1) Moya vs Del Fierro:

As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be
the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption
of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of
popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his
Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when called upon to act in
justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for
the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.

2) Badelles vs Cabili:

We are not unaware of the undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their
drafting or precision in their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure
to have the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts,
rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed,
would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a cause
of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleaded. We cannot
in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.

3) Tolentino vs COMELEC, 2004 (Focus on dissenting opinion)

The 1987 Constitution, with its declaration that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a
democratic state, and its various provisions broadening the space for direct democracy unmistakably
show the framers' intent to give the Filipino people a greater say in government. The heart of
democracy lies in the majoritarian rule but the majoritarian rule is not a mere game of dominant
numbers. The majority can rule and rule effectively only if its judgment is an informed one. With an
informed electorate, a healthy collision of ideas is assured that will generate sparks to fan the flames of
democracy. Rule by the ignorant majority is a sham democracy — a mobocracy — for in the words of
Jefferson, a nation cannot be both free and ignorant . If there is anything that democracy cannot
survive, it is the virus of ignorance.

4) Purisima vs Salanga

It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent irregularity in the
election returns. In the present case, there were patent erasures and superimpositions in words and
figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers. It was therefore
imperative for the board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic copies and
recourse to the courts. the board of canvassers.

Since the board of canvassers prevented Purisima from securing the Commission on Elections' copies of
the returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies the failure to
submit the Commission on Elections' copies to said board should not prejudice Purisima's right to
petition for recount before the court. It was therefore grave abuse of discretion for respondent court to
refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies, regardless of the patent and admitted
irregularities on the face of the Provincial Treasurer's copies and the alleged discrepancy amounting to
thousands of votes sufficient to affect the results.

Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent erasures
and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns strike at the
reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with the other copies,
and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of
said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.

5) Cauton vs COMELEC

The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils
that may vitiate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government.

The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a
fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the
Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly and honest
elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.

As We have adverted to, the Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there exist
discrepancies among the various copies of the election returns.

6) Roque vs COMELEC (Automated Elections 2009)

The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and
lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions
that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be
afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would
enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly, honest
and peaceful elections.

We may not agree fully with [the Comelec's] choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and
political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from the standpoint of pure theory [or
speculation].

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to
evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the
laws relative to the conduct of elections, . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
[Comelec] the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

MR: The Court, to repeat, will not venture to say that nothing could go wrong in the conduct of the 2010
nationwide automated elections. Neither will it guarantee, as it is not even equipped with the necessary
expertise to guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and
consolidation software embedded in them. That difficult and complex undertaking belongs at the first
instance to the Comelec as part of its mandate to insure orderly and peaceful elections. The Comelec,
as it were, is laboring under a very tight timeline. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of
orderly and honest elections, all men and women of goodwill, to assist Comelec personnel in addressing
the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. After all, peaceful, fair, honest, and credible
elections is everyone's concern.

7) Arroyo vs DOJ and COMELEC

2012:

the grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the Comelec was
not by virtue of the Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses
concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. If the prosecutors had been allowed to
conduct preliminary investigation and file the necessary information by virtue only of a delegated
authority, they now have better grounds to perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of
authority. If deputation was justified because of lack of funds and legal officers to ensure prompt and
fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses, the same justification should be cited to justify
the grant to the other prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent jurisdiction.

2013:

To reiterate:

The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one les a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-ling of substantially the same complaint with another
office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases
led will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

8) Ongsioko Reyes vs Comelec

June 2013:

the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives,

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

October 2013:

9) Lico vs COMELEC
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not
intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.

Needless to say, membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that
qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the
officer entire tenure.

Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes
to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

10) Lokin, Jr. v COMELEC

The COMELEC has jurisdiction over case pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of party-list
representatives.

In any case, the COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well
established. This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by
the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers.

11) Estrella v. COMELEC

Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which provides:

SECTION 7.

Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. . . . (Emphasis and italics
supplied)

The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its members and not
only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory
construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. Since the above quoted constitutional provision states "all of its
members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.

12) Sevilla vs COMELEC:

Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads:

Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.

— When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

13) Ibrahim vs COMELEC

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by
the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is no obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions resolutions, orders
or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

14) Jaramilla vs COMELEC

As stated in the provision (Article IX-C), and in line with the Court's recent pronouncement in Milla v
Balmores-Laxa, 8 election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and
decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for
reconsideration of the division is filed.

It must be noted however that this provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.
This doctrine was laid out in Castromayor v COMELEC and reiterated in subsequent cases.

Accordingly, when the case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions,
such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the
statement of votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional
function to decide questions affecting elections.