St. Thomas Aquinas On: "The Per Accidens Necessarily Implies The Per Se"

AQUINAS' PROOFS FOR GOD'S
EXISTENCE
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON: "THE PER ACCIDENS
NECESSARILY IMPLIES THE PER SE"
by
DENNIS BONNETTE, Ph.D .
•
MARTINUS NI]HOFF /THE HAGUE/ 1972
© I972 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands
All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1303-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2380-1

DOl. 10.1007/978-94-010-2380-1
PREFACE
The purpose of this study is to investigate the legitimacy of the

principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," as it is found
in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special emphasis will be placed
upon the function of this principle in the proofs for God's existence. The
relevance of the principle in this latter context can be seen at once when
it is observed that it is the key to the solution of the well known "prob-
lem of infinite regress."
The investigation of the principle in question will be divided into two
Parts. A preliminary examination of the function of the principle will
be made in Part I: Domains Other Than That of Creature-God. The
domains to be considered in this Part are those of accident-substance,
change, and knowledge. Employing what is learned of the function of
the principle in these areas of application, Part II: The Domain of
Creature-God will analyze the role of the principle in the proofs for
God's existence. This latter Part will constitute the greater portion of
the book, since the domain of creatures in their relation to God is the
most significant application of the principle in the writings of St.
Thomas.
In the course of this investigation, relevant analyses by St. Thomas'
commentators - both classical and contemporary - will be considered.
Finally, in light of the insights offered by St. Thomas and his commen-
tators, an attempt will be made to show why St. Thomas considers that
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," is a genuinely meta-
physical principle - universal and necessary in its application.
I am indebted to Professor Joseph Bobik of the University of Notre
Dame for the original idea of the topic to be investigated. More
importantly, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Dr. Bobik
for his tireless and incisive criticism of my work. Only through his
fruitful suggestions - flowing from his profound grasp of the thought
VI PREFACE
of St. Thomas - has this study been brought to completion. Whatever

of value may be found herein must be ascribed to Dr. Bobik's inspi-
ration and guidance. Wherever there is found failure, I freely admit
it as my own.
Further, I am personally indebted to my entire family for the sym-
pathy, patience, and encouragement so vitally needed by anyone who
attempts a project of this sort. Most of all, this debt is owed to my wife,
Lois - to whom, in loving appreciation, I dedicate this book.
DENNIS BONNETTE
Niagara University
Lewiston, New York
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank sincerely and Random House Inc. for
permission to quote from Etienne Gilson's Christian Philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas (translated by L. K. Shook),
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface v
Introduction I
The Nature and Limits of the Inquiry - The Central Contexts to
be Analysed
PART I
DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CREATURE-GOD
CHAPTER I. THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE 9

Accident Implies Substance - A Self-Evident Principle - Classical
Modem Objections are Irrelevant - How Accidents Depend on
Substance - A More Profound Reason
CHAPTER II. THE DOMAIN OF CHANGE 20
The Problem of Change - A Difficulty - The Per Accidens in
Change Necessarily Requires the Per Se
CHAPTER III. THE DOMAIN OF KNOWLEDGE
Sense Knowledge - The First and Second Acts of the Mind - The
Third Act of the Mind - The Necessity of a Per Se - The Nature
of the Scientific Syllogism - A Possible Confusion - The Argument
- A Clarification - New Definitions
PART II
THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
INTRODUCTION: THE CAUSE OF PER ACCIDENS BEING 53

CHAPTER I. THE WAY OF THE DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA 56
The Way - Essence and Existence - The Argument Itself - A
Further Argument
VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER II. APROPOS OF THE QUINQUE VIAE IN GENERAL 69

The Ways - The Problem of Infinite Multitude - Proper Causality
CHAPTER III. THE PRIMA VIA 80
The Way - The Principle in Question - The Arguments - Sylvester
of Ferrara - A Second Argument - A Further Argument - Con-
temporary Comment
CHAPTER IV. THE SECUNDA VIA 105
The Way - Efficient Causality - The Argument - The Commen-
tary on the Metaphysics - The Commentators - Contemporary
Comment - Conclusions on Efficient Causality
CHAPTER V. THE TERTIA VIA 127
The Way - The Argument - The Latter Part of the Proof
CHAPTER VI. THE QUARTA VIA 140
The Way - The Argument - The Principle in Question - Parti-
cipation and Analogy - Proof from St. Thomas
CHAPTER VII. THE QUINTA VIA 157
The Way - Finality in St. Thomas - Chance - An Intelligent
Orderer - Necessity of a Per Se - The General Arguments
CONCLUSION 181
Exterior Causality - The Quinque Viae - Three Categories of
Application - The Principle in General- The Other Applications -
A Final Comment
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
INTRODUCTION
1. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF THE INQUIRY
This book is partly historical and partly systematic. It is historical in

the sense that it arises out of the writings of an historical figure, St.
Thomas Aquinas. For St. Thomas holds as a necessary proposition the
principle that whatever is per accidens must be reduced to that which is
per se. 1 And yet, although he ventures close to explicit treatment of the
topic on two occasions,2 St. Thomas never offers an ex professo analysis
of the principle.
Such an analysis is needed. For although it is immediately clear that
the per accidens or per aliud 3 necessarily requires an aliud, it is not
immediately clear that this other must be, ultimately, something per se
(and this especially in the context of proving God's existence). Although
St. Thomas does employ the principle in question as self-evident in
several of the contexts we shall investigate,4 nevertheless it will have to
be determined at some later point whether such "self-evidence"
depends solely on the particulars of those contexts or whether, rather,
it can be established in virtue of something proper to the universal
nature of the per accidens in relation to the per se.
It is with respect to this problem that this study becomes systematic.
And the systematic task becomes to show whether the principle at
issue, as such, must function in each and every order. St. Thomas does
not explicitly undertake such a task. The reason why the phrase,
1 Cf. S.T., I-II, 35, 7; De Prin. Nat., 3, n. 352; In I Phys., 14, n. 7; In I Post. Anal.,
7, n. 8; 37, n. 5. See Appendix for a list of Latin editions employed for the works of St. Thomas
Aquinas cited.
2 In I Post. Anal., 7 and In II Meta., 3 and 4.
3 That the term "per aliud" is frequently substituted for "per accidens" will be seen later.
See below, p. 10, footnote 8.
4 See below, pp. 9-37.
2 INTRODUCTION
"principle ... as such," is employed here is that there are two occasions 5
on which St. Thomas does explicitly treat a somewhat different topic,
the problem of infinite regress, which when viewed from the proper
perspective, illuminates the relationship of the per accidens to the per
se.
Although such portions of the book are termed "systematic," insofar
as they do not merely elucidate the explicit arguments of St. Thomas,
nonetheless, every attempt will be made to remain faithful to the
thought of St. Thomas by grounding each argument in his writings and,
where absolutely necessary, by building new insights in a manner which
accords with these writings.
Although St. Thomas frequently cites the proposition in support of
an argument,6 he never explicitly defends the principle: And, as noted
above, even indirect defense of the principle is offered by him on very
few occasions. This explains the otherwise perhaps surprising fact that
relatively few texts of St. Thomas will be quoted. In fact, since the
choice of contexts to be investigated will be deliberately systematic,7
appropriate use of the selected portions dictates a limited presentation
of their texts. Of course, parallel citations will be taken from parts of
St. Thomas' writings which fall outside the selected sections wherever
useful or illuminating.
Further, the contributions of St. Thomas' commentators will be
noted in those contexts to which they are applicable. And, although
according to the best available information there are virtually no formal
treatments of this topic by contemporary writers, the thought of these
writers will be consulted when advantageous to the development of the
study.
As expressed earlier, the purpose of this book is to investigate the
legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
per se," as it is found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special
emphasis is placed upon the function of this principle in the proofs for
God's existence. The relevance of the principle in the latter context can
be seen at once when it is observed that it is the key to the solution of
the well known "problem of the infinite regress." 8
It is noteworthy that competent scholastic philosophers,9 in present-
ing the proofs for God's existence, do not succumb to the temptation to
5 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 7 and In II Meta., 3 and 4.
6 Cf. In I Phys., 14, n. 7; S.T., I-II, 35, 7; C.G., III, 52.
8 See below, pp. 74-75, 84-85.
INTRODUCTION 3
reject the possibility of infinite regress out of hand by relying on St.
Thomas' "argument against an infinite multitude in act." 10 For, since
an infinite regress in act would constitute such an "impossible" multi-
tude, no infinite regress in act would be possible. But rather than rely
on any such argument, these philosophers prescind from such reasoning
entirely and insist that even deeper reasons require that the regress
come to a First, which is God - regardless of whether the intermediate
elements in the series are finite or infinite in multitude.
The wisdom of contemporary writers in this regard is witnessed by
the fact that it is rather debatable whether any argument against in-
finite regress based upon the impossibility of an infinite multitude in
act can be definitively grounded in the writings of St. Thomas, since at
best it must be admitted that he demonstrated some degree of vacilla-
tion and hesitation on the question of the possibility of an infinite multi-
tude in act.H It will be shown later, in the context of the quinque viae,
that some other principle - indeed, the one which this book in-
vestigates - is employed by St. Thomas, and, that the principle involved
is legitimate. 12
The need for this investigation, as noted above, lies in the fact that
St. Thomas does not explicitly analyze the universal function of the
principle as such. The importance of this inquiry will be seen when it is
shown that the principle in question is a crucial premise in other major
contexts, and not only with respect to the proofs for God's existence.
I t is not the proper function of this book to test the legitimacy of all
of the many terms and principles of St. Thomas which may be intro-
duced in the development of the topic, e.g., accident, substance, form,
matter, privation, etc. Nor are such concepts simply accepted on the
authority of St. Thomas. Rather, since the purpose of this book is to
examine the function of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," such terms will be accepted with the sole intention
of seeing whether, given some per accidens principle such as accident,
there must necessarily be some corresponding per se, such as substance.
And thus, in the proofs for God's existence, the intention is not to
prove the existence of any per aliud, e.g., beings in motion, caused
causes, contingent beings, etc. Rather, the proper concern of this book
is simply to show that, assuming some such per aliud, then something
per se is necessarily required.
10 Cf. S.T., I, 7, 4.
4 INTRODUCTION
Again the scope of this work is limited in that there will be no attempt
to prove that the per se which is thus discovered must be the God of
Christianity. In all cases, the sole purpose of this book is to examine the
function of the single principle in question, and, to be sure, any prin-
ciples of St. Thomas which are essential to such an examination.
II. THE CENTRAL CONTEXTS TO BE ANALYZED
Since it would be an endless task to analyze each and every context in

which St. Thomas relates the terms, per accidens and per se, it is clearly
desirable to limit the scope of this investigation to those central con-
texts which may serve as an adequate basis for judgment.
An attempt will be made herein to show that although the principle,
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," has different referents
in different contexts, nonetheless, its meaning is the same in each case.
Further, from the analysis of systematically chosen contexts, it is
hoped that the principle in question can be established as a metaphysi-
cal principle which is valid in every domain.
The schema of analysis herein proposed does not purport to detail
each and every instance in which St. Thomas employs the principle; it
does purport to show that in every real order where something is said to
exist per accidens, there must exist a per se, as the only adequate cause
of the per accidens. This procedure entails essentially two steps:
(r) every accident necessarily implies substance and (2) every caused
substance necessarily implies some uncaused substance.
While we do not claim that the proposed schema o~ this investigation
is one explicitly given by St. Thomas,13 nonetheless it can be shown that
the following method of procedure is fully consonant with his doctrine.
Further, according to his writings, such a schema would be seen to
encompass all reality, as follows:
Whatever exists is either an accident or a substance: "If we take
accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can
13 It is true that St. Thomas offers a very similar schema: ..... the principles of accidents
are reduced to the principles of substance, and the principles of perishable substances are
reduced to imperishable substances, and so in a certain hierarchical order all beings [are
reduced] to certain principles." In Boeth. De T.,in., 5,4. Yet, an essential difference between
this text and what we propose here is that, while the first division corresponds to our own,
that is, accidents imply substance, yet the second does not. What St. Thomas seems to have
in mind in De T.,in. is that all physical things reduce to spiritual things, e.g., angels. Whereas,
our proposed schema reduces all creatures to the sole uncaused substance, absolutely speak-
ing, namely God. Thus, our interest here is in an ontological division based on a somewhat
different doctrine of St. Thomas.
INTRODUCTION 5
be no medium between substance and accident; for they are divided by
affirmation and negation, that is, according to being in a subject and
not being in a subject." 14
Not only does St. Thomas hold that all reality can be divided proper-
ly into either accident or substance, but he also declares that every
accident necessarily implies substance. For the writes, "Accident is
not separable from substance .... " 15 Rather, " ... we call accidents ...
[things] ... such as quantities and qualities whose proper subject is not
prime matter, but composite substance which is substance in act." 16
The possibility of accident without substance is strictly excluded by St.
Thomas since accident is simply a form superadded to substance and
whose very being is dependent on that substance: " ... because all
accidents are forms of a sort superadded to the substance and caused by
the principles of the substance, it must be that their being is superadded
to the existence of the substance and dependent on that being." 17
Thus, for St. Thomas, accident necessarily implies substance. And,
substance, by simple dichotomy, is either caused or uncaused. And
again, according to St. Thomas, the former is necessarily reduced to the
latter:
Therefore it is necessary that every such thing, whose existence is other than
its nature, has its existence from some other thing. And because everything
which is per aliud is reduced to that which is per se, as to its first cause; therefore
it is necessary that there is some thing which is the cause of the existence of all
things, because it itself is existence alone. ls
Thus every substance which is caused by another is ultimately reduced

to a substance which is uncaused, " ... because it itself is existence
alone."
Since the above given dichotomies are exhaustive (accident-sub-
stance; caused substance-uncaused substance), and since St. Thomas
holds that the former in each pair necessarily reduces to the latter, this
book shall examine the function of the principle, "The per accidens
necessarily implies the per se," by surveying each of these major
domains of reality according to the following schema: (1) It will be
shown that every accident necessarily requires substance as its only
adequate subject of inherence. 19 (2) It is evident in st. Thomas'
14 S.T., I, 77, I, ad. 5.

15 In VII Meta., Z, n. I291.
16 Ibid., n. I284.
17 e.G., IV, I4.
18 De Ente, 4.
19 See below, pp. 9-I9.
6 INTRODUCTION
Commentary on the Physics 20 that any principle of change which is per

accidens must involve the existence of some per se principle of change,
i.e., material substance with respect to an accidental change, and
primary matter in the case of a substantial change. Finally (3), in the
context of the proofs for God's existence we will examine accidental
and substantial being as found in the things of experience, insofar as it
exists per accidens and requires an extrinsic cause, in order to observe
the function of the principle in this context which, St. Thomas insists,
leads us to conclude that there must exist a cause of being itself, a per
se existent, which is GOd. 21
Such a threefold analysis, i.e., of accident in relation to its substance,
of accidental and substantial change, and of finite being in relation to
God, would be sufficient to establish that the principle in question can
function validly at all ontological levels. Yet, to support the universal
validity requisite of any truly metaphysical principle, this work will
also examine instances of the principle's application in the realm of
knowledge.
The domain of knowledge embraces both sense and intellect. 22 And
since each type of knowing is specified by its object,23 it is reasonable
to test whether every object of knowledge per accidens must involve
some object of knowledge per se. Further, since man possesses two
types of knowledge concerning which this question may be asked,
sensory and intellectual knowledge, an analysis of each will serve to
conclude the groundwork for this investigation prior to applying the
principle to the proofs for God's existence.
It is hoped that by examining the function of the principle in ques~
tion in various applications, both in the real order and in the order of
knowledge (while it may not be feasible to consider every specific con-
text in which the terms "per accidens" and "per se" are employed),
sufficient light may be shed on the intrinsic nature of the per accidens
in its relation to the per se to enable us to understand exactly why St.
Thomas freely attributes to the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," that universality, necessity, and certitude which is
proper to any genuinely metaphysical principle.
20 Cf. In I Phys., 14, n. 7. " ... we must posit something from which being comes to be
pel' se, because everything which is pel' accidens is reduced to that which is pel' 5e." See below,
pp. 20--27.
22 Cf. In II De Anima, 12, n. 375.
2S "Acts are specified by their objects." e.G., III, 61. See In II De Anima, 13, n. 383.
PART I
DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CREATURE-GOD

CHAPTER I
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE
I. ACCIDENT IMPLIES 1 SUBSTANCE
As was noted in the introduction, St. Thomas explicitly holds that

" ... every accident is something inhering in a substance .... " 2 Now
there are at least two reasons for beginning this investigation of the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," with a con-
sideration of accidents in their relationship to substance. First, since
all things fall into the categories of substance and the nine accidents
according to St. Thomas, 3 if it is shown that all accidents necessarily
involve substance, then it is established at once that the principle in
question somehow has application to all things. Second, since it is
always proper to proceed from what is more known to us to what is
more knowable in itself,4 the being which is the object of sensory per-
ception is a fit point of departure. For St. Thomas holds that all knowl-
edge comes to us through the senses. 5 And he likewise holds that the
immediate objects of sensation are those accidents known as the proper
sensibles. 6 Thus, both from the point of view of what is widest in appli-
cation and from the point of view of the intellectual prudence of
proceeding from the first known, it is fitting to begin by considering
whether every accident, which is an instance of a per accidens, neces-
sarily implies another which must be an instance of a per se, namely
substance.
1 "Implies" here is to be understood in the sense of: requires substance as its only adequate
subject of inherence.
2 In VII Meta., Z, n. 1z84. Also, " ... in the definition of any accident it is necessary to
include the definition of substance .... " Ibid., I, n. 1Z58; " ... all accidents involve the
concept of substance .... " In IX Meta., I, n. 1768.
3 Cf. In IX Meta., I, n. 1768.
4 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 184aI6-ZI.
5 " ••. the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing which
is apprehended by the senses." S.T., I, 85, 5, ad. 3.
6 " .•• strictly speaking, only the proper sensible objects are perceived directly." In II
De Anima, 13, n. 387.
10 DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CREATURE-GOD
As noted earlier,7 accident and substance, when placed in opposition

to one another, constitute an important instance of the relationship of
the per accidens to the per se:
What is per se and unqualified in any genus is prior to that which is per aliud
and qualified. But substance is a being unqualifiedly and through itself: whereas
all other genera of things than substance are beings in a qualified manner and
exist through substance. Therefore substance is primary among beings. s
Any ambiguity which may arise as to whether this text in book seven
of the Commentary on the Metaphysics really shows that by the phrase,
"all other genera of things," which St. Thomas tells us must imply
something per se, namely substance, actually refers to accidents - is
quickly removed in book nine of that same work:
... all the other categories of being are referred to substance as the primary kind
of being, because all other beings - quantity, quality, and the like - are named
according to the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it
is the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition
of substance; and similarly in the case of the other categories. This is evident
from the fact that all accidents involve the concept of substance, since in the
definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for
example, in the definition of snub it is necessary to include nose. And this is
declared in the premises, as in the beginning of book seven. 9
Thus it is evident that "all other beings" than substance are accidents.
Further, since accidents are said to be "per aliud" and substance is said
to be "per se" in the context of book seven, St. Thomas' subsequent
insistance that "all accidents involve the concept of substance" shows
that the accident-substance relationship is for him an instance of the
general principle that the per aliud or per accidens implies the per se.
II. A SELF-EVIDENT PRINCIPLE
It might be well to remark at the outset that any suggestion that there
might actually be some per accidens (accident) without its correspond-
ing per se (substance) is, in this context at least, entirely foreign to the
See above, pp. 4-5.

?
In VII Meta., I, n. 1248. While St. Thomas, in this text, uses "quod est per aliud" in
8
opposition to "quod est per se," it is nonetheless clear that the former clause refers to the
entire order of accidental being (Cf. our next paragraph in the text) which, elsewhere, is
referred to as "quod est per accidens." Cf. S.T., I, 3, 6. This illustrates the frequent substitution
of per aliud for per accidens. Geiger lists these terms as interchangeable in his "vocabulary
of participation": See L. B. Geiger, La participation dans la Philosophie de s. Thomas d' Aquin
(Paris, I953), p. 459. Hereafter cited as: Geiger, Participation.
S In IX Meta., I, n. 1768.
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE II
teaching of St. Thomas_ As De Raeymaeker observes in commenting on

this teaching:
The correlation of substance and accidents can therefore never be broken up.
We cannot conceive them outside of their mutual relation. The substance of
particular being has meaning only as a relation to the accidental becoming, and
the accidental order has meaning only as a relation to the substance. Hence it
follows that the distinction between substance and accidents cannot be verified
by experimental methods. There are no means to separate the accidents in order
to uncover the substance and to verify its reality, no more than we can isolate
the accidents in order to study them outside of the relation which orients them
towards substance.... we cannot prove that there are accidents in this being
without proving by the same means that there is a substance, and reciprocally,
since substance and accidents are real correlative principles. It is not easier,
therefore, to get to the accidents than to recognize the substance; we must
admit them together as distinct principles or indeed reject their real distinc-
tion. 10
De Raeymaeker can insist that "the accidental order has meaning only
as a relation to the substance," because such a correlation appears to be
considered as self-evident according to St. Thomas. For St. Thomas
says that, according to definition, " ... to the quiddity or essence of an
accident it belongs to have existence in a subject," 11 and that the
"proper subject" of an accident is "substance in act." 12 Thus, Gilson
properly observes, "Accidents have no existence of their own to be
added to that of the substance in order to complete it. They have no
other existence than that of substance. For them, to exist is simply 'to-
exist-in-the-substance' or, as it has been put, 'their being is to-be-in' ."13
We say that the proposition, "Every accident necessarily implies
substance," would be accepted by St. Thomas as self-evident, since St.
Thomas holds that" ... substance is included in the definition of acci-
dent. ... " 14 As he explains in his Commentary on the Metaphysics:
" ... every accident involves the notion of substance, since in the defini-
10 Louis De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy 0/ Being, trans. Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer (St.

Louis, 1957), p. 177. Hereafter cited as: De Raeymaeker, Being.
11 S.T., III, 77, I, ad. 2.
12 In VII Meta., 2, n. 1284.
18 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy 0/ St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. I.. K. Shook
(New York, 1956), p. 31. Hereafter cited as: Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy; also," ... accidents
have no being but what they hold from the subject." Ibid., p. 177; also, " ... we recall that
substance is that whose nature is to be in itself, whereas accident is that whose nature is to
be in another; that is, in substance. This community is formed by a direct relationship
(proportion) between substance and its accidents: substance needs to be completea by its
accidents, and accidents are inasmnch as they inhere in and/or perfect their subject," George
P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy (Chicago, 1960), pp. 130-131. Hereafter cited
as: Klubertanz, Analogy.
14 C.G., I, 32.
tion of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for

example, in the definition of snub it is necessary to include nose." 15
Hence, we may say that, for St. Thomas, the very definition of any
accident must include a reference to its proper subject. And by "proper
subject," he means the only adequate subject of inherence, substance.
The reasoning behind his judgment of this matter we will examine
shortly. But first, let us see why his judging that the definition of
accident involves substance reveals that he would consider the proposi-
tion, "Every accident necessarily implies substance," as self-evident.
We may convert the above given proposition to the more traditional
Aristotelian form as follows: "Every accident is something which neces-
sarily implies substance." And since" ... substance is included in the
definition of accident ... ," it follows that the predicate of the reform-
ulated proposition, namely, "something which necessarily implies sub-
stance," is of the very nature 16 of its subject - for the subject of that
proposition, namely "accident," includes substance in its definition, as
seen above. Now according to St. Thomas, when" ... the predicate is of
the nature of the subject ... " of a proposition, such an enunciation is
said to be self-evident.1 7 Therefore, "Every accident necessarily implies
substance," would be a self-evident proposition according to the doc-
trine of St. Thomas.
III. CLASSICAL MODERN OBJECTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT
Despite the seeming assurance with which St. Thomas treats the topic
in question, it is well known that the accident-substance relation is one
of the most disputed concepts in modern and contemporary philosophy.
And in the development of the classical modern period, various expla-
nations were proposed which ultimately evolved into the complete de-
nial of any material causal dependence by the phenomena on the thing-
in-itself (the "replacement terms" for accident and substance in the
hands of post-Kantian idealists, such as Schopenhauer).
Now, whatever reasons the historian of philosophy may offer as he
analyses the evolution of the accident-substance topic during the early
to late modern period, this much is evident: The classical modern
thinkers, beginning with Descartes, were struggling with the problem
15 In IX Meta., I, n. 1768. See De Ente., 6.
16 N.B. We do not say that substance is of the very nature of the subject of the proposition;
rather, we say that it belongs to the very nature of an accident that it is "something which
necessarily implies substance." That is, it belongs to the nature of accident that in its
definition" ... it is necessary to include its proper subject," namely, substance.
17 In I Post. Anal., 7, n. 8.
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE 13
of accident in its relation to substance in the form in which it had been
transmitted to them by the decadent scholasticism of the late middle
ages_ And the concept of accident and substance offered them by the
philosophers of the late scholastic period was clearly foreign to the
doctrine of Aquinas:
Decadent Scholasticism forfeited the meaning of ontological structure. It con-
sidered every non-logical distinction as a real distinction between things, inter
rem et rem. On this pattern William of Ockham, O.F.M., conceived the distinc-
tion between substance and accidents. Undoubtedly, he grants that in the
natural order these elements are inseparable; they are nevertheless real objects
which are defined separately, and it would be impossible to deduce from the
consideration of one the existence of the other, since the first is not in the second.
Considered in itself, every one of these elements is therefore complete and finish-
ed, and if it enters into relation with others this relation is superadded to its
own reality. 18
It is in no way surprising that Schopenhauer should deny that the

phenomena are dependent on the thing-in-itself, as upon a material
cause, when, some five centuries earlier, Ockham had denied that the
knowledge of accidents could imply the knowledge of substance. What
is, perhaps, surprising, is that it took so many years for philosophers to
accept the ontological implication of their epistemological position.
But a detailed investigation of this development is not relevant to the
topic of this book.
What is relevant to this inquiry, though, is the irrelevance of all the
attacks made by modern philosophers on a conception of accidents and
substance which is completely other than that of St. Thomas. For in
opposing the ontological schema proposed by decadent scholasticism,
Descartes and the later moderns apparently did not realize that they
were completely ignoring the structure of being offered by St. Thomas. 19
One central distinction between decadent scholasticism and St.
Thomas on the question of accidents in relation to substance was, as
seen above, that while Ockham and others, such as Nicholas d' Autre-
court, held that these principles of being are complete and finished in
themselves,20 for Aquinas neither principle (when considering beings
which could be composed of both) 21 could exist without the other. Now
in the doctrine of St. Thomas, the incompleteness of an accident con-
sidered by itself is already well established, "for the existence of an
18 De Raeymaeker, Being., p. 182.
19 Cf. ibid., p. 184.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 182.
21 Not all beings are composed of substance and accidents: ..... in God there cannot be
any accident." S.T., I, 3, 6.
accident is inherence[inesse]." 22 Nor can a substance to which is due

certain properties in the form of accidents be found without those acci-
dents: "The powers of the soul are accidents as well as propel ties.
Hence, although we may understand what the soul is without these
powers, still it is not possible or intelligible for the soul to exist without
these powers." 23
These considerations should suffice to demonstrate that the doctrine
of St. Thomas concerning the accident-substance relationship is quite
independent of the difficulties raised in connection with this same topic
in modern and contemporary philosophers by the significantly distinct
teaching of the later scholastic period.
It is not the function of this book to determine which of these differ-
ing doctrines on the relation between accidents and substance possesses
greater acceptability. The sole reason why the disputes of the moderns
over the decadent scholastic doctrine have been mentioned in this
context is to show that the later objections raised against the accident-
substance theory were not aimed at St. Thomas. Once this point has
been made, one can with greater hope of profitable inquiry return to the
task of seeing how St. Thomas, opel ating in accord with his own concept
of accident and substance, regards as self-evident the principle that
every accident necessarily implies substance.
IV. HOW ACCIDENTS DEPEND ON SUBSTANCE
A distinction must be made here between the subject of an accident and

its proper, or adequate, subject. St. Thomas insists that the only proper
or adequate subject of inherence for an accident is substance. But, he
recognizes that there can be other subjects of accidental inherence,
namely, accidents:
, .. an accident is said to be the accident of an accident because of the way they
come together in the same subject .... for instance, when a subject receives one
accident by means of another, as when a body receives color by means of its
surface. And thus one accident is said to be in another, for we say that the color
is in the surface. 24
Hence, according to St. Thomas, one accident can inhere in another

accident. This raises a logical question: Why does st. Thomas insist
that the only proper and adequate subject of inherence is substance?
The answer to this question may lie in the fact that it was evident to
22 S.T., I, 28, 2.
23 De Anima, 12, ad. 7.
24 S.T., I-II, 7, I, ad. 3.
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE IS
St. Thomas that one could not proceed to infinity in the order of acci-
dents inhering in other accidents. For he held, along with Aristotle, that
there exist only nine categories of accident. 25 And, as we have just seen
above, there is a definite order in which accidental inherence takes
place, e.g., quality may reside in quantity as color resides in surface,
but the converse is not possible in the same being.
Because of the order of inherence which necessarily leads one through
the categories in a definite pattern which is irreversible, and because
the number of categories of accidents is limited, no infinite regress is
possible in accidental inherence. Hence, some ultimate subject of in-
herence must be posited, substance.
It is entirely possible that st. Thomas concludes to substance as the
only adequate subject of inherence for accidents because of the above
analysis. Nonetheless, we feel that an even more basic line of reasoning
may be found in St. Thomas - one which leads to the same conclusion
because of the intrinsic nature of accidental being as such.
v. A MORE PROFOUND REASON
The writings of St. Thomas reveal a conception of the intrinsic nature

of accidental being which would naturally require his holding that
some ultimate and adequate subject of accidental inherence exists,
namely, substance. Numerous texts support the view that, for St.
Thomas, an accident is merely a principle of a being, not a being in its
own right; it has reality only in relation to substance, it has no reality
independently of substance. This interpretation is supported by St.
Thomas when he states, "The other kinds of beings [accidents] are not
beings except inasmuch as they are referred to substance." 26 This
confirms what De Raeymaeker noted above when he said:, " ... the
accidental order has meaning only as a relation to the substance." 27
The relation to substance which accidents require is further emphasized
by St. Thomas as he asserts the virtual non-existence of accidents, when
considered in themselves and abstractly: "Now accidents signified in
the abstract seem to be non-beings, because no one of them is fitted by
nature to exist of itself. In fact for any of them to exist is to exist in an-
other, and it is not possible for any of them to exist separated from
substance." 28 St. Thomas further insists that the "being" of accidents
25 Cf. In V Meta., 9, Il. 889; S.T., I, 28, 2.
26 In VII Meta., I, Il. I252.
27 See above, p. II.
28 In VII Meta., I, Il. I253.
has meaning only when signified in connection with substance:

" ... accidents do not seem to be beings insofar as they are signified in
themselves, but only insofar as they are signified in connection with
substance." 29
St. Thomas explains his doctrine on the matter in the following
passage:
[Aristotle] says that quantity and quality and the like are not beings in an un-
qualified sense, as will be said below. For being is spoken of in a sense as some-
thing having existence. But it is substance alone which subsists. However, ac-
cidents are called beings, not because they are, but rather because by them
something is; for example, whiteness is said to exist because its subject is white.
Therefore, [Aristotle] says that [accidents] are not called beings in an unqualified
sense, but beings of a being, for example, quality and motion. 3o
Since" ... it is substance alone which subsists," it is understandable

why, for St. Thomas, accidents have reality only in relation to sub-
stance. The reason for this necessary relationship of dependence of acci-
dents on substance is rendered even more explicit in the De Ente et
Essentia:
But that to which an accident comes is a being complete in itself and subsisting
in its own existence. And this existence naturally precedes the accident which
supervenes. And this is why the supervening accident does not, by its conjunc-
tion with that to which it comes, cause that existence in which a thing subsists,
and through which the thing is a being in itself [per se]. It causes, rather, a
certain second existence, without which the subsisting thing can be understood
to exist, just as what is first can be understood without what is second. 31
This text of St. Thomas renders even more clearly the meaning of the
term, "being," when it is predicated of an accident. For an accident is
not simply called a "being," absolutely considered as " ... subsisting in
its own existence," and" ... complete in itself .... " Rather, it is merely
a "being of a being," having only a secondary kind of existence. As the
quotation before this one illustrates, an accident is called a being only
because by it something (substance) exists in a certain qualified manner,
for example, as the accident whiteness is said to exist (in a secondary
sense) because its subject (substance) happens to be white. Thus, for
St. Thomas, an accident has reality only in relation to the substance in
which it exists; the accident is utterly dependent on that substance as
on a subject of inherence. As St. Thomas says in this text from the De
Ente, " ... the subsisting thing [substance] can be understood to
29 Ibid., n. 1256.
30 In XII Meta., I, n. 2419. See ibid., nn. 2420-2422; In VII Meta., I, nn. 1248-58.
31 De Ente., 6.
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE 17
exist ... " without" ... a certain second existence ... " which is that of
the supervening accident. But the converse is not true, since an accident
is not " ... a being complete in itself and subsisting in its own exist-
ence."
This latter consideration illuminates even further the reason why St.
Thomas holds that accident requires substance as its only adequate
subject of inherence. That is, the basic reason why an accident has
reality only in relation to its substance is that accidents do not possess
their own existence(esse).32 For the existence of every accident, accord-
ing to St. Thomas, is not an existence in itself, as is the case with sub-
stance, but merely an existence in another (inesse): " ... we must con-
sider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points
to observe. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered
as an accident, and this is, in the case of all of them, that their being is
to inhere in a subject; for the being of an accident is to inhere." 33
Hence, according to St. Thomas, it belongs to the very essence of an
accident, considered precisely as an accident, that its" ... being is to
inhere in a subject." The reason why St. Thomas considers that the only
adequate subject of inherence for accidents is substance is that he
conceives existence as belonging properly to substance alone:
Now that properly exists which itself has existence, subsisting as it were, in its
own existence. Hence, only substances are properly and truly called beings,
whereas an accident does not have existence, but something exists by it, and
in this way it is called a being: for instance, whiteness is called a being because
by it something is white. 34
Here St. Thomas nearly denies existence to an accident altogether, save

insofar asit someshowdetermines or qualifies something which " ... prop-
erly exists ... ," namely substance. Accidents have being only because
they are something belonging to true being, which is substance:
From this it is clear that substance itself is said to be a being of itself, because
terms which simply signify substance designate what this thing is. But other
classes of things [accidents] are said to be beings, not because they have a
quiddity of themselves (as though they were beings of themselves, since they
do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense), but because "they are
of such a being," i.e., because they have some connection with substance, which
is being per se,35
32 Cf. S.T., I, 90, 2.

33 " ••. accidentis enim esse est inesse.," S.T., I, 28, 2. See also, De Pot., 8, 2; Quodl., IX,
3, I, ad. 2.
34 S.T., 1,90, 2.
35 In VII Meta., I, n. 1251.
Finally, St. Thomas makes it evident that he never conceives the ex-
istence of accidents except in relation to substance, since the only
adequate subject of accidental inherence is that which" ... properly
exists ... ," substance:
Since these [accidents] signified in the abstract appear to be non-beings, it seems
rather to be the concrete names of accidents that signify beings. And "if any-
thing is a being," it seems rather to be "the thing that walks and sits and is
healthy," because some subject is determined by them by reason of the very
meaning of the term, inasmuch as they designate something connected with a
subject. Now this subject is substance .... But "good or sitting" are not said
"without this," i.e., without substance; for an accident signifies something
connected with substance. 36
Hence, St. Thomas makes it clear that he considers the term, "being,"
to be properly and primarily predicated of substance alone. This is why,
for him, if accidents are to have any existence at all, it has to be had in
and through substance as the only adequate subject of their inherence.
Further, St. Thomas holds that" ... existence is that which is more
intimate and more profound in anything, since it is the formal element
with respect to everything in the thing." 37 Thus, when he declares that
" ... the being of an accident is to inhere," St. Thomas has circum-
scribed the nature of an accident at its most intimate and profound
level. An accident is termed per accidens because existence is not proper
to its essence ;38 it may be said to exist only in a qualified sense insofar
as it exists through another (per aliud).39 St. Thomas immediately
perceives that that other (aliud) must be substance. 4o This is so because
existence belongs properly and unqualifiedly to substance alone. 41 This
is the opposition of the per accidens to the per se which St. Thomas ex-
presses when he says, " ... substance is a being unqualifiedly and
through itself; whereas all other genera of things than substance are
beings in a qualified manner and exist through substance. Hence, sub-
stance is primary among beings." 42 Since " ... nothing gives to an-
36 Ibid., n. 1255.
37 S.T., I, 8, I. See Quodl., XII, 5, I; S.T., I, 3,4; 4, I, ad. 3; 4, 2; 7, I; 20,2; De Pot., 7, 2,
ad. g; In II Sent., d. I, 1,4, sol.; Cornelio Fabro, Participation et causaUte selon s. Thomas
d'Aquin (Louvain, Ig6I), pp. 208-244. Hereafter cited as: Fabro, Participation; De Raey-
maeker, Being., pp. 126-140; Gilson, The Philosophy ot St. Thomas Aquinas (Le Thomisme),
trans. Edward Bullough (Cambridge, England, Ig24), pp. 76-86. Hereafter cited as: Gilson,
Philosophy; Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 29-45.
38 Cf. S.T., I, go, 2.
39 Cf. In VII Meta., I, n. 1248.
40 Cf. ibid.
41 Cf. ibid.; In XII Meta., I, n. 24Ig.
42 In VII Meta., I, n. 1248.
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE
other what it does not have ... ," 43 and since existence is not proper to
an accident in an unqualified manner, it is immediately evident that no
quantity - not even an infinite multitude - of accidents can supply for
what is lacking to their very essence as accidents, namely, existence in
an unqualified sense. That is to say, accidents cannot exist by them-
selves. Accidents can exist only in substance. Accidents require sub-
stance as their only adequate subject of inherence.
43 S.T., I, 75, I, ob. I. Note also, " ... each thing stands in the same relation to the fact
of its causing as it does to the fact of its existing." e.G., III, 74. See In III De Anima, 10,
n.733·
CHAPTER II
THE DOMAIN OF CHANGE
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE
The next context in which the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," shall be investigated is that portion of St. Thomas'
Commentary on the Physics ot Aristotle, in which he considers the prob-
lem of change.
Of particular interest to this book is lesson fourteen of book one,
where St. Thomas considers the problems posed by the Eleatic think-
ers. There he analyses the character of the various principles of change,
and concludes that " ... if being comes to be per accidens from both
being and non-being, we must posit something from which being comes
to be per se, since everything which is per accidens is reduced to that
which is per se." 1 Before reaching this conclusion, St. Thomas begins
with the presentation of a problem which was old even in the time of
Aristotle.
St. Thomas reaffirms that the ancients (namely ,the Eleatics) sought
to determine how change is possible. 2 They concluded in the negative,3
since, they argued, being cannot be said to come to be from either being or
non-being. Their dilemma was posed in this fashion: If being comes
from being, then, " ... before it comes to be, it is nothing; but being
already exists; therefore, it does not come to be." 4 Nor can being come
from non-being, since" ... nothing comes to be from nothing." 5 De-
ceived by this seeming dilemma, the Eleatics ignored their common
philosophical experience, and thus, " ... sinned insofar as they were of
the opinion that nothing comes to be." 6
1 In I Phys., I4, n. 7.
2 Cf. ibid., n. 2.
a " ... they concluded that there was neither generation nor corruption of being." Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
6 Ibid., n. 4.
THE DOMAIN OF CHANGE 21
St. Thomas unites with Aristotle in resolving this pseudo-dilemma by

positing a tertium quid between being and non-being. That is, he intro-
duces a distinction within each of these (being and non-being) between
the per se and the per accidens. He admits that being" ... does not come
to be per se from being, nor per se from non-being .... " 7 Yet, St.
Thomas insists that" ... being comes to be per accidens from both being
and non-being .... " 8 For example, even Michelangelo could not
fashion his famous "David" from the work already completed (per se,
from being) - since it already had being. Nor could he fashion it, per se,
out of non-being, since" ... nothing comes from nothing." Yet, from
an unfigured block of marble, the Rennaisance genius could sculpture his
masterwork, since" ... something comes to be per accidens from priva-
tion [non-being], or from the preceding form [being], insofar as it
happens that the matter from which something comes to be per se is
under such form or under such privation .... " 9
II. A DIFFICULTY
At this juncture a difficulty appears to arise. For in one context St.

Thomas speaks as though form were a per accidens principle of change.
And yet, in another context he declares that form is a per se principle
of change.
Now lesson fourteen, book one, of St. Thomas' Commentary on the
Physics is of primary interest to this book, since in it St. Thomas de-
clares explicitly that " ... everything which is per accidens is reduced
to that which is per se," and this in the context of change. 10 While
applying this principle, he states that " ... something comes to be per
accidens from privation, or from the preceding form, insofar as it
happens that the matter from which something comes to be per se is
under such form or under such privation." 11
Yet, in apparent opposition to this stands a text from the immediate-
ly preceding lesson, which reads: " ... the subject and form are per se
causes and principles of all that which comes to be according to na-
ture." 12 How then can form be both a per se and a per accidens prin-
ciple of change? The resolution of this seeming contradiction is not as
difficult as it may initially appear.
7 Ibid., n. 6.
8 Ibid., n. 7.
9 Ibid., n. 8.
10 Ibid., n. 7.
11 Ibid., n. 8.
12 Ibid., I3, n. 2.
Two things indicate that St. Thomas does not actually contradict
himself, but rather that he simply has shifted his perspective of analysis
from one case to the other, i.e., in the former case he considers the
principles involved in change from the point of view of the origin or
source of the change; in the latter case his concern centers on the con-
stitutive principles of that which comes to be in change, the end product
itself.
First, a careful reading of the quotation from lesson fourteen reveals
that St. Thomas deliberately refers to the "preceding" form as a per
accidens principle of change. This, of course, shows that the form which
is per accidens is the one which is at the source of the becoming, not at
its term. Also, since the only argument in this lesson, which demon-
strates the per accidens character of a principle,13 concerns itself solely
with privation, the parenthetical inclusion of form (since he mentions it
as a per accidens principle of change nowhere else in this lesson, and
here does so only in conjunction with privation) in this quotation is in-
dicative that St. Thomas refers to form here primarily because it is the
foundation of that privation 14 from which the thing made comes to be
per accidens.
Second, this interpretation is confirmed by reading further in the
passage containing the quotation from lesson thirteen: "It must be
noted here that he [Aristotle] here intends to inquire about the prin-
ciples not only of coming to be but also of being." 15 From this it is
evident that when St. Thomas calls form, a per se principle of that
which comes to be according to nature, he is considering form as cause
and principle of what is present and existing at the term or end of the
change, since he would not inquire of the cause of being (as opposed to the
cause of coming to be) of that which is past, and hence, does not now
exist.
Thus there is no contradiction. It is the preceding form which is the
per accidens principle of change, since preceding form " ... does not
enter into the essence of the thing made," 16 and it is the succeeding
form which is the per se principle of that which comes to be in change.
13 Cf. ibid., 14, n. 5.

14 A form is the "foundation of a privation" insofar as a privation is simply" ... the very
lack of a form or the contrary of the form which happens to the subject." In I Phys., 13,
n. 4. Thus, by having the accidental form of blackness, a dog exhibits the privation of white-
ness, since its color, which is the contrary or negation of whiteness, is "non-white." See In
I De Cae/o, 6; C.G., I, 71; III, 7; S.T., I, 17, 4; In V Meta., 20, nn. I070-I079.
15 " .•• non solum fiendi sed etiam essendi." Ibid., n. 2.
16 Ibid., 14, n. 5. See below, p. 27, for properties of per accidens principles of change in
the con text of lesson fourteen.
When a block of marble becomes the statue of a man, it is the privation
which is rooted in the form 17 of the block which is the per accidens
principle of the coming to be of the statue. Whereas, it is the form of
the man which is a per se cause and principle of the completed statue.
Although St. Thomas does not explicitly refer to the principle that
the per accidens necessarily implies the per se in lesson thirteen, none-
theless, that maxim can easily function in this context in which he
considered form as a per se principle of that which comes to be in
change, since he insists, as a primary and central thesis in this lesson,
that form is an intrinsic and per se principle of every thing which comes
to be in change:
Those things are said to be the principles and causes of natural things from which
they [the latter] are and come to be per se and not accidentally; but everything
which comes to be, is and comes to be from a subject and a form; therefore the
subject and the form are per se causes and principles of all that which comes to
be according to nature. Moreover, he proves that that which comes to be accord-
ing to nature comes to be from a subject and a form, by the following: Those
things into which the definition of some thing is resolved are those things which
compose that thing because each thing is resolved into those things from which
it is composed. But the definition of that which comes to be according to nature
is resolved into a subject and a form because the definition of musical man is
resolved into the definition of man and the definition of musical; because, if
anyone wants to define musical man, he should give the definition of man and
of musical. Therefore that which comes to be according to nature, is and comes
to be from a subject and a form. It must be noted that he here intends to inquire
about the principles not only of coming to be but also of being. Thus he pointedly
says, tram which they primarily are and come to be. He says, tram which ... pri-
marily, i.e., per se and not accidentally. Therefore the per se principles of every-
thing which comes to be according to nature are the subject and the form.1s
While it seems that this argument of St. Thomas is sufficiently clear of

itself, it does not matter to the development of this investigation to
analyze or criticize it - since, in this context, it is evident that St.
Thomas is not establishing the existence of something per se from any
per accidens point of departure. Rather, he establishes subject and
form as per se principles for other reasons which are not relevant to this
investigation. What is relevant, however, is that this text makes clear
to us that St. Thomas holds that wherever there is change, there is
subject and form which are per se principles.
Yet, because St. Thomas considers form in its less generally known
role as a per accidens principle, a source principle of change, in lesson
fourteen, the immediately preceding analysis will not suffice to show
17 See above, footnote 14.
18 In I Phys., 13, n. 2.
why the principle in question functions even when form is not a per se
principle. So the question of the relation of the per accidens to the per se
must be reopened in this somewhat different context in which we view
change, not so much from its terminus ad quem (as in lesson thirteen),
but rather in its terminus a quo (the perspective of lesson fourteen).
III. THE "PER ACCIDENS" IN CHANGE NECESSARILY

REQUIRES THE "PER SE"
As noted above,19 in the context of lesson fourteen, St. Thomas posits

the preceding form and privation as per accidens principles of change. 2o
And, as has just been seen, these principles are so denominated, ac-
cording to the perspective employed in that context by St. Thomas,
insofar as they are found in the thing from which the change proceeds,
but not found in that to which the change proceeds, since they do not
" ... enter in to the essence of the thing made." 21
Now the direct concern of this book is not so much why St. Thomas
and Aristotle posit these precise per accidens principles of change;
rather, what is important here is that they insist on the necessity of
positing a third principle which is per se, " ... because everything which
is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se." 22
Here again, as in the context of substance and accidents, it appears
that St. Thomas is using the principle in question as though it were
immediately evident. He does not defend its use in this context. He
simply asserts it as he would any universal metaphysical principle
which he might freely apply to any context, including this one.
Whether such an application is fully justified in this case (lesson four-
teen) is a question which may be further illuminated as we examine
exactly in what manner St. Thomas uses the terms "per accidens" and
"per se" in the context of change.
St. Thomas summarizes his doctrine here as follows:
... something comes to be per se from being in potency; but something comes
to be per accidens from being in act or from non-being. Moreover, he says this
because matter, which is being in potency, is that from which something comes
to be per se because this is what enters into the substance of the thing made.
But something comes to be per accidens from privation, or from the preceding
form, insofar as it happens that the matter from which something comes to be
19 See above, p. 21, footnote 9.
20 It should be noted that the phrase, "principle of change," is used somewhat loosely.
Actually, these principles are principles, not of change, since change is not a thing, but of
the thing which comes to be in change.
21 In I Phys., 14, n. 5.
22 Ibid., n. 7.
per se is under such form or under such privation; as the statue comes to be
per se from bronze, but it comes to be per accidens from that which does not
have such a figure or from that which has some other figure. 23
Here St. Thomas reveals his criteria for distinguishing the per accidens
from the per se in the context of change. For he tells us that matter
" ... is that from which something comes to be per se because this is
what enters into the substance of the thing made." Conversely, he
insists that such a principle of that which comes to be in change as
privation is per accidens, " ... because privation does not enter into the
essence of the thing made." 24 In this latter context St. Thomas lays
down explicitly the criteria of the per se,' "But something comes to be
per se from something else because the latter is in the thing after the
the thing is already made. However, the figured thing does not come
to be per se, but per accidens, from unfigured because after it is already
figured, unfigured is not in it." 25
Hence, St. Thomas understands the per se here as that which enters
into the essence or substance of that which comes to be in change;
whereas, he understands the per accidens, such as privation or pre-
ceding form, as that which happens to exist in the per se principle,
matter. For privation and preceding form do not enter into the essence
of the thing made, and thus, are only accidentally related to that which
comes to be in change, " .. .insofar as it happens that the matter from
which something comes to be per se is under such form or under such
privation." 26
Now since it is the preceding form and privation which St. Thomas
considers as per accidens principles of change (since they do not enter
into the essence of the thing which comes to be in change), the test of
whether or not the per accidens necessarily implies the per se here con-
sists in determining whether or not it is possible that all these principles
of change which are found at the point of origin in any change are per
accidens. If it can be shown that even one such principle must be per se
(in that it enters into the essence of that which comes to be), then the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," applies to
the context of change.
Supposing, hypothetically, that all the principles of change found at
the term of origin in any change were per accidens, what, indeed, would
sa Ibid., n. 8.
24 Ibid., n. 5.
25 Ibid.
28 Ibid., n. 8.
26 DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CKEATURE·GOD
follow? Since all would be per accidens, none would" ... enter into the
essence of the thing made." 27 But in that case, no principle of change
would be present both in the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of
change. Now this would violate St. Thomas' notion of change - which
can be shown as follows: " ... all change is from [one] thing into [another]
thing, as is manifested from the very name of change, insofar as it de-
notes that something follows from another, and one thing is prior and
the other is posterior." 28
Change, for St. Thomas, implies one thing following from another;
one is prior, the other posterior. Further, and more importantly, he
declares that" ... in every change or motion there must be something
existing in one way now and in a different way before, for the very word
"change" shows this." 29 Now it is clear from this text that St. Thomas
considers that it belongs to the very essence of change that something is
the same during the entire change, for he says that the same "some-
thing" exists in one way before and in a different way after.
From this consideration of St. Thomas' notion of change, the follow-
ing may be concluded: If the per accidens principles of change are truly
principles of "change," then it must be that such per accidens principles
of change necessarily imply something per se, since St. Thomas' con-
ception of change includes "something," a principle of change, which is
present both in the terminus a quo and in the terminus ad quem. This
follows of necessity, since, according to St. Thomas, any principle of
change which " ... enters into the substance of the thing made ... " 30
is a per se principle of change. And since every change involves some
such element of continuity,31 it becomes evident by definition that
genuine principles of "change," even if they are themselves per accidens,
necessarily imply something per se, namely, a principle of change which
is present both in the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem, and
which, since it thereby " ... enters into the substance of the thing
made ... ," must be a per se principle of that which comes to be in
change. St. Thomas calls this per se principle "matter." 32
Now as was seen in the context of our treatment of accidents and
substance,33 what is lacking to the very essence of something cannot be
27 Ibid., n. 5.
28 In V Phys., 2, n. 2. See In I Sent., d. 37, 4, 3.
29 e.G., II, 17. See also, In VII Meta., 2, nn. 2429-2430.
30 In I Phys., 14, n. 8.
31 "Everything which is changed remains the same with regard to some element of
it .... " ST., I, 9, I.
32 Cf. In I Phys., 14, n. 8.
33 See above, pp. 18-19.
accounted for or supplied, according to St. Thomas, simply by adding
quantity, since, " ... nothing gives to another what it does not have." 34
This applies to the per accidens principles of change, since by their very
nature they do not enter into the essence of that which comes to be in
change. Only a per se principle enters the essence of the thing made.
Hence, even an infinite multitude of per accidens principles of "change"
would fail, unless related to some per se principle of change, to fulfill
St. Thomas' conception of change. Since none would enter the essence
of the thing made, all would be restricted to the terminus a quo of
change - thereby failing to fulfill the requirement that "change" in-
volves something present both in the terminus a quo and the terminus
ad quem. 35 But if the concept of change is not fultilled, how can these
per accidens principles be justly termed, "principles of change?" They
cannot. Hence, something must be per se here.
From the above considerations we can see why St. Thomas holds as
an immediately evident principle when applied to the principles of that
which comes to be in change, that" ... everything which is per accidens
is reduced to that which is per se." 36 For any principle of change which
is per accidens (preceding form or privation) must involve the existence
of some per se principle of change, i.e., material substance with respect
to an accidental change, and primary matter in the case of a substantial
change. 37 This is because St. Thomas 'understanding of the nature of
change requires that some principle be present both in the terminus a
quo and in the terminus ad quem. And since no per accidens principle is
able to fulfill this notion of change, it becomes immediately evident that
some per se principle must be posited - in order that the per accidens
principles of change may be meaningfully spoken of as principles "of
change" in any sense. Hence, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
per se," in the context of change.
34 S.T., I, 75, I, ob. I.

