bidder and through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a
total consideration of P10,800. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an
application with the CFI Cebu to have its title to the land registered.

The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the
property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the
public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to
registration by any private individual. The trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application
for registration of title.

For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:
1st ISSUE: Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34,
give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and

HELD: The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:

Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary
notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property
thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or
street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close
city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said:

These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it
would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain
property is still necessary for public use.Such power to vacate a street or alley is
discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the
courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust
will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will
not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

2nd ISSUE: Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City
of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract?

HELD: Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can
be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms,
states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

MUYOT v DE LA FUENTE
FACTS: Appelants contructed booths on the the sidewalk of the Plaza Sta. Cruz. When they were
instructed to remove the same, appellants claimed that they had obtained permit from the present of the
City of Manila, to connect booths Nos. 1 and 2, along the premises in question, and for the use of spaces
where the booths were constructed, they had paid and continued paying the corresponding rentals. The
booths in question served as fruit stands for their owners and often, if not always, blocked the fire
passage of pedestrians who had to take the plaza itself which used to be clogged with vehicular traffic.

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila could lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz

HELD: NO, it being beyond the commerce of man. Granting the claim that it was leased to them as true,
one should not entertain any doubt that such permit was not legal, because the City of Manila does not
have any power or authority at all to lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question,
forming part of the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper subject matter of the contract, as it
was not within the commerce of man (Article 1347, new Civil Code, and article 1271, old Civil Code). Any
contract entered into by the City of Manila in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra
vires. The sidewalk in question was intended for and was used by the public, in going from one place to
another. "The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public,
and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for
other purpose as provided by ordinance or regulation; ..." (Sec. 1119, Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila.)

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE vs. HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO. (March 31,
1915)

FACTS: The provincial fiscal of Cavite, representing the same, filed a complaint against the defendants
(Rojas and her husband Siuko) alleging that the plaintiff municipal corporation had exclusive right, control
and administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite and that
the defendants, through a lease from the municipality, occupy a parcel of land which forms part of the
Soledad public plaza belonging to the municipality of Cavite.

The defendant had already constructed a house thereon. The defendants refused to vacate the said land
because they had acquired the right of possession to it and further alleged that the lease agreement
provided that they can only be ordered to vacate the said property if the municipality needed it for
decoration or public use. The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim to the property. This
case was appealed through bill of exceptions.

ISSUE: WON the lease agreement between the parties was valid?

HELD: NO.
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not
withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private use
the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a
thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he commerce of man may
be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce.

Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to Hilaria
Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary to the
law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. On the hyphotesis that the said lease is null
and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant must restore
and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which in its
turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals
just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons as have been set forth,
and as said contract is null and void in its origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant
is not entitled to claim that the plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the
removal of her house from the said land.

Hence, the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as the lease
of said parcel of land is null and void, the defendant is ordered to vacate it and release the land in
question within thirty days. There is no ground for the indemnity sought in the nature of damages, but the
municipality must in its turn to the defendant the rentals collected.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

FACTS: P.D. No. 27 was promulgated along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.

President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics
for its implementation.

Subsequently, R.A. No. 6657 was enacted, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988.

These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation
No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that
taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under
the above-quoted decree.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid exercise of power of eminent domain. YES

HELD: I. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power of expropriation are: (1) public
use and (2) just compensation.

A. Public use

The requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the
1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken
from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No.
27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State
adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to
enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

B. Just Compensation

1. Objection is raised to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d),
which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to
buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the
land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days after it is submitted for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and
may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that
rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described
as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to
submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just
compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

2. The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional
insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in
less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed.

We do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State
from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

Payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money. The proportion of
cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of
the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing
it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No
less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are
also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

II. The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual
payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent
domain.
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and
declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except
that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full
payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was
also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the
landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full
payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution authorizing then Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Sugui. The
intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.

