[G.R. No. 182601. November 10, 2014.
] On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and
RONALD MUÑOZ, petitioners, vs. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision 1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution 2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and
Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. MorenoGeneroso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. 3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report the
incident. 4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPO1 Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched SPO2
Dominador Javier (SPO2 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SPO2 Javier, together
with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of
the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation 6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. 7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 8
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest proceeding,
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon.
Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. 10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows: HCDaAS
That on or about the 20th day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of
the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty.
MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some
cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant
was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they
were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. 14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They
attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their
motion for preliminary investigation. 16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled
that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SPO2 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The
arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as
a consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to
Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the
grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008; 18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT
A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN
THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON
WHICH IT WAS BASED. SaHIEA
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued;
they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of
Arrest, which actually used the word "invited."
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section
7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at
the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal
knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
 The petitioners additionally argue that the RTC's Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution.
The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule
65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case
the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the
guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the
opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, 19 and
the 1935, 20 1973 21 and 1987 22 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure." 23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke 24 and The Great Charter of the
Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames
near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. 25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers
and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties 26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war. 27 The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we
not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law
of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or
Right. 30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder, 31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision
does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable. 32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness. 33HCSEcI
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The
Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not
different from the Spanish laws. 34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson 36 that Section 37 37 of Act No. 183, or
the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of
Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., 38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under
statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the
common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos 39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason. 40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative
Code 41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza, 42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 43 of the Provisional Law
for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5 (a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5 (b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5 (b) — the provision applicable in the present case.
This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in
our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5 (b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5 (b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza, 45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
"Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It
will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest: SIHCDA
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than
that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the
presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant
who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and
 who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court
competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coming under the provisions of the preceding paragraph
may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the
following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime."
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 37 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that
certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without
warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to
show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos, 46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston, 47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons
walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although
there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an
arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is
guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions
are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary
for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the
presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime;
and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was
also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable
cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its
breach. 48
In The U.S. v. Hachaw, 49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the
arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or
circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion
(probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940
Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court (Restricting the arresting officer's determination of probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. aCSHDI
Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940
Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest.
Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether
a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual
commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of
the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was
limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the
1940 and 1964 Rules of Courtrestricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6 (b),
Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded
and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
As amended, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the
offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting
officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
 When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section 5
(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just,"
connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on
probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting
officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2)whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer
shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether
the person to be arrested has committed the crime. aSIETH
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York, 52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn, 53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law
is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States 54 that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether
there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable
cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds." 55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a
probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a
warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on
information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of
everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in
each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his
fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on
reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not
verify such information. 58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5 (b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita III v. Doria, et al., 59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished
from probable cause in preliminary investigations
and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held
for trial. 60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses. 62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the
evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause 63 to issue a warrant of arrest. EHTCAa
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion, based on actual facts. 65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting
without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable
man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out
determine probable cause. to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of In People v. Tonog, Jr., 73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation,
committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
by the parties.
In People v. Gerente, 74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame. death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was
held valid.
Hence, in Santos, 66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable
cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one In People v. Alvario, 75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received
should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was
judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the
belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. 67 time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest.
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5 (b), Rule 113: In People v. Jayson, 76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene
of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
The crime has just been committed/personal
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
to be arrested has committed it
In People v. Acol, 77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of
these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were
whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen
made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman, 68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was
In Cadua v. CA, 78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was
only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message.
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three
When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the
(3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal
officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the
invalidated the warrantless arrest.
offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos, 69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
In Doria, 79 the Court held that Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who
was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3
certainty as regards the commission of a crime. Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the
incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him,
In People v. del Rosario, 70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt.Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters
means that there must be a large measure ofimmediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time
as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and
of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
warrant of arrest must be secured.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting
arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report
officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of
which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's
existence of probable cause. TIcEDC
identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has
In People v. Cendana, 71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on
just been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed
the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid. CIaDTE
it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
In Rolito Go v. CA, 72 the arrest of the accused six (6) days after the commission of the crime was held
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section 5 (b),
invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedurerequires clarification.
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon
which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the
 The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary, 80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at
the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still
make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base
their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this — as the time gap from the commission of the crime
to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited toraw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within
a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as
the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless
arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid
warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of
discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his
personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate againstunreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5 (b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been
committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the
arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent
person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision. 81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against
the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter 82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged
crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police
blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan
St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the
time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the
commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of
the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty. Generoso indeed suffered blows from
petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense
against Atty. Generoso. ITDSAE
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate 84 that was issued by
East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that
was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left
Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd
posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of 7th rib (L ant.
Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P.
Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and,
notably, the petitioners 85 and Atty. Generoso 86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when
the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. 87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the
arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, 88 the police officers in the present case saw
Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who
mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police
officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. 89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily
went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved
in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider
if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPO1 Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SPO2 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed — the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
 Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion,
the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the
City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue
is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary. 92 aEAIDH
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93 SPO2 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty.Generoso's account. SPO2 Javier did not need to apply violent
physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar
effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal
knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense.
Furthermore, SPO2 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them
before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the RTC Order denying the petitioners'
urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution 95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. 96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that "the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof,
the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving
the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the
RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the
trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was
precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the
reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision
dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541.
The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

||| (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, [November 10, 2014])

 [G.R. No. 163879. July 30, 2014.]
DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F. PALMA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 165805. July 30, 2014.]
DR. CLENIO YNZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the Decision 1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision 2 dated February 28, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting
petitioners Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
The Information 3 alleged —
That on or about June 17, 2000 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, DR. ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and
DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the attending physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a
minor 10 years old, confederating and acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and imprudence to perform
immediate operation upon their patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis, when they,
the said physicians, should have been done so considering that examinations conducted upon
their patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr. seriously manifest to do so, causing by such negligence,
carelessness, and imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die due to:
"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY,
SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)"
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage
and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR. and other
consequential damages relative thereto.
CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001. HEacDA
Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to consolidate these cases. 4 The facts, as culled from the
records, are as follows:
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma,
Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5 o'clock that same afternoon, Palma's mother
and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner,
specializing in family medicine gave medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach pains
continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15, 2000, they returned to Dr. Cabugao,
who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the
said hospital at 5:30 in the morning. 5
Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. The complete blood count conveyed the following
result: wbc — 27.80 x 10 9/L; lymphocytes — 0.10 and neutrophils — 0.90. Diagnostic ultrasound was likewise
conducted on the patient's lower abdomen by radiologist, Dr. Ricky V. Querubin, with the following findings:
Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and urinary bladder.
There is no free peritoneal fluid.
There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region, more so in the supra and right
paraumbilical areas.
There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right periumbilical region roughly about 47
x 18 mm surrounded by undistended gas-filled bowels. This is suggestive of an
inflammatory process wherein appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology cannot be
excluded. Clinical correlation is essential." 6
Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness,
negative mass." The initial impression was Acute Appendicitis, 7 and hence, he referred the case to his co-accused, Dr.
Ynzon, a surgeon. 8 In the later part of the morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and read the CBC
and ultrasound results. The administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JR were ordered. Thereafter, JR
was placed on observation for twenty-four (24) hours.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his parents noticed a swelling in
his scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels also
three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely gave orders via
telephone. 9 Accused continued medications to alleviate JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again
vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following morning, June 17, 2000, JR's
condition worsened, he had a running fever of 38ºC. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he
was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, JR's temperature soared to 42ºC, had convulsions and finally died.
The Death Certificate 10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of
death:
Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY
Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS)
Other significant conditions contributing to death: CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?).
No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against
accused for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. AcSIDE
On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the following circumstances as
sufficient basis to conclude that accused were indeed negligent in the performance of their duties:
It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the accused from the time of
his admission for confinement at the Nazareth General Hospital until his death. Upon his
admission, the initial working diagnosis was to consider acute appendicitis. To assist the accused
in the consideration of acute appendicitis, Dr.Cabugao requested for a complete blood count
 (CBC) and a diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and ultrasound showed that an
inflammatory process or infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process
was happening in the periumbilical region where the appendix could be located. The initial
diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct possibility. . . . .
Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being manifested by JR.
Thereafter, he ordered that JR be observed for 24 hours. However, the accused, as the attending
physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that may occur.
Rather, they left the monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians who are just on
residency training and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill and competence with
those of physicians who are merely new doctors still on training. Not having personally observed
JR during this 24-hour critical period of observation, the accused relinquished their duty and
thereby were unable to give the proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In
situations where massive infection is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of
antibiotics, the condition of the patient is serious which necessitated personal, not delegated,
attention of attending physicians, namely JR and the accused in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Throughout the course of the hospitalization and treatment of JR, the accused failed to
address the acute appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not take steps to find out
if indeed acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing inside
the body of JR even when the inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region
where the appendix can be located. . . .
There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused
took steps to find out what disease exactly was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find out the
disease causing the health problem of JR, but they did not perform any process of elimination.
Appendicitis, according to expert testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery
Thus, these appeals brought before this Court raising the following arguments:
was done by the accused. But the accused could not have found out the real disease of JR
because they were treating merely and exclusively the symptoms by means of the different
medications to arrest the manifested symptoms. In fact, by treating the symptoms alone, the
accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as signs of the graver health problem of
JR. This gross negligence on the part of the accused allowed the infection to spread inside the
body of JR unabated. The infection obviously spread so fast and was so massive that within a
period of only two and a half (2 1/2) days from the day of admission to the hospital on June 15,
2000, JR who was otherwise healthy died [of] Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis) on June 17,
2000. 11
On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused's conviction, the Court of Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of reasonable skill and care
on the part of JR's attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon in neglecting to
monitor effectively and sufficiently the developments/changes during the observation period and
act upon the situation after said 24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his condition
even worsened with the appearance of more serious symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea.
Considering the brief visit only made on regular rounds, the records clearly show such gross
negligence in failing to take appropriate steps to determine the real cause of JR's abdominal pain
so that the crucial decision to perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out precisely
because of the inexcusable neglect to undertake such efficient diagnosis by process of
elimination, as correctly pointed out by the trial court. As has been succinctly emphasized by Dr.
Mateo, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of symptoms after
the 24-hour observation (high fever, vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery, not
even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also expressed the opinion that the decision
to operate could have been made after the result of the ultrasound test, considering that acute
appendicitis was the initial diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he had conducted a rectal
examination. ESIcaC
Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in treating JR, appellants have
demonstrated indifference and neglect of the patient's condition as a serious case. Indeed,
appendicitis remains a clinical emergency and a surgical disease, as correctly underscored by Dr.
Mateo, a practicing surgeon who has already performed over a thousand appendectomy. In fact,
appendectomy is the only rational therapy for acute appendicitis; it avoids clinical deterioration
and may avoid chronic or recurrent appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and
immediate treatment of the disease prevent complications. Under the factual circumstances, the
inaction, neglect and indifference of appellants who, after the day of admission and after being
apprised of the ongoing infection from the CBC and initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from
rectal examination and ultrasound test and only briefly visited JR once during regular rounds and
gave medication orders by telephone — constitutes gross negligence leading to the continued
deterioration of the patient, his infection having spread in so fast a pace that he died within just
two and a half (2 1/2) days' stay in the hospital. Authorities state that if the clinical picture is
unclear a short period of 4 to 6 hours of watchful waiting and a CT scan may improve diagnostic
accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis. Even assuming that JR's case had an atypical
presentation in view of the location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have helped to confirm
diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined that the possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis should
have been a strong consideration. Lamentably, however, as found by the trial court, appellants
had not taken steps towards correct diagnosis and demonstrated laxity even when JR was
already running a high fever in the morning of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting with diarrhea,
his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the reason why private complainants were not
even apprised of the progress of appellants' diagnosis — appellants have nothing to report
because they did nothing towards the end and merely gave medications to address the
symptoms. 12
I
WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS
"FAILURE TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION UPON THE PATIENT RODOLFO
PALMA JR. OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
II
WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH
ACCUSED DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED DECISION SEEMS TO
HAVE TREATED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY;
III
WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A
SURGEON) AND HAVE EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE LIMITS OF HIS PRACTICE,
AND IT WAS NOT AND NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT RODOLFO PALMA
JR., THAT WAS WHY HE REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A SURGEON, DR. CLENIO
YNZON;
IV
WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING
SURGERY WOULD HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT; DACTSH
V
 WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S ATTY. CASTRO:
EXPERT WITNESSES EVER DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER
DR. CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen, ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C
PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF which is the ultrasound result, with that laboratory would you operate the
DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE APPENDICITIS; patient?