35 Cf. C.G., II, 17.
36 In I Phys., 14. n. 7.
37 Cf. In VIII Meta., I, nn. 1688-1689. N.B. We have seen earlier (see above, pp. 21-24,
how the succeeding form is also a per se principle of that which comes to be in change. But
our concern here, as has been St. Thomas', deals with "matter," the per se principle which
is necessarily implied by the per accidens in this context.
CHAPTER III
THE DOMAIN OF KNOWLEDGE
The principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," has
been examined thus far in its chief instances as found in St. Thomas'
writings on physics and metaphysics. Yet, in order to make certain that
no radically different employment of the principle by St. Thomas is
overlooked, it seems appropriate to consider that other domain in
which things exist, not entitatively, but intentionally - that is, the
domain of knowledge. As far as human knowledge is concerned, there
are two types: sensory and intellectual;! and intellectual knowledge
consists of three distinguishable acts. 2
I. SENSE KNOWLEDGE
St. Thomas gives clear definitions of what he means by the terms" per
se" and "per accidens" in the context of sense knowledge: " ... as said
above, to sense consists in something being acted upon and altered in
some way. Whatever, therefore, makes a difference in a passion or an
alteration of the sense, has a per se relation to the sense, and is called
a sensible object per se." 3
Per se sensible objects are of two sorts: the proper sensible objects,
namely, color, sound, odor, flavor, and tangibility,4 and the common
sensible objects, namely, motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude. 5
The former are called proper sensible objects, since they differentiate
the sense as to the kind of agent which actualizes it: " ... strictly
speaking, only the proper sense-objects are per se sensible, for the
substance of any sense and its definition consists in its being naturally
1 Cf. In II De Anima, 5, nn. 284, 290-294; 6, n. 302; III, 7, nn. 675-676; III, 12, 13.
S Cf. In Peri Hermeneias, PIoemium, n. I.
3 In II De Anima, 13, n. 393.
4 Cf. ibid., n. 384.
6 Cf. ibid., n. 386.
THE DOMAIN OF KNOWLEDGE 29
fitted to be affected by such a sensible object. The nature of each power
consists in its relation to its proper object." 6
On the other hand, the latter are called common sensible objects,
since they differentiate sensation, not on the basis of that which is the
proper object of a given sense, but rather, in view of those modes of
activity which are perceptible to several or all the sense faculties at
once:
... the common sense-objects are five: motion, rest, number, figure, and mag-
nitude. These are not proper to any single sense, but are common to all - which
is not to be understood to mean that all these are common to all the senses but
that some of them, that is, number, motion, and rest, are common to all senses.
Yet touch and sight perceive all five. 7
Thus, while color is perceptible only to sight, and sound only to hear-
ing, since they are proper sensible objects, yet the common sensible,
movement, can be sensed by both faculties. And yet, both the proper
and the common sensibles have in common the ability actually to
modify or affect of themselves the sense faculties, and in virtue of this,
they are said to be per se sensible, according to St. Thomas. 8
Contrariwise, St. Thomas defines the per accidens sensible object as
follows: "But whatever makes no difference to the immediate modifi-
cation of the sense we call a per accidens sensible object. Hence, the
Philosopher says explicitly that the senses are not affected at all by the
per accidens sensible object as such. 9
But the first requirement of any per accidens sensible object is that
it must be accidentally connected to some per se sensible object, " ... as
a man may happen to be white .... "10 And secondly, the per accidens
sensible object must be perceived in some way by the one who is
sensing, or else, it could not even be said to be a per accidens sense-
object. This, in tum, implies that the per accidens sensible object must
6 Ibid., n. 387.
7 Ibid., n. 386.
8 " •.. both common and proper sensible objects are per se sensible objects" Ibid., n. 387.
See ibid., n. 386. St. Thomas does raise the objection that, perhaps, " ... the common objects
themselves are per accidens objects ... ," since" ... if the per accidens sense-objects are only
apprehended insofar as the proper sense-objects are apprehended, the same is true of the
common-sense objects." Ibid., n. 388. But, he insists, nonetheless, that the common sensibles
are not per accidens since they do, in fact, " ... differentiate sensation with respect, not to the
kind of agent [as color specifies sight], but to the mode of its activity [as size and position
vary for all five senses] .... " Ibid., n. 394. See S.T., I, 78, 3, ad. 2.
9 Ibid., n. 393.
10 Ibid., n. 395.
actually and directly affect some faculty, and thus, is, in fact, a per se
object of that faculty.l1
Now the only other faculties which the per accidens sensible object
could affect are another sense faculty, the intellect, the cogitative
faculty, and the estimative sense. 12
St. Thomas does not include in this list the imagination or the
common sense - probably because, on the one hand, the imagination
grasps the sensible thing, not when present, but when absent, and, on
the other hand, the common sense, insofar as it simply unifies the
cognitions of the several external senses, presupposes and merely col-
lates the functions of the per se sensibles. But while an object may be
accidental to some other sense faculty, as when sweetness is white,
nonetheless, such an object is essentially, or per se, sensible to taste.
Thus, speaking strictly ,St. Thomas insists that the per accidens sen-
sible object must not be the proper object of anyone of the special
senses.l 3 There remain only the intellect, the cogitative sense, and the
estimative sense.
Certainly, when the intellect abstracts the universal form from the
particular matter presented to it in the phantasm, its product (the
concept) conforms to the definition of the per accidens sense-object in
that it " ... makes no difference to the immediate modification of the
sense." 14 But St. Thomas dismisses the intellect in its widest applica-
tion. 15 He does so because a per accidens sense-object ought properly to
be called only" ... what is at once intellectually apprehended as soon
as the sensation of a thing occurs." 16 Evidently this is because the
senses are ordered to the particular, and what is immediately and par-
ticularly known is the essence of the individually sensed being. 17
Thus, according to St. Thomas, the term, per accidens sensible object,
is rightly applied to that intellectual faculty which judges individual
entities 18 - as when someone judges the presence of " ... this man or
this animal .... " 19 The faculty in question is known as the cogitative
11 Cf. ibid.
11 Cf. ibid.
13 Cf. ibid., nn. 395, 396.
14 Ibid., n. 393.
15 Ibid., n. 396. Thus, syllogistic reasoning would be excluded, since it is not immediate
upon sensing. See Peter Hoenen, ReaUty and Judgment according to St. Thomas, trans. Henry
F. Tiblier (Chicago, 1952), p. 211. Hereafter cited as: Hoenen, Reality.
16 Ibid.
17 Cf. ibid.
18 The cogitative power is sometimes called the particular reason, since it compares (that
is, judges) individual intentions. See S.T. I, 78, 4; 81, 3.
1D In II De Anima, 13, n. 396.
sense. 20 Its correlative faculty in animals is called the estimative sense, 21
or natural instinct, which issues practical directives concerning appro-
priate reactions to sense data, e.g., an animal may know that grass is to
be eaten without knowing grass as grass:
However, the cogitative faculty differs from the estimative sense. The cogitative
faculty apprehends the individual thing as existing in a common nature, and this
because it is united to intellect in one and the same subject. Thus it knows this
man as this man, and this tree as this tree [italics mine]; whereas the estimative
sense does not apprehend an individual thing as in a common nature, but only
insofar as this individual thing is the term or principle of some action or pas-
sion. 22
Thus while the human cogitative faculty apprehends the individual

thing as existing in a common nature, the estimative power in animals
does not. Rather, as seen in this quotation, animal instinct merely ap-
prehends the object known as the proper term of some passion or
action.
But since, according to St. Thomas, neither of these per accidens sense-
objects (that is, neither the object of the estimative sense nor the object
of the cogitative sense) can exist unless they are formed through sense
experience which entails the common and proper senses,23 it is at once
evident that the per accidens sensible objects necessarily imply the
existence of something per se, namely, the common and proper sensible
objects. And this conclusion is seen to flow immediately from St.
Thomas' understanding of the role of sense experience in relation to the
function of the cogitative sense in man and the estimative sense in
animals. For St. Thomas defines the per accidens sensible object in man
(that is, the object of the cogitative sense) as" ... what is at once intel-
lectually apprehended as soon as the sensation of a thing occurs." 24
And St. Thomas declares that the estimative sense in animals comes
into play, " ... as when a sheep knows its offspring by sight, or sound,
or something of that sort." 25
Hence it follows that to speak of the function of the cogitative sense
and of the estimative sense necessarily implies that one speaks of those
common and proper sensibles through which the per accidens sensible
objects are known in sense experience. For this reason, it is immediately
evident to St. Thomas that the per accidens necessarily implies the per
20 Cf. ibid.
21 Cf. ibid., n. 397.
22 Ibid., n. 398.
23 Cf. ibid., nn. 396, 397.
24 Ibid., n. 396.
25 Ibid., n. 397.
se in the context of sense experience, since the very nature of the per
accidens sensible objects is such as to entail the existence of the per se
sensible objects without which they cannot be apprehended.
Further, since " ... the senses are not affected at all by the per
accidens sensible object as such ... ," 26 the only way they could be
known at all is through some per se sensible. Otherwise, the very defini-
tion of the per accidens sensible object would exclude it from being a
sensible object at all, since, of its own essence, it is unable to affect the
senses. If, therefore, every sensible object were per accidens, then none
could affect the sense organs. In which case, sensation could not occur
at all. For St. Thomas holds that" ... the soul senses nothing without
the body, because the act of sensing cannot proceed from the soul ex-
cept by a corporeal organ." 27 But sensation does occur. Hence there
must be something per se here.
In fact, not even an infinite multitude of per accidens sensible objects
- no matter how arranged - could be known all by themselves and
without the aid of something per se sensible. For the reasoning here is
similar to that employed earlier in this book: 28 The per accidens
sensible objects are per se imperceptible. 29 And no combination - not
even an infinite multitude - of what is, of its very essence, imperceptible
(that is, what is unable to affect or make a difference to a sense faculty)
can become known through sensation, except through something which
can affect or make a difference to a sense faculty, namely, the per se
sensible obj ects. 30
Therefore, both because an analysis of the objects of the cogitative
sense and of the estimative sense reveals their dependence on the com-
mon and proper sensibles, and because "the senses are not affected at
all by the per accidens sensible object as such," it is clear that the per
accidens sensible object necessarily implies the per se sensible object
according to St. Thomas. For the per accidens sensible object is such
because it belongs to its essence to affect or modify the sense faculty
only through another, and thus, of itself, cannot make any difference to
the sense faculty, "as a man [per accidens sensible object] may happen
to be white [per se sensible object]." Hence, man is sensible only in
virtue of his whiteness (or some other common or proper sensible).
Since "sense experience" takes place only when the sense faculty is
26 Ibid., n. 393.
27 S.T., I, 77, 5, ad. 3.
28 See above, pp. 18-19, 26-27.
29 Cf. In II De Anima, 13, n. 393.
30 Cf. ibid., nn. 387, 393.
altered, and since such alteration can occur only through a per se
sensible object,31 it is immediately evident to St. Thomas that the per
accidens necessarily implies the per se in the context of sense knowledge.
II. THE FIRST AND SECOND ACTS OF THE MIND
Whatever principle is metaphysically valid must be transcendent: it

must apply to any being whatever - simply in virtue of the existence
of that thing. As Maritain puts it, the metaphysical:
... intelligible object "being" is not the privilege of one of the classes of things
that the Logician calls species, genus, or category. It is universally communi-
cable. I find it everywhere, everywhere itself and everywhere varied. I cannot
think anything without positing it before my mind. It imbues everything. It is
what the scholastics called a transcendental object of thought.32
But being may be said to have existence in two ways: being outside
the mind has real existence; being as known has intentional existence. 33
If the principle which we investigate is truly metaphysical, it must
apply not only to the domain of extramental reality but also to the
domain of knowledge, and within the latter domain - even to the order
of second intentions, i.e., logic.
In order to present a thorough treatment of the domain of knowledge,
the first two acts of the mind will now be given brief consideration, as
possible sites in which to apply the principle, "The per accidens neces-
sarily implies the per se." We say, "brief," because it is our contention
that St. Thomas so understands the operation of the mind that he
considers something per se as immediately given in both the first and
the second act of the intellect. Hence, it becomes immediately evident
in each case that the principle in question has application - just as soon
as we can determine what it is that St. Thomas considers as per accidens
in relation to his immediately given per se. This determination we shall
make shortly. It is, of course, also evident that insofar as the intellect
participates in the formation of the per accidens sensible objects (as
discussed in the immediately preceding section), its operations neces-
sarily imply something per se, namely the per se sensible objects. Let us
now consider each act of the mind in turn.
According to St. Thomas, " ... the first act of the intellect is the
31 Cf. ibid., n. 393. See above, p. 28.

32 Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York, 1959),
p. 210. Hereafter cited as: Maritain, Degrees.
33 "This manner of existence which things have in the thought assimilating them is called
'intentional' being." Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 229. See In II De Anima, 24, 552-553.
intelligence of indivisible or incomplex things, as when it conceives what

a thing is." 34 It is that act of indivisible intelligence" ... through which
the intellect apprehends the essence of anything in itself .... "35 This is
the first operation of the mind, commonly known as simple apprehen-
sion or abstraction. As we see from these quotations, it is in the first act
of the mind that we come to know the quiddities of things. And yet, it
seems that the distinction between the per accidens and the per se has
application here. For in the opening lines of the De Ente et Essentia,
St. Thomas declares, " ... what the intellect first conceives is being and
essence." 36 The order of expression here is not accidental. St. Thomas
makes this clear in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle:
" ... the intellect has two operations, one by which it knows quiddities,
which is called the understanding of indivisibles. . . . In the first opera-
tion the first thing that the intellect conceives is being, and in this oper-
ation nothing else can be conceived unless being is understood." 37
Hence, as Bobik points out, "being," considered simply as "some-
thing-there," is held by St. Thomas as logically prior to the conception
of any other quiddities by the intellect in its first operation:
... the concept of being, that which we expressed above as something-there, is
so related to all our concepts about sensible things that nothing other than it
can be conceived if it is not conceived; or whenever whatever else is conceived
about sensible things, something-there is always conceived. Thus, something-
there is a per se constituent of, or is analytically prior to, all other concepts
about sensible things; but not vice versa. Thus further, whenever the intellect
does anything at all apropos of sensible things, it conceives something-there.
The concept of being is the analytical beginning point of all human intellectual
activity apropos of sensible things. 38
This, then, is what St. Thomas intends when he says, " ... what the
intellect first conceives is being and essence." 39 That is, he means that
what the intellect first conceives is being ... and, in turn, through the
concept of being, the quiddities of all other sensible things. In this
fashion our knowledge of the essence of all material things may be said
34 In Post. Anal., Proemium, n. 4.
35 In Peri Herm., Proemium, n. Z.
36 De Ente, Proemium.
37 In IV Meta., 6, n. 605. Despite St. Thomas' clear expression here, Pieper insists that
one cannot conceive "being." He first refers to St. Thomas' ..... concept of being, or more
precisely, the concept of existing". But then, Pieper observes, " ... the peculiarity of existing
is just this, that it - existing, existence - cannot be grasped in a 'concept.' " Josef Pieper,
Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Scranton, zg6z), p. Z34. For
a defense of the concept of being, see Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas,
ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame, zg67), pp. 43-45.
38 Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence (Notre Dame, zg65), p. 5. Hereafter cited
as: Bobik, On Being.
39 De Ente, Proemium.
to be per accidens in reference to our knowledge whereby we conceive
their being. And since St. Thomas understands the first operation of the
mind as one in which essence is known only in and through the concept
of being, it is immediately evident that, in this context, "The per
accidens necessarily implies the per se." We may validate this inter-
pretation of St. Thomas by considering the following remarks from his
De Veritate: "Now, as Avicenna says in the beginning of his Meta-
physics, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most
known, and into which it resolves all its concepts, is being. Hence, it
must be that all other conceptions of the intellect are grasped by addi-
tions to being." 40
Here the function of the principle in question is manifest. For St.
Thomas says of the intellect that that" ... to which it reduces all its
concepts, is being." Just as the per accidens is always reduced to the
per se, all other concepts are reduced to the concept of being, i.e., the
concept of being is part of the content of all other concepts, but not
vice versa. It is not necessary to penetrate St. Thomas' doctrine further
on this point in order to see that the per accidens necessarily implies the
per se in the first act of the mind. The per se in this context is the con-
cept of being, and all other concepts are per accidens in reference to the
concept of being because they are defined as understood only in relation
to being. Whereas, the concept of being is per se since it is understood
through itself and cannot be reduced to any other concept.
For St. Thomas has made it evident, at the outset, that his very
understanding of the first act entails that what it first conceives is
being, and all other concepts through being. Hence, in terms of the very
manner in which he approaches the subject, it is at once evident that
that which is known through the concept of being necessarily reduces
to the concept of being through which it is known. In the first act of the
mind it is self-evident that the per accidens implies the per se, according
to the doctrine of St. Thomas. We say, "self-evident," because St.
Thomas holds that "all other conceptions of the intellect are grasped by
additions to being." 41 Hence, the proposition, "All other conceptions
of the intellect (the per accidens) necessarily implies the concept of
being (the per se), is self-evident, since " ... the predicate is of the
nature of the subject .... " 42 For, according to St. Thomas, the con-
cept of being is included as part of the nature of all other concepts.
40 De Ver., I, I.
41 Ibid.
42 In I Post. Anal., 7, n. 8; See above, p. 12.
Much the same situation obtains in St. Thomas' exposition on the

second act of the mind. Something is given as per se here also - and St.
Thomas so defines its role as to reveal the existence of a per accidens
which, it is immediately evident, reduces to that per se. First let us
consider the nature of the second operation of the mind according to
St. Thomas: "The second operation of the intellect is the composition
or division of the intellect in which there is now truth or falsity." 43
This act is the judgment, in which the mind combines or separates
those concepts grasped in its first operation:
Although the intellect has within itself a likeness of the things known according
as it forms concepts of incomplex things, it does not because of this render a
judgment about this likeness. This occurs only when it combines or separates ....
There is truth and falsity, then, only in this second operation of the intellect,
according to which it not only possesses a likeness of the thing known, but also
reflects on this likeness by knowing it and by making a judgment about it.44
As Hoenen notes,45 in its own order, i.e., as composing or dividing quid-

dities abstracted by the prior act of intellect, the second operation ex-
presses a new reality not found in the first act of the mind, namely, the
judgment. And yet, in its own order, the second act of the mind entails a
necessary relationship of the per accidens to the per se. For St. Thomas
holds that all other judgments depend upon a "firmest principle" which
is self-evident as soon as one understands "being:"
... since the intellect has two operations, one by which it knows that which is ...
and another by which it combines and separates, there is something first in
both [operations] .... And because this principle, "It is impossible for a thing
both to be and not be at the same time," depends on the understanding of being
(just as the principle, "Every whole is greater than one of its parts." [depends]
on the understanding of whole and part), then this principle is by nature also
the first in the second operation of the intellect, i.e., in the act of combining
and separating. And no one can understand anything by this intellectual opera-
tion unless this principle is understood. For just as a whole and its parts are
understood only by understanding being, in a similar way, the principle that
every whole is greater than one of its parts [is understood] only if the firmest
principle is understood. 46
Hence, just as being is per se and all other concepts are per accidens in
the first act of the mind, so too, the judgment, "It is impossible for a
thing both to be and not be at the same time," is per se and all other
43 In Post. Anal., Proemium, n. 4; " ... the second act is the operation of the intellect
composing and dividing." In Peri. Herm., Proemium, n. I.
44 In VI Meta., 4, n. 1236.
45 Hoenen, Reality, p. 5.
46 In IV Meta., 6, n. 605.
judgments are per accidens in the second act of the mind. For just as
being is analytically prior to all other concepts, so is the principle of
non-contradiction analytically prior to all other judgments. St. Thomas
insists that just as other concepts" ... are understood only by under-
standing being, in a similar way," all other judgments are" ... under-
stood only if the firmest principle [non-contradiction] is understood."
Hence, according to St. Thomas' understanding of the function of the
principle of non-contradiction in relation to the second operation of the
intellect, it is necessarily per se - and therefore, it is immediately evi-
dent that all other judgments are per accidens insofar as he considers it
axiomatic that the principle of non-contradiction is presupposed for
their very understanding. Thus, it is also self-evident for St. Thomas
that the per accidens necessarily implies the per se in the second opera-
tion of the mind. Here again, we say, "self-evident," because St.
Thomas holds that" ... no one can understand anything by this intel-
lectualoperation [the second act of the mind] unless this principle [non-
contradiction] is understood." 47 Hence he has defined the per accidens
(other judgments) in terms of the per se (non-contradiction). Because of
this, the proposition, "All other judgments (the per accidens) necessarily
imply the principle of non-contradiction (the per se)," is self-evident
since" ... the predicate is of the nature of the subject .... " 48 For we
have seen that St. Thomas considers that understanding the principle
of non-contradiction is included in the very nature of the operation
whereby we understand any other judgment.
III. THE THIRD ACT OF THE MIND
The third act of the mind culminates the logical process with the
reasoned conclusion. 49 The metaphysical principle, "The per accidens
necessarily implies the per se," has application in this context, since a
per accidens, or per aliud, is actually present, namely, the conclusion of
the scientific syllogism. 50 Here we are dealing with propositional judg-
ments, but the principle in question and its terms are defined by St.
Thomas in a manner conformable to previous usage.
In the early part of the Posterior Analytics, St. Thomas (and Aristo-
tle) propose to show" ... that demonstration is from first and imme-
47 Ibid.
48 In I Post. Anal., 7, n. 8. See above, pp. I2, 35.
49 Cf. In Peri. Herm., Proemium, n. I; In I Post. Anal., Proemium, n. 4; I, 4, nn. 5, 9;
7, n. 8.
50 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 7, n. 8.
diate [propositions]. .. ," 51 An immediate proposition is defined as

" ... one which has no other [proposition] prior to it." 52 This is opposed
to a mediate proposition which, " ... having a middle through which it
is demonstrated, ... it is necessary that there be prior to it propositions
from which it is demonstrated." 53
Regarding the nature of the immediate proposition, St. Thomas tells
us that" ... any proposition, whose predicate is of the nature of the sub-
ject, is immediate and pcr se known in itself." 54 Thus the immediate
proposition, having no other prior to it, is said to be per se known, or
self-evident. Unlike the mediately known proposition, it is not the
product of demonstration. Whereas, the mediate proposition has propo-
sitions prior to it from which it is demonstrated as a conclusion. Thus
we see the opposition of the per se and the per accidens, or per aliud, in
this context:
Once it is known what "whole" is and what "part" is, it is known that every
whole is greater than its part, since in such propositions, as said above [1. 5, n. 7],
the predicate is of the nature of the subject. Therefore, it is reasonable that the
knowledge of these principles should be the cause of the knowledge of the conclu-
sions, since always that which is per se is the cause of that which is per aliud. 55
Hence, this is the use of the per accidens and the per se in syllogistic
reasoning: the per se known proposition is evident through itself;
whereas, the per accidens known proposition is evident only through
another (or rather, others) from which it is demonstrated.
By telling us that the immediate proposition is self-evident, St.
Thomas does not intend to suggest that the first universal principles of
scientific demonstration have nothing prior to themselves in any order.
For, although there is no prior proposition from which they are demon-
strated, per se known propositions are, themselves, the product of an
inductive process which begins in sense experience. At the very end of
the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, in discussing how the first
principles of demonstration are known to us, St. Thomas says:
51 Ibid., 5, n. I.
52 Ibid., n. 2.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., n. 7; "In order that something be known per se, nothing other is required than
that the predicate is of the essence of the subject; for then the subject is not able to be
known except that the predicate appears to be contained in it." De Ver., 10, 12. On the
nature of self-evident propositions, see Robert W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic according
to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The Hague, 1966), pp. 282-293. Hereafter cited as: Schmidt.
Logic.
55 Ibid., 7, n. 8. See ibid., 34, n. I I .
Since, therefore, we attain the knowledge of universals from singulars, he [Aris-
totle] concludes that it is plain that it is necessary for the first universal prin-
ciples to be known through induction. For thus, namely, by way of induction,
sense brings about the universal within the soul, inasmuch as all the singulars
are considered. 56
This is the source of immediate universal principles which St. Thomas

has in mind when he says: (( ... since there can be no infinite regress in
demonstrations, as will be shown later, one must finally come to
premises which are immediate and indemonstrable. And thus, it is
necessary that demonstration should proceed from immediate pre-
mises, either from the start, or through some middles." 57
Yet, it is because a per accidens known proposition is not self-evident
i.e., because its predicate is not of the very nature of its subject, that
it must become known scientifically as the product of a demonstra-
tion. 58 For to be self-evident is to be per se known. 59 The self-evident
need not be demonstrated since the predicate is seen to belong to its
subject by nature - and in this fashion, (( ... we know indemonstrable
principles better than by scientific knowledge because we know them
as per se known." 60
The purpose of a demonstration is to establish the necessity of con-
necting the predicate of the conclusion to its subject.61 This connection
is achieved by means of one or more middle terms. 62 Something is said
to have been shown scientifically when certitude is obtained as to the
inherence of its predicate in its subject through the agency of such
middles as may be necessary to place the subject term clearly within
(or without) that domain of reality denominated by the predicate
term. 63
The question posed by the thesis principle in this context is the fol-
56 In II Post. Anal., 20, n. 14. See ibid., nn. 13-15; I, 30, n. 4; " ... one universal judgment
about all similar things comes from the apprehension of many experiences." In I Meta., I,
n. 18; "For first principles become known through the natural light of the agent intellect,
and they are not acquired by reasoning, but by having their terms become known. This
comes about by reason of the fact that memory is derived from sensible things, experience
from memory, and knowledge of those terms from experience. And when they are known,
common propositions of this kind, which are the principles of the arts and sciences, become
known." In IV Meta., 6, n. 599.
57 In I Post. Anal., 4, n. 14.
58 Cf. ibid., 5, n. 2.
59 Cf. ibid., n. 7.
60 Ibid., 34, n. II.
61 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 26, n. 2.
62 Cf. ibid., 32, n. 2.
63 " ••. it is necessary for a demonstration to be had through a necessary middle, otherwise
it would not be scientifically known that the conclusion was necessary .... " Ibid., 13, n. II.
Cf. ibid., nn. 1-4.
40 DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CREATURE·GOD
lowing: Assume that some proposition is scientifically known, i.e., it is

known with certitude, but per accidens from and through prior prin-
ciples. These prior principles could, in turn, be known through still
prior principles. 64 The question here is: Must one come to a first among
prior propositions, i.e., to some truth which is not itself demonstrated
but is known per se.- or, is an infinite regress among such per accidens
principles possible?
IV. THE NECESSITY OF A "PER SE"
In the context of scientific demonstration there are several ways in

which to show the need for a per se known starting point. St. Thomas
explains the basic problem of the per accidens regress:
The principles of demonstration either proceed to infinity, or else, there is an
ultimate [status] in them. If they proceed to infinity, there is none in them to
take as first: since the infinite cannot be gone through in order to come to a
first: and thus no first can be known. 65
Thus, an infinite regress among per accidens known propositions implies

that the ultimate foundations of the conclusion, whether they be few
or many, cannot be known - since the infinite cannot be gone through
in act. The full force of this argument cannot be grasped until one has
examined the precise nature of the premises of the scientific syllogism
in relation to their conclusion, a task which is undertaken in the imme-
diately following.
V. NATURE OF THE SCIENTIFIC SYLLOGISM
Now the end of the demonstrative syllogism is "to know," and in terms
of that end it is defined. 66 "To know," in this context, means to know
scientifically, " ... since to know seems to be nothing else than to under-
stand the truth of some conclusion through demonstration." 67 Demon-
stration is that type of reasoning which produces scientific knowledge. 68
Scientific knowledge means, " ... to know something perfectly, this
64 " ••• certain propo~itions are called suppositions. For there are certain propositions
which cannot be proved except by the principles of another science; and thus, they must be
supposed in the science in question, although they are proven by the principles of another
science." Ibid., 5, n. 7.
65 Ibid., 7, n. 3.
66 "He defines the demonstrative syllogism through its operation to its end, which is to
know." In I Post. Anal., 4, n. 3. On the nature of the scientific syllogism, see Schmidt, Logic,
pp. 256-270.
67 Ibid., n. 9.
68 " ••• demonstration is a sciential syllogism .... " Ibid.
however is to apprehend the truth of something perfectly ... if one
knows perfectly, he knows the cause of the thing known ... And where-
as it is the cause of that [fact] ... And it is not possible that it should be
otherwise." 69 Thus the demonstrative syllogism must be such an
argument that its content will stand as a firm basis for scientific knowl-
edge as defined above.
In light of the nature of the scientific syllogism, St. Thomas points
out that the premises of such a demonstration are the causes of the
conclusion because we are said to know scientifically when we know
the causes of a certain fact. 7o And arguing from the universal relation-
ship of cause to effect, St. Thomas concurs with Aristotle, when:
... he concludes further that they are prior and better known, because every
cause is naturally prior and better known than its effect. It must be that the
cause of a demonstrated conclusion is better known, not only as to the know-
ledge of what it is, but also as to the knowledge that it is. To demonstrate that
there is an eclipse of the sun, it is not enough to know that [an eclipse] is the
interposition of the moon, but also it must be known that the moon is interposed
between the sun and the earth. 71
Thus, premises of a demonstration must be better known and known

prior to the conclusion. This means not only that the meaning of the
premises must be understood prior to understanding the meaning of the
conclusion, but also that the truth of the premises must be known
before one can conclude to the truth of the conclusion.
Premises which are not understood prior to the conclusion are mean-
ingless or unintelligible in relation to that conclusion. 72 But premises
must be proportionate causes of their effect, the conclusion. 73 And if
the conclusion be taken as intelligible, then it must have a propor-
tionate cause. Unintelligible premises would not suffice as a sufficient
cause for an intelligible conclusion. 74 Thus the premises must be
understood, and since cause is prior to effect, they must be intelligible
prior to the intelligibility of the conclusion. 75 They must not only be
able to be known, but since the conclusion is actually known, they must
actually be foreknown in like manner.
69 Ibid., n. 5.
70 " .•• the propositions of a demonstration are the causes of a conclusion, because we
know scientifically when we know the causes". Ibid., n. IS.
n Ibid.
72 " ••• certain principles need proof in order to be known and before they are proven
they are not more known than the conclusion." In I Post. Anal., 6, n. 2.
73 " ••• the cause is always more powerful than its effect." Ibid., n. 4.
74 Cf. ibid., n. 7.
75 " ••• they [the premises] are prior and better knowu, sincee very cause isn aturally prior
and better known than its effect." Ibid., 4, n. IS.
Further, not only must the meaning of each premise be known, but
their truth, too, must be verified, i.e., the mind must be united to the
real actually, which unity the premises express. 76 For, to use an example,
unless there actually is an interposition of the moon, there is no
eclipse. 77 The truth of the premises is the cause of the truth of the con-
clusion, for truth follows upon being. 78 But truth is known to the mind
and exists in the mind. Thus, if the truth of the conclusion follows from
the truth of the premises as effect follows cause, then the truth of the
premises must be known to the mind prior to the truth of the conclu-
sion, as cause is prior to effect.79
Hence, according to St. Thomas, the discursive operation of the
intellect requires that the premises be better and prior known than the
conclusion, both in meaning, i.e., what it is, and in fact, i.e., that it is.
What is prior known is naturally better known since the cause is always
superior to its effect. 80
Here, St. Thomas considers a seeming objection: It seems possible
that the conclusion could become better known than the premises, once
it has been demonstrated - by means of sense verification, e.g., that
"the sun is eclipsed" might be certified by perceptual judgment 81 after
being known through demonstration. 82 Suffice it to point out that inso-
far as such a proposition is verified by the sense, it becomes a perceptual
judgment, and as such, is not a product of demonstration. But insofar
as it is considered the proper product of demonstration, i.e., as a con-
clusion, it remains known through the premises, and thus, inferior to
said premises as the less known is to the more known. 83
From the foregoing it is clear that no demonstration can reach a
conclusion unless its premises are known prior to its conclusion. And
likewise, since premises are composed of terms, each term in an argu-
ment must be known before a conclusion can be drawn from it. 84 Con-
76 Cf. ibid., n. 5.
77 Cf. ibid., n. 15.
78 " .•. For to be and to be true are convertible." Ibid., n. 13; also, " ... the principles of
the existence of a thing and of its truth are the same .... " Ibid., n. 5.
79 Ibid., n. 5.
80 Cf. ibid., n. 15.
81 The term, "perceptual judgment" is not to be understood as the "sense judgment" to
which Hoenen refers. Rather, it is a genuine intellectual judgment of existence based on
data received by the senses. Cf. Hoenen, Reality, pp. 210-212.
82 "In another sense, certain conclusions are most known, as being received through the
senses, such as that the sun is eclipsed." In I Post. Anal., 6, n. 2.
83 " ••• the principle is more known in the process of reason proceeding from cause to
effect." Ibid.
84 " ••• a proposition is either part of an enunciation in which one term is predicated of
another term." Ibid., 5, n. 3.
versely, if the terms are unknown, the conclusion cannot be said to have
been actually demonstrated. And finally, if a conclusion has been
demonstrated, all the terms which compose the premises of the argu-
ment, and the truth of the premises themselves, must have been prior
known.
VI. A POSSIBLE CONFUSION
In certain texts relevant to this discussion 85 a possible confusion arises.

For St. Thomas therein argues that the premises of a demonstrative
syllogism must be known prior to and better than its conclusion. Yet,
he begins by speaking of premises which are propositions and concludes
in a discussion of the terms, i.e., universals or singulars. Thus an ambi-
guity arises: Does his argument apply to terms, propositions, or both
in a syllogism? This seeming confusion is quickly resolved by reflecting
on the role which propositions play in the movement of the mind from
major premise to conclusion.
The function of propositions as premises is simply that of leading the
mind from one term to another until the last is connected to, and iden-
tified with, (or, possibly, denied of) the first.86 The following schema
makes this evident:
If every B is A,
And if every C is B,
Then every C is A.
Since the order of propositions parallels the order of terms, if one must
be prior and better known, so must the other.
VII. THE ARGUMENT
N ow that the nature of the scientific syllogism has been more thorough-
ly explored, it is possible to grasp more firmly the argument which
rejects the possibility of an infinite regress among per accidens known
propositions. To do this, St. Thomas first states a premise: "It was
determined above that the principles of a demonstration must be
known, nay rather that they must be more known. But the first alone
suffices as a premise." 87 Thus, St. Thomas will argue from the simple
fact that the premises of a demonstration must be known in order to
prove his point.
85 Ibid., nn. 15-16.

86 Cf. ibid., 35, n. 10.
87 Ibid., 7, n. 2.
For if we must know that from which demonstration proceeds, and

if these principles can never be reduced to something immediate, it
follows that between the major and minor extremes of a demonstration,
Le., between the subject and predicate which are finally united in the
conclusion, there must exist and be known an infinite number of
middle terms in act. 88
And yet, according to the above argument, if the principles of a
demonstration proceed to infinity, " ... there is none in them to take as
first: since the infinite cannot be gone through in order to come to a
first: and thus, no first can be known .... "89 And since knowledge of
the premises of a demonstration is the cause of knowledge of the con-
clusion,90 lack of knowledge of the first premises results in lack of
knowledge of the conclusion. But since an actual infinity cannot be
gone through, one could never know the first, and thus, one could not
know the conclusion. Or else, as the argument runs,91 if one does come
to a stop, then the prior principles remain unknown - and since knowl-
edge of such prior principles is required for certitude of the premises at
which one stopped, and since these, in tum, are required for knowledge
of the conclusion,92 the conclusion remains unknown.
Put another way, if one starts with knowledge of the conclusion, and
then, regresses through the logically prior premises, one would, by
definition of infinity, never arrive at all the premises on which knowl-
edge of the truth of the conclusion depends. 93 On the other hand, if one
were to argue that it is possible to start at the other end of a demonstra-
tion, Le., with the prior principles, one would have to face the impos-
sibility of ever finding a starting point which has no prior principles,
since this possibility has been ruled out on the hypothesis that there is
no per se here. 94
It must be pointed out that whether one considers this regress a
temporally and logically ordered multitude, or merely as a temporally
ordered multitude, is of no consequence - for in either case the require-
ment of passing through an actually infinite ordered multitude cannot
be met. For passing through anything entails coming to its end. But to
88 Cf. ibid., n. 7.
89 Ibid., n. 3.
90 Ibid., 4, n. IS.
91 Cf. ibid., 7, n. 3. See above, p. 40.
92 Cf. ibid., 4, n. IS. See above, pp. 41-42.
99 Cf. ibid.
94 " ••• if one comes to a stop in principles, the first principles would have to be unknown,
if one knows only through demonstration: for the first have no others prior to them, through
which they might be demonstrated." Ibid., 7, n. 3.
come to the end of that which, by definition, has no end, is a contradic-
tion in terms, and is clearly, therefore, impossible. 95
As long as it is granted, as St. Thomas insists, 96 that scientific knowl-
edge is the product of an actual progression from the known to the un-
known, the above argument proves conclusively that there must be
per se known first premises to which each per accidens known conclusion
may be reduced - since it is not possible to pass through an actually
infinite multitude of middles. 97
It is possible to deny the above conclusion only by denying that
scientific demonstration is really a progression from one thing to an-
other. But this is contrary to the very notion of demonstration accord-
ing to St. Thomas,98 which implies that certain things given, others
necessarily and subsequently follow. It may, thus, be concluded that,
according to St. Thomas' doctrine on the nature of syllogistic reason-
ing, the per accidens must imply a per se in this context.
VIII. A CLARIFICATION
Before bringing this chapter to a close, it is most important to note that

the per se known proposition, which we considered above, must not be
confused with the per se proposition which, as Hoenen points out,99 is
properly identified with the necessary proposition.1 00 The exact differ-
ence between these two senses of "per se" is given by Hoenen:
The notion of a "self-evident" and the notion of a "per se proposition" do not
then coincide. And this is clear from the meaning of the concepts: the per se
of the proposition concerns the nature of the objective structure which is affirm-
ed by the proposition, that is, it concerns what per se belongs to the things
themselves; the "self-evident" concerns our mode of knowing the objective
structure. lOl
It is, of course, the "self-evident," that is, the per se known, proposition
which has been our topic until now in this section on syllogistic reason-
ing. Yet, by opposing that per se (the self-evident) to the per accidens in
96 " ••• the infinite, properly speaking, is what cannot be traversed by measurement; and
thus, [the term] 'infinite' is used in the same number of senses as [the term] 'intraversable.' "
In XI Meta., IO, n. 2314.
96 "The third act of reason is according to that which is proper to reason, namely, to
discourse from one thing to another, so that through what is known one may come to a
knowledge of the unknown." In Post. Anal., Proemium, n. 4.
97 Cf. ibid., 7, nn. 3, 7.
98 Cf. footnote 96 above.
99 For a treatment of the per se proposition, see Hoenen, Reality, pp. 95-133.
100 Cf. ibid., p. 99; In I Post. Anal., IO, n. 8.
101 Ibid., p. 97.
this context, our treatment of the topic appears subject to Hoenen's

criticism:
To begin with, let us examine this per se. Above all, we must not, as is sometimes
done, confuse it with the frequently used expression "self-evident" (notum per
se). The per se proposition and the self-evident proposition can sometimes be
coupled together, but not always; for not every truth that is formulated in a
per se proposition is self-evident (notum per se); and inversely, not everything
which is self-evident corresponds to a per se proposition. The "self-evident"
(notum per se) has as its contrary the "mediately known" (notum per aliud);
whereas the per se of a proposition is opposed to per accidens. "Self-evident,"
then, is said of a direct cognition of the relationship between the terms, and not
of scientific knowledge strictly so-called (which is deduced, through middle
terms, from self-evident first principles). Conclusions of such a demonstration
are not "self-evident" (notae per se) but are "mediately known" (notae per aUud);
the medium is the system of the middle terms. And yet these conclusions are
per 5e propositions, since they express a connection between the subject and
predicate which without being direct or immediate is nevertheless necessary.I02
A superficial reading of this quotation might well lead one to conclude

that it is erroneous to apply the term" per accidens" to the conclusion of
the scientific demonstration, especially since St. Thomas consistently
prefers the term "per aliud" in that context, while he is careful to
reserve the term "per accidens" to the subsequent and diverse context
of lesson ten of book one of the Posterior Analytics.
Nevertheless, a defense of the terminology which we employed in
treating of the syllogism can be made easily when one observes that we
did not refer earlier to "per se propositions" and "per accidens proposi-
tions," but rather to "per se known propositions" and "per accidens
known propositions." Indeed, as Hoenen points out, St. Thomas'
phrase for the "self-evident" is "notum per se", which, while it may not
be identifiable in all instances with the "per se proposition," nonethe-
less can be properly identified with the per se known proposition. lOS
Similarly, while the term "per accidens proposition" is not correctly
identified with the "mediately known" proposition (notum per aliud),
nevertheless the term "per accidens (or per aliud) known proposition"
is identical with the mediately known proposition, as was seen earlier. 104
In order to understand the legitimacy of our procedure here it is
necessary to look briefly at the doctrine of lesson ten, book one, of St.
Thomas' Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. For the fashion in
which St. Thomas uses the term" per accidens" here reveals the fitting-
102 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
103 Cf. ibid.; " ... any proposition whose predicate is of the nature of the subject is imme-
diate and pel' se known in itself." In I Post. Anal., 5, n. 7.
ness of this phrase in this context: "Those predicates which are in the
[subject] neutrally, i.e., in such a way that they are neither placed in the
definition of the subject, nor the subject in their definition, are acci-
dents, i.e., are predicated per accidens, as music and white are predicated
of animal per accidens." 105
This quotation clarifies two points: First, in using the term "per
accidens" as opposed to the term "per se" in this context, St. Thomas is
concerned with the mode at predication expressed. Second, when the
predicate involved is a predicable accident, we have a per accidens
proposition. On the other hand, a per se proposition is expressed when:
... the subjects are in the definition of the accidents which are predicated of
them, or are in them because of themselves, i.e., when the predicates are in the
subject because ofthe subject, which is the cause of the predicate. And conse-
quently he shows that such knowable things are necessary, because it does not
occur that a proper accident is not predicated of its subject. 106
Thus, the difference between the per accidens proposition and the per se
proposition is based upon the objective structure of the relationship of
the predicate to its subject. Hoenen expresses it as follows:
The preposition per designates, then, a relationship, primarily a causal relation-
ship, and consequently, one which is necessary and intelligible ... Now if this cause
which connects a predicate with its subject is to be found in the subject itself,
by reason of the form which denominates it, then it has that predicate per se.
lf the subject is not in that manner the cause of its predicate, then the presence
of the predicate has an external cause and the subject is determined by this
predicate per accidens (nn. 5 and 7).107
The per se proposition discussed in lesson ten is, of course, a necessary

proposition, since its predicate is guaranteed by the very nature of the
subject. For, according to St. Thomas, " ... what belongs to anything
per se is in it of necessity and always and inseparably." 108
Since, of course, the only mode of predication which would not be
necessary is that of accident, it is now evident why St. Thomas calls
such non-necessary propositions "per accidens propositions" as opposed
to the necessary propositions which he terms "per se propositions."
Yet, when St. Thomas is not dealing with the way in which the predi-
cate is related to the subject of a proposition, but rather is writing about
the way in which we come to perceive the necessary relation of the
predicate to the subject (a condition which always obtains in the con-
105 In I Post. Anal., 10, n. 5.
106 Ibid., n. 8.
107 Hoenen, Reality, p. 97.
108 e.G., II, 55, n. 3.
clusion of the scientific demonstration) 109 - that is, when St. Thomas
treats of the way in which we come to a knowledge of the reasoned con-
clusion during the first eight lessons of book one, he uses a terminology
more suited to that different context.
IX. NEW DEFINITIONS
It is now appropriate that we turn to St. Thomas for his own defined
understanding of the terms "per se" and "per accidens." This procedure
has been deferred until now, since the following definitions have more
force in this context in which greater justification seems required, i.e.,
in the context of logic in which st. Thomas appears to prefer the oppo-
sition, "per aliud to per se," rather than "per accidens to per se." The
frequent substitution of "per aliud" for "per accidens" was mentioned
earlier. 110 That St. Thomas intends to retain the same meaning when
he speaks of the "mediately known proposition" as notum per aliud,l11
and when he speaks of the per accidens generally, may be shown from
those definitions we now quote.
St. Thomas tells us that " ... the preposition, "per," designates
causality .... " 112 On the distinction between the per se and the per
accidens, he offers these definitions which, in simplest terms, explain
the source of the causality in question as being either "through itself"
or "through another," which, in Latin, is "per se" and "per aliud,"
respectively: " ... whatever things are in anything per se either belong
to that thing's essence, or flow from its essential principles .... every-
thing that is in anything per accidens, because it is extrinsic to its
nature, must be found in that thing by reason of an exterior cause."113
From this it is evident why any proposition which is notum per aliud
is also properly termed "a per accidens known proposition" because,
even though such a proposition may be a per se proposition insofar as
there is a necessary connection between its subject and predicate,
nevertheless, our knowledge of the necessity of that connection is per
aliud, i.e., "by reason of an exterior cause" (since the premises cause
knowledge of the conclusion). And because our knowledge of the truth
of such a proposition is in us because of something "extrinsic to its
(the reasoned conclusion's) nature," such a proposition is rightly term-
ed "per accidens known."
109 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 10, u. 8.
110 See above, p. 10, footuote 8.
111 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 7, u. 8.
112 Ibid., 10, u. 2.
113 De Pot., 10, 4.
Likewise, since its "predicate is of the nature of the subject," any
immediate proposition is properly termed "per se known," because its
truth is evident in virtue of its own essence. But if one proceeds to
infinity among per accidens known propositions, then nothing is first
known and per se. And, according to St. Thomas, if no proposition is
known per se, neither is any intermediate premise known, nor is the
conclusion known. For the knowledge of the conclusion depends on
knowledge of the prior premises, and if nothing is known first, no sub-
sequent proposition can be known either. In this fashion, St. Thomas
demonstrates that the per accidens necessarily implies the per se in the
third act of the intellect.
With this reaffirmation of the principle in question in the field of
logic, we conclude this investigation of its application to the domain of
knowledge and this chapter. Further, since we have now concluded our
study of major contexts in which the principle has application other
than the domain of creatures in their relation to God, we now bring to a
close Part I of this book. In each context investigated in this Part, we
have seen that the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
per se," has application. Part II will investigate the application of the
principle in question to the domain of creatures in their relation to
God.
PART II

INTRODUCTION
THE CAUSE OF PER ACCIDENS BEING
In all the previous applications of the principle, "The per accidens

necessarily implies the per se," the context selected was limited to some
important, but restricted, aspect of reality. First it was shown that
wherever is found that type of per accidens known as accidental being
there must necessarily exist some per se, substance.! Secondly, it was
shown that change of any type revealed the existence of per accidens
principles of change, form and privation, which must involve the ex-
istence of some per se or matter - known as subject or substance in the
case of accidental change, and as prime matter in the case of substan-
tial change. 2 Thirdly, and lastly, it was seen that the per accidens known
objects of sense and intellect could not themselves be known unless
there exists some per se known object for each respective faculty.3 The
unique aspect of this Part (Part II) is not an examination of some
limited application of the principle, but rather an investigation of the
principle's application in St. Thomas' attempt to show that wherever
any finite facet of reality is found - something per accidens, something
by intrinsic nature dependent in the order of existence - that every such
finite per accidens demands the existence of a per se existing cause of its
very being. 4
To prevent any possible confusion concerning application of the
principle to "the context of existence itself" some points of clarification
should be made. Earlier,5 a line of argument was developed designed to
prove that the per accidens existence of an accident necessarily involves
the existence of a per se, i.e., the existence of that substance in which it
inheres. One might be led to conclude, therefore, that the attempt to
1 See above, pp. 9-I9.
4 Cf. De Ente, 4. See above, p. 5.
5 See above, pp. 9- I 9.
54 THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
reduce per accidens existence to a per se existent in this chapter is

nothing but a needless repetition of the above mentioned argument.
Such is not the case. For the earlier application of the principle differs
from its application in this context as the relative differs from the
absolute.
The earlier context reduces the accidental order of existence to that
of substance because it considers the nature of accidental being relative
to its correlative, substance. But in this chapter" per accidens existence"
shall be taken in an absolute sense. Per accidens herein shall mean that
which is dependent on another, as upon an efficient cause, for its ex-
istence and per se shall mean that which is in no way dependent on an-
other for its existence. 6 This taking of per accidens is absolute because
it is not relative to any limited aspect of the object considered, e.g., its
accidentality, its knowability, etc. It is absolute because it considers
the object taken as per accidens in its most basic aspect, i.e., in its very
being through another. Such a consideration of the per accidens nature
of finite reality cannot accept as adequate the simple reduction to some
other finite, as in the reduction of accident to finite substance - for
finite substance does not exist per se in the absolute sense. 7 It exists in
itself but not as independent of anything else, i.e., it is still per accidens
absolutely considered.
Thus the purpose of this chapter is to examine St. Thomas' search
for the ultimate ground of that which is per accidens in an absolute
sense, i.e., in the sense of its very dependence in being on another. The
question to be resolved herein is whether or not what is per accidens in
the order of dependence in being necessarily implies the existence of
something absolutely independent, or per se, as its ultimate cause.
This portion of the book will necessarily involve St. Thomas' argu-
ments for the existence of God - and appropriately so. For if a per se
existent can be shown to exist - one on which all per accidens existents
depend for their being, then, what has actually been demonstrated is
the existence of what is, in fact, identical with the God of tradition. s
Yet it is important to note again the purpose of this book as it pertains
to the proofs for God's existence. For while St. Thomas is concerned
with actually demonstrating God's existence, our purpose consists
6 "Strictly speaking, only God is an ens per se, that is, ... a being whose essence is its
act-of-being." Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 445, note 4.
7 " ••• it is necessary that there exist some thing which is the cause of the existence of
all things .... " De Ente, 4.
8 "Therefore something exists which is to all beings the cause of their existence ... and
this we call God." S.T., I, 2, 3.
THE CAUSE OF PER ACCIDENS BEING 55
simply in examining the application of the principle, "The per accidens
necessarily implies the per se," insofar as it functions within the proofs
of St. Thomas. Now the fact that St. Thomas' intent here is not coter-
minus with our own is crucial, since it makes the difference between:
I. a book on the proofs of God's existence, and 2. a book on the prin-
ciple, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," in general -
with special emphasis on the principle's application to the proofs for
God's existence. Our task is the latter. Because of this fact, although
we will now examine proofs of God's existence offered by St. Thomas,
nonetheless, our investigation will be greatly restricted compared to
his.9

CHAPTER I
THE WAY OF THE DE ENT E ET ESSENT I A
I. THE WAY
According to Gilson, the proofs for God's existence are given by St.
Thomas in the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles. 1 By
so saying, Gilson eliminates, as an intended proof of God's existence,
the argument offered by St. Thomas in his little, early work, the De
Ente et Essentia. 2 Gilson writes, "Contrary to what we ourselves have
once believed, this development is not intended by Thomas Aquinas to
be a proof of the existence of God. It is not presented as such in On
Being and Essence." 3 The argument itself appears, at least at first
reading, to contradict Gilson:
Now, whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles of its nature,
as the ability to laugh in man, or comes to it from some extrinsic principle, as
light in the air from the influence of the sun. But it cannot be that the existence
of a thing is caused by the form or quiddity of that thing - I say caused as by
an efficient cause - because then something would be its own cause, and would
bring itself into existence, which is impossible. It is therefore necessary that
every such thing, the existence of which is other than its nature, have its exist-
ence from some other thing. And because every thing which is per aliud is reduced
to that which is per se, as to its first cause, it is necessary that there be some
thing which is the cause of the existence of all things because it is existence alone.
Otherwise, we would proceed to infinity among causes, since every thing which
is not existence alone has a cause of its existence, as has been said. It is clear,
therefore, that an intelligence is form and existence, and that it has existence
from the First Being, which is existence alone. And this is the First Cause,
which is God. 4
Given the very formal character of the argument, and given the fact
that St. Thomas here concludes to the existence of God by name, how
1 Cf. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 59; S.T., I, 2, 3; C.G., I, 13.