The city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC. Suguitan filed a motion to
dismiss which the trial court denied.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid exercise of power of eminent domain. NO

HELD: In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over
petitioners' property by means of a resolution. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a
resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the
court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show
that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning
at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to
the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings,
which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order
of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the
plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

NOTE: A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently -a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997]

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution
No. 43-89 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare
Portion of a lot owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports Facilities.

In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for
the establishment of the government center.

The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain
against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court and filed a Motion to Take or Enter
Upon the Possession of said land.

RTC: granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land.

CA: affirmed.

ISSUE: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which
was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. YES

HELD: The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it
is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which
does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337,
grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No.
43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and
its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section
9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as
lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983

Heirs of Juancho Ardona, petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding
Judge of Branch I, COURT OF FIRST instance OF CEBU, and the PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City,
under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings
any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph
B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no
specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that
assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the
land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally
repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations
and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

ISSUE: WON the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the taking of private
property for the promotion of tourism? NO

HELD: The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably the search would
be in vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social
justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public interest, and
general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and
according to place, To freeze specific programs like Tourism into express constitutional provisions would
make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond
Delphic proportions.

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads,
bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants,
markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation
systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as
elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been
discarded.

The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private
concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.
inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside
restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least
bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses
of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers
catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of
private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area
is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other
private concerns.

Petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to formulations of
national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter
of the Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree No. 564:

2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or

by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the
following reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land
speculation in areas declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection
of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose expressly
authorized under this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain under its own
name, which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation
proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable
to the land owners: Provided, That in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set
forth in Chapter III, Section 8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.

[G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998]

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a
Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of
land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 577, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with
private respondent, which the latter did not accept.

The RTC issued an order authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property.

The trial court later on issued its resolution nullifying its order and dismissed the case. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES: (1) WON the the Municipality of Paraaque can authorize an expropriation of private property
through a mere resolution. NO

(2) WON the principle of res judicata bars subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same
property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. NO
HELD: Pursuant to Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160, one of the essential requisites that
must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain is that an ordinance is enacted by
the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance.

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.[32] An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

(2) The Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it
does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an
expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same
issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as
prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By
the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through
a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement
and, for that matter, allothers are properly complied with.

Beluso vs Municipality of Panay

FACTS: Petitioners are owners of parcels of land. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay
issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed by the Municipality of
Panay (respondent) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss which the trial court denied and declared that the expropriation in
this case is for public use and the respondent has the lawful right to take the property upon payment of
just compensation.

ISSUE: WON there is valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. NO

HELD: The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize
an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses
a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly
defective.While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot
grant judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of
the very law giving it such power.

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE

FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner, Filstream International Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject of this
dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila.

Petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the MTC against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of
land (herein private respondents) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of
rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to
vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. Such decision become final and executory.

However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, private respondents filed a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner Filstream. It was at this stage that
respondent City of Manila came into the picture when the city government approved Ordinance No. 7813
authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or
other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of petitioner then occupied
by private respondents. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the
expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerero streets
in Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierez, petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to
the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.

Respondent City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate the aforecited
parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream which are situated at Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II,
Manila.

The trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of possession
over the disputed premises to the City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid exercise of power of eminent domain. NO

HELD: There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner
Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this dispute. Thus,
petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already became final and
executory.

However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of
eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for public use is expressly
granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code.

More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its
urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
(R.A. No. 409).

In fact, the City of Manilas right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and
executory judgment over the property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of
Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21, 1993.

We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the
acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the
existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when
exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still
have to be followed, such as: no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. Thus the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without
limitations. Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must comply with
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposed of urban land reform and
housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Sections 9 of which
specifically provide as follows:

Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of LandLands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following
order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired;
and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Very clear from the abovequoted provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in
acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as means to acquire the
same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only
safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is
expropriated for public use.

Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above disquisitions, we now pose the crucial question: Did
the city of Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions when it expropriated petitioner Filstreams
properties? We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would indicate
the respondent City of Manila complied with R.A. 7279. Petitioners Filstreams properties were
expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a
violation of petitioner Filstreams right to due process which must accordingly be rectified.

