action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
Caterpillar, Inc. vs. Samson, criminal action may proceed.
808 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 205972, G.R. No. 164352 November 9, 2016
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; The determination of probable
cause to charge a person in court for a criminal offense is exclusively
lodged in the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Department of Justice (DOJ).—The determination of probable cause to
charge a person in court for a criminal offense is exclusively lodged in the
Executive Branch of the Government, through the Department of Justice.
Initially, the determination is done by the investigating public prosecutor, and
on review by the Secretary of Justice or his duly authorized subordinate.
Same; Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured
party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution.—We note, to begin with, that
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in
Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of
trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal
prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A common element of all such
cases for unfair competition — civil and criminal — was fraud. Under Article
33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and
such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
Prejudicial Questions; A civil action for damages and cancellation of
trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend
the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair competition.—A civil action
for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a
prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
cases for unfair competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a
civil case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issues to be
determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.
Same; The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7
of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar to or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.—The
elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111,
Rules of Court, to wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar to or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
Probable Cause; Certiorari; The courts could intervene in the
determination of probable cause only through the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal through
the petition for review under Rule 43.—The courts could intervene in the
determination of probable cause only through the special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal through the
petition for review under Rule 43. Thus, the CA could not reverse or undo the
findings and conclusions on probable cause by the Secretary of Justice
except upon clear demonstration of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Secretary of Justice.
Same; Probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court
consists in such facts and circumstances as would engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused may
probably be guilty thereof.—Probable cause for the purpose of filing an
information in court consists in such facts and circum stances as would
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
accused may probably be guilty thereof. The determination of probable
cause lies solely within the sound discretion of the investigating public
prosecutor after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Same; By the nature of his office, the public prosecutor cannot be
compelled to file a criminal information in court if he is not convinced
of the sufficiency of the evidence adduced for a finding of probable
cause.—It is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering with the
determination of what constitutes sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of the accused. Thus, it is
imperative that by the nature of his office, the public prosecutor cannot be
compelled to file a criminal information in court if he is not convinced of the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced for a finding of probable cause. Neither
can he be precluded from filing an information if he is convinced of the merits
of the case.
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo,
837 SCRA 160, G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; It is within the Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper
conditions, it may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the
parties’ arguments and positions despite the supposed technical
infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws.—On matters of
technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless,
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court’s
power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We
may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties’ arguments and
positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Matters of procedure and
technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and
transcendental importance are present.—Matters of procedure and
technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and
transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the
Philippines’ problem on illegal drugs has reached “epidemic,” “monstrous,”
and “harrowing” proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes,
and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. At the
same time, We have equally noted that “as urgent as the campaign against
the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant
in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution
x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may
be unjustly accused and convicted.” Fully aware of the gravity of the drug
menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the
Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to
lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers
and users.
Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Supreme Court’s (SC’s)
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.—The power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared
with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 301 SCRA 96 (1999), then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puna traced the history of the Court’s rulemaking power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
Political Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers among
the three (3) coequal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of the Supreme Court
(SC).—The separation of powers among the three coequal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province
of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, We
have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise
of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules).
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Speedy Trial Act
of 1998; Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of
1998”) required that plea bargaining and other matters that will promote
a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pretrial
conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the Sandiganbayan.—When
R.A. No. 8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of 1998”) was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118
of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that
plea bargaining and other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial
are to be considered during pretrial conference in all criminal cases
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) sole
prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter.—The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to
issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter. “Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Promulgation of Judgments;
Failure to Appear at the Promulgation; The Supreme Court (SC) said in
Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA 452 (2015), that Section
6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the judgment, does not take away
substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.—We said in Jaylo, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA 452 (2015), that Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely
provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the
right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is
the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits
their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment. It is not
correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of
the power of the Supreme Court to “provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.” This provision protects the
courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases — delay arising
from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
Same; Same; Plea Bargaining; In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has
been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval.”—In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-
and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed, economy, and
finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and
the court. Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on
plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
Same; Same; Same; Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged.—The decision to plead guilty is often
heavily influenced by the defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case
against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense
charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a “serious and sobering
occasion” inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and
counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Yet a defendant has no
constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand
can sustain.