2 Cf. De Ente, 4.
3 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 82.
4 De Ente, 4.
THE WAY OF THE DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA 57
then is it possible that Gilson should even suggest that " ... this devel-
opment is not intended by Thomas Aquinas to be a proof of the exist-
ence of God."? And yet, Gilson offers cogent defense of his position:
An essential feature of a Thomistic way to the knowledge of the existence of God
is that it should start from sense experience. Now, to the best of our knowledge,
Thomas Aquinas has never attempted such a demonstration. [Gilson refers here
to the context of the De Ente et Essentia.] Nor does one see how the thing could
be done. The distinction of essence and existence presupposes the very notion
of the pure act of being which its alleged demonstrations are supposed to jus-
tify.5
Now it is beyond the scope of this book to debate the epistemological

presuppositions and intrinsic merit of the famous "man and phoenix"
argument on which St. Thomas bases his seeming argument to God's
existence in the De Ente et Essentia. 6 Nevertheless, Gilson has at least
one valid premise for his assertion that the De Ente argument is not
intended by St. Thomas as a scientific demonstration of God's exist-
ence. For he is correct in saying that, for St. Thomas, every genuinely
scientific demonstration must proceed, ultimately, from sense ex-
perience. 7 And if one judges, as Gilson does, that St. Thomas" ... has
never attempted such a demonstration ... " in this context, then one
must agree that the argument in the De Ente is not intended as a proof
of God's existence. One might then accept Gilson's suggestion that,
"What here is at stake is the metaphysical intuition of the first prin-
ciple, which is the notion of being. At this highest metaphysical level,
it is not a question of proof, but of sight." 8 As indicated above, we
would stray from our purpose if we entered dialogue with Gilson con-
cerning whether the distinction between essence and existence can be
known prior to demonstrating God's existence,9 or only subsequently
thereto, as Gilson suggests. 10 But Gilson is undoubtedly correct in
pointing out that " ... an essential feature of a Thomistic way to the
knowledge of the existence of God is that it should start from sense
experience." 11 Thus, the ultimate criteria of whether St. Thomas in-
tended this as a proof of God's existence seems to be whether or not the
5 Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, p. 82.
6 Cf. De Ente, 4.
7 "All our knowledge originally consists in knowledge of the first indemonstrable prin-
ciples. Our knowledge of these arises from sense experience as is made clear at the end of
the Posterior Analytics." De Ver., 10, 6, sed contra 2. See above, pp. 38-39.
9 For a defense of this position, see Bobik, On Being, pp. 163-170; De Raeymaeker, Being,
PP·99- I I 5.
11 Ibid.
argument is judged to be intended by St. Thomas as ultimately derived

from sense experience. Fortunately, this last and difficult judgment is
neither relevant to nor essential for the development of this investi-
gation.
For, whether the argument offered in the De Ente was intended by
St. Thomas as a formal proof or not, even Gilson readily admits that the
natural interpretation of this controversial text from the De Ente per-
ceives it as expressing the meaning of that distinction between essence
and existence which" ... qualifies all the proofs. It is not a sixth way.
It is rather the ultimate metaphysical implication of the other five,
in the light of the Thomistic interpretation of the notion of being." 12
For this reason alone we can justly include so illuminative an argument
in this chapter. Further, our justification for prescinding from the
question concerning the origin of the data from which the argument in
question proceeds rests in the essential limitation imposed by the
purpose of this book. That is, it is not our purpose to prove the existence
of a per accidens. Rather, our task is to understand accurately the per
accidens which St. Thomas offers in any given context, and to deter-
mine therefrom whether something per se necessarily follows. In the
De Ente et Essentia the principle in question is explicitly stated by St.
Thomas in the context of the argument to God's existence which we
have been discussing: " ... everything which is per aliud reduces to that
which is per se . ... " 13 Therefore it is appropriate that we investigate
the application of this principle in a context so intimate to the demon-
strations of God's existence offered in the Sztmma Theologiae and the
Summa Contra Gentiles.
II. ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
The essential presupposition of the argument to God's existence is the

product of the "man and phoenix" argument which immediately
precedes it: " ... it is clear that existence is other than essence or
quiddity, unless, perhaps, there is a being whose quiddity is its very
existence." 14 That is, the distinction between essence and existence
(in finite beings) is presupposed in the proof.
While this is not a treatise on the distinction between essence and
existence, nonetheless, it is appropriate to clarify briefly so vital a pre-
supposition. That St. Thomas truly holds such a distinction, not only
12 Ibid., p. Sr.
13 De Ente, 4.
14 Ibid.
as valid in the order of second intentions, but also as valid in extra-
mental reality, can be shown. For he writes in In Boetium de H ebdoma-
dibus, "Therefore it is first to be considered that as existence[esse] and
essence [quod est] differ in simple second intentions, so do they differ
in the composite reality, which is manifest from the premises." 15
As we did not enter the controversy over the "man and phoenix"
argument because of the proper limits of this book, so too we will not
attempt proof of the distinction between essence and existence by any
other means. For our singular concern is to manifest the doctrine of
St. Thomas insofar as it bears directly on the application of the prin-
ciple, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," in the argument
for God's existence in the De Ente. As to the meaning of essence in this
context, we follow Gilson to obtain a working definition:
In so far as substance can be conceived and defined, it is called "essence."
Essence, therefore, is only substance as susceptible of definition. To be exact,
the essence is what the definition says the substance is .... To signify what a
substance is, is to reply to the question quid sit (what is it ?), and so, to the
extent that it is expressed in the definition, the essence is called the "quiddity." 16
Gilson's description of essence appears to be derived directly from the

text of the De Ente: 17
... in the first sense, only that can be termed being which posits something in
reality .... being in the first sense of the word is that which signifies the essence
of a thing .... since that by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or
species is what is signified by the definition expressing what the thing is, the
word "essence" is changed by philosophers, into the word, "quiddity." The
Philosopher, thus, frequently calls this the "what a thing was to be" [quod quid
erat esse], that is, that by which a thing is a "what." 18
Thus, it is this definable element of the substance, the "whatness" of

the thing, to which St. Thomas refers when he prepares for the conclu-
sion that essence and existence are distinct:
Whatever does not belong to the notion of an essence or quiddity comes from
without and enters into composition with the essence, for no essence is intel-
ligible without its parts. Now, every essence or quiddity can be understood
15 In Boeth. De Heb., 2, n. 32; " ... a thing's existence is other than its essence .... " In
IV Meta., 2, n. 558. See Geiger, Participation, p. 36, footnote 2; De Raeymaeker, Being,
pp. 99-145; Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 35-36; M. D. Roland-Gosselin, ed. Le "de
ente et essentia" de s. Thomas D'Aquin (Paris, 1948), pp. 185-199; Jacques Maritain, A
Preface To Metaphysics (New York, 1958), pp. 64-65. Hereafter cited as Maritain, Preface.
17 Cf. ibid., p. 445, note 3.
18 De Ente, 1. See In V I I Meta., 17, n. 1658; Bobik, On Being, pp. 46-48; De Raeymaeker,
Being, 99-145.
without anything being known of its existing. I can know what a man or a
phoenix is and still remain ignorant as to whether it exists in reality.19
An since he concludes that" ... existence is other than essence or quid-

dity .... ," as was seen above, it remains to inquire concerning the
nature of that principle called "existence," which " ... comes from
without and enters into composition with essence .... " St. Thomas
offers us terse assistance:
... existence [esse] itself is the proper act, not of the matter [alone], but ofthe
entire substance; for existence [esse] is the act of that of which we can say that
"it exists." Now, existence is not said of matter, but of the whole [substance].
Therefore, matter cannot be called "that which is"; rather, the substance itself
is "that which is." 20
Thus, existence is simply that act whereby "that which is" exists,
according to St. Thomas. This is confirmed by Gilson, who emphasizes
the primacy of esse in the metaphysical order:
•.. the word "to be" - or esse - is a verb, because it designates an act. To under-
stand this is also to reach, beyond the level of essence, the deeper level of exist-
ence. For it is quite true to say that all that which is a substance must by
necessity have also both an essence and existence. In point of fact, such is the
natural order followed by our rational knowledge: we first conceive certain
beings, then we define their essences, and last we affirm their existences by
means of a judgment. But the metaphysical order of reality is just the reverse
of the order of human knowledge: what first comes into it is a certain act of
existing which, because it is this particular act of existing, circumscribes at once
a certain essence and causes a certain substance to come into being. In this
deeper sense, "to be" is the primitive and fundamental act by virtue of which
a certain being actually is, or exists. In Saint Thomas' own words: dictur esse
ipse actus essentiae - "to be" is the very act whereby an essence is. (In I Sent.,
dist. 33, q. I, a. I, ad. r.) 21
Thus it is that in the real order "this particular act of existing" is under-
stood as the "primitive and fundamental act" whereby, as St. Thomas
says above, the entire substance exists. This primacy of esse is affirmed
by Maritain who insists that essence is nothing at all without it, while
at the same time he rejects the classical error of conceiving essence and
existence as separate things-in-themselves:
Nor was it a mistake to affirm that if existence is received by the essence as
act by potency, it is by (the existence) itself holding (not certainly efficient
causality, but by formal or intrinsically activating causality) the essence outside
19 Ibid., 4. Cf. R. Masiello, "A Note on Essence and Existence", The New Scholasticism,
XLV (1971), 491-494.
20 C.G., II, 54.
21 Gilson, God and Philosophy, pp. 63-64.
the realm of simple possibility, since the esse is not received by the essence as
in a pre-existing subject which would thus already be in existential act. The
essence which receives existence holds from it - in what concerns the existential
order - absolutely all its actuality, in short is nothing without it. 22
In short, neither existence nor essence are beings by themselves; but

existence, " ... comes from without and enters into composition with
essence ... ," 23 forming a single substance of which, alone, it is correct
to say that it is "that which is." 24
III. THE ARGUMENT ITSELF
Possessing now an elementary knowledge of how St. Thomas employs

the terms, "essence or quiddity" and "existence," we are prepared to
examine the argument in the De Ente which concludes to the existence
of the First Being, which, St. Thomas informs us, is the First Cause,
God. He begins, "Now, whatever belongs to a being is either caused by
the principles of its nature, as the ability to laugh in man, or else it
comes to it from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the
sun's influence." 25 This is a simple dichotomy: Either what belongs to
a thing flows from its essence or quiddity, or else, it does not. If it does
not, then "Whatever does not belong to the notion of an essence or
quiddity comes from without. ... " 26
"But it is impossible that the act of existing be caused by a thing's
form or its quiddity, (I say caused as by an efficient cause); for then
something would be the cause of itself and would bring itself into ex-
istence - which is impossible." 27 Having shown earlier that" ... ex-
istence is other than essence or quiddity ... ," St. Thomas now argues
that the essence cannot cause its own existence, or else, it would bring
itself into existence. Elsewhere,28 he notes that" ... nothing is its own
cause, because it would be prior to itself, which is impossible." From
this he concludes, "Everything, then, which is such that its existence
is other than its nature must have its existence from something else." 29
22 Maritain, Degrees, p. 437.
23 De Ente, 4.
24 On the doctrine of existence in St. Thomas, see 11£ IV Meta., 2, n. 558; Fabro, Participa-
tion, pp. 208-223; Maritain, Preface, pp. I9-24; De Raeymaeker, Being, pp. 99-I45; Gilson,
Christian Philosophy, pp. 29-45; Dominico Banes, Scholastica commentaria in primam partem
summae theologicae s. Thomae Aquinatis (Valencia, I934), In I S.T., 3, 4, pp. I39-I60.
Hereafter cited as: Banes, Scholastica commentaria.
25 De Ente, 4.
26 Ibid. See above, pp. 59-60.
27 Ibid.
28 Cf. C.G., I, IS.
29 De Ente, 4.
Therefore, excepting tor" ... a being whose quiddity is its very exist-
ence ... ," all other beings must have their existence caused by an-
other.
Here we have all the elements of the per accidens or per aliud in this
argument. Earlier30 we noted st. Thomas' notion of the per accidens:
"Everything that is in anything per accidens, because it is extrinsic to
its nature, must be found in that thing by reason of an exterior cause."31
Here, every being whose existence is distinct from its essence is seen to
exist per accidens, or per aliud, since existence is "extrinsic to its na-
ture" and "must be found in that thing by reason of an exterior cause."
Whatever exists per accidens is, of course, caused by another in its very
being, since "it must have existence from another." 32
At this point in the argument St. Thomas introduces the principle
which we here investigate:
And because everything which is per aliud is reduced to that which is per se,
as to its first cause; therefore there must be some being which is the cause of
the existing of all things, because it itself is existence alone. If that were not so,
we would proceed to infinity among causes, since, as we have said, every being
which is not existence alone has a cause of its existence. 33
St. Thomas places the burden of proof here on the principle that every-
thing which is per aliud is reduced to that which is per se. This is why
he says, "And because everything .... " It is from this principle that he
concludes that "there must be some being which is the cause of the
existing of all things .... " His reference to "proceeding to infinity
among causes" is not the reason and cause of the conclusion here. 34
Rather, it is simply the obvious alternative to coming to a first, which,
"itself is existence alone," since "every being which is not existence
alone has a cause of its existence." Hence we must see whether or not
the principle in question has valid application in this context, since it
would appear that this argument is entirely dependent upon it.
In testing the application of the principle in this context, the first
point to be observed is that the per aliud here is completely dependent
on another for its very existence:
The per aliud in this context is a per aliud with respect to existence. This means
that the per aliud is completely dependent on an extrinsic source. To make this
30 See above, p. 48.

31 De Pot., IO, 4.
32 De Ente, 4.
33 Ibid.
34 St. Thomas takes up the problem of infinite regress among causes in In II Meta.,
3 and 4. See below, pp. III ff. and I72 ff.
THE WAY OF THE DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA
clear, consider the following. First of all, a thing cannot be dependent on its
essence for its existence as on an efficient cause, as was explained above. Second-
ly, if in depending on an extrinsic source for its existence a thing were not
completely dependent on that other thing, then it would depend on that thing
for more than its existence. But what is there besides its existence? Only its
nonexistence. Clearly, then, a thing cannot depend on an extrinsic source for
more than its existence. Thus, it is completely dependent on that other thing.
And it is to be noticed that "completely dependent on an extrinsic source"
means not only that the per aliud cannot depend on the extrinsic source for
more than its existence, as was explained above, but also that the extrinsic
source is all that the per aliud depends on. This other thing must be such, there-
fore, that of itself it can account for the existence of the first thing; otherwise,
the first thing could not be said to be completely dependent on it. 35
As St. Thomas says in the argument, " ... every being which is not
existence alone has a cause of its existence." What Bobik is saying
above when he says, " ... a thing cannot depend on an extrinsic source
for more than its existence," is simply that to be dependent on another
for existence is the most radical kind of dependence possible - it is
complete dependence. For there is nothing outside of existence in a thing
except its non-existence, and non-existence is not. This is the import-
ance of Gilson's observation that existence is the "primitive and funda-
mental act" whereby, as St. Thomas says, the entire substance exists.
Thus, for the per aliud here (any being whose essence is not its existence)
to be dependent on another for its very existence, is for it to be com-
pletely dependent on that other.
At this point in his commentary on St. Thomas' De Ente et Essentia,
Bobik offers us a rare attempt at direct and specific elucidation of the
principle, "The per aliud necessarily implies the per se." Employing his
previously demonstrated thesis that the per aliud is completely de-
pendent on some aliud, he shows that the aliud on which the per aliud
is completely dependent must be seen to be, ultimately, something
per se:
If A depends completely on some extrinsic source, B, it makes no difference
whether there is but one B in existence, or more than one. Nor does it matter
whether the number of B's is finite or infinite; and if infinite, it doesn't matter
whether there is a last member or not. In any of these cases B must of itself be
capable of accounting for the existence of A. The reason for this point must be
stressed, for it is a justification for, or rather an elucidation of, the proposition.
If something exists per aliud, then it is necessary that something exist which
exists per se. B must of itself be capable of accounting for the existence of A,
both because A is completely dependent on an extrinsic source and because B
is here being assumed to be the only thing in existence other than A. This is
to say not only that what exists per aliud necessarily implies the existence of
35 Bobik, On Being, pp. 177-178.

another but also that this other must be something which exists per se. If B is,
like A, something completely dependent on another, then it is self-contradictory
to assert that A depends completely on B. And to suggest that there may be an
infinite series of B's without a last member is but to suggest an infinite number
of self-contradictions. 36
The point of Bobik's argument here focuses on the absolute existential

dependence of the per aliud. For, as seen above, that which depends on
another as the cause of its very existence is completely dependent on
that other. But if that other is, in turn, completely dependent on yet
another (third), it is self-contradictory to say that the first is completely
dependent on its immediate cause - for" completely dependent" implies
that nothing else is assumed except the immediate cause on which the
per aliud depends. And thus, Bobik says, "B must of itself be capable
of accounting for the existence of A, both because A is completely
dependent on an extrinsic source and because B is here being assumed
to be the only thing in existence other than A." (italics mine) This is the
meaning of complete dependence.
The self-contradictory character of the per aliud with the per se is
manifested in Bobik's immediately preceding paragraph in which he
rejects the possibility of an infinite series of caused causes such that,
though the final effect (the last per aliud) " ... would not be completely
dependent on anyone member in the series, it would be completely
dependent on the series as a whole." 37
This suggestion is rejected because it violates the principle of com-
plete dependence which is required among beings which depend on an-
other for their very existence and because such an hypothesis simply
compounds self-contradictions ad infinitum:
This suggestion cannot be accepted because an infinite series (whether there is
a last member or not) of things each of which is completely dependent on some-
thing other than itself is a series which cannot exist. It is to be pointed out,
first of all, that the only existence which the series has is the existence of each
of its members. That is, if the members do not exist, either does the series exist.
That the members of such a series cannot exist is clear from the fact that no
matter which member you choose, it is a member which is completely dependent
on something other than itself. No matter which one you choose, you can choose
only something which is completely dependent on something other than itself.
Thus an infinite series produces an infinite number of self-contradictions; A is
completely dependent on B, and cannot be completely dependent on B; A and
B together are completely dependent on C, and cannot be completely dependent
on C; A is completely dependent on Band C, and cannot be completely depend-
36 Ibid., p. I79.
37 Ibid., p. I78.
ent on Band C; A, B, and C together are completely dependent on D, and

cannot be completely dependent on D; etc. ad infinitum. as
The inability of the members, and therefore, of the series which the
members compose, to exist, lies in the fact that any member, as well as
any segment, of the series is a contradiction in its very being. For it
must both be completely dependent on the immediately prior element
or elements (since it depends on the prior element or elements as the
total cause of its existence), and yet, not be completely dependent upon
the prior cause or causes (since these, in turn, are necessarily dependent
on prior causes ad infinitum in an infinite series). Therefore, an infinite
regress among beings whose existence is other than their essence, and
which, thereby, require an extrinsic cause of their existence, is im-
possible. The per aliud without the per se is, at least in this context,
inconceivable because it is self-contradictory.
Needless to say, St. Thomas is speaking of causality in this argument
in the De Ente in the strictest, most proper sense of the term - for he
considers here the very cause of a thing's existence. This is the kind of
causality to which he refers when he says, " ... with the cessation of the
cause, the effect also ceases .... " 39 For St. Thomas is well aware that
it is possible to have an infinite series of accidental causes, succeeding
one another in time. 40 But it is because all the causes must act hic et
nunc in this context that St. Thomas denies the possibility of infinite
regress among causes and demands a per se First Cause, for without
the per se there can be no per aliud, as we have seen above.
IV. A FURTHER ARGUMENT
Further consideration reveals other evidence for the impossibility of an

infinite regress among the per accidens here. For, as we have indicated
in earlier contexts,41 even an infinite multitude of per accidens prin-
ciples in any given order cannot escape the need for a per se in that
same order. The problem lies in the intrinsic deficiency of the per acci-
dens, since, in this case, existence is per accidens in the being which is
composed of essence and existence " ... because it is extrinsic to its
nature .... " 42
Now the problem with the purely per accidens regress in this context
38 Ibid., pp. l78-l79.
3U S.T., I, 96, 3, ob. 3. See below, pp. 75-79.
40 Cf. S.T., I, 7, 4.
41 See above, pp. l8-l9, 26-27, 32.
42 De Pot., lO, 4.
(whether its members are finite or infinite in number) is that, by de-

finition, existence must be extrinsic to the nature of each and every
member of the series. As St. Thomas says, "Everything, then, which is
such that its existence is other than its nature must have its existence
from something else." 43 Now, among beings whose existence is ex-
trinsic to its nature or quiddity, causality is not without its limitations
according to St. Thomas:
Since every agent acts insofar as it is in act, the mode of action must be according
to the mode of a thing's actual existence: what is more hot in the act of heat,
causes more heat. Therefore, anything whose act is subject to generic, specific,
and accidental determinations must have its power determined to effects similar
to the agent as such; for every agent produces its like. 44
Certainly there is no more radical a limitation that a being can suffer

than that its very existence be extrinsic to its nature and, thus derived
from another. This is evident from the primacy of existence itself and
from the fact that existence does not belong to the essence of the per
accidens entities which we here discuss.
Now St. Thomas holds that form is the principle of action in any-
thing: " ... the form, which is the first act, is for the sake of its opera-
tion, which is the second act." 45 And since the form of beings whose
existence is per accidens does not include existence, neither can they act
of themselves so as to cause existence in another. We say, "of them-
selves," because it would be contrary to St. Thomas' teaching to suggest
that such beings are incapable of producing being in another when aided
by the appropriate cause, the first cause:
... a thing conserves another in existence in two ways: the first way, indirectly
and accidentally, through this: that it removes or hinders the action of a corrupt-
ing cause; another way, directly and essentially, because on it depends the
other's existence, as the existence of an effect depends on the cause. And in
both ways a created thing conserves another in existence .... It happens also
that an effect depends on a creature as to its existence. For when we have many
ordered causes, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and
principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the
intermediate causes. Therefore the first cause principally conserves the effect;
secondarily all the intermediate causes conserve the effect.46
Hence, according to St. Thomas, creatures (beings composed of essence

and existence) can cause existence in another, but only insofar as they
43 De Ente, 4.
44 C.G., II, 2I.
45 S.T., I, 105, 5.
46 S.T., I, 104, 2.
act as intermediate causes in the production of being. Yet, " ... since
every agent acts insofar as it is in act," and since" ... the form ... is
for the sake of operation," no being whose essence does not include ex-
istence can account for or cause, of itself, existence in another. 47 Only a
being whose essence is one with its existence can, of itself, cause
existence. Hence, St. Thomas attributes such causal power to God
alone, since this is the power of creation:
Now, existence is the first effect, which is apparent by reason of its universality.
Hence, the proper cause of the being is the first and universal agent, which is
God. Other agents, indeed, are not the cause of being as such, but of being this -
of being a man or being white, for example. However, existence, as such, is
caused by creation, which presupposes nothing, because nothing can pre-exist
that is outside of being as such. 48
We do not intend to presuppose the existence of God here. Neverthe-

less, by discerning St. Thomas' doctrine on the nature of God's causali-
ty, it becomes evident that he does not conceive it proper to the nature
of any creature that it should be able to cause existence without God's
aid. Beings composed of essence and existence may function as inter-
mediate causes of being; they may account for a being's being this - as
"being a man or being white." But creatures, according to St. Thomas,
" ... are not the cause of the act of being as such." Existence as such can
be adequately explained only by « ••• the First Being which is existence
alone. This is the First Cause, God." 49
How then are we to resolve the seeming conflict in St. Thomas' doc-
trine when, in one context, he says, " ... a created thing conserves an-
other in existence," 50 and in another context, he declares that crea-
tures " ... are not the cause of being as such?" 51 Gilson offers the fol-
lowing: " ... if any being causes the existence of another being, it only
does so because God confers on it the power. This truth is immediately
evident if we but remember that esse is an effect proper to God alone.
Creation is His proper action and to produce being is, properly speak-
ing, to create." 52
"Esse is an effect proper to God alone," since only in God is essence
one with existence. We need not presume God's existence here in order
to perceive that, according to st. Thomas ,no being which is composed
47 " •.. an agent produces its like according to the form by which it acts." C.G., II, 46.
48 C.G., II, 2I.
49 De Ente, 4.
50 S.T., I, 104, 2.
51 C.G., II, 2I.
of essence and existence can cause existence in another - all by itself.

Once again, we invoke the principle that" ... since nothing gives to an-
other what it has not," 53 multiplying - even to infinity - the causes in
which existence is found per accidens solves nothing in terms of explain-
ing the being of things composed of essence and existence, since it
simply is not in the nature of such beings to cause existence unless
aided by some being in which existence is found per se. Regardless of
their number, beings whose existence is other than their essence can
neither account for their own existence nor can they account for the
existence of any other unless there exists some being in which essence
and existence are one and which causes in all the others their being and
their causation of being.
Hence, St. Thomas concludes that " ... the first cause principally
conserves the effect; secondarily all the intermediate causes conserve
the effect." 54 Intermediate causes (beings composed of essence and
existence) are able to cause being in others only through the agency of a
first cause which is not only first, but also, superior in nature to all the
dependent causes, since it is "existence alone." The "problem of in-
finite regress" is irrelevant in this context, because none of the members
of the causal series involved is an adequate reason for that existence
which is found in each member per accidens. Only a first efficient cause
of an entirely different nature, one in which essence and existence are
identical, can adequately account for the efficient causality of existence
which runs through the entire chain of intermediate causes. And we have
seen that this follows from St. Thomas' understanding of the nature
and causation of a being in which essence and existence are distinct.
It is because we are dealing with the act of existence itself (which
St. Thomas regards as of such great primacy), as it is found in finite
beings, that the argument in the De Ente et Essentia moves so swiftly
and surely to the conclusion of God's existence, according to St.
Thomas. Yet, we must remember that our concern in analysing this
text of St. Thomas has not been so much to scrutinize the nature of his
conclusion, as to see that the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," has application .It has. We are now in a position to
examine the application of the principle in question in the context of
the quinque viae.
58 S.T., I, 75. I, ob. I.

54 S.T., I, 104. 2.
CHAPTER II
APROPOS OF THE QUINQUE VIAE IN GENERAL
I. THE WAYS
We may now turn to what philosophers generally accept as St. Thomas'

versions of the attempts of others to prove God's existence 1 as found
in the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles. In our exami-
nation of the application of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," in this central context of the book, we shall
concentrate our attention on the quinque viae as they appear in the
Summa Theologiae, because it is later and superior in character. 2 The
text of the Summa Contra Gentiles will be employed consistently as a
guide in the interpretation and elucidation of that of the Summa
Theologiae. Bearing in mind the limitations which are proper to this
investigation,3 and employing what has been learned from our earlier
examination of other contexts, it should be possible to complete our
investigation of the function of the principle in this context without
the complications which would arise were we to take our task to be
(which we do not) that of proving God's existence itself. For our sole
concern is the application of the principle in question.
Despite the aforementioned limitations, it does appear relevant to
our task to raise a question which is critical to the number of applica-
tions which we must investigate, i.e., "Do the quinque viae constitute
one proof or five?" For depending on how this is answered, we shall
have either one, or else, five contexts of application in which to test the
principle. Mascall objects that the quinque viae are not five different
proofs for God's existence, since, he claims, they fail to conclude to the
1 There are exceptions to every rule: Thus, Sillem concludes, " ... St. Thomas does not
answer the query 'does God exist?' at the end of the article, and furthermore it does not
appear that he intended to do so." Edward Sillem, Ways of Thinking about God (New York,
1961), p. 72. Hereafter cited as: Si1Jem, Ways.
2 Cf. ibid., pp. 55-56.
3 See above, pp. 3-4, 54-55.
same God: "Their (the Five Ways) primary function, as I believe is not
to provide us with five different proofs of God's existence - viewed as
such they are, as we have seen, open to the objection which St. Thomas
never directly rebuts, that it is by no means evident that they all
terminate in the same God." 4
Actually, this objection by Mascall appears directed not so much at
the plurality of the quinque viae, as against their efficacy. He denies
they are "syllogistic proofs" altogether.5
On the other hand, the more acceptable position, especially as re-
flected in the thinking of more eminent writers such as Garrigou-
Lagrange,6 Gilson, and Maritain, tends to support the thesis that what
we deal with here are five formally distinct and independent proofs -
even though they concede at the same time that the structure of all the
proofs is formally identical and that St. Thomas intends them to be
taken as a mutually complementary whole. Gilson explains the seem-
ing enigma:
Nowhere more than here [when one compares the prima via to the secunda via]
is one more likely to accept the recently suggested thesis that there are not five
proofs for the existence of God, but only one divided into five parts. 7 If we mean
by this that the five proofs of St. Thomas are conditioned upon one another -
and some have gone so far as to regard the proof by a first mover as a mere
preparation for the proof - the conclusion is unacceptable. Each proof is suffi-
cient in itself .... But it is correct to say that the structure of the five proofs of
St. Thomas is identical, even that they form one whole and reciprocally complete
one another. Anyone of them is enough to establish the existence of God but
each begins from a different series of effects and brings out a different aspect
of the divine causality.8
Thus, according to Gilson, the question finds its watershed in the fact
of the diversity of the effects from which the proofs proceed as well as
the diversity of the aspects of the divine causality thereby manifested.
Maritain concurs, and states the principle on which his decision is
based:
One sometimes wonders if the five ways of Thomas Aquinas are but different
aspects of one and the same proof or if they constitute five specifically distinct
proofs. In my opinion, the proper reply to this question is that the nerve of the
4 E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London-New York-Toronw, 1949), pp. 77-78.
Herea1ter cited as: Mascall, Analogy.
5 Cf. ibid., pp. 78-79.
6 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, trans. Dom Bede Rose
(st. Louis, 1939), I, pp. 242-377, 390. Hereafter cited as: Garrigou-Lagrange, God.
7 Here Gilson refers to the following article: "A. Audin, 'A proposito della dimostrazione
tomistica dell'esistenza di Dio,' Revist. di tilosotia neo-scolast, IV, 1912, 758-769." Christian
PhilosoPhy, p. 452, footnote 38.
B Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, p. 67.
APROPOS OF THE QUINQUE VIAE IN GENERAL 71
proof, the formal principle of the demonstration, is the same in each of the five
ways, to wit, the necessity of a cause which is pure Act or Being, itself subsistent
in its own right. From this point of view one could say that they form but one
proof presented under different modes or aspects. But that which makes a proof
is in reality not its formal principle alone, but also its point of departure and
the basis on which it rests. And because the proofs of St. Thomas rest on the
facts of experience ("philosophic facts"), and because these facts are typically
distinct data discerned in the world of experience, it is necessary to say purely
and simply that the five ways of Thomas Aquinas constitute specifically distinct
proofs. 9
Thus, it is the "point of departure" (Gilson's "series of effects") which

is the basis on which the proof rests, that constitutes the specific dis-
tinction among the proofs for Maritain.1 0 Now this is a matter of great
interest to this book because it is the "point of departure" which also
is an "effect" which constitutes the per accidens in each of the quinque
viae. This means that, even if one did not consider these as five distinct
formal proofs, one would, nonetheless, have to grant that specific dis-
tinction among the types of per accidens in each via requires that a spe-
cifically distinct reduction to a per se is in order in each case. Therefore,
for our purposes, that is, 1:0 test the application of the principle, "The
per accidens necessarily implies the per se," it will be necessary to con-
sider the quinque viae as offering five distinct contexts in which the
principle must be examined.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INFINITE MULTITUDE
Before we enter the individual proofs of the quinque viae we should

pause briefly to eliminate a potentially confusing side-path. Garrigou-
Lagrange succinctly removes the obstacle we have in mind when, in
treating the problem of infinite regress, he says: "The second proposi-
tion: 'There is no regress to infinity in a series of movers which are
actually and essentially subordinate: is based upon the principle of
causality and in no way upon the fact that an infinite and innumerable
multitude is an impossibility." 11
In the beginning of this book,12 we noted that commentators on the
quinque viae such as Garrigou-Lagrange, Sillem, Gilson, Mascall, De
9 Jacques Maritain, Approaches to God (New York, 1967), pp. 33-34. Hereafter cited as:
Maritain, Approaches.
10 For a summary of various positions on this question, including those of Gredt, Maquart,
Van Steenberghen, Gilson, Owens, Smith and Finili, see: Thomas C. O'Brien, Metaphysics
and the Existence 0/ God (Washington, 1960), pp. 6r-95.
11 Garrigou-Lagrange, God, p. 264.
18 See above, p. 2-3.
Raeymaeker, and Maritain,13 do not succumb to the temptation of re-

jecting the possibility of an infinite regress among causes in act -
simply because such a regress would constitute an actually infinite
multitude, which St. Thomas considers to be impossible in a well known
passage of the Summa Theologiae. 14 Rather, they always seek a relevant
reason.
Here we have a general agreement as to the inadmissability of any
argument from the impossibility of an infinite multitude in act to the
impossibility of an infinite regress of caused causes in act - at least in
the context of the quinque viae. Three reasons may be offered for this
concensus of opinion, although not all authors would accept all three.
1. There are those, such as Maritain,15 who maintain that, after some
vacillation, St. Thomas finally concluded that an infinite multitude in
act is in fact possible. 2. Others, such as De Raeymaeker,16 maintain the
opposite and conclude that St. Thomas finally ruled out such a possi-
bility - but that " ... the Angelic Doctor hesitates a long time before
declaring it impossible in all cases." 17 So long did St. Thomas hesitate,
according to De Raeymaeker (and the texts of St. Thomas as well), that
it would have been impossible for him to have intended to employ the
supposed argument from the impossibility of an infinite multitude in
the quinque viae, which date several years before the question was sup-
posedly settled in St. Thomas' mind. 3. Finally, careful examination of
the text of the quinque viae reveals that St. Thomas does not intend to
employ any such reasoning in order to show that there must be a first
in any causal regress. We shall consider each in turn.
Concerning the first two positions: We shall not attempt to list
every text relevant to this discussion. De Raeymaeker has done this
well. 18 The texts given below will suffice to show that, in fact, St.
Thomas did not definitively make up his mind on the subject until alter
the quinque viae were written - a point on which both Maritain and De
Raeymaeker agree. This, of course, is sufficient to show that the "im-
possibility of an infinite multitude in act" could not have been safely
used by St. Thomas in the quinque viae. First, we consider the most
13 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, God, p. 264; Sillem, Ways, pp. 68-71; Gilson, Chl'istian Philos-
ophy, pp. 59-83; Maritain, Appl'oaches, p. 45, footnote 6; De Raeymaeker, Being, pp. 71-72,
297, footnote 28; Mascall, Analogy, pp. 73-76; He Who Is (London-New York-Toronto,
I958), p. 44. Hereafter cited as: Mascall, He Who Is.
14 Cf. S.T., I, 7, 4.
15 Cf. Maritain, Approaches, p. 45, footnote 6.
16 Cf. De Raeymaeker, Being, pp. 7I-72; 297, footnote 28.
17 Ibid., p. 72.
18 Cf. ibid.
famous text, the one written at the same time (1266-1268) as the quin-
que viae:
However, an accidentally infinite multitude is impossible, since every multitude
must be in some species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are according
to the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite, for every number
is multitude measured by one. Hence, it is impossible that there exists an infinite
multitude in act, either in itself or accidentally. Furthermore, multitude in the
world [in rerum natura existens] is created, and everything created is compre-
hended under some definite intention of the Creator; for no agent labors in vain.
Hence, everything created must be comprehended under a certain number.
Therefore it is impossible for an infinite multitude in act to exist, even acciden-
tally. 19
During his lifetime St. Thomas addressed this question several times 20
- sometimes declaring any kind of actually infinite multitude impos-
sible, as in the above text; sometimes he appears uncertain that any
demonstration against the infinite multitude in act is possible. Both
De Raeymaeker and Maritain cite the following quote from the De
Aeternitate Mundi as an instance of the latter viewpoint: "And further,
it has not yet been demonstrated that God is not able to make an in-
finite multitude in act." 21 Both writers agree that this represents a
change from St. Thomas' position of two to four years earlier in the
Summa Theologiae. But, unfortunately, they are not in perfect agree-
ment as to the date of its writing: Maritain gives" about 1270-1271" ;
De Raeymaeker gives "1270." This difference appears crucial since it
seems to lead Maritain to conclude that the text from the De A eterni-
tate Mundi is St. Thomas' final consideration of what he had written in
in the Summa Theologiae. 22 On the other hand, De Raeymaeker goes on
to choose what he considers a later text as the final position - one he
says was written in December of 1270 and one which he interprets as
" ... declaring it [an infinite multitude of things which would exist
simultaneously] impossible in all cases." 23 The text in question reads:
"When therefore it is asked whether it is possible for God to make some-
thing infinite in act, we must answer, 'No.' ... All things which God
does must be formed; but the infinite is taken to be as matter without
form - for the infinite is classed on the side of matter." 24
Since, evidently, an infinite multitude in act is "something infinite
19 S.T., I, 7, 4.
20 Cf. In II Sent., d. I, 1,5, ad. I7; De Ver., 2, 10; S.T., I, 7, 4; De Aetern. Mundi, n. 3IO;
In III Phys., 8; In XI Meta., IO, nn. 2328-2329; Quodl., XII, 2.
21 De Aetern. Mundi, n. 3IO.
22 Cf. Maritain, Approaches, p. 45, footnote 6.
23 De Raeymaeker, Being, p. 72.
24 Quodl., XII, 2.
in act," it would escape God's causality according to this text. But

what even God cannot make cannot be, because such things are not
possible. As St. Thomas says in the Summa Theologiae, " ... God, in
accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things,
and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall
short of being possible .... " 25 Such things are impossible because,
" ... nothing that implies a contradiction falls under God's omnipo-
tence." 26 Therefore the text which De Raeymaeker cites as St. Thomas'
last on the subject does, in fact, appear to rule out the possibility of
any infinite multitude in act in the judgment of St. Thomas.
Unfortunately, as we can see from the opposition of Maritain and De
Raeymaeker here, which position is taken to be the definitive one is
seemingly dependent on which of the cited texts is taken to be the
historically last. This is not a dispute which we are prepared to resolve.
Nor need we. For what all authors who contend here seem to agree on
is the fact that St. Thomas did, in fact, waver on the doctrine in ques-
tion after having treated both it and the quinque viae in the Summa
Theologiae. This sumces to establish the point intended in comparing
these contending positions, i.e., St. Thomas could not have been so
firmly set on the impossibility of an infinite multitude in act that he
would have employed it as an implicit premise in the quinque viae. As
to the unlikely possibility that St. Thomas erred in judgment here and
employed the premise (of the impossibility of an infinite multitude in
act) in the quinque viae in spite of the fact that his mind was not yet set
on the subject, we will now turn to our third point made above 27 in
order to show that the very wording of the proofs excludes this possi-
bility.
Actually, this final point is easily made. Let us examine the wording
of the only two viae in which St. Thomas explicitly makes issue of the
impossibility of infinite regress, namely, the prima and secunda viae.
(He mentions it in the tertia via, but only by referring the proof back
to the secunda via).
In the prima via, St. Thomas argues in this fashion: "This however
is not to proceed to infinity, because then there would not be any first
mover, and consequently neither any other mover .... " 28 Notice, he
does not say that there must be a first mover because we cannot proceed
to infinity; rather, he says that we cannot proceed to infinity because
25 S.T., I, 25, 4, ad. 2.
26 S.T., I, 25, 4.
28 S.T., I, 2, 3.
there must be a first mover. This proves that St. Thomas does not in-
tend to argue from the impossibility of infinite regress to the need for a
first. Rather, he reverses the process and argues from the need for a
first to the impossibility of an infinite regress.
Likewise, in the secunda via, St. Thomas declares, "But if one proc-
eeds to infinity in efficient causes, there will be no first efficient cause,
and thus neither will there be an ultimate effect .... " 29 For, as he says
immediately before, " ... removing the cause removes the effect." Here
again we see that it is the need for a first which dictates that there can
be no infinite regress, and not the impossibility of infinite regress which
demands a first. The only reason that St. Thomas refuses to admit an
infinite regress here is that, in such a case, there would be no first. And
he insists that there must be a first, or else, he declares, " ... if there be
no first among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any inter-
mediate, cause." 30
Thus, it is evident from an analysis of the wording of these viae that
St. Thomas does not intend to introduce the problem of the infinite
multitude in act in this context. For the reasoning he offers against the
infinite regress is never based on any allegation that this would involve
an infinite multitude, but rather, simply that an infinite regress pre-
cludes the possibility of a first in the series - and St. Thomas insists that
there must be a first. It would appear that some other principle is opera-
tive here, a matter which we shall investigate later. 31 But this much is
evident. St. Thomas did not argue from the premise that an actually in-
finite multitude is impossible in order to prove that an actually infinite
regress among causes is impossible in the quinque viae. And thus, the
problem of the actually infinite multitude is irrelevant to our discus-
sion of the quinque viae.
III. PROPER CAUSALITY
Before turning to the individual proofs themselves it is appropriate that

we clarify the concept of proper causality, since the per accidens always
refers itself to a cause and since the kind of causality operative in the
quinque viae is proper causality.
We say that the per accidens always implies reference to a cause
because, by definition, "Everything that is in anything per accidens,
because it is extrinsic to its nature, must be found in that thing by
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
reason of an exterior cause." 32 Now St. Thomas tells us that in order to

demonstrate the existence of God we must employ a quia demonstra-
tion in which we argue from effects, which are prior known relative to
us, to the existence of their proper cause:
I answer that, demonstration can be made in two ways: one is through the cause,
and is called propter quid, and this is [to argue] through what is prior absolutely.
The other is through the effect, and is called demonstration quia; this is [to
argue] through what is prior as to us. When an effect is more manifest to us
than its cause, through the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause.
And from every effect the existence of its proper cause [italics mine] can be
demonstrated (so long as its effects are better known to us) ; because, since every
effect depends on its cause, if the effect is posited, the cause must pre-exist.
Hence the existence of God, insofar as it is not self-evident to us can be demon-
strated through those effects which are known to us. 33
Garrigou-Lagrange confirms that it is proper causality which illumi-

nates and connects all of the quinque viae:
This notion of proper cause illuminates the Thomistic proofs for the existence
of God, so that we can perceive the connection between them.
In each of these a posteriori proofs, St. Thomas starts from a fact known as
certain from experience, and from a rational principle, which is necessary and
evident, he proves the existence of GOd, the proper and universal cause of the
universal effects which originate from Him.34
The same author answers the most obviously pressing question: "What
is the proper cause? It is the cause on which the effect absolutely first
of all, or necessarily and immediately, depends .... " 35 Without at-
tempting an extensive digression on the Thomistic notion of causality,
this much should be said concerning the proper cause: It is a cause
which operates simultaneously with its effect. For, " ... with the cessa-
tion of the cause, the effect also ceases .... " 36 What we distinguish
here is the proper cause from the accidental cause: "Causes are dis-
tinguished in another way inasmuch as one thing is said to be a proper
cause and [another] an accidental [cause]. ... For example, a sculptoris
the proper cause of a statue, and Polyclitus is an accidental cause inas-
much as he happens to be the sculptor of the statue." 37 We must
understand, here, the sculptor as the proper cause of the coming-to-be
32 De Pot., IO, 4.
83 S.T., I, 2, 2.
34Garrigou-Lagrange, God, pp. 380-38I.
35Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, trans. Dom Bede Rose (St. Louis, I959), p. U5.
Hereafter cited as: Garrigou-Lagrange, One God.
36 S.T., I, 96, 3, ob. 3; see above, p. 65.
37 In V Meta., n. 787.
of the statue. Hence, if at any stage the sculptor ceases to sculpture,

the statue ceases to be sculptured - and remains unfinished.
Garrigou-Lagrange explains St. Thomas on this point and draws out
the implication of this doctrine which pertains to causality in the
quinque viae:
The proper cause must be the direct or necessarily required cause, and not the
accidental cause. We have an example of a direct cause in the following: a man
generates a man, or the man generating is the direct cause of the generation of
the man. An accidental cause would be: Socrates generates a man; because for
a man to be generated it is not necessary that the one generating be Socrates
or Plato. . .. In like manner and with far greater reason, the grandfather is the
accidental cause of the generation of the grandson, for he is not directly concern-
ed in it, and often he is already dead. His son generates inasmuch as he is a
man, and not inasmuch as he is the son of another man, as St. Thomas says.
Hence a series of past causes, as grandfather, great-grandfather, and so on, is
a series of accidental causes and in Aristotle's opinion was infinite in the past,
that is, there was no first generator; but, according to St. Thomas, this is not
repugnant to reason .... 38
This, then, is the key to St. Thomas' understanding of causality as it is

