(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
December 7, 2018 - Gian Antonio Maligad
INTRODUCTION TO TORTS AND DAMAGES
Latin Phrase: Lex Talionis
English Translation: A tooth for a tooth. An eye for an eye.
Take Note: Every civilization in human history has an equivalent of this
principle. A person who has injured another person returns the
offending action to the originator in compensation.
Also known as: The Principle of Exact Reciprocity. The amount of
damage that you have caused to another would be the amount of
damage that you would also suffer. It requires a penalty or punishment
that is identical, exact, to the offense.
Example of Principle of Exact Reciprocity: If a person causes the
death of another person. The penalty shall also be death.
Discussion:
 This is in relation to the Code of Hamurrabi;
 This is a recurring theme in the Old Testament, in which a
person who has injured the eye of another is instructed to give
the value of his or her own eye in compensation.
 But, despite its biblical connection, the rule on reciprocity
doesn’t have a place anymore in modern society. To allow such
would lead to immoral or even barbaric results
An example to exhibit the absurdity of the application of
the Principle of Exact Reciprocity in the modern times:
If Ace commits an act of lasciviousness upon Jade by touching her
private parts, the punishment ought to be that Ace being touched
also in his private parts
Q: Under the law of retaliation if applied today, how should the
punishment be carried out? Should it be carried out in public or in
private where there is a chance of something happening? Or
should Jade be allowed to touch Ace’s private parts by way of
recompense?
A: Of course not! A molested person, for example, would not
obtain relief or justice if the punishment is that she be allowed to
molest her molester.
Q: Should it therefore be the agents of the State that would carry
out the reciprocal justice?
A: No, it is because the State is concerned only about the
protection of public interest—criminal prosecution. It should not
interest the public that a molester is himself molested.
Roman Law: The Roman law has moved to a more civilized
compensation as a substitute for vengeance—in the form of monetary
compensation as a substitute for vengeance.
In cases of assault, fixed penalties were set for various injuries.
Although, talio (the act of retaliation) was still permitted if one persons
broke another’s limb.
Retaliation is not lawful: History teaches us that when acts of
retaliation are allowed, anarchy ensues.
Examples:
 Philippine setting—Rido; which is the retaliatory violence
between families and kinship groups;
 Italy (Sicily)—The concept of Vendetta
The State must regulate vengeance by dispensing justice. For criminal
acts, prosecution and incarceration has taken the place of talio.
Q: For purely private offenses, how should the law treat them? A
situation wherein a person versus another person—for example you
besmirch the reputation of another. What do you do?
In the sixth century, the Saxons developed what is knows as
WEREGILD (Man-money or blood money). It was a value placed on
every human being and every piece of property in Salic Code. If
property was stolen, or someone was injured or killed, the guilty person
would have to pay weregild to the victim’s family or to the owner of the
property.
Despite these changes, the basic formula remains the same up to this
day. For a wrong or injury, there must be a commensurate
compensation.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Comment of Atty. JZE: You know what? What I am introducing to you
is not something new. You already know what is torts and damages. It’s
just that you don’t realize it.
Obligations and Contracts
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(5) Quasi-delicts.
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
Persons and Family Relations
Article 19. [Principle of Good Neighborliness] Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Property Law
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Revised Penal Code
Article 365 Imprudence and Negligence—Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a
light felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
shall be imposed. xxx
DAMAGES
Discussion: We also know this already. Practically, every subject of law
devotes a portion of its provisions and remedies to the recovery of
damages such as moral and exemplary damages in Human Relations.
For example, a breach of the promise to marry, generally, doesn’t give
rise to an action for damages. However, there are instances where such
breach shall lead to damages—such as when there has already been
expenses paid and costs incurred regarding the wedding. There is
payment of actual damages.
If there is seduction, meaning that there is a woman who is seduced and
then the woman is presumed to be a woman of virtue and it amounts to
criminal seduction. There is of course prosecution under the revised
penal code.
Q: But what if there is merely moral seduction? Does that amount to
prosecution under the RPC? What will therefore be measure of
retaliation in so far as the victim is concerned?
A: Damages!
In Transportation law, we have the Law on Averages.
 General Averages—affects both the ship owner and cargo
owner;
 Specific Averages
BACKBONE OF THE PHILIPPINE TORT LAW
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
LOGICAL STARTING POINT IN UNDERSTANDING QUASI-DELICTS:
To start, we shall go back to the most basic principle of what is an
obligation.
Civil Code
Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or
not to do.
Article 1156—classifies obligations into two:
1.) Real Obligations—obligations that consist of giving;
2.) Personal Obligations—obligations to do or not to do.
Q: Why do they call it juridical necessity?
A: Violation leads to juridical sanction. An obligation in its purest form,
is a promise or an oath coupled with a curse.
Examples of Oaths with punishment/s:
 I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. So help me God—punishment: the sanction is so bad
that you would need the help of the Lord;
 I, Willie Revillame, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of
the Nation. So help me God.
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 Civilized Times: Because we live in civilized times, when we violate
our promises, we are simply subjected to juridical sanctions—the
payment of damages.
Q: What is the obligation involved in quasi-delicts?
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Usual Tort Situation:
Cindy was driving while she was texting Maureen, because she was
distracted she didn’t that Jenica was crossing the street. Cindy bumped
Jenica causing the latter injuries, which made Jenica look uglier than she
already is.
Driving while texting—this is considered as negligence per se.
Q: In this example, what is the obligation of law? In the context of
Article 2176, does the motorist have the obligation to be careful in
operating a vehicle? Is that the obligation under Article 2176?
Is the obligation in a quasi-delict a personal one, a to do, or not to do?
QUASI-CONTRACT
Civil Code
Article 2142—Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give
rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no
one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.
Q: What is being stated by Article 2142?
A: There is no such thing as a free beer.
Q: What is the obligation involved in a usual negotiorum gestio?
Example in relation to Negotiorum Gestio:
For example, the farm lot of X is being flooded while he was away
on vacation. Y his neighbor, sees that X’s animals are to perish
because of the flood. Which of the following statements is
true?
a.) Y is obliged to save X’s animals under the principle of
negotiorum gestio;
b.) If Y doesn’t save X’s animals, Y can be held liable for
damages;
c.) X must offer compensation as a consideration so that Y
will save the animals;
d.) None of the above
Answer: D—none of the above
Q: What is the obligation involved in the previous example?
A: For one it is a positive obligation and also it is a real obligation—an
obligation to give. In the example I have given, there is no quasi-
contract because Y didn’t do any lawful, voluntary or unilateral act.
The obligation is not to save X’s animals, because there is no obligation
for such under the law.
The obligation is for X to give compensation if Y did something to save
the former’s animals.
Example: Shikki was driving while texting, because she was distracted
she didn’t notice that Jenny was crossing the street. Thankfully, Shikki
was able to avoid hitting Jenny because he swerved the vehicle away
from him at the last moment. No damage, No Injury.
Q: What is the obligation of Shikki?
A: No, Shikki doesn’t have any obligation. It is a matter of cause and
effect. If there is no effect, then who cares about the cause.
Q: Doesn’t Shikki have the obligation to be careful under Article 2176?
A: No, but not under Article 2176. It is a natural obligation that exists
outside of the law.
PRINCIPLE TO REMEMBER: Regardless of how reckless you are, for
as long as you don’t cause injury to anyone, you are not liable under
Article 2176. Responsibility under Article 2176 arises only when there is
damage done and normally it would not cover potential or perceived
injuries. Actual injury is what the law would recompense.
In relation to Article 2176: The obligation is to pay for the damage
done. Provided, that there is damage done in the first place.
So, the obligation involved in quasi-delicts is a real obligation or an
obligation to give that is to pay for damages done.
What is a Tort?
Latin word: Torquere, meaning to twist or tortum, which means
twisted, wrong, or injustice.
A tort is a private or civil wrong or injury, including actions for breaches
of contract in bad faith, for which the court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
From this definition we can conclude that:
1.) It is a private wrong involving private acts and parties—it’s not
a crime therefore.
2.) It’s a civil wrong and the remedies are therefore lodged in the
form of civil actions in court;
3.) It includes breaches of contract in bad faith;
4.) The remedy is in the form of an action for damages
Q: Is tort law in the Philippines to private acts and private parties?
A: No, for example the law on human relations that is part and parcel of
the Tort law in the Philippines.
[Republic vs. CA]—The State and its agents are not immune to the
provisions of the law on Human Relations. It applies equally well to both
private and public entities. The Government may actually be held liable
for a tort.
THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT IMMUNE FROM TORTS
Civil Code
Article 2189—Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Example on Article 2189 (CC): Suppose, you fell in a manhole.
Civil Code
Article 2180—xxx
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
xxx
Discussion on Article 2180—We are a talking about vicarious liability.
Q: When an agent of the State commits a tort, who can be held liable?
A: The State can be held liable vicariously.
Conclusion: A tort action is available to a private individual against
the State.
Q: Is the reverse true? Can tort action be availed of by the State
against a private individual?
A: Yes, we consider the following provisions in Human Relations:
Civil Code—Human Relations
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when
one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Comment on Article 24: The Court seeks to level the playing
field.
Article 25. [Sanctuary Legislation in the Philippines]
Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display
during a period of acute public want or emergency may be
stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government
or private charitable institution.
Q: Is tort in the Philippines a purely civil wrong and the remedies are
therefore lodged in the form of civil actions in court?
A: No. For example, we recall that nuisance is part and parcel of
Philippine tort law. Under the provisions of the Civil Code on Nuisance:
Civil Code
Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Discussion: The remedy against a public nuisance is not exclusive to
civil actions. You can prosecute under the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, the definition of a tort is not accurate in a sense.
Q: According to Black, does Philippine tort law include breaches of
contract?
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A: Basing on Article 2176 (CC), basing on the codal, then the answer
would be NO. What does Article 2176 state? There should be no pre-
existing contractual relations between the parties.
“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.”
Therefore, based on Article 2176, a tort or quasi-delict should not
include breaches of contract. If there is a pre-existing contractual
relation, the remedies should be limited to those provided for breach of
contract, such as:
 Rescission; or
 Specific performance;
 With an action for damages in either case
Example: You rode a bus. After which, the bus got into an accident and
you weren’t able to arrive to your destination safely and securely—you
were injured.
Q: Do you file an action for damages based on Article 2176?
A: No, because there is a pre-existing contractual relation, which is the
breach of the contract of carriage. You must file a case for breach of
contract of carriage—a culpa contractual.
However, it is possible that an action for damages based on Article 2176
(Tort law) be filed. The Supreme Court in the precedent case of:
[Loadmasters vs. Glodel]—The act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort. In fine, a tort may arise from a contract whereby tort is not
what gave rise to the breach of the contract.
Note: Generally, a tort doesn’t arise if there is a contractual relation.
However, if the art that breaks the contract is also a tort, then you can
claim for damages under Article 2176.
AIR FRANCE versus CARRASCOSO
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1996
FACTS: Plaintiff was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes in France. Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Airlines Inc., issued to plaintiff a first
class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in first class but at
Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the first
class seat because, in the words of the witness Cuento, there was
a “white man” who the Manager alleged to have a better right to
the seat. When asked to vacate his first class seat, the plaintiff, as
was to be expected, initially refused. But to avoid further
commotion, the plaintiff reluctantly gave up his first class seat in
the plane.
HELD: The Supreme Court awarded damages to Carrascoso based
on a quasi-delict.
On culpa contractual.
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso. First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran
leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third,
that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he
was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages.
On culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict or tort)
Even though there is a contract of carriage, there is also a
tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the
part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier.
The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Although the relation
of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".
Q: Does the remedy consist of an action for damages?
A: Yes, but it is only one of the remedies.
For example:
Civil Code
Article 26—Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations
of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
In the US: Article 26 is part of provisions which are called is
“Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress”.
[Islamic Dawa Council case]: In this case, the former acting Chief
Justice Antonio Carpio discussed that although it is not applied in the
Philippines. But, it is supposed to be the name of the tort under Article
26 of the Civil Code.
Reiteration:
Civil Code
Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Discussion: It is not specified that only civil action for damages are the
only remedy for torts. In conclusion, the Philippine tort law doesn’t fit
the common-law definition of a tort.
TORT IS NOT CAPABLE OF AN EXACT DEFINITION—A tort is not
capable of exact definition, because the lines are blurred. A tort may
overlap from civil actions, to criminal actions. As previously noted, an
act that breaches a contract may also be a tort. In the same vein, a
tortuous act may also be classified as a crime.
TORTS AND CRIMES ARE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF WRONGS
TORT CRIME
Against a private person Against the public
Prosecuted by the persons Prosecuted by the State
themselves
Covers negligent act in general Covers international acts in
and intentional acts by general and negligent acts by
exception exception (Art. 365)
Remedies are punitive and Reliefs are mainly prosecutorial
injunctive in nature
Preponderance of evidence Proof beyond reasonable doubt
 Actus reus;
 Mens rea
Note: The same act may also constitute both a tort and a crime.
Example: Noynoy was driving his care at nigh time above the speed
limit while texting Mar. He bumped Jejomar as he didn’t see him
crossing the street. Noynoy defended that Jejomar, with his complexion,
could not be seen at night.
Remedies of Jejomar:
 Criminal prosecution—Under Article 365 of the RPC; or
 Action for Damages—Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
Example: In a heated public quarrel, Noynoy called Jejomar Nognog
King of the Dwarfs.
Remedies of Jejomar:
 Criminal Prosecution—Under Article 358 of the RPC
(Imputation of a Vice or Defect); or
 Action for Damages—Under Article 26 of the Civil Code
(Vexing or humiliating another on account of his lowly station
in life, physical defect, or other personal condition)
Conclusion: The remedies are not exclusive. You cannot box it up to
just civil wrong, because remedies can also extend to those, which are
not civil wrong—penal in nature.
DEFINITION OF TORT (By Prosser)—Tort is the term applied to a
miscellaneous and more or less unconnected group of civil wrongs,
other than breach of contract, for which a court of law will afford a
remedy in the form of an action for damages. The law of torts is
concerned with the compensation of losses suffered by private
individuals in their legally protected interests, through conduct of
others, which is regarded as socially unreasonable.
[Legal Garbage Can—if it doesn’t fall under a crime or a breach of
contract, then it can be a tort.]
COVERAGE OF PHILIPPINE TORT LAW:
 Intentional acts; and
 Accidents, or acts deemed tortuous by law
Classes of Torts:
1.) Negligence torts—there is fault or negligence. Quasi-delict;
2.) Intentional torts—it would depend on the presence of
negligence. It deals with intent of a particular actor or
defendant that causes damage to the plaintiff.;
3.) Strict liability torts
NEGLIGENCE TORTS:
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 3
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
INTENTIONAL TORTS:
Article 26—Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations
of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
Discussion: In Article 26 (CC) there is intent, but it is considered as a
tort. At the same time, you know that there would be criminal
prosecution if it amounts to a criminal offense.
Vexing or Humiliating Another—you can file a criminal case for
slander. It can also be libel if in writing.
STRICT LIABILITY TORTS—Those that are deemed tortuous by law.
 This a tort where the law has determined that some activities
are so dangerous that an individual engaging in those
activities is liable for damages regardless of the intent or
negligence resulting therefrom.
Examples:
1.) Maintenance of a Fire Hazard (RA 9513)—If you maintain
a fire hazard, even if you don’t maintain it intentionally, but it
is a hazard, then you can be held liable. It is a strict tort
liability.
2.) RA 2183—Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or
whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage, which it may cause, although it may escape or be
lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage
Example: You were the one held responsible for taking care of
my carabao. Consequently, the carabao got away and
skewered another person. Such person was injured. Were you
negligent? No. Was there intent on your part? No.
But, you are still held liable because of strict liability.
3.) Article 2187— Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death
or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers.
Discussion: You were responsible of manufacturing of the
product. But, someone died or got sick because of your
product. Since it is a strict tort liability—you are still held
liable despite the absence of direct contractual liability.
4.) Article 2193— The head of a family that lives in a building or
a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things
thrown or falling from the same.
Example: If a person was walking and a pot fell on his
head. The pot came from the 2 nd floor of the building where
your family is situated. You are the head of the family. Even
it wasn’t your fault if you are the head of the family, then
you shall be held liable.
You are liable by the very fact that you are the head of a
family. Negligence is immaterial—strict liability tort.
NEGLIGENCE TORTS STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
If you’re unable to prove The law imposes absolute
negligence, no liability can be liability without regard to fault
attributed to the defendant. or negligence and therefore
obviates the need to prove
fault or negligence in court.
All you need to prove is how
the law is applicable to the
factual antecedents of the
case.
For Intentional torts: At the onset, remember that when a wrongful
act is committed intentionally, what usually results is not a mere civil
wrong, but a criminal offense.
Example: Duterte says that Leila de Lima you are fat, dumb and a flirt.
What will be Duterte’s liability for intentionally calling De Lima fat,
dumb, and a flirt?
It depends:
 If the statement was printed—liability would be under
Article 353 of the RPC (Libel). Take note that these acts require
the element of publicity. Otherwise, there is no crime;
 What if the statements were uttered privately—If that is
the case, then the liability would be civil in nature, and for that
you apply Article 26 of the Civil Code:
“Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.”
Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress: This example is also
applicable to the Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress. The gravamen
of the tort is not the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, but the harm to
plaintiff’s mental and emotional state.
In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.
Reputation is the community’s opinion of what a person is.
 If the statements were uttered privately, you’re not
talking about community perception anymore. You’re talking
about the effect of a statement upon the person upon whom
the statements were directed.
 In intentional infliction of mental distress, the opinion of
the community is immaterial to the existence of the action.
Although the court may consider it in awarding damages.
What is material is the disturbance of the mental or emotional
state of the plaintiff as the object of the humiliation.
What is important is the plaintiff actually suffers mental or
emotional distress because he saw the act or read the
statement and it alludes to an identifiable group to which he
clearly belongs.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in the case of MVRS vs.
Islamic Dawah Council: The requirements of libel have no application
in intentional torts under ART 26 where the impression of the public is
immaterial while the impact on the mind or emotion of the offended
party is all important. That is why in American jurisprudence, the tort of
intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress is completely
separate and distinct from libel and slander.
NEGLIGENCE TORTS
Negligence torts are the most prevalent tort. It is not a deliberate tort.
Rather, negligence torts occur when an individual fails to act as
reasonable person to someone whom he/she owns a duty to.
Elements: Negligence Torts—
1.) Duty—The person must owe a duty or service to the plaintiff
in question;
2.) Breach—The individual who owes the duty must violate the
duty or obligation;
 The breach must be the proximate causation for the
damages suffered by the plaintiff.
3.) Damages—An injury then must arise because of that specific
obligation; and
4.) Causation—The cause of the injury must have been
reasonable foreseeable as a result of the person’s negligent
actions.
(1st ) DUTY
Everyone has the duty to exercise due care all of the time.
Due care—it is the amount of care that a reasonable person would
exercise under the circumstances. In due regard of the circumstances of
the person, and of the time, and of the place.
Civil Code
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in
the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall
apply.
If the law or contract doesn’t state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required.
Reasonable Person—A reasonable person is not any real person or
even the average person, but an imaginary prudent person who takes
the precautions necessary to avoid harming another person or property.
 That reasonable person is equated to a good father of a family.
Reasonableness—Reasonableness is relative. The element of due care
depends on the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF A PERSON
Q: What is the standard of care required of a bus driver? It depends.
a.) Towards his passengers (a circumstance of persons)—He is
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers transported by him;
b.) Towards non-passengers or other motorists (a
circumstance of persons)—he owes them only ordinary due
care.
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TIME
A public utility company, such as an electric company, is required to
exercise only ordinary care in its day-to-day dealings with consumers.
INELCO vs. CA
The Supreme Court held that in times of calamities extraordinary
diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in a constant vigil
to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or
limb.
There is a change according to time.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLACE
A motorist can operate a vehicle at a higher speed at straight away
portions of the road but must slow down when he approaches an
intersection. (Heirs of Completo vs. Albayda Jr. GR No. 172200, July 6,
2010)
(2nd) BREACH
It is the simplest of the four elements. You must determine whether the
defendant followed that standard of care as required.
Example: The standard of care required of an owner of an aggressive
dog is to keep the dog on a leash. If the owner doesn’t do so, then he
has breached his duty of care.
(3rd) CAUSATION
The cause and effect relationship “Causal relationship between conduct
and result”.
There are two (2) types of Causation:
1.) Causation-in-fact—But-for Causation. But for
defendant’s actions, would injury have occurred?
Example: Manny hit Jinkee’s face with a basketball. Jinkee’s
face would not have been injured if Manny had not hit her in
the face with the basketball.
2.) Proximate Causation—It’s a little bit more complex.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without which the result would
not have occurred. In other words, even if an event is a cause
in fact. It may be not the cause in law. [Bataclan vs.
Medina]
Example 1: Practice makes perfect
In order to put up a credible showing in the PBA (as 11TH over-all
pick in the 2014 PBA Draft), Manny keeps on practicing his
dribbling “skills” in his living room. One time, the ball slips from
his hands and hits Jinkee’s sister Janet, in the face, causing a black
eye.
Was there a causation in fact? Was there proximate
causation?
YES to both questions. Janet’s eye would not have been injured
but for the Manny’s ball hitting her face. There is causation in fact.
As to proximate cause, the ball, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, found its
way to Janet’s face thereby producing the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Example 2: Practice makes perfect
A week after the incident, Manny once again practiced dribbling in
his living room. Once again, the ball slipped from his hands,
through the window, hitting the ladder set up by the Cignal TV guy
who was installing a satellite dish, causing the latter to fall and
break his arms.
Was there a causation in fact? Was there proximate
causation?
YES to both questions. Cignal guy’s arms would not have been
broken had Manny’s ball not hit the ladder he was using, causing
him to fall. There is causation in fact. As to proximate cause, the
ball, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, found its way to the ladder causing
Cignal guy to fall and thereby break his arms and without which
the result would not have occurred.
Example 3: Practice makes perfect
The next day, undeterred, Manny practiced his dribbling skills
some more. This time, when the ball slipped, it hits his neighbor in
the head just as he is pouring gas onto his grill. He pours too
much, which causes an explosion. In addition to his head injuries,
he suffers burns from the explosion and there is some fire damage
to his house.
Was there a causation in fact? Was there proximate
causation? What if the wind caused the fire to spread to
other houses and burned down one block in Forbes Park
where Manny lives?
Let’s look at the element of foreseeability. You dribbling while your
sister’s twin is right there (Sir means that Manny’s wife’s sister, in
reference to the first example), you hit her in the face, causing a
black eye. Foreseeable, when you started dribbling? Pwede! In the
second example, you know there’s a guy there, installing a
satellite dish, right outside the window, the window is open.
Would it be foreseeable na kung kintahay nalagput ang bola sa
iyaha, posible na matumba and mahulog sya? Posible! There’s an
element of foreseeability although it’s kinda remote.
But this (third example), is a difficult situation, something that you
cannot really foresee even in your wildest imagination.
When you were dribbling, is it foreseeable that it will hit your
neighbor just as he was about to put some gas in his grill, which
would cause him to pour too much, which would then cause an
explosion, and which would then cause injuries to his head, and
then fire damage to his house? Foreseeable? No!
In this scenario, there is causation in fact. However, proximate
cause may be more difficult. Perhaps there is something wrong
with the grill or the gasoline that caused the fire.
Why was the neighbor pouring gas in the first place? Perhaps one
could foresee the neighbor burning himself at the grill, but could
the fire damage to the house be foreseen?
What about the wind spreading the fire to the other houses? Is this
not an efficient intervening cause?
Resolution would depend on the evidence, arguments of the
counsel and similar factors. But remember, there is no policy
under the law curtailing a person from dribbling a ball inside his
own house.
the Conclusion:
 Causation in fact—easy;
 Proximate cause—requires an analysis on a case to case
basis
(4th) DAMAGE
The principle of damnum absque injuria (damage without legal injury).
There might be damage, but the law doesn’t give you a relief for
damages.
All injuries can be reduced to monetary amount. The real difficulty
comes in the calculating of the damages.
For example, it is pretty easy to figure out how much a burnt down
house is worth, but it is not easy to figure out how much Janet’s
eyesight is worth.
There is a difficulty in calculating damages, because you cannot
quantify a certain things.
COVERAGE OF TORT LAW:
Tort law covers:
 Actual injuries;
 Potential injuries; and
 Foreseeable injuries
Tortious conduct can lead to liability for actual injuries suffered by a
person such as when, by reason of another’s act, his body is injured. He
may claim damages in the form of reimbursement for his medical bills,
to cite an example. in Philippine Tort Law, liability does not necessarily
arise if there is no actual injury.
IN RELATION TO WESTERN JURISPRUDENCE (Western Tort Law):
 DEJECTUM EFFESUMVE ALIQUID imposes liability for
damages of the person occupying the house for injury for
anything thrown or poured from the house, regardless of
whether he is the owner of the house or not. In Philippine Tort
Law, this is reproduced under Article 2193 of the Civil Code.
This is strict liability.
 DEL POSITIS VEL SUSPENSIS – the mere placing or
suspension of an object in a dangerous position is already a
ground for liability for it was not necessary that anyone should
be hurt or injured. This principle did not find its way to
Philippine laws, except maybe fire hazards and nuisance. But
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 5
 remember, if we talk about a fire hazard, it can be abated
even if there is no person injured. It’s usually the government
that causes the abatement. For nuisance, more or less the
same thing, and damage is not the determinant of liability, but
the mere condition of the property. That’s why when we talk
about a remedy against nuisance, we have abatement or
prosecution. Can you consider, therefore, that Tort Law in the
Philippines would cover potential injuries, such as in fire
hazards and nuisance? Dili lang gihapon. That’s the difference:
Philippine Tort Law – there must always be actual injury.
 Tort Law covers physical and non-physical injuries.
E.g. of physical injuries: Article 2176, Accidents;
E.g. of nonphysical injuries: invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Q: Can moral damages be awarded for both physical and non-physical
injuries?
A: Yes, it is allowed. For example, moral damages can end physical
suffering and non-physical suffering. The purpose of moral damages is
to restore you to your spiritual status quo. Money to be given in order
for you to forget your suffering.
Application to physical suffering: If you were in an accident and you
lost your hand. Can you be awarded moral damages?
Yes, because clearly you have suffered mental and physical suffering.
Restoration here can only be spiritual. It gives you means and
diversions in order for you to forget that you lost your hand.
Conclusion: There is a difference between physical and non-physical
injuries.
AIMS OR THEORY OF TORT LAW
(copied from 2016 tsn, because the discussion was more elaborate)
In The Aims of the Law of Tort (1951), Glanville Williams saw four
possible bases on which different torts rested:
1) Appeasement – to restore the claimant to his spiritual (not
necessarily physical) status quo ante;- to appease. That would be your
talio; your retribution, rather than exacting proportionality or reciprocity.
Physical restoration – kung nabangga imong sakyanan, ipa-ayo
imong sakyanan.
Spiritual restoration – nakabangga ka ng tao, it lead to the
amputation of his arm. You pay him damages for spiritual appeasement,
because maybe he will forget that he no longer has an arm if you give
him a lot of money. It gives him means, methods, amusements to
forget.
2) Justice or vindication – to bring relief to the distress, disturbance
or damage suffered by the claimant caused by the wrong committed by
the tortfeasor;
3) Deterrence – to set an example for the public good so that similar
tortuous conduct will be avoided;
E.g you know for a fact that your neighbor is a reckless driver.
Nakasuhan sya and was made to pay P1 million in the form of damages.
If that’s the case, then maybe I should be careful in driving, so that I
won’t be made to pay P1 million like my neighbor.
4) Compensation – to compensate the plaintiff for unreasonable
harms they have sustained.
In Atty. Espejo’s view, the aim of tort law may be expanded to include
the following:
a) Efficient distribution of risk – to reflect as closely as possible
liability where transaction costs could be minimized.
Would it be more economical for me to drive faster to get to an
appointment but risk injuring a pedestrian?
Would it be more efficient and cheaper to employ workers in hazardous
occupations instead of buying an expensive machine to do the work? If
the workers are injured, would my savings be enough to cover
compensation?
b) Regulation of vengeance – by legally recognizing a class of
wrongs not otherwise defined or regulated by statute, there is less
possibility of individuals putting the law into their own hands.
Somehow, tort law developed when lawmakers realized that this could
not be crime or breach of contract. So why not put something in
between; something that will catch anything else that is not covered by
civil law or criminal law. Then we call it tort law; to make sure that no
wrong remains unpunished.
January 4, 2019 – Aligato
QUASI DELICTS
PART 1
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault of negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Just to do a little word play here, the word quasi-delict comes from two
latin words. When you say “quasi”, it means almost or hapit na. sa
bisaya pa, “susama”. And delicto, crime. And therefore, we translate the
term quasi-delict, “almost a crime”.
Now, take note , if you ask me, it is a misnomer because quasi-delicts in
the Philippines are not almost crimes. When you talk about almost
crime, you did something with criminal intent except that you were
unable to consummate it. Possible siyang attempted or frustrated na
crime. Ang tort, because you do it without a criminal intent, then you
cannot be considered an almost crime. What makes a quasi-delict under
Article 2176 is actally the presence of fault or negligence. Kanang
imong pagkadanghag.
Kitang tanan simpleng mga tao, diba daghan tag ginabuhat nga wala
gihunahuna. Kanang mag text ka nya nag-drive. Or naggunit kag bata
unya nag archery ka. Naa kay gibuhat, wala nmo gihuna-hunaan.
TAKE NOTE: under the Revised Penal Code, the law defines crimes as
follows:
Acts and omissions punished by law or Felonies or delito--felonies are
committed not only by deceit or dolo but also by means of culpa.
And that, to my mind, is the main delineation between a crime and
quasi-delict. When you talk abiout a crime there is deceit or dolo. When
you talk about quasi-delict, there is fault or culpa, kadanghag,
There is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. Wala ka naghuna-huna.
What is the obligation involved?
I have a problem with what Paras is saying. Because he says that the
obligation involved in a quasi-delict is the obligation to be careful in all
dealings. and we discussed this already. Ang discussion nato was
pinaagi sa quasi-contracts. We discussed when would there be an
obligation when we talk about a quasi contract as a source of
obligation? Only when there is certain lawful voluntary act that causes
unjust enrichment to other person. Somebody is benefitted at your
effort or at your expense. And therefore, you have to recompense. In
quasi-delict, your obligation only is to pay for the damage done if and
only if there is damage that is caused to other person by reason of your
kadanghag.
It is as simple as that. The obligation involved here, as we have already
discussed, is real obligation. To pay for the damage done.
QUASI-DELICT TORTS
Quasi-delicts are limited to those Torts include quasi-delicts,
under Article 2176 to 2194 of violations of the law on human
the Civil Code relations and nuisances
A quasi-delict is strictly a A tort originally is a common law
concept of civil law concept
As defined and originally Tort is broader than quasi-delict
conceived under Article 2176, a because it includes not only
quasi-delict arises only if there is negligence, but intentional
fault or negligence criminal acts as well
What are the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict? We have
here, the case of:
DE LA LLANA VS. BIONG (2013)
Juan dela Llana was driving while Toyota Corolla. His car’s rear end
was rammed by a dumptruck violently pushing the car forward. Due
to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and wind shield was
broken. Dela Llana doesn’t show to have
A month later, her health deteriorated. She suffered from a Whiplash
injury. She sued the employer of the driver of the dump truck
ISSUE: WON the truck driver has liability? Is the owner vicariously
liable?
Rule:
Elements:
1. Damage
De la Llana suffered whiplash injury
2. Negligence
Driver of the dump truck was driving recklessly.
3. Relation of cause and effect between the two
The chain of causation between the reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
What is the duty of the plaintiff? To first establish by preponderance
of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict. Did the plaintiff
succeed in the instant case? No. She failed to discharge the burden
of proving the third element of quasi-delict. She failed to establish by
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 6
preponderance of evidence that the driver’s negligence, in its natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash
injury would not have occurred
Remember, we have discussed that there are two types of causation:
1. Causation in fact; and
2. Proximate Causation or Causation in law
Causation in fact does not really refer to our own law on tort of Article
2176. What we are concerned here is that there should be a causal
connection between the negligent act of the defendant and the
damages or injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
So, based on the requisites, what are the duties of the plaintiff?
1. to establish by preponderance of evidence the 3 elements of a quasi-
delict. So, applying the elements:
1. Damage
De la Llana suffered whiplash injury
2. Negligence
Driver of the dump truck was driving recklessly.
3. Relation of cause and effect between the two
The chain of causation between the reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
Were they abe to prove that? NO.
They failed to establish the 3rd element. They failed to establish that the
driver’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause produced her whiplash injury, and
without which, the whiplash injury would not have occurred.
So that is the definition of proximate cause- the cause which in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, suffices to produce the injury, and without which the injury would
not have occurred.
What was the evidence of Dela Llana here?
1. The pictures of her damaged case
According to the SC, it only proves impact. It cannot be used
to infer whiplash injury.
2. The medical certificate dated November 20, 2000
Hearsay. The doctor who issued it did not testify.
3. Her testimonial evidence that collisions can cause whiplash injury
Excluded for being a mere opinion. The only opinion that
matters is the opinion of the court. Di ka pwede mag buot-buot sa korte.
FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
Fault in civil law must be distinguished from dolo in criminal law. If the
act or omission causing the damage is committed with intent to cause
such damage, it is dolo, the act becomes a crime, and is governed by
the Revised Penal Code.
When intent is absent, it is fault or culpa. This distinction between the
two concepts depends on the will of the actor rather than on his
intelligence.
WHAT IS NEGLIGENCE?
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. xxx
SMITH BELL VS. BORJA (10 JUNE 2001) Negligence is conduct that
creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.
Two types of FAULT:
1. “Fault substantive and independent” which, on account of its origin,
gives rise to an obligation between two persons not similarly bound by
any other obligation;
Otherwise known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. Diba naa
tay tulo ka klase nga culpa:
1. culpa aquiliana
2. culpa contractual
3. culpa criminal
These are faults or negligence nga dili alien sa atua.
Culpa-contractual- fault that exists concurrent with a pre-existing
obligation.
Also a violation of penal law
Fault substantive and independent of contract. Cause f there is a
contract, you do not call that quasi-delict. You call that culpa contractual
or breach of contract.
ORIGIN OF CULPA AQUILIANA
The “Lex Aquilia” of Roman Law
If anyone wrongfully kills another’s male or female slave or four-footed
herd-animal, let him be ordered to pay the owner whatever its highest
value was in the preceding year. Fault that is not criminal, fault that is
not contractual in nature.
Note that this is a mere civil action despite the fact that it may concern
the unlawful killing of a person (slave). The killing of a slave then was
not treated as a crime. It was merely a tort.
*story on Romans and how they were the first to use roads*
2. As “an incident in the performance of an obligation” which already
existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and
which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation.
This means that the fault or negligence arises out of a pre-existing
obligation. There can be no liability if there was no contract in the first
place. Also known as culpa contractual
Example: A is not contractually bound by B. si A nagadinahggag, si B is
injured. That’s a culpa aquilana.
Another example:
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged
to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a
family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires
another standard of care.
Do you know the contract of commodatum? Delivery perfects a contract
of commodatum. Remember that the ultimate obligation is to return.
But in the meantime, you have the oblgation to take care of it. What if
nanghiram kag ballpen and nawala kay nagdinanghag ka, culpa
aquiliana? No. it I still culpa contractual.
Fault under 2176 is:
Fault substantive and independent
 It means that Article 2176 is an independent source of
obligation.
 Fault in Article 2176 cannot be “an incident in the performance
of an obligation” because the provision requires that there
should be “no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties.
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place.
***MEMORIZE THIS
Is there a uniform rule in the determination of whether or not a person
is negligent?
No. In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company (1969), the SC ruled
that “negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is
relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”
RELATIVE NOT ABSOLUTE
Examples:
1. Driving in a crowded street during business hours compared to
driving in an empty street;
2. Transporting an infant compared to transporting an adult;
3. Carrying a loaded gun compared to carrying an empty one.
The relative positions and physical situations of the parties must also be
considered.
What do I mean when I say that negligence is relative, not absolute and
you have to consider the relative positions and physical situations of the
parties? This is what I call the Spiderman Doctrine.
Because with great power comes with great responsibility. So, the
greater your position, the more careful you should be.
HEIRS OF COMPLETO VS. ALBAYDA (2010)
FACTS: On August 27, 1997, while Albayda was on his way to the
office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi
driven by Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious
physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the Philippine Air Force
General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was immediately
transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center
(AFPMC) because there was a fracture in his left knee and there was
no orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH.
RULING: It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s
breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was
negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury
to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury suffered. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater
danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa. Accordingly, while the
duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist,
due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is
required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the
bicyclist. The physical advantages that the motor vehicle has over
the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than vice versa.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 7