Same; Same; Same; Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a
plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for
the convenience of the accused.—The plea is further addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court
on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted
to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment,
the pretrial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested
its case.—Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pretrial, or
even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. As
regards plea bargaining during the pretrial stage, the trial court’s exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. “Grave abuse of
discretion” is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when
a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its
case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.—If
the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail
hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea
only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the
court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As
soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said
motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution’s
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence
on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is
improper and irregular.
G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Tiara Commercial Corporation,
842 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 201378 October 18, 2017
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; Motion for Extension of Time; Under the Rules, the period to
file a petition for review on certiorari is fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the judgment, resolution, or final order appealed from. Nevertheless, on
motion of the party filed before the reglementary period, the Supreme
Court (SC) may grant extension for a period not exceeding thirty (30)
days.—Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governing the procedure
for filing an appeal through a petition for review on certiorari expressly allows
the filing of a motion for extension of time. Under the Rules, the period to file
a petition for review on certiorari is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
judgment, resolution, or final order appealed from. Nevertheless, on motion
of the party filed before the reglementary period, this Court may grant
extension for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. In a Resolution dated
July 16, 2012, we granted Florida’s motion for extension of time. We thus find
GV Florida’s petition to be timely filed.
Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; Interlocutory Orders; In remedial law,
an order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory
order; When an order is merely interlocutory — one which refers to
something between the commencement and end of the suit which
decides some point or matter but is not the final decision of the whole
controversy — Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an appeal cannot be
had. In this instance, a party’s recourse is to file an answer, with the
option to include grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and proceed
to trial. In the event that an adverse judgment is rendered, the party can
file an appeal and raise the interlocutory order as an error.—In remedial
law, an order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory
order. This classification is vital because the kind of court order determines
the particular remedy that a losing party may pursue. In the case of a final
order — one that finally disposes of a case — the proper remedy is an
appeal. On the other hand, when an order is merely interlocutory — one
which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but is not the final decision of the whole
controversy — Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an appeal cannot be had.
In this instance, a party’s recourse is to file an answer, with the option to
include grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and proceed to trial. In the
event that an adverse judgment is rendered, the party can file an appeal and
raise the interlocutory order as an error. This general rule is subject to a
narrow exception. A party may question an interlocutory order without
awaiting judgment after trial if its issuance is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, the party
can file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; “Appeal” and “Certiorari,” Distinguished.—A special civil action
for certiorari is an original civil action and not an appeal. An appeal aims to
correct errors in judgment and rectify errors in the appreciation of facts and
law which a lower court may have committed in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari, on the other hand, is used to
correct errors in jurisdiction. We have defined an error in jurisdiction as “one
where the officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion is not
mere abuse of discretion but must be grave “as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”—Grave abuse of
discretion has a precise meaning in remedial law. It is not mere abuse of
discretion but must be grave “as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.” In more concrete terms, not every error committed by a tribunal
amounts to grave abuse of discretion. A misappreciation of the facts or a
misapplication of the law does not, by itself, warrant the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari. There must be a clear abuse of the authority vested in a
tribunal. This abuse must be so serious and so grave that it warrants the
interference of the court to nullify or modify the challenged action and to undo
the damage done.
Same; Civil Procedure; Summons; Service of Summons; Alias
Summons; In cases of improper service of summons, courts should not
automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to issue alias
summons and ensure that it is properly served.—We agree that there
was improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply
jurisprudence and rule that in cases of improper service of summons, courts
should not automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to issue alias
summons and ensure that it is properly served. Service of summons is the
main mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in a civil case. Through it, the defendant is informed of the action
against him or her and he or she is able to adequately prepare his or her
course of action. Rules governing the proper service of summons are not
mere matters of procedure. They go into a defendant’s right to due process.