employed by him in the quinque viae, where he insists that " ... it is
impossible to proceed to infinity ... " among essentially subordinated
causes. For accidental causes could, indeed, go back through time to
infinity, never coming to a first; whereas, proper causes require a first
cause which is operative hic et nunc. Thus he concludes: "Hence it is
not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a
thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon
this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to
infinity." 39
Now it is evident that St. Thomas is talking about proper causes in
the proofs for God's existence, since he insists that the causes exist at
the same time as their effects. In the secunda via he says that" ... re-
moving the cause removes the effect." And in the parallel text of the
Summa Contra Gentiles, he writes that" ... removing a cause is to re-
move that of which it is a cause." 40 It is therefore obvious that he is
not talking about accidental causality in this context. For in accidental
causality which stretches back through time, we have the situation
depicted by Garrigou-Lagrange: " ... the grandfather is the accidental
cause of the generation of the grandson ... and often he [the grand-
father] is already dead." 41 One can remove the accidental cause and
38 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. II6.
39 S.T., I, 46, 2, ad. 7.
40 C.G., I, I3.
41 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. II6.
have the effect survive. Such is not the case among proper causes; they
must be simultaneous. And proper causality is the backbone of the
quinque viae. 42 Only of causes which must be simultaneous with their
effects may it be said that there can be no infinite regress. This is a
central theme of the quinque viae. Thus, St. Thomas says explicitly
in the Contra Gentiles, when referring to the proof from motion, "The
mover and the thing moved must exist simultaneously." 43
Gilson clearly expresses the atemporal quality of the causal chain
found in the quinque viae: " ... the impossibility of going back to in-
finity does not refer to an infinite regression in time, but in the present
instant in which we are considering the world. We can put this another
way by saying that the structure of the proof would be the same if we
admitted the hypothesis of the eternity of the world." 44
That St. Thomas in no way confused the impossibility of infinite caus-
al regress in the proofs for God's existence with his Catholic belief in the
impossibility of infinite temporal regression is manifest. For he de-
clares, " ... the most efficacious way to prove that God exists is on the
supposition of the eternity of the world .... " 45 Granted the world is
eternal, one need not come to a first in temporal causal regress. But
St. Thomas insists on a first. Hence the causality of which he speaks
cannot involve the temporal regress of accidental causality.
Finally, Maritain offers us an overview of the role of proper causality
in the quinque viae. The hie et nunc character of divine causation is
emphasized:
If then we consider the relation of any efficient cause whatever to the First
Cause, we see that this efficient cause would not act at any moment at all if,
at that very moment, it were not activated by the First Cause. Every relation
of succession in time in the exercise of causality is here eliminated; the causality
of the First Cause embraces and dominates without succession the whole succes-
sion of time; it is at each moment the ultimate foundation of the exercise of the
causality of all the agents which act at that same moment in the world. In other
words the line of intelligible conditioning or of reason for existence is, so to
speak, "vertical" .... 46
Here we do not intend to presuppose the conclusion of the proofs, i.e.,

that God exists. Rather, this passage is selected for its adroit expression
of the kind of causation which St. Thomas has in mind in the quinque
42 For a treatment of the crucial role of proper causality in the proofs of God's existence,
see: Garrigou-Lagrange, God, pp. 7I-77, 379-38I.
48 C.G., I, I3.
45 C.G., I, I3.
48 Maritain, Approaches, p. 43.
viae. For in this context St. Thomas refers to causality in its most proper
sense - a sense in which cause and effect must be simultaneous, because
" ... every relation of succession in time in the exercise of causality
is here eliminated." It is nothing less than the direct influence of divine
causality itself for which he searches, and therefore, there is no concern
for accidental causation whose temporal regression to infinity in an
eternal world is well known by St. Thomas not to be beyond the range
of reason.47
47 Cf. S.T., I, 46, 2. " •.• it does not follow necessarily that if God is the active cause of
the world, he must be prior to the world in duration ......
CHAPTER III
THE PRIMA VIA
I. THE WAY
In the prima via as in each of the quinque viae, our precedure shall be as
follows: First, we shall attempt to ascertain the nature of the per
accidens as understood by St. Thomas in each given context. Then,
accepting as a given the per accidens which St. Thomas offers us, our
second step is each via will be to determine whether the per accidens in
question necessarily implies something per se. And again, whether this
per se is God or not is not the concern of this investigation. Our sole
concern is the application of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se."
Since whatever is in anything per accidens is always " ... in that
thing by reason of an exterior cause ... ," 1 it is evident that what
Maritain calls the "point of departure" 2 for the quinque viae is what
Gilson calls the "series of effects," 3 and that these effects constitute
the per accidens with which we must begin our investigation in each of
the proofs.
The per accidens of the prima via is manifested in its first two sen-
tences, and, as St. Thomas says, this way to God's existence begins
with a datum which is more manifest than that of any of the others:
"The first and more manifest way is that taken from motion. It is
certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are
moved." 4
Garrigou-Lagrange interprets motion, as St. Thomas uses it in this
argument, as having the widest possible meaning: "The existence of
motion or change is the starting-point of the argument, without stating
1 De Pot., 10, 4. See above, p. 48.
2 Cf. Maritain, Approaches, pp. 33-34. See above, pp. 70-71.
3 Cf. Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, p. 67. See above, p. 70.
4 S.T., 1,2, 3.
THE PRIMA VIA 81
precisely whether the change is substantial or accidental, whether the
motion is spiritual or sensible, local, qualitative or by way of augmen-
tation. . .. Internal and external experience confirms the existence of
motion." 5
Whether Lagrange reads St. Thomas correctly here is at least open
to question, for surely "spiritual "motion is not "evident to our senses."
And yet, St. Thomas does hold that spiritual motion exists, as in the
case of the will. 6 Nevertheless, it is clear that the earlier portion of the
parallel argument in the Summa Contra Gentiles applies to physical
motion only: " ... whatever is moved is ... a body .... " 7 Referring to
the argument from motion as found in the Summa Contra Gentiles,
Gilson illuminates the problem:
In reality it is not one text of Aristotle but a synthesis of texts from Books VII
and VIII of the Physics and Book XI of the Metaphysics. Upon close examina-
tion it proves to be composed of two parts of unequal length. One, developed
fully, is based on the Physics, the other, quite brief, on the Metaphysics. A
comparison of the two texts reveals that they are very different. The text in
which he uses the Physics leads the reader towards a conclusion that is really
in the realm of physics, or, to be more exact, of cosmography: the existence of
a first mover which moves itself, and, in moving itself, causes motion in the
entire universe. Since this first mover is not completely immovable and separat-
ed, it is not the God whose existence Thomas intends to demonstrate. 8
Since it is not our intent to prove God's existence here, the question
as to whether the per accidens in the prima via is physical motion only,
as the argument in the Contra Gentiles explicitly claims,9 or both
physical and spiritual motion, as Lagrange suggests, is not as critical
to our purpose as it may appear. For our concern here is not that the
per accidens implies a per se which must be physical or spiritual, self-
moving or absolutely immobile, but rather, that something per se is
implied, regardless of its character, by every per accidens. Therefore,
each argument for a per se offered by St. Thomas and his commentators
will be examined on its own merits in order to determine the applicabil-
ity of the principle in question in that particular argument. Thus we
may return to the discussion of the per accidens in the prima via,
motion.
Maritain points to the indubitable character of motion and offers us
a preliminary notion of its meaning:
6 Cf. S.T., I-II, 9, 4.
7 C.G., I, 13.
8 Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, pp. 65-66.
9 Cf. e.G., I, 13.
Our world is the world of becoming. There is no fact more indubitable and more
universal than motion or change. What is change? This grain of wheat is not
yet that which it is going to become; it can be what it will become, and when
the change is accomplished it will actually be that. To change is (for a thing
already "in act," but also "in potency" in other respects) to pass from being in
potency to being in act. lO
St. Thomas explains the meaning of motion in some detail in the fol-
lowing passage. We shall not attempt to expand on his use of the terms
"potency" and "act" here, since their meaning as restricted to the con-
text of motion is well explained within the quotation itself.
We should consider then that a certain kind of thing is in act only, another in
potency only, a third thing holding an intermediary position between potency
and act. That, therefore, which is in potency only, is not yet moved; but that
which is in perfect act is not being moved any more, but it has been moved in
the past. That, therefore, is moved which stands in a middle position in respect
of pure potency and act, which is partly in potency, partly in act, as is evident
in alteration. For when water is but only in potency to heat, it is not yet being
moved, but when it is already heated, the motion of heating is terminated. But
when it partakes somewhat of heat, though imperfectly, at that time it is being
moved to heat, for that which is being heated gradually partakes of heat more
and more.
Thus it is this imperfect act of heat - existing in what is heatable - which is
motion, not indeed as it is in act only, but according as the thing now existing
in act has an order to a further act, because if this order to a further act were
removed, that [now existing] act, however imperfect, would be a term of motion
and not motion .... 11
According to this, St. Thomas holds that a thing is in potency to mo-

tion if it " ... is not yet moved .... " It is in perfect act if it has com-
pleted its motion and " ... is not being moved any further. ... "
Motion itself is found only in beings in a state of imperfect act, an
intermediate position between pure potency and perfect act. Motion is
not an act only, but it is an imperfect act; it is the act of something
existing in act which" ... has an order to further act. ... " Thus St.
Thomas lays the groundwork for his later formal definition (borrowed
from Aristotle, or course) of motion in terms of potency and act: "Mo-
tion is said to be the act of that which is in potency insofar as it is such
[in potency]." 12
The importance of St. Thomas' definition of motion in terms of
potency and act here can be seen as soon as we observe that the poten-
tiality of this incomplete act (motion) can only be brought to comple-
11 In III Phys., 2, n. 3.
12 In XI Meta., 9, n. 2294; also, " ... motion is the act of something in potency insofar
as it is in potency." C.G., I, 13, para. 9.
THE PRIMA VIA
tion by another being in act. "For that which is a being in potency must
always be brought to being in act by an agent, which is being in act." 13
Since the agent here functions as an extrinsic cause of the mobile qua
mobile, we may anticipate the introduction of the need for an extrinsic
moving cause wherever there are things in motion - according to St.
Thomas.
Finally, St. Thomas provides a simple explanation of what is en-
tailed when something is moved: "What i~ situated differently now
than it was before, is moved." 14 Much more could be said on the nature
of motion,15 but this will suffice for the purposes of this investigation.
For St. Thomas immediately reveals the per accidens character which
he understands as belonging to anything in motion when he declares
that: " ... a thing is said to be movable inasmuch as motion is caused
in it; but the thing capable of causing motion produces that motion
which is found in the thing moved and not in another. This is what
Aristotle means when he says that it is on what is movable that the
mover is capable of acting." 16 Thus the very notion of things being in
motion implies the per accidens. For St. Thomas holds that motion is
found in the movable by reason of an exterior cause, which means, of
course, that motion is extrinsic to the nature of the movable,17 Hence,
we may properly consider the next step in the argument: "Everything,
however, which is moved, is moved by another." 18
This principle is, of course, crucial to the demonstration of the prima
via. We have seen above how St. Thomas' analysis of motion entails a
causal relationship between that which is in motion and its mover.19
Hence, it is to be expected that, as soon as things in motion are taken
as the data in a quia argument to God's existence, St. Thomas would
have recourse to this application of the principle of causality - based
upon his analysis of the nature of motion.
Hence, St. Thomas defends the principle, "Whatever is moved is
moved by another," in the context of the prima via by having recourse
to the principles of potency and act. For, as we have just seen, motion
is defined as the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency, and
18 In IX Meta., 7, n. x848; also, " ... a thing is not moved from potency to act except
through a being in act .... " In VII Meta., 2, n. X278; "Now a thing cannot be brought from
potency into act except by a being in act." S.T., I, 2, 3.
14 C.G., II, 33.
15 Cf. De Raeymaeker, Being, pp. X7o-x8x; In III Phys., X-5; In XI Meta., 9, nn. 2289-
23 x3·
16 In XI Meta., 9, n. 23II.
17 Cf. De Pot., zo, 4. See above, p. 48.
18 S.T., I, 2, 3.
19 See above, p. 8xff.
nothing can reduce itself from potency to act. Using these principles,
St. Thomas manifests the need for an efficient cause of motion as
follows:
Now whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except
that it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing
moves inasmuch as it is in act. For to move is nothing else than the reduction
of something from potency to act. But nothing can be reduced from potency to
act, except by some being in act. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes
wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and
changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in act
and in potency in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is
actually hot cannot be simultaneously potentially hot; but it is simultaneously
potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the
same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move
itself. Hence, whatever is moved must be moved by another.2o
Thus, from the impossibility of a thing being simultaneously in potency

and act in the same respect, St. Thomas shows that a being in motion
cannot be simultaneously in a state of potency to further act, so that it
can be moved, and in a state of act, so that it can move itself to that
further act. Nothing can simultaneously be both mover and moved in
the same respect. Hence, if anything is moved, it is moved by another,
according to St. Thomas.
Thus we see that St. Thomas' very understanding of the nature of the
per accidens in this context, namely, things in motion, involves that he
holds the principle, "Whatever is moved is moved by another," as
valid. For he says that" ... a thing is said to be movable inasmuch as
motion is caused in it ... " and that" ... the thing capable of causing
motion produces that motion which is found in the thing moved .... " 21
Therefore St. Thomas' understanding of the meaning of "things in
motion" involves his understanding that there must be some "other"
(an aliud) which causes the motion in the things in motion. All this will
be presumed by us for purposes of the argument, since it all belongs to
St. Thomas' understanding of the per accidens in the prima via. The
problem which we investigate is this: Given this understanding of the
per accidens here (things in motion) and its corollary (Whatever is
moved is moved by another), must there exist something per se?
II. THE PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION
St. Thomas confronts the problem of infinite regress among moved

20 S.T., I,
2, 3.
21 In Xl Meta., 9, n. 23II.
THE PRIMA VIA 85
movers when he says:

... whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved
is [itself] moved, then this also must be moved by another, and that by another
[again]. But this cannot proceed to infinity, because then there would be no first
mover, and consequently, no other mover. For subsequent movers do not move
except through this, that they are moved by the first mover; as the staff does
not move, except through this, that it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is
necessary to arrive at some first mover which is moved by no other; and this
everyone understands to be God. 22
As was noted during the discussion of the problem of infinite multi-

tude,23 St. Thomas does not argue here from the impossibility of an
infinite multitude in act to the impossibility of an infinite regress
among moved movers, since they would constitute such an impossible
multitude. Nor does he argue that because an infinite regress is impos-
sible, it is necessary to come to a first. Rather, he says that" ... this
cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover .... "
But the "infinity" to which St. Thomas refers here is an infinity of
things in motion which are moved by another, that is, an infinity of
per accidens. And when he says that if there were an infinity of moved
movers, " ... then there would be no first mover, and consequently, no
other mover," he is actually declaring that unless there is something
per se here, the per accidens cannot exist. Therefore, it appears that St.
Thomas is actually employing the principle, "The per accidens, or per
aliud, necessarily implies the per se," in the context of the prima via.
That this is not an arbitrary imposition of the principle in question can
be seen from the fact that St. Thomas explicitly states, in the parallel
text of the Summa Contra Gentiles: " ... the first mover can be moved
by itself. This seems provable, because that which is per se is always
prior to that which is per aliud. Hence, among things moved as well,
it seems reasonable that the first moved is moved through itself and
not by another." 24
While we see here that St. Thomas applies the principle that the per
se is prior to that which is per aliud, nonetheless we should not overlook
a striking difference in its application in the Contra Gentiles: The first
mover of the Summa Theologiae is an unmoved mover, absolutely un-
moved; unmoved even by itself. Contrariwise, the first mover of the
above Contra Gentiles text is a self-moving first mover; hence, a mover
in motion. Nonetheless, St. Thomas does explicitly apply the principle
22 S.T., I, 2, 3.
24 C.G., I, I3.
in question to the context of motion so as to reveal that he considers

things in motion as a instance of something per aliud. The fact that the
per se to which he refers the per aliud in the Contra Gentiles is not the
absolutely unmoved first mover of the Summa Theologiae does not lessen
the importance of explicit application in this context. For, as we shall
see later,25 that per se which is a self-moving first mover is itself sub-
sequently treated by St. Thomas as a per aliud which is, in turn, itself
reduced to a per se which is an absolutely unmoved first mover. For the
per se of the above Contra Gentiles text must be considered as only
relatively per se: That is, it is per se in reference to those things which
are per aliud in that they are moved by another which is an efficient
cause of their motion; but, it is per aliud in reference to the absolutely
unmoved and separate first mover to which he concludes at the end of
his discussion in the Contra Gentiles, a first mover which moves even
the self-moving first mover as a final cause of the self-moving first
movers' appetite.
III. THE ARGUMENTS
The first argument from motion to the existence of a per se cause of

motion which will be examined is the first argument given by St.
Thomas against proceeding to infinity among movers and things
moved. It appears in the Summa Contra Gentiles, book one, and it is
evident from the text that the argument proceeds from the considera-
tion of a per accidens which is physical motion, not spiritual: "For
whatever is moved is divisible and a body .... " St. Thomas argues as
follows:
If among movers and things moved we proceed to infinity, all of this infinite
multitude must be bodies. For whatever is moved is divisible and a body, as
is proved in Book VI of the Physics [Ch. 4J.26 But every body that moves some-
thing moved is itself moved while moving it. Therefore, all of the infinite mul-
titude are moved simultaneously while one of them is moved. But one of them,
since it is finite, is moved in a finite time. Hence, all of that infinite multitude
of bodies is moved in a finite time. This, however, is impossible. It is, therefore,
impossible that among movers and things moved one can proceed to infinity.27
This argument from the Summa Contra Gentiles appears to be a con-

densed version of a later one given in the Commentary on the Physics in
which he again argues that an infinite regress among moved movers

26 Cf. In VI Phys., 5 and 6.
27 C.G., I, 13.
THE PRIMA VIA
would necessarily imply the absurdity of an infinite motion existing

in a finite time:
... it is evident that both movers and things moved are moved simultaneously,
and that it is possible to take the motion of anyone of the things in motion
insofar as they are finite and one. The motion of this thing in motion which is
A may be taken as E, and the motion of B may be taken as Z, and the motion
of CD and of all that follows may be taken as IT. The time, however, in which
A is moved may be taken as K. But because the motion of A itself is determined,
it is finite. Also, the time in which this motion exists would be K which is
determined and not infinite .... From what is said it is evident, that in the
same time in which A is moved, B is moved, and all other things. Therefore the
motion of all, which is EZIT, exists in a finite period of time. 28
This extended passage from the Physics is simply an explication of

what was said in the Summa Contra Gentiles when St. Thomas said,
" ... one of them, since it is finite, is moved in a finite time. Hence, all
of that infinite multitude of bodies is moved in a finite time." 29 For he
has shown in the Physics that all things, moving at the same time, must
move in the same length of time at the last. But the last moves in a
finite period of time. Hence, the entire chain of moved movers moves
in a finite period of time. St. Thomas concludes as follows: "But this
motion is infinite when it is the motion of infinite things. Thus it fol-
lows that an infinite motion exists in a finite period of time, which is
impossible. However, this would follow, because in the time in which
A is moved, all other things, which are infinite in number, are moved. "30
St. Thomas seals the argument in the Physics by pointing out that
the relative velocity of the things in motion makes no difference to the
conclusion, for all take some time to move:
~;'.
How long it takes makes no difference to the premise, whether the motion of
all things in motion are of equal velocity or that the inferior things in motion
are moved more slowly and in a greater length of time, because it follows entirely
that an infinite motion would exist in a finite time. For it is necessary that any
one of the things in motion has velocity and definite slowness. This, however,
is clearly impossible: that infinite motion exists in finite time. Hence, and
primarily, it is clearly impossible that there is procession to infinity among
things in motion and movers.31
Now we return to the Contra Gentiles for a final point in St. Thomas'
argument. Here he emphasizes the fact that such a chain of things in
28 In VII Phys., 2, n. 2.
29 e.G., I, 13, para. 12.
30 In VII Phys., 2, n. 2.
31 .''';,}.
motion would constitute a single mobile entity, and that this fact
implies that one infinite would be moved in a finite time.
The mover and the thing moved must exist simultaneously.... But bodies
cannot be simultaneous except through continuity or contiguity. Now, since, as
has been proved, all the aforementioned movers and things moved are bodies,
it must be that they constitute a sort of single mobile through continuity or
contiguity. And thus, one infinite is moved in a finite time. This is impossible,
as is proved in book six of the Physics [Ch. 7J. 32
Several times St. Thomas has spoken of the impossibility of an infinite

motion in a finite time. This crucial premise is taken from his Com-
mentary on the Physics where he follows Aristotle in examining numer-
ous absurdities which occur when one considers the possibility of the
infinite traversing the finite, or the finite traversing the infinite. For if
one assumes that the infinite and the finite are simultaneously ex-
hausted, absurdity arises when the finite is matched to the infinite, part
by part, and exhausted. For it is evident that when the finite is finish-
ed, the infinite is not, which contradicts what was assumed. 33 Here we
will quote directly from Aristotle, since he makes the point just as
clearly and more concisely than St. Thomas:
The same reasoning will prove that in a finite time there cannot be an infinite
extent of motion or of coming to rest, whether the motion is regular or irregular.
For if we take a part which shall be a measure of the whole time, in this part
a certain fraction, not the whole, of the magnitude will be traversed, because
we assume that the traversing of the whole occupies all the time. Again, in
another equal part of the time another part of the magnitude will be traversed:
and similarly in each part of the time that we take, whether equal or unequal
to the part originally taken. It makes no difference whether the parts are equal
or not, if only each is finite: for it is clear that while the time is exhausted by
the subtraction of its parts, the infinite magnitude will not be thus exhausted,
since the process of subtraction is finite both in respect of the quantity subtract-
ed and the number of times the subtraction is made. Consequently the infinite
magnitude will not be traversed in a finite time: and it makes no difference
whether the magnitude is infinite in only one direction or in both: for the same
reasoning will hold good. 34
Since the finite time is always exhausted before the infinite motion, no
infinite motion can take place in a finite time. For the motion of this
"single infinite mobile" constitutes an infinite motion, according to
St. Thomas. He holds this because what he treats as a "single infinite
mobile" is, in actuality, an infinite multitude of causally subordinated
32 e.G., I, 13, para. 13.
33 Cf. In VI Phys., 9, nn. 6-10.
34 Aristotle, Physics, VI, 7 (Z38a ZO-31), trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in The Basic
Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (New York, 1941), p. 33Z. Hereafter cited as: McKeon
Edition.
THE PRIMA VIA 89
movers and things moved - through which an infinite motion must
pass, in virtue of the contiguity of each member of the series with both
the prior and the posterior member. For, if the same motion must
actually pass through each member of the series, and if the series is
actually infinite, an infinite motion results. Nor does it make any dif-
ference that all members are moving simultaneously, since the need for
the motion to pass through the entire infinite series is not, thereby,
avoided. We still have an infinite motion in a finite time. It is this
impossibility to which St. Thomas refers in the Contra Gentiles when he
says, " ... one infinite is moved in a finite time .... " 35 And since in-
finite regress among moved movers entails such an impossible motion,
such a regress is also impossible, according to St. Thomas. Hence, there
must exist some first unmoved mover here, that is, something per se.
IV. SYLVESTER OF FERRARA
Another crucial assertion in St. Thomas' reasoning is that the entire

series of moved movers " ... constitute a sort of single mobile." 36
Sylvester of Ferrara, when commenting on the prima via of the Contra
Gentiles, responds to an objection that this supposed infinite regress
need not be considered as "a single moving moved," " ... if one is
moved by another, and that other by another, and so on ad infini-
tum." 37 Sylvester argues:
... that every mover must be a mover in act; the same applies to every locally
moved thing. Hence, the whole multitude of moved things and movers can be
considered as one: especially since none of them is able to be a mover except
insofar as it is moved, and thus, it must be, if it has a reason to be moved, that
it is moved by another. S8
N one, therefore, is a mover in act except insofar as it is moved by an-

other. What Sylvester seems to be saying here is that the motion of
each moved mover must be seen as here and now dependent on the
actual motion of all prior movers, and in this sense, they may be con-
sidered - beginning with the last and regressing to infinity - as a single
unit. And since we have already seen that proper causality is the kind
of causation which is operative in each of the quinque viae,39 it is
reasonable to assert that all moved movers must act simultaneously
35 C.G., I, 13.
86 Ibid.
3? Sylvester of Ferrara, In summa contra gentiles, OPera Omnia of St. Thomas Aquinas,
ed. Leonine, XIII (Romae, 1888), In I C.G., 13, n. 10.
38 Ibid.
and as a "single moved mover," because none could move in act unless
all prior moved movers were simultaneously and contiguously opera-
tive. This is why St. Thomas has been seen to insist that all movers and
things in motion must exist simultaneously, in continuity and conti-
guity - for they are bodies which act as a causal unity.40
Having supported the various premises of this first argument, it is
now evident that there can be no infinite regress among moved movers.
There must be a first which is unmoved and per se. For if, among things
in motion whose motion is caused by another, there must be a first
which is either absolutely unmoved, or else, self-moved - in either
case - there must be something which St. Thomas terms "per se," 41
since the motion which proceeds from it is not caused in it by anything
extrinsic to its nature. We say, "which proceeds from it," since, if it
were itself absolutely unmoved, there would be no motion in it, but
it would cause the motion of the others.
v. A SECOND ARGUMENT
St. Thomas offers a second argument aimed at proving the same con-
clusion, namely, that there can be no infinite regress among movers and
things moved:
In an ordered series of movers and things moved (this is a series in which one
is moved by another according to an order), it is necessarily the fact that when
the first mover is removed or ceases to move, no other mover will move or be
moved. For the first mover is the cause of motion for all the others. But if there
are movers and things moved following an order to infinity, there will be no
first mover, but all would be as intermediary movers. Thus, none of the others
will be able to be moved, and hence nothing in the world will be moved. 42
This argument from the Contra Gentiles reveals a closer affinity to the
argument in the Summa Theologiae which declares that there must be a
first mover, "For subsequent movers do not move except through this,
that they are moved by the first mover; as the staff does not move ex-
cept through this, that it is moved by the hand." 43 Here we have a
most evident application of the principle that the per se is necessarily
prior to the per accidens or per aliud. 44 For, St. Thomas asserts that the
world will have nothing in motion at all unless one posits something
per se here, the first mover.
40 Cf. C.G., I, 13.
41 Cf. C.G., I, 13, para. 2I. See above, pp. 85-86.
42 C.G., I, 13.
43 S.T., I, 2, 3.
44 Cf. C.G., I, 13, para. 21.
THE PRIMA VIA 9I
Gilson paraphrases St. Thomas' argument as follows:
When a series of movers and things moved are ordered, that is, when they form
a series where each one moves the next, it is inevitable that, if the first mover
disappeared or ceased to move, none of the rest would any longer be either a
mover or moved. It is the first mover, indeed, which confers the power of moving
on all the others. Now if we have an infinite series of movers and things moved,
there will no longer be a first mover and all are intermediate movers. Therefore,
if the action of the first mover is wanting, nothing will be moved and there will
be no movement in the world. 45
Here, Gilson speaks of the first mover as conferring the power of

moving on all the things in motion. He agrees with St. Thomas in
establishing the first mover as something distinct in kind from the
entire series of moved movers, something on which all simultaneously
depend for their motion. The absolute need for such a first mover is
defended by Sylvester of Ferrara as he comments on the text of the
Contra Gentiles. Sylvester rejects the objection of those who find
nothing repugnant in the possibility of an infinite regress among moved
movers when" ... all move and are moved simultaneously," 46 saying:
" ... if there are many moved things and movers among which there is
not a certain unmoved first mover, then the entire multitude of moving
things would be as a single moving moved." 47
We have already considered a passage in which Sylvester defends
what he here asserts, that is, that the entire multitude of moving things
constitutes a single whole and may be considered as such for purposes
of demonstration. 48 He continues:
But this is impossible because then something would be moved, and yet, moved
by nothing. For that multitude would not be moved first by itself, since nothing
moves itself first. Nor could one unmoved part move the other parts, since we
do not consider any unmoved mover to be present. Nor could one moved part
move the others, since the aggregate of all parts is the reason for its motion,
and thus, needs to be moved by something else. 49
If "all move and are moved simultaneously," then the whole series may
be treated as one moved mover, as we have already discussed. Now in
this case, either it moves itself (which is impossible),50 or else, it is
moved by another. But in the case which we consider here there is no
other to move it, since we presume that there is no unmoved mover here
45 Gilsoll, Christian Philosophy, p. 62.
46 Sylvester of Ferrara, In I C.G., 13, ll. 10.
47 Ibid.
49 Sylvester of Ferrara, In I C.G., 13, ll. 10.
50 Cf. C.G., I, 13.
and that all moved movers are within the series considered. Therefore
such a series of moved movers with no first mover is impossible since
it cannot move itself and since there is nothing outside the series to
move it.
Sylvester warns us that the part cannot, without contradiction, ac-
count for the motion of the whole series, since it is the motion of the
entire series which accounts for the motion of the part. Hence, he con-
cludes: "Since therefore among essentially ordered moved movers there
must be a first unmoved mover: and since in an infinite regress there
can be no first; it follows that it is not possible to have an infinite
regress of essentially ordered moved movers." 51
The third argument which St. Thomas offers in the Contra Gentiles in
order to prove that there can be no infinite regress among moved
movers, is, by his own admission, not really new: "The third proof
amounts to the same thing, except that, by beginning with the superior,
it has a reversed order." 52 Here he argues from principal and instru-
mental causality, pointing out that even an infinite series of instru-
mental causes cannot act without a principal cause of motion.
St. Thomas presents this same argument, in an even more forceful
manner, in his Compendium Theologiae. We present the expanded
version:
We observe that all things that move are moved by other things, the inferior
by the superior - as the elements are moved by heavenly bodies, and among
the elements, the stronger moves the weaker, and even among the heavenly
bodies, the inferior are set in motion by the superior. This, however, cannot
proceed to infinity. For everything that is moved by another is a sort of instru-
ment of the first mover. Hence, if there is no first mover, all things that move
will be instruments. . .. But even to the untaught it is rediculous to suppose
that instruments are moved unless they are put into motion by some principal
agent. This would be like imagining that, when a chest or bed is being built,
the saw or hatchet performs its functions without a carpenter. Therefore, there
must be a first mover that is above all the others, and this being we call God. 53
As we have seen above,54 all the moved movers taken together act as a
single mobile. As Gilson puts it, " ... all the causes that simultaneously
concur, bringing about a certain change at one and the same moment of
time, are really constituting one single cause." 55 In this case they are a
51 Sylvester of Ferrara, In I C.G., I3, n. IO.

52 C.G., I, IS.
53 Compendium Theologiae I, 3, n. 4.
54 See above, pp. 89-9I.
55 Etienne Gilson, The Elements of ChrisUan PhilosoPhy (New York and Toronto, 1963),
p. 69. Hereafter cited as: Gilson. Elements.
THE PRIMA VIA 93
single instrumental cause. But an instrument cannot act by itself. Thus,
some principal cause must exist. To apply Sylvester of Ferrara's reason-
ing, it is impossible that this single instrumental cause should be moved,
and yet, moved by nothing. Since something must move it, and since
nothing moves itself primarily,56 it must be moved by another cause
which is not instrumental. Hence, we have a principal cause which is
the first mover. As is evident, the reasoning in this third argument is
the same as that of the second, " ... except that, beginning with the
superior, it has a reversed order."
Even though St. Thomas has now demonstrated" ... that there is a
first mover that is not moved by an exterior moving cause ... ," 57 he
warns us not to consider that this first mover is absolutely unmoved.
Therefore he goes on to prove that the first mover, even if it should be
self-moving, must ultimately be moved through appetite for an abso-
lutely unmoved and separate first mover, God: 58
Now God is not part of any self-moving mover. In his Metaphysics [XI, 7, I07za],
therefore, Aristotle goes on from the mover who is a part of the self-moved
mover to seek another mover - separate from all things - who is God. For, since
everything moving itself is moved through appetite, the mover who is part of
the self-moving being must move because of appetite of some appetible object.
This object is higher in the order of motion than the mover desiring it, for the
one desiring is in a certain way a moved mover - whereas, an appetible object
is a mover unmoved by anything. Therefore, there must exist a first immobile
mover - separate from all things - who is God. 59
Since St. Thomas is concerned with proving God's existence, he has

found it necessary to pursue the disjunction offered him by Aristotle:
" ... it is necessary either to arrive immediately at an immobile sepa-
rate first mover, or else, to arrive at a self-moved mover from whom,
in turn, an immobile separate first mover is reached." 60 And here
following the latter part of the disjunction, he traces the path of the
Commentary on the Metaphysics,' "For even if one might come to some-
thing that moves itself, it would again from this be necessary to come
to some unmoved mover .... " 61 In so doing St. Thomas has opened
the chain of causal regress to include appetition: " ... the self-moving
being moves because of the appetite of some appetible object." In turn,
56 What is moved primarily is moved" ... by reason of itself and not by reason of a part
of itself." e.G., I, 13, para. 5.
57 e.G., I, 13.
58 Cf. ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 In XII Meta., 6, n. 2517.
he has ceased to consider what he initially termed the first mover as an

absolutely first mover; it is now a moved mover: "_ .. for the one
desiring is in a manner a moved mover - whereas, an appetible object
is an absolutely unmoved mover." Hence, in the latter part of Aris-
totle's disjunction the self-moving mover must be considered in its own
way as something per aliud. Yet, in either case, arguments against an
infinite regress of moved movers remain valid.
It must, of course, be admitted that St. Thomas' first argument,
since it depends upon properties peculiar to physical motion,62 would
not properly apply to a regress among moved movers which are spiri-
tualinkind-as is possible in the case of intellectual appetition. Never-
theless, St. Thomas' second and third arguments would, as to their
formal structure, apply to any kind of motion whatever - despite the
fact that the prima via begins with motion as given in sense experience.
For, as we see in Sylvester of Ferrara's commentary on these latter
arguments, whether the moved movers are spiritual or physical makes
no difference as to their being taken as a "single moving moved" -
since it still remains true that " ... none of them is able to move except
insofar as it is moved." 63 And thus, the rest of Sylvester's demonstra-
tion. 64
VI. A FURTHER ARGUMENT
We will now consider a further and somewhat different sort of argument

by means of which St. Thomas leads up to the above mentioned dis-
junction between a first mover which is absolutely unmoved and one
that is selfmoving.
The point of the demonstration here is to show that the proposition,
"Every mover is moved by another," is not true, either by itself (per se)
or by accident (per accidens).65 He begins by showing that this proposi-
tion is not true by accident:
If by accident, then it is not necessary, since what is true by accident is not
necessary. It is something contingent, therefore, that no mover is moved. But,
if a mover is not moved, it does not move: as the adversary says. It is therefore
something contingent that nothing is moved. For, if nothing moves, nothing is
moved. This, however Aristotle considers to be impossible - namely, that at
any time there be no motion [VIII Phys., I; 250b). Therefore, the first proposi-
tion was not contingent, since from a false contingent, a false impossible does
62 Cf. C.G., I, 13. See above, p. 86.

63 Sylvester of Ferrara, In I C.G., 13, n. 10.
65 Cf. C.G., I, 13.
THE PRIMA VIA 95
not follow. Hence, this proposition, "Every mover is moved by another," was
not true by accident. 66
What Aristotle intends here as noted by St. Thomas, seems to be this:

If the proposition, "Every mover is moved," is true only by accident,
then it is not true of necessity. This would mean that the fact that every
mover is moved is true only because it happens that in every case of
something being moved, there is a mover. But this entails no necessity
of relation between a thing being in motion and something being the
efficient cause of its motion - in which case, it is just as possible that
no mover (in motion) is moved. But that entails the possibility of no
motion at all, since if no mover is moved, nothing is moved and nothing
is in motion.
But the total absence of motion in the physical world is impossible
according to Aristotle. Hence, the conclusion is that the first proposi-
tion, "Every mover is moved," is not true by accident. Otherwise, it
would entail a false contingent from which follows a false impossible.
For, from the false contingent (Nothing is moved) necessarily follows
the false impossible (Nothing is in motion). Now what is impossible
cannot follow from what is truly a contingent falsehood - because what
is necessarily false (the impossible) follows only from what is necessarily
and not contingently false.
Therefore, "Nothing is moved" is not a false contingent proposition,
since such a contingent proposition necessarily implies something im-
possible, i.e., that nothing is in motion. But, if "Nothing is moved" is
not contingent, then the proposition, "Every mover is moved by an-
other," cannot be true merely by accident, since, if it were true only by
accident, then, "Nothing is moved" would be a contingent proposition,
as was said above. Hence, the conclusion that the proposition, "Every
mover is moved," is not true by accident.
The second argument to this same conclusion seems to be a probable
argument,67 and since it has already been proved that "Every mover is
moved" is now true by accident (per accidens) in the preceding para-
graph, we will now proceed to the proof that this same proposition is not
true by itself (per se) either. St. Thomas argues as follows:
... if the proposition that every mover is moved is true by itself, something
impossible or awkward likewise follows. For the mover must be moved either
by the same species of motion as that by which it moves, or by another. If the
same, then the cause of alteration must itself be altered, and further, a healing
66 Ibid.
67 Cf. ibid.
cause must itself be healed, and a teacher must himself be taught, and this with
respect to the same knowledge. Now, this is impossible.... if the proposition
were true, the same thing would be possessed and not possessed by the same
being, which is impossible. 68
St. Thomas makes use of a disjunction in order to show that "Every

mover is moved" is not a proposition which is necessarily true, i.e., true
by itself (per se). He states the disjunction when he says" ... the mover
must be moved either by the same species of motion as that by which
it moves, or by another species of motion." In showing the impossibility
of the former part of the disjunction, St. Thomas' point is simply this:
The mover, qua mover, is in act; whereas, the moved, qua moved, is in
potency. If it is per se true that "Every mover is moved," then it is
necessary that a mover be moved in order to be a mover. But this amounts
to saying that what is in act, qua in act, must necessarily be in potency.
Thus, " ... the same thing would be possessed and not possessed by the
same being .... " This, of course, is impossible. As St. Thomas points
out, "A teacher must have science, whereas he who is a learner of
necessity does not have it." 69 But if "Every mover is moved" is
necessarily true, then " ... a teacher must himself be taught, and this
with respect to the same knowledge. Now, this is impossible." 70 Hence,
the first part of the disjunction is rejected by St. Thomas, following
Aristotle: That is, it is not necessarily true that every mover is moved
by the same kind of motion as that by which it moves.
Next, St. Thomas examines the laUer part of the disjunction: That
is, he considers the hypothesis that it is necessarily true that every
mover is moved by a different species of motion:
If, however, the mover is moved by another species of motion, so that the alter-
ing cause is moved according to place, and the cause moving according to place
is augmented, and so forth, since the genera and species of motion are finite in
number, it will follow that the regress cannot proceed to infinity. There will thus
be a first mover which is not moved by another.71
Since St. Thomas holds that the number of the species of motion is
limited, we must come to a first species of motion. And he has already
considered the question of motion within the same species of motion in
the first part of the disjunction, as we have just seen. Therefore, he
responds to the only remaining alternative when he rejects the sugges-
68 e.G., I, 13.
G9 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
THE PRIMA VIA 97
tion that, perhaps, " ... there will be a recurrence, so that when all the
genera and species of motion have been completed, the series will return
to the first species of motion .... " 72 He points out that this would lead
only to the same absurd conclusion as before, that is, that" ... a certain
species of motion is itself moved according to the same species of
motion, though mediately, and not immediately." 73 With this, St.
Thomas eliminates the second part of the disjunction: That is, he con-
cludes that it is not necessarily true that every mover is moved by
another species of motion than that by which it moves.
Although the conclusion is not explicitly stated, it is now clear that
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, has determined that it is not necessari-
ly true (that is, true by itself) that "Every mover is moved" - either
by the same species of motion or by another. Nor, as was shown
above,74 is the proposition, "Every mover is moved," true by accident
(per accidens). Therefore, it is true neither by accident (per accidens)
nor by itself (per se). But St. Thomas has said earlier, "If every mover
is moved, this proposition is true either by itself or by accident."75
Hence, "Every mover is moved" is not true. St. Thomas therefore con-
cludes this portion of his argument by saying, "It remains, therefore,
that we must posit some first mover that is not moved by any exterior
moving cause." 76
With this conclusion, St. Thomas reaches the point in the text at
which he makes the disjunction between having concluded to a first
mover which is absolutely unmoved or one that is self-moving. 77 Since
we have already discussed this disjunction,78 this portion of our exa-
mination of the prima via as interpreted according to the Contra
Gentiles is now completed.
VII. CONTEMPORARY COMMENT
It is common practice among contemporary commentators on the

prima via of the Summa Theologiae to offer a single summary proof of
the impossibility of infinite regress among moved movers. (This is
often in addition to their detailed analysis of the argument in the Contra
72 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
75 C.G., I, I3.
76 Ibid.
77 Cf. ibid., para. 2I.
;;: See above, pp. 93-94.
Gentiles.) Thus, Garrigou-Lagrange gives us the following version:

We are concerned, therefore, with a series of actually and essentially subordinat-
ed movers .... Thus we say that the moon is attracted by the earth, the earth
by the sun, and the sun by another center of attraction. But in this ascending
series there can be no process to infinity. For if all the essentially subordinated
movers receive that impulse which they transmit, so that there is not a prime
mover which imparts movement without receiving it, then motion is out of the
question. So a clock, even if you increase the number of wheels, will never run
without a spring, or without the ductility or elasticity of som metal, or without
some weight that acts as its driving power. 79
This way of arguing seems to us based on the kind of reasoning dis-

cussed in our treatment of St. Thomas' "Second argument" of the
Contra Gentiles. SO It is saying that moved movers cannot move without
a first mover; instrumental causes cannot function without a principal
cause.
Preller does not accept Lagrange's interpretation of the prima via
according to the analogy of the clock. He begins his objection by offer-
ing us a summary of an essential part of the insight presented by
Garrigou-Lagrange:
Thus, the infinite regress generated by the first way is an infinite regress in the
present of currently operative subordinated causes of motion. The "first mover"
must now be "pushing" the next mover, in order that the "push" may be com-
municated finally to the here and now object whose motion initiated our regres-
sive analysis. Aquinas' analogy of the staff which "moves only because it is put
in motion by the hand" seems to suggest the accuracy of the analysis. 81
Here Preller correctly observes that Lagrange intends to speak of a

series of essentially subordinated efficient causes of motion - proper
causes whose operation is simultaneous with the effects which they
produce. Preller then continues to develop his interpretation of La-
grange's interpretation of st. Thomas.
Surely Aquinas is suggesting that when something is being moved it is being
moved by another - that being moved is being passive before the moving power
of another. Somewhere, then, there must be that which is not passive before the
moving power of another, but which is active and responsible for the motion
of the whole chain of moved objects totum simul. Not even an infinity of passive
objects will move without some agent. 82
Garrigon-Lagrange, God, p. I4I.

79
See above, pp. 90-92.
80
82 Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas
(Princeton, N.J., I967), p. IIO. Hereafeer citcd as: Preller, Divine Science.
81 Ibid., pp. I II-II2.
THE PRIMA VIA 99
It is at this point that Preller parts company from Lagrange. He
accuses Lagrange of conceiving motion in the world as pure passivity;
whereas, Preller insists, moving forces possess a real agency - an in-
trinsic, though communicated, dynamism - which operates in and
through time:
For Aquinas, the motion of the world cannot be understood in terms of pure
passivity. The moving forces of the world possess real agency, although it is a
communicated or created agency. Objects within the created world possess a
dynamism that they have received and which has been communicated to them
in and through time. The reception of the power to move cannot, therefore, be
understood in terms of a nontemporal subordination in the present instant, but
must be viewed as a temporal process of being moved in such a way as to be
able to move. S3
Preller immediately supports his thesis that secondary movers can

exert a causality of their own - even after the cessation of a prior
mover's causation - by quoting the following text from St. Thomas:
" ... the first mover, that is, the thrower, gives to the second mover,
that is, air or water or any such body which can naturally move a
thrown body, the power to move and to be moved .... [For] as soon as
the first mover, that is the thrower, ceases to move, the air ceases to be
moved, but it is still a mover.84 [italics mine]
Preller now offers us his explanation of how something which has
ceased to be moved can still be a mover:
In an analysis of natural motion, each proximate mover is able to move its
object because it has itself been moved in the past from a merely dispositional
possession of the power to move (potentia passiva) to the actual possession of
that power. Garrigou-Lagrange's analysis would evacuate the reality of second-
ary causality, the integrity and independence of which Aquinas never challenges.
Many things in the world do in fact move under their own power - there are
"self-movers" or "natural-movers" in the world .... If a thing is "at rest" it will
remain "at rest." ... Once it has been so moved, however, it possesses the power
to move another. Each subordinated mover is first passive and then active. s5
Here again, Preller cites St. Thomas for support: "The efficient cause,
which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time." 86 St.
Thomas goes on, " ... for the effect exists only in the end of the action
and every agent must be the beginning of action." 87 Now we do not
see that this quotation proves Preller's point. For, in this text, St.
83 Ibid., pp. II2-II3.

84 In VIII, Phys., 22, n. 3.
85 PrelIer, Divine Science, pp. II3-II4.
86 S.T., I, 46,2, ad I.
8? Ibid.
Thomas is speaking of that-which-comes-to-be-in-change, not of the

process of coming-to-be. It is evident that, in the order of physical
motion, the maker precedes the thing made in time. Nonetheless, the
process of coming-to-be requires the continued and simultaneous causa-
tion of the agent - since, " ... removing a cause is to remove that of
which it is a cause." 88 This is evident when a strike occurs during the
building of an edifice: The edifice ceases to be built. And in the prima
via, it is efficient causes of coming-to-be, not of being, which concern us.
Nothing in the above text of St. Thomas would indicate that the effi-
cient cause of coming-to-be could cease to cause, and yet, the coming-
to-be would continue.
Finally we arrive at the crux of Preller's objection to Garrigou-
Lagrange. He maintains that, contrary to Lagrange, the prima via is
actually based on a temporal regress:
The clock model holds only while a particular mover is being moved from
potency to act. The first member (the relative first mover) of a series need not
be existing at the present time in order for the secondary movers to operate -
they have already received the power to move and can exercise that power
independently of that to which they were at one time essentially subordinated,
or per se moved. The stone will continue to be moved even if the man who
threw it dies instantaneously of a massive coronary. It would appear, then,
that God's present actuality can never be proved by an appeal to the present
possession of the power to move by things that have been moved in the past.
The first way generates a temporal regress. 89
Thus Preller's objection is addressed, not merely at Lagrange, but at

all attempts to interpret the prima via according to an essentially sub-
ordinated series of efficient causes of coming-to-be - all of which must
be operative in the here and now of time. Preller accepts Lagrange's
analysis for some cases of moving causes, e.g., the cogs of a clock. But,
Preller insists, there are other instances in which simultaneous causality
does not obtain, e.g., when a mother stops pushing a baby carriage -
and yet, the carriage continues rolling for some distance. 9o Preller's
example in this latter case parallels the text of St. Thomas in which he
refers to a thrown body whose motion is continued by the air, although
the air ceases to be moved.
These latter instances clearly involve the phenomena of physical
inertia. The fact that a physical body can be set in motion - and will
continue in motion - only to impact with another body at a later point
88 e.G., I, 13.
89 Preller, Divine Science, p. II4.
90 Cf. ibid., p. IIZ.
THE PRIMA VIA IOI
in time -leads quite naturally to the inference that the cause of motion
precedes its effect in time (at least in some cases). In his exposition of
the prima via, Maritain goes so far as to adjust the principle, "What-
ever is moved is moved by another," in order to respond to the problem
raised by this phenomena:
Taking the principle of inertia as established, and even hypothetically granting
it a meaning beyond the mere empiriological analysis of phenomena, it suffices,
in order to reply to the objection, to note that, applied to movement in space,
the axiom "Everything which moves is moved by another" ought then logically,
by the very fact that motion is considered a state, to be understood as meaning
"Every body which undergoes a change in regard to its state ot rest or ot motion
changes under the action of another thing." And thus the axiom remains always
true. 91
It seems to us that Maritain grants too much. He has retreated to a

secure position, but the retreat is unnecessary. We hold that, regardless
of the problem apparently posed by inertia, whatever is in motion must
be hic et nunc moved by another. For, according to St. Thomas, where-
ever is found the reality of change, some extrinsic agent must be
posited.
Let us assume a body which is already in motion. It no longer con-
cerns us how it got into motion, since we presume that the cause which
began its motion is no longer operative. Now we do not wish to chal-
lenge Newton's law which simply describes the fact that a body in
motion tends to remain in motion. Yet, we do demand an explanation
as to why this fact is so.
N ow according to contemporary natural science, physical motion
cannot take place unless a body (even if it is conceived simply as a
mathematical point) undergoes some change of spatial position relative
to some physical frame of reference. Hence, the very concept of physi-
cal motion (even if that which is in motion is represented as merely
obeying the law of inertia) entails a real and constant change of spatial
relation between two or more entities. Such an accidental change in the
category of relation, therefore, requires some cause which is operative
here and now (since we presume that the cause which initiated the
motion is no longer operative). For St. Thomas holds that nothing can
reduce itself from potency to act - and surely, the reality of the physical
change of spatial relation entailed in motion involves such a reduction,
regardless of any natural scientific descriptive explanation which may,
quite properly, ignore this philosophical insight. Hence, Preller's
example of the errant baby carriage does not escape Garrigou-Lagrange's

insistence upon simultaneous causation.
Since the initiating cause of motion was precluded from the fore-
going analysis of a body in a state of motion, one might well wonder to
what cause we would assign responsibility for this inertial phenomena.
It is our suggestion that, since the conventional physical agent as well
as the "law of inertia" have proven to be insufficient as a total explana-
tion, it is possible that some transcendental cause beyond the range of
natural science may be posited as the only adequate cause for the
phenomena of inertia. But such a suggestion leads us astray from our
topic. It suffices for our purpose that "inertia" does not escape the
need for efficient causes of motion which are operative here and now.
And thus, on this point at least, Lagrange's analogy of the cog-like
structure of a clock withstands Preller's attack. Nor, does it appear to
us, does St. Thomas' reference in the Commentary on the Physics to the
(supposed) fact that" ... the air ceases to be moved, but it is still a
mover ... " 92 prove that Preller's interpretation of the prima via is
correct. For the phenomena of inertia must have appeared even more
mysterious in the ancient cosmology, and, as Preller has noted, the
prima via, appearing in the later context of the Summa Theologiae,
employs the analogy of the staff which " ... moves only because it is
put in motion by the hand," - thereby suggesting the accuracy of
Lagrange's analysis. Further, we observe that the principle of simul-
taniety of cause and effect is enunciated by St. Thomas immediately
thereafter in the secunda via; "Now removing the cause removes the
effect." 93
Insofar as Preller's objection appears to be based upon the assump-
tion that the "law of inertia" is a sufficient explanation as to how
" ... each proximate mover is able to move its object because it has it-
self been moved in the past from a merely dispositional possession of the
power to move ... to the actual possession of that power," 94 we must
agree, with Lagrange, that adequate inquiry has not been completed
until essentially subordinated causes of coming-to-be - operative here
and now - have been included in the analysis of any series of moved
movers.
Thus, while considering the efficient causes of motion in the prima
via as all operative simultaneously, Garrigou-Lagrange employs the
92 In VIII Phys., 22, u. 3.