*story on cars*
Compare a taxi with a bicycle. Which on is easier to operate? The
bicycle. Pero which position is more difficult? Do bicycles do have the
same right on the road compared to taxis? According to the SC, yes.
Because they occupy the road the same right with other vehicles.
Meaning, dako kayo ang difference sa two.
TYPES OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
1. Diligence agreed upon by the parties
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged
to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a
family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires
another standard of care.
It is therefore possible to stipulate as to the degree of diligence to be
employed.
2. Diligence required by law
Ordinary diligence or diligence of a good father of a family (bonum
pater familias), which is the default standard of care (equal to the
diligence of a reasonably prudent man as mentioned in Picart vs. Smith.
3. Extraordinary diligence
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE WHEN REQUIRED BY LAW:
1. Common Carriers
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
2. Public utility companies
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. CA (1989)
FACTS: On June of 1967, typhoon Gening buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte with strong winds and heavy rains. After the storm,
Isabel Lao Juan ventured out of the house (located at Guerrero St.) to
check the status of her business properties (grocery stores). Wading
on waist-deep flood, she was followed by her employees who walked
side by side at a distance behind Isabel. Suddenly, Isabel screamed
"Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two employees attempted
to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot
where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a
post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. RULING: In times
of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity
to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb. Indeed, under the circumstances of the
case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to
the general public… “considering that electricity is an agency, subtle
and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must
be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be.” The negligence of petitioner
having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by
arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
“When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission.”
The same with what happened to us when we went to the Christmas
Village in Tamayong. Naay nagdula nga bata sa lights, ug
nakuryentehan. The kid got up and presumably they went home. Pero
from I learned dapat gidala ang bata sa ospital.
And action for damages was instituted against INELCO. The SC said that
in times of calamities, the electric companies are required extraordinary
diligence. Only in times of calamities.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
(Doctrine of assumption of risk)
 “To one who voluntarily consents to and takes the risk, no
injury is done.”
 [If I voluntarily undertake an activity, knowing fully well the
risks involved, I cannot later on blame another person for any
injury that I suffered. An example is sport competitions.]
Can the deceased be deemed to have voluntarily assumed the risk
when she ventured into the flood waters?
A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Can you apply this in the care? No. citing the rule on common law that:
XXX
For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by
the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss.
3. BIR and Customs Examiners
RA 9335, SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and
Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners,
and employees of the BIR and the BOC who violate this Act or who
are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or
misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury
suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of
such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance, or
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
4. Banks, in certain cases
When are they required to exercise exercise extraordinary diligence in
their dealings?
Example, you have 100 dollars and magpakambyo ka a bank or you go
to aldivinco. If ang nahatag sa imuha kay kulang, pwede ba ka
magreklamo nga wala ang exert ug extraordinary diligence sa
pagkambyo sa imuha.
No. because the rule is that extraordinary diligence might be required
by bank but only when they are acting in their fiduciary capacity.
SAMSUNG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PH., INC. VS. FEBTC
(2004)
FACTS: On 19 March 1992, a certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for
payment FEBTC Check No. 432100 to the bank. The check, payable
to cash and drawn against Samsung Construction’s current account,
was in the amount of P999,500.00. Following the internal banking
procedures, after the teller was satisfied with the authenticity of the
signature appearing on the check, she forwarded the same to the
Branch Senior Assistant Cashier, who concluded that the check was
indeed signed by Jong.
Finally before approval, another bank officer (Syfu) had to verify the
check. Noticing Jose Sempio III (“Sempio”), who is well- known to
Syfu and to the other bank officers, Syfu showed the check to
Sempio, who vouched for the genuineness of Jong’s signature.
Confirming the identity of Gonzaga Satisfied with the genuineness of
the signature of Jong, Syfu authorized the bank’s encashment of the
check to Gonzaga.
The following day, the accountant of Samsung Construction, Kyu,
examined the balance of the bank account and discovered that a
check in the amount of P999,500.00 had been encashed. Aware that
he had not prepared such a check for Jong’s signature, Kyu perused
the checkbook and found that the last blank check was missing. He
reported the matter to Jong, who then proceeded to the bank. Jong
learned of the encashment of the check, and realized that his
signature had been forged.
Defense of Far East: They followed their usual validation and
verification procedure. According to the CA, it was the fault of
Samsung, for lack of care and prudence in keeping the checks. If a
loss, which must be borne by one or two innocent persons, can be
traced to the neglect or fault of either, such loss would be borne by
the negligent party, even if innocent of intentional fraud.
RULING: The irregular circumstances attending the presentment of
the forged check should have put the bank on the highest degree of
alert. The Court recently emphasized that the highest degree of care
and diligence is required of banks.
Banks are engaged in a business impressed with public interest, and
it is their duty to protect in return their many clients and depositors
who transact business with them. They have the obligation to treat
their client’s account meticulously and with the highest degree of
care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The
diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than that of a good
father of a family.
Why? Remember the nature of bank deposits as irregular deposits. In
truth and in fact, when you say bank deposits, they are deposits in
name only but in actuality they are contracts of mutuum. Who is the
debtor and who is the creditor? Who is the lender and who is the
borrower? Imo man nang kwarta. Sila ang nanghiram sa imo ug kwata.
Your money is demandable anytime and they are required to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
REYES VS. CA (2001)
In Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA, upholding a long standing
doctrine, we rules that the degree of diligence required of banks, is
more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned. In
other words, banks are duty bound to treat the deposit accounts of
their depositors with the highest degree of care. But the said ruling
applies only to cases where banks act under their fiduciary capacity,
that is, as depository of the deposits of their depositors. But the
same higher degree of diligence is not expected to be exerted by
banks in commercial transactions that do not involve their fiduciary
relationship with their depositors.
5. Board of Canvassers during election
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 8
In Arsenia B. Garcia vs. CA, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006, the SC
ruled: Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be
exercised by the members of the Board of Canvassers in canvassing the
results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statement of votes prepared by
the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents
whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
Does this doctrine still apply now when we are already automated? Naa
pa baya gihapon naga canvass.
6. Officers of the Securities and Exchange Commission
This is found in Section 6 of RA 8799.
Indemnification and Responsibilities of Commissioners.– 6.1. The
Commission shall indemnify each Commissioner and other officials of
the Commission, including personnel performing supervision and
examination functions for all cost and expenses reasonably incurred
by such persons in connection with any civil or criminal actions, suits
or proceedings to be liable for gross negligence or misconduct. In the
event of settlement or compromise, indemnification shall be
provided only in connection with such matters covered by the
settlement as to which the Commission is advised by external
counsel that the persons to be indemnified did not commit any gross
negligence or misconduct. The costs and expenses incurred in
defending the aforementioned action, suit or proceeding may be paid
by the Commission in advance of the final disposition of such action,
suit or proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of
the Commissioner, officer or employee to repay the amount
advanced should it ultimately be determined by the Commission that
he/she is not entitled to be indemnified as provided in this
subsection.
7. Respondent Public Officers in Writ of Amparo cases
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. –
The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The
respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that
ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent
who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official
or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
In a nutshell, if you are a respondent of a writ of amparo case, you are
a public official or employee, you have to prove that extraordinary
diligence is required by applicable laws. You observe that in the
performance of duty. You need to provide sufficient explanation kung
diin ba ning tao nga allegedly na enforce iyang disappearance.
There is no presumption of regularity when you talk about writ of
amparo cases.
REYES VS. CA (2014)
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers
to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
DOES THE TERM QUASI-DELICT APPLY TO INTENTIONAL ACTS?
DULAY VS. CA (243 SCRA 220)
FACTS: BenignoTorzuelais an employee of Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., and/or Superguard Security Corp. and, at the
time of the incident complained of, was under their control and
supervision.
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang saAlabang," Alabang
Village, as a result of which Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
the said carnival, shot and killed Dulay. Action for damages was filed
against Torzuela and Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela.
RULING: Art. 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
In criminal law:
What happens of a security guard kills in the line of duty? Can you sue
the company criminally? No.
But there could be civil liability when the employee’s criminal guilt
becomes the employer’s civil guilt. When the employer becomes
subsidiarily liable when the employee is insolvent.
This is an action for damages, making it only as civil case. Later we will
learn about vicarious liability wherein an employer can be held liable
directly. We will discuss that in Article 2180.
Example: a contract of suretyship. A borrowed money from B. C is the
surety. Can A sue C without impleading B? yes. Because the surety is
liable like an original promisor. So it does not matter. Dili necessary
party si A.
Same thing with solidary liability with the employer. You are, as
employer, presumed negligent in the selection or supervision of your
employees.
That is the contention of Superguard. The civil liability is governed by
Article 100 of the RPC and not Art 2176 in relation to 2180.
SIGNIFICANCE:
If only Article 100 of the RPC, in relation to Article 103, the security
agency is only subsidiarily liable. They can only be held liable for
damages if the employee is convicted and is insolvent.
If Article 2176 is applied, in relation to Article 2180, the liability of the
security agency is primary. They can therefore be held liable directly.
But remember it is a shooting. Naay negligence? When you aim a gun
to somebody, with the intent of killing him, that is a crime. You have
intent to kill. But, the ruling of the SC, there is no reason of limitin the
scope of Article 2176.
This is confusing. Pagtuo ba nako quasi-delict lang ang covered sa 2176.
Nganong covered pati ang delict? Pagtuo ba nako negligence ang
cornerstone sa 2176 and not dolo? But why is it in Dulay, apil kuno ang
intentional acts?
Situation: Maja files a criminal case against Sara with a prayer for
damages. She was also allowed to file an independent action for
damages under Article 2176.
Would this not lead to unjust enrichment because, if Maja wins in both
cases, she will be awarded damages twice?How did the SC address this
situation in Dulay?
RULING IN DULAY: Article 2176, where it refers to “fault or negligence”
covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
There is no double recovery because that is unjust enrichment.
CALANG VS. PEOPLE (2010)
The SC, in this case, ruled that: Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts
that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not
apply to civil liability arising from delict.
Why is the ruling different in this case?
The RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally
liable with Calang. He was charged criminally before the RTC.
Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the
cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and
the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.
There was no independent action filed against Philtranco in this case.
Does it mean that if an act is both a quasi-delict and a crime that the
tortfeasor or offender can be sued twice for the same act or omission?
In essence, YES. However, there should be no double recovery of
damages. Under Article 2177, “responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.”
Based on what we know so far, there are three different types of culpa
that can be used as basis for personal injury actions, namely:
1. Culpa aquiliana
2. Culpa contractual
3. Culpa criminal
Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Criminal Culpa Contractual
There can be a quasi- There can be no
delict as long as there crime unless there is
is fault or negligence a law clearly
resulting in damage punishing the act.
or injury to another. It
is broader in scope
than crime.
Criminal intent is not Criminal intent is
necessary for quasi essential for criminal
delict to exist. Fault or liability to exist.
negligence without
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 9
intent will suffice. gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire
broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned
Right violated is a Right violated is a several houses including the house of Sps. Bernabe and Soledad
private right. Quasi public one. Crime is Africa. Allegedly, a passerby threw a cigarette while gasoline was
delict is a wrongful a wrong against the being transferred which caused the fire. There was no evidence
act against a private State. presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be had
individual. as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the
Every quasi delict Some crimes do not branch owner (Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to
gives rise to liability give rise to liability, contain fire if in case one happens.
for damages. e.g., Illegal
possession of
firearm, contempt. EFFECT IN EVIDENCE:

