Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
J O H N TOMLINSON*
*Department of English and Media, The Nottingham Trent University, Clifton Main
Site, Nottingham NGI 1 8NS, U.K.
891
892 John Tomlinson
2. CULTURAL TOURISM
3. HOMOGENISATION AS A THREAT TO
CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY
This is the most commonly encountered argument and in many ways the
weakest. There is not space here to step through all the problems with the notion
of 'cultural authenticity' itselfmits connotations of folksy romanticism, the
associated myth of origins, the a-historic nature of the idea and the way it casts
cultural practices as static. Suffice it to say that the notion of 'authenticity' suffers
from similar problems of reification to the notion of 'national heritage' which
underpins the growing 'heritage industry' in the West. Though with clearly
different ideological intentions, both notions misrepresent the essentially dynamic
nature of culture itself (always changing, always on the move), in their attempts
to conjure up a stable and coherent past stretching back to time immemorial and
in some sense 'belonging' to the cultural present. 9
But, apart from this, what is interesting about the authenticity argument is
how little it departs from the cultural tourist perspective. Cultures need to
preserve their unique features, it is argued. But why? Apart from some
unconvincing attempts to assign some social-functionality to uniqueness, 1° it is
hard to see any other reason than that it would be nice to have people behaving in
traditional ways dotted around the worldmso long as it's not us. Jeremy Tunstall
long ago pointed to the irony in:
the Western intellectual who switches off the baseball game, turns down the hi-fi or
pushes aside the Sunday magazine and pens a terse instruction to the developing
world to get back to its tribal harvest ceremonials or funeral music. H
And, just as tourists want their 'home comforts' when abroad--decent plumbing
and a nice wine list in the hotel--so the cultural tourist who defends authenticity
would generally like to temper this with some friendly Western liberal values.
Nice to keep ceremonial dancing--but we're not so sure about female
circumcision, or foot binding, or mutilation as punishment under Shariah
law . . . .
Indeed, it is not difficult to think of examples of cultural practices which would
attract a consensus amongst liberal or radical critics in the West in favour of their
universal application: the material benefits of modernity (as distinguished from
the system of capitalist production and distribution) that I have already
mentioned but also, perhaps, various 'liberal' cultural attitudes towards
emancipation, toleration, compassion, democratic political participation, and so
on. This is not, of course, to say that all of these are indisputable 'goods' under
any description whatever, nor that they are all the 'free gifts' of an expanding
capitalist modernity. But it is to say that there are plenty of aspects of 'culture',
broadly defined, that the severest critic of cultural homogenisation might wish to
find the same in any area of the globe. The implication is that critics of cultural
homogenisation are selective in the things they object to and there is nothing
wrong in this so long as we realise that it undermines the notion that
homogenisation is a bad thing in itself. But then we enter a quite separate set of
arguments--not about the uniformity of capitalist culture, but about the spread
of its pernicious features which require quite different criteria of judgement.
4. H O M O G E N I S A T I O N AND AUTONOMY
to describe the exercise of free moral agency. As Richard Lindley puts it:
The concept of autonomy is also used widely in political analysis in relation to the
'actions' of institutions, notably nation-states. One notion of cultural autonomy
is based on an analogy--misconceived, as I believe--with this institutional
usage. However I don't want to pursue these complications here. 13
The more interesting point about the autonomy principle, for our purposes, is
that it is quite indifferent to the outcomes of cultural practices and processes: so
long as these take place free from heteronomous control, the autonomy principle
is entirely satisfied. The implication of this is that autonomy would not
necessarily be at issue if all cultures came to resemble one another. If all
restaurants looked like McDonalds, or Pizza Hut, all music became variants of
Western electronic Rock, all cities concrete and glass clones of Los Angeles, all
television programmes blandly 'international', if identical parades of shops were
to be found in every shopping centre in the world--if all this were to
occur---defenders of autonomy would not be able to grumble, so long as this
homogeneity was the outcome of autonomous choices. For autonomy is only
concerned with freedom of action, not with the outcome of actions. The
relationship of homogenisation to cultural autonomy turns out to be only a
contingent one--it might suggest that autonomy has been infringed or it might
not. At any rate, the mere fact of cultural practices becoming the same is not in
itself any threat to cultural autonomy.