Thus, strict compliance with the rules on service of summons is mandatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the former rule allowed service on an
agent of a corporation, the current rule has provided for a list of
specific persons to whom service of summons must be made.—Section
11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of
summons to a domestic private juridical entity. It states: Sec. 11. Service
upon domestic private juridical entity.—When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the
old rules pertaining to the service of summons on corporations. While the
former rule allowed service on an agent of a corporation, the current rule has
provided for a list of specific persons to whom service of summons must be
made.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of summons is not the only mode
through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; When a party appears before the court without qualification,
he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack
of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.—Service of
summons, however, is not the only mode through which a court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—
The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. There is voluntary appearance when a
party, without directly assailing the court’s lack of jurisdiction, seeks
affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the court
without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection
regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons. When a
defendant, however, appears before the court for the specific purpose of
questioning the court’s jurisdiction over him or her, this is a special
appearance and does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so
long as a defendant raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is
allowed to include other grounds of objection. In such case, there is no
voluntary appearance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Improper service of summons and lack of
voluntary appearance do not automatically warrant the dismissal of the
complaint.—Still, improper service of summons and lack of voluntary
appearance do not automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint. In
Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 125 SCRA 522
(1983), we held: A case should not be dismissed simply because an original
summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for
example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court
complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed
against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served
on said defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alias Summons; When there is improper
service of summons and the defendant makes a special appearance to
question this, the proper and speedy remedy is for the court to issue
alias summons.—When there is improper service of summons and the
defendant makes a special appearance to question this, the proper and
speedy remedy is for the court to issue alias summons. In the present case,
the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While
she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find
that TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC
when it filed its pretrial brief without any reservation as to the court’s
jurisdiction over it. At no point in its pretrial brief did TCC raise the issue of
the RTC’s jurisdiction over it. In fact, it even asked the RTC that it be allowed
to reserve the presentation of additional evidence through documents and
witnesses. While it is true that TCC initially filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, we
rule that TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the
court when it subsequently filed its pretrial brief without any reservation and
even prayed to be allowed to present additional evidence. This, to this
Court’s mind, is an unequivocal submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC to
conduct the trial.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Prescription; Prescription is a
ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the
merits; When the issue of prescription requires the determination of
evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal
without hearing.—Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint
without going to trial on the merits. Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is
raised in a motion to dismiss which is filed before the answer. It may also be
raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. At the discretion of the court,
a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense may be conducted as if a
motion to dismiss was filed. Nevertheless, this is only a general rule. When
the issue of prescription requires the determination of evidentiary matters, it
cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal without hearing.
Same; Evidence; Admissibility of Evidence; Under the Rules of Court, a
party presenting a document as evidence must first establish its due
execution and authenticity as a preliminary requirement for its
admissibility.—TCC alleges that GV Florida’s third-party complaint (which it
argues is essentially an action for implied warranty) has already prescribed.
The Civil Code states that this claim must be made within six months from
the time of the delivery of the thing sold. Without preempting the RTC’s
findings on the validity of the argument that this is a warranty claim, a finding
that the action has prescribed requires the ascertainment of the delivery date
of the tires in question. This, in turn, requires the presentation of the delivery
receipts as well as their identification and authentication. Under the Rules of
Court, a party presenting a document as evidence must first establish its due
execution and authenticity as a preliminary requirement for its admissibility.
Planters Development Bank vs. Ramos,
840 SCRA 453, G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Written stipulations as to venue
may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the
place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file
their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed
by law.—The general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4
thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the
parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof. Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or
restrictive. “Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense
that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but
also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential
is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.”
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words,
the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.—In view
of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely permissive, the
parties must therefore employ words in the contract that would clearly evince
a contrary intention. In Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, 499 SCRA 718
(2006), the Court emphasized that “the mere stipulation on the venue of an
action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues.
The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed
as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.”