Preponderance of Proof beyond Ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res
evidence reasonable doubt. ipsaloquitor is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to
the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had
Reparation or Punishment is either exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.
indemnification of the imprisonment, fine
injury or damage. or both; sometimes The requisites for the application of the res ipsaloquitor rule are the
other accessory following:
penalties are 1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
imposed. someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
Direst, Substantive Negligence is exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
and independent merely incidental to 3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, the performance of or contribution on the part of the person injured.
etc., 7 Phil. 395). the contractual
obligation. There is ROLE: Jarcia vs. People
a pre-existing
contract or The doctrine of res ipsaloquitor as a rule of evidence is unusual to the
obligation (Rakes law of negligence which which recognizes that prima facie negligence
vs. Atlantic, etc., 7 may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
Phil. 395). specific proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
Complete and proper NOT a complete and convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
defense insofar as proper defense in of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
parents, guardians, the selection and requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It
employers are supervision of merely determines and regulates what shallbe prima facie evidence
concerned (Art. 2180, employees (Cangco thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The
last par.) vs. MRC, 38 Phil. doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
768). involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

No presumption of There is SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE (2014)

negligence. The presumption of
injured party must negligence as long Same conclusion was reached by the SC as in Jarcia.
prove the negligence as it can be proved
of the defendant that there was January 11 Part 1 – Manligoy
(Cangco vs. MRC, 38 breach of the
Phil 768). Otherwise, contract . The QUASI DELICT
the complaint of defendant must
injured party will be prove there was no Traditional Elements of a Quasi-Delict
dismissed. negligence in the
carrying out of the
terms of the 1. There must be an act or omission;
contract (Cangco 2. There must be fault or negligence attendant in the same act
vs. MRC, 38 Phil. or omission;
768). 3. There must be damage caused to another person;
4. There must be a causal connection between the fault or
negligence and the damage; and
Taken from Torts and Damages by Pineda 5. There must have been no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties. (Meaning, they are not otherwise bound
NECESSITY OF PROVING NEGLIGENCE by a contract)

Negligence must be proved in a suit on a quasi-delict, so that the
plaintiff may recover. Note as well that the plaintiff must establish
negligence by a preponderance of evidence. However, since negligence
in some cases is hard to prove, we apply the doctrine of res ipsaloquitor
(the thing speaks for itself).
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
This means that in certain instances, the presence of facts and
circumstances surrounding the injury clearly indicate negligence on the
part of the defendant. The maxim applies whenever it is so improbably
that such accident would have happened without the fault of the
defendant, that a reasonable man could find without further evidence
that it was so caused. The maxim throws on to the defendant the
burden of disproving negligence.
The facts and circumstances of the case need to know other conclusion
than that the defendant was negligent. There is no other explanation to
it. The defendant is negligent.
This is my favorite case because of its simplicity.
REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEVEDORING (1967)
A barge being towed by tugboats “Bangus” and “Barbero” all owned
by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the
Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after
heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for
actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force
majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sure; and that the
Nagtahan Bailey Bridge is an obstruction to navigation.
AFRICA VS. CALTEX (1966)
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing
Damage
It comes from the Latin damnum–demo–to take away.
In legal contemplation, damages could mean any of the following:
1. Sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction from any injury
done or wrong sustained (Articles 2195-2235)
2. The injury or loss caused to another by the violation of legal
rights.
Take note, however, of the more important requisite in so far as Article
2176 is concerned is the Absence of Contract.
Absence of Contract
For example under Article 2176, there should be no pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties for liability to attach under the
provision. Why? Because under Article 1157 of the Civil Code, a contract
is a separate source of obligation (the law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law and you have quasi delicts). They
two very different sources of obligation.
Take note that culpa aquiliana is different from culpa contractual and
also different from culpa criminal. There is, of course, a separate body
of remedies for violation of the penal law for that matter and also for
the violation of a contract.
Example No. 1
Let us suppose that if a common carrier leaves a passenger stranded in
the middle of nowhere, there is breach of contract of carriage.
Remember the obligation of a common carrier to bring the passenger
safely and securely to his contracted destination. It does not matter how
the contract is breached or whether in the breach of contract the
common carrier was negligent. The fact that the contract was entered
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 10
into and was not fulfilled is enough for culpa contractual to be a source
of liability.
That is what culpa contractual is all about, breach of contract.
Example No. 2
You rode a bus operated by Y Bus Company. The driver of the bus was
negligent and bumped a light post. You did not arrive at your
destination safely and securely. You also suffered injury.
What type of culpa is involved in that situation? That is Culpa
Contractual because there is a breach of contract of carriage.
But remember there is negligence on the part of the driver. Can you for
example sue the bus company for culpa acquiliana?
As a general rule, you cannot because there is a pre-existing
contractual relationship. There must be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the plaintiff and the defendant for you to maintain an
action for damages under Article 2176.
BUT there is a very broad exception based on jurisprudence.
Exception
It has been held many times by the Supreme Court that, if the manner
of breaching a contract is in itself tortuous, there can be a viable cause
of action for culpa aquiliana, even if there is a pre-existing contractual
relationship between the parties.
This is the case of Air France vs Carrascoso.
Air France vs Carrascoso
G.R. No. L-21438 | September 28, 1966
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Romeo Carrascoso, an engineer wanted to take a pilgrimage
at Lourdes in France. He bought a “first class” round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. There was no problem in the first leg of
his travel from Manila to Bangkok. He was able to pay first class
accommodations as per contract with PAL but from Bangkok to
Rome, the Manager of the airline forced Engr. Carrascoso to vacate
the “first class” seat on the ground that there was a “white man”,
who, according to the airline Manager, had a “better right” to the
seat.
To prevent an altercation and cause a scene, Carrascoso was forced
to have economy seats from Bangkok to Italy. When he arrived in the
Philippines, he filed an action for damages for breach of contract of
carriage against Air France.
The problem is the ground he wanted for damages would be Article
2176, quasi -delict. Remember, that in a breach of contract of
carriage, moral damages are tempered. There are limited instances
when moral and exemplary damages are awared in a breach of
contract of carriage:
1. When the passenger dies while the culpa contractual took
place
2. If the common carrier was guilty of fraud, wanton
negligence, gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
Those are the time where higher amount of damages will be granted.
The case was filed, Article 2176 for damages.
Air France contends that Carrascoso cannot do that. There cannot be
any liability for damages under Article 2176 if there is a pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled here that even if there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties but the act that breaks the
contract is itself a tort, damages may be awarded under Article 2176
even if there is a pre-exiting contractual relations.
What was the tortuous act of the airline employees here in breaching
the contract with Mr. Carrascoso? Very simple. According to the
supreme Court, passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They also contract for the right to treated by the
common carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
given due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from
such employees.
When the airline manager did that against Carrascoso, of course the
SC treated it as a wrongful expulsion ang therefore a violation of
public duty by the common carrier, a case of quasi-delict and
therefore damages are proper.
The question is, what was the tortuous conduct in this case? Is there
negligence? This is not negligence but willful conduct. Therefore,
what is the basis for the liability? Is it Article 2176? The answer is NO.
Instead, you go to the law on Human Relations which is Article 21 of
the Civil Code. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, etc., shall be liable
for damages.
What you need to remember here when you talk about Article 21 is
Article 21 does not make a case for quasi-delict. It is not a quasi-
delict but it is a tort because remember, when you talk about quasi-
delict, under Article 2176, the cornerstone for liability would be
negligence. In this case, it is willful. Rather than it be predicated in a
quasi-delict, the proper term would be to predicate liability here on a
tort and not a quasi-delict.
To my mind, the SC got it wrong but anyway, torts and quasi-delict are
used interchangeably to describe liability.
Coca-Cola vs CA
GR 110295 | October 18, 1993
FACTS:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to
close down as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft
drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign substances in certain
beverages sold by it.
The petitioner insists that the legal basis for private respondent’s
cause of action is not article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict –
for the complaint does not ascribe any tortuous or wrongful conduct
on its part – but Art 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller’s
implied warranties under the law on sales. According to the law on
sales, as contended by Coca-cola, there is a limited period within
which you can file an action to enforce the seller’s implied warranty
in the contract of sale which is 6 months from delivery of the thing
sold.
The Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription.
Two points made by Coca-cola:
1. There is a breach of contractual relations
2. The cause of action, there being a contractual relation
between the parties, should be under the law on sales.
ISSUE: Is Coca-Cola correct?
HELD:
The Supreme Court said No. While it may be true that the pre-
existing contract between the parties bar the applicability of the law
on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict, again the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-
delict. Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations.
In Coca-Cola we must observe here that the SC used the term “quasi-
delict” to describe the act of Coca-Cola which is the act of “negligent
manufacture”. There’s negligence and it is quasi-delict.
Then we have this case of Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges.
Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
(PCST)
GR NO. 156109, NOV. 18, 2004
FACTS:
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the
“Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to
go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts.
The problem here was that each student was required to pay 2
tickets at the price of P100 each.
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students
who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores;
those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the
final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets.
On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final
examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers – Gamurot and
Baladad – disallowed her from taking the tests. Gamurot made her
sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their
examinations.
The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 11

