The Constitution of the Philippines

1. De Leon v. Esguerra
GR No. 78059
August 31, 1987

Facts:
On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a
Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of
1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed
by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitioners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null
and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.+++++++++++++++++++++

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and
to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution
and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election
Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for
being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling:
Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no
legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely
on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

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 "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of 6
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

2. Manila Prince Hotel

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or
the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the
declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price
and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.  “In
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

Held:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power
to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

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3. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
GR No. 160261
November 10, 2003

Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

Held:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2. From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that

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Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are
not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Amendments and Revisions

4. Ramon Gonzales v. COMELEC
GR No. L-28196
November 9, 1967

Facts:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the
same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon
Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question.

Issues:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

Held:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.
Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the
people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or
proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly.
Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional
limitations.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held
that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is
a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so
under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.

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Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so
as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original
proposition with the amended proposition.

5. Imbong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432
September 11, 1970

Facts:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it
prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each
representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by
providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each
representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions
the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

Issues:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such
convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

Held:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress
also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such
details are within the competence of the Congress in the exercise of its legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely an application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely
obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid
limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the
petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights
remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional
guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

6. Occena vs. Comelec

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law. The three Resolutions were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National

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Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections. The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim BatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
and 27, 1981 which the date of plebiscite has been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period
provided by the Constitution.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a fundamental law.
(2) Whether or not the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power to propose amendments.
(3) Whether or not the three-fourth votes is necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission.
(4) Whether or not the three BatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid.

Held: Yes, the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power and privilege to propose amendments. On January 17,
1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court
and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to
respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts
were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this power is indubitable as the
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit.The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as
well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Resolution No. 1
proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to
own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to
5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by
a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus making them valid.

7. Arturo Tolentino vs Commission on Elections

GR No. L-34150
October 16, 1971

Facts:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering
the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that
it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a
petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to
the resolution be null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition will prosper.

Held:

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Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people. Such is not
allowed.

The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire
constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a
proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest
of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed
amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the
same time, NOT piecemeal.

8. Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. L-44640
October 12, 1976

Facts:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree,
PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct
16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Petitioners
contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.

Issue:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

Held:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true
in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution,
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
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active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme
Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able
to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

9. Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic

of the Philippines
G.R. No. 183591
October 14 2008

Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF
to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to
meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya
which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which
consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect.
Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants
―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further
provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above
it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a
shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship
was described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and
finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated
by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and
laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right
to information

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2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

Held:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid
symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of
access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital
to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to
say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is
an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in
not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the
design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to
information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose
information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided
by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the
contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-
based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by
the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.
Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for
peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a
peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace
process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”
consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further,
E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information,
comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the
comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum
for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace
advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the
implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government [-] civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be
consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
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present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers
that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as
a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on
RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the
MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive,
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive
compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may
have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless,
given that there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of
international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of
association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The
MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries,
the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the
ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation
of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments
of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting
them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does
not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity
the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

10
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on
the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of
the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM
and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without
need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview.
That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein
in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because
what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to
be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative arrangement
does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between
the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national
unity.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the
same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1,
2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that
the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP
Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

10. Miriam Defensor Santiago et al vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325
March 19, 1997

Facts:
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
11
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed
by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution,
on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles
II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed
out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether
the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

Held:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this
constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed
by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section
2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly stated,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does
not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA
6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads
in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when
the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

11. Lambino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153 AND 174299
October 25, 2006

Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

12
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution

Held:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be
“ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
13
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after
the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is
no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit
Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

14
Fundamental Powers of the State
Police Power
12. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon
GR No. L-81958
June 30, 1988

Facts:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male
and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of
DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on
behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State
and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

Held:
Yes it is constitutional.
“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,” but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same
class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.

13. Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957

Facts:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities
herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
15
enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or
the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

Issue:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Held:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does
not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

14. Lutz v. Araneta

G.R. No. L-7859
December 22, 1955

Facts:
Appellant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen
thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-
1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of
sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons
in control of the land devoted to the cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or
otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected
and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is
unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in
plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was
dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of our nation,
sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers
in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important source of foreign
16
exchange needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of
currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be
stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that the
distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of
the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of
the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.

15. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs

Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989

Facts:
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act
(R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as
the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also
enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This
law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands
whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares,
they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have
shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program
because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground
that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must

17
be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also
violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in
bonds.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

Held:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements for equal protection clause :

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class
and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is
no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if
the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the
just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree
with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of
the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
18
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be
used for just compensation.

16. Lozano v. Martinez

G.R .No. L-63419;
December 18, 1986

Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person “who
makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing
checks that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest. Contentions on the law are that: 1) it
offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it
contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its
enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading

Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

Held:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large since
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP
22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.

There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal protection clause since it only
penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation
of legislative powers. Contrary to the contention, the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty
are not delegated to the payee. On the last contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported
that the clause in question was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the
constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.

17. Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Roberto

San Diego
G.R. No. 89572;
December 21, 1989

Facts:
Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the NMAT rule:

19
H) A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY THREE (3) CHANCES TO TAKE THE NMAT. AFTER
THREE (3) SUCCESSIVE FAILURES, A STUDENT SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE NMAT
FOR THE FOURTH TIME.
He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his petition, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional
grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Issue:
Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police
power.

Held:
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations is a valid exercises of
governmental power.

The Court agreed that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving
the quality of medical education in the country.”

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

18. Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74457
March 20, 1987

Facts:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right
to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is
a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate
slaughter of carabaos.

Issue:
Whether or not the law is valid.

Held:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based
on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
20
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

19. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang

Pilipino
G.R. No. L-34915
June 24, 1983

Facts:
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

Held:
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

20. White Light Corp., vs City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846
January 20, 2009

Facts:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the
said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains
that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The
CA ruled in favor of the City.

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Issue:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

Held:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure.
The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

21. Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways

GR No. 158793,
June 8, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll
way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the
dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to
accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
considerations.

Issue:
Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.

Held:
No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of
the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific
formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines
precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

22. Manila Memorial Park Inc v. DSWD Secretary

GR No. 175356
December 3, 2013

Facts:
RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules and
Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

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Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power.

Issue:
Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent domain.

Held:
The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the challenged
governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be
gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing
basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate
of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.

The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments from
adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a
given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution
of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory
measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject
regulation is a police power measure.

23. Social Justice Society v. Atienza

G.R. No. 156052;
February 13, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et.al. filed a petition against Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, reclassifying the Oil Depot in Pandacan Terminal, from
industrial to commercial area and to cease and desist from operating their businesses from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance.

Oil companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron as well as DOE sought to intervene and asked for the nullification of said
ordinance. The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of
Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property rights. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate.

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On the other hand, the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila who
recommended the approval of the ordinance cited:

The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among
others;
The depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and
In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring communities.

Issue:
Whether the enactment of the ordinance a legitimate exercise of Police Power.

Held:
Yes. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of
Manila and not just of a particular class.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or
means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in
view.

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions
of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former
should prevail.

SC reiterated the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.

24. MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co. Inc.

G.R. No. 170656
August 15, 2007

Facts:
The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate
the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to
facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes;
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project.

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As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has
been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and
the MMDA had “recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to
the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities”which plan is referred to under
the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the
MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the
imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal
areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila.8

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Manila. Chairman Fernando, was “poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to
closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic
regulation.” This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila
and two others in Quezon City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which
empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of transport and traffic
management.

Issue:
W/N EO is unconstitutional

Held:
YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation
of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no
legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA,
which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the
limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to
it under R.A. No. 7924.
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement
the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to
undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals

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This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the
pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the
face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not
change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and
regulate networks of transportation and communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a
transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.

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