VI A. Yes, I would do surgery.

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION EVER Q. And you should have done surgery with this particular case?"
QUESTIONED THE MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;
A. Yes, sir. 16
VII
xxx xxx xxx
WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS
COURT:
IN APPROVING THE METHOD OF TREATMENT APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS
ON SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD FIRST Q. You stated a while ago doctor that you are going to [do] surgery to the patient, why doctor, if
PLACE SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER OBSERVATION, AND WOULD NOT PERFORM you are not going to do surgery, what will happen?
IMMEDIATE OPERATION;
A. If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would be that it would be ruptured and
VIII generalized peritonitis and eventually septicemia, sir.
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR. YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH Q. What do you mean by that doctor?
THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
PATIENT WAS SPECIFICALLY SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS; A. That means that infection would spread throughout the body, sir.
and
Q. If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
IX
A. It will result to death. 17
WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN
AS APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx

In a nutshell, the petitions brought before this Court raise the issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of Q. And what would have you done if you entertain other considerations from the time the patient
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the was admitted?
evidence on record.
A. From the time the patient was admitted until the report of the sonologist, I would have made a
Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a general rule, findings of fact of decision by then.
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such
Q. And when to decide the surgery would it be a particular exact time, would it be the same for all
factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
surgeons?
judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. In the instant case, we find the need to make certain exception.
A. If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about 24 hours because acute
AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:
appendicitis is a 24-hour disease, sir.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the changes on the condition of the patient?
such act. 13 The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing
A. Yes, sir.
or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are changes?
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place. 14 A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards appendicitis then you have to decide right
there and then, sir.
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the evidence on
record. The court a quo and the appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to appendicitis?
standard of care expected from doctors. IcaHCS
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in the observation period, sir.
In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform
surgery on JR immediately. Even the prosecution's own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo, 15 testified during Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring you in doubt that there is something else
cross-examination that he would perform surgery on JR: other than appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24 hours?
 A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.
Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician and there is a change not pointing
to appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24 hours?
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending physician?
A. Yes, sir. 18 TAHIED
Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is concerned, because if you will agree with me,
you did not even touch the patient?
A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir. The records show that after the
observation period, the abdominal pain is still there plus there are already other
signs and symptoms which are not seen or noted.
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the abdomen of the patient, would you give a
comment on that?
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of observation, the pain apparently was still
there and there was more vomiting and there was diarrhea. In my personal
opinion, I think the condition of the patient was deteriorating.
Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?
A. I based on what was on the record, sir. 19
From the foregoing, it is clear that if JR's condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his death,
as what actually happened in the present case. Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified
on direct examination that he would perform a personal and thorough physical examination of the patient as
frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting,
fever, anurecia (sic), elevated white blood cell count, physical examination of a positive
psoas sign, observation of the sonologist of abdominal tenderness and the ultrasound
findings of the probability of appendiceal (sic)pathology, what will you do if you have
faced these problems, Doctor?
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will depend on my physical examination and
that is probably every 4 to 6 hours, sir. 20
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
Q. . . . However, there are corrections and admissions made at that time, your Honor, do I
understand that T/C does not mean ruled out but rather to consider the matter?
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it says here, impression and T/C means to
consider the appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr.,
otherwise known as JR, to whom I shall now refer to as JR, the primary consideration
then is acute appendicitis, is that correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the impression.
Q. . . . Now if it is to be considered as the primary consideration in the initial working diagnosis,
isn't it a fact that it has to be ruled out in order to consider it as not the disease of JR?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact that to rule out acute appendicitis as not the disease of JR, surgery or
operation must be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes. aCHcIE
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an
operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to
operate. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes
pain, considering that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomiting, does that not
show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have
earlier mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute
appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any
confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir. 22
Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of
his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinions of
qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most
instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. 23 From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was
irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending
to the needs of JR by neglecting to monitor effectively the developments and changes on JR's condition during the
observation period, and to act upon the situation after the 24-hour period when his abdominal pain persisted and his
condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared to have visited JR briefly only during regular rounds in the
mornings. He was not there during the crucial times on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to deteriorate until JR's
death. As the attending surgeon, he should be primarily responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best
position considering his skills and experience to know if the patient's condition had deteriorated. While the
resident-doctors-on-duty could likewise monitor the patient's condition, he is the one directly responsible for the patient
as the attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross negligence of duty to relegate his personal responsibility to
observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of
graver symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no apparent reason. We, likewise, note
that the records are devoid of showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr. Ynzon to overrule appendectomy
despite the initial diagnosis of appendicitis. Neither was there any showing that he was entertaining another diagnosis
nor he took appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is
the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of
precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused. 24 Quasi-offenses penalize the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia
punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. 25 This is precisely where this Court found Dr.
Ynzon to be guilty of — his seeming indifference to the deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to
exercise precaution which eventually led to JR's death.HCATEa
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of
his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science. In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and
skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients. He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. 26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that
degree of care and precaution demanded by the circumstances.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the
presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove these two things. The
Court is not convinced with moral certainty that Dr. Cabugao is guilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof
were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to
determine the source of infection which caused the deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the records fail
to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position to perform the required appendectomy.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,
but a general practitioner specializing in family medicine; 27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much
less an appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he suspected
appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the prosecution's expert witness, emphasized the role of the surgeon during direct examination,
to wit:
ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and condition, you have mentioned that
surgery is the solution, would you have allowed then a 24 hour observation?
A. If there is a lingering doubt, in short period of observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed
provided that there would be close monitoring of the patient, sir.
Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the monitoring doctor?
A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best surgeon, sir.
Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the surgeon attending to the case to have
been the one to observe within the period of observation?
A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe the sudden changes in the
condition of the patient, sir.
Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how often would the surgeon re-assist
(sic) the condition of the patient during the period of observation?
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four (4) hours, some centers will
recommend hourly or every two hours but here in the Philippines, would
recommend for 4 to 6 hours, sir. 28 AacSTE
Dr. Cabugao's supervision does not cease upon his endorsement of his patient to the surgeon. Here,
Dr. Cabugao has shown to have exerted all efforts to monitor his patient and under these circumstances he did not have
any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon's competence and diligence. Expert testimonies have been offered to prove the
circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr. Villaflor, on cross
examination testified, to wit:
Q. Isn't it a fact that to rule out acute appendicitis as not the disease of JR, surgery or operation
must be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation,
that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to
operate. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes
pain, considering that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomitting, does that not
show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. It's possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier
mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by
surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir. 30
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his
performance of his duty as a family doctor. On the contrary, a perusal of the medical records would show that during the
24-hour monitoring on JR, it was Dr. Cabugao who frequently made orders on the administration of antibiotics and pain
relievers. There was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is
suspecting appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that
appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise. This clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge and skill
in attending to JR's condition, even after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the calculated assessment of
Dr.Cabugao to refer JR to a surgeon who has sufficient training and experience to handle JR's case belies the finding
that he displayed inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient. 31
 We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before
he left, he made endorsement and notified the resident-doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.
Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it cannot
be said that the finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy
is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa. 32 Thus, the accused-doctors to be found guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, it must be shown that both accused-doctors demonstrated an act executed
without malice or criminal intent — but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the evidence on
record clearly points to the reckless imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in Dr. Cabugao's
case. IASEca
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on
December 23, 2011 due to "multi-organ failure" as evidenced by a copy of death certificate. 33 Thus, the effect of death,
pending appeal of his conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities should be in
accordance to People v. Bayotas, 34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final
judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but by
contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a
separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based, 36 and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment
and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or
which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. CDHacE
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to
any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from the
same act or omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the other sources of obligation in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. 37 If the same act or omission complained of arises fromquasi-delict, as in this
case, a separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87 of theRules of Court: 38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him. (Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of
arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil action must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. — All claims for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for
the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within
the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has
against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided,
and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in
the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
 As a final note, we reiterate that the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained
for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the executor or administrator, or the estate. 39 The
heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of action for damages they will bring.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.

Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal liability is
extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A separate civil action may be filed either against the
executor/administrator, or the estate of Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based. EAcIST

SO ORDERED.

||| (Cabugao v. People, G.R. Nos. 163879 & 165805, [July 30, 2014])
 [G.R. No. 168539. March 25, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HENRY T. GO, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 of the Third Division 2 of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision 3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO)for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows: DCcTHa
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy
with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter
into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the
draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic
Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public
Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO
in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to
Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO
while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines. 4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show
cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. 5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer. 6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash 7 the Information filed against him on the ground that
the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition. 8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus: CHcTIA
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and
it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged
co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. 9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY
POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 10
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
 xxx xxx xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are: ISDCaT
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. 11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. 12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by
this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent. 13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private
person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent
can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019. 14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already
died, the private person may be indicted alone. SDHacT
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. 15 If two or more
persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the
act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. 16 This means that everything said, written or done by any
of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done or written by
each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of
trial. 17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors. 18 Thus, this Court held that:
. . . [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that
one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a
co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may
be found guilty of the offense. 19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which
is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to
repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices," 20 would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public
officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta 21 as to the nature of and the
principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
. . . A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The
crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long
as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by
two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in
the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that SHcDAI
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty
therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases
a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record,
in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the
conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing
rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to
accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when
two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of
the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective
liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
. . . it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of
each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all
acted by common agreement . . . . The crime must therefore in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the . . . accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all
equally responsible. . .
 Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in
the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as
to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest
of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of
them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable
offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.aHTDAc
xxx xxx xxx
. . . A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all
of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.
This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent
display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must
be held solidarity liable. 22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile.
It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. 23 Hence,
the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion 24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve 25 that in a
different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB,
through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction
over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this
Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on
January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the
instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919,
he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation 26 in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting
bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. 27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to
the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John
Brown vs. Fitzgerald,51 Minn., 534)
xxx xxx xxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction." DcCITS
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting
to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the
court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner's participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters
which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to
deny said court's jurisdiction over him. . . . . 28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over
his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information
in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by
public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated
in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested
of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the
power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and
the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court
would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy
trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, [March 25, 2014], 730 PHIL 362-377)
 [G.R. No. 209518. June 19, 2017.]
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, petitioner, vs. ANA KARI CARMENCITA NUSTAD, as
represented by ATTY. MARGUERITE THERESE L. LUCILA,respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J p:
Petitioner Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante seeks to set aside and reverse the: (1) Decision 1 dated
February 27, 2013, which dismissed petitioner's Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65; and (2) Resolution 2 dated
October 2, 2013, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 124811.
The Facts
On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad (Nustad), as represented by Atty. Marguerite
Therese Lucila (Atty. Lucila), filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City (RTC) and
prayed that Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante (Tujan-Militante) be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of
Lucena City the owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and
T-387159, which were all issued in Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said
titles.
In its Order dated July 26, 2011, the RTC set the petition for a hearing. 4
Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul
Proceedings 5 dated September 2, 2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as
she was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she argued that the Order appeared to be a decision on the merits,
as it already ruled with certainty that she is in possession of the subject titles.
The Ruling of the RTC
In an Order dated November 23, 2011, the RTC 6 denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has
jurisdiction over the case. Further the RTC stated that it has not yet decided on the merits of the case when it
ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender TCT Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and T-387159 because it merely set
the petition for a hearing.
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration 7 and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by
Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is
representing a Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case,
petitioner prayed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority be impleaded.
Moreover, Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In an Order 8 dated February 27, 2012, the court a quo denied Tujan-Militante's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision 9 dated February 27, 2013, the CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of
Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her Motion for
Reconsideration. Such Motion sought for affirmative reliefs, which is considered as voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution 10 dated
October 2, 2013.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it is
equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. 11 Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Courtprovides:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative
relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. 12
In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the
ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for
affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such
relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction. 13
As to the claim of Tujan-Militante that the requirements laid down in Sec. 24, Rule 132 14 of the Rules of
Court apply with respect to the power of attorney notarized abroad, she cited the ruling in Lopez v. Court of
Appeals. 15 In said case, this Court held that the power of attorney must comply with the requirements set forth
under Sec. 25 (now Sec. 24), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court in order to be considered as valid.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that:
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of Rule 132 states that:
Section 19. Classes of documents. — For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a
foreign country;
 (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private. (emphasis supplied)
In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, 16 this Court clarified that the ruling in the Lopez case is
inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence which were then effective were the old Rules, prior to their amendment
in 1989. When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry
therein" was substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19," 17 as found in the present Rules. Also, Section 25 of the former Rules became Section 24 of the present Rules.
On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign
service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to
wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The Court agrees
with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial documents as one of the
public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have
specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section
19. 18 (emphasis supplied) ETHIDa
As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service refers only
to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers of the Philippines, or of a foreign country, as found in Section 19 (a), Rule 132, such enumeration does not
include documents acknowledged before a notary public abroad.
With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that [Nustad]
certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an oath that she is authorizing Atty. Lucila
to institute the petition before the court a quo on her behalf. 19
A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be
upheld. 20
Lastly, Tujan-Militante's contention that the TCTs under the name of Nustad are invalid because of her
citizenship constitutes a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly ruled that the issue as to whether an alien is
or is not qualified to acquire the lands covered by the subject titles can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. 21
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2013 and
Resolution dated October 2, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, G.R. No. 209518, [June 19, 2017])
 [G.R. No. 228617. September 20, 2017.]
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICTORIANO and MELANIE
RAMOS, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision 1 dated July 5, 2016 and Resolution 2 dated December 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 140264.
Antecedent Facts
The facts show that in July 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos (Spouses Ramos) applied for
several credit lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the construction of a warehouse in Barangay Santo
Tomas, Nueva Ecija. 3 The said application was approved for P40,000,000.00, secured by Real Estate
Mortgage 4 dated July 25, 2012 over properties owned by the spouses, particularly covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) Nos. 048-2011000874 and 048-2011000875.
Subsequently, Spouses Ramos requested for additional loan and PDB allegedly promised to extend
instead of filing an answer to the complaint. This prompted Spouses Ramos to file a motion to declare PDB in
them a further loan of P140,000,000.00, the amount they supposed was necessary for the completion of the
default. Subsequently, in an Order 14 dated February 20, 2015, the RTC denied both motions, ratiocinating thus:
construction of the warehouse with a capacity of 250,000 cavans of palay. 5 Despite the assurance of the bank,
only P25,000,000.00 in additional loan was approved and released by PDB, which was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage 6 over four (4) real properties covered by TCT Nos. 048-2012000909, 048-2012000443,
048-2012000445, and 048-2012000446.
Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their obligations as they fell due. They
appealed to PDB for the deferment of debt servicing and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed
to reach an agreement.
On April 23, 2014, PDB filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Act
3135, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, which was docketed as
EJF-2014-112-SJC. A Notice to Parties of Sheriff's Public Auction Sale dated May 7, 2014 was thereafter issued. 7
On June 18, 2014, Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint 8 for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages and
Promissory Notes, Accounting and Application of Payments, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against PDB and its officers, namely, Ma. Agnes J. Angeles, Virgilio I. Libunao, Carmina S.
Magallanes and Norberto P. Siega, also before the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2014-485-SJC.
Instead of filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion 9 to Dismiss, alleging that the venue of the action
was improperly laid considering that the real estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any
suit arising therefrom shall be filed in Makati City only. 10 It further noted that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and must therefore be dismissed. 11
Ruling of the RTC
In an Omnibus Order 12 dated November 17, 2014, the RTC denied the Urgent Motion to Dismiss, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
for denying its motion to dismiss, despite the fact that the venue was clearly improperly laid.
I. The Venue is Improperly Laid
Pursuant to autonomy of contract, Venue can be waived. Rule 5, Section 4(d) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to validly agree in writing before the filing of
the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Indeed, on the defendants they have the contract
where the venue allegedly agreed upon by them with the plaintiffs is Makati City. However, one
of the contentions of the plaintiffs is that the contracts between them and the defendants take
the form of an adhesion contract (par. 20, Complaint). As such, this Court has to apply Section
1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the venue of real actions to avoid
ruling on the merits without any evidence that would sufficiently support the same.
II. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action.
With such an issue raised, the Court examined the records and it has to tell the
defendants that in civil cases before the Court orders the issuance of summons, it looks on
whether or not the facts alleged on the Complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action
and not whether the allegations of fact are true. Hence, as summons were issued in this case,
the Court had already found that the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
xxx xxx xxx
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 13
Unyielding, PDB filed a motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated November 17, 2014,
Necessarily, the defendants were allowed to file Motion to Dismiss before filing an
Answer or responsive pleading. As a consequence of the Motion to Dismiss that the
defendants filed, the running of the period during which the rules required her to file her Answer
was deemed suspended. When the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, therefore the
defendants had the balance of the period for filing an Answer under Section 4, Rule 16 within
which to file the same but in no case less than five days, computed from the receipt of the
notice of denial of the Motion to Dismiss. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
However, after the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, the defendants filed Motion
for Reconsideration which is not precluded by the rules. Only after this Court shall have denied
it would the defendants become bound to file the Answer to the Complaint. It is only if the
defendants failed to file Answer after the period given by the foregoing rules would the plaintiff
be entitled to have the defendants be declared in default. This was the same ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case ofNarciso v. Garcia, G.R. No. 196877, November 12, 2012.
With regard to the Motion for Reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated
November 17, 2014, there being no new arguments presented, the Court finds no cogent
reason to reconsider and reverse the said Omnibus Order.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and the Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Aggrieved, PDB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC
 Ruling of the CA
In a Decision 16 dated July 5, 2016, the CA denied the petition, the pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:
The order of the public respondent in denying the motion to dismiss and the
consequent denial of the motion for reconsideration is correct and judicious. Petitioner anchors
its claim on the validity of the mortgage, and thereby the provision[s] therein on venue must be
upheld. On the other hand, respondents anchor its claim on the invalidity of the mortgage, and
thereby the complaint is filed in the proper venue. Clearly, no valid judgment can be passed
upon the allegations of both parties. 17
Thus, having found no grave abuse on the part of the public respondent in denying
the motion to dismiss and the resulting denial of the motion for reconsideration, We find no
cogent reason to disturb or modify the assailed Decision. What the petitioners should have
done was to file an answer to the petition filed in the trial court, proceed to the hearing and
appeal the decision of the court if adverse to them. 18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Omnibus Order
dated 17 November 2014 and the Order dated 20 February 2015 is herebyAFFIRMED in
TOTO.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 19
PDB filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution dated December 7,
2016, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 20
Unyielding, PDB filed the present petition with this Court, reiterating its claim that the CA erred in affirming
the order of the RTC, which denied the motion to dismiss despite the improper venue of the case. It argues that
since there is a stipulation on venue, the same should govern the parties.
Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the rules on venue in filing an action, to wit:
RULE 4
Venue of Actions
Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.
Based on the foregoing, the general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a
specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.
Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to venue
may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that
the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter." 21
Further, in Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Court elaborated, thus:
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the
proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and that
interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties convenience. In other words,
stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as
designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation
to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in
said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general
policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and categorical as to leave no doubt of their
intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for
their actions. x x x. 23
In view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely permissive, the parties must therefore
employ words in the contract that would clearly evince a contrary intention. In Spouses Lantin v. Judge
Lantion, 24 the Court emphasized that "the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude
parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place." 25
In the instant case, there is an identical stipulation in the real estate mortgages executed by the parties,
pertaining to venue. It reads as follows:
18. In the event of suit arising from out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or
the promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes
of action exclusively in the proper court/s of Makati, Metro Manila, the MORTGAGOR
waiving for this purpose any other venue. 26(Emphasis ours)
In Spouses Lantin, the Court ruled that "the words exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other
venue are restrictive." 27 Therefore, the employment of the same language in the subject mortgages signifies the
clear intention of the parties to restrict the venue of any action or suit that may arise out of the mortgage to a
particular place, to the exclusion of all other jurisdictions.
In view of the foregoing, the RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed by PDB on the
ground that that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint being one for annulment of real estate mortgages
and promissory notes is in the nature of a personal action, the venue of which may be fixed by the parties to the
contract. In this case, it was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or the
promissory notes must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on
venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and
thus, should be complied with in good faith. 28
The CA, however, ruled that the RTC correctly denied the motion to dismiss in view of the contradicting
claim of the parties on the validity of the mortgage contracts, which, in turn, affects the enforceability of the
 stipulation on venue. The CA agreed with the RTC that the ruling on the validity of the stipulation on venue depends
on whether the mortgage is valid which means there has to be full-blown hearing and presentation of evidence. It
added that what PDB should have done was to file an answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and appeal the
decision, if adverse to them. 29