was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their
statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly
ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner’s pleas ostensibly went
unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended
their positions as compliance with PCST’s policy.
Thus, Regino filed an action for damages in forma pauperis against
PCST and the 2 teachers. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
According to the respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST;
hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
In her Comment to respondent’s Motion, petitioner argued that prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary, because
her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for
damages arising from respondents’ breach of the laws on human
relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts. The RTC dismissed
the complaint.
Exhaustion Issue:
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST.
Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution.
Exhaustion of admin remedies is applicable when there is
competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the
matter complained of. The CHED does not have the power to award
damages.
With respect to the contract issue:
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held
liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with students, since
the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.
Now, what about the issue of academic freedom?
The Supreme Court here said, there is liability even if there is a contract
of matriculation between PCST and Regino, the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
Take note of what we are talking about here: Even if there is a breach
of contract between the parties, the tort can still be a source of
liability for damages.
January 11 Part 2 – Mondragon
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
And it’s very related to what we were talking about. We were talking
about an act that breaks a contract may likewise be a tort which means
that you have liability for example under the law of contracts, there
could be damages under the law on contracts. There could also be
damages under the law on quasi delicts; with all the more reasons of
course that we apply the same type of source of responsibility under
Article 2176 when we talk about criminal acts. Every person who is
criminally liable is also civilly liable. What the law actually abhors will be
the act of awarding damages twice for the same acts or omissions of
the defendant.
Example:
What’s an example of a case na pwede bitaw nato siya file-an ug kaso
for culpa criminal and then culpa aquiliana? Perfect example there
would be kana bitaw nabanggaan ka. That could be considered reckless
imprudence resulting to physical injuries. Pwede pud na siyang
mahimong civil case lang, an action for damages, under Article 2176
because the cause of action stems from the same act or omission from
the defendant for the accused.
Evidence example:
Can you recall my example sa evidence? Katong nilupad na tao?
Nabanggaan ug motor? Paunsa ka kalayo nalagpot? 50 meters! Just
imagine. Murag na kag nilupad. That’s the first time that I’ve ever
applied that, I won in both cases. So daog ko sa MTC for culpa criminal
(reckless imprudence) and then nadaog pud ko sa civil action for
damages under Article 2176.
Whichever is the higher of the 2 awards sa criminal case or sa civil case,
mao na siya ang dapat nimo i-apil. You cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission.
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable
to a quasi-delict. (n)
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph
2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to
be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
(1105a)
Now, for me, importante pud kayo ang Article. 2179
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. (n)
Siya ang sal-an. Why was he injured? Because of his own negligence,
not the negligence of the defendant.
In an ideal world, you can always pinpoint who is to blame for any
misery, for any injury. But in all probability, mas kadaghanan bitaw sa
mga instances, when you are forced to blame somebody or you blame
each other, it really takes two to Tango.
Ikaw negligent ka, ang defendant negligent pud. In other words, both
your negligence (plaintiff and defendant) coincides to produce the
injury. So the Court will now be forced to determine kinsa man jud ang
mas negligent sa inyong dalawa. Kung nakita sa korte na mas negligent
ang defendant, then majority of the damages shall be borne by the
defendant rather than the plaintiff.
That’s contributory negligence. Now let’s talk about the different
defenses. Pag ma file-an kag kaso for damages under Art. 2176 for
quasi-delicts, what are the possible defenses?
DEFENSES IN QUASI-DELICT CASES
1. THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
This one tries to attack the elements of quasi-delict. That is the element
of negligence. The defendant is saying I was not negligent, I was being
careful. The defendant therefore when he interposes that type of
defense, he is trying to prove before the court that a preponderance of
evidence exists that he exercised the required degree of care that
corresponds with the circumstances of the time, the person and the
places.
2. “DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA”
This simply means “damage without wrong” or damage without
anything that the law considers a legal injury, one that at least is
compensable under the law.
Pag walay legal injury, the law does not consider your damage to be
compensable maskin nasamaran ka, nasakitan ka, wala kay mahimo.
Examples:
Under the concept of justifying circumstances in the RPC, there can be
damnum absque injuria. Briefly, they appear in Art 11 as:
a. Self-defense
b. Defense of relatives
c. Defense of strangers
d. State of necessity
e. Fulfillment of a duty or exercise of a right or office; and
f. Obedience of lawful orders
Self Defense
Elements:
1. Unlawful Aggression
2. Reasonable necessity to use the means employed to prevent
or repeal the unlawful aggression
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself
What happens if nag self-defense ka? Nakapatay na ka ug tao.
Ang pagpatay nimo ug tao dili ban a siya damage, dili ba na
siya injury? It is. But the law does not consider it a lawful
injury deserving of compensation. But clearly there is damage,
that is the perfect example. You are not liable but clearly there
is damage that is caused.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 12
Death or Physical Injuries under Exceptional Circumstances
Nakita niya iyang asawa doing the thing with somebody else. He is so
obfuscated that he got his ax and then chopped both of them into
pieces. He is not liable. Is there damage? Yes. Nakapatay siyag tao. But
he can always contend that nabuang ko kalit, insanity. Then death
under exceptional circumstance, that’s a justifying circumstance. That’s
damage without legal injury.
Art 429 of the Civil Code
This is another instance where there may be damage or injury but there
is no liability.
Art. 429 The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
Pwede ka mag prevent pero pag naa na didto, nakasulod na sa property
unya forcibly gipahawa nimo, ikaw pa karon ang liable. For what? Liable
for grave coercion kay gipugos nimog pahawa against their will even if
technically speaking, squatters sila sa property.
FORMULA
So how do we now determine whether ang butang ba kay damnum
absque injuria? For me, it is as simple as this, liability only arises if
there is an invasion of a right that corresponds with a breach of
duty.
Meaning when you committed the injury, you have no right whatsoever
to cause that injury.
Like self defense, nakapatay kag tao but you have the right to defend
yourself. In death or physical injuries under exceptional circumstances,
you have no right to kill but you have every right to defend your honor
under those exceptional circumstances. There is no breach of obligation
or breach of duty that corresponds with the invasion of right which
brings me to this case:
BPI EXPRESS CREDIT CARD VS CA
292 SCRA 260
FACTS: Lawyer has credit card. Failed to pay his bill. Asked to issue a
check for P15,000 otherwise credit will be cut off. Lawyer issued
postdated check. BPI sent letter to inform him that his credit card was
temporarily suspended and asked him to refrain using credit card. He
still used his credit card and it was dishonored. He sued BPI for
damages.
HELD: In order for plaintiff to maintain an action for the injuries which
he complains of, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff – a concurrence
of injury (VIOLATION OF RIGHT) to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
(BREACH OF DUTY) by the person causing it. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the person injured alone and the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called DAMNUM
ABSQUE INJURIA. Dispositive Portion: “IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision of the CA ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P20,000.00 as atty’s fees, is SET ASIDE. Private respondent is directed
to pay his outstanding obligation with the petitioner in the amount of
P14,439.41.
Discussion: This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Tinood
napaulawan ka but there is no violation of a right that actually
corresponds with the breach of duty. There is no concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. Naa bay
legal responsibility ang BPI Express credit card to continue its credit
facility for the benefit of the lawyer na nibayad ug post dated check?
Wala. Remember also na in ObliCon and CredTrans, when does a check
produce an effect of payment? Only when it has been encashed. The
Supreme Court here said kabalo na bitaw ka na ni-issue kag post-dated
check, wala pa na encash imong check, that’s therefore a case of
damnum absque injuria.
GILCHRIST VS CUDDY, ET AL.
29 PHIL 542
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. He rented it out to
Gilchrist for a week for P125. Cuddy backed out their contract and sent
the money back to Gilchrist. Apparently, Cuddy rented the film to Espejo
and Zaldarriaga for a higher price of P350. Gilchrist filed for injunction
against these parties.
ISSUE: Can Espejo and Zaldarriaga be held liable for damages for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy? Espejo and
Zaldarriaga contend that they cannot be held liable because they were
merely exercising their right to compete in business.
HELD: YES.
Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own
enterprise, industry skill and credit. He has no right to be free from
malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If
disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of
like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior
right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. In the case at bar, the
only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist – Cuddy contract on
the part of the appellants was a desire to make profit by exhibiting the
film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this
fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that
contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear under the above
authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by
their acts, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the
fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee
(Gilchrist) of the film. The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful
acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such
obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that
if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be
governed by Chapter 2, Title 6, Book 4 of CC. Art 1902 of that code
provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to
another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a
condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know
the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the
chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such
knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for
the damage suffered.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB VS ELIZAGAQUE
GR NO. 160273
Elizagaque, who is an officer of San Miguel Corporation, applied for
membership in Cebu Country Club and then, na blackball siya.
(Blackball system: majority of one; if there is one member there who
doesn’t like you, cast a blackball pag elect sa imuha, that’s a majority of
one. Di jud ka pwede maapil ana na grupo).
Can you sue Cebu Country Club for blackballing him? Na di siya
dawaton?
You can’t. Because naa tay freedom of association. So members of an
association dili pud pwede mapugos na paapilon ang dili namo ganahan
paapilon. It’s as simple as that. What about Sir sa fact na ulaw ma
reject? Wala tay mahimo ana.
But you know what made a difference in this case? It’s the fact that he
was given a ran around for a long period of time. Like mangutana siya
kung apil na ba siya, nobody would ever tell him na na-reject siya. That,
according to the Supreme Court, cannot be considered Damnum Absque
Injuria because there is an abuse of rights. True, you have the right to
exclude somebody from the membership, but you have to treat that
person humanely.
3. THAT THE PLAINTIFF’S OWN NEGLIGENCE IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE LOSS
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.XXX
Take note na ginaingon nimo diri na ang defendant kay dili dapat sal-an.
Why? Because it is actually the plaintiff who caused his own loss kay
siya ang nag dinanghag.
This is a compete defense directed particularly to the element of
causation or that “there must be a causal connection between the fault
or negligence and the damage. Kato ang element of proximate
causation.
What therefore is PROXIMATE CAUSE?
BATACLAN VS MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
FACTS: The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of
Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by
Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst
and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape
by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including
Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the
neighborhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a
torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers
died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva
Vda. De Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children,
sought to claim damages from the bus company.
HELD: Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 13
Discussion: My advice is for you to memorize proximate cause. That is
actually a technical term. What’s the consequence a term being a
technical term under the law?
When a term is considered a technical term, it admits of no other
definition than that which the law provides. If a term has a statutory
definition, you use the definition. The codal definition. In the absence of
statutory definition, you use what is known as the doctrinal definition or
how the term is actually defined by the Supreme Court. So proximate
cause, no other definition but:
PROXIMATE CAUSE
That cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred.
Dominoes example:
Imagine, this the 10th domino, this is the 1 st domino, in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, you have
the right to expect na pag matumba ang first domino, tumba tanan.
Pero ang pangutana karon, kay kinsang sala? Katong 1 st domino na
unang natumba? Or katong 9 th domino na maoy niigo sa 10 th domino?
Mao na siya ang proximate cause.
What happens if in the middle or the process na natumba ang domino,
giuna nimo’g pitik ang 7 th domino? Unsa karon ang cause sa
pagkatumba sa 10th domino? Ang pagflick sa 1st domino or katong
pagflick sa 7th domino? Katong pag flick sa 7 th domino. That is proximate
cause, the flicking of the 7 th domino can be deemed to be an efficient
intervening cause.
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
It is one which destroys the causal connection between the negligent
act and injury and thereby negatives liability. It is also known as a PRE-
EMPTIVE CAUSE which breaks the continuity of causal connection
between the original negligent act or omission and the injury so that the
former cannot be said to have been the efficient cause of the latter.
RODRIGUEZ VS MANILA RAILROAD CO.
GR NO. 15688, NOV. 19, 1921
FACTS: The house of the plaintiff was razed by fire because of the
sparks emitted by the defendant’s train. The fire started in one house
until it reached the house of the plaintiff. The defendant contended that
the fire would not have spread to the house of the plaintiff were it not
for the wind, which is contended to be an efficient intervening cause.
HELD: A cause is not intervening if it is already in operation at the time
the negligent act was committed. The wind cannot be deemed to be an
efficient intervening cause because it was already in operation at the
time of the negligence of the defendant. Even if the wind was not in
operation then, it cannot be considered to be an efficient intervening
cause because the wind did not break the chain of causation between
the negligence of the defendant and the resulting damage to the
plaintiff.
Discussion: This is home along da riles. Usually squatters na, and
homes nila usually shanties ra. Naa karong train dira. Manila Rail Road
man, so naay train na ginaoperate sa Manila Rail Road na naga emit ug
sparks, ngano? Kay wala na properly maintain siguro, so naay sparks
emitted by the train. So nasunog ang mga balay nila Rodrigueza, mga
homes along da riles. Naturally pag masunog ang isa, mangasunog
tanan because they are a row of shanties. So they sued Manila Rail
Road company for its negligence for not undertaking the proper repairs
upon the trains and trucks kay mao na ang cause sa sunod. Ang
contention sa Manila Rail Road kay very simple, butang nato na sala
namo sa sugod pero ningkusog man gud ang hangin. The wind made it
possible for the fire to spread, otherwise dili unta na sila mangasunog.
So, the issue of this case is whether the wind is an efficient intervening
cause. According to the Supreme Court, it cannot be considered an
efficient intervening cause if it is already in operation at the time the
negligent act was committed. So when they did not maintain properly
their trains that can cause sparks, naa na bay wind? Naa naman siguro.
Wind will always be present. So it cannot be considered an efficient
intervening cause. Even if the wind was not in operation then, it cannot
be considered to be an efficient intervening because the wind did not
break the chain of causation between the negligence of the defendant
and the resulting damage to the plaintiff.
MCKEE VS IAC
211 SCRA 517
FACTS: Plaintiff Jose Koh was driving along the highway. He swerved his
car to the left and encroached upon the opposite lane to avoid hitting 2
children. His car was hit by a speeding truck coming from the opposite
direction. Jose sued the driver of the truck.
HELD: The efficient intervening cause is the negligence of the
defendant. The plaintiff may be negligent but the defendant’s
negligence pre-empted the effect of such negligence. Although it may
be said that Jose Koh’s act was negligent and was the initial act in the
chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the injuries and
deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the driver. The truck driver did not heed the warning
signs of Koh to slow down. Instead of swerving to his right (to the dirt
road portion) which was the proper precautionary measure, he
maintained his speed.
NOTE (from 2018 TSN):
 In Bataclan, the first cause (overspeeding of the bus driver
causing the bus to turn turtle) was still the proximate cause.
 In McKee, the 1st cause (swerving) was not considered the
proximate cause. Note that in McKee, the SC applied the
emergency rule as follows:
One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,
and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.
BJDC CONSTRUCTION VA LANUZO
GR NO 161151 MARCH 24, 2014 (from 2018 TSN):
FACTS: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death
of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to the supposed
negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking
work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the accident
happened because the construction company did not provide adequate
lighting on the site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was
caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself.
HELD: Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence
cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown
its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project
site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast,
Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his
motorcycle. The records disclose that he himself did not take the
necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid
hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his
motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s
investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This causation
of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
By the time of the accident, the project, which had commenced in
September 1997, had been going on for more than a month and was
already in the completion stage. Balbino, who had passed there on a
daily basis in going to and from his residence and the school where he
then worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the
project site. Nor could the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination
was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was
equipped with headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night
time to see the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still
occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of
care expected of him as a prudent motorist. Considering that it was
shown that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet
at the time of the accident, he was guilty of negligence in that respect.
Had he worn the protective head gear or helmet, his untimely death
would not have occurred. All the established circumstances showed that
the proximate and immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own
negligence. Hence, the Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.
CALALAS VS CA
GR NO. 122039, MAY 31, 2000
(from 2018 TSN):
FACTS: Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was given by the
conductor an “extension seat”, a wooden stool at the back of the door
at the rear end of the vehicle. When the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off, SUnga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she
was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. She sued Calalas for breach of contract of carriage.
HELD: It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between
the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict,
not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated
by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence of common carriers
with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. In the case at bar,
upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to
observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Here,
Sunga was made to sit on an extension seat and the jeepney at the
time of the mishap was improperly parked.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
PRESENT RULES:
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 14
What’s the prevailing rule right now for contributory negligence?
1. If the plaintiff’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover (Taylor vs Manila Electric).
2. If his negligence was merely contributory, there is a mere
mitigation of damages to be awarded.
Contributory negligence, under Art 2179, is a PARTIAL
DEFENSE as courts are mandated to merely mitigate the
damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. The defendant,
because of his lack of due care is still the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury, is still ultimately liable with the
modification that his liability to indemnify the plaintiff is
lessened.
BUT PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE:
Contributory negligence before was an absolute bar to recovery. Maskin
gamay lang kaayo, 99% ang negligence sa defendant, but 1% lang ang
negligence sa plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover because he himself is
negligent.
JARCO MARKETING VS CA
Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under
9 years old is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The
same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in
a case of a person over 9 and under 15 years of age, unless it is shown
that he has acted with discernment.
NOTES: (from 2018 TSN)
 If the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is duly proven, the
matter of whether or not to mitigate the damages is not a
matter of discretion. The courts are absolutely required to
lessen the damages to be awarded. The extent of the
mitigation is, however, within the sound discretion of the court
with particular reference to the degree of negligence exhibited
by the plaintiff.
 It must also be noted that the enactment of Art 2179 of the
Civil Code is a statutory rejection of the rules on Contributory
Negligence in Common Law.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS IAC
MARCH 10, 1987 (from 2018 TSN)
FACTS: Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and
dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna
St when he was a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector
devices. The truck was driven earlier by Carbonel, a regular driver of
Pheonix. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late.
He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionisio
filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew
pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and CA ruled
in favor of Dionisio.
HELD: The truck driver’s negligence far from being a “passive and
static condition” was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision between the dump truck and the private respondent’s car
would in all probability not have incurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of
injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna St and for having so
created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of time than the truck
driver’s negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
efficient intervening or independent cause.
Mitigation in Phoenix: Turning to the award of damages and taking
into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio
on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand,
we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award
of P10,000 as exemplary damages and P4,500 as attorney’s fees and
costs, shall be borne by Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be
paid by the petitioners who are solidarily liable therefor to the former.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and costs shall be
borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Another Argument: The theory here of petitioners is that while the
petitioner truck driver was negligent, respondent Dionisio had the “last
clear chance” of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that
Dionisio having failed to take that “last clear chance” must bear his own
injuries alone.
PICART VS SMITH
37 PHIL 814
Picart seeks to recover from Smith damages from an accident caused by
Smith while driving his automobile. The incident happened on the
Carlatan Bridge of San Fernando, La Union. Picart was riding his pony
over the said bridge and when he saw halfway across Smith
approached. Smith had the last fair opportunity to avoid the collision
but failed to act accordingly.
From the facts mentioned, it was derived that the control of the
situation had passed entirely to Smith and it was his duty to bring the
car to an immediate stop or pass in the other side of the road, there
being no other persons on the bridge, to avoid collision. Under the
circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The doctrine “last clear chance” or LCC (also referred to, at times, as
“supervening negligence” or as “discovered peril”), in essence, is to
effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed
to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and filed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof.
Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the liability sought
by, another if the latter who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
In applying the doctrine of last clear chance what we need to remember
is that both parties must have been negligent. But there is a timing
element, one negligence is ahead, the other was later in time. So it
considers the relative position of the plaintiff and defendant with the
knowledge that both of them had been negligent.
Why is it that we have a doctrine of Last Clear Chance?
This doctrine was actually a common law doctrine, there is no codal
provision talking about the doctrine of last clear chance. It was simply
imported to our jurisdiction by the case of Picart vs Smith.
Prior to the enactment of the New Civil Code, Contributory Negligence
was an absolute bar to recovery. In order to mitigate the harshness of
the former rule of Contributory Negligence, the SC had to import from
another jurisdictions the doctrine of Last Clear Chance para dili siya
absolute bar to recovery, katong former doctrine nato on Contributory
Negligence.
But remember, that under Article 2179 right now, our rule on
Contributory Negligence is no longer an absolute bar to recovery. I-
mitigate lang ang damages to be awarded.
So ngano naa pa tay doctrine of Last Clear Chance? There is no more
harsh common law rule on Contributory Negligence to mitigate because
apportioned na ang liability when both parties are negligent.
True enough, it has been the observation of the Supreme Court all along
that in the 1987 case of Phoenix vs IAC, the SC questioned why we still
have the doctrine of Last Clear Chance and even declared categorically
that there is no more role to be played by the doctrine of Last Clear
Chance in our current system of laws. Wala na dapat ni.
Wala na ba jud ang doctrine of Last Clear Chance?
Answer is no, why? Because 2 years later:
The FLIP-FLOP begins:
 Glan Peoples Lumber vs NLRC, 173 SCRA 464, 1989 (SC
applied doctrine)
 PANTRANCO vs BAESA, 179 SCRA 384, 1989 (SC applied
doctrine)
 LBC Air Cargo, Inc. vs CA, GR No. 101683, 1995 (SC applied
doctrine)
 PBCOM vs CA, March 14, 1997 (SC applied doctrine in a non-
accident case) –
The Supreme Court applied it in the matter of encashment of
forged checks. Nganong na forged imong check? Kay because
you left it hanging around, wala nimo gitago imong check,
maong gi fill-in, gipa-encash karon. Kinsang sala? Ikaw, you
were negligent because you did not keep it safely.
Next question to ask, ikaw lang ba ang negligent, kanang
check owner? Answer is no, sala pud sa bangko. Nganong na
encash man na siya? When in fact it could have exercise
proper diligence na i-confirm sa imuha kung nag-issue ba jud
kag cheke in the amount of 2,500 for example.
So this case was actually one that used the doctrine of Last
Clear Chance. Kinsa ba naay last clear chance to prevent the
loss of that encashment of a forged check? Ang Bangko.
So what happened to the negligent check owner? Naa siyay
Contributory Negligence so therefore, naay apportionment sa
liability. He cannot recover everything.
 William Tiu vs Arriesgado, Sept. 1, 2004, (SC rejected doctrine,
applied Phoenix)
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 15
  Phil. National Railways vs Brunty, Nov. 2, 2006 (SC applied
doctrine)
 Lapanday vs Angala, GR No. 153076, June 21, 2007 (SC
applied doctrine)
CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
So instead of putting a stop to the application of the doctrine of Last
Clear Chance in the Philippine jurisdiction, because our rule on
Contributory Negligence is actually different, gi expand pa hinoon karon
sa Supreme Court ang applicability sa doctrine of Last Clear Chance to
non-accident cases. In common law, they only use the doctrine in
accident cases, not in banking cases or commercial transactions.
Still applicable in the Philippines despite the ruling of the SC in the
case of Phoenix vs IAC in 1987, and later on in the case of Tiu vs
Arriesgado.
4. PRESCRIPTION
What is the prescriptive period for filing an action based on quasi-delict?
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within 4 years:
1. Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff
2. Upon a quasi-delict.
(From 2018 TSN)
What is the difference between #1 Upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff and #2 Upon a quasi-delict?
In Valencia vs Cebu Portland Cement Co, December 23, 1959, the
plaintiff was separated from employment for allegedly unjustifiable
cause. SC held that the action is one for “injury to the rights of the
plaintiff”.
TAKE NOTE:
Valencia was decided before the effectivity of the Labor Code in 1974.
During that time, labor complaints were cognizable by the judiciary.
Right now, under the Labor Code, the act complained of in Valencia is
cognizable as illegal dismissal. What is the proper prescriptive period?
STILL 4 YEARS
Remember the labor principle that a person’s right to his labor is a
property right. Thus, in proper legal contemplation, illegal dismissal is a
violation of a property right or “an injury to the rights of the plaintiff”.
Thus, Valencia still applies. (Teekay Shipping vs Concha, GR No. 185463,
Feb. 22, 2012)
5. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK is to the effect that bears a
claim for negligence when it can be shown that the plaintiff, by his or
her conduct, voluntarily chose to encounter a known and specific
danger and either fully appreciated or should have fully appreciated the
risks posed by that conduct.
The applicable Latin maxim is “VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA” or “VOLENTI
NON FIT INJURIA NEQUES DOLUS” meaning “HE WHO VOLUNTARILY
ASSUMES A RISK, DOES NOT SUFFER DAMAGE THEREBY” or “to a willing
person, no injury is done”.
This doctrine holds that a person who knowingly and willingly puts
himself in a dangerous situation cannot sue for any resulting injuries.
Again, this is a common law doctrine of Anglo-American origin which
serves as a bar to recovery of damages in negligence cases.
AFIALDA VS HISOLE
GR NO. L-2075, NOV. 29, 1949
FACTS: Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses Hisole
as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending
the animals he was, on March 21, 2947, gored by one of them and later
died as a consequence of his injuries. The heirs of the deceased alleged
that the mishap was due neither to the own fault of Afialda nor to force
majeure.
HELD: In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the
control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it
was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the
animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences.
NIKKO HOTEL VS REYES
GR NO. 154259, FEB. 28, 2005
This doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even
if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the NCC, were still under
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary
ridicule and shame.
Discussion: Kung nag gate crash kag party, gipahawa ka, naulawan ka,
can you sue the person na nagpahawa sa imo kay napaulawan ka? That
is answer in this case.
6. FORCE MAJEURE
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
This is complete and proper defense for a quasi-delict case.
 ACTUS DEI NEMINI FACIT INJURIAM – The act of God prejudices
no one.
REQUISITES OF FORCE MAJEURE:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation must be
independent of the human will (ex. A building is destroyed by
an earthquake; typhoon destroys ship and cargo);
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event or, if it could be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid (ex. Earthquake is
impossible to foresee and impossible to avoid; that a typhoon
will strike is impossible to foresee and avoid but see Tan
Chiong Sian vs Inchausti &C Co., 22 Ohil. 152);
3. The obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
7. DUE DILIGENCE IN SELECTION AND SUPERVISION
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in
this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
January 18, 2019 Part 1 – Pahayahay
QUASI-DELICTS – PART 3
Vicarious Liability
Vicarious Liability, In General
- Vicarious Liability, in tort law, means the imposition of
responsibility for the failure of another with whom the person
has a special relationship.
Atty. Espejo: So you cannot be held vicariously liable if you were not
otherwise bound or privy with a person, regardless of the nature of the
privity, whether it is privity by blood or privity by contract. There has to
be some privity here.
There are instances under the law wherein you did not do anything but
by virtue of the relationship in which you may have to a person who
caused damage, you will also be held responsible therefor. That would
be vicarious liability.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 16
Vicarious means “acting for another” Note: So there is no need to prove that the owner or manager was
negligent because negligence is actually imputed. What the
- From the Latin vicis meaning “substitution or succession”
plaintiff proves is only the negligence of the employee and the
- Word association: latter’s relationship with the owner or the manager.
o Vice as in vice president, meaning in case of
disability of the President, you actually succeed or To illustration further the Strict Liability
substitute.
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of
o Vicar meaning“a substitute, deputy, proxy”. the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
According to Catholic Doctrine, the Pope is the vicar may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
of Christ. damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage. (1905)
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons Atty. Espejo: If you take a look at the provision, there is no act or
for whom one is responsible. omission on the part of the possessor but of the animal but he is made
responsible. So, there is no need to impute negligence here.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in COMPARISON
their company.
Both provisions do not require proof of fault or
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated negligence. It is enough that there is damage
persons who are under their authority and live in their company. caused by a person or instrumentality subject to the
control of another.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are Art. 2180 Art. 2183
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the Who caused damage? What caused damage?
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the Children, employees, The animal.
occasion of their functions. agents, student, etc.
Who is liable? Who is liable?
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, The person responsible The person responsible
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. for another. for the animal
(possessor/user of the
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special animal)
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to In both provisions, negligence is imputed. Both the
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in “vicars” and the possessor/user are deemed negligent
article 2176 shall be applicable. and liable, subject to defences to be proved later on.
Art. 2180 Art. 2183
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be The responsibility treated This responsibility shall
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, of in this article shall cease only in case the
so long as they remain in their custody. cease when the persons damage should come
herein mentioned prove from force majeure or
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons that they observed all from the fault of the
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good the diligence of a person who has
father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) good father of a suffered damage.
family to prevent
"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only damage.
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible." Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
Under Art. 2180, a person is not only liable for torts committed by
Atty. Espejo: That opening paragraph tells you that in law, you are himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
responsible for your own negligence but if you are acting or you are a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
vicar for somebody else, there would also be a tort liability consisting of
what we call vicarious liability. Other Examples of Strict Liability Torts: Liability even without
Fault
Who are these persons?
1. Vicarious Liability under Art. 2180
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are 2. Animals under Art. 2183
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in 3. Falling objects (dejectumeffesumvealiquid) under Art. 2193
their company.
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown
persons who are under their authority and live in their company. or falling from the same. (1910)

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
4. Art. 1711 imposes an obligation on owners of enterprises and
other employers to pay for the death or injuries to their
employees.
*Liability is strict because it exists even if the cause is purely
accidental.
5. Nuisance. There is strict liability on the part of the owner or
possessor of the property where a nuisance is found because
he is obliged to abate the same irrespective of the presence or
absence of fault or negligence.
Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property
who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started
by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same
manner as the one who created it.

