Sunteți pe pagina 1din 2

02 SPOUSES LATIP v. CHUA By: Marjorie L.

Alvarez
G.R. No. 177809 Topic: Judicial Notice
October 16, 2009
Ponente: J. Nachura
DOCTRINES:
1. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
2. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Facts
1. Rosalie is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located in Baclaran, Paranaque City. She entered into a
contract of lease with Sps Latip who occupied 2 cubicles. Rosalie demanded payment of back rentals but Sps failed to do so.
Hence, the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against Sps. Latip.
2. In their Answer, they averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by (3) receipts
showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00.
3. In October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over 2 cubicles. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the
Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights. The immediate payment of P2.5M would be
used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles. And as soon
as the 2 cubicles were finished, Spouses occupied them. Spouses averred that the contract of lease they signed had been
novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from
Rosalie’s counsel.
4. MeTC: ruled in favor of Rosalie.
5. RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip.
a. It did not give credence to the contract of lease since it was not notarized and incomplete, lacking (i) signature of
Ferdinand, Rosalie’s husband; (ii) Signatures of Spouses Latip on the 1st page; (iii) Specific dates for the term of the
contract; (iv) Exact date of execution of the document; (5) Provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which
is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
b. It believed that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2)
cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2.5M.
c. RTC shot down Rosalie’s claim that the P2.5M was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor,
and not payment for the purchase of lease rights. The court said that apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did
not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim.
6. CA reversed and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and
not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. It also found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not
render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of P2.5M+ merely constituted payment of goodwill
money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist
Church. According to CA, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane
Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
7. Sps. filed the present appeal.
Issue/s
Whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles. YES
Ruling
Spouses can be ejected since the lease ended in 2005 however, the amount of P2M+ must be deducted from
this liability of spouses to Rosalie.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary
on the courts, thus State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive. “The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.”

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. To say that a court will take
judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters, which are generally accepted by mankind as true
and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

The matter which the CA judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. Only CA took judicial notice
of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced
no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2M+ simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie
attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in
Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor.

The reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial
notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed
by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court—What need not be proved.

xxx

On the issue of whether Spouses ought to be ejected, what remains in evidence is the contract of lease and the receipts. SC
ruled that the contract is complete. It need not be signed by the husband as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts. Besides,
it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls thus, doing away with the need for her husband’s consent.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2.5M, SC held that there is nothing on
the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. Thus,
since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals
on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie
Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.

Notes

S-ar putea să vă placă și