The ruling of the CA renders meaningless the very purpose of the stipulation on venue. In Unimasters,
the Court emphasized:
Parties may by stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being
merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons.
It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such
renunciation would be against public policy.30
In the present case, Spouses Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the venue for any suit or
action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they agreed to the limit the same to Makati City only
and nowhere else. True enough, the stipulation on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention of
the parties to restrict the filing of any suit or action to the designated place only. It is crystal clear that the intention
was not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action
pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be filed. There being no showing that such waiver was invalid or that the
stipulation on venue was against public policy, the agreement of the parties should be upheld. It is therefore a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to deny the motion to dismiss filed by PDB on the ground of improper
venue, especially when the said issue had been raised at the most opportune time, that is, within the time for but
before the filing of an answer. The CA should have given this matter a more serious consideration and not simply
brushed it aside.
Moreover, Spouses Ramos never really assailed the validity of the mortgage contracts and promissory
notes. Apparently, what they were only claiming was that the said contracts contain stipulations which are illegal,
immoral and otherwise contrary to customs or public policy. 31 For instance, they alleged that the interest was
pegged at an excessive rate of 8% which the bank unilaterally increased to 9%. They likewise claimed that the
penalty interest rate of 3% was unconscionable. Further, they claimed that the escalation clause provided in the
mortgage contracts was violative of Presidential Decree No. 1684. 32 These matters, however, do not affect the
validity of the mortgage contracts. Thus, with all the more reason that the stipulation on venue should have been
upheld pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Briones v. Court of Appeals, 33 viz.:
[I]n cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written
instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be
binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of
improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written
instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and
should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be sure, it would be
inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation
when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is
contained. 34

Spouses Ramos impliedly admitted the authenticity and due execution of the mortgage contracts. They
do not claim to have been duped into signing the mortgage contracts or that the same was not their free and
voluntary act. While they may have qualms over some of the terms stated therein, the same do not pertain to the
lack of any of the essential elements of a contract that would render it void altogether. Such being the case, the
stipulation on venue stands and should have been upheld by RFC and the CA.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 5, 2016 and Resolution dated December 7, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140264 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2014-485-SJC is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of improper venue.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 228617, [September 20, 2017])
 [G.R. No. 152272. March 5, 2012.]
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA,
BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY,
FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M.
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A.
LOYOLA, petitioners, vs. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM
CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 152397. March 5, 2012.]
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA,
MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL ALUNAN, petitioners, vs. JUANA COMPLEX I
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO,
LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31, 2001 Decision 1 and February 21,
2002 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March 3,
1999 Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order 4 denying the motion to dismiss.
The Facts:
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et al.), instituted a
complaint 5 for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of
Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land,
Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and
Warbird Security Agency and their respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.). DEcTCa
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al., were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled
towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La
Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz
Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al., would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored
by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the
Municipal Government and the Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable
and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice,
inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was
re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not
only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable
injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al., also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or
a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al., from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz
Road.
On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al., for a period of twenty (20) days, to stop
preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road. 6
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al., filed a motion to dismiss 7 arguing that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al., filed their comment 8 on
the motion to dismiss to which respondents filed a reply. 9
On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order 10 granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al., to post a bond.
On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al., filed a motion for reconsideration 11 arguing, among others, that JCHA,
et al., failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et al., filed their opposition
to the motion. 12 aDcEIH
The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for
reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al., filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order
dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants
averred that JCHA, et al., failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and
further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal
easement constituted over it. 13
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order dated March 3,
1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the
portion of the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.
SO ORDERED. 14
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al., alleged in their
complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated
when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a
class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were
so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of
JCHA, et al., to prove their clear and present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC
for a full-blown trial on the merits.
Hence, these petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al., come to this Court, raising the following issues:
(A)
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL ON
THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION. aHATDI
(B)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED
TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. 15
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al., anchor their petition on the following issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals' declaration that respondents' Complaint states a cause of
action is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
II.
The Court of Appeals' pronouncement that respondents' complaint was properly
filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
III.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is required to
determine the nature of the La Paz Road is contrary to existing laws and
jurisprudence. 16 THacES
JCHA, et al., concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. They, however,
disagree with the CA's pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the
hearing on the application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and
that commuters and motorists of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access to the San
Agustin Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly
during the rush hours when traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.
JCHA, et al., argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of a public road or burdened by an
apparent easement of public right of way. They point out that La Paz Road is the widest road in the neighborhood used by
motorists in going to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and that there is no other road as wide as La
Paz Road existing in the vicinity. For residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards
SLEX Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz Road.
Finally, JCHA, et al., argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI because the public nature of La Paz Road
had been sufficiently proven and, as residents of San Pedro and Biñan, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is
undeniable.
In their Memorandum, 17 Fil-Estate, et al., explain that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in the name of La Paz. The
purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, one
of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage,
canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of Biñan. The streets within the subdivisions
were then converted to public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La Paz Road, not being part of
the Juana Complex I, was excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a
consortium formed to develop several real properties in Biñan, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for
shares of stock, La Paz contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Biñan, including the properties
constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper since JCHA, et al., failed to prove
that they have a clear right over La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al., assert that JCHA, et al., failed to prove the existence of a
right of way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an injury to such right.
According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement
constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private property registered under the name of La Paz and the
beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a
cause of action. They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds
nothing to the pleading.
They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al.,
and the commuters and motorists they are representing have a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road.
They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of action for
JCHA, et al., against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently
than the others. SHcDAI
The Court's Ruling
The issues for the Court's resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a cause of action; (2) whether
the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates
the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the
acts committed by the defendant. 19 Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. 20 To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint;
extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. 21
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. 22 Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant. 23
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of
action. First, JCHA, et al.'s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their
right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an
easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road
existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and
motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed byFil-Estate, et al., when they
excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al., consequently
suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition
without merit. TEDaAc
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a
 number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully
protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest
shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can
fully protect the interests of all concerned. 24
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As
succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz
Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal
that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention
to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the
La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually
as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in
Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective
positions on the issues.
Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits but merely
an order for the grant of a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct from the trial
on the merits of the main case. 29 The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or
complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction
pending the decision of the case on the merits. 30 There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which
may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. 31 Moreover, the quantum
of evidence required for one is different from that for the other. 32
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED. AcDaEH
SO ORDERED.
||| (Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. Nos. 152272 & 152397, [March 5, 2012],
683 PHIL 415-430)

Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lays down the rules for
the issuance thereof. Thus:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. 25 The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of
a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. 26 For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must
be shown to be clear and positive. 27 This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint. 28 cEAHSC

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al., failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the
issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As
correctly ruled by the CA:

Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents failed to prove as
yet that they have a clear and unmistakable right over the La Paz Road — which was sought to be
protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor their purported right over the La Paz Road on
the bare allegation that they have been using the same as public road right-of-way for more than
ten years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant the issuance
of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear right which should be judicially
protected through the writ of injunction is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction.
 [G.R. No. 201378. October 18, 2017.]
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, vs. TIARA COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. (GV Florida) to challenge the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110760 dated October 13, 2011 (Decision) 2 and its Resolution dated March 26, 2012
(Resolution) 3 which denied GV Florida's subsequent motion for reconsideration. The CA granted respondent Tiara
Commercial Corporation's (TCC) petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It found
that Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to grant TCC's motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint in an action for damages pending before
the RTC.
The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages 4 against GV Florida and its bus
driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action arose out of a vehicle collision between the buses of
VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan, Cordon, Isabela on May 1, 2007. In its complaint, VLI claimed that Vizquera's
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise due diligence in supervising
its employee. 5
In its Answer, 6 GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus had factory and mechanical defects
which caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate cause of the vehicle collision. 7
On April 8, 2008, GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint 8 against TCC. According to GV Florida, on
March 23, 2007, it purchased from TCC fifty (50) brand new Michelin tires, four (4) of which were installed into the
bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that though Vizquera exerted all efforts humanly possible to avoid the
accident, the bus nevertheless swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus.
GV Florida maintains that the "proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was brought about by
factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party plaintiff GV Florida absolutely and totally had
no control over." 9
The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC. In the return of summons, it appears that the sheriff
served the summons to a certain Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who represented herself as an accounting manager
authorized by TCC to receive summons on its behalf. 10
TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss. 11 Therein, it stated that the summons was received by Gino-gino,
its financial supervisor. The RTC granted TCC's prayer for extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a
motion to dismiss.
TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss 12 GV Florida's third-party complaint. First, it argued that the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of summons. Under Section 11 of Rule 14, there is
an exclusive list of the persons upon whom service of summons on domestic juridical entities may be made. As the
summons in this case was not served on any of the persons listed in Section 11 of Rule 14, there was no proper
service of summons on TCC that would vest the RTC with jurisdiction over it. Second, TCC stated that the purported
cause of action in the third-party complaint is a claim for an implied warranty which has already prescribed, having
been made beyond the six-month period allowed in the Civil Code. Third, the third-party complaint failed to state a
cause of action against TCC. TCC harped on the fact that GV Florida did not mention in the third-party complaint
that the tires that blew out were purchased from it. Moreover, a tire blow-out does not relieve a common carrier of its
liability. Fourth, TCC argues that there is a condition precedent which the law requires before a claim for implied
warranty may be made. The party claiming must submit a warranty claim and demand. GV Florida failed to do so in
this case. Fifth, GV Florida has the burden of first establishing that the cause of the accident was not its own
negligence before it can be allowed to file a third-party complaint against TCC. Sixth, venue was improperly laid
since TCC's principal place of business is in Makati. And finally, TCC states that the third-party complaint should be
dismissed due to GV Florida's failure to implead Michelin as an indispensable party. 13
The RTC denied TCC's motion to dismiss in an Order 14 dated March 2, 2009. It also denied TCC's
subsequent motion for reconsideration in an Order 15 dated July 16, 2009.
On October 5, 2009, TCC filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court challenging the RTC's denial of its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, TCC filed its Answer Ad Cautelam 16 which repeated its arguments pertaining to
jurisdiction, the prescription of the implied warranty claim, the impropriety of the third-party complaint and the venue
of the action, and the failure to implead Michelin. Upon order of the RTC, the case was set for pre-trial 17and the
parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs. Notably, TCC filed its pre-trial brief without any reservations as to
the issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, not only did it fail to include in its identification of issues the question of the RTC's
jurisdiction, TCC even reserved the option to present additional evidence. 18
On October 13, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting TCC's petition and reversing the Orders of
the RTC. Emphasizing that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is exclusive, the CA
found that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over TCC because of the improper service of summons upon a
person not named in the enumeration. 19 It then proceeded to rule that GV Florida's third-party complaint against
TCC is a claim for implied warranty which, under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, must be filed within six months from
delivery. While the CA noted that the delivery receipt for the tires is not in the records of the case, it may be assumed
that the tires were delivered a few days after the purchase date of March 23, 2007. Since GV Florida only filed the
third-party complaint on April 8, 2008, the action has prescribed. 20
GV Florida thus filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the CA's Decision.
GV Florida argues that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over TCC. While it agrees that the enumeration in
Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is exclusive, GVFlorida argues that service of summons is not the only
means through which a court acquires jurisdiction over a party. Under Section 20 of Rule 14, voluntary appearance
of a defendant is equivalent to service of summons, which then gives a court jurisdiction over such defendant. In this
case, GV Florida claims that TCC voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed
motions and pleadings seeking affirmative relief from said court. It adds that Section 11 of Rule 14 is only a general
rule which allows for substantial compliance when there is clear proof that the domestic juridical entity in fact
received the summons. Moreover, GV Florida argues that improper service of summons is not a ground for
dismissal of the third-party complaint since the RTC has the authority to issuealias summons. 21
GV Florida also challenges the CA's ruling that its third-party complaint against TCC should be dismissed
on the ground of prescription. It claims that prescription cannot be the basis of a dismissal when the issue involves
evidentiary matters that can only be threshed out during trial. In this case, GV Florida asserts that the issue of
whether its action has prescribed requires a determination of when the Michelin tires were delivered. Thus, there is
a need to examine the delivery receipts which, as GV Florida highlights, are not in the records of the CA as stated in
the Decision itself. 22
In its Comment, TCC raises the procedural defense that GV Florida's petition was filed out of time. It
insists that GV Florida's motion for extension of time to file its petition is no longer allowed by virtue of AM No.
07-7-12-SC n which prohibits the filing of motions for extension of time in petitions filed under Rule 45 and Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. 23 Further, TCC repeats its position that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it due to
improper service of summons. It also disputes GVFlorida's argument that it voluntarily appeared. TCC insists that it
initially filed a Special Entry of Appearance to apprise the RTC that "[TCC] is represented without necessarily
waiving any right/s of the latter." 24 TCC adds that in its motion to dismiss and Answer Ad Cautelam, it consistently
raised the question of the propriety of the service of summons and the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over it. 25
Moreover, TCC insists that GV Florida's implied warranty claim has prescribed and that the latter has, in
any case, failed to comply with a condition precedent — the filing of a warranty claim or demand. TCC also insists
that GV Florida has never complained about the other Michelin tires it purchased. This, in TCC's view, belies
GV Florida's claim that the tires are defective. 26
TCC also contends that GV Florida's filing of the third-party complaint is improper. It explains that the test
for ascertaining whether a third-party complaint may be filed is whether the third-party defendant may assert any
defense which the third-party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiff in the original case. However,
GV Florida's defense against VLI, which is lack of negligence, is personal to GV Florida and cannot be raised by
TCC for its own benefit. TCC also asserts that in any case, the venue of the third-party complaint is improperly laid
since TCC's principal place of business is in Makati. 27
Finally, TCC claims that the third-party complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead an
indispensable party — Michelin, the manufacturer of the tires which GV Florida claims are defective. 28
We GRANT the petition.
I
We emphasize that GV Florida's appeal came from an original special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 filed before the CA. In cases such as this, the question of law presented before us is
whether the CA was correct in its ruling that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. 29
In particular, the main issue we must resolve is whether the CA correctly found that the RTC's Order
dismissing GV Florida's third-party complaint is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which, in turn, merits its
reversal and the reinstitution of the third-party complaint.
A pertinent facts in arriving at its decision on the issue of probable cause. 42 We held that "an examination of the
However, we shall first resolve the procedural issue raised by TCC pertaining to the timeliness of this
petition.
Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governing the procedure for filing an appeal through a petition
for review on certiorari expressly allows the filing of a motion for extension of time. Under the Rules, the period to file
a petition for review on certiorari is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the judgment, resolution, or final order appealed
from. Nevertheless, on motion of the party filed before the reglementary period, this Court may grant extension for a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days. In a Resolution 30 dated July 16, 2012, we granted Florida's motion for
extension of time. We thus find GV Florida's petition to be timely filed.
B abuse of discretion. Rather, it imputed errors in the RTC's proper interpretation of the law. Further, the CA's
The central issue in this case arose from the RTC's Order dated March 2, 2009 denying TCC's motion to
dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint. In remedial law, an order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an
interlocutory order. 31 This classification is vital because the kind of court order determines the particular remedy
that a losing party may pursue. In the case of a final order — one that finally disposes of a case — the proper
remedy is an appeal. On the other hand, when an order is merely interlocutory — one which refers to something
between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not the final decision of
the whole controversy, 32 — Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an appeal cannot be had. In this instance, a party's
recourse is to file an answer, with the option to include grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and proceed to trial.
In the event that an adverse judgment is rendered, the party can file an appeal and raise the interlocutory order as
an error. 33
This general rule is subject to a narrow exception. A party may question an interlocutory order without
awaiting judgment after trial if its issuance is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 34 In this case, the party can file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
A special civil action for certiorari is an original civil action and not an appeal. An appeal aims to correct
errors in judgment and rectify errors in the appreciation of facts and law which a lower court may have committed in
the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. 35 A special civil action for certiorari, on the other hand, is used to correct
errors in jurisdiction. We have defined an error in jurisdiction as "one where the officer or tribunal acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." 36
This distinction finds concrete significance when a party pleads before a higher court seeking the
correction of a particular order. When a party seeks an appeal of a final order, his or her petition must identify the
errors in the lower court's findings of fact and law. Meanwhile, when a party files a special civil action forcertiorari, he
or she must allege the acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in remedial law. It is not mere abuse of discretion but
must be grave "as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 37 In more concrete terms, not every error
committed by a tribunal amounts to grave abuse of discretion. A misappreciation of the facts or a misapplication of
the law does not, by itself, warrant the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. There must be a clear abuse of the
authority vested in a tribunal. This abuse must be so serious and so grave that it warrants the interference of the
court to nullify or modify the challenged action and to undo the damage done. 38
In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 39 we found grave abuse of discretion when a trial court judge issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent the implementation of a writ of execution for an indefinite period. There, we
declared that the blatant violation of the Rules of Court is clearly grave abuse of discretion. 40 In Belongilot v.
Cua, 41 we also ruled that the Ombudsman's dismissal of a complaint for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 was
attended with grave abuse of discretion because it used irrelevant considerations and refused to properly examine
records reveal a collective pattern of action — done capriciously, whimsically and without regard to existing rules
and attendant facts." 43
There are instances when litigants file a petition seeking the reversal of an interlocutory order yet their
pleadings fail to allege any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower tribunal. Instead, these petitions merely
identify errors of fact and law and seek their reversal. In such a case, the higher court must dismiss the petition
because it fails to allege the core requirement of a Rule 65 petition — the allegation of the presence of grave abuse
of discretion. Without this requirement, litigants can easily circumvent the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be
appealed. They will simply file a pleading denominated as a special civil action forcertiorari, but which instead raises
errors in judgment and is, in truth, an appeal. An appeal and a special civil action for certiorari are, however, not
interchangeable remedies. 44
In the present case, TCC's petition for certiorari did not identify the RTC's specific acts constituting grave
Decision makes no finding of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The penultimate paragraph of
the Decision, which summarizes the basis for its ruling, states:
In fine, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of [TCC] since the
service of summons to its Account Manager is not binding on the corporation. Furthermore, the
action brought by [GV Florida] against [TCC] is already barred by prescription having filed
beyond the six-month prescriptive period. Having settled the pivotal issues in this case, We find
 that it is no longer necessary to address other arguments raised by the petitioner since those
questions, if considered, would not alter the outcome of this case. 45
The CA, in choosing to reverse the RTC in a special civil action for certiorari, based its decision on its
disagreement with the RTC as to the correct application of the law. This is not an error in jurisdiction but merely an
error in judgment. Instead of granting the petition and reversing the RTC, what the CA should have done was to
dismiss the petition for certiorari for failing to allege grave abuse of discretion. We further note that the RTC Order
challenged before the CA through the petition for certiorari is an interlocutory order. As there was no showing of
grave abuse of discretion, TCC's recourse is to proceed to trial and raise this error in its appeal in the event of an
adverse judgment.
II
Nevertheless, we have examined the errors raised by GV Florida in the appeal filed before us and hold
that the CA erred in its conclusions of law as well.
We agree that there was improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply jurisprudence and
rule that in cases of improper service of summons, courts should not automatically dismiss the complaint by reason
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to issue alias summons and ensure that it is
properly served. 46
Service of summons is the main mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in a civil case. Through it, the defendant is informed of the action against him or her and he or she is able
to adequately prepare his or her course of action. Rules governing the proper service of summons are not mere
matters of procedure. They go into a defendant's right to due process. 47 Thus, strict compliance with the rules on
service of summons is mandatory.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of summons to a
domestic private juridical entity. It states:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the old rules pertaining to the service of
summons on corporations. While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a corporation, the current rule has
provided for a list of specific persons to whom service of summons must be made.
In Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, 48 we explained that
the purpose of this rule is "to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him." 49 This rule requires strict
compliance; the old doctrine that substantial compliance is sufficient no longer applies. 50 In E.B. Villarosa Partner
Co., Ltd. v. Benito, 51 we ruled that the liberal construction of the rules cannot be invoked as a substitute for the
plain requirements stated in Section 11 of Rule 14. 52 In Mason v. Court of Appeals, 53 we definitively ruled
that Villarosa settled the question of the application of the rule on substantial compliance. It does not apply in the
case of Section 11 of Rule 14. We said:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled inVillarosa which
applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and
with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private
respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its
contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon
Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa
filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of
summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter
questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa's favor and
declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that there
was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not
included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
revised [ ] Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court's basis
for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondent's substantial compliance with the
rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner's assertions that the enumeration
under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio union est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision
Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we
stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.54 (Italics in the original.)
Service of summons, however, is not the only mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of theRules of Court states:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction,
seeks affirmative relief from the court. 55 When a party appears before the court without qualification, he or she is
deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of
summons. 56 When a defendant, however, appears before the court for the specific purpose of questioning the
court's jurisdiction over him or her, this is a special appearance and does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. 57 Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so long as a defendant raises
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other grounds of objection. In such case, there is no
voluntary appearance.
Still, improper service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not automatically warrant the
dismissal of the complaint. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 58 we held:
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was
wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant
personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that
the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on
said defendant. 59 (Italics in the original)
We repeated this doctrine in later cases such as Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v. Ting Guan
Trading Corporation, 60 Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,61 and Teh v. Court of Appeals. 62
In Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Breva, 63 we even said that there is no
grave abuse of discretion when a trial court refuses to dismiss a complaint solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant because of improper service of summons. 64
Thus, when there is improper service of summons and the defendant makes a special appearance to
question this, the proper and speedy remedy is for the court to issue alias summons.
In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While she is
not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and
submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it.
At no point in its pre-trial brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it. In fact, it even asked the RTC
that it be allowed to reserve the presentation of additional evidence through documents and witnesses. While it is
true that TCC initially filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, we rule that TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the
jurisdiction of the court when it subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even prayed to be
allowed to present additional evidence. This, to this Court's mind, is an unequivocal submission to the jurisdiction of
the RTC to conduct the trial.
Moreover, we apply the doctrine in Lingner & Fisher GMBH and hold that the mere fact of improper
service of summons does not lead to the outright dismissal of the third-party complaint. While the RTC should issue
an alias summons to remedy the error, its refusal to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction (over TCC due to improper service of summons) does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
III
one year from the date of purchase, it concluded that the claim on the implied warranty has prescribed. 69 Findings
of fact, however, cannot be based on mere assumptions. The Rules of Court provide the process through which
factual findings are arrived at. This procedure must be followed as it is the means chosen by law to ascertain judicial
truth. Relying on probabilities, when the rules provide for a specific procedure to ascertain facts, cannot be
countenanced.
Since we cannot proceed to rule beyond the question of whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion, this being the only question of law presented before us in this petition for
review on certiorari, we shall withhold ruling on the other issues raised by TCC in its Comment which have not been
discussed by the CA in its Decision. In any case, we find that the other matters raised by TCC in its Comment are
questions that should first be threshed out before the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 13, 2011
and its Resolution dated March 26, 2012 are REVERSED. The Order dated March 2, 2009 of Branch 129 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