Atty. Espejo: Take note, just a precursor to our discussion later on
relating to the State as an employer, it is liable under Article 2180 when
it acts through a special agent but if the official causes damage is the
person whom the task done properly pertains, the liability here is
ordinary.
6. Product Liability.
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists xxx

What would be your defense if you are charged vicariously for

Common Theme:
the commission of another person of a tort?
 There is no need to prove fault or negligence in these cases.
 Negligence is imputed.
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
Why is the liability here strict?
a good father of a family to prevent damage"

So there is that defense that is built in under Article 2180.
Characteristic of Vicarious Liability
It is STRICT liability. This means that, under Art. 2180, there is no need
to prove fault or negligence upon the person sought to be made
responsible.
e.g. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees x
xx So kinsa ang nag commit ug quasi-delict diri? Not the employer
but rather it is the employee.
TAMARGO vs. CA (1992)
Citing Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768
Rationale
Our Legislature has so elected, for reasons of public policy, to extend
tort liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in

Torts 2019 1st Exam | 17

which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged.
This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of
persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
Atty. Espejo: Under the Tamargo case, there are two types of
liability: one that is directly created by the defendant and one which
may simply be imputed upon the defendant by reason of some
special relationship.
Type of Liability Imposed Under Art. 2180
In general, the liability imposed against a vicarious tortfeasor is DIRECT
AND PRIMARY but subject to reimbursement under Art. 2181.
So why direct and primary when in fact vicarious lang naman such that
mag arise lang ang liability not because of the acts of the vicar but acts
of the person for whom the vicar is responsible?
Because ultimately, it is the vicar's lack of diligence in preventing
damage or selection or supervision with respect to employees and
agents that is actually the source of liability subject to reimbursement
under Article 2181.
For example, my employee caused damage to another in the course of
doing his assigned task. The injured party here can directly go after me,
the employer, as my liability is direct and primary.
This highlights one of the distinctions between culpa criminal and culpa
acquiliana. In criminal cases, recourse must be first had against an
employee before the employer can be held liable. In quasi-delict,
recourse can be made directly against the employer without suing the
employee.
What about in criminal cases? When does an employer become
liable to pay damages?
1. The employee must be convicted;
2. The employee is insolvent.
How do you do that? You file a motion for subsidiary liability in the
same case. That's the procedure.
Basis of Liability. The basis of liability is the presumed negligence in
supervision.
Other Traditional Bases of Vicarious Liability:
1. Respondeat Superior
o Command responsibility or that which would hold a
superior officer jointly and severally accountable for
damages, including moral and exemplary, with his
subordinates who committed such transgressions.
o This is related to captain of the ship. Ultimately,
liable ka regardless of what you do.
2. Pater Familias
o This theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. (Cuison vs. Norton and Harrison Co., 55
Phil. 18)
Atty. Espejo: Is it fair for the law to impute somebody who did not lift
a finger nor did not do a thing? The fairness comes with the age-old
principle, “With great power comes great responsibility.” If you examine
everything written under Art. 2180 which all hinge on pater familias,
there is that responsibility because of the peculiar authority granted to
the persons who are the vicars. The parents have the authority to
discipline the children. The employer has the authority over the
employee as it is for the former that the latter is permitted or suffered
to work and is therefore subjected to the employer’s reasonable
regulations and instructions. The State has also that power and
authority over another, whether it a special agent or ordinary agent.
(Based on 2017
Atty. Espejo: The parent has the responsibility to keep their children in
line so as they may not commit negligent acts. The employer, for
example, who authorizes an employee to use a company vehicle, has
that responsibility of supervising the employee or at least of insuring
that the vehicle will not in any way [meet] an accident.
TIU vs. ARRIESGADO (2004)
What are the distinctions between Respondeat Superior and Pater
Familias?
Pater Familias Respondeat Superior
Presumed negligence Command Responsibility
Basis of Liability in Civil Basis of liability in Anglo-
Law American/Common Law
Presumption of The negligence of
negligence is disputable employee is conclusively
presumed to be the
negligence of the
employer
Defense is diligence of a Diligence of a good
good father of a family to father of a family is not a
prevent damage. proper defense.
Respondeat Superior: When Applicable
1. Liability of employers under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC)
Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. -
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
In Art. 103, the employee’s criminal guilt is automatically the
employer’s civil guilt.
Take note they should be engaged in any industry, meaning,
hindi pwede yung personal or family driver or kasambahay.
2. Liability of a partnership for the tort committed by a partner:
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful
act or omission of any partner acting in
the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or with the authority of his
co-partners, loss or injury is caused to
any person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefor to the
same extent as the partner so acting or
omitting to act. (n)
Atty. Espejo: In here, it does not provide for a defense that
the partner (without fault) can prove that he exercised due
diligence. He simply has to answer for someone else’s
negligent act.
Under our Civil law, the basis of liability is not respondeat superior,
but the relationship of pater familas, which theory bases the liability
of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. (Cuison vs. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18)
Persons Vicariously Liable
For unity of discussion, let us divide vicarious liability as follows:
1. Parental and Pseudo-Parental Vicarious Liability
o Parents, Guardians and Teachers and Heads of
Establishments of Arts and Trades.
2. Employment-based Vicarious Liability
o Owners and Managers, Employers and State
3. Other Vicariously Liability not found in Art. 2180
Atty. Espejo: In Parental and Pseudo-Parental Vicarious
Liability, plaintiff must prove the relationship (parental or filial
relationship or guardianship). Employment-based Vicarious
Liability requires, for the vicarious liability to attach, that the
plaintiff should prove employer-employee relationship.
OTHER VICARIOUSLY LIABILITY NOT FOUND IN ART. 2180
1. Innkeepers and Hotel Keepers
o They are civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments in cases of violations of statutes by them,
in default of persons criminally liable. (Art. 102, RPC)
o The basis of liability here is the fact that there is privity
between the innkeeper or hotelkeeper with the agent or
the employee who committed the crime.
o They are subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests
lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that:
i. The innkeeper was notified in advance of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and
ii. The guest shall have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have
given with respect to the care and vigilance over
the goods. (See Art. 1998)
o What about in the case of airbnbs? What is the
advantage in the case of a traditional hotel?
Subsidiary liability. They are strictly regulated. Airbnbs, no.
I do not even know if the laws would actually apply to
them. Technically speaking, they are not hotelkeepers,
they are not innkeepers. They are just property owners
who happen to lease their properties. In other words,
transient.
2. Partnership
o Partnership or every partner is liable for torts committed
by one of the partners acting within the scope of the firm
business, though they do not participate in, ratify, or have
knowledge of such torts.
o Partners are liable as joint tort-feasors.
o Vicarious liability is similar to the common rule on
respondeat superior.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 18
 o Liability is entirely imputed and the partnership cannot
obviously invoke diligence in the selection and supervision
of the partner.
3. Spouses
o Liability depends on the applicable Matrimonial Property
Regime.
Absolute Community. The absolute community of
property shall be liable for liabilities incurred by either
spouses by reason of crime or quasi-delict, in case of
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse.
Payments of which shall be considered as advances to be
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community. (See Art. 94, Family Code)
Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon the husband or wife are not chargeable
against the conjugal partnership but against the separate
properties of the wrongdoer.
Exception: CPG should be made liable:
1. When the profits have inured to the benefit of the
partnership; or
2. If one of the spouses committed the tort while
performing a business or if the act was supposed to
benefit the conjugal partnership
Let us now go to the next class of vicarious liability:
PARENTAL AND PSEUDO-PARENTAL VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
What is the Basis:
FUELLAS vs. CADANO (1961)
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise
over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting
them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to
their means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct
and punish them in moderation."
Citing Manresa:
Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern
themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty
of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards
in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of
foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If
the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should
suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by
repairing the damage caused.
Q: Who is liable here?
A: Under Art. 2180, the father is liable. The mother
becomes liable only in cases of death or incapacity of the
father. Thus, the liability here is alternative and not concurrent
or simultaneous.
Q: Is this still the rule?
A: Take note of the provision of the Family Code (FC)
regarding parental authority:
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx
Atty. Espejo: If we recall the case of Tamargo, the basis for vicarious
liability is parental authority. Under the Civil Code, parental authority is
primarily vested in the father and then the mother. But in the family
code, it is very clear, the father and the mother jointly. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail unless there is judicial
order to the contrary in exercising parental authority.
Q: Is there a change in the liability imposed by
law, from the father primarily now to both parents?
A: Art. 221, FC is instructive:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
or omissions of their unemancipatedchildren living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
Thus, under Art. 211, it appears that this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification. We now follow the FC. Since they both
exercise parental authority, they are now both vicariously liable. This
was the categorical ruling of the Supreme Court in the en banc case of:
LIBI vs. IAC, GOTION (1992)
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. xxx However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is
now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility
of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over
the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with
Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
January 18 Part 2 – Peroy
Other Provisions
1. Child and Youth Welfare Code
Art. 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code.
2. Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (A.M. No. 02-118-SC,
Feb. 28, 2002):
Section 33. Discharge of Juvenile Subject of Disposition
Measure. – xxx The parents and other persons exercising parental
authority over the juvenile shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the juvenile living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
Atty. Espejo: More or less the same. Take note that the liability here is
solidary. However, the instances when the parents are merely subsidiary
liable. Subsidiary meaning kung dili kabayad ang person primarily liable
it’s the time na pwede pabayron ang parents. Subsidiary liability, like in
criminal law, subsidiary lang ang liability sa employer, dili solidary, dili
direct and primary.
Types of Liability Imposed on Parents
GR: Liability is SOLIDARY.
Exception: there are instances when the parents are merely
subsidiarily liable.
Instance #1:
Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Atty. Espejo: Kung naa sa skwelahan, kinsa’y naay parental authority
over the children? Substitute parental authority – it’s the school.
What if sa custody sa skwelahan the child commits a tort. Kinsa ang
primarily liable?
Art. 218, it’s the school. They have, in the meantime, special parental
authority over the children.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Atty. Espejo:
Par. 1:
That’s the only situation na ang parents would only be subsidiary liable,
not primarily and directly liable for the tort commited by the children.
What’s the nature of the liability here?
Locational. The tort was commited in the school. Katong panahon nga
special parental authority ang school over the child.
Everything else, sa gawas, it’s always the parents.
Instance #2:
ELCANO vs. HILL (1977)
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of
Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but the latter
was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.”Elcano then
filed a civil action against Reginald and his father (Marvin Hill) for
damages based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the
civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and
that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by
the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of
his marriage.
RULING: While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 19
"Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Therefore, Art. 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age,
Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
Atty. Espejo:
There are 2 Instances/Situations where parents are subsidiarily
liable:
1. Art. 218-219 (NCC) – Parents are merely subsidiarily liable
because of the special parental authority then exercised by
the school, it’s administrators, etc.
2. Elcano v. Hill – when as a matter of equity there should only be
subsidiary parental authority.
Children:
Note that the law makes no distinction as to “children.” Hence, children
could be legitimate, illegitimate, or even adopted.
TAMARGO vs. CA (1992)
FACTS: On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then
a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner
MacarioTamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition
to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for
adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is,
after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they,
but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and FelisaRapisura, were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
ISSUE: Who between the adopting parents and the
natural parents are liable for the tort committed by the
minor child?
RULING: The natural parents are liable.
Retroactive effect cannot be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had
no actual or physically custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental
authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability
for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they
were at the time in the United States and had no
physical cus tody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the
tort was committed.
Atty. Espejo:
Tan-awa ang complication diri: si Tamargo (victim) adopted. Naa sya’y
natural parents, naa pud sya’y adopting parents. Defendant Bondoc
also had natural and adopting parents.
We’re talking here about vicarious liability, and Bondoc (the minor). By
the time the case was filed, who had parental authority over him? The
adopting parents.
At the time of the incident, who had parental authority over him? The
natural parents.
Who between the natural and adopting parents are liable?
Remember, parental authority, i-trace nimo ang parental authority.
Analysis: The basis for the vicarious liability of parents for the torts
committed by their minor children is the actual exercise of Parental
Authority.
Q: What if the parents are dead? Ulila ang mga bata.
A: In the absence of parents (or the adopter in proper cases), a
guardian may be appointed by the court who would then exercise
parental authority.
In default of parents or guardians, parental authority shall be exercised
by the following, in the order indicated (see Art. 214 and Art. 216, FC):
 Surviving grandparents
 Oldest brother or sister, over 21 years
 Child’s actual custodian, over 21 years
Because these persons exercise parental authority, they are civilly liable
in cases where both parents are dead, absent or otherwise
incapacitated to perform their duty.
Take note: Because the age of majority and marrying age in the FC
(which is 18 y/o) are the same, no child can ever be emancipated by
marriage anymore.
Upon attaining age of majority, (1) parental authority, and therefore, in
proper legal contemplation, (2) vicarious liability ceases.
Right now, you can only be emancipated upon reaching the age of
majority.
Example:
Problem: Maja, 19, committed a tort against Angel. Can her parents be
held vicariously liable?
A: Yes!
Family Code
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases)
xxx
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Atty. Espejo: Between 18 and 21, naa gihapon ka’y residual parental
authority over your children so long as they live in your company.
To my mind, however, there’s no more basis to hold parents vicariously
liable for the torts of their children who are no longer minor because
they don’t have parental authority over them. Di naman nimo ma
disiplina. Nag-cease na ang parental authority. Consequence ang right
to discipline children in moderation sa parental authority. When parental
authority ceases there’s no more right to discipline your children in
moderation.
So, what’s the basis for vicarious liability when you can no longer
discipline, when there’s no longer any parental authority? Wala. To my
mind that’s an aberrant rule. There is liability but there’s no authority to
discipline children of majority age.
Civil Liability under the Revised Penal Code
Certain minor children are exempt from criminal liability under the
Revised Penal Code (e.g. under 9, 9-15 acting without discernment)
under Art. 101 of the RPC:
For both these types of children, civil liability sya devolved upon parents
or guardians being those who have minor under their legal authority.
But if you really look at the law does not talk about civil liability pag
minor over 9 but below 15 acting with discernment.
What about 15 to 18? Labaw na. regardless of whether they acted with
or without discernment.
Finally, 18 to 21 because there’s still vicarious liability. According Art.
236 (FC) there’s still vicarious liability – civil liability.
SALEN vs. BALCE (1960)
To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because
it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused
by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent.
Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal
or identical cases.
Atty. Espejo: The RPC is silent as to the civil liability of over 9 below 15
with discernment, 15-18, 18-21. So, based on Salen v. Balce, you apply
Art. 2180 (NCC) for 9-15 with discernment and 15-18. That’s also
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 20
applicable to 18-21. We also apply Art. 2180 (NCC) but we only do that
because of what Art. 236 (FC) tells us.
There are pseudo-vicarious parental liability:
1. Guardians -- They are liable for damages by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
“minors or incapacitated”
Even if you reach the age of majority but if you are still incapacitated,
there’s still vicarious liability for your guardians.
“who are under their authority and live in their company”
There is this custody requirement. The guardian must have had custody
over the minor or incapacitated person.
2. Teachers, or heads of establishments of arts and trades – shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Rationale: They stand in loco parentis when they are in the school.
To my mind this is confusing as we are no longer familiar with the
concept of actual apprenticeship. Example, what is this “establishment
of arts and trades”? (ADDU is arts and sciences) It refers to
apprenticeable occupations.
The concept of apprenticeship is not the same as with the labor code. In
the olden times, a skilled craftsman, sculptor, artist, stonecutter, takes
on the custody of a minor (8-15 y.o.) whom he trains and teaches in the
craft. After that time, he can work but he is not yet considered a master
in the craft. This is the situation envisioned by the civil code. So long as
they remain in custody.
So, what does the civil code mean?
Applying *Reddendo Singula Singulis:
It means by referring each to each; referring each phrase or
expression to its corresponding object. It is a rule of
construction used typically in distributing property.
“Teachers” “Heads of Establishments
of Arts and Trades”
Correspond to the torts of:
Pupils and students Apprentices
So long as they (pupils or apprentices) remain in their
custody
Atty. Espejo: In the case of heads of establishments of arts and trades,
the custody meant by that is living together. That’s the original
intention. Pupils and students, of course, do not live with their teachers.
The custody is temporary physical custody, kanang nagasulod mo ug
klase.
The law only mentions “arts and trades” not “arts and sciences”.It
seems that the heads of establishment of arts and sciences appear to
be exempt from liability based on Art. 2180. That’s unfair. Example: Acts
of bullying inside the school. That could be considered a tort. Remember
torts may include intentional acts. But what does jurisprudence say?
Based on Art. 2180: Heads of establishment of arts and sciences are
exempt from liability.
EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO (1957)
If a school is not one of arts and trades, there is no liability to be
imposed on the head of the establishment. It has to be a
nonacademic school.
Example of non-academic schools:
Techical institutes such as: Samson Technical Institute, Joji Ilagan Career
Center (old designation). Vocational courses: secretarial, stenographers.
MERCADO vs. CA (1960)
The school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts
and trades. Moreover, the CUSTODY requirement had not been
proved as this “contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.”
PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES (1971)
Under Art. 2180, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute are liable jointly and severally for damages to
plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the
hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. The
school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been
properly impleaded as party defendant.
[Note: The implication therefore, is you can hold the school itself
liable if you implead it.]
The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence
of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
Atty. Espejo: If that’s the ruling of the SC, what’s the implication?
You can hold the school liable.
But in Art. 2180 it’s “heads of establishments…”, teachers and heads. It
doesn’t say that you can file against the school itself for vicarious
liability.
In Palisoc, you can hold the school liable not because of “teachers and
heads of establishment” but because teachers are employees of the
school.
Mercado and Exconde cases have been overturned. There’s no longer
any requirement of living together. Pwede na transcient lang ang
transfer of parental authority in the present setup.
AMADORA vs. CA (1988)
The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the
provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of
arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school,
no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible
reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the
school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the
school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an
academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
liable if the school were non-academic.
Atty. Espejo: Amadora was really that one that told us that there is no
need for us to distinguish if its “arts and trades” or “arts and sciences”.
Before, the SC was strict in construing Art. 2180. Later the SC expanded
it to mean what we know schools are today.
Custody: The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and within the
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.
Katong panahon na naa ka sa control sa skwelahan, within its premises.
SALVOSA vs. IAC (1988)
Summary:
For as long as the student is within the premises of the school and
remains within the call of his teachers, the custody requirement is
satisfied. This includes “recess” or “temporary adjournment of school
activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor
and is not permitted to leave the school premises.”
However, if the student is outside of school premises or has been
dismissed, vicarious liability does not attach.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of
a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or
being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. CA (1991)
FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at
the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken
by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and
Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to
join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on
with them to the beach.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 21
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were
in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning.
Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but
in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was
recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was
brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt.
Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
RULING: It is clear that before an employer may be held liable for
the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused
damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in
the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely
private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident
happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High
School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no
permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin
because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity.
Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the
picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the
same.
The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and
neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the
findings of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be
exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for
the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or
omission he committed while they are not in the performance of
their duties.
PBSA vs. CA (1992)
FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the
death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals
justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA
and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was
enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's
academic community but were elements from outside.
RULING: Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed
that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA , for whose
acts the school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. No student
can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are
flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around
the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is,
as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. A school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all
risks.
THE PRESENT RULE:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Atty. Espejo:
Art. 218: Authorized, whether sa sulod or sa gawas. There is vicarious
liability.
SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT RULES:
 As a consequence of substitute parental authority, the school,
its administrators and teachers are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by their pupils or students.
 Parents are not exempt from liability. They are subsidiarily
liable under Art. 219. Liability is only subsidiary because, when
students are at school, the primary authority of the parents is
supplanted.
 The Family Code makes no distinction between academic and
non-academic institutions.
 If the school is being sued together with administrators and
teachers, the liability is joint and solidary, in keeping with Art.
2194 which provides that the liability of joint tortfeasors is
solidary.
 Responsibility and authority shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school.
 Unlike Art. 2180, where the child should be within the school
premises, custody under Art. 218 of the FC extends to acts
committed inside or outside the school provided that the
activity was an authorized activity.
Atty. Espejo: If you are a school administrator specifically dealing with
minors, what you need to be aware of it the fact the act of authorizing
an activity makes you liable for damages in case of torts/acts commited.
If it is totally unauthorized, pwede ka maghugas kamot regardless
whether you know it or not.
Rules if Student, etc. is NOT a Minor
In case the main tortfeasor is not a minor anymore, the rules contained
in Art. 2180 will be followed. To restate these rules:
 Art. 2180 makes teachers and head liable for acts of students
and apprentices who are not minors.
 The teacher-in-charge is liable for the acts of the non- minor
student. The school and administrators are not liable.
However, in the case of the teacher, liability will attach
whether the school is academic or non-academic.
 By way of exception, it is only the head of the school, not the
teacher, who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades.
 Custody mean “protective custody”, which means that the
student must be under the control and influence of the school
within its premises, whether the semester has no yet begun or
has already ended.
[Note: Cases, digests, and some outline items were lifted from the 2016-
17 TSN]
January 25, 2019 - Apura
QUASI-DELICTS PART 4
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
We are still talking about Article 2180- Vicarious Liability.
Again, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. We are now going to shift from parental and pseudo-
parental to those called employment-based vicarious liability. Such
vicarious liability will now be based on your employment or your
connection to a particular employer which actually includes the state in
certain cases.
EMPLOYMENT-BASED VICARIOUS LIABILITY
When we talk about employment vicarious liability, the liability is based
on the employer-employee relationship. You have to prove, if you are
the plaintiff, that there is employer-employee relationship that exists
between the parties.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 22
 Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
“The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.”
The important phrase to remember there and we would of course make
some qualifications to this later on, will be on occasion of their
functions.
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.”
Take note of the last phrase here again. Another point of specific
interest here would be this:
“…the former are not engaged in any business or industry”
What’s the reason for the law? Nganong kinahanglan og qualification? It
actually 16:16 the phraseology of subsidiary liability in the RPC.
Because there, there is this qualification na dapat engaged in any
business or industry.
Then finally:
“The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.”
Take note ang importante pud na timan-an nato diri is ang special
agent. Meaning naa diay ginatawag nato na kung dili special, unsa man
regular or ordinary agent.
Take note of the defense that is dealt in Article 2180:
“The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
So there’s that defense. As to how we are going to raise that, we will
know later on. So just a shortlisting of liabilities.
LISTING OF LIABILITY
 Owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions;
 Employers are likewise liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry. (Article 2180 of Civil Code); and
 Employers and corporations engaged in any kind of industry are
subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees
in the discharge of their duties (Article 103, Revised Penal Code)
What does the term “manager” here mean? There seems to be two
terms used by the law, you have owners and managers. You also have
employers and managers. Are they the same? Or are they different?
PHIL. RABBIT vs PHIL-AMERICAN
GR No. L-25142, March 25, 1975
The term “manager” is used in the same sense as ‘employer”. Thus, no
liability for tort can arise where the defendant can himself be regarded
as an employee.
Meaning, kadtong “manager” kung fellow employee lang gihapon siya,
he should not be the one who should be held to be vicariously liable.
Because he himself is a mere employee. Mao na siya ang gist sa ruling
sa Philippine Rabbit.
DOCTRINES TO REMEMBER
In order to hold the defendant vicariously liable under Article 2180, the
plaintiff must prove employer-employee relationship by preponderance
of evidence.
If you’re holding somebody liable under Article 2180, that would be by
virtue of a civil case for damages. Mere preponderance of evidence
would be enough.
To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we rely on
the four-fold test. This involves:
a. The employer’s power of selection;
b. Payment of wages or other remuneration;
c. The employer’s right to control the method of doing the work;
and
d. The employer’s right of suspension or dismissal
The same thing that we learned in Labor Standards Law. Diba under
termination law. Pero if you really look at it, it is actually just Fr. Gus who
discusses kana bitaw termination of employment or kanang elements of
employer-employee relationship. Sometimes, a great detail in Labor
Standards because actually that’s Labor Relations Law kanang
termination. Unsa gani ang kaso diri? LVN vs. PHILIPPINE MUSICIAN’S
GUILD.
Can you recall? That is Fr. Gus’ favorite case. Such that he tells us
always before that everytime he reads that case, he learns something
new. How many times can you read a case and learn something new?
You’ve mastered that case already. Again, it’s his way of saying na
importante kaayo ng kasoha na.
NECESSITY OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Remember that without employer-employee relationship, kadtong
vicarious liability that is based on employment under Article 2180
cannot be applied as a basis for liability. The controlling element there
as we know from Labor Standards, is power of control.
A little bit of review lang no, there are certain cases where employer-
employee relationship is created not by the application of the 4-fold test
but by the law itself.
Can you recall that in Labor Standards? What are they?
Examples:
1. Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, if the contractor or
subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that
he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
But if you recall the discussions made in your Labor Standards
classes, diba it is employer-employee relationship created and
supplied by law but only for a limited purpose and that is only to
ensure payment of wages.
2. In the case of labor-only contracting, the person or intermediary
shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall
be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if
the latter were directly employed by him.
There is an employer-employee relationship there that is created
because you skipped kadtong middleman, kadtong labor-only
contractor. It is as if directly hired karun ang employee sa principal.
Later on, what we need to ask ourselves would be: If there is
presence of labor-only contracting such that the employees are
considered directly the employees of the principal, will that also
cover a situation where that employee committed a tort? Because
here, the purpose is for labor-standards compliance, for purposes
of regularization, as well. But apil ba diha ang commission of torts?
That is what we need to look at.
3. Article 138. Classification of certain women workers. Any woman
who is permitted or suffered to work, with or without
compensation, in any night club, cocktail lounge, message clinic,
bar or similar establishments under the effective control or
supervision of the employer for a substantial period of time as
determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, shall be
considered as an employee of such establishment for purposes of
labor and social legislation.
The employer-employee relationship created and supplied by law in
this situation is comprehensive in effect for all labor and social
legislation. Worthy of note,is the fact that it actually does not
seem to hint that there also an employer-employee relationship for
the purposes of liability for damages. Naa ba giingon? For labor
(regularization,e tc) and social legislation lang (SSS, Medicare,Pag-
ibig) Mao lang ang purpose for coverage. Let us assume gikan ka
nag exam, then niadto ka og bugnaw na lugar, syempre kanang
bugnaw na lugar ingon pa nila – would be naa kay katapad na
babae na ientertain ka because you are a guest. Mao na ang
ginatawag na guest relations officer or GRO. 1980’s tawag ana
hostess. Karun nag evolve na. For example, that woman
committed a tort, a damage against you. Will the establishment be
made liable vicariously under Article 2180? We’ll see later on.
4. In RAMOS versus CA, for the purpose of allocating responsibility
in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in
effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
It’s the case filed against De los Santos Medical Center where naay
isa ka babae, si Erlinda Ramos nagpa-opera pero ang nahitabo is
that she had this severe allergic reaction to the anesthesia and it
caused her to be comatose and then she died. The defense of the
hospital when it was sued together with the physicians- dili man
namo employee ang mga doctor. Because for lack of a better term,
they are merely “visiting physicians” or “consultants”. The SC said
that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect
exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
Now here it is very clear in Ramos vs. CA. The SC said this is for the
purpose of Tort Law, medical negligence cases. There is a doctor
who committed medical malpractice. Unsa gani akong example
anang medical malpractice? My same example for Res Ipsa
Loquitor, where you don’t need to prove negligence and the burden
is shifted on the defendant to prove that he was not negligent. Like
when you go in for an appendectomy, you go home with a
vasectomy. That seems to be covered by Ramos vs. CA. Liability for
damages - quasi-delicts, that employer-employee relationship
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 23
 would be the basis despite assuming for example, even if we don’t
go traditionally by the elements of the employer-employee
relationship.
REQUISITES OF LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 2180
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their
employees, the following requisites must be established:
1. That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another;
2. That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and
3. That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him. Significantly, to
make the employer liable under paragraph 5 and 6 of Article
2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act
was committed at the time the employee was performing his
functions.
It presupposes that the tort was committed while the
employee is being permitted or suffered to work by his
employer and for the latter’s behalf. It brings to mind the fact
that if you’re an employee – you come in maybe at 8am and
go home at 5pm. What happens when you commit a tort gikan
ka sa imong opisina pabalik sa imohang balay? When
technically speaking, you are not acting as an employee
anymore. Is that covered? We will go to the case of Valenzuela
vs. CA, later, where that is actually discussed.
Requisite 1: That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another
Agency arrangements like mga guards nato diri. Are they employees of
Ateneo? No, of course not. They are employees of security agency.
ROQUE vs TORRES ET AL
G.R. No. 157632, December 6, 2006 I
In Soliman, jr. v Tuazon, we held that where the security agency recruits,
hires, and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a
client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency and
not the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security
guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family cannot be demanded from the said client.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers
such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency
has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the
client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards.
Does the fact that the client has the ability to impose conditions or
guidelines in the performance of duties, does that derogate from the
ruling that the agency has the responsibility?
Like ako, I’m an academic executive, pwede ko manugo sa security
guards. Employed sila by a security agency pero pwede ko manugo nila.
Does that show that I have power of control or the client himself has
power of control over the job performed by these security guards? I can
give them instructions which they have no choice but to follow. Does
that make me an employer. Let us refer to the 2nd requisite.
Requisite 2: That the service to be rendered in accordance with
orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable
for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are
ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract
for services entered into with the security agency.
So kadto requests lang to siya, incidental ra in other words.
SPOUSES JAYME vs APOSTOL
G.R. No. 163609, November 27, 2008
FACTS:
The Municipality of Koronadal (now City), selected and employed
drivers. One of these drivers were assigned to the Mayor. While the
driver was so assigned, he met a vehicular accident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor can be held liable under Article 2180
by reason of the fact that the driver, at the time of the accident, was
under his supervision.
HELD:
Spouses Jayme argue that Mayor had at least supervise and control over
Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during
the time of the accident. they, however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger
gas control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of
the driver.
Requisite 3: The injurious or tortious act was committed at the
time the employee was performing his functions.
Act done by the employee in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of infliction of
the injury or damages.
If the employee was doing something for his own benefit and not for the
benefit of his employer, there is supposedly no basis for vicarious
liability in case at that time he commits a tort. Kung gigamit niya iyang
kaugalingong oras para sa iyang mga kaugalingong purposes, then
definitely it would be unfair to hold the employer vicariously liable and
that is precisely the reason why it has to be committed at the time
when the employee was performing his functions.
The phrase “acts done within the scope of the employee’s assigned
tasks” includes “any act done by an employee in the furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time
of infliction of the injury or damages.” (CASTILLEX vs VASQUEZ, G.R
No. 132266, December 21, 1999).
It is not necessary that the task performed by the employee is his
regular job or that which is expressly given to him by the employer. It is
enough that the task is indispensable to the business or beneficial to
the employer. (FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs IAC, 212 SCRA
637 [1992])
Dapat on the occasion of the performance of his functions. That’s the
reason why also if the employees went on strike and then they
committed a tort and injured other people, that is not supposed to call
for the application of vicarious liability under Article 2180.
SAME PRINCIPLE APPLIED IN STRIKES:
UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS vs Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 155990, September 12, 2007
An employer incurs no liability when an employee’s conduct, act, or
omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionable, when
Resources’ employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own,
beyond the range of their employment. Thus, Resources’ cannot be held
liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its employees.
DISCUSSION:
Kaila ba mo ni Jann Paul? He happens to be a student from the
undergrad who is also an employee. Unsay tawag ana diri? Student
Assistant. So unsa ba usually ang arrangement ana? You are a scholar,
discounted imong tuition but in exchange you have to render service.
Dual imong role. You are a student, you have to fulfill your academic
requirements and at the same time, you are an employee subject to the
control of the school kung asa ka nagskwela.
For example, si Jann Paul kuntuhay kay nagatrabaho as SA sa Dean’s
Office pagkahuman naka commit siya of tortious acts sa imoha kay
gikataw-an niya imong exam score sa succession. Gikataw-an niya
imohang score na 33/200. So that’s a tort right? Unsa man ang
treatment ana niya? Is he to be treated as an employee or is he to be
treated as a student for purpose of determining vicarious liability? That
is answered by the case of:
WORKING SCHOLARS
FILAMER vs IAC
G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992
FACTS:
Funtencha, a working student and janitor of Filamer Christian Institute,
took over the wheel utility vehicle of the school from its regular driver
Masa and on navigation, incurred damages.
ISSUE: Is the school liable?
HELD:
The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for
and in behalf of his employer for when she act the petitioner-school
cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of their assigned tasks. For purposes of raising the presumption
of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interest of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of infliction of the injury or damage.
Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some
benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the
employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not
the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master’s business.
DISCUSSION:
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 24