Same; Same; Same; Not being contrary to law or public policy, the
stipulation on venue, which Planters Development Bank (PDB) and
Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law
between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.—In
view of the foregoing, the RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to
Dismiss filed by PDB on the ground that the venue was improperly laid. The
complaint being one for annulment of real estate mortgages and promissory
notes is in the nature of a personal action, the venue of which may be fixed
by the parties to the contract. In this case, it was agreed that any suit or
action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or the promissory notes
must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public
policy, the stipulation on venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and
willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should
be complied with in good faith.
Same; Same; Same; The stipulation on the venue was couched in a
language showing the intention of the parties to restrict the filing of any
suit or action to the designated place only. It is crystal clear that the
intention was not just to make the said place an additional forum or
venue but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to
the mortgage contracts may be filed.—In the present case, Spouses
Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the venue for any suit or
action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they agreed to
limit the same to Makati City only and nowhere else. True enough, the
stipulation on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention of
the parties to restrict the filing of any suit or action to the designated place
only. It is crystal clear that the intention was not just to make the said place
an additional forum or venue but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action
pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be filed. There being no showing
that such waiver was invalid or that the stipulation on venue was against
public policy, the agreement of the parties should be upheld. It is therefore a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to deny the motion to
dismiss filed by PDB on the ground of improper venue, especially when the
said issue had been raised at the most opportune time, that is, within the
time for but before the filing of an answer. The CA should have given this
matter a more serious consideration and not simply brushed it aside.
Tujan-Militante vs. Nustad,
827 SCRA 390, G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; A trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons.
However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of
summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.—A trial court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of
summons. However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of
summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court provides: Section 20. Voluntary Appearance.—The
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service
of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
Same; Same; Same; A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.—By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual
[petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In this case, while
Tujan-Militante’s motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a
quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of
a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative relief is tantamount
to voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary
appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper
objection, necessitates submission to the [court]’s jurisdiction.
Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notarized document has in
its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.—We rule on
the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that
[Nustad] certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to
administer an oath that she is authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition
before the court a quo on her behalf. A notarized document has in its favor
the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the document should be upheld.
People vs. Go, 719 SCRA 704,
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices; Public Officers; Corrupt
Practices of Public Officers; Elements of.—Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019
provides: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: x x x x (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government,
into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. The
elements of the above provision are: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for
the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.—At the outset,
it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this
Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.
Same; Same; Same; It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile’s death,
there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer
be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.—It is
true that by reason of Secretary Enrile’s death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It
does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no
public officer who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were
it not for his death, he should have been charged.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer; If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.—The requirement before a private person may be indicted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private
person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The
law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the
public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
Same; Same; Same; The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.—Indeed, it is not
necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.
If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them
and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said,
written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of
them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead,
sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more
conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
Thus, this Court held that: x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense.
One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or
intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot
be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
Same; Same; Same; The avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress “acts of public officers and private persons alike,
which constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be frustrated if the
death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person
who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft
Law.—The Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State
and the legislative intent to repress “acts of public officers and private
persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be frustrated
if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person
who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.—It is
settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where
respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; The rule is well settled
that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.—Respondent should be reminded that prior to this
Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that private
respondent’s act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests
the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of
an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus,
it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before
a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to
avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise
the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea
or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his
person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Sandiganbayan;The Sandiganbayan is a
special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by
certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606
as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers.—The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by
certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accesso ries with the said public officers. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based
on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of
one of the alleged offenders.
Cabugao vs. People,
435 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 158033 July 30, 2004
Evidence; Hearsay Evidence; Certified True Copies; Under the Rules of
Court, when the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.—The
contention of the respondent that the subject documents are uncertified is
erro neous. Under the Rules of Court, when the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. The Rules does not require that the certification should be in a
particular form. The four-page Resolution dated December 8, 1997 contains
a stamped certification signed by Police Inspector David U. Ursua of the
Legal Service, PNP Regional Office I of Parian, San Fernando, La Union.