G.R. No. 155746

LAGCAO vs JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA

FACTS: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot
1029. Petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029,
reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the
City of Cebu to the petitioners.

The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of
sale in favor of petitioners.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) rendered a decision ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of
execution and order of demolition.

However, the demolition order was suspended upon the request of Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia.
Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed an ordinance which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing.
Another ordinance was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate
expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners.
The intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to
the actual occupants thereof.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid exercise of power of eminent domain. NO

HELD: Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of
small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for
public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience
of a few without perceptible benefit to the public.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and
housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted:

We ruled that the above-quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for
socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private
lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with
these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of
private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly
taken from them allegedly for public use.
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9
and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to
first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish
that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the
passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners
property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be
constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to due process.

NOTE: For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in
accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require
that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of
constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject
ordinance. We recapitulate:

first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;

second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor
ordinance;

third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of awarding
it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and

fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the
means adopted.While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum
dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and
called for by the circumstances.

Antonio v. Geronimo

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Alexander Catolos (private respondent), who
alleged that he was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land situated at Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal.
The defendants therein were the petitioners, who were occupying the said properties.

The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent. Private respondent filed a motion for issuance
of a writ of demolition which was granted by the lower court. A writ of demolition was issued.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Daniel Garcia to
acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public purposes/socialized housing, and
authorizing him to secure financing for the acquisition of the said parcel of land subject of this case.
Sangguniang Bayan informed respondent court of the expropriation and the fact that the funds required
for the same have already been included in the budget, and requested that the demolition be held in
abeyance. At this point, the writ of demolition had not yet been fully implemented.

The demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE: WON a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend the writ of execution
and demolition in an ejectment case. NO

HELD: In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo. In its stead
were Resolution Nos. 61-95 and 88-95. It has been categorically stated in the cases of Municipality of
Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation and Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong that a local
government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body.

These resolutions cannot partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of execution in the
ejectment proceedings. They merely express at most an intention to expropriate. Private respondent
correctly maintained that there was no positive act of instituting the intended expropriation proceedings.

Assuming arguendo that instead of resolutions, an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, we
still find for private respondent. There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses the power of
eminent domain. But the taking of private properties is not absolute. The power of eminent domain must
not be exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for resolving a critical problem such as urban squatting. The
safeguards afforded by law require strict observance.

The UDHA is also relevant as it governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10, in particular, provide the relevant limitations, thus:

Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:

(a) Those owned by the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired;
and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking,
donation to the government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided,
however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other models of acquisition have been
exhausted.

Assuming that there was even an attempt by Antipolo City to expropriate the subject properties for
socialized housing, the records do not show compliance with the abovementioned rules. No attempt was
made to acquire the first five (5) lands mentioned in Section 9. Neither were the other modes of
acquisition exhausted, as mandated by Section 10. An examination of the resolutions readily shows that
the purpose for which they were passed is to save petitioners from the impending demolition. Yet nothing
therein is of binding force as to preclude the ejectment of the petitioners or the demolition of their houses.

Moreover, the Court, inferring from the twin cases of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. and Republic of the Philippines v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et. al., imposed guidelines for its
implementation, such that an ejectment proceeding cannot be barred or suspended unless an action for
expropriation is actually filed; the government takes possession of the land; and coetaneous payment of
just compensation is made. The Court explained in Familara v. J.M. Tuason, thus:

Definitely, to hold that the mere declaration of an intention to expropriate, without instituting the
corresponding proceeding therefor before the courts, with assurance of just compensation, would
already preclude the exercise by the owner of his rights of ownership over the land, or bar the
enforcement of any final ejectment order that the owner may have obtained against any intruder
into the land, is to sanction an act which is indeed confiscatory and therefore offensive to the
Constitution. For it must be realized that in a condemnation case, it is from the condemnor's taking
possession of the property that the owner is deprived of the benefits of ownership, such as possession,
management and disposition thereof. Before that time, the proprietary right of the owner over his property
must be recognized.