||| (G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corp., G.R. No. 201378, [October 18, 2017])
We also disagree with the CA that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the merits. Under Rule 16
of the Rules of Court, it is raised in a motion to dismiss which is filed before the answer. It may also be raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer. At the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense
may be conducted as if a motion to dismiss was filed. 65 Nevertheless, this is only a general rule. When the issue of
prescription requires the determination of evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal without
hearing.
In Sanchez v. Sanchez (Sanchez), 66 we held that the trial court erred when it dismissed an action on the
ground of prescription on the basis of the pleadings filed and without requiring any trial. The issue of prescription
in Sanchez required the prior determination of whether the sale subject of the case was valid, void or voidable. This
is a matter that requires the presentation of evidence since the fact of prescription is not apparent in the pleadings.
We said:
The Court has consistently held that the affirmative defense of prescription does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of theRules of Civil Procedure.
An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the
complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the issue of
prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it
cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss x x x. 67 (Citations omitted.)

Here, TCC alleges that GV Florida's third-party complaint (which it argues is essentially an action for
implied warranty) has already prescribed. The Civil Codestates that this claim must be made within six months from
the time of the delivery of the thing sold. Without preempting the RTC's findings on the validity of the argument that
this is a warranty claim, a finding that the action has prescribed requires the ascertainment of the delivery date of the
tires in question. This, in turn, requires the presentation of the delivery receipts as well as their identification and
authentication. Under the Rules of Court, a party presenting a document as evidence must first establish its due
execution and authenticity as a preliminary requirement for its admissibility. 68