What the law here is saying is that look, dili niya na duty pero what he
was doing - driving a utility vehicle is normally and usually necessary to
the interest of the school. It is a service regularly done by an employee
for the school albeit a different employee compared to, kadtong si
Funtencha.
Very stringent ang ruling sa SC at that particular case.
We go back to the question I posed earlier. Remember that if there is a
finding of labor only contracting, the law will actually step in and supply
the employer-employee relationship between the workers and the
principal. Murag gitanggal lang ang middleman. That’s the way I would
describe labor-only contracting. But we also know for a fact that the
purpose of that is a way of ensuring compliance with labor and social
legislation or payment of wages. The SC is saying time and again that
there is an employer-employee relationship between the contracted
employees and the principal as if the employees are directly hired by
the principal. Kung dili mabayaran ilang sweldo, ang principal mismo
ang pabayaron. But does that apply to vicarious liability? For that we
consult the case of:
LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING?
NAPOCOR vs CA
G.R. No. 119121, August 14, 1998
FACTS:
PHESCO supplied employees to NAPOCOR. Dump truck owned by
NAPOCOR and driven by one of these employees, collided with a Toyota
Tamaraw that resulted in death and injury to the passengers.
ISSUE: Can NAPOCOR be held liable?
HELD: PHESCO was a labor-only contractor. The person acting a
contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the
principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to
the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between
the principal employer and the employees of the labor-only contractor is
created. Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the
employees of the “labor-only” contractor as if such employees had been
directly employed by the principal employer.
NAPOCOR posits the theory that its liability is limited only to compliance
with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages and shall not extend to liabilities suffered by third
parties.
The reliance is misplaced. IT bears stressing that the action was
premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against
both PC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code
which is the applicable law in resolving this case.
It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code
will determine the liability of the NPC in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees of
the “labor-only” contractor. This is consistent with the ruling that a
finding that a contractor was a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to a
finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the
owner (principal contractor) and the “labor-only” contractor, including
the latter’s works.
DISCUSSION:
I realize that it is very difficult to find good help nowadays, kanang
kasambahay bitaw. May nalang nakakita mi og kababayan rapud namo
pagkahuman maayo, buotan. Pero niagi jud mi og agency. What does
the agency do? The agency recruits and then sila ang mag place karun
sa mga prospective kasambahays didto sa mga clients na nangita og
kasambahay. So siyempre, being lawyers, labor-only contractor kaya ni?
Kay ang labor only contractor, mag direct ko og tao ikaw na bahala ha,
ibayad nimo sa akoa ing-ani. Pero kadto bang amount na to, maadto to
tanan sa empleyado? Dili. So unsa ba ang capital sa labor-only
contractor? Laway lang iyang capital. Igo ra siya mupatong sa pasweldo
na dapat unta maadto tanan sa empleyado. Niadto jud mi sa agency
and lo and behold, there really is an office. They have a physical office,
naay computer so clearly that is not a labor-only contractor. It is a
legitimate contractor. Remember, right now, dili ka pwede maka engage
in the business of contracting if wala ka’y certificate of registration from
the Department of Labor and Employment.
“NAPOCOR posits the theory that its liability is limited only to
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions,
rest periods, and wages and shall not extend to liabilities suffered by
third parties.
The reliance is misplaced. IT bears stressing that the action was
premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against
both PC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code
which is the applicable law in resolving this case.”
Unsa daw? Unsa ba ang basis na maconsider nato na employer ang
NAPOCOR? Diba Labor Code. Unya karun muingon na dili man Labor
Code ang applicable but Civil Code. So if you really are strict in applying
what the SC is saying, wala nay premise daan iyang reasoning na
mahimong liable si NAPOCOR. For the purpose of determining whether
employer ka sa mga employee, apply the Labor Code. But for the
purpose of determining whether there is vicarious liability, muapply ta
og Civil Code. Mao na siya ang ruling sa SC. Which to my mind is weird
and then muingon pa siya na dili applicable ang Labor Code.
“It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code will determine the liability of the NPC in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees
of the “labor-only” contractor. This is consistent with the ruling that a
finding that a contractor was a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to a
finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the
owner (principal contractor) and the “labor-only” contractor, including
the latter’s works.”
Ang premise sa entire ruling of the SC is the finding of labor-only
contracting. Asa nato na makita sa Labor Code? And yet, the SC in
justifying that they are liable as employer vicariously, is the Civil Code
and walay applicability ang Labor Code. Which for me is weird, but this
is the prevailing law right now.
We need to remember that it appears that comprehensive karun ang
employer-employee relationship created and supplied by law in cases
where there is a finding of labor-only contracting. Mag extend siya dili
lang sa labor standards provisions but also for liability in torts. So it is
safe to assume that for the purposes of determining liability in the RPC
in case the employee becomes insolvent, you can also hold the principal
liable and not the labor-only contractor as liable subsidiarily.
BASIS OF LIABILITY
When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent one
other the selection (CULPA IN ELIGIENDO) or in the supervision of the
employee (CULPA IN VIGILANDO).
This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father a
family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
HOW TO PROVE DILIGENCE FOR SELECTION AND SUPERVISION
TO NEGATE LIABILITY
As the law merely imposed the standard of a good father of a family, no
particular acts are required for the employer to establish the he
exercised proper diligence. Supervision depends on the circumstances
of employment. It has been observed, however, that the exercise of
diligence may include promulgation of proper rules and regulations and
the formulation and publication of proper instructions for the
employees’ guidance in case where such rules and regulations and
instructions are necessary. (Yamada vs Manila Railroad Company,
G.R. No. L-10073, December 24, 1915)
NOTE: The giving of instructions is indicative of the exercise of power of
control. The putative employer regularly issues policies, directives to
employee then that is actually indicative of power of control.
It may also include the requirement that the employee-applicant submit
the necessary license or clearances and that the employee be required
to undergo examination, tests and training. Nevertheless, the mere
issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various
company policies on safety, without showing that they are being
complied with, are not sufficient to exempt the employer from liability
arising from the negligence of the employee. It is incumbent upon the
employer to show that in recruiting and employing the erring employee,
the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed. (Pantranco North Express Inc vs Baesa, 179
SCRA 384 [1989])
CAN AN EMPLOYER BE HELD LIABLE FOR INJURIOUS ACTS OF
THE EMPLOYEE DONE AFTER OFFICE HOURS?
As a GENERAL RULE, NO. Remember that after office hours, there is no
more power of control that an employer exercises over the employee.
After office hours, it can be said that the employee is using his own time
and no longer in furtherance of the business of the employee.
BUT, jurisprudence provides an exception which might be familiar to
Medical Representatives.
Who are medical representatives? Kana bitaw naga adto sa doctor,
representatives of pharmaceutical companies para i-carry sa doctor ang
iyang ginabligya na tambal. Mao na trabaho nila, storya-storya sa
doctor para ireseta ilang tambal.
If you are familiar with this, kaning mga medical representatives ang
ilang mga sakyanan mauli mana nila. For all intents and purposes, ilaha
na siya. Every after how many years, i-upgrade napud na nila ilang
vehicle into another company-issued vehicle.
VALENZUELA vs CA
G.R. No 115024, February 7, 1996
FACTS:
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either
wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 25
various plans though which employees eventually acquire their vehicle still be liable for damages, for
after a given period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many the death, and injuries of
companies provide liberal “car plans” to enable their managerial or passengers.
other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of What’s a valid complete Not a proper defense- liability
vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to purchase on defense? Diligence in the doesn’t cease.
their own. selection, and supervision.

Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the Article 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not
car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause
second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
employee himself. damages shall be equitably reduced.

ISSUE: In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally
absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
RULING:
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given So remember that a Common Carrier, can be an employer. Employer
the privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other like those found in Article 2180, when there is a big distinction when we
than those cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the talk about actual liability. And so naa’y 3 ka distinction as what we have
privilege serves important business purposes either related to the already discussed, so just take note of this table the specifics, when you
image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the think about the restriction.
public in general, or - for practical and utilitarian reasons- to enable its
managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach DISTINCTIONS ORDINARY COMMON CARRIER
clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves EMPLOYER AS EMPLOYER
both purposes.
As to acts covered. Acts performed on All negligent or
the occasion or by willful acts although
Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all
reason of the the employees
hours in all sort of situations, the provision for the unlimited us elf a
functions entrusted acted beyond the
company car principally serves the business and goodwill of a company
to the employee. scope of their
and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually
authority or in
use the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such,
violation of the
in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose
common carrier’s
of furthering the company’s image, a company owes a responsibility to
orders.
the public to see to it that the managerial or the employees to whom it
As to effect of The employee That the employee
entrusts virtually unlimited use of company issued car are able to use
violation of orders violated orders is a violated the
the company issue capably and responsibly.
defense because it common carrier’s
proves diligence in orders is not a
Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it
supervision defense
should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be As to availability of Valid defense Not a valid defense
defense of diligence
jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. in selection and
supervision
As to effect of Apply Article 2179 C/N of the
contributory passenger does not
DISCUSSION:
negligence bar recovery of
damages, if the
The SC is saying na actually dili lang na for the benefit of the employee,
proximate cause is
benefit pud na nimo. And I can relate, ikaw daw medical representative
the negligence of
ka, magbahis-bahis ka sa mga clinic sa mga doctors and wala ka’y
the carrier, but the
sakyanan – mag tricyle raka or nagbaktas ka. Pag-abot nimo sa doctor,
amount of damages
baho naka. Kinsa paman karun ang ganahan makig-storya nimo?
shall be equitably
Unsaon pagka carry ang product sa imong employer, kung ing-ana ka?
reduced.
As simple as that. So, it serves a purpose for the employer himself.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE PENAL CODE
Now, Medical representatives, if you remember the case of kanang mga
agents oh.
Please take note Article 103 of the RPC, subsidiary liability; ex delicto.
CARUNGCONG VS. NLRC
Kung agent ka ang tawag saimo independent contractor, so unsa ba Requisites:
ang mga medical representatives, independent contractors ba na or 1. That the employer is engaged in any kind of industry;
employees? That is another issue that you need to tackle, just take note 2. That the employee was convicted of the offense committed in
of that, dili man ta labor law class, but I think you should refresh what the discharge of his duties and
you know in Labor Law. 3. That the employee is insolvent

Common Carrier can also be an employer right? Just take note that is also a specie of Vicarious Liability, dili nimo sala,
Like unsa’y tawag ana, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, katong mga Bus pero ikaw ang pabayron, bantog na Vicarious.
Drivers imo nang empleyado.
THE STATE
So Article 21 updating applies to common carrier as employers.
Finally you have the State, it can also be an employer. Except that ang
Take note, it depends: difference is the private employment, that is a property right, is a
 If the cause of action is Culpa Aquilliana (injury to a non- property right, it connotes that it cannot be deprived of you without
passenger)- then yes. following the due process of law.
 If it is Culpa Contractual (injury to a passenger), or breach of
contract of carriage- you apply the provision of law on common What about a public office, public employment?
This is a public trust, you hold the office for the benefit of the public.
carriers.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's Article 2176 shall be applicable.
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common This is a very simple provision. Take note that the state has different
carriers. aspects:
1. PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT ASPECTS: The State is liable for the
And in contrast with Article 2180, last paragraph: tortious acts of special agents only.
xxx This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the Please refer to the Special Agent discussion.
selection and supervision of their employees. 2. PRIVATE/BUSINESS ASPECTS: The State is liable as an
ORDINARY EMPLOYER.
So there is really that contrast, like if you back to Article 2180.
It descends to the level of an ordinary private individual, therefore it is
2180 1759 liable as an ordinary employer, and in evidence on the topic of judicial
General Rule: Only in the But if you talk about a common notice, that the public governmental functions of the states can be
scope of their assigned task, carrier it doesn’t matter, given judicial notice, but private or business aspect of the state cannot
while they are committing acts because even though the be given judicial notice.
or performing functions employees acted beyond the
incidental to the business of scope of authority, in violation of WHO IS A SPECIAL AGENT?
their employer. the orders of the common A special agent is a government employee who commits a tort while
carrier- common carrier would performing an act foreign to his usual duties.