93 S.T., I, 2, 3.
94 Preller, Divine Science, p. II 3.
THE PRIMA VIA 103
analogy of the cog-like mechanism of a clock which we have just been

considering. According to this analogy, Lagrange argues that, just as
no matter how you increase the number of wheels the clock will never
run without a spring, so too, unless there is a first mover unmoved the
motion of all secondary movers can never be explained. What is the
fundamental insight expressed in his analogy?
Lagrange seems to be declaring that without a first mover there is
simply no sufficient reason for the motion of the moved movers, since
it is not within their natures to account for the motion found in them.
Motion is in the moved mover only per accidens, " ... because it is ex-
trinsic to its nature ... " and is found in the moved mover" ... by
reason of an exterior cause." 95 That the only adequate cause of such
motion must be something per se is implied by Gilson, when he searches
for that" ... of which it can be said, appropriately and without qualifi-
cation, that it is the cause of the motions at stake." 96
Whatever their number, all the causes that simultaneously concur, bringing
about a certain change at one and the same moment of time, are really con-
stituting one single cause. This is true if their number is finite. For if it were
not finite, given that all the causes it contains are both moving and moved at
one and the same time, there still would be no cause of which it can be said,
appropriately and without qualification, that it is the cause of the motions at
stake. On the contrary, one would have to go on to infinity in a series of things
each of which is both mover and moved. There would be no first cause of motion,
the subsequent movers themselves could not move, and there would be no
motion at all. 97
Gilson's argument here is certainly suggestive of the second argument

against infinite regress of moved movers as found in the Contra Gentiles.
But also, as we have just said above, it appears to imply, with some
directness, the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per
se." For Gilson clearly understands that "the cause" of the motions
must be something which is a cause "without qualification" - that is, it
must depend on nothing else for its causation. "The cause" cannot be
per aliud; it must be per se. Both Lagrange and Gilson seem to be
pointing to the essential inability of the per accidens to exist without
the per se in the context of motion.
All this leads us to a kind of proof similar to that which we have
employed in several previous contexts :98 Even an infinite multitude
of things in which motion is found per accidens, regardless of how they
95 De Pot., lO, 4.
96 Gilson, Elements, p. 69.
97 Ibid.
98 See above, pp. l8-l9, 26-27, 32, 65-68.
may be ordered, is impossible unless there exists a per se cause of that

motion. As Sertillanges classicly remarks, "In no order can anything
give what it does not possess. If it does not possess it of itself, it re-
ceives it from something else." 99 But that act which is the cause of
motion is, by definition, extrinsic to everything in which motion is found
per accidens, " ... because it is extrinsic to its nature .... " 100 There-
fore, even an infinite series of moved movers cannot, of itself, account
for the existence of that motion which is found in it. There must, there-
fore, exist something per se here, a first mover unmoved. Hence, "The
per accidens necessarily implies the per se," in the context of the prima
via.
99 A. D. Sertillanges, Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy, trans. Godfrey Anstruther

(London, I932), p. 66. Hereafter cited as: Sertillanges, Foundations.
100 De Pot., IO, 4.
CHAPTER IV
THE SECUNDA VIA
1. THE WAY
As Gilson has noted, St. Thomas' argument for a first mover given in
the Compendium Theologiae 1 suggests that he" ... was interpreting the
efficacy of the Prime Mover as that of an efficient cause." 2 This is
acceptable, insofar as the first mover may also be understood as an
efficient cause of coming-to-be.
Nevertheless, our point of reference here is the presentation of the
proofs for God's existence as they are given in the Summa Theologiae,
and, in that context the per accidens of the secunda via clearly differs
from that of the prima via. In the prima via, our point of departure was
things in motion; in the secunda via it is the nature of efficient cause as
found in the order of efficient causes which we experience. St. Thomas
describes the per accidens for us: "The secunda via is from the nature
of efficient cause. For we find in sensible things that there is an order
of efficient causes .... " 3 Maritain compares the first two viae:
Having considered that effect which is everywhere open to our observation,
namely change, let us now turn to causes and connections between causes. It is
a fact, and this is also absolutely general, that there are efficient causes at work
in the world, and that these causes are linked to each other or form series in
which they are subordinated to one another. 4
Thus it is the series of essentially subordinated efficient causes of being

which we encounter in experience that constitutes the point of depar-
ture of the secunda via. We say, "essentially subordinated," because
there is no accidental subordination in a series of proper causes. And,
1 See above, p. 92.

2 Gilson, Elements, p. 319, note 16.
3 S.T., I, 2, 3.
as we have observed earlier,5 the causality of which we speak in the

quinque viae is always proper causality - at least, insofar as what con-
stitutes the proof is concerned. This interpretation is confirmed by
G arrigou-Lagrange:
We find that there axe in the world essentially subordinated causes. For instance,
there are all the cosmic causes, which axe necessary not only for the production
but also for the conservation of animal and plant life. Thus we have the chemical
activity of the air, the atmospheric pressure according to its determinate degree,
solax heat. . .. But causes of this kind presuppose a first unconditioned cause. 6
Here the meaning of "essentially subordinated causes" is manifested.

For life cannot exist except through the efficient causality of the air,
whose proper balance of nitrogen and oxygen depends on proper
atmospheric pressure, which in turn depends on gravity, etc.
Gilson points out the experiential character of the per accidens here.
The point of departure of the secunda via is seen as that order which is
efficient causality as perceived in sense experience:
The first point to be noted is that efficient causes axe here considered as facts
given in sense experience. In other words, we see that there axe efficient causes.
This sensible experience of efficient causality consists in this, that we see some
beings, or qualities of beings, follow from other beings, or qualities of beings .
. . . This experience is that of an order. The efficient cause imparts something
of its own being to that of the effect .... This is the reason that the cause comes
first, if not in time, at least in order. The notion of order is thus contained in
the very notion of causality. Efficient causality itself is an order. Such is the
meaning of the sentence: "In the world of sensible things we find there is an
order to efficient causes," a statement which, in the mind of Thomas Aquinas,
amounts to saying, as he presently does, that there is no possible case "in which
a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself." 7
Thus the "series of effects" which constitute the per accidens in the
secunda via is a chain of essentially subordinated efficient causes of
being. Each of these efficient causes is actually an effect of a prior
cause, because nothing can be an" ... efficient cause of itself."
II. EFFICIENT CAUSALITY
Because of the limitations of this investigation, a formal treatise on the

nature of the per accidens, the order of efficient causes, would not be
appropriate. Yet, so that it will be possible to evaluate adequately the
application of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
S See above, pp. 75-79.

7 Gilson, Elements, pp. 74-76.
THE SECUNDA VIA !O7
per se," in the context of efficient causality, some preliminary under-
standing of St. Thomas' notion of causality is in order. Since we have
already discussed the meaning of the proper cause above,S it should be
sufficient for our purposes here to survey briefly the meaning of "cause"
in general and "efficient cause" in particular, according to the mind of
St. Thomas.
St. Thomas defines a cause when he says, " ... the name 'Cause'
implies some influence on the existence [ad esse] of the thing caused." 9
Now since St. Thomas follows Aristotle as to the ways in which a cause
can influence the existence of the thing caused, and since Aristotle
summarizes these points more succinctly than St. Thomas, we will turn
to Aristotle for the various meanings attached to the term "cause."
"Cause" means (I) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into
being, e.g., the bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and
so are the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e., the definition
of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g., the ratio 2: I and number
in general are the causes of the octave), and the parts included in the definition.
(3) That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g.,
the adviser is a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child, and in
general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the
changing. (4) The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g., health is
the cause of walking .... These then are practically all the senses in which causes
are spoken of .... 10
Thus we have Aristotle's definitions of the material, formal, efficient
and final causes, respectively. Yet, our attention must be turned prima-
rily and directly to the efficient cause. Commenting on the above text
of Aristotle, St. Thomas expands on the notion of the third sense of
"cause," the efficient cause:
In a third sense cause means that from which the first beginning of change or
of rest comes, i.e., a moving or efficient cause. He says "of motion or of rest,"
because natural motion and natural rest are reduced to the same cause, and the
same is true of violent motion and of violent rest. For that cause by which
something is moved to a place is the same as that by which it is made to rest
in place: "An adviser" is a cause in this way. For it is from an advisor that
motion begins in the one who acts according to the advice for the conservation
of something. And in a similar way "a father is the cause of a child." In these
two examples Aristotle touches upon the two principles of motion from which
all things come to be, namely, purpose in the case of an adviser, and nature in
the case of a father. And in general every maker is a cause of the thing made
in this fashion, and every changer is a cause of the thing changed. l l

9 In V Meta., I, n. 751.
10 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 2 (IOI3a24-I013b4), trans. McKeon Edition, pp. 752-753.
11 In V Meta., 2, n. 765.
r08 THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
Here again, as St. Thomas speaks of the "moving or efficient cause"

and of "makers" and "changers" as instances of the third sense of
"cause," which is the efficient cause, it becomes evident just how
proximate is the affinity of the prima via and the secunda via. Yet,
efficient causality is broader than motion, for there can be causal
dependence where there is no motion, as when the continued standing
of a skyscraper is dependent on the very immobility of its foundation.
And here the opposition of the prima via to the secunda via is mani-
fested: For in the prima via, our concern was the efficient cause of
motion, i.e., the efficient cause of coming-to-be; whereas, in the secunda
via, we are speaking of the efficient cause of being. As Mascall notes,
" ... the basis of this second way is wider than that of the first, which
deals only with causes secundum fieri, while the second deals also with
causes secundum esse." 12
Keeping in mind that we are always speaking in terms of proper
causes, operative hic et nunc, in the quinque viae, we now tum to
Gilson for an explanation of the efficient cause. He sees it essentially as
something productive of being.
Every effect is dependent upon its cause. It depends upon its cause in the very
measure in which it is produced by it. The word "cause" here designates some-
thing very different from that "constant relationship between phenomena" to
which empiricism had reduced it. For St. Thomas, an efficient cause is an active
force; that is, it is a being which produces being. Now if we look into this closely,
we find that acting or causing is still being. It is only the unfolding or procession
of being from its cause in the form of an effect. There is no occasion for introduc-
ing any new notion in order to pass from being to causality. If we regard the
act-of-being as an act, we shall see in this first act, by which each thing is what
it is, the root of this second act by which being, which is first posited in itself,
is also posited outside itself, in its effects.13
This is the sense in which Gilson interprets the influence of the efficient
cause on the existence of the thing caused. In his existential meta-
physics he sees the influence of the cause on the effect as, literally, an
" ... inflowing ... " of being, from its root in the " ... first act-
of-being ... " of the cause, through its form on which it " ... confers
esse," through the second act of the cause which is its operation, and
finally, into the effect itself.1 4 Although Gilson admits its" ... expres-
sion is not perfect," 15 he cites a quotation from the Summa Theologiae
to support his thesis: "Act, however, is twofold, first and second. The
first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is opera-
12 Mascall, He Who Is, p. 49.
13 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 178-179.
14 Cf. ibid., p. 468, note 14.
15 Ibid.
THE SECUNDA VIA 109
tion." 16 Gilson prefers " ... the classical adage, 'operatio sequitur
esse' .... " 17 For if operation follows being, and if every cause in-
fluences the existence of its effect, then Gilson can properly term the
efficient cause as "a being which produces being," since that operation
which influences the being of the effect flows from the being of the
cause. And since the efficient cause is a making or changing cause, its
existential influence may be termed "productive," since what makes
or changes produces that being or coming-to-be which is the term of
its operation.
Without extending this consideration of efficient causality in-
ordinately, let us borrow a summary of the doctrine from De Raey-
maeker:
Before all else the cause is an efficient principle; it gives birth to, it produces
the effect; it is the source of a new reality which is distinct from this latter. The
effect, therefore, is not a part of the cause; to produce effects does not signify
to distribute parts of itself and in so far to impoverish itself; but the effect is a
reality which results from the efficiency of the cause and which consequently
participates in the perfection of the cause. The effect reproduces in a new and
individual manner a determination which the cause possesses in its own right.
Causality is understood only in terms of participation. If we do not admit this
we cannot give any meaning to a real efficiency of beings. The doctrine of
causality is an expression of optimism: being is good, and in so far it exerts its
efficient causality by making other beings participate in its perfection. "Bonum
est diffusivum sui": (The good is diffusive of itself) .18
Once again, we are not trying to prove the existence of efficient causes
here, but rather, to determine what St. Thomas understands of their
nature. Since" ... the effect is a reality which results from the efficiency
of the cause and which consequently participates in the perfection of
the cause ... ," we may understand how Gilson can insist that, "Effi-
cient causality itself is an order," 19 and St. Thomas himself can argue
from the "order of efficient causes."
We may not safely avoid all reference to participation here, despite
the temptation which this topic poses to extend this investigation
beyond its proper limits. For this notion expresses the superabundance
of the cause in relation to its effect. Solely for the purpose of illumi-
nating this aspect of efficient causation, we quote the following: "To
participate is to receive as it were a part; thus, when something re-
ceives in a particular way what pertains to another in a universal way,
16 S.T., I, 48, 5.
17 Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, p. 468, note 14.
IIO THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
it is said to participate in it .... And similarly effects are said to partici-

pate in their cause, and particularly when they do not equal the power
of their cause .... " 20
Hence, De Raeymaeker says, "The effect reproduces in a new and
individual manner a determination which the cause possesses in its
own right." 21
As in the case of motion, much more could be said about St. Thomas'
concept of efficient causality.22 But it will suffice for the purpose of
this investigation to conclude these remarks at this point. For we now
understand that St. Thomas views the cause as directly influencing the
existence of the effect in a productive fashion, and that, since we are
speaking here of proper causality, the cause and effect must be seen as
existing simultaneously.
III. THE ARGUMENT
In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas proceeds with the secunda via:
"Neither is it found nor is it possible that something should be the
efficient cause of itself; because thus it would be prior to itself, which
is impossible." 23 Now by " ... prior to itself," he does not mean prior
in time, since proper causes are simultaneous with their effects.24
Rather, he means logically prior: that is, the cause would have to be in
order to cause itself and, at the same time, not be in order to receive
existence from itself. This is a manifest contradiction and, therefore,
"impossible." But if things must be caused by causes prior to, and
other than, themselves - and these, in turn, by others, and so forth ...
we again face the problem of infinite regress - this time among efficient
causes. St. Thomas immediately addresses the problem, even though,
it is interesting to note, the text contains only implicit reference to a
causal series up to that point:
Now in efficient causes it is not possible to proceed to infinity, because among
all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and
the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate
cause is several or only one. Now removing the cause removes the effect. Hence,
if there is no first among efficient causes, then there will be no ultimate, nor
any intermediate. But if among efficient causes one proceeds to infinity, then
20 In Boeth. De Heb., 2, n. 24.
22 Cf. ibid., pp. 262-270; Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 179-184; ]. F. Anderson, The
Cause of Being (London and St. Louis, 1952), pp. 1-31; In V Meta., 2, nn. 765-770; Maritain,
Preface, pp. 96-102; Fabro, Participation, pp. 629-634.
23 S.T., I, 2, 3.
THE SECUNDA VIA III
there will be no first efficient cause, and thus neither will there be an ultimate
effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is clearly false. Hence,
it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which all give the name, God. 25
Because it is crucial to the acceptability of the argument, we note once

again that St. Thomas is speaking here of proper causality, which is
operative hic et nunc. Causes and effects must exist simultaneously, or
else, he declares, the effects cannot exist at all: " ... removing the cause
removes the effect." And since every intermediate cause is also the
effect of its prior cause, and that, in turn, is the effect of its prior, and
so forth ... it is evident that no intermediate causes can exist unless
all exist and operate simultaneously.
There is no need at all to reproduce the parallel argument given by
St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, since it is nearly identical
verbatim to the text of the Summa Theologiae. Yet, that other text
does begin with one additional and interesting note: "In Metaphysics I I
[2 (994a)] the Philosopher proceeds to show in another way that it
is not possible to proceed to infinity among efficient causes, but rather
that one must come to one first cause, and this we call God." 26 From
this reference we are led to the appropriate text of the Commentary on
the Metaphysics. 27 This text, which is St. Thomas' own most definitive
explanation of the impossibility of infinite regress among efficient
causes will now be examined, along with the commentaries on this
same problem as given by John of St. Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan, and
Banes.
IV. "THE COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS"
In his commentary on the second book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, St.

Thomas presents his arguments proving" ... that there are not an in-
finite multitude of causes in a series .... " 28 Explaining the thought
of Aristotle, he begins by analysing the proper order of causation among
those things which have a first, an intermediate, and a last:
... if we had to say which of the three, i.e., the first, the intermediate, or the
last, is the cause of the others, we would have to say that the first is the cause.
We could not say that what is last is the cause of all the others, because it is
not the cause of anything; for in other respects what is last is not a cause, since
25 S.T., I, 2, 3.
26 C.G., I, 13.
27 Cf. In II Meta., 3, nn. 30'-304.
28 Ibid., n. 301.
II2 THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
an effect follows a cause. Nor could we say that the intermediate is the cause of
all the others, because it is the cause of only one of them, namely, what is last. 29
Thus the last in the series causes nothing in respect to the series, since
it is simply the effect of the series. Likewise, the intermediate cause
causes only the last, and thus, cannot be the cause of the causality in
the series. By a simple process of elimination, "the first is the cause." 30
And so, in the Summa Theologiae, st. Thomas says simply, " ... the first
is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause
of the ultimate cause .... " 31
St. Thomas continues his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics:
And lest someone should think that an intermediate has nothing after itself
except one thing, i.e., what is last (for this occurs only when there is a single
intermediate between two extremes), in order to exclude this interpretation he
argues that it makes no difference to the premise whether there is only one
intermediate or many, because all of the many intermediates are taken together
as one insofar as they have in common the nature of an intermediate. Similarly
it makes no difference whether there is a finite or infinite multitude of interme-
diates, because so long as they have the nature of an intermediate they cannot
be the first moving cause. 32
The number of intermediate causes makes no difference. Hence, St.

Thomas adds to the argument of the Summa Theologiae: " ... whether
the intermediate cause is several or only one." 33 Even if the number
of intermediates is infinite, it makes no difference to the force of the
proof, " ... because all intermediates are taken together as one insofar
as they have in common the character of an intermediate." Here, as in
the case of motion,34 St. Thomas emphasizes that all the intermediate
causes constitute a single entity, and that, for the purpose of argument,
they may be considered as but one intermediate cause.
Because he speaks of "the first cause of motion" in the above text,
one might wonder whether this passage is actually intended to apply to
efficient causes in general, or only to causes of motion. Yet, the fact
that the argument from efficient causes as it appears in the Contra
Gentiles has referred us to this text of the Commentary on the M eta-
physics should be sufficient evidence that st. Thomas interprets the
text of Aristotle in the wider sense, i.e., as referring to efficient causali-
ty as a causa secundum esse. We would make this same response to the
29 Ibid., U. 302.
30 Ibid.
31 S.T., I, 2, 3.
32 In II Meta., 3, u. 303.
33 S.T., I, 2, 3.
34 Cf. C.G., I, I3. See above, p. 89.
THE SECUNDA VIA II3
remark made by Gilson that the passage of Aristotle 35 to which St.
Thomas seemingly refers in the Contra Gentiles 36 makes no direct
mention of efficient causality: "Aristotle is showing that it is impossible
to go back to infinity in any of the four kinds of causes, material,
moving, final and formal, but there is no question of the efficient cause
properly so called." 37 For it seems to us that it is not what Aristotle
is saying that matters for our purposes; rather, what matters is what
St. Thomas tells us Aristotle is saying. Whether St. Thomas does justice
to Aristotle - or, perhaps, even more than justice - is something for the
historian to decide. But our concern is what St. Thomas has in mind
in referring us to the Metaphysics, and even more importantly, which
passages of his own commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics he in-
directly refers to in the Contra Gentiles. Now it seems evident to us that,
since St. Thomas is talking about efficient causality in the Contra
Gentiles when he refers to the passage in the Metaphysics, it must be
that he refers to the part where Gilson says Aristotle is talking about
"moving causes." 38 Therefore, his commentary on that passage must
be intended by St. Thomas as applying to efficient causality secundum
esse, since the Contra Gentiles makes evident his interpretation of
Aristotle in the passage in question.
In another work, Gilson clarifies the difficulty when he points out
that St. Thomas did not actually consider that there was any difference
between the moving cause and the efficient cause of motion:
In the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas there is no real distinction between the
moving cause and the efficient cause; but Thomas found himself confronted
with two different interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine, that of Averroes, ac-
cording to whom the cause of motion really is the "moving cause" (causa movens),
and that of Avicenna, according to whom there is, over and above the moving
cause, a truly "efficient cause" (causa etficiens, causa agens). In the doctrine of
Thomas Aquinas, the moving cause can be the efficient cause of motion, but it
can also be its final cause. For this reason, the "first way" can be read in a
twofold manner .... But in his own exposition 01 the live ways, Thomas Aquinas
himself has specified the first way by attributing it to the order of the moving
cause, whereas he has specified the second way by attributing it to the order of
the efficient cause. 39
From this comment by Gilson it is evident why St. Thomas would have
no difficulty, in his own mind, in introducing the concept of efficient
85 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, 2 (994a I-I9).

86 Cf. C.G., I, I3, para. 33.
88 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, 2 (994a I-I9).
causality secundum esse into a context in which Aristotle may have

simply been speaking of a "moving cause."
Having established that St. Thomas, in fact, intends to speak of
efficient causality in his commentary on the second book of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, let us return to that text. St. Thomas now affirms the
need for a first cause uncaused:
Further, since there must be a first moving cause prior to every secondary mov-
ing cause, then there must be a first cause prior to every intermediate cause -
a first moving cause which is not intermediate in any sense, as though it had
another cause prior to itself. But if we were to hold that moving causes proceed
to infinity in the above way, it follows that all causes would be intermediate
ones. 40
If "all causes would be intermediate ones," this would be the same as

having a single intermediate cause" ... because all of the many inter-
mediates are taken as one insofar as they have in common the nature of
an intermediate." 41 But this "intermediate" would have no prior
cause, since ,in an infinite series of caused causes, "all causes would be
intermediate ones." Here one can argue in a fashion parallel to that of
Sylvester of Ferrara. 42 For just as Sylvester argues that" ... nothing
moves itself first ... ," 43 so does St. Thomas hold that" ... nothing is
its own cause." 44 Hence, this "single" intermediate cause cannot
account for its own causation. Nor, since there is no first cause prior to
it, can anything else account for its causation. Therefore, an infinite
series of caused causes is impossible. There must be something per se
here, namely, a first cause which has no cause prior to itself. This is the
same argument as Sylvester offers - the only difference being that it is
applied to efficient causality rather than to things in motion.
The above argument by St. Thomas appears to be essentially what
Weber intends to describe in the following: " ... it is the belief that the
universe as a whole is per aliud that ultimately allows the conclusion to
God. It is argued that even if the series of per alia is infinite it neverthe-
less requires a cause." 45
Weber rejects this kind of reasoning because, he claims, it is based
upon the fallacy of composition. That is to say, he argues that, just
because each individual per aliud is dependent upon another does not
40 In II Meta., 3, n. 303.
41 Ibid.
43 Sylvester of Ferrara, In I e.G., 13, n. 10.
44 S.T., I-II, 20, 3, ob. 3.
45 Stephen Weber, "Proofs for the Existence of God: A Meta-Investigation." (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1969), p. 81.
THE SECUNDA VIA 115
logically justify the conclusion that the entire series of per alia must
also be dependent upon another. For, he suggests, the series as a whole
does not exist, except by an arbitrary act of the mind which composes
its members into one "thing." And since the entire series is not a
"thing" outside the artificial unity imposed upon its members by the
mind, it does not require a cause. Weber summarizes his conclusion as
follows: "A group is nothing more than the totality of its membership.
If we have developed an explanatory system in which each member is
explained by the one preceding it, and each member is preceded by
another, then there is no sense in asking for an explanation of the whole
as if it were something above and beyond the members which make it
up." 46
Now this appears to be a powerful objection. And yet, its weakness
rests in the assumption that "each member is explained by the one
preceding it." For the exact sense in which one member "explains"
another is crucial here. For what constitutes the intermediate cause as
such is its per aliud character, i.e., its causality is per aliud insofar as
what it causes in another is caused in it by another and prior cause.
That is, causality is found in it, not by reason of its own essence, but
by reason of an exterior cause. Now, an infinite series of such causes
can be only a series in which each member is per aliud in respect to that
causality which is found in it. This means that that causality which is
simultaneously transmitted through all members of the series derives
from the nature of none of its members. Now, to use Weber's own
argument, we must not attribute to the entire series anything not found
in the individual members which comprise that totality. Hence, the
causal thread which simultaneously passes through all members, and
which is caused per se by no member, cannot possibly be accounted for
by the entire series insofar as none of the members can account for it.
Therefore, if this per accidens causation is to have a cause, something
outside the series of per accidens causes must be posited. There must be
a per se here, a first cause uncaused which is capable through its own
nature of explaining that causation which is found in all other members
of the series per accidens.
It is in this respect that St. Thomas can consider the entire series of
intermediate causes as though it were a "single" intermediate cause,
for in respect to that causality which is present in all members of the
series per aliud, they are as one. We say this because, whether taken
singly or collectively, all members of a series of caused causes are one in
46 Ibid., p. 82.
their inability, by nature, to account for that causation which is in

each of them per aliud. If the principle of sufficient reason is not to be
violated here, some being must be posited which can of its own nature
account for that causation which is found per accidens in all others; and
that being is a cause per se, since causation belongs to its very essence.
V. THE COMMENTATORS
In his commentary on the secunda via of St. Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan

addresses himself to the objection of those who assert that a series of
intermediate causes need not imply a first cause. First, he speaks on
behalf of the objectors: "The intermediate cause or mover, if it neces-
sarily depends upon a first cause or mover, does so either because it is
intermediate, or because it is a cause, or because it is an intermediate
cause. But none [of these alternatives] is acceptable. Therefore an inter-
mediate cause nust not depend upon a first cause." 47
Thus the opponent's position intends to proceed by simple disjunc-
tion: That is, it will analyze the notion of intermediate cause into its
various logical parts - attempting to show that neither part, nor their
combination, entails the notion of a first cause. And so it proceeds with
the elimination of each of the three possibilities, declaring that there is
no need of a first: " ... First, not because it is intermediate, because
"intermediate" says only a relation to two terms of reference between
which it is: and not necessarily in respect to a first and last term, as is
the case in the intermediate proportional parts of a circle." 48
So saying, the opponent points out that the term "intermediate"
means simply "that which is between two elements" in a series. Of
itself, "intermediate" says nothing of a first or a last, as in the case of
the parts of a circle which have neither a first nor a last element. For
in the series ABCDE, C is intermediate between Band D - and more
than this we do not know. From the intermediacy of C between Band
D, we cannot judge whether B is first, A is first, some other element is
first, or that there may be no first at all. And the same holds with
respect to what follows C, i.e., whether D is last, E is last, or there is no
last cannot be known, simply by knowing that C comes between Band
D. Thus the term "intermediate" implies neither a first nor a last in a
causal series.
47 Cajetan, In summa theologiae, OPera Omnia of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Leonine, IV
(Romae, 1888), In I S.T., 2, 3, n. 4.
48 Ibid.
THE SECUNDA VIA II7
The objector's argument continues, pointing out that the term
"cause" need not imply a first cause: "Secondly, not because it is a
cause, for 'cause, as cause' refers to an effect, and not dependency on a
prior or first cause, as is evident." 49 Here it is observed that the con-
cept of a cause has reference only to some subsequent effect, and in no
way implies even a prior, say nothing of a first, cause. After all, if the
concept of cause always refers to something prior to itself, then even
a first cause could not be first, since there would have to be something
prior to it. Therefore, the term "cause" need not imply a first in a causal
series.
Finally, the objector's argument is concluded by insisting that the
combination of the two previously considered concepts of "inter-
mediate" and "cause" into "intermediate cause" does not imply a first
cause either:
... Thirdly, not because of the composition of the first and the second, that is,
not because it is an intermediate cause, for an intermediate cause as such, does
not imply anything other than mediation in the causality process; but this
mediation is sufficiently explained if there is some intermediate causality be-
tween any previous cause and its effect. Therefore, an intermediate cause, just
because it is an intermediate cause, does not imply any dependency on a first
cause, but only upon a previous cause. 50
If intermediate causality "does not imply anything other than media-
tion in the causality process," then it appears that nothing more can be
inferred from it than what was entailed in the notions of "intermediate"
and "cause." But these terms, at most, implied merely a reference to a
previous cause, not to a first cause. Therefore nothing is found in the
analysis of the term, "intermediate cause" which would imply any
dependency on a first cause. For if an intermediate cause does not
depend upon a first cause, either because it is intermediate, or a cause,
or an intermediate cause, then there would, indeed, appear to be no
way to prove the need for a first cause which is itself uncaused by any
other.
Cardinal Cajetan responds to this exceedingly difficult objection
(which he himself has posed) in the following manner:
... one must remember that efficacy belongs to the very definition [essence] of
a cause. Unless a cause causes something (it is a cause in act of which I speak
here), it cannot be called a cause. The efficacy of a cause consists in its causality
in act. And consequently, unless this causality is fulfilled, we can save the
meaning neither of a cause in act nor of efficacy nor of efficiency of any kind.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
lI8 THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE·GOD
Therefore, it is necessary that the causality of a cause be fulfilled in order to

save the very essence of a cause. 51
Cajetan nearly belabors his point here. For a cause to be a true cause
in act its causality must be fulfilled. As St. Thomas has said, " ... the
name 'cause' implies some influence on the existence of the thing
caused." 52 If a true or proper cause is to merit the name "cause" it
must do so by actually exerting its influence on the existence of the thing
caused. This requires that it actually be in operation as a cause and that
whatever is required for such operation be fulfilled, that is, that its
causality be fulfilled. Thus, Cajetan continues: "And consequently,
whatever is repugnant to the fulfillment of the causality of a cause, is
also repugnant to the cause itself. Since, therefore, an intermediate
cause is true cause, it must have its own fulfilled causality." 53
But, Cajetan points out, dependence upon an infinite number of
prior causes is repugnant to the fulfillment of the causality of an inter-
mediate cause: " ... it is impossible for an intermediate causality to be
fulfilled, unless it is sustained by the first cause. If, indeed, it depends
upon an infinite number of prior causes, then it could never be ful-
filled." 54
This argument by Cajetan is nearly identical in substance to Banes'
commentary on the same text of St. Thomas, the secunda via. We will
present Banes' argument before commenting further on Cajetan:
... the first cause influences the effect, and from those things proceeds influence
to their effects, and so forth; in all their operations intermediate causes receive
actual power influencing their effects, which reception of power ought not to be
understood habitually. For middle causes are not called "middle" because they
have power which they occasionally receive from a superior cause. Rather, in
this consists the essential subordination of causes: that in actual operation the
inferior causes have dependence on superior causes. From which it follows that
it is impossible that procession to infinity be given in this way to subordinate
efficient causes. 55
Hence, Banes and Cajetan say the same thing: The causality of inter-
mediate causes is dependent on the causality of all prior causes for its
fulfillment. And if there is an infinite regress among prior causes, the
causality of the intermediate cause can never be fulfilled.
Now, whether Cajetan and Banes would explain their arguments here
in the same fashion may be open to dispute. For Cajetan gives evidence
51 Ibid., n. 5.
52 In V Meta., I, n. 751.
53 Cajetan, In I S.T., 2, 3, n. 5.
54 Ibid., n. 6.
55 Banes, Scholastica commentaria, In I S.T., 2, 3, p. 115.
THE SECUNDA VIA II9
of thinking along the same lines as Sylvester of Ferrara, as we explained
above, 56 when he says, " ... it is impossible for an intermediate causali-
ty to be fulfilled, unless it is sustained by the first cause." 57 For the
intermediate cause, whether one or an infinite multitude, cannot be its
own efficient cause. Only a first cause can account for the causality of
the intermediate. Since causality is in the intermediate cause only per
accidens, it " ... must be found in that thing by reason of an exterior
cause." 58 And since the exterior cause, in this case, cannot be an inter-
mediate cause (since all intermediate causes are considered as included
in a single intermediate cause), it must be a first cause which is itself
caused by no other, that is, it is something in which causality exists per
se, and not per accidens.
On the other hand, Banes offers two somewhat different explanations
to support his contention that the dependence of inferior causes on
superior causes demands a first. One argument we shall consider now;
the other will be delayed briefly so as better to conform it to the text
of St. Thomas. 59 The present argument sounds at its outset as though
its author is speaking of final causality. But it quickly becomes evident
that what Banes is actually talking about is the fact that the final
causality which necessarily attends the operation of efficient causes
requires that there be a first efficient cause:
Every inferior cause operates subordinate to another because its end is sub-
ordinated to that other. But if there were infinite subordinate causes, there
could not be assigned any determinate end on account of which all operate.
Thus, from that which the first efficient cause brings forth, all other causes are
supported. This consequence is proven because every operation of causes pro-
ceeds from intention to a determined end. 6o
This rather original approach to the problem of infinite regress among

caused causes is based on a principle affirmed by St. Thomas: " ... the
effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate." 61
For if every agent must act for an end. and if the superior cause assigns
the end of the inferior, there must be some first efficient cause to order
the finality of the entire series, or else, no determinate end could be
effected. If nothing is effected, nothing causes, and there is no causal
series. In a infinite regress there is no first cause which can determine
56 See above, p. II4.

57 Cajetan, In I S.T., 2, 3, n. 6.
58 De Pot., ro, 4.
59 See below, p. r20.
60 Banes, Scholastica commentaria, In I S.T., 2, 3, p. rr6.
61 C.G., III, 2.
the final effect, and this makes such a causal series impossible - for
nothing would be effected. Hence, there must exist a first efficient
cause by which "all other causes are supported." In this case, Banes is
saying that the causality of the intermediate causes which fails to be
fulfilled is final causality. Thus, " ... the first cause influences the
effect. .. " 62 in this case by determining its end.
Returning to the text of St. Thomas in his Commentary on the M eta-
physics, we find that he offers us a definition of the infinite as that
whose nature " ... excludes every limit, and starting-point and ter-
minus." 63 Such a notion of the infinite is employed by John of St.
Thomas in his proof of a first cause:
That it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the taking of causes is clear, be-
cause it is impossible to go through an infinite multitude of causes in order to
effect something new. For the infinite is that which has neither beginning nor
end. Thus if infinite causes were needed to cause something new, that causation
would never have an end - which is to have no effect.64
The conclusion is evident: Since there are effects, there must not be an
infinite regress among causes. There must be a first cause uncaused.
This conclusion is manifested even more clearly by another text in
which St. Thomas defines the infinite: "... the infinite, properly
speaking, is what cannot be spanned by measurement; and thus, [the
term] 'infinite' is used in the same number of senses as [the term] 'intra-
versable.' " 65 Hence, it appears that John of St. Thomas interprets the
"infinite" as the "intraversable" when he asserts that "it is impossible
to go through an infinite multitude of causes in order to effect some-
thing new."
In conjunction with the above argument we may consider the very
similar argument of Banes, given in his commentary on the secunda via.
Developing his thesis that subordinate efficient causes receive their
power through the actual operation of superior causes, he writes:
... the last effect cannot be effected except out of the ordination and actuality
of all the superior causes' influence: This however is not able to be fulfilled. 66
If there would be procession to infinity in order to bring about the last effect,
it could not be fulfilled because the infinite cannot be gone through, and because
it is impossible that simultaneously in an unique instant infinite causes operate
successively - for this reason, that an infinite time would be necessary. 67
62 Banes, Scholastica commentaria, In I S.T., 2, 3, p. II5.

63 In II Meta., 3, n. 303.
64 John of St. Thomas, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, (Taurini, 1933), II, 485a7.
65 In XI Meta., 10, n. 2314. See above, pp. 44-45.
66 Reading impleti for impleri.
67 Banes, Scholastica commentaria, In I S.T., 2, 3, pp. II5-II6.
THE SECUNDA VIA 121
Now it must be granted that both of these arguments, the one by John
of St. Thomas, the other by Banes, sound as if they belong more to the
prima via than to the secunda via. For John of St. Thomas talks about
effecting "something new." And Banes speaks about infinite causes
operative in succession - which would require "an infinite time." Both
of these proofs, therefore, appear as though they could be interpreted
according to St. Thomas' argument to a first mover which is given in
his Commentary on the Physics,68 and in which he argues that an infinite
motion could not be gone through in a finite time. 69
Further, insofar as the above arguments might be intended to show
that there can be no infinite regress among physical moved movers,
they are acceptable. For, as we have seen earlier,70 the contiguity of such
physical movers requires that the motion involved must, literally,
"pass through" the entire infinite chain of physical bodies and infinite
distance which is, thereby, involved. This would entail an "infinite
motion" which, as Aristotle and St. Thomas concur, cannot take place
in a finite time. Interpreted in this fashion, the above arguments of
John of St. Thomas and Banes would, indeed, prove that some first
cause of physical motion must exist.
But, on the other hand, it is not altogether clear that these proofs are
not intended to apply to a regress among efficient causes of being. For,
neither commentator explicitly says that he intends to speak of causes
of physical motion alone. Both speak of "causes" - and Banes explicitly
states that he speaks of "subordinate efficient causes." 71 Hence, it is
appropriate to examine whether or not these arguments would be just
as applicable to the context of efficient causes of being as they are to the
context of efficient causes of physical motion. It seems that they are
not.
These and similar arguments cannot be applied to efficient causes of
being, since among efficient causes of being all causes must operate
simultaneously, i.e., in the "now" of time. More importantly, unlike
the case of physical movers, efficient causes of being need not be
physical. Hence, the requirements of contiguity and extension in space
need not be met. This means that it no longer makes any sense to speak
of "passing through" causes, since one cannot meaningfully speak of
"passing through" that which has no physical extension. And here the
basic point of the earlier proof no longer obtains. For the impossibility
68 Cf. In VII Phys., 2, n. 2.
69 See above, pp. 86--89.
n Cf. Banes, Scholastica commentaria, In I S.T., 2, 3, p. !IS.
of "passing through" an infinite distance in a finite time has no appli-

cation to causes which need not be physical. And for this reason, we
must reject the application of the above proofs by Banes and John of
St. Thomas to the context of the secunda via.
Thus we have now seen the various arguments offered by St. Thomas
and several of his commentators concerning the need for a first cause
to explain the causality of any series of essentially subordinated inter-
mediate causes. In so doing, we have likewise examined the application
of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," in the
context of the secunda via. For the causality of every intermediate
cause is in that intermediate cause per accidens ,since it is extrinsic to
its nature and must be found in it by reason of an exterior cause. 72 For
if causality were in the intermediate cause per se, it would either belong
to its very essence or flow from its essential principles. 73 But, if that
were the case, the intermediate cause would not be intermediate - since
in that cause causality would not be in it by reason of an exterior
cause. Only a first cause uncaused has its causality in it per se, for
only a first cause does not have its causality caused in it by reason of an
exterior cause. Therefore, that every intermediate cause necessarily
implies a first cause uncaused must be understood as an instance of the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se."
VI. CONTEMPORARY COMMENT
There exist, of course, numerous contemporary commentaries on the

problem of infinite regress among ef£icient causes as it is found in the
secunda via of St. Thomas. 74 We cannot examine each of these in
detail; nor does it suit our purpose to do so. For there appears to be a
consensus of opinion among the leading writers concerning their inter-
pretation of St. Thomas' argument - at least, regarding what they all
seem to view as the heart of the demonstration. Let us begin by look-
ing at Sertillanges' explanation of the impossibility of infinite regress
among efficient causes:
Since each thing gives only what it has received, it is an intermediary, and, of
itself, explains nothing: it is a simple channel, not a source. Consequently, in
7' Cf. De Pot., 10, 4.
73 Cf. ibid. See above, pp. 48, 75-76.
74 For example, see Mascall, Analogy, pp. 73-76; He Who Is, pp. 43-44, 46; Garrigou-
Lagrange, God, p. 291; Gilson, Philosophy, pp. 62-63; Christian Philosophy, pp. 66-68;
Sillem, Ways, pp. 68-71; De Raeymaeker, Being, pp. 287-289, 297; Maritain, Approaches,
pp. 42-47; Sertillanges, Foundations, p. 67; D. J. B. Hawkins, The Essentials of Theism
(London and New York, 1949), pp. 53-54. Hereafter cited as: Hawkins, Theism.
THE SECUNDA VIA 12 3
each series of causes, these channels or intermediaries cannot go on indefinitely.

"There cannot be an infinite series of causes." The reason is, not only because
an infinity of elements in the universe seems an impossibility, but also because
it would have no purpose, would account for nothing, and leave the whole train
of nature without a sufficient cause. 75
Prescinding from his remark about the possibility of an infinite mul-
titude in act - which we discussed earlier,76 the essence of Sertillanges'
argument seems to be this: Intermediate causes, of themselves, explain
nothing. They transmit causality, but do not explain it as a "source."
He has just previously said, "In no order can anything give what it
does not possess. If it does not possess it of itself, it receives it from
something else." 77 And what he appears to be saying now is that the
entire order of intermediate causes must depend on a first cause, be-
cause there is no "sufficient cause" of the causality found in inter-
mediate causes unless there is a first cause to give it to them. The very
nature of "intermediate cause" is deficient with respect to causality.
Therefore, multiplying intermediate causes solves nothing. Only a first
cause which possesses causality of itself can give to intermediate causes
their causality. Upon inspection it becomes evident that this proof is
simply a variation of the argument of St. Thomas and his commenta-
tors to the effect that intermediate movers or causes, whether one or
several or infinite in number, cannot move or cause themselves, and
that, therefore, there must exist a first mover or cause extrinsic to the
chain of intermediate movers or causes which is the "sufficient cause"
for the causality of the entire series. 78 When Sertillanges says that even
an infinite regress of intermediary causes "would account for nothing,"
he suggests that all intermediary causes may be considered as one in
regard to their character as intermediary causes - for this is what he
says of the singular intermediate, that it, "of itself, explains nothing."
By so doing, he echoes the point made by St. Thomas in the Commen-
tary on the Metaphysics: " ... all of the many intermediates are taken
together as one insofar as they have in common the nature of an inter-
mediate."79 For whetherthe intermediate causes are considered as one
in number or as one in character, the result is the same: There is no
"sufficient cause" for the intermediate causation unless there is a first
cause, since causality in act is found in the intermediate cause only per
accidens, by reason of an exterior cause. This exterior cause itself cannot
75 Sertillanges, Foundations, p. 67.
78 See above, pp. 89-93, I II-120.
79 In II Meta., 3, n. 303.
be intermediate, since all intermediate causes belonged to the series

first considered.
Garrigou-Lagrange states that he has already solved the problem:
" ... in actually and essentially subordinated causes, it is impossible to
go on to infinity, as was already shown in the first way." 80 This ease
of identification of the problem of regress among efficient causes of
motion in the prima via with the same problem among efficient causes
generally in the secunda via is explained by Mascall:
All that was said in discussing the question of an infinite regress in connection
with the First Way will, with obvious verbal changes, apply here. But one or
two remarks may be added. We are, it must be noted, not primarily concerned
with causes in fieri, but with causes in esse, that is, not with the causes which
bring things into existence, but with those that keep them in being. 81
Now if we return to examining Lagrange's handling of the prima via on

the question of infinite regress (which we did earlier), 82 we find him
using the analogy of the clock whose parts cannot move, no matter
what their number, save through the efficacy of a mainspring. As has
already been seen, this argument falls into the now familiar pattern of
the argument that the instrumental cause cannot operate without a
principal cause, or the intermediate cause cannot function without a
first cause - according to the reasoning of st. Thomas, Sylvester of
Ferrara,83 and Cajetan. 84 For in each case, the intermediates are taken
as one, and it is pointed out that that one intermediate cannot move or
cause itself. Because of his concern for historical fidelity, this manner of
exposition of the question of infinite regress is particularly manifested
by Gilson:
... in a passage well calculated to make us understand what he really is about,
Thomas specifies that it does not matter "whether the intermediate cause be
several, or one only." And indeed, if the problem at stake is to account for the
existence of causality in the world, all the efficient causes taken together, what-
ever their number, can be considered as a single one. So long as none of them
is the first efficient cause, the presence of efficient causality in the world remains
unexplained.
Such is the true meaning of the proposition that it is not possible to go on to
infinity among efficient causes. . .. Since there are efficient causes, there is a
first efficient cause. 85
80 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. I43.

83 See above, pp. 9I-92.
84 See above, pp. II8-II9.
THE SECUNDA VIA 125
Gilson's expression of the argument is so faithful to the classical that

no further comment is needed, except, perhaps, to notice a certain
affinity in his presentation to the more contemporary directness. That
is, when he says, " ... the presence of efficient causality in the world
remains unexplained ... " unless there is a first cause, he seems to be
speaking in terms of explanation and sufficient reason. We do not
mean to imply that this changes the substance of the argument, but it
is more akin to the modern mentality to say, simply, that unless there
is a first cause, there is no sufficient reason or explanation for the
causality of all the rest. Garrigou-Lagrange put it in this fashion ex-
plicitly when, in presenting the prima via, he says, "It is contrary to
reason to say that an actually existing motion can have its sufficient
reason, its actualizing raison d' etre, in a series of movers, each one of which
is moved by some external cause." 86 This is simply another, perhaps
more succinct, way of affirming that it is of the very nature of the inter-
mediate mover or cause not to be able to move or cause of itself - that
is, whether it be one or many, the intermediate cause or mover, as
such, lacks a sufficient reason for its own motion or causation.
Maritain describes the absolutely foundational character of the first
cause in such a way as to make clear that he sees it as the reason d' etre,
the only sufficient reason, for the activity of all intermediate causes:
If then we consider the relation of any efficient cause whatever to the First
Cause, we see that this efficient cause would not act at any moment at all if,
at that very moment, it were not activated by the First Cause. Every relation
of succession in time in the exercise of causality is here eliminated; the causality
of the First Cause embraces and dominates without succession the whole succes-
sion of time; it is at each moment the ultimate foundation of the exercise of the
causality of all the agents which act at that same moment in the world. 87
When he speaks of " ... the ultimate foundation of the exercise of the
causality of all the agents ... ," Maritain is speaking in terms of the
absolute need for a sufficient reason for causality which could never be
explained in terms of intermediate causes, regardless of their multitude.
When he says that" ... the First Cause is not first in a series, but
beyond every series ... ," 88 he reveals his own estimation of the absolute
irrelevance of the length of any causal series, since he judges that all
particular lines of intelligibility are" ... appendent to the 'intelligibili-
ty-through-itself' of a First Cause, which exists in its own right." 89
This is nearly to say explicitly that the per accidens implies the per se,
88 Ibid., p. 45.
89 Ibid., p. 43.
I26 THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
and that the priority of the per se in this context is absolutely required
as the existential ground, the "ultimate foundation" for that causality
which is found per accidens in all causes except the First Cause. So
speaking, Maritain reflects the same line of thought we have seen in St.
Thomas, Sylvester of Ferrara, Cajetan, Sertillanges ,Gilson, and others
- to the effect that all intermediate causes necessarily require a first
cause, since there is no sufficient reason within their nature (as inter-
mediate) for the causation found in them.
VII. CONCLUSIONS ON EFFICIENT CAUSALITY
We may now conclude our discussion of the secunda via with some
observations about the relationship of the per accidens to the per se in
the context of efficient causality. First, it is evident, according to the
doctrine of St. Thomas, that intermediate causes are causes per acci-
dens. 90 Secondly, employing St. Thomas' understanding of the nature
of efficient causality and intermediate causes, it is clear that wherever
are found causes per accidens there must necessarily be found some
cause per se, that is, a first cause which is itself caused by no other. 91
Thirdly, wherever the question of infinite regress among efficient
causes may arise in our subsequent analysis of the doctrine of st.
Thomas, it may be resolved by observing that the immanent logicofthe
metaphysics of St. Thomas requires that wherever essentially sub-
ordinated efficient causes are found, regardless of their number, there
must exist a first cause in which causality is found per se, and not per
accidens. Fourthly, this conclusion (the third, just above) follows, not
from the intrinsic impossibility of an infinite multitude of causes in
act,92 but from the essential inability of intermediate causes to explain
their own causality, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas and his
interpreters.93
Hence, we may conclude that the principle, "The per accidens neces-
sarily implies the per se," has application in the secunda via of St.
Thomas, and we have seen in what fashion this application is made:
That is, essentially subordinated intermediate efficient causes neces-
sarily imply something per se, namely, a first cause uncaused.
90 See above, pp. 105-106, 121-122.

