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To cite this article: Tuhin K. Das & Ishita Datta Ray (2008) Monopolistic competitive market in
religion: a case study of Hindu temples, Applied Economics Letters, 15:1, 69-72
Download by: [Birla Institute of Technology and Science] Date: 02 April 2017, At: 21:23
Applied Economics Letters, 2008, 15, 69–72
The objective of this article is to examine, based on field survey, the market
behaviour of the Hindu temples in India. The cost and revenue functions
have been estimated for the Hindu temples, and it has been found that the
market of Hindu temples does not strictly follow the monopoly models.
The estimated average revenue curve has been observed to be slightly
negatively sloped. Moreover, like perfect competition here exist a large
number of small temples with easy entry and exit. The actions of any single
temple do not have significant impact on the other temples in the market.
Thus is resembles the monopolistic competition model rather than the pure
monopoly model.
11
9 AR
MR
Revenue, cost
7 AC
III. Estimation of Cost and Revenue MC
Functions 5
3
A number of devotees visit these temples each day. 1
They contribute money in these temples at the time of
−1
paying homage to the deities of the temples.
The money contributed by the devotees as homage −3
10
30
50
70
90
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
MR
AC
57 MC
temples increase. Moreover, congregation in a temple
creates environmental, and law and order problems
37 in the neighbourhood of the temples. Also temples
are occasionally built encroaching the land illegally.
17
All these factors culminate into some ‘under
−3 the table payments’, which ultimately increase the
10
30
50
70
90
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Frequency of visits (number of visitors) result, the profits earned from the temples decline in
Fig. 2. Revised revenue and cost functions of Hindu the long-run. Hence, it may be inferred that each
temples temple earns only the normal profit in the long-run.
72 T. K. Das and I. D. Ray
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