We find that the reckoning date from which the prescriptive period may be ascertained is not apparent
from the pleadings themselves. We agree with GVFlorida's observation that the CA itself admitted in its Decision
that the delivery receipts do not appear in the records. A finding of fact as to the date of delivery can only be made
after hearing and reception of evidence. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that GV Florida's third-party complaint should
be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
We further note that the CA based its finding on the delivery date on mere presumptions. The assailed
Decision states that since Florida purchased the Michelin tires on March 23, 2007, it may be presumed that the
delivery was made in the ensuing days. Since the third-party complaint was filed only on April 8, 2008, or more than
 [G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017.]
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition 1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," 2 which provides:
SEC. 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. — Any person charged under any provision of
this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining. 3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his
possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-1G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance,
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu),
a dangerous drug.
this petition raising the issues as follows: CAIHTE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, 5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity
of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent
of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three
equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition 6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion
for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to
choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition 7 dated June 29, 2016, it
manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the
law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of
[R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea
bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule
on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot
be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal
cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of
the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only
possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by
case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366,
13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of
an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the
enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible
basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as
unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the
exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving,
whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of
the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare
Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial
station. 8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order 9 dated July 26, 2016; hence,
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE
RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 10
We grant the petition.
 PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should
have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court
or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of
judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the
case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG may be correct. Nonetheless, without much
further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under
proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite
the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the
final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues
of first impression, with far-reaching implications. 11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial
and transcendental importance are present. 12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal
drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, 13 and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands
especially our young citizens. 14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against
the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the
accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers,
may be unjustly accused and convicted." 15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our
country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort
to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users. 16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not
deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment
and guidance. 17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a
constitutional issue. 18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of
procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon.
Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz.:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. 20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for
in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence,
our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for
it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure
are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In
re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946
up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question."
The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusivelyto this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the
power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution.
For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its
Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the
Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x. 22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) 23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxx xxx xxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of
its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
independent judiciary." DETACa
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that
the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino
proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a
comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members
agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the
phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved,
thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that
"both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. x x x. 24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. 25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. 26 Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power,
to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto 27 — Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 — The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14
of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon.
Judge Cabato-Cortes; 30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment
of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 — Despite
statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment
of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) 33 — The first paragraph of Section 14
of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
 Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches
of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence. 34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when
the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. — The defendant, with the consent of the court and of
the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule
118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty
to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by
a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information
is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2,
Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. — The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2,
Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be
equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998") was enacted, 35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters 36 that will promote a fair
and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules 37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
(Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment
and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme
Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. 38 "Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." 39 Fabian v.
Hon. Desierto 40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes
which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those
which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is
whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter;
but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure. 41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For
example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused. 43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of
one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear,
on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and
 those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the
State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable
period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is
shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.
The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar. aDSIHc
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice
system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the
deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either
the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when
such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the
public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public
prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually
operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction.
He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce
the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim
or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may
become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the
dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does
not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable
to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to
suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may
also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it
may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal
justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only. 44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to
appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the
Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases
— delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction. 46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts 47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly
desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice. 48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty
and limiting the probable penalty are obvious — his exposure is reduced, the correctional
processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the
State there are also advantages — the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission
of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial,
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a
substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can
sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness
during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public
from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial
release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever
may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
(Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a
trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a
prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed
by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of
criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." 49 There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. 50 The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. 51 Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed, economy, and finality — can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, 53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right
nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's
case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and
accepted. 54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and
sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. 56 Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
 offended party 57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged. 58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one,
based on what the evidence on hand can sustain. 59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons
for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In
addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider
other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they
also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that
simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these
decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute." 60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 61 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be
allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. 62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. 63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. 64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. 65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of the crime charged. 66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully
act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on
record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial
court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. 67 The ruling on the
motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. 68 Absent any finding on the weight
of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. 69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the
policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose. ETHIDa
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No.
9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Estipona, Jr. y Asuela v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, [August 15, 2017])
 [G.R. No. 205972. November 9, 2016.]
CATERPILLAR, INC., petitioner, vs. MANOLO P. SAMSON, respondent.
[G.R. No. 164352. November 9, 2016.]
CATERPILLAR, INC., petitioner, vs. MANOLO P. SAMSON, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The determination of probable cause to charge a person in court for a criminal offense is exclusively
lodged in the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Department of Justice. Initially, the determination is
done by the investigating public prosecutor, and on review by the Secretary of Justice or his duly authorized
subordinate. The courts will respect the determination, unless the same shall be shown to have been made in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Cases
Before us are the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 205972 1 and G.R. No. 164352. 2
G.R. No. 164352 involves the appeal by petition for review on certiorari of Caterpillar, Inc. (Caterpillar) to
reverse the decision promulgated on January 21, 20043 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75526,
and the resolution promulgated on June 30, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. 4
G.R. No. 205972 relates to the appeal brought by Caterpillar to assail the decision and resolution
promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 102316 respectively on May 8, 2012 5 and February 12, 2013, 6 whereby the CA
affirmed the resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ) finding that there was no probable cause to indict
Manolo P. Samson (Samson) for unfair competition.
Antecedents
Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of footwear, clothing and
related items, among others. Its products are known for six core trademarks, namely, "CATERPILLAR," "CAT,"
"CATERPILLAR & DESIGN," "CAT AND DESIGN," "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR &
DESIGN" (Core Marks), 7 all of which are alleged as internationally known. On the other hand, Samson, doing
business under the names and styles of Itti Shoes Corporation, Kolm's Manufacturing Corporation
and Caterpillar Boutique and General Merchandise, is the proprietor of various retail outlets in the Philippines
selling footwear, bags, clothing, and related items under the trademark "CATERPILLAR," registered in 1997 under
Trademark Registration No. 64705 issued by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO). 8
G.R. No. 164352
On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 56, in Makati City issued Search Warrants Nos. 00-022 to 00-032, inclusive, all for unfair
competition, 9 to search the establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson. The implementation of the
search warrants on July 27, 2000 led to the seizure of various products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks.
Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal complaints for unfair competition in the Department of
Justice (DOJ), docketed as I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364, inclusive.
Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action against Samson and his business
entities, with the IPO as a nominal party 10 — for Unfair Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction — docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-00-41446 of the RTC in Quezon City. In said civil action, the RTC denied Caterpillar's application for the
issuance of the TRO on August 17, 2000. CAIHTE
The DOJ, through Senior State Prosecutor Jude R. Romano, issued a joint resolution dated November 15,
2001 11 recommending that Samson be criminally charged with unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), 12 in
relation to Section 123.1 (e), 13 Section 131.1 14 and Section 170, 15 all of Republic Act No. 8293, or
theIntellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IP Code).
However, because Samson and his affiliate companies allegedly continued to sell and distribute products
clothed with the general appearance of its own products, Caterpillar again applied for another set of search
warrants against Samson and his businesses. The RTC, Branch 172, in Valenzuela City issued Search Warrants
Nos. 12-V-00, 16 13-V-00, 17 20-V-00 18 and 29-V-00 19 upon application of the NBI, by virtue of the
implementation of which several goods were seized and confiscated by the NBI agents.
As a consequence, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal complaints for unfair competition on January 31, 2001,
docketed as I.S. Nos. 2001-42 to 2001-67, against Samson and/or the occupants of his affiliate entities before the
DOJ. 20 In due course, the DOJ, through State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim, issued a joint resolution dated
September 28, 2001 21 recommending the filing of criminal complaints for unfair competition under Section 168.3
(a), in relation to Section 123.1, Section 131.1 and Section 170 of the IP Code. Accordingly, six criminal complaints
were filed in the RTC, Branch 256, in Muntinlupa City, presided by Judge Alberto L. Lerma, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243.
On January 17 and 22, 2002, Samson filed a petitions for review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice
to appeal the joint resolutions in I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364 22 and I.S. Nos. 2001-042 to 2001-067. 23
On May 30, 2002, Samson filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to
243, 24 citing the following as grounds: 25
I.
THERE EXISTS PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS PENDING LITIGATION BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 90, IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-00-41446
ENTITLED: "CATERPILLAR, INC., ET AL. VS. ITTI SHOES CORPORATION, ET AL.," THE
FINAL RESOLUTIONS OF WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF THE INSTANT
CRIMINAL CASES.
II.
ACCUSED HAS FILED PETITIONS FOR REVIEW WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ASSAILING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR WHO CAUSED
THE FILING OF THE INSTANT CASES AND ARE STILL PENDING THEREIN UP TO THE
PRESENT.
In the meanwhile, on July 10, 2002, the DOJ, through Secretary Hernando B. Perez, issued a
resolution 26 denying Samson's petition for review in I.S. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364. Samson's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on May 26, 2003.
On September 23, 2002, Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC granted Samson's Motion to Suspend
Arraignment, and suspended the arraignment and all other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-243
until Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 was finally resolved, 27 holding:
 After a careful scrutiny of the case, this Court finds that private complainant, in Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446, seeks for the cancellation of the trademark "CATERPILLAR" which is
registered in the name of the accused and to prevent the latter from using the said trademark
("CATERPILLAR"), while the issue in the instant case is the alleged unlawful use by the
accused of the trademark "CATERPILLAR" which is claimed to be owned by the private
complainant. From the foregoing, this Court believes that there exists a prejudicial question
since the determination of who is really the lawful or registered user of the trademark
"CATERPILLAR" will ultimately determine whether or not the instant criminal action shall
proceed. Clearly, the issues raised in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 is similar or intimately related
to the issue in the case at bar for if the civil case will be resolved sustaining the trademark
registration of the accused for the trademark CATERPILLAR, then the latter would have all the
authority to continue the use of the said trademark as a consequence of a valid registration,
and by reason of which there may be no more basis to proceed with the instant criminal
action. 28 DETACa
After the RTC denied its motion for reconsideration 29 on December 5, 2002, 30 Caterpillar elevated the
matter to the CA by petition for certiorari on February 14, 2003, 31 docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75526
entitled Caterpillar, Inc. v. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional
Trial Court, Muntinlupa City, and Manolo P. Samson, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in suspending the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
02-238 to 02-243 on the ground of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446
then pending in the RTC in Quezon City whose resolution would determine the outcome of the criminal cases.
Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, Acting Justice Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez reversed and set
aside the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Lim in I.S. No. 2001-042 to 2001-067, and directed the Chief State
Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the criminal informations filed against Samson in court, 32 disposing as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed joint resolution is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to forthwith
cause the withdrawal of the informations filed in court against respondent Manolo P. Samson
and to report action taken hereon within ten (10) days from receipts hereof. 33
Acting Justice Secretary Gutierrez based her resolution on the order dated June 26, 2001, whereby the
RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, had quashed the 26 search warrants upon motion of
Samson. 34 Consequently, the goods seized and confiscated by virtue of the quashed search warrants could no
longer be admitted in evidence.
Correspondingly, Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC ordered the withdrawal of Criminal Cases Nos.
02-240 to 02-243 on February 4, 2003. 35
Aggrieved, Caterpillar assailed the order of Judge Lerma for the withdrawal of Criminal Cases Nos.
02-240 to 02-2432003 by petition for certiorari in the CA on October 16, 2003, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79937, 36 and the CA ultimately granted the petition for certiorari, 37 setting aside the assailed January 13, 2003
resolution of the Acting Justice Secretary and directing the re-filing of the withdrawn informations against Samson.
The Court ultimately affirmed the CA's decision through the resolution promulgated on October 17, 2005 in G.R. No.
169199, and ruling that probable cause existed for the re-filing of the criminal charges for unfair competition under
the IP Code. 38
In the assailed January 21, 2004 decision, 39 the CA dismissed Caterpillar's petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75526, viz.:
Petition has no merit.
The mere fact that public respondent denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
does not justify this petition on the ground of abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. (Benito vs. Comelec, 349 SCRA 705).
Petitioner in this case failed to overcome the burden of showing how public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondent's motion and
denying his own motion for reconsideration. What is clear is that public respondent court acted
judiciously. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of theRules of Court will prosper only if there
is showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent tribunal (Garcia vs. HRET, 312 SCRA 353).
Granting arguendo that public respondent court erred in its ruling, still a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be justified. Where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the orders or decision upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or
decisions within its jurisdiction and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected
by certiorari (De Baron vs. Court of Appeals, 368 SCRA 407).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having no merit in fact
and in law is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED. With costs to
Petitioners.
SO ORDERED. 40
Caterpillar sought the reconsideration of the dismissal, but the CA denied the motion on June 30,
2004. 41 aDSIHc
Hence, Caterpillar appealed the CA's decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75526 (G.R. No. 164352).
G.R. No. 205972
In the meanwhile, in August 2002, upon receiving the information that Samson and his affiliate entities
continuously sold and distributed products bearingCaterpillar's Core Marks without Caterpillar's consent, the latter
requested the assistance of the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of the National Region Public
Police (RIID-NCRPO) for the conduct of an investigation. Subsequently, after the investigation, the RIID-NCRPO
applied for and was granted 16 search warrants against various outlets owned or operated by Samson in
Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Manila, Caloocan, Makati, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Pampanga and Cavite. The warrants
were served on August 27, 2002, 42 and as the result products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks were seized and
confiscated. Consequently, on the basis of the search warrants issued by the various courts, Caterpillar again
instituted criminal complaints in the DOJ for violation of Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Sections 131.3, 123.1 (e)
and 170 of the IP Code against Samson, docketed as I.S. Nos. 2002-995 to 2002-997; 2002-999 to 2002-1010; and
2002-1036.
After the conduct of the preliminary investigation, the DOJ, through State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad,
issued a joint resolution dated August 21, 2003 dismissing the complaint upon finding that there was no probable
cause to charge Samson with unfair competition. 43
Caterpillar moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal, but State Prosecutor Abad denied the motion
on June 18, 2004. 44
The Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint through the resolution issued on
September 19, 2005, 45 and denied Caterpillar's motion for reconsideration on December 20, 2007.
Accordingly, Caterpillar appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of
Court (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 102316). 46
On May 8, 2012, 47 however, the CA denied due course to Caterpillar's petition for review, viz.:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE, and
accordingly, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 48
The CA opined that an appeal under Rule 43 to assail the resolution by the Secretary of Justice
determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause was an improper remedy; and that while it could treat
an appeal as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it could not do so therein because the allegations of
the petition did not sufficiently show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in issuing the
assailed resolutions.
Caterpillar filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion for its lack of merit on
February 12, 2013. 49
Hence, Caterpillar commenced G.R. No. 205972.
Issues
Caterpillar submits that the CA erred as follows:
G.R. No. 164352
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING
DUE COURSE TO CATERPILLAR, INC.'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ORDER SUSPENDING PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
02-238 TO 02-243, ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
C.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT HOLDING THAT A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION CAN
PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF, AND SIMULTANEOUS WITH, THE CIVIL CASE FOR THE
SAME. 50 ETHIDa
Caterpillar posits that the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 was
contrary to Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, Article 33 of theCivil Code on independent civil actions, and Section 170
of the IP Code, which specifically provides that the criminal penalties for unfair competition were independent of the
civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law; that the determination of the lawful owner of the "CATERPILLAR"
trademark in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 would not be decisive of the guilt of Samson for unfair competition in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 because registration was not an element of the crime of unfair competition;
that the civil case sought to enforce Samson's civil liability arising from the IP Code while the criminal cases would
enforce Samson's liability arising from the crime of unfair competition; and that the Court already ruled in Samson v.
Daway 51 that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 was an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code and, as
such, could proceed independently of the criminal actions.
In his comment, 52 Samson counters that the issues of the lawful and registered owner of the trademark,
the true owner of the goodwill, and whether "CATERPILLAR" was an internationally well-known mark are intimately
related to the issue of guilt in the criminal actions, the resolution of which should determine whether or not the
criminal actions for unfair competition could proceed.
G.R. No. 205972
In this appeal, the petitioner interposes that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR REVIEW SOLELY ON THE GROUND OF AN ALLEGED WRONG REMEDY,
DESPITE PETITIONERS HAVING CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS
DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2005 AND 20 DECEMBER 2007, AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO CHARGE
THE RESPONDENT OF THE CRIME OF UNFAIR COMPETITION. 53
Caterpillar seeks the liberal interpretation of procedural rules in order to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice following the denial by the CA of its petition for being an incorrect remedy; and insists that it
presented substantial evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause for unfair competition against Samson.
In sum, the issues to be resolved in these consolidated cases are: firstly, whether or not the CA
committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court a quodid not commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending
the criminal proceedings on account of a prejudicial question; and, secondly, whether or not the CA committed
reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice finding that there was no probable cause to
charge Samson with unfair competition.
Rulings of the Court
G.R. No. 164352
The appeal in G.R. No. 164352 is meritorious.
We note, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in
Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A common element of all such
cases for unfair competition — civil and criminal — was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and
such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil
action, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44.
In fact, this issue has already been raised in relation to the suspension of the arraignment of Samson in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 in Samson v. Daway, 54 and the Court resolved it against Samson and in
favor of Caterpillar thusly: cSEDTC
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a
prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order
which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion
in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of
the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the
existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
 In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition
under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases
of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No.
Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition,
is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at
bar. 55 (Bold emphasis supplied)
Secondly, a civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial
question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair competition. A prejudicial question is
that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issues to be determined in the
criminal case. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case. 56 As stated in Librodo v. Judge Coscolluela, Jr.: 57
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 58 (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to wit: (a) a
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 59
An examination of the nature of the two kinds of cases involved is necessary to determine whether a
prejudicial question existed.
An action for the cancellation of trademark like Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 is a remedy available to a
person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark. 60 On the other hand, the criminal
actions for unfair competition (Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44) involved the determination of whether or not
Samson had given his goods the general appearance of the goods of Caterpillar, with the intent to deceive the
public or defraud Caterpillar as his competitor.61 In the suit for the cancellation of trademark, the issue of lawful
registration should necessarily be determined, but registration was not a consideration necessary in unfair
competition. 62 Indeed, unfair competition is committed if the effect of the act is "to pass off to the public the goods
of one man as the goods of another;" 63 it is independent of registration. As fittingly put in R.F. & Alexander & Co. v.
Ang, 64 "one may be declared unfair competitor even if his competing trade-mark is registered."
Clearly, the determination of the lawful ownership of the trademark in the civil action was not
determinative of whether or not the criminal actions for unfair competition shall proceed against Samson.
G.R. No. 205972
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 205972 is denied for being bereft of merit. SDAaTC
Firstly, Caterpillar assailed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Such resort to the petition for review under Rule 43 was erroneous, 65 and the
egregious error warranted the denial of the appeal. The petition for review under Rule 43 applied to all appeals to
the CA from quasi-judicial agencies or bodies, particularly those listed in Section 1 of Rule 43. However, the
Secretary of Justice, in the review of the findings of probable cause by the investigating public prosecutor, was not
exercising a quasi-judicial function, but performing an executive function. 66
Moreover, the courts could intervene in the determination of probable cause only through the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal through the petition for review under Rule 43.
Thus, the CA could not reverse or undo the findings and conclusions on probable cause by the Secretary of Justice
except upon clear demonstration of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed
by the Secretary of Justice. 67Caterpillar did not so demonstrate.
And, secondly, even discounting the technicalities as to consider Caterpillar's petition for review as one
brought under Rule 65, the recourse must still fail.
Probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court consists in such facts and circumstances
as would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused may probably be guilty
thereof. 68 The determination of probable cause lies solely within the sound discretion of the investigating public
prosecutor after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. It is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering with
the determination of what constitutes sufficient and convincing evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of the accused. 69 Thus, it is imperative that by the nature of his office, the public prosecutor cannot be
compelled to file a criminal information in court if he is not convinced of the sufficiency of the evidence adduced for
a finding of probable cause. 70 Neither can he be precluded from filing an information if he is convinced of the
merits of the case.
In not finding probable cause to indict Samson for unfair competition, State Prosecutor Abad as the
investigating public prosecutor discharged the discretion given to him by the law. Specifically, he resolved as
follows:
It appears from the records that respondent started marketing his (class 25) products
bearing the trademark Caterpillar as early as 1992. In 1994, respondent caused the
registration of the trademark "Caterpillar with a Triangle Device beneath the Letter [A]" with the
Intellectual Property Office. Sometime on June 16, 1997, the IPO issued Certificate of
Registration No. 64705 which appears to be valid for twenty (20) years, or up to June 16, 2017.
Upon the strength of this registration, respondent continued with his business of marketing
shoes, slippers, sandals, boots and similar Class 25 items bearing his registered trademark
"Caterpillar." Under the law, respondent's operative act of registering his Caterpillar trademark
and the concomitant approval/issuance by the governmental entity concerned, conferred upon
him the exclusive right to use said trademark unless otherwise declared illegal. There being no
evidence to controvert the fact that respondent's Certificate of Registration No. 64705
covering Caterpillar trademark was fraudulently or illegally obtained, it necessarily follows that
its subsequent use and/or being passed on to the public militates malice or fraudulent intent on
the part of respondent. Otherwise stated and from the facts obtaining, presumption of regularity
lies, both from the standpoint of registration and use/passing on of the
assailed Caterpillar products.
Complainant's argument that respondent may still be held liable for unfair
competition by reason of his having passed on five (5) other Caterpillar products like "Cat,"
"Caterpillar," "Cat and Design," "Walking Machines" and "Track-Type Tractor Design" is
equally difficult to sustain. As may be gleaned from the records, respondent has been engaged
in the sale and distribution of Caterpillar products since 1992 leading to the establishment of
numerous marketing outlets. As such, it would be difficult to assail the presumption that
respondent has already established goodwill insofar as his registered Caterpillar products are
concerned. On the other hand, complainant's registration of the other Caterpillar products
appears to have been caused only in 1995. In this premise, respondent may be considered as
prior user, while the latter, a subsequent one. Jurisprudence dictates that prior user of the
trademark by one, will controvert the claim by a subsequent one. 71 acEHCD
 We reiterate that the full discretionary authority to determine the existence of probable cause is lodged in
the Executive Branch of the Government, through the public prosecutor, in the first instance, and the Secretary of
Justice, on review. Such authority is exclusive, and the courts are prohibited from encroaching on the executive
function, unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. As declared in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban: 72

A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that establishes the
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent because the
determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor.
Generally, the public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. Consequently, it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in
the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the Department of Justice the
ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy,
courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter of
probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is permitted where the respondent in the preliminary investigation
clearly establishes that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is,
when the public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Moreover, the trial court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference
to the public prosecutor's findings, the courts should never shirk from exercising their power,
when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the public prosecutor's findings are
supported by the facts, and by the law.
Relevantly, grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 73 Herein, Caterpillar did not show the
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review in G.R. No. 164352; SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 21, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75526;DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City
to reinstate Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 and forthwith try and decide them without undue
delay;DENIES the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 205972; and ORDERS respondent Manolo P.
Samson to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

||| (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. Nos. 205972 & 164352, [November 9, 2016])