Torts 2019 1st Exam | 26

  So ikaw clerk ka pero for the mean time gisugo ka para
mahimong pulis, or you’re doing something that is actually
foreign to what you are appointed to do.
 We are talking about ordinary employees of the state.
The State is liable only for torts committed by its special agents
specially commissioned to carry out acts of which the torts arise, and
which acts are outside of the regular duties of said special agents.
It is actually a warning to the state, if you do not want any tort
liability, vicariously under Article 2180, then do not act as an
Special Agent, it is as simple than that.
You have to be employed by the government first and then you do acts
foreign to your duty, you become a special agent.
Function Agent Vicarious Basis
performed Liability
Government Ordinary No 2176
Business Ordinary Yes, as 2180
ordinary
employer
Government Special Yes 2180
Business Special Yes, as 2180
ordinary
employer
Now let us relate, because we are talking about the employers, there is
what we called:
REGISTERED OWNER RULE
The registration of motor vehicles, as required by Section 5(a) of
Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code was
necessary “not to make said registration the operative act by which
ownership in vehicles is transferred,.. but to permit the use and
operation of the vehicle upon any public highway.”
Its “main aim is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual-
the registered owner.
Imagine gud nimo ang situation sa isa ka tao na hit and run,
na bangga.an. Kaila ba siya kinsa’y naka bangga niya? In all
probability no!
 The most that you can do is if na remember nimo ang plate #, adto
ba ka ug LTO, pangitaon nimo ang rehistro aning sakyanan na
nakabangga nimo, and then paggawas sa rehistro, makita nimo
ang registered owner sa motor vehicle. But in otherwise, kinsa
imong ma file-an ug kaso? Wala. Kay wala man ka kaila, the only
thing you can remember is the plate #.
Ordinarily you can rely on the registration who the owner of the motor
vehicle is. And the registered-owner rule establishes another form of
vicarious liability in addition to those enumerated under Article 2180.
The source of registered owner’s liability is not a distinct statutory
provision, but remains to be Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Take note that in Article 2180, there is no mention there that owner of
the motor vehicle.
Unsa naa didto? owners, managers, with respect to their employees. By
fiction of law, a registered owner is considered the employer not only for
the purpose of assuming payment of damages by the motor vehicle.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
But as we may observe that the registered owner of the motor vehicle is
not necessarily the employer or the driver- dili mana siya automatic,
example, kanang hiram2 ug sakyanan. What happens if makabangga
ang car? Dili mana siya employee, so does it mean the rule still
applicable in case lang naa’y mahitabo?
The registered owner of motor vehicle is not necessarily the employer of
the driver.
Because jurisprudence of the registered-owner rule cites the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 as the basis for liability, is there a limited
employer-employee relationship created and supplied by law?
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION vs CUEVAS
GR NO. 167797, June 15, 2015
MMTC and Mina’s Transit Corporation entered into an agreement to sell
whereby the latter bought several bus units from the former at a
stipulated price. They agreed that MMTC would retain the ownership of
the buses until certain conditions were met, but in the meantime Mina’s
Transit could operate the buses within Metro Manila.
On October 14, 1994, one of the buses subject of the agreement to sell,
hit, and damaged a Honda Motorcycle owned by Reynaldo and driven by
Junnel. Reynaldo and Junnel sued MMTC and Mina’s Transit for damages
in the Regional Trial Court.
CONTENTION OF MMTC: Although MMTC retained the ownership of
the bus, the actual operator and employer of the bus driver was Mina’s
Transit; and that, in support of its cross-claim against Mina’s Transit, a
provision in the agreement to sell mandated Mina’s Transport to hold it
free from liability arising from the use and operation of the bus units.
HELD: In view of MMTC’s admission in its pleadings that it had
remained the registered owner of the bust at the time of the incident, it
could not escape liability for the personal injuries and property damage
suffered by the Cuevases. This is because of the registered-owner rule,
whereby the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in a
vehicular accident could be held liable for the consequences.
It is well settled that the case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered
owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the
tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by
the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of
the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor
relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that the
defendant is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage
in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
Note: Let us restate that a little bit.
 Remember that the employer correspond to the tort committed by
the employee under 2180.
 There should be employer-employee relationship, although the
registered owner rule, actually presumes the registered owner to
be the employer of the driver- and actually applies 2180 as the
basis of liability.
 Then there is a defect- no employer-employee relationship. Mao na
ang sulti sa case.
 Ang gamiton nato diri 2180 pero wala ta nanginanghanlan diri ug
relationship. No need for employer-employee relationship. The law
is harsh. Ikaw pa nagpa hulam ikaw pay pakasad.an ikaw pay
pabayron sa danyos.
REMEDY OF MMTC: MMTC could recover from Mina’s Transit, the
actual employer of the negligent driver, under the principle of unjust
enrichment, by means of a cross-claim seeking reimbursement of all the
amounts that it could be required to pay as damages arising from the
driver’s negligence. A cross claim is a claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or o a counterclaim therein, and may
include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be
liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the
action against the cross-claimant.
Note: For the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor
vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor law is not
required.
APPLICATION OF THE REGISTERED-OWNER RULE
Possible Situations which may arise:
1) The registered owner is a stranger or is not the employer of
the driver who caused damage.
2) The registered owner is the actual employer of the driver who
caused damage. In this situation, the fifth paragraph of Article
2180 applies as well. This means that the defenses therein are
applicable to the registered owner.
But in the more complicated one is that:
a. The registered owner is not the employer of the driver.
The registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
employer of the tortfeasor-driver for the purpose of applying vicarious
liability. We follow the doctrine in MMTC.
b. The registered owner is the employer of the driver.
Take note that, if the owner is also the employer of the driver, he is
supposed to be allowed claim the defenses under Article 2180.
Diligence in the selection or supervision.
Take note that if the driver is s stranger, you cannot claim the defense
of acting in their assigned tasks or due diligence in selection and
supervision, kay dili man nimo empleyado. What if dili ikaw ang
employer? Can you say naa ko’y diligence in supervision and
selection?
FILCAR vs ESPINAS
GR NO 174156, June 20, 2012
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned
tasks or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage- because the motor vehicle registration law, to a
certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these
defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle.
Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in
the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the
damages caused to Espinas
Difference between 2180 and 4136.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 27
Article 2180 requires proof of things: first, an employment relationship
between the driver and the owner; second, that the driver acted within
the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
Applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
However if you apply the registered owner rule, it only requires the
plaintiff would prove that the defendant-employer is the registered
owner of the vehicle. It is very easy to prove, just go to the LTO or
LTFRB.
However the SC realized that there is overlapping of the rules.
CARAVAN TRAVEL vs ABEJAR
GR NO. 170631, February 10, 2016
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner
that harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules
must be construed in a manner that will harmonize them with other
rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence. xx
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered-owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises
a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have
been proven. As consequences, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
WHAT IN THE BLUE HELL DOES THAT MEAN? Makalibog ang
phraesolog refer in this discussion.
Simple. If you are the plaintiff, you don’t need to prove employer-
employee relationship in order to establish a prima facie case against
the defendant employer-owner. All you have to do is to secure proof of
ownership of the motor vehicle. The law would now step in and apply a
disputable presumption that the employment relationship exists and
that the employee acted within the scope of his assigned tasks.
So actually, ang effect niya is when the Registered Owner Rule applies,
it is evidentiary ang iyahang effect- you do not need to prove these
things anymore.
This disputable presumption recognizes that between the owner and the
victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward
with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a helpless pedestrian or
motorist with hardly any means to uncover (1) the employment
relationship of the owner and the driver, or (2) any act that the owner
may have done in relation to that employment.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the
public.
What about the defendant?
He can still make use of the defenses available under Article 2180 for
the purpose of refuting the disputable presumptions.
In other words, if the twin disputable presumptions under Caravan
apply, he can present proof that he is not the employer of the driver
who caused damage or, if he is, that he exercised due diligence in
selection and supervision. If he is successful, no liability attached
whether as owner or employer.
So it is not really that harsh, because finally the SC here kinda
evened the scales a little bit, because if you look at the
jurisprudence 30 years ago, if registered owner ka liable kana.
Finally 2016 cases, there is now a way out, it’s a matter of
PROOF.
EFFECTS:
1.) The order of proof is reversed. Instead of the plaintiff proving
employment and acting within the scope of assigned tasks, it
is the defendant who must disprove it.
It is actually very easy to disprove, mere testimony lang,
although you are actually kinda proving a negative fact.
2.) The owner-stranger situation is harder to defend because
factually, it is not easy to prove diligence in selection and
supervision over a non-employee.
MORAL LESSON: Do not lend your vehicle to anyone.
We mentioned the case of Ramos vs CA, we are going to talk about
medical malpractice in that situation. In that setting but we will do that
next meeting, skip nato siya pero part na siya sa vicarious liability.
Let us continue with Article 2181 and other tort provisions, agi.an ra
nato nag paspas.
OTHER TORTS PROVISIONS
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of his claim.
Note that vicarious liability under Article 2180 refers to liability
grounded on the presumed negligence in selection and /or supervision
of a person over whom one is responsible. Thus, under Philippine Tort
Law, vicarious liability is based on imputed negligence but, ultimately,
the employer, parent,etc, will be held liable under their own lack of due
process.
Under the general provisions (Article 2176), liability is direct and
primary. Under the vicarious liability provision, liability is direct and
derivative, to a certain degree. If a defendant is held liable under Article
2176, he therefore corresponds with his own property. If liability is
based on Article 2180, the parent, employer, etc, can directly be
proceeded against.
You’re the employer, you’re liable for the tort committed by your
employee, what does Article 2181 say? Pwede ka mag pa reimburse,
the ultimate analysis dili man ikaw ang naka bangga, dili man ikaw ang
negligent or nag cause ng damage.
PHILTRANCO vs CA
GR NO 120553, June 17, 1997
The liability of the employer for damages arising from the tortious acts
of its employee is PRIMARY, DIRECT, and JOINT AND SEVERAL or
SOLIDARY with the latter. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly
provides:
Art.2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.
Since the employer’s liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only
recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what
it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence
which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict.
Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim.
Now I want you to make a comparison:
 Employer pays for the damages- due to the quasi-delict
committed by the employee.
o Pwede ka mag pa reimburse.
and one more thing you need to remember in that situation is…
 If you’re the plaintiff, you can actually exercise direct recourse
against the employer- not even the employee.  Under Art.
2180
So what is the rationale for Art. 2180 providing for Vicarious
Liability?
Ikaw ba ang naka bangga? Dili. Pero pwede ikaw ang file-lan ikaw ang
pabay-ron, and good thing about it pwde ka mag pa reimburse to the
person who actually committed the Tort.
 So kang kinsa nimo ni karon I compare any other situation in
any law that we have discussed so far that is similar, pwede
direct recourse, pwede ka pabay-ron directly, pwede ka mag
pa reimburse. SURETY. You make a surety when you are the
employer, if you are a vicer in effect you are a surety. Pwede
direct recourse sa imuhan without even impleading the
principal debtor when you are in surety. Kung mapabayad ka,
you are entitled to full reimbursement, like a surety.
IF SOLIDARY: A files a case against B and C who are both solidary
debtors, which means that the entire obligation is demandable
from anyone of them, but what is the effect between he two
solidary debtors of payment by one of them, you are entitled to
proportional reimbursement.
 But here it is different. It is similar to surety, and with that
what the law seeks to guaranty is the right of recourse
payment to damages, para sigurado ka na ang negligence naa
sa laing tao daghan pud ka ug ma sing-ngilan.
ARTICLE 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem shall be appointed.
Take note of the case … because this is the case that mirrors this
provision.
LIBI vs IAC
GR No. 70890, September 18, 1992
The minor trangressor shall be responsible or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former.
Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil
Code states that “ (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor... shall be answerable with his own property in an
action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For
civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the
third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wIt:
“Should there be no person having such... minor under his authority,
legal guardianship or control, or of such person be insolvent, said..
minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civiI
law."
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make . use of
the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 28
may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage.
We have already discussed this before. The basis of this provision are
the cases of: Rationale
VESTIL versus IAC
November 6, 1989
The obligation impose by Article 2183 is not based on negligence of on
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle
of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure
or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
APPLICABILITY OF ART. 2183
The law mentions `posses an animal or whoever may make use of the
same d not owner. Thus, ownership over the animal is not required in
order for liability to attach.
The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers also even
tame ones as long as they cause injury.
Actual control is likewise not required. The Article holds the possessor or
user liable even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be
removed from his control.
DEFENSES
There are only two defense to wit:
1. In case the damage should come from force majeure; or
A is driving a horse-drawn carriage. There was a sudden gunshot
which caused the horse to be agitated and injured pedestrians;
2. From the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
A owns a dog. B, a visitor, hits the dog playfully and gets bitten by
it.
Cases:
a. Afilada vs Hisole- Here is a guy who tended a kalabaw mao
na iyang trabaho, and then one day gi sungay siya sa
kalabaw, which caused his death, so iyang pamilya karon kay
ni file ug kaso against the owner of the kalabaw, para
damages. Kay diba under Article 2183, although wala pa ni na
law at the time of the case. SC said that he bears the risk.
b. Vestil vs IAC
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the
use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
The owner is, in a sense required to be an intelligent back-seat
driver.
The Article covers three (3) situations, to wit:
1. If the owner was in the vehicle could have, by the use
of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune- The
owner is solidarily liable with the driver
2. If the driver had been found guilty of reckless during or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months- The driver is disputably
presumed negligent. The owner is solidarily liable with the
driver also.
3. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle- Apply Article
2180.  ordinary vicarious liability.
Basis and Rationale
The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to
the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
*don’t read anymore cases relating to 2184
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Take note a person driving a motor vehicle, it could be anybody-
comparing to Article 2184.
Article 2184 Article 2185
The driver is not the owner The driver may be the owner or
himself. anyone else.
The presumption arises that a It is presumed that a person
driver as negligent, of he had driving a motor vehicle has been
been forged guilty of reckless negligent if at the time of the
driving or violating traffic mishap, he was violating any
regulations at least twice within traffic regulation.
the next preceding two months.
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper
government office a bond executed by a government-controlled
corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The
amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official.
Nothing much here, just skip this.
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by
any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
relation exists between them and the consumers.
We’ve discussed this already when we were talking about strict liability.
PROVISION APPLIES ONLY IF CONSUMER IS INJURED
An action for damages is in order if injury or death takes place.
This is in consonance with the general principle in Philippine Tort law
that only actual and not potential injuries are actionable.
Situation: Nipalit kag coke, wala pa nimo nainom nakita nimo
naa’y thumbtacks sa sulod sa coke, so wala diud ka na injure, can you
apply Art. 2187? No because there is no injury.
What is the proper remedy if the consumer discovers something
noxious in the product but is not injured thereby?
APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF RA 7394 otherwise known as the
“CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Article 11. Amendment and Revocation of Declaration of the
Injurious, Unsafe or Dangerous Character of a Consumer
Product. – Any interested person may petition the appropriate
department to commence a proceeding for the issuance of an
amendment or revocation of a consumer product safety rule or an order
declaring a consumer product injurious, dangerous and unsafe.
In case the department, upon petition by an interested party or its own
initiative and after due notice and hearing, determines a consumer
product to be substandard or materially defective, it shall so notify the
manufacturer, distributor or seller thereof of such finding and order
such manufacturer, distributor or seller to:
a) give notice to the public of the defect or failure to comply with the
product safety standards; and
b) give notice to each distributor or retailer of such product.
Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or
business.
You can dispute it, it is not conclusive. The exception being, the
possession or use of the dangerous weapons or substances is
indispensable in his business.
 Perfect example here is a pharmacist.
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision.
*Recall the example of Sir about his student who fell sa manhole  naa
sila’y insurance sa UM.
CITY OF MANILA vs TEOTICO
GR NO. L-23052, January 29, 1968
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong
to the province, city, or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city, or
municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street or
road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily from its “control or supervision” by
the City of Manila, under RA 09, or its charter.
APPLIES ONLY TO INJURY TO PERSONS
As worded, the provision applies only to death or injury to persons.
What about damage to property? To my mind, it is illogical to limit the
liability to death or personal injury only. For, injury is an act that
damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of
inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress,
or impairment. Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to an act or
result involving an impairment or destruction of right, health, freedom,
soundness, or loss of something of value.
GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN
March 29, 1989
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city o municipality, for liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or suspension is exercised over the defective
road or street. In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 29
for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer.
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Just take note of this, proprietary torts.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.
(1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be
the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723,
the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the
engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article,
within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling
from the same. (1910)
Based on Roman Law
Dejectum Effusumve Aliquid
Liability for damages of the person occupying the house for injury for
anything thrown or poured from the house, regardless of whether he is
the owner of the house or not.
Dejectum (throning) Effusumve (pourins) Aliquid (umpectlied object
Try to distinguish with:
Actio de positis vet suspensis
In Roman law, it is the action against an occupier for a penalty at the
instance o yon.e who complained in respect of things suspended that
would do damage if they fell.
Placing or suspending an object in a dangerous position is already a
ground for liability for it was not necessary that anyone should be hurt
or injured. If someone is hurt by the falling object, the person who
placed the same in such a dangerous position is liable, regardless of
whether he is the owner of the house or not.
In the PH is not applicable, tanan sa atu.a will be actual not potential
injuries, because this talks about potential injuries, dili siya source of
liability under PH law.
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
Take note gi discuss ko nani sa inyoha, when we compared surety and
person vicariously liable.
Suppose there are joint tortfeasors, there are two of you, and by reason
of your negligence, you bumped somebody causing injury. In that
situation, if I were made to pay, I can recover half from my solidary-
defendant.
But there is also another form of solidarity under the law of torts. That
is, if I am vicariously liable. Article 2180 provides you are solidarily
liable for the acts of the person whom you are responsible. Pila imong
ma recover? You can’t recover full. It is more on guaranty. Guarantor
can recover anything that you have paid for the benefit of the debtor
which is the same on Article 2180. Solidarity here means recovery of
everything you have paid in full from the actual defendant. What do you
guarantee? The payment of damages.
We’re done with 2176-2194.
February 15, 2019 – Cabarlo
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. DEFINITION
GARCIA-RUEDA VS PASCASIO
GR NO 118141, September 5, 1997
Medical malpractice is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
Why medical malpractice is specialized?
Medical malpractice is specialized because it is applicable only
when the tort or quasi-delict that causes harm to another person is
committed by a medical professional in the course of medical
treatment.
ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
GR NO 192123 March 10, 2014
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence each of the following four elements, namely:
1. The duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created
by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance
with the specific norms or standards established by his
profession;
2. The breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in
accordance with the applicable standard of care;
3. The causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and
causal connection between the negligent act or omission
and the resulting injury; and
4. The damages suffered by the patient.
1ST ELEMENT: The duty owed by the physician to the patient, as
created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with
the specific norms or standards established by his profession.
Just to connect it with what we have learned in Zandolf in Evidence.
Remember that we had this form of privilege communication called
physician-patient privilege communication where the privilege would
attach the moment a medical professional attends to a patient in his
professional capacity. Take note that there’s that phrase in evidence
which provides that “in the course of” or “in view of” professional
relationship in the course of medical treatment. This means that for as
long as the doctors are acting in their professional capacity, the
privilege would attach regardless of whether the patient was in a
position to give his consent.
But here it appears that there has to be a physician-patient relationship
that is created by contract. Muadto ka saimong doctor. Magpatreat ka
sa imong doctor. That would be enough already. Naa nay contractual
relationship that is established between the doctor and the patient.
SPOUSES FLORES VS SPOUSES PINEDA
GR NO 158996, November 14, 2008
In medical malpractice cases, Duty arises then the plaintiff
employs the services of the physician, thus creating a physician-
patient relationship between them. Acceptance by the physician
of a patient for the treatment in effect creates a representation on
the part of the former that he has the needed training and skill
possessed by those in the same field and that they will employ
the said training, care and skill in treating the patient.
In other words, there has to be that contract. There has to be consent
on the part of the patient and the doctor to enter into such medical
treatment.
Q: What is the standard of care that is required?
A: In medical treatment, only ordinary diligence is required.
In contract of carriage, extra-ordinary diligence is required as well as
those of banks.
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
There seems to be a disconnect. You’re talking here about life. Common
carrier is probably talking about a bus and there’s a person who will ride
the bus. If he does not reach his destination and there’s negligence on
the part of the bus company or the driver or there is no extra-ordinary
diligence, the bus company or the driver may be held liable.
Q: If you contract for medical care, will you not expect to be treated as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the circumstances
(similar to a common carrier)?
In the case of Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to state that the medical profession is one which like the
business of common carriers is affected with public interest.
Why is there then a variance in the required diligence?
Carriage Medicine
No-prequalification process. Profession engaged in only by
qualified individuals.
There is a guaranty that A doctor cannot warrant that a
passengers or goods will arrive patient under treatment may
at their destination safely and be cured of his disease.
securely.
REYES VS SISTERS OF MERCY
GR NO 130547 October 3, 2000
The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by
qualified individuals. It is a right earned through years of
education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state
through professional board examinations. Such license may, at
any time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In
addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly
governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline
and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in
recognition and acceptance of their great responsibility to society.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 30