91 See above, pp. 106-126.
93 See above, pp. IIO-126.
CHAPTER V
THE TERTIA VIA
I. THE WAY
There is no point in attempting to avoid the fact that difficulties of

interpretation are poised by the tertia via, as Sillem and others have
noted:
Professor Van Steenberghen is surely justified in holding, as anyone who is
familiar with the extensive literature devoted to the study of this Way must
know quite well, that the third Way, as we have it in the Summa Theologica,
is bristling with philosophical difficulties. But surely the best way to meet the
difficulties is to try to see the Tertia Via as St. Thomas himself saw it .... 1
Sillem's advice, " ... to see the Tertia Via as St. Thomas himself saw
it ... ," is well taken. For the first step in avoiding some of the pitfalls
attendant upon this proof is to make sure of the accuracy of the text
itself, since it appears that most contemporary translations and Latin
texts are in error on a central point. Mascall illuminates the text in
question and, in so doing, reveals what may well be a source of some of
the difficulties of interpretation which Sillem mentions .
. . . the true reading of a crucial sentence in the proof as stated in S. Theol., I,
ii, 3, is I mpossibile est autem omnia quae sunt, talia (sc. possibilia esse et non esse)
esse, as in the best uncials, and not Impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt talia,
semper esse, as in most of the printed editions (I am indebted to Fr. Victor White,
O.P., for this information). The latter reading involves a complete non sequitur;
Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange is reduced to mistranslating it by "S'il n'y a que des etres
contingents, il est impossible qu'ils existent depuis toufours" (Dieu, p. 270; d.
E.T. [English translation of Dieu], I, pp. 293-4). Gilson also takes the second
reading when he writes, "Il est impossible que toutes les chases de ce genre existent
toufours" (Le Thomisme, p. 104); the E.T. [English translation of Dieu] ignores
the toutes and reads, "It is impossible that things of this kind should always
exist" (Phil. at St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 85) .... Sertillanges, in the edition of
S. Theol. edited by him with a French translation gives the longer Latin reading
but translates it by "Il est impossible que tout soit de telle nature," in agreement
with the shorter. Again in Saint Thomas d'Aquin he writes "Peut on penser que
1 SiIlem, Ways, p. 71.
tout soU ainsi? Non." (I, p. 151.) Maquart (Elem. Phil. III, II, p. 304) takes the
shorter reading. 2
Of course, it makes quite a difference whether the text reads, "But it

is impossible that all things which are of this kind exist always," as is
generally done, or, on the other hand, "But it is impossible that all
things which are should be of this kind," as Mascall insists. And it is
very interesting to observe that some authors, e.g., Sertillanges, should
intuitively follow the more accurate version in spite of the fact that
they were working from the corrupted text. s In our translation of the
tertia via, we will follow Mascall's suggestion, not only because the
uncials defend it, but also because it seems more reasonable. 4
It is, perhaps, partly because of the textual error mentioned above
that some writers have felt the need to interpret the tertia via of the
Summa Theologiae as though it were quite the same as another argu-
ment given by St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles, chapter fifteen, in
which he seeks to prove the eternity of God. This latter argument is not
to be confused with the tertia via and it is cited by Sillem when he offers
an instance of the difficulties of the tertia via.'
Most Thomists in recent years seem to abandon the attempt to defend the third
Way as it stands, and just put the argument from chapter 15 of the Contra
Gentes in its place. This is quite feasible in practice, provided they do not convey
the impression that in article 3 St. Thomas really meant us to read the argument
of chapter 15 rather than the third Way. There is no getting round the fact that
in the third Way of article 3 St. Thomas meant us to read the argument of
Aristotle. 5
Sillem is right in saying the one argument ought not be read for the
other. Although both begin with the same data, things subject to gen-
eration and corruption and which, therefore, are such that it is possible
for them to be and not to be, nevertheless the Summa Contra Gentiles
argues directly from the causal dependency of such beings,6 whereas
the Summa Theologiae argues from the impossibility of all things being
possibles, since this would entail that at one time nothing existed. 7
Thus the two proofs differ, not only in their purpose, but also in their
formal procedure. Nonetheless, since the data of both proofs is the
same, namely, the possibles, we may legitimately conclude that what-
2 Mascall, He Who Is, pp. 47-48, footnote. See Peter O'Reilly, "Knowledge of God in
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Nature," Proceedings ot the A.C.P.A., XXX (1956),
125, footnote 41.
3 Cf. O'Reilly, art. cit., II7-128.
5 Sillem, Ways, p. 72.
6 Cf. e.G., I, IS, para. 5.
7 Cf. S.T., I, 2, 3.
THE TERTIA VIA 12 9
ever St. Thomas has to say about them in his earlier work, the Contra
Gentiles, would still have some bearing on his evaluation of them at the
time of his writing the tertia via in the Summa Theologiae. Hence, the
association of these arguments by contemporary writers is, as Sillem
says, " ... quite feasible in practice."
II. THE ARGUMENT
As Sillem points out, "St. Thomas's argument as stated in article 3 is

very different from the popular argument from contingency. The proof
is not ex contingenti ad necessarium, but ex possibili et necessario to ens
per se necessarium .... " 8
This observation is sustained by a reading of the text itself. Hence,
we now present the tertia via's opening remarks as presented by St.
Thomas in the Summa Theologiae - remarks in which the character of
the per accidens of this demonstration is manifested: "The third way
is taken from possibility and necessity, and it is such: We find among
things those which are possible to be and not to be, since they are
found to be generated and to be corrupted, and consequently, it is
possible for them to be and not to be." 9
Such beings, which we shall call "the possibles" for purposes of this
discussion, appear to be the same things as St. Thomas mentions at the
beginning of a proof for the eternity of God in the Contra Gentiles: "We
see in the world, furthermore, certain beings, namely, those which are
subject to generation and corruption, whose existence and non-exist-
ence is possible." 10 In this latter context, the per accidens character of
the possibles is directly revealed when St. Thomas says, "But what can
be has a cause because, since it is equally related to two contraries,
namely, being and non-being, it must be, if existence accrues to it, that
this is from some cause." 11 Now, this is to define the possible as some-
ting in which existence is found per accidens, since existence must not
belong to the nature of the possible, but rather, as St. Thomas says,
accrues to it owing to some exterior cause. 12
And since the possibles, as they appear in the Contra Gentiles, are the
same things which st. Thomas takes as his point of departure in the
Summa Theologiae ,we may likewise anticipate that existence is to be
8Sillem, Ways, p. 64.
9S.T., I, 2, 3.
10 C.G., I, IS, para. 5.
11 Ibid.
12 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4. See above, p. 48.
found per accidens in them in this latter context. We will observe that
this anticipation is realized subsequently.13 Thus, the possibles,
because they exist per accidens, constitute the per accidens point of
departure of the tertia via. Of course, in order to be most faithful to
St. Thomas' manner of presentation in the Summa Theologiae, we
should note that the per accidens character of the possibles is not
explicitly manifested in his later argument at this point, but rather that
it requires further development. This development begins with the
premise which we have borrowed from Mascall's critique: "But it is
impossible that all things which are should be of this kind [that is,
possible to be and not to beJ." 14 St. Thomas immediately supports this
thesis:
... for what is possible not to be, at some time is not. If, therefore, all things
are possible not to be, then at one time nothing was in existence. But if this is
true, then even now nothing would exist - for that which is not does not begin
to exist except through something which exists. If, therefore, at one time nothing
would be being, it would be impossible that something would begin to exist, and
thus, in that way nothing would exist now, which is clearly false. Therefore, not
all beings are possible beings, but rather there must be something among things
which is necessary.15
Since it was Mascall who brought to our attention the error in the text
mentioned above,16 we will first examine his interpretation of the first
part of St. Thomas' argument. For, as was indicated in that context,
the correct reading is essential to correct interpretation. If one reads,
"But it is impossible that all things which are of this kind exist always,"
this would allow the possibility that some things of this kind (the
possibles) do exist always, which, as Mascall points out, leads to a
complete non sequitur in the argument - since it is only on the premise
that no possible can exist always that one can infer the existence of
some necessary being which is responsible for the existence of the
possibles. Hence, it is crucial to read the line in question as, "But it is
impossible that all things which are should be of this kind." Thus,
Mascall's interpretation of the tertia via becomes reasonable once the
corrected reading is presumed:
In the world, it asserts, there are clearly many beings whose existence is possible
but not necessary. This is shown by the fact that they are subject to generation
and corruption, they come into existence and then pass away, so there cannot
be in the nature of things any necessity for them to exist; of anyone of them it
13 See below, p. 134.
14 S.T., I,2, 3. See above, pp. 127-128.
15 Ibid.
16 See above, pp. 127-128.
THE TERTIA VIA 131
is true that, since at one moment it exists and at another it does not, it can
either be or not be. Now, it is argued, it is impossible for the totality of existent
being to be of this type. For, if it were, we should merely have to go back far
enough in time to come to a moment when nothing existed. But, if at any
moment there had existed absolutely nothing, it is clear that nothing could have
subsequently come into existence, and therefore nothing would exist today.
This would contradict the fact of experience from which we began. Therefore
the hypothesis which we assumed must be false. That is to say, at any moment
the existence of some being or beings is necessary.1?
Actually, Mascall's expression of the conclusion here is rather a
corollary of St. Thomas'. For the reason why" ... at any moment the
existence of some being or beings is necessary" is simply that "there
must exist something among things which is necessary." 18 Mascall
himself implies the direct conclusion in the next paragraph when he
states, "Such a necessary being either has its necessity caused by an-
other or it has not." 19 Yet, to sustain the conclusion that some neces-
sary being must exist, one must first sustain the transitional premise
that not all beings can be possibles, " ... for what is possible not to be,
at some time is not." 20 The rest of the argument is rather simple, once
one has shown this principle, since all that then need be done is to
regress in time to a point at which nothing existed. Since, of course, as
Mascall says, " ... if at any moment there has existed absolutely
nothing, it is clear that nothing could have subsequently come into
existence ... ," 21 one would then be forced to conclude that nothing
exists today - which is plainly false. Hence, the assumption that all
beings are possibles leads to absurdity - and the conclusion is forced
upon us that something necessary exists.
But what of this principle of St. Thomas' that" ... what is possible
not to be, at some time is not."? Gilson suggests that this premise
assumes the eternity of the world, during which, whatever is genuinely
possible must at some time be fulfilled:
If the Jewish philosopher and the Christian philosopher both admit that in the
event that the non-being of all things had been possible, the moment would
necessarily have come when nothing would have existed, it is because they are
reasoning within the hypothesis that time is of infinite duration. Where there
is infinite duration, it is unthinkable that a possible worthy of the name be not
realized. 22

18 S.T., I, 2, 3.
20 S. T., I, 2, 3.
In that same passage, Gilson further asserts that it is not that Maimo-
nides (from whom Gilson says, St. Thomas most directly borrowed the
construction of the tertia via) 23 and St. Thomas actually believe in the
eternity of the world. Rather, they concur in assuming what they both
agree to be a contrary to fact hypothesis in order to found their argu-
ment on a basis so secure that it can never be shaken. That is to say, by
assuming that the world is eternal, and then showing that this assump-
tion (which neither Maimonides nor St. Thomas believe) entails the
existence of some necessary being, they have built a demonstration
whose premises even the pagans would accept.
Maritain, greeting the same central question, responds in the same
fashion (He employs the term "contingent," rather than "possible" -
doubtless a reaction to the influence of modern thinkers, such as
Leibniz.) :
Is there, however, nothing but the contingent, nothing but what is able not to be?
Can we by thought eliminate absolutely all necessity from things? The hypothesis
destroys itself: on the supposition of pure contingency, nothing at all would
exist.
Imagine a time without beginning or end; imagine that there was nevertheless
absolutely nothing necessary, either in time or above time: It is then impossible
that there always was being, for that for which there is no necessity cannot have
been always. It is inevitable then that at a certain moment nothing would have
existed. 24
Here Maritain appeals to the principle of sufficient reason. 25 For when

he says, " ... that for which there is no necessity cannot have been
always," he implies the need of some sufficient reason for the very
permanence of that which exists always. Such a sufficient reason would
constitute the necessity of what exists permanently, and thus, some-
thing necessary would exist. Maritain seeks the raison d' etre for a thing
existing always - and finds it in something which " ... endows it with
some kind of necessity."
... the principle "That for which there is no necessity cannot always be" ... is
evident in virtue of the very principle of "reason-far-being" (raison d' etre). Either
a thing is by reason of itself - then it is its own reason; or it is by reason of
something else - then it has its reason for being in something else. Correspond-
ingly, a thing is always either by reason of itself or by reason of something else.
The fact that it never ceases to be has itself a reason. If it is of itself the total
reason for its always being, then it is necessary by reason of itself. If the reason
for its always being is something other than itself, then that reason, by the very
23 Cf. ibid., p. 69.

25 Cf. Maritain, Pre/ace, pp. 97-105.
THE TERTIA VIA 133
fact that it guarantees its never ceasing to be, endows it with some kind of
necessity. 26
Conversely, according to Maritain's reasoning, if there is no necessity

that something should always exist, then no sufficient reason for its
permanence may be assigned. In this latter case, which obtains for all
possibles, such a thing cannot have always existed - for, "It does not
exist because it lacks that without which it does not exist." 27 That is,
it lacks that sufficient reason for existing always without which it
cannot exist always. And this concurs with Gilson, save that it
expresses the reverse side of the argument: Gilson stresses that any
possible worthy of the name must sometime be realized and if non-
existence is genuinely possible, non-existence must sometime occur;
Maritain prefers to note simply that what exists always must have some
reason for the permanence of its existence, in which case its existence is
necessary - which means such a thing is not a mere possible being.
Gilson points out that this reasoning must apply, not only to indivi-
duals, but also to the collectivity of possibles (otherwise, it appears that
some reason for the permanence of the collectivity itself would have to
be assigned) :
.•. this applies to all merely possible things, singly and collectively. There should
therefore have come a time when, given that all things ceased to exist, there
was nothing in existence, and since what no longer is cannot bring itself back
to existence, there should still be nothing in existence. Now this consequence
is absurd .... 28
Garrigou-Lagrange reverses the argument and concentrates, not on the

fact that possibles must sometime cease to exist, but on St. Thomas'
assertion at the beginning of the argument that possible beings are
also generated beings. Lagrange begins with this focus: "After having
established the existence in the world of beings which begin to ex-
ist .... " 29 He then addresses himself to the meaning ot this beginning
of existence:
To exist without a beginning cannot properly be said of any but self-existent

beings, and this could not apply to a series of contingent beings, unless they
received their existence from a self-existent, or, in other words, from a necessary
Being. Hence, if there were in existence only contingent beings, there must have
been a time when nothing at all existed. Now, if "at any particular moment

27 Maritain, Preface, p. 101.
nothing actually exists, then nothing can ever come into existence." Therefore,
some necessary being must exist, that is to say, one which cannot not exist .... 30
Lagrange's argument seems to be this: If we take St. Thomas precisely

as he states the tertia via, "what is possible not to be" is earlier identi-
fied with those things which "are found to be generated." Now if all
things were "generated," this means that all things "came into being"
at some time - in which case, at some time all things were non-existent.
Now Lagrange's argument would seem to us very forceful- except that
it does not appear to reflect accurately St. Thomas' understanding of
the term "generated." For St. Thomas, the generation of one thing is
simultaneously the corruption of another, and prior, thing - in which
case, something would always exist. This proof, then, is more Lagrange's
them St. Thomas'. Thus, Lagrange espouses the first of two possible
interp.etations noted by De Raeymaeker:
As a matter of fact, two hypotheses can be conceived: first, according to which
the complexus of things (which are all contingent) has had a beginning. Before
this beginning there was nothing; consequently, that which exists is grounded
on nothing. A second hypothesis: time did not begin; all the possibilities have
had to have occasion to be realized in the course of eternal time, notably that
of the simultaneous non-existence of all things. This is possible, since all are
equally contingent; but by that token this hypothesis falls to the ground; things
have had to begin and they have had to do this by proceeding from nothing. 31
As we have seen above,32 Maritain and Gilson present the latter hypo-
thesis. Either procedure leads to the same conclusion, i.e., that some-
thing necessary must exist.
Now in the context of the tertia via, St. Thomas manifests the per
accidens character of the possibles when he says, " ... that which is not
does not begin to be, except through something which exists." 33 For
on either hypothesis noted above, either all possibles had a beginning, or
else, presuming eternal time, all the possibles presently existing must
have had a beginning (and they are the point of departure of St.
Thomas' proof) - the same conclusion follows: All possibles have begun
to be, and therefore, their existence is caused by something which
already exists - which means that existence is in the possible being
per accidens. This, of course, we already knew from the Contra Gentiles. 34
However, St. Thomas reveals the same truth by a somewhat different
procedure in the context of the tertia via.
30 Ibid., p. 294.
31 De Raeymaeker, Being, p. 297, footnote 29.
32 See above, pp. 131-133.
33 S.T., I, 2, 3.
THE TERTIA VIA 135
III. THE LATTER PART OF THE PROOF
In accord with the preceding argumentation, we may now conclude,

with St. Thomas, that" ... there must exist something among things
which is necessary." 35 This, of course, pertains to the tertia via as it is
found in the Summa Theologiae. Regarding the parallel argument which
appears in the Contra Gentiles and which aims to prove God's eternity,
we may proceed from that point in the argument in which we had
observed that existence is found per accidens in the possible, since
" ... it must be, if existence accrues to it, that this is from some
cause." 36 Here St. Thomas appeals to what he has already proved in
the prima and secunda viae: "Now, as we have proved by the reasoning
of Aristotle, one cannot proceed to infinity among causes. We must
therefore posit something that is a necessary being." 37
What St. Thomas here implies is that every possible being has a
cause, because" ... what is able to be has a cause, since it is equally
related to two contraries, namely, being and non-being." 38 Since, as we
saw earlier,39 every causal series requires a first efficient cause (recalling
that proper causality in which cause and effect must be simultaneous
obtains in the quinque viae) ,40 St. Thomas concludes that there must be
some being or beings which is not a possible being, that is, something
which must exist, a necessary being. Hence, the argument in the Summa
Contra Gentiles is now at the same point as that of the Summa Theolo-
giae.
At this moment we are prepared to conclude the presentation of the
tertia via:
But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not.
Now it is impossible that one should proceed to infinity in necessary things
which have a cause of their necessity, as has been already proved in regard to
efficient causes. Therefore, it is necessary to admit the existence of some being
which is necessary per se, having of itself its own necessity, and not having the
cause of its necessity from another, but which is the cause of necessity in others.
This all men call God. 41
St. Thomas has shown that the possible necessarily implies the neces-
sary. Now he intends to show that whatever is necessary per accidens
necessarily implies something necessary per se. Those things are neces-
35 S.T., I, 2, 3.
36 C.G., I, 15. See above, p. 129.
37 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
39 See above, pp. 105-126.
41 S.T., I, 2, 3.
sary per accidens" ... which have their necessity caused by another. .. ,"
since, " ... because it is extrinsic to its nature ... ," necessity" ... must
be found in that thing by reason of an exterior cause." 42 Here St.
Thomas makes evident that the kind of exterior cause for that necessity
which is found per accidens in any necessary being is the efficient cause.
For he states that" ... it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has already
been proved in regard to efficient causes."
Hence, following the reasoning developed during the investigation of
the prima via and the secunda via,43 St. Thomas concludes to the ex-
istence of an uncaused first efficient cause of the necessity of all other
things - " ... having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from
another .... " Such a being is necessary per se, since its necessity is not
extrinsic to its nature - rather, it is " ... having of itself its own neces-
sity .... " This means that necessity is in that being per se, since the
necessity of its existence either belongs to its very essence, or else, flows
from its essential principles. 44 Although St. Thomas concludes by say-
ing, "This all men speak of as God," we must recall that the intent of
our inquiry is not to prove God's existence, but to show that the per
accidens must imply something per se. Therefore, whether a being which
is necessary per se would actually be what all men understand by
"God" does not concern us. What does concern this investigation,
though, is that whatever exists per accidens, because it is a possible
being, necessarily implies the existence of some necessary being or
beings, and that every being in which necessity is found per accidens
necessarily implies the existence of something in which necessity is
found per se. And this has been done.
That St. Thomas has in mind, explicitly, the reduction of the per
accidens or per aliud to the per se is made evident by the parallel text
of the Summa Contra Gentiles:
Every necessary being, however, either has the cause of its necessity in another,
or not - but rather, it is necessary through itself. But one cannot proceed to
infinity among necessary beings which have the cause of their necessity in
another. We must, therefore, posit a first necessary being, which is necessary
through itself [per seipsum necessarium]. This is God, since, as we have shown
[C.G. I, 13J, he is the first cause. God, therefore, is eternal, since whatever is
necessary through itself [necessarium per seJ is eterna1. 45
42 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4.

43 See above, pp. 80--126.
44 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4.
45 C.G., I, IS.
THE TERTIA VIA 137
Thus, as we see here, St. Thomas concludes to a being which is neces-
sary per se - after, in this context also, pointing out the impossibility of
infinite regress among efficient causes. The argument here is perfectly
parallel to that of the Summa Theologiae, excepting that here st. Thomas
concludes to what is necessary per se in order to manifest God's eternity.
The meaning of what is said to be necessary through another is the
object of some discussion among philosophers. For some feel that St.
Thomas was addressing himself to a worldview which is no longer
current. For instance, Hawkins remarks:
•.• we may distinguish between what is necessary of itself and what is necessary
but derives its necessity from something other than itself. This distinction
probably acquires its meaning from Avicenna, according to whom the supreme
intelligence or God is necessary of himself but there are other pure intelligences
which emanate necessarily from God. St. Thomas would then be arguing hypo-
thetically; if anyone thinks like Avicenna, then let him see what follows. For
it is impossible that all necessary existents should derive their necessity from
something else. This would be contradictory, since there would be nothing from
which they could derive their necessity. Consequently there must be something
which is necessary of itself.46
On the other hand, assuming that there are no " ... pure intelligences
which emanate necessarily from God," Garrigou-Lagrange prefers to
speak of those things which are necessary through another as being
conditionally, not metaphysically, necessary:
Moreover, if something is only hypothetically or physically and not absolutely
and metaphysically necessary (as cosmic matter is necessary for all changes),
"it has its necessity caused by another." But it is impossible to go on to infinity
in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another. Therefore
there is required, as the cause of all other things, the existence of a being that
is not hypothetically but absolutely necessary.47
Finally, we come to thinkers like Maritain and Gilson, who prefer to

read St. Thomas, not as speaking about necessary beings as such, but as
referring to those necessary aspects which are found in created things.
For instance, Maritain writes:
The question now arises regarding whatever may be necessary in the world of
things, whether it derives its necessity from no other thing, or, in other terms,
whether it is necessary through itself (per se) or in essence (per essentiam). In
the latter case, there would be neither change nor contingency in things. For
what is necessary in essence excludes every kind of contingency and change,
and exists of itself with the infinite plenitude of being, since, by definition, it
cannot be necessary in one respect only.48
46 Hawkins, Theism, pp. 54-55.
47 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. 144.
48 Maritain, Approaches, pp. 48-49.
Thus we see that Maritain seeks to avoid any thought of a world of

necessary beings, intermediate between God and the possible beings.
The necessity to which St. Thomas refers is a necessity in things, not a
group of things" ... necessary in essence .. . ," since such latter things
could not, according to Maritain, be distinguished from God himself,
since what is " ... necessary in essence . .. " must be the " ... infinite
plenitude of being ... " because it " ... cannot be necessary in one
respect only."
Gilson makes the same sort of point when he insists that it is the
existence found in created things which is the element of necessity
which derives from the Necessary Being:
... being is necessary to the extent that it is. This is the philosophical point,
too often overlooked by its readers, that confers upon the proof its true meaning.
The third way does not consist in establishing that a necessary being is required
in order to account for the possibility of the beings subject to generation and
corruption, but rather in order to account for what they have of necessity (i.e.,
of being) while they last.49
Hence, Gilson concurs with Maritain in reading the tertia via in such
fashion that the necessity spoken about in the latter portion of the
proof is not taken as a chain of incorruptible intelligences, necessary
beings per accidens - but rather, necessity per accidens is seen as a
quality found in finite things themselves. Nevertheless, all these com-
mentators agree that the possibles, things subject to generation and
corruption, are the point of departure for the tertia via, and that the
argument concludes to the existence of something which is necessary
in the absolute sense.
Hence, the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per
se," has application in the tertia via of St. Thomas. For we have seen
that the possibles have existence caused in them by an exterior efficient
cause, and thus, are said to exist per accidens. 5o The existence of some
necessary being had to be posited in order to explain the existence of
the possibles. 51 And, in turn, the question arises as to whether this
necessary being" ... had its necessity caused by another, or not." 52
If its necessity is caused by another, then necessity exists in it per
accidens. Hence, St. Thomas reduces this latter per accidens to some-
thing per se, namely, a necessary being which is necessary through it-
self. He does this by means of efficient causality: "Now it is impossible
50 See above, pp. 129, 134.
51 See above, pp. 129-135.
5a 5 T., I, 2, 3.
THE TERTIA VIA 139
to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity
caused by another, as has already been proved in regard to efficient
causes." 53 In this fashion, it is now evident in precisely what manner
the relationship of the possible to the necessary as it occurs in St.
Thomas' tertia via is to be understood as an instance of the principle,
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se." With this we con-
clude our discussion of the tertia via.
58 Ibid.
CHAPTER VI
THE QUARTA VIA
I. THE WAY
We will begin the investigation of the function of the principle, "The

per accidens necessarily implies the per se," in the context of the quarta
via in the same fashion as that of the previous contexts, i.e., by deter-
mining, first of all, the nature of that "series of effects" which consti-
tute the per accidens. St. Thomas presents his point of departure in the
following manner: "The quarta via is taken from the gradation which is
found among things. For among things are found some more and less
good, true, noble - and thus it is of other things of this type." 1
The quarta via of the Summa Theologiae has its counterpart in the
Summa Contra Gentiles. Although phrased in a slightly different
manner, it, too, proceeds from the relative perfection of the multiple:
" ... of two false things one is more false than the other, whence it must
be that one is more true than the other." 2 Since St. Thomas holds that
" ... those things which are greatest in truth are greatest in being," 3
we may understand that this is the same point of departure which
Garrigou-Lagrange assigns to the quarta via of the Summa Theologiae:
"It is important to determine exactly the point de depart of this argu-
ment, which is that there are various grades of being." 4 In a later
work, Lagrange specifies that it is the transcendental and analogous
properties of being he has in mind: "This means that being and its
transcendental and analogous properties (unity, truth, goodness,
beauty) are susceptible of greater and less, which we do not find to be
the case with specific and generic perfections." 5
Maritain affirms the existential basis of the argument:
1 S.T., I, 2, 3.
2 C.G., I, I3.
3 Ibid.
5 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. I45.
THE QUARTA VIA
It is a fact that there is a qualitative "more or less," that there are degrees of
value or perfection in things. There are degrees in the beauty of things (Plato
saw this better than anyone); degrees in their goodness; in fine, things are to a
greater or lesser degree. Knowledge is more highly and more perfectly knowledge
in intelligence than in sense; life is more highly and more perfectly life in the
free and thinking living thing than in the animal living thing, and in the animal
living thing than in the vegetative living thing. 6
By saying, " ... in fine, things are to a greater or lesser degree,"

Maritain points to the transcendental character of the data. This inter-
pretation is confirmed shortly after, when he takes pain to insist that
even knowledge and love are really convertible with being: " ... I think
that a fully realistic metaphysics should regard knowledge and love as
themselves constituting transcendentals or passiones entis." 7 He goes
further still and declares that life" ... is nothing but the transcendental
Being itself in its highest form." 8 Since St. Thomas does not, himself,
mention knowledge, love, or life in the quarta via, we do not intend to
labor these points made by Maritain - save in order to show that his
interpretation, as was the case with Lagrange, takes the point of
departure for the argument as the gradation in things of being and its
transcendental properties.
Before beginning his analysis of the quarta via Gilson observes the
fact that this argument is replete with difficulties which have led to
conflicting interpretations. He offers this advice which we adopt: "In
view of the many different interpretations proposed of this fourth way,
it seems advisable to lay it down, as a sort of guiding rule of interpreta-
tion, that its nature should be conceived as similar to that of the pre-
ceding ways unless some compelling reason appears to attribute to it
another one." 9
Following this principle, Gilson suggests that, like its predecessors,
this proof proceeds from an abstract formulation of some immediately
observable fact of sense perception. 10 Further, he remarks concerning
the data (true, noble, etc.):
These expressions do not signify the truth of true judgments or the nobility
attributed to certain beings by what is now called "judgments of value." What
is here at stake is the good inasmuch as to be good is to be, and the truth inas-
much as to be true is a certain way of being. The question then simply is: are
there, in fact, things given in experience as more or less good, more or less true,
7 Ibid., p. 52, note II.
S Ibid.
10 Cf. ibid.
THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE·GOD
more or less noble, and the like? We are looking for a metaphysical explanation
of physically given modes of being.l1
Thus, Gilson confirms again the interpretation that the "series of

effects" which constitute the point of departure of this via are the
various gradations of being and its modes as given in experience. Since
this interpretation which we will follow presupposes the convertibility
of being and its transcendental modes, we must briefly examine St.
Thomas' understanding of the relation of being and its transcendentals.
Without becoming mired in this point, we turn to Gilson again:
The word "transcendentals" stands for the Latin word transcendentia. Thomas
Aquinas applies this name to certain notions that define properties of being qua
being. Since being as such transcends all genera, these notions likewise transcend
all genera and categories. In other words, like being itself, they are predicable
of that which is, inasmuch as it is. Hence their name of "transcendentals." For
instance, "thing" (res) is such a transcendental. The three transcendentals
Thomas Aquinas is chiefly interested in are the "one," the "true," and the
"good." 12
St. Thomas himself employs the term "transcendentals" as when he

describes their proper ordering: "Whence, of those things termed
'transcendentals,' such is their order, if considered in themselves, that
after being is one, then true, then, after true, the good." 13 That, as
Gilson indicates, the transcendentals are convertible with being, and
that, as such, " ... these notions likewise transcend all genera and
categories," may be substantiated in St. Thomas' explanation of the
convertibility of being and one:
The "one" that is convertible with "being" designates "being" itself, adding to
it the notion of indivision, which, as a negation or privation, does not posit any
nature added to being. And thus, it is in no way different from being in reality,
but only in notion. For negation or privation is not a being in nature, but a being
of reason, as has been said. 14
Thus, the transcendentals do not differ from one another in reality,

but only in notion: " ... 'being' and 'one' are the same in subject, and
differ only in notion." 15 Finally, St. Thomas offers us a detailed
explanation of the sense in which the transcendentals differ conceptu-
ally, while, in reality, they are identical with being:
It is also evident from the foregoing argument that they [being and one] are
not only one in reality, but also that they differ in notion. For if they did not
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 334, note 19.
13 De Ver., 21, 3.
14 In IV Meta., 2, n. 560.
15 In X Meta., 3, n. 1974.
THE QUARTA VIA
differ in notion they would be fully synonyms, so that to say "a being man"
and "one man" would be pointless. For it is known that the name "man" is
taken from the quiddity or nature of man, while the name "thing" is taken from
the quiddity alone. But the name "being" is taken from the act of being, and
the name "one" is taken from order or from indivision, since "one" is "undivided
being." Now, it is the same thing which has essence and quiddity through that
essence, and which is, in itself, undivided. Hence, these three names, "thing,"
"being," "one," signify each the same thing, but according to diverse notions. 16
What St. Thomas intends here is to show how the same reality may be
considered according to diverse aspects. In the case of that reality which
is man, he says, " ... the same 'man' is taken from the quiddity or
nature of man .... " By this he means that we conceive "man" accord-
ing to the specific nature defined as "rational animal." Whereas, when
he says, " ... the name 'thing' is taken from quiddity alone," St. Thomas
means that we conceive of man as "thing" when we understand that
some specific nature, or "whatness," has existence, while prescinding
from any consideration as to which specific nature happens to be
present.
When St. Thomas says, " ... the name 'being' is taken from the act
of being ... ," he indicates that any reality is denominated a "being" in
virtue of that act whereby its essence has existence, the actus essendi.
He then points out that the "one" is simply "undivided being." Im-
mediately thereafter ,St. Thomas reminds us that" ... it is one and the
same reality that has an essence, and that is undivided." In this
fashion, he reveals that " ... these three names, 'thing,' 'being,'
'one,' signify the same thing, but they do so according to diverse
notions." In this manner, St. Thomas explains how being is to be under-
stood according to its various transcendental modes.
From this cursory examination of the transcendentals, we may
understand that when Garrigou-Lagrange, Gilson, and Maritain deter-
mine that the point of departure of the quarta via is being and its
transcendental modes, they mean that the gradation of goodness, truth,
nobility, perfection, etc., found in things is simply the gradation of
being found in things, but considered according to a conceptual diver-
sity as indicated by St. Thomas above. It is this gradation of being
among things which constitutes the per accidens in the quarta via.
16 In IV Meta., 2, n. 553.
II. THE ARGUMENT
Having obtained some knowledge about the point of departure of the

argument, we are now prepared to examine the rest of the proof:
But more and less are said of different things accordingly as they approach in
diverse ways to something which is the greatest; as that is more hot which more
approaches the maximum in heat. Therefore there is something which is most
true, most good, most noble, and consequently the greatest being. For those
things which are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as is said in Metaphysics
II. Now what is called greatest in any genus is the cause of all those things
which are of that genus - as fire which is the maximum of heat is the cause of
all hot things, as is said in that same book. Therefore, there is something which
is to all beings the cause of their existence, goodness, and every other perfection -
and this we call God. 1 ?
Before attempting any sort of intelligent assessment of this argument

it is necessary to clarify an unfortunate and evident source of confusion.
We refer to the premise laid down by St. Thomas that" ... what is
called greatest in any genus is the cause of all those things which are
of that genus - as fire which is the maximum of heat is the cause of all
hot things .... " As Maritain suggests,18 this maxim would seem to
lead logically to what would be, in modern eyes, the physical absurdity
of a supreme solid, the cause of solidity in all other things, a supremely
hot element, the cause of heat in all other things, etc. And while, doubt-
less, something is the hottest, the most solid, etc., in the physical
universe, modern physics does not allow that these would be the cause
of heat and solidity in others. Hence, it appears that either the principle
that the" ... greatest in any genus is the cause of all those things which
are of that genus ... " fails by contradictory instance, or else, that it
was never more than a mistaken generalization from the ancient
physics.
Maritain responds that such physical examples are not to be con-
fused with the metaphysical principle which they illustrate, " ... for the
reason that these qualities, being generic qualities and not transcenden-
tal modes of being, do not exist in things by participation .... " 19
Gilson bluntly refers to " ... the unfortunate choice of examples bor-
rowed from the Aristotelian doctrine of the physical elements." 20
Going further, Gilson explains, " ... it was no more than an illustration
of a metaphysical truth for which no adequate example can be found
17 S.T., I, 2, 3.
18 Cf. Maritain, Approaches, pp. 53-54.
19 Ibid., p. 54.
THE QUARTA VIA
in the physical world. This metaphysical truth is that, in anyone of the

many ways of being, "more" and "less" are predicated according as
things more or less resemble absolute being." 21
Since we have seen that the point of departure of the quarta via is the
gradation of being found in the things of experience, and since St.
Thomas later concludes that the God who is the cause of created things
is but one, and not many,22 it is evident that there can exist only one
instance of gradation in being which reduces to an absolute being.
Hence, as Gilson indicates, any example borrowed from the physical
world must necessarily fail to express adequately the real relation of
relative grades of being to absolute being, which St. Thomas has in
mind. Hence, it is best to terminate discussion of this example, taken
from an outmoded physics, and return to the properly metaphysical
principles of the argument.
III. THE PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION
Garrigou-Lagrange, in commenting on the quarta via, grasps the essen-

tial point at issue:
What is found in a being without properly belonging to it according to its
nature, is something which has been caused in it. In fact, not possessing this
characteristic of itself and immediately (per se et primo), it can possess the same
only in a conditional manner, by reason of another, and, in the final analysis,
from another which possesses the same of itself and immediately, as something
belonging to its nature ("secundum quod ipsum est").23
This explanation virtually paraphrases the principle, "The per accidens

necessarily implies the per se." For St. Thomas defines the per accidens
when he says, "Everything that is in anything per accidens, because it
is extrinsic to its nature, must be found in that thing by reason of an
exterior cause." 24 The second step by Lagrange is simply to point out
that the per accidens, in the final analysis, reduces to something
" ... which possesses the same of itself and immediately, as something
belonging to its nature .... " This is the definition of the per se, since
St. Thomas says, "Whatever things are in anything per se either belong
to that thing's essence, or flow from its essential principles .... " 25
Yet, Garrigou-Lagrange must explain the precise fashion in which
21 Ibid., p. 82.
22 Cf. S.T., I, II, 3.
24 De Pot., 10, 4.
25 Ibid.
the principle in question is applicable to this context in which the

per accidens is taken as the gradation of being found in the multiple
things of our experience:
Wherever there is diversity or composition, it is conditional, until we finally
arrive at pure identity. It is only the latter that is capable of self-existence,
whose existence originates from its nature, which is to being as A is to A, which
is Being itself, or existence itself, ipsum esse subsistens. Every limitation of an
essence would involve positing in it a duality between that which is capable of
existing and existence itself. In such a case, existence could be attributed to it
only as something accidental or contingent, and we should have to seek for a
higher cause, continuing our search until at last we arrived at pure simplicity
and pure perfection with no admixture of imperfection. Every limit imposed
upon the supreme attributes of Goodness, Beauty, Knowledge, and Justice
would mean the positing in them of a duality, and, therefore, of contingency .
. . . The first of all beings is essentially distinct from the world ... because this
being is by his very nature simply and pure, whereas the world is essentially
mixed and composite. 26
This is to read the quarta via as though it were a variation of the

argument which we examined earlier in the De Ente et Essentia. 27 The
per accidens is taken as being and its transcendental modes found varied
as to degree in the multiple, limited beings of experience. But in such
things essence and existence are distinct; there is " ... a duality be-
tween that which is capable of existing and existence itself." But in
such a being, " ... existence could be attributed to it only as something
accidental or contingent, and we should have to seek for a higher cause,
continuing our search until at last we arrived at pure simplicity and
pure perfection with no admixture of imperfection." That is to say,
beings in which essence and existence are distinct necessarily imply
something in which essence is one with existence - something in which
existence and its transcendental modes are not found per accidens, but
per se. Following this interpretation of the argument as offered by
Lagrange, we must conclude that the per accidens necessarily implies
the per se in the quarta via - since the reduction of the per accidens to
the per se is the same as that of the earlier proof. 28
Maritain prefers to express the quarta via in a manner which appears
more on the pattern of the secunda via. He speaks in terms which recall
his earlier treatment of a First Cause, " ... not first in a series, but
beyond every series." 29 For, in referring to being and its transcendental
modes as found in things according to gradation, he writes:
26 Garrigou-Lagrange, God, pp. 3I7-3IS.
27 See above, pp. 56-6S.
28 See above, pp. 6I-6S.
THE QUARTA VIA
Things, as we have seen, hold these values of perfections, which exist in them,
from a cause other than themselves, and therefore a cause must ultimately be
posited - a cause above the infinite series of all the possible degrees in things -
which possesses through itself those values or perfections. In that cause these
values and perfections exist in perfect unity, in a formal-eminent mode, within
the infinite transcendence of the Being per se. 30
Once again, we see here an interpretation of a proof for God's existence

in which the use of causality and the principle that the per accidens
must imply the per se, is manifest. Maritain explicitly states that the
argument proceeds from perfections found in things" ... from a cause
other than themselves," i.e., per accidens. These he reduces, by means
of efficient causality, to something" ... which possesses through itself
those values or perfections," i.e., " ... the Being per se." Thus, Maritain
affirms the application of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," in the context of the quarta via. Yet, he prefers to
understand the need for such a reduction according to his interpreta-
tion of the secunda via, which we examined earlier. 31 In so doing, he
does not so much contradict Garrigou-Lagrange's interpretation ac-
cording to the De Ente as he simply illuminates another aspect of the
proof in the Summa Theologiae. For the reduction from beings com-
posed of essence and existence to a being in which essence is one with
existence is a reduction which is made according to efficient causality.32
In either case, what concerns us here is that the principle in question is
seen to apply.
Yet another shade of emphasis is given to the quarta via by Gilson,
who speaks in terms of an "absolute" whose goodness, truth, nobility,
etc., are shared in by creatures according to the notion of participation:
That which is absolute in its own right is by itself that which it is. On the
contrary, the reason that things are more or less good, true, noble, and the like,
is that they more or less participate in goodness, truth, nobility, and so on.
Consequently, it is in virtue of something absolutely good that all more or less
good things are good, just as it is in virtue of something absolutely true that
all more or less true things are true. 33
Such a way of expressing the argument harks back, of course, to Plato

and St. Augustine. But Gilson insists, as we noted earlier in the doc-
trine of St. Thomas,34 that participation cannot be divorced from
30 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

31 See above, pp. 125-126.
34 See above, pp. 10g-IIO.
causality which involves not only the exemplar, or model, but also the
efficient cause which is productive of its effect:
Obviously, the fourth way openly relies upon the validity of the Platonic and
Augustinian notion of participation. But we shall see that, taken in a new sense,
exemplarism is one of the essential elements of St. Thomas' thought. He main-
tains that the lower degrees of perfection and being suppose a being in which
perfections and being meet in their highest degree. He also maintains that to
possess a perfection incompletely and to possess it from a cause are synonymous.
A cause can only give what it has. Anything that does not possess a perfection
of itself and only possesses it incompletely must hold it from something possess-
ing it of itself and in the highest degree. 85
When Gilson says that" ... to possess a perfection incompletely and to

possess it from a cause are synonymous," he affirms that the relative
perfections found in the things of experience are the result of exterior
causation. And when he says that a " ... cause can only give what it
has," he implies that this cause is a "giving" or "productive" cause,
i.e., an efficient cause. 36 This is not to exclude the formal character
involved in exemplarism. But it is to imply a reduction to some first
efficient cause when he declares that what " ... does not possess a
perfection of itself ... " (the per accidens) " ... must hold it from some-
thing possessing it of itself ... " (the per se).
That this interpretation of Gilson's intent here is justified is proven
at once, since he says explicitly that finite participations in the divine
exemplars demand explanation which leads us to a First Cause: "Mo-
tion, efficient causality, and the being of things are not the only reali-
ties that demand explanation. What is good, noble, true in the universe
also requires a first cause." 37
In another work, Gilson identifies gradation of perfection among
things with participation in being. This again, he reduces to a supreme
cause of all such perfections: "All the things that are said to be more
or less anyone of these perfections are therefore said to be more or less,
and since they all are more or less inasmuch as they more or less partici-
pate in being, there necessarily must be a supreme being that is the
cause that each and every thing that is, is a being." 38
Hence, we see that Gilson interprets the quarta via according to the
doctrine of participation. And we see that participation is applied by
Gilson here in such fashion that the relative perfections found in the
35 Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, p. 74. See Arthur Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism
(Dublin, 1949), pp. 6Z-II8.
36 See above, pp. 106-IIO.
THE QUARTA VIA 149
varied beings of experience are reduced to a first efficient cause of being
and its transcendental modes. As should be evident, this way of inter-
preting St. Thomas - although it emphasizes the concept of participa-
tion - does not differ essentially from the procedure of Garrigou-
Lagrange and Maritain. 39 For each writer has taken being and its trans-
cendental modes as the per accidens point of departure for the proof.
And each has insisted that this existence which is found varied in the
limited beings of our experience requires, ultimately, a first efficient
cause.
IV. PARTICIPATION AND ANALOGY
Although neither of the Summae present the quarta via in such a manner
as to mention explicitly either the term "participation" or the term
"analogy," we cannot overlook the facts that these terms refer to major
doctrines in St. Thomas and that, as we have just seen, major writers
who have commented upon the quarta via do not hesitate to interpret
that proof in light of these doctrines. For example, Maritain writes of
the transcendental values or perfections found in things: "They are
analogical, and exist in things by participation, without at any moment
being in any subject, however exalted it may be, according to the
plenitude of their intelligible content."40 And we have just observed
Gilson's emphasis on the doctrine of participation. Hence, arises the
problem as to the proper procedure to be followed regarding these
concepts and their relation to the argument of St. Thomas in the quarta
via.
We have briefly mentioned the notion of participation earlier 41 and
are well aware that it represents an extensive and complex subject in
the writings of St. Thomas. 42 The doctrine of analogy is by no means
less fraught with difficulties as is evidenced by radically diverse inter-
pretations which are current. On the one hand, there are those, such as
Maritain, who follow Cajetan in insisting that the only true analogy is
what they call "metaphysical analogy," the analogy of proper propor-
tionality:
... we only retained the last of the diverse sorts of analogy recognized by logi-
cians (that result from a division which is itself analogical) - analogy of attribu-
39 See above, pp. 145-147.

41 See above, pp. I09-IIO, 147-148.
42 For the doctrine of st. Thomas on participation, see: Fabro, Participation, pp. 509-
640; Geiger, Participation, pp. 298-307, 451-456; Klubertanz, Analogy, pp. 55-64.
tion, metaphorical analogy, analogy of proper proportionality - for this last

one is metaphysical analogy in the highest sense of the word, and there is an
advantage in dealing with it alone in order to work with a pure case. As Cajetan
says, it alone constitutes a true analogy, the others being called by that name
only in an improper manner. Moreover, if analogy of attribution is often mingled
with analogy of proper proportionality, it is only in virtue of the analogy of
proper proportionality that the analogy of attribution, in such mixed cases,
permits us to attain attributes (in things known analogically) that are predicated
of those things intrinsically and formally. Of itself, an analogy of attribution
only permits us to attain a form found intrinsically in the prime analogate, in
aliis vera extrinsece et per denominationem (John of St. Thomas, Log., II P.,
q. 13, a. 4).43
Yet, on the other hand, some writers, such as McInerny, offer radically
opposing views. McInerny challenges the textual foundation of Caje-
tan's distinction between the "analogy of attribution" and the "ana-
logy of proportionality." And in sharp distinction from Maritain's
allusion to "metaphysical analogy," he defends the thesis that analogy
is, in actuality, a logical doctrine, not a metaphysical one:
Contrary to Cajetan, it makes no difference to the logical doctrine whether the
analogical extension of a term is based on a proportionality or whether the
perfection from which the name is imposed to signify belongs essentially or
intrinsically to the things named. Once the irrelevancy of such considerations
is recognized, the validity of any distinction between "analogy of attribution"
and "analogy of proportionality" is immediately called into question. We have
tried to show that the texts of St. Thomas do nothing towards supporting
Cajetan's division of the analogy of names. As for the alleged metaphysical
character of analogy, it is clear that while analogical signification is extremely
important for metaphysics, it is also important for the philosophy of nature as
well as for the naming of logical entities (e.g. "genus," "universal" and "demon-
stration.") It is easy enough to agree that the analogy of names has special
importance for the metaphysician, just as logic generally does, but this hardly
makes a logical doctrine a metaphysical one. 44
With such diametrically opposed views as those quoted above in evi-

dence, it is obvious that anything approaching adequate treatment of
the doctrine of analogy in St. Thomas 45 would be far beyond the proper
scope of our investigation in this book. Hence, we do not propose
to attempt full discussion of the doctrines of analogy and participation.
43 Maritain, Degrees, p. 418.