The three-page Decision dated February 28, 1997 has the handwritten
authentication of Police Inspector Mario L. Aduan, also from the same office,
on each and every page.They ought to satisfy the requirement of the Rules
on certification.
Same; Same; Where a party fails to object to evidence when offered, he
is deemed to have waived his objection thereto, and consequently, the
evidence offered may be admitted.—The respondent did not raise the
hearsay objection when the subject documents were offered in evidence by
the defense. When the father of the petitioner was asked during direct
examination if he had proof that SPO2 Domingo was dismissed from service
and that SPO1 Lomibao was involved in drug activities, the prosecution
objected on other grounds, i.e., that “the line of questioning is now irrelevant
and immaterial” and that “(t)his is not (sic) the character of the complain-ant
which is in issue.” When the subject documents were marked as exhibits, the
prosecution again did not raise any objection. When the documents were
formally offered in evidence, the respondent once more did not object on the
ground of hearsay. The prosecution objected on the ground that the
documents are “off-tangent to the issue in this case.” The Rules of Court
requires that grounds for objection must be specified, whether orally or in
writing. The result of violating this rule has been spelled out by this Court in a
number of cases. In Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, the counsel for the petitioner
objected to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was
privileged but did not question the testimony as hearsay. We held that “in
failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence
offered may be admitted.”
Same; Same; Documentary pieces of evidence which have material
bearing on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses cannot be
cavalierly dismissed as irrelevant.—The documentary pieces of evidence
cannot be cavalierly dismissed as irrelevant. They have a material bearing on
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1
Lomibao. SPO2 Domingo has been dismissed from the service as of
February 28, 1997. At the time of the incident on March 12, 1999, he was no
longer a policeman and yet misrepresented himself as one. On the other
hand, SPO1 Lomibao has been found guilty of drug use. Their credibility as
truth tellers leaves much to be desired.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Policemen; Buy-Bust Operations;
The participation of a dismissed policeman in the alleged buy-bust
operation when he was no longer a member of the police force speaks
ill of the regularity of the operation.—The participation of SPO2 Domingo
in the alleged buy-bust operation when he was no longer a member of the
police force speaks ill of the regularity of the operation. It is unusual for SPO2
Domingo to be given the role of poseur buyer when he was at the time a
dismissed policeman. As a dismissed policeman, he is not entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Yet this
presumption was used as a crutch to convict the petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of the prosecution to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation, failing of which, the
buy-bust operation will be greeted with furrowed brows.—In People vs.
Ong, we held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete
picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the
poseur buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the
illegal subject of sale. Failing in this duty, the buy-bust operation will be
greeted with furrowed brows.
Same; Same; Witnesses; A witness who manufactures a kind of lie that
could lead to the long time incarceration of the victim does not merit
credence.—The records show that the charge for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 or illegal possession of dangerous weapon against the
petitioner was dismissed due to the repeated failure of SPO2 Domingo and
SPO1 Lomibao to appear before the court despite due notice. This repeated
failure strengthens the impression that the prosecution story about the
dagger taken from the petitioner is false. The falsity is not of little
significance. A witness who manufactures that kind of a lie that could lead to
the long time incarceration of the victim does not merit credence.
Same; Same; Same; Prosecution’s evidence, resting mainly on the
testimonies of two police officers whose authority and credibility are
highly doubtful, cannot sustain the conviction of the accused.—It is
well-settled that conviction must rest upon the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The
prosecution’s evidence, resting mainly on the testimonies of two police
officers whose authority and credibility are highly doubtful, cannot sustain the
conviction of the petitioner.
Cabugao vs. People,
731 SCRA 214, G.R. No. 165805 July 30, 2014
Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Reckless imprudence consists of
voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.—
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that
act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results
from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Whether a physician or
surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the
treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion.—Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of
cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert
opinions of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating. From the testimonies of the expert
witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed to
practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.
Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Among the elements constitutive
of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of
guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by
his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution.—
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is
most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the
accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable
lack of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent so
indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under
the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to
the consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of
the frame of mind of the accused. Quasi-offenses penalize the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of
care or foresight, the “imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. This is precisely where this Court found
Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of — his seemingly indifference to the deteriorating
condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of
precaution which eventually led to JR’s death.
Same; Actions; Prosecution of Offenses; Every criminal conviction
requires of the prosecution to prove two things — the fact of the crime,
i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused
stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime.—Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two
things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the
crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is
the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the
prosecution failed to prove these two things. The Court is not convinced with
moral certainty that Dr. Cabugao is guilty of reckless imprudence as the
elements thereof were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Same; Death of the Accused; In People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239
(1994), the Supreme Court (SC) laid down the rules in case the accused
dies prior to final judgment.—While this case is pending appeal, counsel
for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on December
23, 2011 due to “multi­-organ failure” as evidenced by a copy of death
certificate. Thus, the effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of
petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities
should be in accordance to People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994),
wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final
judgment: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b)
Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x x x x x x x e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the
civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/admin-istrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
Same; Same; The death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability.—It is clear that the death of
the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same
is not based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was
guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a
separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based, and in accordance with Section
4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Same; Damages; Independent Civil Action; Upon the extinction of the
criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, the party may file a
separate civil action based on the other sources of obligation in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.—Upon the extinction of the criminal
liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act
or omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action based on
the other sources of obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. If the
same act or omission complained of arises from quasi-delict, as in this case,
a separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of
the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court.
Pestilos vs. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337,
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests;
Probable Cause; Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word
“probable cause” as the basis of the arresting officer’s determination
on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.—
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
amended with the incorporation of the word “probable cause” as the basis of
the arresting officer’s determination on whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has
just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As presently worded, the elements under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it.—From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it
appears that for purposes of Section 5(b), the following are the notable
changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word “just,”
connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought
to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the
arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it. It is clear that the present
rules have ‘‘objectified” the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these
changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or
hearsay. As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been
committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of probable
cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and
exercise reasonable judgment.—In determining the existence of probable
cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and
exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in
warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a
judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is
based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
arrest and not on the information acquired later. In evaluating probable
cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar
to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable
and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each
case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense
involved.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime and should be held for trial.—The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
crime and should be held for trial. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil.
363 (1915), we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Warrant of Arrest; Before issuing a
warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof.—Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be
satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The arresting
officer’s determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.—In contrast, the arresting officer’s
determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the present rules and
jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the
public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the
evidence submitted by the parties.—It is clear therefore that the standard
for determining “probable cause” is invariable for the officer arresting without
a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It
is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case
may be. However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the
judge all determine “probable cause,” within the spheres of their respective
functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use
the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of
facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine
probable cause. Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the
arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must
base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties. In other
words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a
limited time frame.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) holds that
the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer’s
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge.—The clincher in the element of “personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances” is the required element of immediacy within which these facts
or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable
cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation. The reason for the element of the immediacy is this — as the
time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of
information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the
element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer’s determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable
cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the
police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest. In light of the discussion
above on the developments of Sec tion 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the
following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should
have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer’s exercise of discretion
is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts
and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the
existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; With these facts and circumstances
that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners’
warrantless arrests.—To summarize, the arresting officers went to the
scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged
mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than
one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what
positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC’s order as it
notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the Regular Preliminary Investigation.
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that
they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners’
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within then police
officers’ observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that evidence of the

recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime.—To reiterate, personal knowledge of a
crime just committed under the terms of the above cited provision, does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in
this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime. Considering the circumstances of the
stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the
personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot
investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City
Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

Same; Same; Judgments; No less than the Constitution itself provides

that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only
required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.—We do not
see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The
RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the
record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best
reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents
leading up to the trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself
provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only
required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary