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1. Dilema securităţii
Tucidide, Războiul Peloponesului: “Ceea ce a făcut războiul inevitabil a fost creşterea puterii
ateniene şi teama pe care aceasta i-a cauzat-o Spartei”.
Creşterea puterii militare a unui stat, A, produce o percepție de insecuritate pentru alt stat,
B. Dacă statul B nu-şi măreşte, la rându-i, capacitatea militară, riscă să fie expus acţiunilor
agresive ale lui A. Dacă, pe de altă parte, B îşi măreşte puterea militară, A se va simţi
ameninţat, astfel că va trebui să se înarmeze, ceea ce duce, mai departe, la o percepție de
insecuritate a lui B etc. Concluzia este că ambele cursuri de acţiune au ca efect o percepție
diminuată de securitate. Mai mult, unul dintre ele duce la o periculoasă cursă a înarmărilor.
Teza liberală: ieşirea din această dilemă se poate face prin cooperare internaţională.
Vânătoarea cerbului
Replica liberală la argumentul sceptic (neo)realist a fost cel mai bine articulată de către
Robert Axelrod și Robert Keohane (1985), „Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions”, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 226-254.
1
Game theory is a study of strategic decision making. More formally, it is “the study of mathematical models of
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.” (Roger B. Myerson, 1991. Game Theory:
Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, p. 1)
2
Albert W. Tucker (1905-1995) formalized the game with prison sentence payoffs and gave it the name
“prisoner's dilemma” (Poundstone, 1992). A classic example of the game is presented as follows:
Two men are arrested, but the police do not have enough information for a conviction. The police separate the
two men, and offer both the same deal: if one testifies against his partner (defects/betrays), and the other
remains silent (cooperates with/assists his partner), the betrayer goes free and the one that remains silent gets a
one-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to only one month in jail on a minor charge. If each
'rats out' the other, each receives a three-month sentence. Each prisoner must choose either to betray or remain
silent; the decision of each is kept secret from his partner. What should they do? If it is assumed that each player
is only concerned with lessening his own time in jail, the game becomes a non-zero sum game where the two
players may either assist or betray the other. The sole concern of the prisoners seems to be increasing their own
reward. The interesting symmetry of this problem is that the optimal decision for each is to betray the other, even
though they would be better off if they both cooperated.
3
James Dean in Rebel Without A Cause (1955): „The thugs challenge Jim to a "Chickie Run" with Buzz, racing
stolen cars towards an abyss. The first one who jumps out of the car loses and is deemed the "chicken". The
"game" ends in tragedy for Buzz when a strap on the sleeve of his leather jacket becomes looped over a handle
on the car door, preventing him from jumping out before the car goes over the cliff.”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebel_Without_a_Cause)
2
Așadar, teza liberală este că dilema securității poate fi modelată ca dilemă a prizonierului
și că, prin modificarea structurii de răsplăți, dilema prizonierului poate fi, uneori,
transformată în vânătoare a cerbului.
To start with, Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game in which both players have an incentive to defect
no matter whether the other player cooperates or defects. If the other player cooperates, the
first player prefers to defect: DC > CC. On the other hand, if the other player defects the first
player still prefers to defect: DD > CD. The dilemma is that, if both defect both do worse than
if both had cooperated: CC > DD. Thus, Prisoner’s Dilemma has a preference ordering for
both players of DC > CC > DD > CD.
Now consider a shift in the preferences of both players, so that mutual cooperation is
preferred to unilateral defection. His makes the preference ordering CC > DC > DD > CD,
which is a less conflictual game called Stag Hunt.
Actors can also move from Prisoner’s Dilemma to more conflictual games. If both players
come to believe that mutual cooperation is worse than mutual defection, the game becomes
Deadlock, with both sides having preferences of DC >DD > CC > CD. Since the dominant
strategy of each player is to defect regardless of what the other does, the likely outcome is
DD. Players in Deadlock, unlike those in PD, will not benefit from repeated plays since mutual
cooperation is not preferred to mutual defection.
The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to
defect today – since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow. (p. 232)
3
Noul Testament, Matei 18/21-22:
Atunci Petru s-a apropiat de EL si i-a zis: „Doamne, de câte ori să iert pe fratele meu când va
păcătui împotriva mea? Până la șapte ori?” Isus i-a zis: „Eu nu-ți zic până la șapte ori, ci până
la șaptezeci de ori câte șapte.”
Joseph Grieco (1988), „Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 485-507
4
Instituționalismul neoliberal acordă atenție doar celei dintâi și este incapabil să identifice, să
analizeze și să dea seama de cea de-a doua. (Grieco 1988: 487)
Observație