44 Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy (The Hague, 1961), p. 166. Hereafter cited
as: McInerny, Analogy.
45 On St. Thomas' doctrine of analogy, see: Klubertanz, Analogy, pp. III-ISS; Hampus
Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the WMld (Uppsala, 1953), pp. 205-310, 415-475;
Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee, 1948); Thomas de Vio Cajetan, De
nominum analogia in SC1'ipta philosophica, ed. P. N. Zammit (Rome, 1934); McInerny,
Analogy, pp. 80-125, 166-169; Maritain, Pl'eface, pp. 62-64; Degrees, pp. 418-421; Fabro,
Participation, pp. 509-609.
THE QUARTA VIA 151
Two further reasons lend support to this decision: First, as we noted

earlier, the argument of the quarta via as it appears in either Summa
employs no direct mention of the terms "analogy" and "participation."
Second, to address ourselves to the quarta via expressly in terms of
these difficult doctrines may be to introduce, unnecessarily, problems
which arise through the various interpretations of St. Thomas' com-
mentators. Rather, we prefer to work with the texts of St. Thomas
himself, since, we believe, these will quickly enough reveal the need for
a first efficient cause of the relative perfections found in things -
according to the interpretation of Lagrange, Gilson, and Maritain
examined above 46 - without unneeded proliferation of formal doc-
trinal expositions.
V. PROOF FROM ST. THOMAS
We saw above 47 a certain consensus among St. Thomas' contemporary

interpreters that the quarta via, while taking as its starting point the
various grades of the transcendental perfections found in things,
proceeds by way of efficient causality to a First Cause" ... which is to
all beings the cause of their existence, goodness, and every other per-
fection .... "48 In order to sustain this common interpretation, we
propose to show that the point of departure of the proof, the per acci-
dens, does, in fact, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, demand the
existence of an efficient cause or causes. Once this has been done it is
simply to see the need for a first efficient cause, since this has already
been done in the secunda via. 49
We have seen that the starting point of the quarta via is being and
its transcendental modes as found in the multiple, varied, and graded
things of experience. 50 From this fact alone it is possible to show that
the doctrine of St. Thomas demands that some efficient cause must be
operative here, since he insists that a single cause which is not the
distinct natures of the multiple things must be productive of the effect -
for a cause which "produces" is an efficient cause. In St. Thomas'
words: "If one of some kind is found as a common note in several
objects, this must be because some one cause has brought it about in
them; for it cannot be that the common note of itself belongs to each
46 See above, pp. 145-149.
47 Ibid.
48 S.T., I, 2, 3.
49 See above, pp. 105-126.
50 See above, pp. 140-143.
thing, since each thing is by its very nature distinct, one from the other,
and a diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects." 51
The need for some extrinsic efficient cause of any common note found
in several objects arises from the inability of multiple things with
diverse natures to account for a single effect. This argument is reduced
to first principles by Garrigou-Lagrange:
•• •the diversity cannot be the reason of unity. To say that Phaedo and Phaedrus
are beautiful in and by themselves, would be to say that the diverse is of itself
one with a unity of similitude, in other words, that elements in themselves diverse
and not alike, are of themselves alike by reason of that which properly constitutes
them as individuals. This would involve a denial of the principle of identity or
non-contradiction. 52
Thus, when existence and its transcendental modes are found multi-
plied in the things of experience, some efficient cause outside those
things must, according to St. Thomas, be posited.
Perhaps the most direct way to sustain this thesis is to recall the
argument of the De Ente et Essentia:
But it cannot be that the existence of a thing is caused by the form or quiddity
of that thing - I say caused as by an efficient cause - because then something
would be its own cause, and would bring itself into existence, which is impossible.
It is therefore necessary that every such thing, the existence of which is other
than its nature, have its existence from some other thing.53
Regardless of whether St. Thomas intended that the argument from

which the above quotation is taken should be considered as derived
from sense experience, 54 it is, nonetheless, a fact that St. Thomas held
that essence is distinct from existence in the multiple things of our
experience. 55 Bearing this in mind, and considering that existence
(and its transcendentals) as found in the varied things of experience
are the point of departure of the quarta via, it is evident from the above
quotation that St. Thomas holds that above such things whose existence
differs from their natures there is required an efficient cause which is
entirely extrinsic to such beings. Hence, existence and its transcenden-
tals are genuinely per accidens to the things of experience, since they
are found in them, not by reason of those things own nature, but by
reason of an exterior efficient cause. 56 Existence and its transcendentals
51 De Pot., 3, 5.
53 De Ente et Essentia, 4.
56 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4.
THE QUARTA VIA 153
are found in the things of experience by reason of an efficient cause.
And, according to our study of the secunda via, we are led back to a
First Cause in which existence is per se, not per accidens, - since it is
caused by no other. 57
This interpretation receives further confirmation in the Contra
Gentiles where St. Thomas insists that being, as found in multiple
things, requires a first cause, " ... whose being has no cause." He writes:
Whatever does not belong to a thing as such appertains to it through some cause,
as white to man - for that which has no cause is primary and immediate, so that
it must necessarily be per se and as such. But no single entity can as such belong
to two things and to both of them; for what is said of a thing as such does not
exceed that thing .... So, if something belongs to two things, it will not belong
to both as such. Therefore, no single thing can possibly be predicated of two
things so as to be said of neither of them by reason of a cause. 58
St. Thomas begins this argument by showing that whatever does not
belong to the very nature of a thing must be caused in that thing by
some exterior cause. This, we recall once again, is the characteristic
note of something per accidens. 59 Next, he points out that no single
attribute can belong essentially to two diverse things, supporting this
with the following example: " ... to have three angles equal to two
right angles is proper to the triangle exclusively." 60 Hence, he con-
cludes, if one thing is predicated of two (or more) things, that attribute
cannot belong essentially to each. From which it necessarily follows
that that quality or attribute must be caused by an extrinsic efficient
cause in those things to which it does not belong by nature. Hence, the
very fact that the same quality is found in multiple things demonstrates
that it must exist in some of them per accidens and by reason of an
exterior cause.
This above reasoning St. Thomas now applies to "being" (and of
course this would also apply to its transcendental modes) which is
properly predicated of all things: "But existence is predicated of every-
thing that is. Hence, it is impossible that there exist two things, neither
of which has a cause of its being, but either both of them must receive
existence through a cause, or the one must be the cause of the other's
being. Everything which exists in any way at all must, therefore, derive
its existence from that of which nothing is a cause of being." 61
"That of which nothing is a cause of being" is, ot course, the First
57 See above, pp. IOS-I26.
58 C.G., II, IS.
59 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, 7S-76, I29.
60 C.G., II, IS.
61 Ibid.
Cause Uncaused of the secunda via. Thus, without any explicit re-
course to the doctrines of analogy or participation, it is evident that St.
Thomas has reasons for judging that being and its transcendental
modes as found in the varied, multiple, and graded things of experience
exist through another, and that the other must be, ultimately, some-
thing" ... of which nothing is a cause of being," i.e., something existing
per se.
Finally, we may turn to one further argument in St. Thomas - an
argument which reveals the intent of that often confusing premise of
the quarta via: "Now what is called greatest in any genus is the cause
of all those things which are of that genus .... " 62 St. Thomas begins
with the " ... gradation found among things ... "; he begins with the
fact that" ... more and less are said of different things." 63 Using this
point of departure of the quarta via, the argument runs:
... whatever is found in anything from its own nature, and not from some other
cause, cannot be diminished and deficient in it. . .. If, however, the nature or
quiddity of a thing remains integral, and yet something in it is found to be
diminished, it is at once clear that this diminution does not derive simply from
that nature, but from something else, by whose removal the thing is diminished.
Hence, whatever belongs to one thing less than to others belongs to it not by
virtue of its own nature alone, but through some other cause. Therefore, that
thing of which a genus is chiefly predicated will be the cause of everything in
that genus. 64
Hence, all things which are less than "the maximum in any genus" must,
according to this argument, derive that quality which they possess in
"diminution" from" ... that thing of which a genus is chiefly predi-
cated ... [and which is] ... the cause of everything in that genus." From
this proof it is clear that St. Thomas identifies" ... the gradation found
among things ... " with diminution in perfection of what is less than
the maximum in any genus. And since, " ... whatever belongs to one
thing less than to others belongs to it not by virtue of its own nature
alone, but through some other cause," gradation of perfections neces-
sarily implies causation of those perfections by some other cause. And
since, " ... whatever a thing possesses by its own nature, and not from
some other cause, cannot be diminished and deficient in it ... ," the first
cause of everything in a genus must be the maximum in that genus-
something which possesses the quality in question "by its own nature."
In the case of being and its transcendental modes, this means that the
62 S.T., I, 2, 3.
63 Ibid.
64 C.G., II, IS.
THE QUARTA VIA ISS
"maximum" has being by its very own nature. Thus he concludes later
in the same passage: " ... the cause of everything said to be such and
such by participation is that which is said to be such and such by
essence. . .. God is being by His own essence, because He is existence
itself." 65
From these texts it is possible to put together an image of St. Thomas'
meaning in stating that the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in
that genus - in the context of the quarta via. It is this: Everything
which possesses being and its trancendental modes per accidens is some-
thing which is composed of existence and essence, since the multiple
natures involved cannot account for that single quality, existence,
which they share in various degrees. Since St. Thomas holds that
" ... things in themselves diverse do not come together in one thing
unless through some cause uniting them," 66 existence and essence
cannot unite in a single composite unless some efficient cause produces
such unity. The maximum in the "genus" of being is that being in
which existence and essence are one, that is, something which exists
per se and which is the First Cause Uncaused of being and its transcen-
dental modes which are found per accidens in the varied, multiple, and
graded things of experience. Since we have already seen in what fashion
there must be a first cause during our investigation of the secunda via,67
it is now evident that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas regarding
the per accidens as it is found in the gradation in things of experience,
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se." Further, we have seen
above 68 that St. Thomas offers, not just one, but several ways of
showing that the transcendentally shared perfections among things
require an extrinsic cause, and that the cause must be, ultimately, a
first efficient cause in which essence and existence are one.
Lastly, before concluding our discussion of the quarta via, it is
appropriate that we attempt to show that the application of the prin-
ciple, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," is not entirely
foreign to the mind of St. Thomas. In this regard, Gilson points to a
helpful text as it names St. Thomas' sources for the quarta via: "We
are fortunate in having at our disposal a remarkable passage of the
Disputed Question De Potentia, q. 3, a. S, wherein Thomas Aquinas
reveals the various origins of the elements that go to the making of the
65 Ibid.
66 S.T., I, 3, 7.
68 See above, p. 151 ft.
fourth way." 69 In that article, St. Thomas lists three ways in which it
can be shown that God is the universal cause of all things. Among these,
"The third reason is, because that which is through another (per
alterum), is reduced as to its cause to that which is through itself (per
se)." 70 Hence, we may conclude that, accepting St. Thomas' under-
standing of the nature of the per accidens here, and employing appro-
priate principles derived from his writings, the metaphysical principle,
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," is properly applied to
the context of the quarta via.

70 De Pot., 3, 5.
CHAPTER VII
THEQUINTA VIA
I. THE WAY
The quinta via of the Summa Theologiae takes as its point of departure
the fact of governance in the world. It is the way of arriving at a know-
ledge of the existence of God which has been known down through
history as the argument from "order and design." St. Thomas takes as
his specific data here the orderly activity of things lacking in knowledge.
By so doing, he makes the need for an intelligent cause of order more
obvious:
The fifth way is taken from the governance of things. For we see that things
which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end; which is apparent
from this: that always, or more frequently, they act in the same way, so as to
obtain that which is best. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not by
chance, but from intention. However, those things which do not have knowledge
do not tend toward an end unless directed by something with knowledge and
intelligence - as the arrow [is directed by] the archer.l
This is an argument from governance. It excludes chance as an explana-
tion of order in natural bodies. Further, St. Thomas reveals that he
considers order in such things to be per accidens, since" ... those things
which do not have knowledge do not tend toward an end unless directed
by something with knowledge and intelligence." That is, being ordered
to an end is in such things per accidens, since such ordering is extrinsic
to their nature and must, therefore, be found in them by reason of an
exterior cause. 2
With but slight variation St. Thomas offers the same proof in the
Summa Contra Gentiles. There he tells us that the argument is inspired
by Damascene, and to some extent, Averroes:
... the argument is such: It is impossible that contrary and discordant things
unite in a single order, always or for the most part, except under someone's
1 S.T., I, 2, 3.
government, by which is yielded all and each so as to tend to a definite end.

But in the world we see that things of diverse natures unite in a single order,
and this not rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must
therefore be some being by whose providence the world is governed. This we
call God. 3
Here St. Thomas points out, not only the action of individual natures
to a definite end, but also the fact of harmony existing amidst the inter-
action of diverse, even "contrary and discordant." things - so that
some definite end is the fruit of all activity. He does not appear to
restrict this argument to things lacking in knowledge alone.
Gilson affirms, once again, that the starting point of this demonstra-
tion is similar to that of the preceding viae in that all begin with an
intellectual observation based on sense experience: "For the last time,
let us observe that the appeal to sense evidence goes far beyond brute
sense perception. The starting point of the fifth way is the primafacie
evidence that natural beings operate following a certain order and, as
it seems, in view of certain ends." 4 Further, Gilson indicates the per
accidens character of the order found in such things:
The data of the problem are simple. We are in a world in which by far the
greatest number of events and of activities exhibit a regularity that cannot be
the result of chance. On the other hand, an immense number of these events
and operations originate with beings that are not endowed with knowledge.
Consequently, the cause of the regularity, order, and purposiveness present in
the world is not to be found within these beings themselves. 5
Once again, the per accidens character of the" ... regularity, order, and
purposiveness present in the world ... " is manifested when Gilson tells
us that the cause of these qualities" ... is not to be found within these
beings themselves." 6
Commenting on the text of the Summa Theologiae, Garrigou-
Lagrange points to finality among things lacking in intelligence as the
minor of the argument:
We see that things lacking intelligence act for an end. Not only is this an
established fact, but it is the minor of this demonstration .
. . . "What particularly manifests this finality, as St. Thomas notes, is the fact
that natural agents of the irrational order "always or nearly always act in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result." 7
3 C.G., I, 13.
5 Ibid., p. 85.
6 See above, pp. 48, 75-76, 129-157.
, Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. 150.
THE QUINTA VIA 159
Lagrange manifests the per accidens character of finality as it is found
in irrational things, since, he asserts, such activity "presupposes a
directing cause:" "Irrational beings cannot tend toward an end, unless
they are directed by some supreme Intelligence. In fact, to be directed
presupposes a directing cause, which is an act that pertains to the
intellect and not to the imagination." 8
Maritain likewise notes the fact of finality at work among things devoid
of knowledge:
It is a fact that in this universe myriads of beings exist and act but neither
know nor think. And it is a fact that the activities of all these beings follow
regular courses, which are translated into the laws that our science establishes,
and which give rise to recurrences of constant periodicity. All these beings
evolve; they advance in time. The movement of their history is irreversible,
but their evolution itself takes place in conformity with the laws of nature and
moves in a definite direction .... 9
It is this" ... definite direction ... " of things, even " ... in the midst
of the diverse," 10 which reveals that all things must have some end
toward which they are moving. Rejecting Cartesian mechanism,
Maritain continues:
If the world is not a machine, then it must be a republic of natures, each of
which is an internal principle of activity. The fact that things are engaged in a
system of regular relations and orientated in a stably defined direction signifies
that they have natures which are root tendencies, identical with definite onto-
logical structures. But every tendency is by definition a tendency to something;
in other words it is determined by the term toward which it is orientated. Now,
what is this term toward which a tendency is orientated, if not something to be
attained, in a word an end (which, as such, exists only as the object of the
intention of an intellect) ? 11
The per accidens aspect of this action toward an end is indicated above
when Maritain implies the need for the presence of an intellect to ex-
plain such activity among things which " ... neither know nor think."
He renders explicit this causal relationship of dependence shortly
thereafter: "But the things which compose the world of matter are
devoid of knowledge and understanding; no intention to an end can
proceed from them. This intention must exist in an intellect on which
things depend - and which is at once omnipresent and separate from
things." 12
8 Ibid., p. I5I.
10 Ibid. Note the allusion to the argument of the Contra Gentiles here: See above, pp. I57-
I58.
11 Ibid., p. 57.
12 Ibid., p. 58.
Since the intellect upon which the finality of things devoid of know-
ledge depends must be " ... separate from things," according to Mari-
tain, it is evident that he conceives such an intellect as an "exterior
cause" of that finality found in things. Since he holds that " ... no
intention to an end can proceed from them," insofar as their natures
are devoid of intelligence, we can perceive the essential elements of the
per accidens here. For, Maritain's description of finality among things
lacking knowledge would indicate that order is found in such things per
accidens, since their orientation to an end requires a faculty (intelli-
gence) which is extrinsic to their nature, and because, therefore,
finality must be found in such things by reason of an exterior cause. I3
It is in such fashion that we discern the nature of the per accidens point
of departure in the quinta via.
II. FINALITY IN ST. THOMAS
It would not be appropriate to analyze the function of the principle

in question in the context of the argument from the governance of
things without saying something of the doctrine of finality in St.
Thomas. Once again, much could be said on this topic alone.1 4 Yet, in
order to remain faithful to the earlier mentioned limitations which are
proper to this investigation of the principle that the per accidens must
imply the per se, it is necessary that only a brief summary of the doc-
trine of finality be attempted.
St. Thomas indicates the supremacy of the final cause in the follow-
ing classical expression of his doctrine on finality:
The first, however, among all causes is the final cause. The reason of this is
because matter receives form only insofar as it is moved by an agent: for nothing
reduces itself from potency to act. But the agent does not move except from
an intention to an end. For if the agent were not determined to a particular
effect, it would not do this rather than that. Therefore, in order that it produce
a determinate effect, it must be determined to some particular thing which has
the notion of end. This determination, which in rational natures would be through
rational appetite, which is called the will- thus, in other things would be through
natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. I5
The above argument taken from the Summa Theologiae expresses con-
cisely the need for a final cause, or end, to determine the action of the
13 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, 75-76, 129-157.
14 On the doctrine of finality according to St. Thomas, see: De Raeymaeker, Being,
pp. 270-281; In II Phys., II-I4; C.G., III, 2-25; In I Meta., 4, nn. 70-71; In II Meta.,
4, nn. 316-319; Maritain, Preface, pp. 105-152; Gilson, Elements, pp. 264-285.
15 S.T., I-II, I, 2.
THE QUINTA VIA I6I
efficient cause, or agent. This same proof is found in expanded form in

the earlier work, Summa Contra Gentiles:
Moreover, if an agent did not tend to some definite effect, all effects would be
indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce
one rather than another. Hence, from that which is indifferent to either of two
effects, no effect results, unless it is determined by something to one of them.
Thus it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore, every agent tends to some
determinate effect, which is called its end. 16
Since the efficient cause cannot act except to some definite end, St.
Thomas concludes that the final cause is" ... first among all causes ... ,"
in fact, that it is the" ... cause of the causality in all causes," since even
matter and form cannot unite without an end:
... the end is the cause of the causality of the efficient cause because it causes
the efficient cause to be an efficient cause. Likewise, the end causes the matter
to be matter and the form to be form - for matter receives form only for the
sake of the end and form perfects matter only through the end. Hence we say
that the end is the "cause of causes" because it is the cause of the causality in
all causes. I ?
We have seen in the quinta via that St. Thomas insists not only that
things without knowledge act for an end but also that they act" ... so
as to obtain that which is best." This further aspect of finality, namely,
tending to the good, is explained in the Contra Gentiles: "The end is
that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover comes to rest, as also
the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very notion of good
to be the term of appetite, since good is that which all things desire. [I
Ethic., I, I; I094a] Therefore, all action and movement is for the sake
of a good." 18
And finally, we may look at a text in which St. Thomas manifests
all the essential attributes of the final cause - while distinguishing it
from the efficient cause:
... the final cause is the goal of motion, and thus, is opposite to the source of
motion, which is the efficient cause. It is first in intention, and for this reason
is called a cause for which something is done. It is desirable of itself, and for
this reason is called a good - for the good is what all desire. Hence, in explaining
how the final cause is opposite to the efficient cause, Aristotle says that it is the
goal of generation and motion, whose starting point is the efficient cause. 19
16 e.G., III, 2.
17 De Prin. Nat., 4, n. 356.
18 e.G., III, 3.
19 In I Meta., 4, n. 71.
Thus, in its broadest outlines, the doctrine of finality in St. Thomas

assigns to the final cause the role of the" ... cause of the causality in
all causes," which is " ... first in intention ... " and a good - since it is
" ... desirable of itself .... "
III. CHANCE
In the quinta via, St. Thomas introduces the concept of chance when he
says that things devoid of knowledge" ... achieve their end, not by
chance, but from intention." 20 In so doing, he raises a new topic in
which the terms "per se" and "per accidens'" playa central role. For
chance is said to be a per accidens cause: " ... each, namely chance and
fortune, is a per accidens cause .... " 21 Hence, it will be necessary for
us to give a brief analysis of the function of the principle in question
in the context of this new application of the terms "per se" and "per
accidens," as occasioned by the concept of chance which appears in the
quinta via. This must be done, further, in order to determine what
relation the concept of chance has to this proof of God's existence, since
many skeptics have offered chance as an acceptable alternative to an
Intelligent Orderer.
First, we must examine St. Thomas' understanding of the meaning
and distinction between the per accidens cause and the per se cause. In
the Commentary on the Physics, he offers the following explanation:
There are, besides the per se causes, also per accidens causes and their genera.
For example, the per accidens cause of the statue is Polycletus, but the per se
cause is that making the statue, since Polycletus is the cause of the statue
insofar as he happens to be the one making the statue. Also, those things which,
in their community, contain Polycletus are the per accidens cause of the statue,
e.g., man and anima1. 22
Hence that which is directly productive of the effect is called the per se
cause of the effect. On the other hand, the fact that the one who
happens to be making the statue is Polycletus, or, more remotely,
happens to be man and animal, constitutes these latter as causes per
accidens. In another text, St. Thomas illustrates this distinction by
saying: "Just as some beings are per se and some per accidens, so also
are causes. For example, the per se cause of the house is the builder's
art; but the per accidens cause is white or musical." 23
20 S.T., I, 2, 3.
21 In II Phys., 9, n. 9.
22 Ibid., 6, n. 4.
23 Ibid., 8, n. 8.
THE QUINTA VIA
Here again, that which, by its very nature, is productive of the effect
is said to cause the effect per se. But insofar as the per se cause (the
builder in this case, considered insofar as he engages in his art of build-
ing) happens to be something which is not by its very nature connected
with the production of the effect (white or musical in this case), this
latter "something" is said to be a cause per accidens. That is, whatever
is accidentally joined to the per se cause is called a per accidens cause.
St. Thomas explains this further, while at the same time pointing out
that the per accidens cause may be so denominated both on the part of
the cause and on the part of the effect:
But we must consider that a per accidens cause is so called in two ways: in one
way on the part of the cause, in another way on the part of the effect. That is
called a per accidens cause on the part of the cause when something is joined
to the per se cause, as when white or musical is called a cause of the house
because of being accidentally joined to the builder. A cause is said to be per
accidens on the part of the effect when something is taken as accidentally joined
to the effect, as when we say that the builder is the cause of dispute because
there is a dispute about the home which he made. 24
Thus, in this fashion a cause may be called per accidens either because
it is something accidentally joined to a per se cause or because it is the
per se cause of something to which something else is joined accidentally.
In the latter case we have an instance of what St. Thomas calls a per
accidens effect: "That is called a per accidens effect which is joined to
a per se effect and is outside its notion. For example, the per se effect of
cooking is delectible food, but the per accidens effect is healthful food;
for the physician the opposite is true." 25
Thus, for the physician, the per se effect would be healthful food -
something to which tastiness would be joined only accidentally. For,
as a physician, his intention is that the food is healthful, not that it be
tasty. As most hospitals would evidence, tastiness, in this latter case,
is, indeed, a matter of good fortune. Hence, arises St. Thomas' explana-
tion of chance and fortune:
It is in this latter way that fortune is a per accidens cause because something is
accidentally joined to the effect, for example, when the finding of a treasure is
accidentally joined to the digging of a grave. For, just as the per se effect of a
natural cause is that it follow according to the exigency of its form, so the effect
of an agent acting by intention is that it happen by the intention of the agent.
Thus whatever is found in the effect outside the intention is per accidens. 26
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 6, n. 6.
26 Ibid., 8, n. 8.
In the same way chance is a per accidens cause, although" ... chance is
[found in] more [things] than is fortune, because everything that is by
fortune is by chance - but the converse is not true." 27 Chance is
essentially the same as fortune, except that fortune is properly pre-
dicated only in the instance of those agents which act voluntarily and
with deliberate intention. Thus, St. Thomas excludes fortune in the
case of such things lacking free will as "inanimate things," "boys," and
"beasts." 28 Hence, he defines chance in such fashion as to include
fortune, while further curtailing the extension of the latter term:
... in those things which simply come to be because of something, when they
do not come to be for the sake of that which happens but rather come to be for
the sake of something extrinsic, then we say that they come to be by chance.
But among those things which happen by chance only those which happen in
individuals having intention are said to be by fortune. 29
In this fashion chance is understood by St. Thomas as a per accidens

cause of something, or, by shifting perspective slightly, as a per se cause
operating in such fashion that it happens to produce some per accidens
effect. For, in either case, something occurs which is outside the inten-
tion of the agent.
Now, since chance is a per accidens cause, we may examine St.
Thomas' definition of a per accidens cause in order to determine its
similarity to the definition from the De Potentia Dei to which we have
so often referred. He writes, " ... everything which is joined to the per
se cause which is not of its notion is called a per accidens cause." 30 Our
earlier definition runs, "Everything that is in anything per accidens,
because it is extrinsic to its nature, must be found in that thing by
reason of an exterior cause." 31 We can see a common ratio in these two
definitions. For causality is found in the per accidens cause, not by
reason of its own nature, but by reason of the per se cause. Thus,
causality is found in white, not because it is white, but because what
happens to be white is also the cause of building. On the other hand,
causality is found per se in the per se cause, since it " ... belongs to that
thing's essence ... " 32 as the proper and immediate cause of its effect.
There is no difficulty in applying the principle, "The per accidens
necessarily implies the per se," in this context. It is a simple matter of
27 In II Phys., 10, u. 2.
28 Cf. ibid., 10, u. 5.
29 Ibid., u. 8.
30 Ibid., 6, U. 4.
31 De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, 75-76, 129-160.
32 Ibid.
THE QUINTA VIA 165
definition for St. Thomas. For the very definition of the per accidens
cause includes a reference to a per se cause: " ... everything which is
joined to the per se cause which is not of its notion is called a per accidens
cause." 33 From this it is evident that, according to St. Thomas' under-
standing of the nature of the per accidens and the per se in this context,
we may conclude that the per accidens cause necessarily implies the
per se cause.
Further, it is clear that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas,
chance presupposes finality. For, while explaining how fortune is a per
accidens cause, he writes:
... just as the per se effect of a natural cause is that it follow according to the
exigency of its form, so the effect of an agent acting by intention is that it happen
by the intention of the agent. . .. that which is outside the intention is that
which happens seldom because what is always or frequently joined to the effect
falls under the same intention because it is stupid to say that one intends some-
thing and does not wish that which frequently or always is joined to it. 34
While these remarks pertain primarily to fortune and intention, it is

evident that" ... the exigency of its form ... " would cause a " ... natu-
ral cause ... " to act for the same end so that what happens would
always or nearly always be the same. Hence, St. Thomas understands
chance occurrances among natural bodies devoid of knowledge as some-
thing happening outside the "intention" of the natural appetite of such
bodies - an appetite which is determined by " ... the exigency of its
form .... " In this fashion, the very concept of chance in St. Thomas'
thought presupposes the ordering of an agent through its form towards
some definite end. Hence, St. Thomas says of natural bodies in the
quinta via that" ... it is plain that they achieve their end, not by
chance, but from intention." 35 As a matter of fact, in a rather remark-
able sentence in the Contra Gentiles, he indicates that the only reason
why natural agents ever fail to reach their proper end is because some
causal hindrance interferes: "Nature always tends to one thing, and
therefore things that come from nature come always in the same way,
unless they are impeded, which is infrequent." 36 From this it should
be clear that chance events are not to be considered as entirely spon-
taneous, according to St. Thomas, and that the very meaning of
"chance" implies some interference with a presupposed and pre-exist-
33 In II Phys., 6, n. 4.
34 Ibid., 8, n. 8.
35 S.T., I, 2, 3.
36 C.G., III, 23.
ing nature which is always ordered to the same end by " ... the exigency
of its form .... "
In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas recognizes the implicit deter-
minism of his position as regards natural agents devoid of free choice:
" ... since these causes fail in a minority of cases only because of some
impeding cause, the above mentioned difficulty would not seem to
be avoided. For the hindrance itself of such a cause happens of neces-
sity." 37
Responding to this argument, St. Thomas saves his conception of
chance by pointing out that it requires simply a cause per accidens, and
that, therefore, there exists no essential structure which requires that
the chance event must occur. Thus, while avoiding the suggestion that
the chance event arises out of the necessity of a given natural agent,
he does not avoid the implication of a certain determinism among
natural agents. He argues:
But it is clear that the cause impeding the action of another cause ordered to its
effect in most cases, sometimes interferes with it per accidens. Wherefore, such
an encounter of causes has no cause, inasmuch as it happens per accidens. Hence,
what follows from such an encounter cannot be reduced to a particular pre-
existent cause from which it follows of necessity.3S
How the chance event can entail a certain determinism in its constitu-
ent factors which may enable it to be foreseen, and yet, how it remains
truly fortuitous nonetheless, is explained by Maritain:
Chance, a fortuitous event, presupposes the mutual interference of independent
lines of causation. Chance, and this is the basis of the ancient's notion of it, is
the result of an irreducible pluralism, the plurality of the causal series which
meet at a given moment. It is not the fact that it cannot be foreseen that
constitutes chance. A fortuitous event can be foreseen, if its constituent factors
are sufficiently simple. But it is a fortuitous event notwithstanding, since it is a
mere encounter.39
Hence, Maritain's overall view is to see the world as a " ... republic of
natures ... " 40 engaging in myriad encounters - " ... the intersection
of causes which constitutes chance .... " 41 In reflecting what we
believe to be St. Thomas' view, Maritain concludes:
It is equally clear that chance cannot possibly be the origin of things. For it
presupposes an encounter of causal series, and further that each of these series
exists only because the causes it contains are determined to a particular end.
37 S.T., I, 115, 6.
38 Ibid.
39 Maritain, Preface, pp. 141-142.
40 Maritain, Approaches, p. 57. See above, p. 159.
41 Maritain, Preface, p. 147.
THE QUINTA VIA
Chance, that is to say, necessarily implies preordination. To hold that the

universe can be explained by a primordial chance is self-contradictory. 42
It is now evident why St. Thomas holds that natural bodies and other
things which lack knowledge seek ends which they achieve, not by
chance, but from intention. 43
IV. AN INTELLIGENT ORDERER
St. Thomas concludes his version of the q~tinta via by pointing out the
need for some intelligent being to direct all natural beings to their end:
"Those things, however, which do not have knowledge, do not tend
toward an end unless directed by something with knowledge and intelli-
gence - as the arrow by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being
exists by whom all natural things are ordered to an end; and this we
call God." 44
While it is not proper that we should attempt to prove God's exist-
ence here, we can, nonetheless, understand why St. Thomas sees the
need for some being with intelligence in order to explain that order
which exists per accidens in natural things. For since the things which
St. Thomas considers as the point of departure in this proof are devoid
of reason, and since they do, in fact, seek ends, some being with reason
which directs them to their end must be posited. For, St. Thomas holds
that" ... it belongs to the reason to direct to the end .... " 45 Now, even
regarding animals, St. Thomas does not allow that they have knowledge
of the end as such: "Animals have knowledge of that which constitutes
the end, ... but they do not know the nature of an end as such .... " 46
Hence, St. Thomas reserves the power of directing things to their
proper ends to intellectual substances alone.
St. Thomas provides a classic summary of his doctrine on this point
when he takes up the question of whether the world is governed by
anyone. Replying to an objection which argues that the world is not
governed since natural things do not work for an end because they have
no knowledge of their end, St. Thomas writes:
... something moves or operates for an end in two ways. One way, as an agent
moves itself to the end, as do man and other rational creatures and such beings
know the nature of their end, and of those things which are ordered to the end.
42 Ibid., p. 148.
48 Cf. S.T., I, 2, 3.
44 Ibid.
45 S.T., I-II, 90, I.
46 Ibid., I, 2.
Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or

directed to the end by another, as an arrow is moved to the target directed by
the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Hence, as the movement
of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that the arrow is directed by
someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are
without knowledge shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.47
It seems apparent that this passage is but a further expansion of what

St. Thomas said earlier in the quinta via about non-knowing things
being unable to tend to an end unless directed by some intelligent
being - for he even repeats the example of the arrow and the archer.
This principle will be accepted as a premise in St. Thomas' thought -
a premise which he appears to consider as virtually self-evident, since
he insists that only rational creatures" ... know the nature of their
end, and of those things which are ordered to the end.'"
Since the per accidens in this proof is order as it is found in natural
things devoid of knowledge,48 it is at once evident that the argument
from governance as it appears in the Summa Theologiae requires the
existence of some per se cause of order, that is, some intelligent being
in which activity for an end is not found by reason of an exterior cause,
but which itself is the cause of activity for an end as it is found in
natural things devoid of knowledge. Since intelligent beings" ... know
the nature of their end, and of those things which are ordered to the
end," it appears possible that such a being as man could serve the
function of the director of natural things which St. Thomas has in
mind here. But this is a complex question. St. Thomas reveals himself
to be open to the possibility of intellectual substances other than Gol
playing a role in the government of the world:
Nor does it make any difference, as to the present question, whether a heavenly
body is moved by an intellectual substance united to it, which would be its soul,
or by a separate substance. Nor does it make any difference whether each
heavenly body is moved by God immediately, or none, but rather, each is moved
by the intermediary of created intellectual substances; nor whether only the
first heavenly body is moved by God immediately and the others through the
intermediary of created substances: so long as we admit that the movement of
the heavens is caused by an intellectual substance. 49
Here St. Thomas raises the possibility of divine governance taking

place through the" ... intermediary of created intellectual substances."
Thus he suggests to us the hypothesis of a series of intelligent beings
each of which may be subordinated to some higher one in terms of its
47 S.T., I, 103, I, ad. I.

48 See above, pp. 157-160.
49 C.G., III, 23.
THE QUINTA VIA I69
finality. And if the higher directs the finality of the lower, one might
then say that finality is in the lower per accidens and not per se. In this
case, the question of infinite regress among final causes may appear,
since such a series of intelligent beings would involve essential sub-
ordination of final causes.
Although the question of the direction of the heavenly bodies appears
to be taken from the ancient cosmology, 50 it is nonetheless relevant to
the relation of finality among natural things devoid of knowledge to an
intelligent orderer - since St. Thomas believes the heavenly bodies to
function in an intermediate role between the intelligent governor(s)
and irrational creatures:
Now the heavens is the cause of the movements of lower bodies by reason of
its movement, with which it is moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently,
it is as an instrument of an intelligent substance. Hence, the forms and move-
ments of lower bodies are caused by an intelligent substance and intended by
it as by a principal agent, and by the body of the heavens, as by an instrument. 51
Thus, the question of possible regress among intelligent governors of

the heavenly bodies is one with the question of possible regress among
intelligent beings which appoint the ends of natural things. Now it is
possible for finality to exist in intelligent beings in a per accidens
fashion - whenever the end to which such a being is directed is appoint-
ed to it, not in virtue of its own nature, but by reason of an exterior
cause. 52
V. NECESSITY OF A "PER SE"
While we do not share St. Thomas' purpose of proving God's existence

by means of the quinta via, nonetheless, the hypothesis of a series of
beings in which being-ordered-to-an-end is found per accidens, offers us
the opportunity to examine the applicability of the principle, "The per
accidens necessarily implies the per se." What must be determined in
this context is whether or not the order which is found per accidens
among natural things, and which is manifested by the constant finality
of their actions, is, in fact, ultimately caused by some Supreme Intelli-
gent Orderer, that is, a first efficient cause of order as it is found in all
other things. For, just as the archer is the efficient cause of the order-
ing of the arrow to its target, so too, would a Supreme Intelligent
50 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 8, 1073bo-I074b14.

51 C.G., III, 24.
52 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4.
Orderer be the efficient cause of order among all inferior things which
are ordered to an end by some exterior cause_ Hence, Gilson suggests
that the intent of the quinta via places it in the same category as the
other four ways in respect to the principle that it is not possible to
proceed to infinity among intermediate causes:
Four of these ways establish that it is not possible to go on to infinity in the
series of intermediate causes. The fifth does not do so, perhaps for the sake of
brevity, more probably because, since the starting point of the demonstration
is the presence of regularity, order, and purposiveness in non-knowing beings
in general, the necessity of ultimately positing a single providence for the whole
world is immediately evident. 53
Even though the existence of a " ... single providence ... " may appear
evident, we have seen above that St. Thomas entertains the possibility
of a series of " ... intermediary created intellectual substances ... " 54
whose function would be to appoint ends to natural things devoid of
knowledge. In such a series the end of the lower being (whether intel-
lectual or not) must be seen as derived from the end of the higher being.
In this fashion it becomes the role of the highest cause to appoint the
last end of all subordinate members of the series. And insofar as the first
in such a series would necessarily derive its end from no prior cause, the
first cause would possess its own finality per se and not per accidens.
That is to say, the first cause in such a series would be its own end in the
sense that its finality is not found in it by reason of an exterior cause;
rather, its end would be intrinsic to its nature and it would belong to its
essence to be the first efficient cause of order for all other members of
the series in which finality is found per accidens. 55
Insofar as each member of a series of essentially subordinated causes
of order is actually an efficient cause which directs its inferior to an
end, we have here what is simply a series of efficient causes. And in this
respect the quinta via does not differ from the other four ways. As a
series of efficient causes, it is at once evident that there must exist a
first efficient cause of order - since it has already been proven that
there must be a per se in any series of efficient causes. 56
Yet, what does distinguish the quinta via from any of the prior ways
is its emphasis upon the doctrine of finality. And in this respect, it
becomes possible to develop a novel approach to our method of arriving
at a per se here. For, we have seen that the lower beings in any series
54 Ct. C.G., III, 23.
55 ct. De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, 75-76, 129-160.
56 See above, pp. 105-126.
THE QUINTA VIA I7I
of essentially subordinated ordered beings derive their end from the

higher beings of that same series. Hence, in the series, A, B, C, D, E ... ,
the end of E is appointed by D, the end of D is appointed by C, the end
of C is appointed by B, etc. In this fashion, there are as many instances
of subordination of ends, or appointment of ends, as there are members
in the series. Therefore, if it is possible to proceed to infinity in the
appointment of ends, or among final causes, it would, likewise, be
possible to proceed to infinity in the taking of efficient causes (since
each end is appointed by the prior efficient cause). But, conversely, if
it can be shown that one cannot proceed to infinity among final causes,
then, neither is it possible to proceed to infinity among efficient causes
of order. There must be some per se here, a first efficient cause which
orders and directs all other members of the series to their appropriate
ends.
This conclusion is manifested more clearly when one considers the
precise manner in which a "regress among final causes" is to be under-
stood in this context. For, if the end of E is appointed by D, and that
of D by C, and that of C by B, etc., it is evident that the end of E is
subordinated to the end of D, which, in turn, is subordinated to that of
C, etc. That is to say, in serving D, E also is indirectly serving C, B, and
so forth. Thus, the series of final causes with which we are concerned
here must be counted on a one-for-one basis with the superior directing
causes. And the essentially subordinated series of final causes to which
the lower agent is subservient is not some random series of ends proper
to itself alone, but rather, it is nothing other than the ordered subordi-
nation of all the ends of all the prior directing causes. This order of
subordination of final causes is, of course, the reverse of the order of
directing causes. Hence, the directing causes are: A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
H ... etc.; whereas, the order of final causes for, let us say, H, would be:
G, F, E, D, C, B, etc. (In the latter series of symbols, the letter refers
to the end of that directing cause, not the cause itself.)
From this it is evident that if no infinite regress among final causes
is possible, then no infinite regress among efficient causes of order is
possible either. Further, if it can be shown that some ultimate goal of
all finality exists, then it is also evident that, since the ultimate goal is
the final cause of the first directing cause, some highest directing cause
must exist. For, if there is no highest directing cause, then no ultimate
goal could be present according to the above schema.
Because of the above noted relationships between the efficient causes
of order and the subordination of final causes for any member of the
series, our procedur~ shall be as follows: We will examine St. Thomas'

arguments against the possibility of infinite regress among final causes
- in order to demonstrate the need for a first efficient cause of order in
the context of the quinta via.
In his Commentary on the Metaphysics St. Thomas gives four argu-
ments designed to prove that an infinite regress among final causes is
impossible. The first argues that the very notion of final cause, or end,
is destroyed in an infinite regress:
That which is a cause for the sake of which something comes to be has the
nature of an end. But an end does not exist for the sake of other things, but
other things for its sake. Now such a thing either exists or it does not. If there
is something of such a kind that all things exist for its sake and not it for the
sake of something else, it will be the last thing in this order; and thus there will
not be regress to infinity. However, if no such thing is found, no end will exist;
and thus the class of cause called "cause for the sake of which" will be elim-
inated. 57
St. Thomas' second argument is attendant upon the first. Since the
first proof shows that " ... those who posit an infinite regress in final
causes do away with the final cause," 58 and since" ... good and end
are the same in nature," 59 it follows that" ... those who hold that
there is an infinite regress among final causes do away completely with
the nature of the good, although they do not perceive this." 60 The
third argument by St. Thomas points out that no action is possible
without a final goal:
If there were an infinite regress among final causes, no one could reach a last
terminus, because there is no last terminus in an infinite series. But no one will
attempt to do anything unless he thinks he is able to accomplish something as
a final goal. Hence, those who hold for an infinite regress among final causes do
away with every attempt to operate and even with the activities of natural
things; for a thing's natural movement is only toward something which it is
naturally disposed to attain. 61
This argument is intimately connected with the earlier given proof
that was taken from the Contra Gentiles to the effect that every agent
must act for an end, since" ... from that which is indifferent to either
of two effects, no effect results." 62 In an infinite series of essentially
subordinated final causes, no final goal exists. Hence, there is no
ultimate term of action for an agent to incline toward. In which case,
57 In II Meta., 4, ll. 316.

58 Ibid., ll. 317.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., ll. 318.
62 C.G., III, 2. See above, p. 161.
THE QUINTA VIA 173
no action is possible. But action does occur. Therefore some ultimate
goal of all finality exists, which, in the context of the quinta via, re-
quires some highest directing cause, as was seen above. 63
St. Thomas' fourth and final argument against infinite regress
among final causes is taken from the relation of finality to intellection
and is, thus, particularly applicable to the hypothesis of a series of
intelligent beings which are subordinated in terms of the end in view of
which they direct the motion of natural things:
One who posits an infinite regress among final causes excludes a limit, and
therefore, excludes the end for the sake of which something would be a cause.
But every intelligent agent acts for the sake of some end. Hence, it would follow
that there is no intellect among operative causes - and thus the practical
intellect is eliminated. But since these things are absurd, we must reject the
first position, from which they follow, i.e., that there is an infinite regress of
final causes. 64
This last argument shows that the practical intellect, i.e., the possible
intellect considered in its function of seeking knowledge for the sake of
action, would be eliminated as well as the action flowing from it - if
we assume there is no last end for all activity. This proof seems to us
as largely but a summary of the first and third arguments, but directed
especially at the impossibility of action by any intelligent being in the
face of the absence of any ultimate end or goal of activity. For,
assuming an infinite series of final causes, each cause functions simply
as a means to the attainment of the next - and since there is no last
cause, nothing exists which can specify the action of the others. Hence,
no action is possible either for intelligent or non-intelligent beings. But
action does occur. Therefore, an infinite regress among final causes is
impossible.
From the foregoing arguments against infinite regress among final
causes, we must conclude that, according to the doctrine and principles
of St. Thomas, an ultimate goal for all causal activity must exist.
Further, according to St. Thomas' argument from the governance of
things, the harmonious interaction of the "republic of natures" (to
borrow Maritain's phrase) which constitutes the world is ordered to
some final goal by some intelligent cause which directs things devoid
of knowledge to their ends either directly, or else, through the agency
of intermediate intelligences. Lastly, and what is of utmost concern to
this investigation, the relationship of this highest intelligent orderer to
those causes which are subordinate to him is as the relationship of the
63 See above, pp. 170-172.
64 In II Meta., 4, U. 319.
per se to the per accidens. For finality belongs to the highest cause in
virtue of its own essence since it is not derived from any exterior cause,
that is, its goal-oriented activity which directs the actions of all lower
causes is found in it per se, in virtue of itself.65 On the other hand,
finality is found in all the remaining agents in a subordinate fashion,
that is, per accidens. For each of them derives its finality from some
prior efficient cause and not from its own essence or being. 66 And since
we have seen that the latter cannot function or act so as to attain their
goal without the former, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, we
may conclude that the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies
the per se," has application in the quinta via.
It should be noted that, while reasoning in accord with the principles
of St. Thomas in this context has lead us to accept the necessity of his
concluding that " ... some intelligent being exists by whom all natural
things are directed to their end," 67 nonetheless the inference that this
"intelligent being" is actually the God of tradition is not intended by
us, since such a conclusion, as well as the investigation required to
sustain it, lie beyond the proper scope of our inquiry - as we have noted
earlier.68 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that st. Thomas con-
siders the nature of the rational creature to be such that it could not be
the highest intelligent governor: " ... the rational creature governs it-
self by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and
perfected by the intellect and will of God. Therefore, above the govern-
ment whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its
own act, it requires to be governed by God." 69
Since the individual rational creature is manifestly not the good as
such, and since St. Thomas holds that" ... the object of the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will, is good according to the common
nature of goodness," 70 it is evident that man's own nature is ordered,
through its natural appetite, to an end beyond himself. That is, finality
is in human beings per accidens. Now we noted earlier that the proof of
God's existence based on governance, as it appears in the Contra
Gentiles,71 does not appear restricted to things devoid of knowledge
alone, but rather is based upon the harmonious interaction of diverse
natures. Hence, we now observe that rational creatures may be con-
65 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, IZ9-145.
66 Cf. ibid.
67 S.T., I, 2, 3.
68 See above, pp. 54-55, 69.
69 S.T., I, 103, 5, ad. 3.
70 S.T., I, 59, 4.
71 Cf. C.G., I, 13. See above, pp. 157-158.
THE QUINTA VIA 175
sidered as part of that "republic of natures" which St. Thomas de-
scribes as coming " ... together under one order." 72 We note this in
order to avoid any possible mis-understanding that when St. Thomas
concludes to the existence of " ... some being by whose providence the
world is governed ... " 73 in that argument, that he has in mind some
rational creature, such as man. For it is clear that St. Thomas con-
siders that finality is found in man per accidens, just as it is found per
accidens in natural things devoid of knowledge. Hence, man must be
considered as part of the per accidens as far as the proof of God's exist-
ence based on governance is concerned. While this does not, of course,
inform us as to the exact nature of the per se cause of order in the world,
it does, as least, exclude the rational creature from any candidacy.
With this observation, we close our investigation of the principle,
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," in this context. For
we have seen that, from the existence of order which is found per acci-
dens in the things of experience, we are lead necessarily to some first
efficient cause of that order, an intelligent orderer which directs the
goal-oriented activity of all lower things. This Intelligent Governor is
the per se to which the per accidens of the quinta via are necessarily
reduced, according to St. Thomas. Hence, the principle in question has
application in the quinta via of St. Thomas.
VI. THE GENERAL ARGUMENTS
Certain contemporary commentators of St. Thomas have attempted to

abstract the formal character of the quinque viae from the individual
arguments in which it is found, so as to form a single generalized proof
which prescinds from any unique aspects of the various proofs. For
although we noted earlier that most of the more eminent writers hold
that the quinque viae constitute five distinct proofs,74 nonetheless
several of these same writers allow that a like thread of reasoning runs
through each of the ways. Hence, some have attempted to use this
"thread" as the basis for a single generalized argument. For Maritain
admits that" ... the nerve of the proof, the formal principle of demon-
stration, is the same in each of the five ways, to wit, the necessity of a
cause which is pure Act or Being, itself subsistent in its own right." 75
And Gilson agrees, " ... it is correct to say that the structure of the five
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
proofs of St. Thomas is identical. ... " 76 Garrigou-Lagrange affirms

these judgments and also points to the causal nature of such a demon-
stration:
There is indeed a general proof which is readily understood by the natural reason
or the common sense, and which includes confusedly the other proofs. It has
its foundation in the principle that is derived from the principle of causality,
namely, that the greater or more perfect does not come from the less perfect,
but the imperfect comes from the more perfect. 77
Now it is not our intent to enter these general arguments with much
detail, since they have no explicit counterpart in St. Thomas. N ever-
theless, it is true that St. Thomas, in affirming that God's existence is
made known through a quia demonstration (which is from effect to
cause) ,78 has implicitly sanctioned the attempt to formulate some kind
of general proof based upon causality. Hence, let us briefly examine
such an attempt - in order to see the role, if any, which the principle,
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," has to play. Lagrange
offers the following general proof:
The greater does not proceed from the less, the more perfect from the less perfect,
but contrariwise; but men, who contingently exist, have being, life, intelligence,
morality, and sometimes holiness; therefore there must be a first Cause which
possesses, by reason of itself and eternally, these perfections of existence, life,
intelligence, and holiness. Otherwise the greater would come from the less, as
the proponents of absolute evolutionism are obliged to admit, and it is by
recourse to this method of absurdity that God's existence is proved, who is
absolutely perfect and distinct from the world. 79
When Lagrange says that the first Cause possesses" ... by reason of
itself ... " the qualities in question, he affirms the per se character of
the first Cause - since he conceives such qualities as being found in the
first Cause as belonging to its very essence. 80 And by referring to the
contingent existence of men, in whom these same qualities exist, he
implies the per accidens character of such latter qualities, since he
understands them as caused by something greater than man - for
... the greater does not proceed from the less." Hence it is evident that
this general argument falls into the same pattern as the interpretation
given by Lagrange to the quarta via, which we examined earlier, and
concerning which he wrote (of the per accidens quality), " ... not pos-
77 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. 138. Also, "The five classical proofs for God's existence
rest, one and all, on the principle of causality, expressed in ever deepening formulas .... "
Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, trans. Patrick Cummins (St. Louis, 1950), p. 72'
78 Cf. S.T., I, 2, 2. See also, p. 76.
79 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. 138.
80 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, 75-76, 129, 145.
THE QUINTA VIA I77
sessing thIS characteristic of itself and immediately (per se et primo), it
can possess the same only in a conditional manner, by reason of another,
and, in the final analysis, from another which possesses the same of
itself and immediately, as something belonging to its nature .... " 81
That is, holiness, morality, intelligence, life, and even existence itself,
are possessed by man only contingently or per accidens - and efficient
causality demands a first Cause in which these things exist per se, by
reason of its very essence.
Since we have already followed Lagrange's line of reasoning in his
treatment of the quarta via,82 it is not necessary to do so again here in
order to show that by similar reasoning, "The per accidens necessarily
Sertillanges also does not hesitate to attempt a synthetic demonstra-
tion:
How do we set about proving God's existence? St. Thomas, in the Summa, has
opened up five ways. We have no intention of taking them one by one here;
that has been done many times. Let us here take them in globo. They may be
synthesized as follows:
Everything which we experience appears to belong to a chain of existing
things, implying and succeeding one another; a chain of attributes which com-
municate with each other and interchange; a chain of graduated values, of
results, now partial, now general, and growing more and more general till they
form a universe. It is so many ordered series which cross and interlace, indef-
initely sub-divided into a number of combinations, but where everything is
linked up. One being comes from another, which itself finds its raison d'etre in
a third, and this third in yet another. An effect comes from a cause, which in
turn implies a third. 83
Sertillanges then goes on to list the per accidens in this " ... chain of
existing things .... " Among the effects which" ... come from a cause,
which in turn implies a third," etc., he suggests the traditional points
of departure of the quinque viae, that is, effects, changes, perfections
of various degrees, the arrangement of things, and so forth. Then he
looks for something per se: "How can this series be accounted for, and
what does it presuppose?" 84 The direction of his thought inexorably
leads to a first cause, a sufficient reason which is sufficient unto itself-
thereby fulfilling the notion of the per se :85
The fact that there are interchanges and gradations proves that there are
sources .... we must ask: Where are the primordial sources, the first energies,
81 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, p. 3I7. See above, pp. I45-I46.
82 See above, pp. I45-146.
84 Ibid., p. 66.
85 Cf. De Pot., IO, 4. See above, pp. 48, 75-76.
THE DOMAIN OF CREFURE-GOD
beings, perfections, reasons, of everything? For it is the first which supplies

everything in a series of causes. When a chandelier is hung from the ceiling by
a chain, the ring nearest the light holds it up; this ring hangs upon another,
which in turn depends upon a third; but it is the last ring which supports
everything. 86
Hence, what Sertillanges is actually looking for here is, as he says

immediately, " ... a sufficient cause ... " 87 for all those things which
constitute the point of departure of his proof. Once again, we have
already examined his argument to the first cause of the" ... chain of
existing things ... " in our treatment of the secunda via. 88 Therefore, it
is unnecessary to repeat the earlier analysis in order to conclude that
this general argument, just as that of Garrigou-Lagrange's, proceeds by
way of efficient causality and, what is more important to our inquiry,
reveals application of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily im-
plies the per se."
And finally, we find that Gilson as well attempts to synthesize what
he considers the central theme of the proof's for God's existence given
in the Summa Theologiae:
Thus interpreted in the fullness of their meaning, the Thomistic proofs of the
existence of God rejoin another order of considerations which we have already
met several times. To say that an existing thing requires an extrinsic cause of
its existence is to say that it does not contain it in itself. From this point of
view, the proofs of the existence of God consist in constructing a chain of causes
which binds all beings which are by another to the one being who is by itself.
Beings by another, which have not in themselves the wherewithal to exist, are
those same beings whose essence, we were saying, is distinct from their existence,
as opposed to being by itself whose very essence is to exist. We can say, therefore,
that all the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God amount, in the last anal-
ysis, to a search, beyond existences which are not self-sufficient, for an existence
which is self-sufficient and which, because it is so, can be the first cause of all
others. 89
Like Sertillanges' "chain of existing things," Gilson views the essential

character of the quinque viae in terms of " ... constructing a chain of
causes which binds all beings which are by another to the one being who
is by itself." The application of the principle in question is manifest
here, since Gilson's reduction of the "by another" to the "by itself" is
entirely parallel to St. Thomas' reduction of the" per accidens" to the
"per se." The per accidens character of the point of departure here is
86 Sertillanges, Foundations, pp. 66-67.