Given these safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of
doctors the observance of extraordinary diligence.
By the nature of the profession itself, extraordinary diligence is already
required. What is ordinary in certain circumstances is already
extraordinary in the medical field.
REYES VS SISTERS OF MERCY
GR NO 130547 October 3, 2000
As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon
the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already noted,
the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable
average merit among ordinarily good physicians. That is
reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called
it, the reasonable skill and competence that a physician in the
same or similar locality should apply.
This means that a physician is expected to use at least the same level
of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use under
the same circumstances.
2ND ELEMENT: The breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act
in accordance with the applicable standard of care.
Improper performance where the patient is injured in body or in health
constitutes actionable malpractice.
Q: How do you determine whether or not a physician has committed
"inexcusable lack of precaution"?
A: Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science.
Breach of duty occurs when the physician FAILS TO COMPLY WITH OR
DEVIATES FROM these professional standards. If injury results to the
patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for
negligence.
Breach could either be:
1. Failure to meet the standards demand by the medical
profession (Tort of omission), or
2. Deviation from the standards (Tort of action)
Therefore, a breach of duty can either by an act or omission.
HOW TO PROVE BREACH
To establish breach there must be:
1. Evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical
community in the particular kind of case; and
2. A showing that the physician in question negligently departed
from this standard in his treatment.
Medical standards of treatment cannot be subject of mandatory judicial
notice. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.
Ours are courts of law not courts of medicine. Therefore, it would be
totally unprocedural and improper for a judge to take judicial notice for
something it had no particular confidence or expertise of.
Medicine is highly technical field and judges are not expected to know
about medicine and medical knowledge cannot be gained by mere
common experience from which the court can derive its conclusions on.
There are matters that can be attributed to common experience.
Two ways by which evidence of medical standards can be
introduced:
1. Expert testimony
2. Learned Medical Treatises
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY
NECESSITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Because ours are courts of law and not tribunals of medicine a judge is
not expected to be well-versed in the medical field. Generally, therefor,
expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from
the standard medical procedure. Only physicians and surgeons of skill
and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has
been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care.
CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO 122445 November 18, 1997
FACTS: Lydia was admitted at the Perpetual Help Clinic and
General Hospital for a hysterectomy (removal of the uterus). Her
daughter, Rowena, notices that the clinic was untidy and that she
persuaded Lydia not to proceed with the operation. They were
convinced by Dr. Cruz to proceed.
For the operation, the family bought blood from the blood bank.
After the operation, the doctor advised that they would need more
blood. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was
later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who
was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently,
the oxygen supply of the clinic ran out they had to rush to San
Pablo Hospital to procure and oxygen tank.
At around 10:00 PM, she went into shock and her blood pressure
dropped to 60/50.
Lydia’s unstable condition necessitated her to transfer to the San
Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator
and further examined. She died upon arrival due to shock and
Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation.
Dr. Ninevetch Cruz, the attending physician/surgeon was
prosecuted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
The prosecution’s expert witness in the persons of Dr. Arizala and
Dr. Salvador of the NBI only testified as to the possible cause of
death but not venture as to the standard of care that Cruz should
have exercised.
HELD: Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is
the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the
standard of care employed by other physicians of good
standing in the conduct of similar operations.
For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of
courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which
laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of
conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same operation.
It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician
are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable
presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion
which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was
unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this
Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our
hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which
hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this
Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali,
for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish
civil liability.
PURPOSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
LUCAS VS TUANO
GR NO 178763, APRIL 21, 2009
What constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question
that should have been presented to experts. If no standard is
established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have
no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach thereof
by the physician or surgeon. The RTC and Court of Appeals, and
even this Court, could not be expected to determine on its own
what medical technique should have been utilized for a certain
disease or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would
be dangerously engaging in speculations.
B. LEARNED MEDICAL TREATISES
RULE 130, Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published
treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a
matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in
his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
WHO IS AN EXPERT?
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to
which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses
special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an
opinion." (People VS Abriol GR NO 123137, OCT 17, 2001)
Q: Is there is a definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert?
A: None. It is sufficient that the following factors be present:
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 31
 (1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and
(3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his
opinion is based. (People vs Abriol Gr No 123137, Oct 17,
2001)
HOW IS EXPERTISE ACQUIRED?
There is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill/experience
shall have been acquired. Scientific study and training are not always
essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. Knowledge
acquired by doing is no less valuable than that acquired by study (Dilag
Co. v. Merced, 1949).
However in medical malpractice cases, because it is required that the
recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of
case be proven, expertise must be both scholastic and experiential.
WHEN EXPERT TESTIMONY NOT NEEDED
The expert testimony is not needed when the doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur applies (the thing speaks for itself).
Ramos vs. CA
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent
act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff,
the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because
the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is
that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies
only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has
been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill
and care.
Editor’s Note:
General Rule:
Expert medical testimony is relied in medical malpractice suits
Exception:
The court relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor as the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court
is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of
injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred
to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and
why it occurred.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the
following situations:
1. Leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient
after an operation,
2. Injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which
was not under, or in the area, of treatment,
3. Removal of the wrong part of the body when another
part was intended,
4. Knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an
eye while the patient was under the influence of
anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A
distinction must be made between the failure to secure results,
and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily
found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any
particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result
Thus res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit
if the only showing is that the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished.
REQUISITES OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR:
1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured.
SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
GR NO 192123, MARCH 10, 2014
FACTS: Gerald was born with an imperforate anus. When 2 days
old, he underwent a colostromy operation. When he was 3 years
old, a pull-through operation was conducted (to open his anus).
However, after the operation, he became comatose.
After two months, he regained consciousness but he could no
longer hear, see or move. His mother filed criminal charges
against Dr. Solidum the anesthesiologist.
Dr. Solidum did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of his
judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to
monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a
consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and
consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning
insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing,
speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
ISSUE: Does res ipsa loquitur apply?
HELD: NO. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that
the second and third elements were present, considering that the
anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the
control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then
unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably
wanting.
Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that
caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-
through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to
the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence
of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists,
had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to
him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex,
prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.
Editor’s Note:
The res ipsa loquitor does not apply automatically simply because
a patient is injured by something that would ordinarily be within
the control of a medical professional.
The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that
the injury was probably caused by someone's negligence.
Sir’s Lecture:
If you’re not sure if res ipsa loquitor applies, present an expert
witness against a medical professional.
Rosit vs. Davao Doctors
G.R. 210445 December 7, 2015
FACTS: Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray showed
that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a
specialist in mandibular injuries,4 who, on January 19, 1999,
operated on Rosit.
During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to
the jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As the
operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut
the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that
there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not
so inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to
afford the same.
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close
his mouth and was in pain. X-rays showed that the fracture in his
jaw was aligned but the screws used on him touched his molar. Dr.
Gestuvo referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan, opined that another
operation is necessary and that it is to be performed in Cebu.
Alleging that the dentist told him that the operation conducted on
his mandible was improperly done, Rosit went back to Dr. Gestuvo
to demand a loan to defray the cost of the additional operation as
well as the expenses of the trip to Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo gave Rosit
P4,500.
In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed
by Dr. Gestuvo and replaced them with smaller titanium plate and
screws. Dr. Pangan also extracted Rosit's molar that was hit with a
screw and some bone fragments. Three days after the operation,
Rosit was able to eat and speak well and could open and close his
mouth normally.
On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo
reimburse him for the cost of the operation and the expenses he
incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as for the
P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the
plate and screws that Dr. Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to
pay.
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 32

Rosit filed a civil case for damages and attorney's fees against Dr.
Gestuvo.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is
applicable?
RULING: YES. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are satisfied:
1. the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent;
2. the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit proved
that one of the screws installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. It
was for this issue that Dr. Gestuvo himself referred Rosit to Dr.
Pangan. In fact, the affidavit of Dr. Pangan presented by Dr.
Gestuvo himself before the trial court narrated that the same
molar struck with the screw installed by Dr. Gestuvo was
examined and eventually operated on by Dr. Pangan. Dr. Gestuvo
knew that the screws he used on Rosit were too large as, in fact,
he cut the same with a saw.
As to the second element, it is sufficient that the operation which
resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed
by Dr. Gestuvo. No other doctor caused such fact.
What is more damning for Dr. Gestuvo is his failure to inform Rosit
that such smaller screws were available in Manila, albeit at a
higher price.
As testified to by Dr. Gestuvo himself:
Court: This titanium materials according to you were already
available in the Philippines since the time of Rosit's accident?
Witness: Yes, your Honor.
Court: Did you inform Rosit about the existence of titanium
screws and plates which according to you is the screws and plates
of choice?
Witness: No, your Honor.
Witness: The reason I did not inform him anymore Judge because
what I thought he was already hard up with the down payment.
And if I will further introduce him this screws, the more he will not
be able to afford the operation.
In this case, Rosit was deprived of the opportunity to make an
"informed consent".
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the doctrine of informed consent is
likewise applicable?
RULING: YES
Doctrine of Informed Consent
Informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable
care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of
injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and
faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or
alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the
probable benefits.
Therefore, it is the duty of Dr. Gestuvo to tell the patient
that these are your options and which can you afford.
ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT:
1. The physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
(Duty)
2. He failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those
risks; (Breach)
3. As a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose,
the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would
not have consented to; and (Proximate Causation)
4. Plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. (Injury
or Damage)
Editor’s Note:
Same element for tort but a different type of tort.
The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to
"point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it
Just to apply:
First, Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit the
risks of using the larger screws for the operation. This was his
obligation as the physician undertaking the operation.
Second, Dr. Gestuvo failed to disclose these risks to Rosit,
deciding by himself that Rosit could not afford to get the more
expensive titanium screws.
Third, had Rosit been informed that there was a risk that the
larger screws are not appropriate for the operation and that an
additional operation replacing the screws might be required to
replace the same, as what happened in this case, Rosit would not
have agreed to the operation.
Fourth, as a result of using the larger screws, Rosit experienced
pain and could not heal properly because one of the screws hit his
molar. This was evident from the fact that just three (3) days after
Dr. Pangan repeated the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo,
Rosit was pain-free and could already speak. This is compared to
the one (1) month that Rosit suffered pain and could not use his
mouth after the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo until the
operation of Dr. Pangan.
Therefore, in the case of Rosit, both the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitor and the Doctrine of Informed Consent applies.
The definition of medical negligence in both Garcia-Rueda vs
Pascasioand Sps. Flores vs Spouses Pineda contemplate only BODILY
HARM or DEATH of a patient.
But in the case of CASUMPANG VS CORTEJO (2015), the SC defined
medical malpractice suit, as an action available to victims to redress a
wrong committed by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to,
or the death of, a patient. As the term is used, the suit is brought
whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet
the standards demanded by his profession, or deviates from this
standard, and causes injury to the patient.
Situtational problem:
Suppose you visit a gynecologist and he videos your genital. The video
became a scandal over the internet. Is that medical malpractice?
Answer: It’s malpractice but it’s not medical malpractice because it is
outside of his being a medical professional.
What then is the remedy?
1. Go after his license.
2. Sue him a civil case.
3RD ELEMENT: Causation
There must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the
negligent act or omission and the resulting injury.
The same as causation in general tort law. Thus, the same defenses to
causation, including the concept of an efficient intervening cause,
applies to a medical malpractice case.
CAYAO-LASAM VS RAMOLETE
GR NO 159132 December 18, 2008
The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a
substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own injury. Had Editha
returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper medical
tests and procedure necessary to determine Editha’s health
condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could
have prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure
having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical
practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission was the proximate cause
of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her
part.
Based on the evidence presented in the present case under
review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner,
the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury
was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up
check up, in defiance of petitioners orders. The immediate cause
of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover
damages from the injury.
EXTENT OF LIABILITY
If a physician, for example, committed actionable malpractice as a solo
practitioner and in the course of treatment in his own clinic, liability
would be based on Article 2176.
If a physician committed a medical malpractice while being clearly an
employee of the hospital, vicarious liability is proper under Article 2180.
Remember that for employment based vicarious liability, it is essential
to prove employer-employee relationship in accordance with labor law
including the power of control.
This is easy to prove if, for example, the malpractice was committed by
a nurse, orderly, or aide of a hospital. All elements of a vicarious liability
would conceivably be present.
REQUISITES TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM
To sustain claims against employers (hospitals) for the acts of their
employees (nurses, etc.) the following REQUISITES must be
established:
1. that the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another;
2. that the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and
3. that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.
What about doctors?
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Note that many of them are, for a lack of a better term and to a certain
degree, “independent contractors”
Many doctors have clinics in one or more hospitals. Surgeons do not
perform surgeries exclusively in one hospital.
The threshold issue therefore, is whether a doctor can be
considered an employee of the hospital. If he is, then article
2180 applies.
RAMOS VS CA & DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER
GR NO 124354, December 29, 1999
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos was admitted at the De Los Santos Medical
Center complaining of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by
the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was operated
upon by Dr. Hosaka and the anesthesiologist was Dr. Gutierrez.
After the operation, the patient suffered brain damage. She
became comatose due to an allergic reaction to the anesthesia.
Her family sued both doctors and the hospital under Article 2180.
De Los Santos Medical Center contends that the doctors were
merely consultants and technically not its employees.
HELD: The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up
specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants," who are
allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in
apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice
cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring
and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within
the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots,
visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of
residency, their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of
accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of
fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or
by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or
reject the application. (Power of Control)
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending
consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological
conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and
residents, moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform
other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of
admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the
physician's performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a
peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity
statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and
residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who
regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the
hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely
terminated. (Power of Dismissal)
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While
"consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the rights
to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in
fact exists, the control test is determining. (Power of Hiring)
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
This being the case, the question now arises as to whether or not
respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for
petitioner's condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a
general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians,
failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the
latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of
supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to
offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital
thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of
Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is
consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's
condition.
DOCTRINE TO REMEMBER: for the purpose of allocating responsibility
in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in
effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
RAMOS VS CA
GR NO 124354 APRIL 11, 2002
(MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the
services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and grants
him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting
patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he
or she possesses the necessary qualifications, such as
accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of
fellowship and references.
Second, it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the
consultants fee for services rendered by the latter.
Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter
may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the
hospital.
Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a patient for
admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the
treatment to be given to said patient. The hospitals obligation is
limited to providing the patient with the preferred room
accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed
by the doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary for the
treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital
staff who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the
doctor’s orders are carried out strictly.
In other words for this particular medical malpractice case, there
is no power of control.
HELD: After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by
DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent hospitals position on this
issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee relationship
between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold
DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Editor’s Note:
There was no employer-employee relationship because there was
no power of control that was established.
Observation (first case Vs. the MR):
In the first case, the SC ruled that for the purpose of allocating liability
in medical negligence cases there is deemed to exist an employer-
employee relationship between the hospital and the physician-
consultants.
However, on the MR, the SC reversed its earlier pronouncement and
ruled that using the four-fold test, there could not be any such
relationship between the hospital and the doctors.
Q: The 1st case was reversed by the motion for reconsideration. So does
that mean that the doctrine to remember is not anymore applicable
because the ruling was reversed? Does the MR operate as a complete
reversal?
Answer: NO. Because after the ruling of the SC in the MR, the SC again
reiterated the doctrine in:
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS N&E AGANA
GR NO 126297, January 31, 2007
In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital
and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of our
categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals that for
purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE DOCTRINE:
Q: Does the fact that a physician-consultant is allowed to practice
medicine in a hospital operate to immediately call for the application of
the RAMOS DOCTRINE in medical malpractice cases?
A: No. you still have to apply the four-fold test and most especially, the
control test.
It becomes therefore a question of fact. You must plead and prove it.
If you are the plaintiff and you are able to prove it, then employee-
employer relationship exists.
If refuted properly by the defendant, especially power of control, then
there is no application of article 2180 and you only hold the doctors
liable under 2176. No vicarious liability.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS N&E AGANA
GR NO 126297, February 2, 2010
(Motion for Reconsideration)
PSI sought a reconsideration of the earlier decision based on the
second Ramos case. It contends that it exercises no control over
its consultants.
HELD: This Court still employs the control test to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between hospital
and doctor. In Calamba Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al. it held:
Under the "control test", an employment relationship exists
between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both
the means and the details of the process by which the physician is
to accomplish his task.
xx xx xx
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 34
As priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-
schedules, as determined by petitioner through its medical
director, which consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight
hours each week and which were strictly to be observed under
pain of administrative sanctions.
That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from
the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating
room, or any department or ward for that matter, respondents'
work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses
and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its
medical director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas.
For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to
actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, it
being enough that it has the right to wield the power.
Even in its December 29, 1999 decisionand April 11, 2002
resolution in Ramos, the Court found the control test decisive.
Control as a determinative factor in testing the employer-
employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which
the hospital could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical
negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established by
preponderance of evidence.
What happens if the control test is not satisfied?
In PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS N&E AGANA, GR NO
126297, February 2, 2010, the SC ruled that employer-employee
relationship is not the only basis to hold hospitals liable in medical
malpractice suits.
HELD: While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice
medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical
practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and
surgical treatment.
Within that reality, three legal relationships crisscross:
(1) between the hospital and the doctor practicing within its
premises;
(2) between the hospital and the patient being treated or
examined within its premises and
(3) between the patient and the doctor.
The exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent
of the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the doctor.
Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the
hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent ( doctrine
of apparent authority), the hospital may still be vicariously liable
under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the
Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.
Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital
may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or
failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should
conform as a corporation.
THREE ADDITIONAL DOCTRINES AVAILABLE ASIDE FROM THE
CONTROL TEST:
1. Concurrent or Independent Negligence
2. Doctrine of Apparent Authority
3. Doctrine of Corporate Responsibility
CONCURRENT OR INDEPENDENT NEGLIGENCE
If both the doctor and the hospital were negligent, and their negligence
concurred in producing the injury, they are both liable as joint
tortfeasors.
Remember that the liability of joint tortfeasors is solidary. (Art. 2194)
DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY
In other words, if the hospital holds out to the public, make patients rely
on the representation on the part of the hospital that this physician or
doctor has the power or agency to act in its behalf.
Two factors that determine apparent authority:
1. The hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which led
the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent;
and
2. The patients reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the
doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
NOGALES ET AL VS CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER ET AL
GR NO 142625 December 19, 2006
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception
to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the
ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as
the DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY.
[U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing
care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an
independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have
known, that the physician is an independent contractor. The
elements of the action have been set out as follows:
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent
authority, a plaintiff must show that:
1. The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual
who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or
agent of the hospital;
2. Here the acts of the agent create the appearance of
authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital
had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
3. The plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
The element of holding out on the part of the hospital does not
require an express representation by the hospital that the person
alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is
satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency
room care without informing the patient that the care is provided
by independent contractors.
The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is
satisfied if the plaintiff relies upon the hospital to provide
complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific
physician.
READ:
 Casumpang vs. Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015
(Reiteration of the Doctrine of Apparent Authority)
DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC. VS CA
GR NO 126297, February 11, 2008
The duty of providing quality medical service is no longer the sole
prerogative and responsibility of the physician. This is because the
modern hospital now tends to organize a highly-professional
medical staff whose competence and performance need also to be
monitored by the hospital commensurate with its inherent
responsibility to provide quality medical care. Such responsibility
includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical
staff. Accordingly, the hospital has the duty to make a reasonable
effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and
administered by the physicians practicing in its premises.
SUMMARY
Making hospitals vicariously liable
1. Establish power of control by the hospital over the physician
(RAMOS CASE)
2. Establish apparent authority to render hospital estopped from
denying its connection to the physician (NOGALES CASE, 3rd
professional services ruling and CASUMPANG CASE);
DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY or OSTENSIBLE
AGENCY; or
3. Establish that the hospital failed to properly supervise the
members of its medical staff or that it failed to discharge its
duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the
treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians
practicing in its premises, (2nd PSI case, DOCTRINE OF
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY.
4th ELEMENT: Damage suffered by the patient
In short, we go back to the same basic elements for practically every
tort and that would be:
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Proximate Causation (as distinguished from causation in fact)
4. Injury or Damage
Torts 2019 1st Exam | 35