However I do think autonomy is important in all this and to finish I will try to
say briefly how it might figure in a critique of these issues. In the first place, I
think we need to take a different view of the significance of homogenisationmto
get right away from the ideas of sameness and difference. To return to my starting
point, we need to expand the conceptual vocabulary with which we approach
global cultural phenomena. Perhaps it's best to see homogenisation as merely
symptomatic of a more profound process of 'globalisation'. Globalisation has
been variously described but it is most commonly understood primarily in terms
of an expanding global capitalist production system and market. This is not only
the case with obviously political-economic accounts (for example, Wallerstein's
world system theory) but with accounts at the level of the cultural. 14 Now
although I would not want to deny the centrality of capitalism to global culture, I
think we might usefully avoid the obvious critical strategy in response to
thismthe route through the critique of commodification which often fetches up
in the critique of homogenisation.
Global capitalism clearly has cultural consequences. Certainly it tends to
spread around a lot of Kentucky Fried Chicken, Coke and Madonna videos. But
I don't think this is its most significant consequence. More significant, I think, is
the shift in the locus of control of cultural patterns from a local to a 'decentred'
global space. It is in this process--a function of'capitalist modernity' rather than
simply of the capitalist market--that the threat to cultural autonomy lies and it is
here, I think, that a broader cultural critique of globalisation might be
established.
Anthony Giddens has provided some suggestive concepts here in his analysis
of the globalising tendencies of modernity. In particular, he speaks of the process
of 'displacement' or 'disembedding': 'the lifting out of social relations from local
contexts and their rearticulation across indefinite tracts of time/space'. This
process derives from the impact of the major institutions of modernity--global
capitalism, certainly, but also mass communications, and what Giddens refers to
as the 'abstract systems' of modernity. 15
The main cultural implications I take from the process of 'disembedding' is
that global capitalist modernity shrinks the space for, and the significance of,
local decision making and therefore inhibits cultural autonomy. There is scarcely
space to develop this argument here but I will sketch it out in relation to an
example Giddens provides:
The local shopping mall is a milieu in which a sense of ease and security is cultivated
by the layout of the buildings and the careful planning of public places. Yet
everyone who shops there is aware that most of the shops are chain stores, which
one might find in any city, and indeed that innumerable shopping malls of similar
design exist elsewhere? 6
Giddens does not make the obvious move of focussing on the homogenisation
of experience implied in this example, rather he uses it to illustrate how the
planning of these public spaces represent 'an expression of distant events and was
'placed into' the local environment rather than forming an organic development
within it'. What is at stake is thus the issue of the heteronomous control of
cultural environments rather than that of the uniformity of experience within
these environments. Cultural autonomy would, I think, have to involve local
users of such environments in their conception and planning massively more
than is the case in present conditions.
But in addressing this we confront a puzzle, for no one actually 'lives' in the
global space which defines our local experience: even the directors of
multinational companies necessarily live in a locality, shop (or send their wives or
servants to shop) in the local mall. So in what sense is local cultural autonomy to
be expressed in the conditions of global modernity? Here we must accept the
impossibility of returning to some pre-modern 'gemeinschaftliche' world of
presence availability. There is clearly no retreat from modernity and the idea of
'locality' must be expressed somewhat differently in this context; detached from
the sense of physical proximity and small-scale community which tie it to images
of'traditional' society. Perhaps, as Giddens suggests, we might see disembedding
as a process of 'integration within globalised 'communities' of shared
experience'. 17 But however the local is reconceptualised, it seems to me that the
effort must be to define a meaningful public space for the expression of
autonomous cultural choice and the generation of narratives of collective
meaning. It is the articulation and the establishment of such a space, rather than
John Tomlinson
The Nottingham Trent University
NOTES