87 Ibid.
89 Gilson, Christian PhilosoPhy, pp. 80-8I.
THE QUINTA VIA I79
made evident when he affirms that, "To say that an existing thing
requires an extrinsic cause of its existence is to say that it does not
contain it in itself." For this is simply to say that existence is found
in that thing per accidens, " ... because it is extrinsic to its nature ... "
and" ... must be found in that thing by reason of an exterior cause." 90
Since, "Beings by another ... are those same beings whose essence ...
is distinct from their existence, as opposed to being by itself whose
very essence is to exist," according to Gilson here, it is clear that the
reduction of the per accidens to the per se in this context is conceived
by Gilson as essentially that which was given by St. Thomas in the
De Ente et Essentia, which we have already examined. 91 This being the
case, the application of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," has already been demonstrated.
Gilson explains the existential orientation of his proof when he says,
"The first efficient cause cannot cause the existence of the effects
which other causes produce if it does not first cause the existence of
these causes." 92 Recognizing that every intermediate cause is also a
dependent being, Gilson observes that aU chains of causality presuppose
the dependent existence of the intermediate causes themselves. Hence,
he points to the radical existential contingency of all finite causes
upon a first cause whose essence is identical with its existence. In this
light he relates each of the quinque viae to an existential foundation in
the first cause:
It seems true to say that the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God are
developed immediately upon the existential level as demonstrations that there
exists a first moving cause of the heavenly motions and, through them, of the
very beings that come to be owing to their influence; a first efficient cause of
all the causes and of their efficacy; a necessary existent, cause of the actualiza-
tion of all possibles; a first term in the orders of Being, Good, True, cause of
everything contained in these orders; a Last End, whose existence is the why
of every "why - something - exists." 98
Thus, while Gilson prefers to emphasize the existential character of

causality, he concurs with Sertillanges and Garrigou-Lagrange in
attempting to formulate a general proof based on the quinque viae ac-
cording to the principle of efficient causality, the inexorable need for a
source of all that exists in a per accidens fashion. And while these sug-
gested generalized arguments are not as immediately relevant to our
90 De Pot., 10, 4. See above, pp. 48, 75-76.

93 Ibid.
180 THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE·GOD
investigation as are the actual proofs of St. Thomas himself, they do

serve, once again, to illustrate the application of the principle which we
investigate.
We may now bring this Part (Part II) to a close. It has been estab-
lished herein that, according to the doctrine of st. Thomas Aquinas, the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," has applica-
tion in each of his proofs for God's existence.
CONCLUSION
I. EXTERIOR CAUSALITY
At the beginning of this book we stated our intention to investigate the

legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
per se," as it is found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special
emphasis was to be placed upon the function of this principle in the
proofs for God's existence. 1 Certainly, the bulk of our inquiry has been
made in this more restricted context. And we have seen that the prin-
ciple in question has application in each of the quinque viae.
During the course of this investigation, we have seen that St. Thomas
offers a description of the per accidens (or per aliud) which reveals that
the "other" to which the "through another" refers is some exterior
cause: "Everything that is in anything per accidens, because it is
extrinsic to its nature, must be found in that thing by reason of an
exterior cause." 2 Now it would be very tempting to identify this no-
tion of "exterior cause" with that of the "extrinsic cause" which St.
Thomas mentions in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle.
For, in that work, he devides the four causes into two classes, the
intrinsic and the extrinsic:
Hence he says that whatever answer is given to the question, "What is this
thing?," pertains to the quiddity [quod quid est], whether it is intrinsic, as matter
and form, or extrinsic, as the agent and final cause. But the philosopher, who
inquires about the existence of things and their final and efficient causes, does
not include them under the quiddity [quod quid Mat esse], since they are extrin-
sic. a
It is clear that St. Thomas holds, with Aristotle, that a natural

thing's quiddity, its whatness, is composed intrinsically of matter and
form, but that the agent, or efficient cause, and final cause are not part
1 See above, p. 2.
2 De Pot., 10, 4.
3 In VII Meta,. 17, n. 1658. Cf. ibid., XII, 4, n. 2468.
182 CONCLUSION
of the quiddity, since they are extrinsic causes. Hence, we might be

tempted to conclude that the "exterior cause" mentioned in St.
Thomas' description of the per accidens, which was quoted above, is the
same as the "extrinsic cause" of the Commentary on the Metaphysics,
i.e., either an efficient cause or a final cause. But such is not the case.
For we have seen in chapters one and two of Part I of this book
that St. Thomas also says that some things are per accidens in that they
depend upon an exterior cause which is a material cause,' In chapter
one of Part I, accidents were seen to require some material cause which
functioned as a subject of inherence. 4 And in chapter two of Part I,
we observed that form and privation (the per accidens) necessarily
implied matter (the per se), as principles of that which comes to be in
change. 5 Hence, it is evident that St. Thomas intends to employ the
notion of "exterior cause" in a somewhat wider extension than he
intends to employ the notion of "extrinsic cause," since, as we have
just seen, this latter term refers to the efficient and final cause only.
Hence, when St. Thomas tells us that whatever is found" ... in any-
thing per accidens, because it is extrinsic to its nature, must be found
in that thing by reason of an exterior cause," 6 it seems reasonable to
assume the most evident meaning. That is to say, a quality is said to be
found in something per accidens, because the cause which is responsible
for said per accidens quality is exterior or extrinsic to the nature of the
thing involved. In this fashion, matter may be considered as a subjec-
tive, or receptive, cause which is exterior to the form which inheres in it
(in the case of the accidents-substance composition). And in this respect
we may understand how St. Thomas employs the term "exterior cause"
so as to include more types of causality than is usually understood by
the term "extrinsic cause." For the per accidens is understood by him
as having reference to any cause which is exterior to the nature of the
thing involved.
Nonetheless, it is correct to say that the kind of exterior causality
which is involved of the quinque viae is extrinsic causality in the stricter
sense. For, each via employs efficient causality in leading the mind from
some per accidens point of departure back to a first cause uncaused
which is per se. The other extrinsic cause, the final cause, is seen to play

6 De Pot., 10, 4.
CONCLUSION
a minor secondary role in the prima via 7 and a major secondary role in
the quinta via. 8
II. THE "QUIN QUE VIAE"
Let us be more specific. In the prima via, the per accidens was seen to be
motion as it is found in the things of experience. 9 Motion is found in
these thing per accidens, since it does not belong to their very essence,
but rather is caused in them by some exterior efficient cause of their
coming-to-be.1 O Confronting the hypothesis of an infinite regress among
moved movers, St. Thomas concludes that some first mover, absolutely
unmoved by any prior mover, must exist.1 1 In coming to this conclu-
sion, he follows the disjunction proposed by Aristotle which introduces
the possibility of a self-moved mover which is itself, in turn, moved by
appetition. I2 In this fashion the notion of finality appears in the prima
via in a minor role. Yet, according to the arguments offered by St.
Thomas and his commentators, regardless of which part of the pro-
posed disjunction is followed, the need for an absolutely first unmoved
mover remains.1 3 Hence, we see that the prima via employs the prin-
ciple in question in such fashion that something per se is necessarily
implied by the per accidens.
In the secunda via, the per accidens is understood as efficient causality
as it is seen in the essentially subordinated causes of being which we
experience in operation in the world.1 4 The various arguments which
are examined, and which sustain the application of the principle which
we investigate, are arguments in which the only kind of exterior cause
posited for the per accidens is the efficient cause.1 5
The same is true of the tertia via, whose point of departure, the pos-
sibles, have existence caused in them by an exterior efficient cause, and
thus, are said to exist per accidens. I6 The existence of some necessary
being had to be posited in order to explain the existence of the possi-
bles.17 And, in turn, the question arises as to whether this necessary
13 See above, pp. 86--104.
14 See above, pp. 105-106.
15 See above, pp. IIo--126.
16 See above, pp. 129-130, 134.
17 See above, pp. 129-134.
CONCLUSION
being" ... has its necessity caused by another, or not." 18 If its neces-
sity is caused by another, then necessity exists in it per accidens. Hence,
St. Thomas reduces this latter per accidens to something per se, namely,
a necessary being which is necessary through itself. He does this by
means of efficient causality: "Now it is impossible to proceed to infinity
in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as
has been already proved in regard to efficient causes." 19 So we see that
in applying the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
per se," to the context of the tertia via, we find that the exterior causali-
ty which is responsible for the existence which is found per accidens in
the possibles and for the necessity which is found per accidens in
" ... necessary things which have their necessity caused by another ... "
is, as in the case of the first two viae, efficient causality. St. Thomas
resolves the problem of infinite regress in the tertia via simply by re-
ferring to the reasoning of the secunda via.
St. Thomas takes, as the point of departure of the quarta via, being
and its transcendental modes as found in the varied, multiple, and
gradated things of experience. 20 According to the doctrine of St.
Thomas, it is evident that being and its transcendental modes are
found in the things of experience per accidens, since they are found in
them, not by reason of those things own nature, but by reason of an
exterior efficient cause. 21 As soon as this fact is established, the reduc-
tion of the per accidens to the per se in this context becomes obvious, for
the same reasons as were applicable in the secunda via. Hence, we con-
clude that the exterior causality which is causing being and its modes
to be found in the things of experience is efficient causality - and in this
fashion the description of the per accidens given by st. Thomas 22 is
again fulfilled.
Lastly, the quinta via offers us yet another, and final, argument for
God's existence in which the exterior cause of the per accidens is an
efficient cause. For, by it, St. Thomas intends to show that the first
cause uncaused is a Supreme Intelligence which orders all things to
their appropriate ends. The per accidens in this context is order as it is
found among the things of experience which lack knowledge of their
ends. 23 Because st. Thomas focuses upon the goal-oriented actions of
18 S.T., I, 2, 3.
19 Ibid.
20 See above, pp. 140-145, 151-153.
21 See above, pp. 151-153.
22 Cf. De Pot., 10, 4.
23 See above, pp. 157-160.
CONCLUSION I8S
natural things as the starting point of his proof, the doctrine of finality
plays a major role in this demonstration. Ruling out the pseudo-
explanation of "chance" as it is understood by St. Thomas,24 such
finality as is manifested by things devoid of knowledge can be ex-
plained only by the directing efficient causality of some intelligent
orderer, according to St. Thomas. 25 As to the possibility of infinite
regress among intelligent governors and their corresponding essentially
subordinated goals, St. Thomas offers several arguments designed to
show that one must come to an end in any regress of final causes - and
that, in virtue of this fact, some First Intelligent Governor must exist. 26
Hence, from the existence of order which is found per accidens in things
of experience which are devoid of knowledge, we are lead necessarily
to some first efficient cause of that order, an intelligent orderer which
directs the goal-oriented activity of all lower things. This Intelligent
Governor is the per se to which the per accidens of the quinta via is
necessarily reduced, according to St. Thomas.
Thus, we have seen how the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," has application in each of the quinque viae.
III. THREE CATEGORIES OF APPLICATION
Nowhere in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas have we encountered

an explicit attempt at demonstration of the principle, "The per accidens
necessarily implies the per se." And yet, we have seen St. Thomas re-
peatedly employing this metaphysical principle with an assurance
which befits the self-evident. But, as we noted at the beginning of this
inquiry,27 the principle is not self-evident. How, then, are we to under-
stand St. Thomas' attitude regarding this principle?
It seems to us that there are three categories of application of this
principle which we have found in the writings investigated: First, there
are those instances in which the application of the principle appears,
indeed, self-evident. This is not because the principle, itself, is self-
evident, but rather, it is because the particular context of application
is approached by St. Thomas in such a fashion that the per accidens is
defined in terms of the per se. Now, in such a case, it becomes at once
evident that, unless there is a per se, there can be no per accidens. Hence,
the per accidens must imply the per se. Instances of this type of applica-
24 See above, pp. r62-r67.
25 See above, pp. r67-r68.
26 See above, pp. r69-174.
27 See above, p. 1.
186 CONCLUSION
tion of the principle in question are the topics of accidents-substance,28

the problem of change,29 the domain of sense knowledge,30 and the first
two acts of the mind. 31
A second category of application involves the context in which St.
Thomas employs the principle in question, and yet, its application is
neither self-evident in virtue of the context (as in the first category) nor
does he appear to attempt some demonstration of its application. The
context of application to which we refer is that of the De Ente et
Essentia. 32 Nevertheless, as we have seen, in this context it has proven
possible to show the applicability of the principle - but, by employment
of arguments which are drawn from other sections of St. Thomas'
writings. In the argument from the De Ente, St. Thomas explicitly
employs the principle that the per aliud implies the per se. Yet, he
offers no explanation in the context of this argument of the need for a
first among efficient causes of existence - other than to note that the
alternative involves an infinite regress among causes. And, as we have
seen,33 such an implied argument may be deemed somewhat circular
unless one knows that the per aliud necessarily implies the per se, since
it appears that the only thing wrong with an infinite regress among
efficient causes is its exclusion of any per se cause. Hence, in order to
demonstrate that the principle in question has application to the con-
text of the De Ente, we were forced to employ principles derived from
other writings of St. Thomas, (especially the Summa Theologiae and
Contra Gentiles) and construct an argument therefrom.
The third category of application of the principle is the one of great-
est interest to this investigation. For in it st. Thomas not only appears
to employ the principle in question, but also, he seems to support the
application with a demonstration - or, at least, with the outline of a
demonstration which may then find elucidation in other of his writings.
Instances of this latter category include his consideration of the scien-
tific syllogism 34 and the quinque viae. 3s Although we grant that St.
Thomas offers us but a skeleton of his reasoning in support of the need
for a first cause uncaused in the quinque viae, nonetheless the outline of

CONCLUSION
the proof of the need for a per se is present, e.g., in the secunda via when
he says:
... among all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate
cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause is several, or only one. Now removing the cause removes
the effect. Hence, if there is no first among efficient causes, there will be no
ultimate, nor any intermediate. S6
It is upon this basic outline of an argument, when combined with other

texts from St. Thomas and his commentators, that we constructed our
complete demonstration of the applicability of the principle in question
to the context of the quinque viae, according to the principles of St.
Thomas. 37 And thus, basing ourselves in particular upon what we
learned while examining this third category of application, we now feel
able to attempt a general argument in support of the principle which
we investigate.
IV. THE PRINCIPLE IN GENERAL
Approach may be made to the demonstration of the universal and

necessary character of the metaphysical principle which is the subject
of this investigation. On several previous occasions 38 we have formu-
lated arguments which may be generalized as follows: In whatever
respect something is said to be per accidens, it is so because it is, in
that respect, "through another." That in respect to which it is termed
per accidens is something which is not only extrinsic to its nature, but is
in it by reason of an exterior cause. 39 This is true whether a thing is
termed per accidens in respect to its existence, or in respect to any
other quality. Now such a thing must rely upon some exterior cause
for the explanation of that in respect to which it is per accidens, since
it is incapable of accounting in virtue of its own nature for whatever
quality it possesses per accidens. That is to say, whatever is per accidens
in a certain respect, is so, because the aspect in question is extrinsic to
its nature, and its nature is intrinsically deficient in regard to it. This
is why it must depend upon some exterior cause.
Now the question arises as to whether the exterior cause on which the
first per accidens depends is itself per accidens, or not. If it is not, then
it is something per se. If it is per accidens, then it too must depend on a
86 S.T., I, 2, 3.
37 See above, pp. IIo-II9.
38 See above, pp. 18-19, 26-27, 32, 65-68, 103-104.
188 CONCLUSION
prior, and so forth. Then ... can this series of per accidens proceed to
infinity?
Bearing in mind that each per accidens is deficient as to its very na-
ture in respect to that which is found per accidens in it, it is evident that
even an infinite multitude of such things cannot account for that
quality which is found in each of them per accidens. For, since nothing
can give what it does not possess, those things to which a certain
quality is lacking by nature could never be a sufficient reason for that
quality which is found in them only per accidens, and not per se. The
quantitative multiplicity of the causes in question can in no way make
up for that which they lack qualitatively - since that in respect to
which they are all termed per accidens is a quality which is simply
extrinsic to, and beyond the power of, their natures, whether taken
singly or collectively.
It may properly be said that all the intermediate causes in any chain
of causes in which a certain quality is found per accidens constitute but
a single cause, since, as proper causes, they must all act simultaneously
and since they are one in their mode of causation, i.e., as causes in
which the quality in question is found per accidens and not per se. And
once this has been said, it is immediately evident that the argument
which we present here is not at all new, but rather is simply a variation
of a line of reasoning already put forward by St. Thomas and his com-
mentators.40
We recall St. Thomas' observation concerning the efficient causes
of motion: " ... all of the many intermediates are taken together as one
insofar as they have in common the nature of an intermediate." 41 Now
an intermediate cause is simply one in which causality is found per
accidens, or, stated otherwise, one in which the quality which it causes
in another is, itself, caused in it by yet another - that is, the quality in
question is found in it per accidens. In other words, the intermediate
causes of which St. Thomas speaks are, in fact, the same thing as a
chain of causes in which a certain quality is found per accidens - such
as we were speaking about above. Therefore, just as St. Thomas con-
siders all intermediate causes as one insofar as they are intermediate, so
too, we may consider all intermediate causes as one insofar as they are
per accidens in respect to that quality which is found in them and which
they cause in another.
Now St. Thomas and his commentators argue that the intermediate
40 See above, pp. 91-92, IIo-II9.
41 In II Meta., 3, n. 303. See above, p. II2.
CONCLUSION
cause, whether one or many, requires a first cause, since" ... it is im-
possible for an intermediate causality to be fulfilled, unless it is sustain-
ed by the first cause." 42 For the intermediate cause, whether one or an
infinite multitude which functions as one, cannot be its own exterior
cause. Hence, some cause must be posited which is entirely above the
series of intermediate causes in which the quality in question is found
only per accidens. Since the intermediate causes are deficient as to their
very nature with respect to that quality which is found in them per
accidens, something entirely outside the order of the per accidens must
exist in order to cause that quality which exists in the intermediate
causes per accidens. And that first cause which is thereupon posited
must be something which, in virtue of its own nature (per se), is able to
produce the effect in question. The per se cause does not, therefore,
produce its effect by reason of an exterior cause - or else, it too would
be simply an intermediate cause, which was ruled out above.
The only sense in which this way of putting the argument differs
from its expression in the prima via and the secunda via is that we wish
to extend it beyond the order of efficient causes to include explicitly,
all other exterior causes. For in those first two viae we employed a line
of reasoning which was borrowed from Sylvester of Ferrara, which
reasoning was found open to application both to efficient causes of
coming-to-be (the prima via) and to efficient causes of being (the
secunda via).43 While Sylvester's argument was designed to apply to
the prima via, we noted, in our consideration of the secunda via, that
an argument could be developed out of the writings of St. Thomas
which would parallel the reasoning of Sylvester on motion. In this
fashion, a first among efficient causes of being could likewise be estab-
lished. 44 Thus, by treating all intermediate causes as one, and by
noting that this "single" intermediate cause cannot account for its
own efficient causation, one concludes to the need for a first efficient
cause. 45 And we have seen that much the same argument is put for-
ward by several modern writers, such as Gilson, Sertillanges, Garrigou-
Lagrange, and Maritain. 46
Now we hold that the above argument, which was designed to apply
to efficient causes, may be generalized so as to include any exterior
cause, and for this reason. We can form an argument perfectly parallel
42 Cajetan, In I S.T., 2, 3, n. 6. See above, p. II9.
43 Cf. Sylvester of Ferrara, In I C.G., 13, n. 10. See above, pp. 91-92, II4.
44 See above, p. II4.
45 Cf. ibid.
46 See above, pp. 122-126.
190 CONCLUSION
to the one given above, and - while retaining its legitimacy - we may
abandon any restriction as to the type of causality involved, provided
that it is some kind of exterior causality. For, once again, all inter-
mediate causes may be treated as one. This "single" intermediate
cause cannot account for its own causation - since the very notion of
intermediate implies causation by another. Hence, some cause which is
exterior to the entire order of intermediate causes must be posited -
in order to cause the causation of the intermediate. That other cause
must not be intermediate, but first - and thus, per se. And it is on the
basis of this parallel argument that we feel secure in generalizing the
arguments found in the writings of St. Thomas and his commentators
regarding efficient causality, so as to include all forms of exterior causa-
lity. For if our argument is not explicitly intended by St. Thomas and
his commentators, it at least appears to be implicit in their writings.
The force of this argument is based on the per accidens character of
the intermediate cause. For, whether it is one or an infinite multitude
makes no difference to the fact that whatever it is which is found in it
per accidens lies outside the powers of its essence, and therefore, can
never find adequate explanation within itself. And since all inter-
mediate causes can be taken as one in this regard, since they all share
the same per accidens character as intermediate, no adequate explana-
tion of what is found in them per accidens can ever be achieved unless
some cause which is exterior to the entire order of the per accidens is
posited, namely something per se. Hence we witness the repeated
demand by modern authors for some "ultimate foundation," some
"sufficient cause," some "source" of the causation involved. 47
And since the need for a first cause is equally applicable to all exterior
causes, we have simply generalized the arguments of Sylvester, Cajetan,
and others to include all exterior causes. In this fashion, the essential
deficiency of the entire order of the per accidens becomes manifest, since
what is found in that entire order (the per accidens) can be in it only by
reason of an exterior cause. And since per accidens is opposed to per se,
as is "through another" to "through itself," the only cause which could
be "exterior" to the order of the per accidens must be something per se.
It is in this sense that we say that even an infinite multitude of things
in which something is found per accidens explains nothing - for the
"something" in question can never be explained by that in which it is
found per accidens, since the very concept of the per accidens implies
something exterior to the natures involved. Hence, just as one must
47 See above, pp. 122-123, 125-126.
CONCLUSION 191
step entirely outside the order of the intermediate cause and conclude
to a first cause, so must one step entirely outside the order of the per
accidens - since it explains nothing by itself - and conclude to some-
thing per se.
V. THE OTHER APPLICATIONS
From the preceeding general argument ,48 we now feel confident that the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," possesses
the universality and necessity which is proper to any genuinely meta-
physical principle. This being the case, it is proper that we review
briefly its application in those contexts examined prior to the quinque
viae.
I ts application to the argument taken from the De Ente et Essentia
is, perhaps, the most evident of the entire investigation. 49 For it is
existence itself which is found per accidens in whatever is composed of
essence and existence. The exterior cause of existence must be an
efficient cause, productive of the very being of the composite of exist-
ence and essence. 50 Since the first efficient cause must possess existence
per se, that is, of its very essence, in such a per se, essence and existence
must be one.
And thus, St. Thomas concludes to the existence of a first being or
cause" ... which is existence alone." 51 And, as we observed earlier,52
in the context of this argument St. Thomas explicitly employs the prin-
ciple in question , saying, " . . . everythingwhich is per aliud reduces to that
which is per se . ... " 53 The intimate relation of this argument to that
of the quarta via was noted at an earlier point,54 and therefore, further
explanation of the function of the principle in question in this context
would prove repetitious. Suffice it to say that the regress among effi-
cient causes to a first cause of existence, which we find in the De Ente,
offers itself as an early prototype of St. Thomas' later proofs for God's
existence which involve a regress among efficient causes of being,
namely, the secunda, tertia, et quarta viae. 55
Among the other major contexts in which the principle, "The per
48 See above, pp. 187-191.
51 De Ente, 4. See above, p. 56.
53 De Ente, 4.
54 See above, pp. 146, 152.
55 See above, pp. IIO-lII, 135-139, 146, 152.
192 CONCLUSION
accidens necessarily implies the per se," was investigated was the do-
main of knowledge, which was the topic of chapter three of Part 1.
Human knowledge is of two types: sensory and intellectual. In the
former context, St. Thomas defines the per accidens sensible object in
man as " ... what is at once intellectually apprehended as soon as the
sensation of the thing occurs." 56 Since "sense experience" takes place
only when the sense faculty is altered, and since such alteration can
occur only through a sensible object per se,57 it is immediately evident
to St. Thomas that the per accidens necessarily implies the per se in the
context of sense knowledge. The latter context, intellectual knowledge,
is divided according to the three acts of the mind. In the first two acts
of the mind we saw that the applicability of the principle in question is
self-evident. For, in both cases, St. Thomas begins with the per se, and
then defines the per accidens in terms of the per se. In the first act of the
intellect, simple apprehension, St. Thomas holds that the concept of
being is first known - and that all other concepts must be known
through this first concept. Hence, the concept of being is per se here, and
all other concepts are per accidens in reference to the concept of being
and are defined as understood in relation to being. Because of this, the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," is self-
evident in its application to the first act of the intellect. 58 Likewise, in
the second act of the mind, composition and division, St. Thomas
defines the principle of non-contradiction as presupposed for the forma-
tion of all other judgments. Hence, the application of the principle in
question is self-evident here also, since St. Thomas has first defined the
per se - and then, the per accidens (other judgments) in terms of the
per se (non-contradiction).59
Finally, in the third act of the mind, reasoning, St. Thomas employs
demonstration to show the relation of the per accidens to the per se. 60
For our knowledge of the truth of the conclusion of a scientific syllo-
gism is possessed in respect to that conclusion only per accidens, i.e.,
not in virtue of the very essence of the conclusion as such, but only by
reason of an exterior and prior cause, an efficient cause from which the
truth of the conclusion is made evident. 61 Now the efficient cause(s) of
the truth of a conclusion are the prior premises from which it is
56 In II De Anima, I3, n. 396.

57 Cf. ibid., n. 393. See above, p. 28.
61 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 4, n. IS. See above, p. 4I.
CONCLUSION 193
demonstrated. If one proceeds to infinity among such causes, then
nothing is first known and per se. But if no proposition is known per se,
St. Thomas argues, neither is any intermediate premise known, nor is
the conclusion known. For the knowledge of the conclusion depends on
knowledge of the prior premises, and if nothing is known first, no
subsequent proposition can be known either. In this fashion, St. Tho-
mas demonstrates that the per accidens necessarily implies the per se
in the third act of the intellect.
In chapter two of Part I we investigated the problem of change. 62
In this context, St. Thomas applies the principle in question when he
says, " ... if being comes to be per accidens from both being and non-
being, we must posit something from which being comes to be per se,
because everything which is per accidens is reduced to that which is
per se." 63 The per accidens principles of that which comes to be in
change are the preceding form (being) and privation (non-being).64
These principles are per accidens since they do not " ... enter into the
essence of the thing made." 65 Hence, they are called principles of that
which comes to be in change, not by reason of their own nature, but by
reason of some exterior cause. The exterior cause in this context turns
out to be a material cause, i.e., material substance with respect to an
accidental change, and primary matter in the case of a substantial
change. For we observed that St. Thomas' understanding of the nature
of change requires that some principle be present both in the terminus a
quo and in the terminus ad quem. And since no per accidens principle was
seen to fulfill this notion of change, it became immediately evident that
some per se principle must be posited - in order that the per accidens
principles of change may be meaningfully spoken of as principles "of
change" in any sense. 66
Finally, we return to our opening chapter in which we treated of
accidents and substance. 67 Here we have a particularly clear applica-
tion of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se."
For an accident is per accidens in regard to its existence, not only in the
sense that it exists through another (as we have seen is true of any
being composed of essence and existence) ,68 but also insofar as its

63 In I Phys., 14, n. 7.
65 In I Phys., 14, n. 5.
I94 CONCLUSION
mode of existing is to exist in another. 69 That is to say, existence is

found per accidens in an accident, not merely in the sense that existence
must be caused in it by another, but, more radically, in the sense that
it has no existence which is proper to its essence such that it can enjoy
existence "on its own." "The existence of an accident is to inhere." 70
Now that in which existence is found per accidens in this sense must
be reduced to something per se. For existence, " ... because it is
extrinsic to its nature, must be found in that thing by reason of an
exterior cause." 71 Here one must speak of "exterior causality," not as
though the cause were entirely extrinsic to the being in which the
accident exists, but rather in the sense that that in which the accident
inheres must be distinct from the accident itself as that which is in a
subject must be distinct from the subject in which it is. Hence, the
exterior causality which enables an accident to exist must be under-
stood, in this context as that of a material cause - on the part of that
in which the accident inheres.
Here, again, the procedure is a matter of manifesting the self-evident.
For St. Thomas would consider the proposition, "Every accident
necessarily implies substance," as self-evident insofar as he holds that
substance is the only adequate subject of inherence for an accident. 72
In this context, the per accidens is the entire order of accidental being
and the per se is the order of substantial being. Although it was seen
possible for an accident to exist in another accident,73 nevertheless
St. Thomas holds that the ultimate, and only adequate, subject for
accidental inherence is substance, since" ... it is substance alone which
subsists." 74 Hence, St. Thomas does not even for a moment consider
that accidents might exist without substance - for such a thought
would amount to denying them existence altogether. Not even an
infinite multitude of accidents could supply what is lacking to their
very essence as accidents, namely, existence in an unqualified sense.
Such unqualified existence is proper to substance alone, according to
St. Thomas. Hence, it is immediately evident to St. Thomas - from his
very understanding of the nature of accidents and of substance, that
accidents necessarily imply substance. 75 Therefore, the per accidens
necessarily implies the per se in the context of accidents-substance.
70 S.T., I, 28, 2.
71 De Pot., 10, 4.
7B See above, pp. 10-12.
74 In XII Meta., 1, n. 2419. See above, p. 16.
CONCLUSION
From our examination of each of the foregoing contexts of applica-

tion, it is evident that the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," has application - either because its application to a
particular context is self-evident, or because some formal demonstra-
tion is given by St. Thomas or can be constructed according to his
principles. Further, we have seen that a general argument can be
developed according to the reasoning of St. Thomas which enables us
to perceive the genuinely metaphysical character of the principle in
question. That is to say, according to St. Thomas' understanding of the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," there could
be no instance in which something per accidens would be found - with-
out some corresponding per se.
VI. A FINAL COMMENT
As we said at the beginning of this investigation, it would require nearly

inexhaustible effort to analyze each and every context in which St.
Thomas relates the terms "per accidens" and "per se." And so, we
declared our intention to limit the scope of this inquiry to those central
contexts which would serve as an adequate basis for judgment con-
cerning the legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se." Particular emphasis on the principle's application
in the proofs for God's existence was made.
As we have seen, it was in the proofs for God's existence that the
ultimate grounding of the principle in question became evident. For it
was in that context that the relationship of the per accidens to an
exterior cause bore fruit - insofar as it became evident, according to
the reasoning of St. Thomas, that some first cause must always be
posited in order to explain the causality of the intermediate causes -
regardless their number or the type of causality involved. And it is
because there must be some cause per se that no infinite regress among
the per alia is possible.
Thus, it was in our investigation of the proofs for God's existence
that it became evident why St. Thomas considers the principle in
question as a genuinely metaphysical principle - universal and neces-
sary in its application. And once the intrinsic rationale of the principle
was thus manifested, it became more evident, in retrospect, that the
principle must apply, not only in those major contexts studied prior
to the proofs for God's existence, but also in any context at all.
In a closing word of caution, however, it must be understood that the
CONCLUSION
principle which we have investigated in this book is, in a very real

sense, the property of St. Thomas Aquinas. That is to say, we have
established its legitimacy in this inquiry according to the under-
standing of the per accidens and the per se offered to us by St. Thomas.
And the application of the principle has always been examined in the
light of St. Thomas' doctrine. It would be entirely beyond the scope
of this work to attempt to establish the fundamental metaphysical
theses from which St. Thomas proceeds. Therefore, bearing this
caution and the intrinsic limitations of any attempt at verifying
the immanent logic of a portion of a philosophical system in mind, we
conclude, with St. Thomas Aquinas, that "The per accidens necessarily
APPENDIX
EDITIONS OF THE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS
EMPLOYED IN THIS BOOK
WORK OF ST. THOMAS CITED EDITION USED*
Compendium Theologiae (Opuscula Theologica) Marietti

De Aeternitate Mundi (Opuscula Philosophical
"
De Anima (Questiones Disputatae)
De Potentia (Questiones Disputatae)
"
De Principiis Naturae (Opuscula Philosophical
De Veritate (Questiones Disputatae)
"
In Boetium de Hebdomadibus (Opuscula Theologica)
In Boetium de Trinitate (Opuscula Theologica)
"
In libros de Anima
In libros Metaphysicorum
In libros Perihermeneias
"
In libros Physicorum Aristotelis
"
In libros Posteriorum Analyticorum
"
Questiones Quodlibetales
In libros Sententiarum P. Lethielleux
De Ente et Essentia (Opuscula Philosophical Roland-Gosselin
Summa Contra Gentiles Leonine
Summa Theologiae
* See Bibliography for complete reference data.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Anderson, James F. The Bond 0/ Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence.

St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949.
- The Cause 0/ Being. London and St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952.
Anscombe, G. E. M., and Geach, P. T. Three Philosophers. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1961.
Aquinas, St. Thomas. OPera Omnia, Leonine ed. 16 vols. Romae: Ex Typo-
graphia Polyglotta, 1882-1948. Vols. IV-IX, XIII-XV.
- In Aristotelis libros peri hermeneias et posteriorum analyticorum expositio.
Edited by P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1955.
- In Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium. 3rd ed. Edited by P. F. Angeli
M. Pirotta, O.P. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1948.
- In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edited by M. R.
Cathala, O.P. and P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. Taurini-Romae: Marietti,
1950 .
- In octo libros physicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edited by P. M. Maggiolo, O.P.
Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1954.
- Opuscula Philosophica. Edited by P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. Taurini-
Romae: Marietti, 1954.
- Opuscula Theologica. 2 vols. Edited by P. Doct. Fr. Raymundi A. Verardo,
O.P., P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P., and P. Fr. M. Calcaterra, O.P.
- Questiones disputatae. 8th ed. 2 vols. Edited by P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi,
O.P. Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1949.
- Questiones quodlibetales. 8th ed. Edited by P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P.
- Scriptum super libros sententiarum. 4 vols. Edited by R. P. Mandonnet, O.P.
Parisiis: P. Lethielleux, 1929. Vols. I and II.
- Aristotle's De Anima with the Commentary 0/ St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated
by Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959.
- Basic Writings 0/ Saint Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Laurence Shapcote.
Edited by Anton C. Pegis. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1945.
- Commentary on the Metaphysics 0/ Aristotle. Translated by John P. Rowan.
2 vols. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961.
- Compendium 0/ Theology. Translated by Cyril Vollert, S.J. St. Louis: B.
Herder Book Co., 1948.
- Exposition 0/ the Posterior Analytics 0/ Aristotle. Translated by Pierre Conway.
Quebec: La Librairie Philosophique M. Doyon, 1956.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- An Introduction to the PhilosoPhy ot Nature. Translated by Roman A. Kocou-

rek. St. Paul: North Central Publishing Co., 1956.
- On Being and Essence. Translated by Armand Maurer. Toronto: The Pontif-
ical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949.
- On the Power ot God. Translated by the English Dominican Fathers. West-
minster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952.
- On the Truth ot the Catholic Faith. Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1955-
1957·
Book One: God. Translated by Anton C. Pegis. 1955.
Book Two: Creation. Translated by James F. Anderson. 1956.
Book Three: Providence. Translated by Vernon J. Bourke. 2 vols. 1956.
Book Four: Salvation. Translated by Charles J. O'Neil. 1957.
- St. Thomas Aquinas Philosophical Texts. Translated by Thomas Gilby. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- The Soul. Translated by John P. Rowan. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.,
1949·
- The Trinity and The Unicity ot the Intellect. Translated by Sister Rose
Emmanuella Brennan, S.H.N. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1946.
- Truth. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952-1954.
Volume One: Questions I-IX. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. 1952.
Volume Two: Questions X-XX. Translated by James V. McGlynn, S.J. 1953.
Volume Three: Questions XXI-XXIX. Translated by Robert W. Schmidt,
S.J. 1954·
Aristotle. The Basic Works ot Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York:
Random House, 1941.
- On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated by
Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962.
Banes, Domiuico. Scholastica commentaria in primam partem summae theologicae
s. Thomae Aquinatis. Valencia: Hernan Cortes, 1934.
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas on Being and Essence. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1965.
Cajetan, Thomas de Vio. The Analogy ot Names and The Concept ot Being.
Translated by Edward A. Bushinski. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1953·
- In summa theologiae. Vol. IV of the Opera Omnia of St. Thomas Aquinas.
16 vols. ed. Leonine. Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888.
- Scripta philosophica: De nominum analogia: De conceptu entis. Edited by
P. N. Zammit, O.P. Rome: Institutum "Angelicum," 1934.
Carlo, William E. The Ultimate Reducibility ot Essence to Existence in Existential
Metaphysics. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Chenu, M. D. Toward Understanding St. Thomas. Translated by Albert M. Landry
and Dominic Hughes. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964.
Copleston, Frederick C. Aquinas. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955.
- Medieval PhilOSOPhy. New York: Harper, 1961.
D'Arcy, M. C., S.J. Thomas Aquinas. London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1933.
De Raeymaeker, Louis. The Philosophy ot Being. Translated by Edmund H.
Ziegelmeyer. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1957.
Fabro, Cornelio. Participation et causalite selon s. Thomas d'Aquin. Louvain:
Publications Universitaires De Louvain, I96I.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. God: His Existence and His Nature. Translated
by Dom Bede Rose. 2 vols. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1939.
- The One God. Translated by Dom Bede Rose. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.,
1959·
200 BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. Translated by Patrick Cummins,

O.S.B. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950.
- The Trinity and God the Creator. Translated by Frederic C. Eckhoff. St. Louis:
B. Herder Book Co., 1952.
Geiger, L.-B. La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin. Paris:
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1953.
Gilson, Etienne. Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1952.
- The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by L. K. Shook.
New York: Random House, 1956.
- The Elements oj Christian Philosophy. New York and Toronto: The New
American Library, 1963.
- A Gilson Reader. New York: Image Books, 1957.
- God and Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946.
- History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York: Random
House, 1955.
- The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Le Thomisme). Translated by Edward
Bullough. Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1924.
- The Spirit of Medieval PhilOSOPhy. Translated by A. H. C. Downes. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940.
- The Spirit oj Thomism. New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1964.
Grabmann, Martin. Thomas Aquinas: His Personality and Thought. Translated
by Virgil Michel, O.S.B. New York-London-Toronto: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1928.
Hawkins, D. J. B. The Essentials oj Theism. London and New York: Sheed and
Ward,1949.
Henle, R. J., S.J. Saint Thomas and Platonism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1956 .
Hick, John (ed.). The Existence of God. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
Hoenen, Peter. Reality and Judgment according to St. Thomas. Translated by
Henry F. Tiblier. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952.
John Capreolus. Defensiones theologiae. 7 vols. ed. Turonibus, 1900.
John of St. Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus thomisticus. 3 vols. Taurini-Romae:
Marietti, 1933.
Jolivet, Regis. The God of Reason. Translated by Dom Mark Pontifex. New York:
Hawthorn Books, 1958.
Klubertanz, George P. St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy. Chicago: Loyola Univer-
sity Press, 1960.
Little, Arthur. The Platonic Heritage of Thomism. Dublin: Golden Eagle Books,
Ltd., 1949.
Lonergan, Bernard J., S.]. Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Edited by David
B. Burrell, C.S.C. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.
Lyttkens, Hampus. The Analogy between God and the World. Uppsala: A-B.
Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1953.
Maritain, Jacques. Approaches to God. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1967.
- The Degrees oj Knowledge. Translated by Gerald B. Phelan. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959.
- Existence and the Existent. Translated by Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B.
Phelan. Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1958.
- On the Use of Philosophy. New York: Atheneum, 1965.
- A Preface to Metaphysics. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958.
- The Range of Reason. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 201
- St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958.

MascaIl, E. L. Existence and Analogy. London-New York-Toronto: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1949.
- He Who Is. London-New York-Toronto: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1958.
McInerny, Ralph M. The Logic ot Analogy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961.
Meehan, Francis X. Etticient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas. Washington:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1940.
O'Brien, Thomas C. Metaphysics and the Existence ot God. Washington: The
Thomist Press, 1960.
Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Toronto:
The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951.
Pegis, Anton C. St. Thomas and PhilosoPhy. Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1964.
Peifer, John F. The Concept in Thomism. Milwaukee: Bookman Associates, Inc.,
1952.
Phelan, Gerald B. St. Thomas and Analogy. Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1948.
Pieper, Josef. Guide to Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Richard and Clara
Winston. Scranton: Pantheon Books, 1962.
- The Silence of St. Thomas. Chicago: Henry Regnery, Co., 1965.
PreIler, Victor. Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas
Aquinas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Roland-Gosselin, M. D. (ed.). Le "de ente et essentia" de s. Thomas D'Aquin.
Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948.
Rousselot, Pierre, S.J. The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas. Translated by James
E. O'Mahony, O.M.Cap. New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1935.
Schmidt, Robert W. The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Sertillanges, A. D. Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy. Translated by Godfrey
Anstruther. London: Sands and Co., 1931.
- Saint Thomas Aquinas and his Work. Translated by Godfrey Anstruther.
London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, Ltd., 1932.
Sillem, Edward. Ways of Thinking about God. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Sylvester of Ferrara. In summa contra gentiles. Vol. XIII of the OPera Omnia
of St. Thomas Aquinas. 16 vols. ed. Leonine. Romae: Ex Typographia Poly-
glotta, 1888.
Vann, Gerald, O.P. Saint Thomas Aquinas. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd.,
1947·
VoIlert, Cyril, S.J., Kendzierski, Lottie H., and Byrne, Paul M., S.J. St. Thomas
Aquinas: Siger of Brabant: St. Bonaventure: On the Eternity of the World.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964.
Weber, Stephen L. "Proofs for the Existence of God: A Meta-Investigation."
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Philosophy Department, University of
Notre Dame, 1969.
ARTICLES
Annice, Sister M. "Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation," The New

Scholasticism, XXVI (1952), 49-79.
- "Logic and Mystery in the Quarta Via of St. Thomas," Thomist, XIX (1956),
22-58.
Bobik, Joseph. "The First Part of the Third Way," Philosophical Studies, XXVII
(1968). 142- 160.
202 BIBLIOGRAPHY
- "Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics," The

New Scholasticism, XXXVII (1963), 4II-430.
Claxke, W. Norris, "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or
Neoplatonism," The New Scholasticism, XXVI (1952), 167-194.
Connell, RichaId J. "Notes on Self-Motion," The New Scholasticism, XXXIX
(1965). 316-322 .
Dwyer, P. "Proving God," Philosophical Studies, XIV (1965), 7-29.
Esser, G. "Augustinian Proof for God's Existence and the Thomistic Fourth
Way," Proceedings 01 the A.C.P.A., XXVIII (1954). 194-207.
Faxicy, R. L. "Establishment of the Basic Principle of the Fifth Way," The
New Scholasticism, XXXI (1957). 18g-208.
Harrison, F. R. " ... Quinque Viae of Saint Thomas," Franciscan Studies, XXI
(1961), 80-93·
Kelly, Matthew J. "St. Thomas and the Meaning and Use of 'Substance' and
'Prime Matter,' " The New Scholasticism, XL (1966), 177-189.
Linehan, J. "Modem Science and the Proof from Motion of the Existence of a
Theistic God," Franciscan Studies, XIX (1959), I28-I4I.
Masiello, Ralph. "A note on essence and existence," The New Scholasticism, XLV
(197 1}·49 1-494·
O'Grady, Donald. "Esse and Metaphysics," The New Scholasticism, XXXIX
(1965). 61-77-
O'Reilly, Peter. "Knowledge of God in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of
Nature," Proceedings 01 the A.C.P.A., XXX (1956), II7-128.
INDEX
Accidents, imply substance,S, 9-19, 193- 103-104, IIO-III, 122-126, 16g--175,

194 18 5
manner of modifying, 14-15 John of St. Thomas, 120-122
mode of existence, 15-19, 194 Judgment, 36-37, 192
Act, and potency, 84 Knowledge, intellectual, 6, 33-49, 165,
Analogy, 140, 149-150, 154 167-169, 192
Aristotle, 88, 94--97, 107 sensory, 6, 28-33
Augustine, 147-148 Maimonides, 131-132
Avicenna, 35, 137 Motion, 6, 80-104, 121, 183, 188-189
Banes, II8-122 Necessity, 135-139, 183
Cajetan, II6-II8, 149-150, 190 Nicholas d'Autrecourt, 13
Causality, accidental, 65 Ockham, 13
efficient, 61, 105-126, 136, 152, 170, Participation, 144, 147-150, 154
182-185, 188, 192-193 Phantasm, 30
exterior, 181-183, 194 Plato, 147-148
final, 107, 157-180, 182-185 Possibles, 129-134, 183
formal, 9-27, 107 Privation, 21-22, 24-25, 27
intermediate, II6--II8, 188-191, 195 Propositions, self-evident, 45-48
material, 9-27, 107, 193-194 Reasoning, 37-49, 192- 193
proper, 75-79, 170 Scholasticism, decadent, 13
Chance, 157, 162-167, 185 Schopenhauer, 12-13
Change, 20--27, 193 Sense Objects, 28-33, 192
Descartes, 12 Singulars, 39
Distinction, between essence and ex- Substance, 9-19
istence, 58-61 Syllogism, 40-43, 186
Eleatics, 20 Sylvester of Ferrara, 89--94, 114, 119, 18g--
Inertia, 101-102 190
Infinite, multitude in act, 71-75, 123 Transcendentals, 140-156
series, 19, 26-27, 44, 66, 68, 71, 84-86, Universals, 30, 39

St. Thomas Aquinas On: "The Per Accidens Necessarily Implies The Per Se"

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

St. Thomas Aquinas On: "The Per Accidens Necessarily Implies The Per Se"

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

AQUINAS' PROOFS FOR GOD'S

DENNIS BONNETTE, Ph.D .

ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1303-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2380-1

The purpose of this study is to investigate the legitimacy of the

of St. Thomas - has this study been brought to completion. Whatever

CHAPTER I. THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE 9

INTRODUCTION: THE CAUSE OF PER ACCIDENS BEING 53

CHAPTER II. APROPOS OF THE QUINQUE VIAE IN GENERAL 69

1. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF THE INQUIRY

This book is partly historical and partly systematic. It is historical in

II. THE CENTRAL CONTEXTS TO BE ANALYZED

Since it would be an endless task to analyze each and every context in

Thus every substance which is caused by another is ultimately reduced

14 S.T., I, 77, I, ad. 5.

Commentary on the Physics 20 that any principle of change which is per

DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CREATURE-GOD

THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE

I. ACCIDENT IMPLIES 1 SUBSTANCE

As was noted in the introduction, St. Thomas explicitly holds that

As noted earlier,7 accident and substance, when placed in opposition

II. A SELF-EVIDENT PRINCIPLE

See above, pp. 4-5.

teaching of St. Thomas_ As De Raeymaeker observes in commenting on

10 Louis De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy 0/ Being, trans. Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer (St.

tion of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for

III. CLASSICAL MODERN OBJECTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT

It is in no way surprising that Schopenhauer should deny that the

accident is inherence[inesse]." 22 Nor can a substance to which is due

IV. HOW ACCIDENTS DEPEND ON SUBSTANCE

A distinction must be made here between the subject of an accident and

Hence, according to St. Thomas, one accident can inhere in another

v. A MORE PROFOUND REASON

The writings of St. Thomas reveal a conception of the intrinsic nature

has meaning only when signified in connection with substance:

Since" ... it is substance alone which subsists," it is understandable

Here St. Thomas nearly denies existence to an accident altogether, save

32 Cf. S.T., I, 90, 2.

THE DOMAIN OF CHANGE

I. THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE

St. Thomas unites with Aristotle in resolving this pseudo-dilemma by

At this juncture a difficulty appears to arise. For in one context St.

13 Cf. ibid., 14, n. 5.

While it seems that this argument of St. Thomas is sufficiently clear of

III. THE "PER ACCIDENS" IN CHANGE NECESSARILY

As noted above,19 in the context of lesson fourteen, St. Thomas posits

34 S.T., I, 75, I, ob. I.

THE DOMAIN OF KNOWLEDGE

Thus while the human cogitative faculty apprehends the individual

II. THE FIRST AND SECOND ACTS OF THE MIND

Whatever principle is metaphysically valid must be transcendent: it

31 Cf. ibid., n. 393. See above, p. 28.

intelligence of indivisible or incomplex things, as when it conceives what

Much the same situation obtains in St. Thomas' exposition on the

As Hoenen notes,45 in its own order, i.e., as composing or dividing quid-

III. THE THIRD ACT OF THE MIND

diate [propositions]. .. ," 51 An immediate proposition is defined as

This is the source of immediate universal principles which St. Thomas

lowing: Assume that some proposition is scientifically known, i.e., it is

IV. THE NECESSITY OF A "PER SE"

In the context of scientific demonstration there are several ways in

Thus, an infinite regress among per accidens known propositions implies

V. NATURE OF THE SCIENTIFIC SYLLOGISM

Thus, premises of a demonstration must be better known and known